[00:05.670 --> 00:06.310] What? [00:08.530 --> 00:12.190] Oh, come on. That's okay. [00:12.670 --> 00:17.470] Okay, what I'd like to do is I'd like to get the slackers up here, up into this portion of the [00:19.990 --> 00:20.630] chairs. [00:20.930 --> 00:25.070] I have got some t-shirts that I'm going to give away. We're going to do a Q&A session and hopefully we're going to have a little bit [00:25.070 --> 00:28.570] of fun with this. Everybody looks bored. It's not going to be as bad as you think. [00:36.320 --> 00:38.500] Here is the mandatory [00:39.720 --> 00:42.800] personal anecdote. Okay, I'm in New Jersey right now. [00:43.360 --> 00:43.960] Yeah. [00:46.700 --> 00:50.580] So I'm on the plane, right? And we're getting ready to take off. [00:50.640 --> 00:54.200] And I've got two guys behind me. [00:54.200 --> 00:57.860] And I've got the cute girl next to him. And there's a guy over here that looks kind of goofy. [00:58.000 --> 01:02.320] And there's another girl next to him, right? So we're waiting to take off and I'm thinking [01:02.800 --> 01:06.800] these two don't know each other. These two don't know each other. We're headed to Vegas. [01:06.800 --> 01:09.000] There's all kinds of possibilities here, right? [01:09.880 --> 01:13.800] Then the dumb guy gets up, taps the girl on the shoulder and he says, [01:13.800 --> 01:17.980] Hey, would you mind moving over so that I can sit with my friend? [01:18.920 --> 01:22.560] That's when I knew that I had computer geeks behind me. [01:25.400 --> 01:26.360] True story. [01:26.360 --> 01:30.120] And somewhere I was hoping that there would be a guy here whose face would turn really red. [01:31.960 --> 01:34.560] Anyway, so they're behind me and they start talking geek speak. [01:34.560 --> 01:37.180] They start talking about XML and security and all this stuff, [01:37.180 --> 01:41.180] which past a certain point you get kind of tired of it. [01:42.520 --> 01:45.780] Then I got a surprise. These guys are all in their 20s. They're clean cut. [01:45.780 --> 01:49.720] They seem really driven by what they're doing, which is typical for DEF CON, I think. [01:51.500 --> 01:55.320] And then they're going through resumes and the one guy looks at a resume and he says, [01:55.320 --> 01:58.680] This guy's got a lot of technical knowledge. And the other guy looks and he says, [01:58.680 --> 02:02.420] Yeah, I interviewed him, but he doesn't have any business knowledge and he doesn't know [02:02.420 --> 02:05.580] what is of value and what is not. And that surprised me. [02:06.280 --> 02:10.260] That's what I look for now. I look for what things have value. I think we're in the midst of a change [02:10.260 --> 02:15.080] in the industry where we focus on what is of value [02:15.080 --> 02:18.280] rather than the mechanics of building things. [02:18.640 --> 02:22.600] So that's what our focus is going to be. It's going to be on keeping people employed through the industry [02:22.600 --> 02:26.300] because I personally don't believe that the shakeout is over yet. [02:28.620 --> 02:30.480] This is my other personal anecdote, [02:30.480 --> 02:34.620] which I decided was too egotistical. Why should you listen to me? [02:34.660 --> 02:37.180] I don't have a black t-shirt on, so maybe you shouldn't. [02:39.360 --> 02:43.300] What we're going to do, we're going to go through and we're going to hit three basic areas. [02:43.300 --> 02:46.500] We're going to lay out a couple simple business concepts, which are very [02:46.500 --> 02:50.140] common in MBA programs. They're common in [02:50.140 --> 02:54.740] large companies. We're going to lay those theories out. [02:54.740 --> 02:57.780] We're going to drive them down into a technical implementation [02:58.340 --> 03:01.640] that gives us concrete results that we can make decisions from. [03:01.920 --> 03:05.840] And then towards the end of the presentation, what I'm going to do is I'm going to throw out some strategic concepts [03:05.840 --> 03:08.420] to you, which are going to be [03:10.040 --> 03:14.000] a little bit radical, I think. We'll test it. We'll see. This is DEF CON. Maybe it won't be radical. [03:14.000 --> 03:17.800] Maybe nobody will care. But there's some ideas that I think that people can play around with and they [03:17.800 --> 03:21.680] might be able to turn them into additional concrete implementations [03:22.320 --> 03:24.020] in companies, things like that. [03:25.480 --> 03:27.720] Okay. Everybody watches the news, right? [03:27.720 --> 03:32.040] I took this a month ago and this is already out of date because there's already like a dozen more I could add on here. [03:32.200 --> 03:35.340] Layouts are still going on. People are still being laid off left and right. [03:35.880 --> 03:39.820] The crash is not over yet. Historically, industrial [03:39.820 --> 03:43.340] revolutions like this have seen a shakeout of approximately [03:43.340 --> 03:47.960] 30% of the peak population of the leading technologies. [03:47.960 --> 03:51.800] What we've seen in IT right now is about a 15% shakeout. So personally, I think [03:51.800 --> 03:55.820] that you're looking at another wave that will be equivalent to [03:55.820 --> 03:59.780] the last four years. How many people here have been laid off or out of work in the last [03:59.780 --> 04:03.900] five years? Yeah. And you know what? For every hand [04:03.900 --> 04:08.360] that's here, there's a guy that isn't here because he's not in the industry anymore. He got washed out. [04:08.360 --> 04:11.800] My goal here is to give people a little bit of knowledge [04:12.360 --> 04:15.960] so that they can make decisions that will keep them employed or [04:16.360 --> 04:19.840] it will let them make a decision to leave the industry now before they waste a lot [04:19.840 --> 04:23.820] of time on it. So either way, if that's the outcome [04:23.820 --> 04:25.480] here, I'm happy with either outcome. [04:27.900 --> 04:31.860] The time and effort that you put out to learn things is finite. If you learn something that has [04:31.860 --> 04:35.880] no value, you're fucked. Right? Your time is gone. You can't [04:35.880 --> 04:38.380] get it back. People are not going to pay you for it. [04:39.940 --> 04:43.760] Now, the skew here in DEF CON is a little bit different because you guys are in the security [04:43.760 --> 04:47.840] industry and I think you've got a substantially better chance [04:47.840 --> 04:50.600] of staying employed over the next four or five years than business. [04:50.600 --> 04:53.860] If you're in business software, I think you're going to be in trouble. [04:55.720 --> 04:59.800] IT market changes constantly, everybody knows that. What we're going to look at is we're going to try and focus [04:59.800 --> 05:02.680] on what kind of skills that we should be learning to stay employed. [05:05.380 --> 05:07.260] How many people know what a meme is? [05:09.080 --> 05:11.720] That's good. The first question I got asked when I walked in was, what is a meme? [05:11.720 --> 05:15.560] And I thought, oh my god, I should have put that up. A meme is an idea [05:16.300 --> 05:19.580] it's a mind virus that passes through a population. [05:19.960 --> 05:23.540] And typically, if you want to be completely theoretical about it, [05:23.540 --> 05:27.640] it starts with a single person, that person talks to two more, those two people talk to [05:27.640 --> 05:31.520] four people, four people talk to eight, so it's typically an exponential function. [05:32.880 --> 05:35.560] And it looks like an exponential function, a [05:36.260 --> 05:40.440] hyperbolic curve, until it reaches about the 50% mark of reaching [05:40.440 --> 05:43.100] the entire population and then, because you're getting people that already know it, [05:43.100 --> 05:46.740] you're talking to people, oh yeah, I already know that, I already know that, it starts tapering down and you get [05:47.340 --> 05:49.720] a drop-off as you reach market saturation. [05:50.580 --> 05:54.760] And that's typically known as an S-curve. How many people know the concept of an S-curve? [05:56.120 --> 05:59.460] Okay, that's good. Here's a picture of it. [05:59.580 --> 06:03.360] I start with a single point, it goes through a rapid run-up, [06:03.360 --> 06:06.400] it reaches the 50% point, and then I reach market saturation. [06:08.600 --> 06:11.200] This is a fundamental concept that you can apply in a lot [06:11.200 --> 06:16.040] of different situations, a surprising number. And it's simple, it's a simple concept. [06:17.940 --> 06:19.620] Ultimately, this is our goal. [06:20.120 --> 06:23.220] We want to eliminate getting into new [06:23.220 --> 06:27.280] technologies when they're first introduced because there's a very high failure rate. I don't want to be [06:27.280 --> 06:31.540] here. I don't want to be in the high-risk area. I don't want to be in the low-reward [06:31.540 --> 06:35.260] area because that's a technology on its way out and I can't make any money in it. [06:35.680 --> 06:37.820] What I want to do is I want to identify [06:37.820 --> 06:41.900] an area as it's ramping up, but I want to get it before [06:41.900 --> 06:45.900] it's at the 50% mark so I can make the most money off of it. Right here, [06:46.480 --> 06:49.900] I can make a decision that, yeah, this is probably going to stick around, this is probably going to [06:49.900 --> 06:53.980] be a viable technology, and I can ride the highest part [06:53.980 --> 06:57.720] of the wave off, which is the optimum profit point because other people are not paying [06:57.720 --> 07:02.040] attention and you're already in the market to learn these things. You're already in the market to sell your services [07:02.040 --> 07:05.660] in this. This is a simple concept. Does everybody grasp this? [07:05.660 --> 07:09.140] Can I get a show of hands where everybody thinks that this is... do you think it's important? [07:16.400 --> 07:18.540] The reason I care about an S-curve is it [07:18.540 --> 07:21.220] has predictive power into the future. [07:22.300 --> 07:26.360] How many people here know calculus? Oh, there you go. [07:26.360 --> 07:30.540] So you know this already. As this is ramping up, my rate of [07:30.540 --> 07:34.700] change is constantly increasing and I can measure that by doing empirical analysis [07:34.700 --> 07:38.460] on certain things. And I can see that the saturation is... [07:38.460 --> 07:42.140] or the propagation of the mean is rising. [07:42.180 --> 07:46.000] Once it reaches the 50% mark, where roughly I have 50% of the people know [07:46.460 --> 07:50.260] the mean's already propagated, it changes, I reach the inflection point [07:50.260 --> 07:54.420] and the rate of change begins decreasing. So if I can measure the rate of change and see that it's [07:54.420 --> 07:58.060] increasing, I know that I'm still on the pre-50% mark. [07:58.120 --> 08:02.520] Afterwards, I know that I'm after the 50% mark. So this is really what we look for. [08:02.520 --> 08:04.160] We look for a rate of change. [08:06.240 --> 08:08.900] Okay, peak oil. How many know about peak oil? [08:10.040 --> 08:12.120] Oh my god, now I'm [08:12.120 --> 08:12.940] stunned. [08:15.460 --> 08:19.940] Just as a quick overview, peak oil is the idea that [08:19.940 --> 08:23.940] oil resources are finite in the world. And there was a guy named Hubert [08:23.940 --> 08:27.540] which, in the 50s, he did basically an S-curve analysis [08:28.140 --> 08:31.900] at the rate at which they were finding oil drilling holes, you know, that they were making [08:31.900 --> 08:36.600] discoveries. And he graphed it down on a chart and he was able to see that in the United States [08:36.600 --> 08:39.760] that peak oil production would occur around 1970. And he [08:39.760 --> 08:43.520] was right within about a year. And he predicted it 15 to 20 years before it happened. [08:43.520 --> 08:47.260] This is all numbers off the top of my head, so I didn't actually expect to talk about this. [08:49.920 --> 08:51.880] What is probably very likely [08:51.880 --> 08:55.440] going to happen over the next few years is you're going to see peak oil occur worldwide. [08:55.740 --> 08:59.740] There's a lot of talk about it. If you do a search on the internet, Google peak oil, you'll get all kinds of [08:59.740 --> 09:04.760] information. Environmentalists have been talking about it for a long time. [09:05.160 --> 09:07.740] I'm not an environmentalist, but I understand the concept [09:07.740 --> 09:12.280] of how Hubert did the analysis, and I personally believe that this is very likely to happen. [09:12.280 --> 09:15.780] I think you're going to see peak oil happen within the next five years. And that's why [09:15.780 --> 09:19.600] you see oil prices being driven up. It's because there's a lot of guys like me sitting at companies like [09:19.600 --> 09:23.660] J.P. Morgan, and they're doing the same analysis, and they're saying, peak oil [09:23.660 --> 09:28.040] is probably going to happen. We need to get our money into oil now and make money on that. [09:28.880 --> 09:32.360] Oil prices at $60, right? Everybody thinks it's speculation? [09:32.360 --> 09:36.420] I don't think so. This is why you care. [09:36.420 --> 09:39.300] You can make money. Or you can avoid losing money, which [09:39.940 --> 09:42.180] depends on if you're risk averse or not. [09:44.360 --> 09:47.800] This is another example of an S-curve. How many people know Harry Dent? [09:48.520 --> 09:51.840] Yeah, that's not surprising. Harry Dent wrote a book in 1989 [09:51.840 --> 09:55.860] which was called The Great Boom Ahead, where he predicted that there would be a rapid [09:55.860 --> 09:59.940] IT boom, which would essentially look like an S-curve, and that's exactly what we saw [09:59.940 --> 10:03.900] from 1990 to 2000. We saw the entire information [10:03.900 --> 10:08.020] technology sector boom hugely beyond what anybody imagined, except Harry Dent [10:08.020 --> 10:12.140] did predict it. I don't buy a lot of his other theories. I do believe he was right. [10:12.140 --> 10:15.780] I mean, you can't deny that he was right about what he claimed. He made a second prediction [10:15.780 --> 10:19.860] in his book, which is that there will be [10:20.040 --> 10:23.840] a subsequent wave of S-curve technologies, which will build upon the [10:23.840 --> 10:28.120] infrastructure that was created in the first S-curve. That's where we're at right now. [10:29.100 --> 10:31.940] There's an infrastructure in place. There's networks everywhere. There's wireless [10:31.940 --> 10:36.080] networks, there's standards, there's TCP, IP, all the acronyms, [10:36.080 --> 10:39.940] all those things. It's too hard for me to remember. But ultimately, if you [10:39.940 --> 10:43.380] want to be looking where you should be, you don't want to be [10:44.840 --> 10:47.760] here anymore. This is foundational [10:48.280 --> 10:51.880] stuff that's in place, that's standard. It's not interesting to work on. It's [10:51.880 --> 10:56.080] maintenance work, and it doesn't pay a lot of money, and that's why you see a lot of things being outsourced now. [10:56.080 --> 10:59.700] It's stuff that's duplicatable, that we can send somewhere where there's a different kind of culture [10:59.700 --> 11:03.600] that adapts to those kind of things. What you want to be looking for is [11:03.600 --> 11:07.860] technologies that build on the existing infrastructure that was [11:07.860 --> 11:09.660] created in the last ten years. [11:11.560 --> 11:15.860] And I goofed up because I was going to give away a t-shirt if somebody told me what peak oil [11:15.860 --> 11:17.060] was and I blew it. [11:20.120 --> 11:21.860] Okay, MemMiner. [11:21.960 --> 11:25.200] This is a little tool that I made, which I've been doing this for about [11:25.200 --> 11:29.300] thirteen years, and basically it assumes that a frequency count, a word count [11:29.300 --> 11:33.400] on the internet is roughly equivalent to an S-curve growth of that technology. [11:33.460 --> 11:37.100] That's a big assumption, I know. And how many math people do we have in here? [11:37.700 --> 11:41.440] Oh, thank God. I don't have to worry about all the criticism. [11:42.160 --> 11:45.060] You get a ton of criticism. From my standpoint, I'm very pragmatic. [11:45.060 --> 11:49.100] I don't want to sit down and do a lot of analysis about probability and this and that. I just want a tool, [11:49.200 --> 11:52.900] a rough cut tool that will give me a way to make a decision quickly and easily without having [11:52.900 --> 11:56.860] to do a lot of analysis and a lot of guessing and things like that. And that's what this does. [11:57.800 --> 12:00.240] In my mind, I think of it as a data miner [12:02.420 --> 12:05.200] that anyone can implement and use in a small business [12:05.800 --> 12:09.080] and compete pretty well against large [12:09.080 --> 12:13.260] companies that have substantially more resources and better ideology, [12:13.260 --> 12:17.760] better methodology of how they do predictions. [12:21.520 --> 12:22.980] It's a simple little program. [12:26.420 --> 12:30.280] I'll go through and do it. I don't consider... does anybody want to see a demo of it? [12:30.280 --> 12:32.000] Do you need to see a Java code of it? [12:34.500 --> 12:37.920] How about if I do it at the end? I don't want to break out of this thing right now. [12:38.260 --> 12:42.140] But to me, it's really simple. It really is. It took me about 4 or 5 days to write it. [12:42.140 --> 12:44.620] Anybody could write it with basic programming knowledge. [12:44.940 --> 12:50.140] The key to it is the business concepts behind it and the application of those things. [12:52.320 --> 12:54.280] Okay, here's an example of one of the first [12:54.280 --> 12:58.540] graphs that I ran after I built the tool. This is the first T-Cert question. [12:58.900 --> 13:02.620] Can anybody tell me what this pattern is? What's driving this pattern? [13:06.820 --> 13:10.060] That's true. Okay, this is a graph made off of the keyword [13:10.060 --> 13:12.940] of work, but can you tell me why it's so rhythmic? [13:14.560 --> 13:18.420] Exactly. People don't talk about work on Saturday and Sunday. [13:18.760 --> 13:22.520] That's exactly right. So, T-Cert. I don't want to take those home. [13:24.900 --> 13:25.840] Saturday, Sunday. [13:25.840 --> 13:29.820] Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. And look, Wednesday really is the hump day. [13:33.760 --> 13:34.360] This is [13:34.620 --> 13:38.140] a small example that there really is data that you can extract out of the [13:38.140 --> 13:42.200] Internet. I use Deja News right now because Deja News, I've used it for several years [13:42.200 --> 13:46.240] because it gives me a time history and I don't have to previously know about [13:46.380 --> 13:50.160] a concept. You know, Deja News is being recorded all the [13:50.160 --> 13:54.100] time. So, let's say RSS comes along. And I'm not paying attention. And a year later I [13:54.100 --> 13:58.040] decide, oh, I should have been paying attention. I want to see what RSS is doing. Deja News [13:58.040 --> 14:01.920] has a history that I can go back and I can backfill it. You can see this graph. The date here is [14:01.920 --> 14:04.740] April 2002. I ran this graph two years ago. [14:05.960 --> 14:08.840] Okay, I was able to backfill it and figure out what was [14:08.840 --> 14:12.840] going on. The search engines, I have done pieces to [14:12.840 --> 14:16.890] do the same kind of analysis against the search engines, against Google, against Yahoo, [14:18.680 --> 14:20.680] a couple of the others, but they're very [14:20.680 --> 14:24.740] highly skewed to the present. You can recreate, you can [14:24.740 --> 14:28.760] make a crude approximation of the same data that you can get out of Deja News, but [14:28.760 --> 14:33.160] it's much less granular and it's just, you've got to do manipulations, it's really goofy. [14:33.160 --> 14:37.240] The search engines are very highly skewed to the present. You can't [14:37.240 --> 14:41.400] backfill data without doing a lot of analysis for more than 90 days or maybe a [14:41.400 --> 14:45.500] year. That's another key, using Deja News. Using some [14:45.500 --> 14:49.320] kind of pre-recorded data that had no knowledge of the fact [14:49.460 --> 14:53.240] that a trend was going on. Here's Easter Bunny, [14:53.240 --> 14:57.420] same thing. You can see every year, along comes Easter, people talk about [14:57.420 --> 15:01.180] Easter Bunny. The data is there waiting to be pulled out, you just have to know how [15:01.180 --> 15:05.060] to do it. Here's Comdex. Now, Comdex [15:05.060 --> 15:09.120] got cancelled in 2004, right? Actually, this isn't my new graph. [15:10.180 --> 15:12.920] Comdex got cancelled right here. If I had had this graph [15:12.920 --> 15:17.680] last year, like I did, is there any doubt in my mind that Comdex is going to get cancelled? [15:18.260 --> 15:21.060] There's not a lot of doubt. It was a predictable event. [15:21.080 --> 15:25.020] The fact that it got cancelled in 2005, same thing, a predictable event. You could have made [15:25.020 --> 15:28.440] money on it if you'd gone to the bookies and said, I think Comdex is going to be cancelled. [15:29.640 --> 15:32.600] Very clear trend, starting right here. [15:33.180 --> 15:36.400] Each successive high is lower. Does anybody do technical analysis [15:36.400 --> 15:40.660] of stocks? This is a very similar analogy. [15:40.700 --> 15:45.220] Each successive high never reaches the previous high, so we're clearly in a downtrend. [15:48.540 --> 15:52.040] Now, here's a graph. I went back later. You know, I'm not... [15:52.040 --> 15:56.640] I don't care about money a lot, but I wish I had. [15:57.060 --> 16:00.760] I went back and I retrofitted stuff on here, and I did keyword searches [16:00.760 --> 16:04.720] against stock prices of the bubble. The green is the stock [16:04.720 --> 16:08.420] price of Siebel. The blue is the frequency word count out of [16:08.420 --> 16:12.080] Deje News at the same time period, and what I did was I matched the amplitudes. [16:12.820 --> 16:16.620] You can see there's a... for Siebel, there's a very tight correlation. I mean, this is like a 90... [16:16.620 --> 16:19.740] you know, for the statistical people, this is close to a 90% correlation. [16:20.240 --> 16:23.980] Now, in this particular example, the word count does lag [16:25.000 --> 16:28.020] the actuality, so maybe it doesn't help you so much, but that's [16:28.020 --> 16:32.160] not always the case. Let's take a look at Palladium. Now, this is the one I really [16:32.160 --> 16:36.080] wish I had done in 2000. You can see [16:36.080 --> 16:39.460] clearly that there are rumors about Palladium's price spiking [16:41.040 --> 16:44.040] almost two years before it actually happens. [16:45.280 --> 16:48.000] Okay, right here. Although, if you really want to get technical and [16:48.000 --> 16:51.920] drive it back, you can say that maybe this was the peak, but that's still a year. A year [16:51.920 --> 16:55.420] before Platinum peaked, it was... you could have figured out [16:55.420 --> 16:59.940] that there was a good chance that Platinum was going to spike. And also, if you take a look, [16:59.940 --> 17:03.720] that when Platinum collapses, the keyword told you that it was going to collapse [17:03.720 --> 17:07.860] before it happened almost a year ahead of time. That's money. [17:07.860 --> 17:12.120] There's money right there. There are large companies that are doing all this analysis right now. [17:12.120 --> 17:15.820] The fact that they're doing this analysis... okay, you know, there's guys [17:15.820 --> 17:19.640] like me floating all around. I'm not really a [17:19.640 --> 17:23.660] large corporation guy, but there are guys in those corporations right now that are doing this and they understand [17:23.660 --> 17:27.420] all these concepts. And they've been piling onto the internet over the last five years [17:27.420 --> 17:31.440] and what they've done is they've cut the margin of where you can make the money. [17:31.560 --> 17:35.660] The latency is shrinking over the last four or five years. This is a very high latency [17:35.880 --> 17:39.560] a year. That's amazing to me. If you look at some of the later graphs that [17:39.560 --> 17:43.700] happened two or three years later, the latency has shrunk to like three months, [17:43.700 --> 17:46.400] four months, things like that. Sometimes it's down to like a month. [17:49.600 --> 17:50.680] Here's another example. [17:50.680 --> 17:54.340] Applied materials. There was a latency. Applied materials was clearly [17:54.340 --> 17:58.840] in an uptrend years before the price spike. [17:58.840 --> 18:02.200] And the keyword count told you that it was collapsing [18:02.200 --> 18:05.460] before the stock collapsed by about a quarter. [18:06.020 --> 18:10.280] And if you look right here, you can see that now the latency has disappeared out of it. There's a latency here [18:10.280 --> 18:13.980] in 2000 and as we go along, right about here, now there's no latency anymore. [18:31.150 --> 18:32.650] That's an excellent question. [18:32.650 --> 18:36.790] I've got a couple of other graphs that will show that it's very hard to determine and that's where there really is. [18:37.010 --> 18:39.330] There is no money to be made in mechanical [18:43.070 --> 18:44.510] skills. You can't make money [18:44.510 --> 18:48.190] in those things, especially in a global market. You have to move into something [18:48.190 --> 18:52.090] that requires some kind of artistic ability. And this particular [18:52.930 --> 18:56.030] mechanism right here does require a fair amount of interpretation [18:56.030 --> 19:00.290] and analysis that sometimes you're wrong. I mean, it's just the way it goes. [19:00.710 --> 19:04.270] In the case of Palladium, there were rumors flowing out of Russia [19:04.270 --> 19:08.110] that they were having problems and that they weren't going to make deliveries. [19:08.170 --> 19:12.070] So in that case, it was the lack of metal that drove the price spike. [19:12.530 --> 19:16.070] But you're absolutely right. There are cases where the rumor precedes [19:16.070 --> 19:19.750] and sometimes, you know, I'm not so sure that there isn't guys at some of the companies that are actually spiking [19:19.750 --> 19:24.230] the internet now in order to create an artificial demand in order to [19:24.770 --> 19:28.030] offload their stock or whatever it is. So that's something you've got to be careful of. [19:31.780 --> 19:33.820] I didn't run Enron. I didn't have any [19:33.820 --> 19:37.680] interest in Enron. I just looked at the dot com boom. But you're more than happy [19:37.680 --> 19:40.380] if you want the source code, you're more than happy to run Enron. [19:44.400 --> 19:47.220] Okay, JBuilder. How many programmers do we have in here? [19:48.420 --> 19:50.860] How many JBuilder programmers? [19:51.360 --> 19:55.020] Ah, interesting. You guys are all assembly, low level, right? [19:55.580 --> 19:58.000] What kind of languages do we have in here? [19:59.880 --> 20:01.820] Well, JBuilder, that's okay. [20:07.960 --> 20:09.920] This is a graph of JBuilder [20:09.920 --> 20:14.180] and it basically, you can see an S curve right here. The inflection point is roughly [20:14.180 --> 20:18.060] right here. And typically what you see, at the inflection point, your rate of change is [20:18.060 --> 20:22.200] infinite. As you're switching over from a rising to a falling rate of change, [20:22.200 --> 20:26.220] there's a spike there of infinite demand, theoretically. And you can see it reflected [20:26.220 --> 20:30.280] in this graph very clearly. There's a huge spike right at the time that [20:30.280 --> 20:34.380] JBuilder is undergoing its inflection point. And by about this time [20:34.380 --> 20:37.880] right here, you should have been out of JBuilder and you should have been doing something else. Although [20:37.880 --> 20:42.220] it's only been in the past year that it finally came to fruition. So there was a [20:42.220 --> 20:46.420] lag time of about two years before JBuilder finally died off and [20:46.420 --> 20:53.860] Borland had to admit it. [20:53.860 --> 20:57.760] No, you have to have a keyword [20:57.760 --> 20:59.020] that has uniqueness. [21:04.700 --> 21:08.960] Well, you have to do qualifiers. And I've got a couple other graphs in there further on [21:08.960 --> 21:12.920] where you'll see that, like ColdFusion. ColdFusion is a perfect one. I ran a graph on ColdFusion [21:12.920 --> 21:17.260] because I saw an article on it and there is some evidence to support that ColdFusion is real. [21:17.260 --> 21:20.740] So I ran a graph and I got this really strange graph that didn't make any sense to me. [21:20.880 --> 21:25.060] And about three days later, after I published it, I found out, oh right, it's [21:25.060 --> 21:29.240] ColdFusion the programming language. So it kind of made me look like a fool. [21:30.080 --> 21:33.240] So what I did for that graph was I added a new qualifier, ColdFusion [21:33.240 --> 21:36.980] Physics. And that gave me a much better picture of what was really going on. [21:36.980 --> 21:41.040] So yeah, you've got to be careful about keyword picks, which I have a little bit later on. [21:41.760 --> 21:45.460] Delphi. Now this is a real life example of something that I did in my own life. [21:45.520 --> 21:49.280] I got into Delphi around 95. I did programming [21:49.280 --> 21:53.360] on it. I wrote the wave up. And about 98 it was clear to me that this [21:53.360 --> 21:57.360] peak was over and I needed to do something different. So right in here I started [21:57.360 --> 22:01.340] learning Java. I went to Sun's conference. I started learning a whole [22:01.340 --> 22:05.140] different ideology and methodology of the way I did programs. And I switched over here and I missed [22:05.140 --> 22:09.360] the crash. There's a lot of Delphi programmers. Delphi is an extremely good language. I like [22:09.360 --> 22:12.920] it a lot. It's the best thing I ever used. I can't make money in it anymore. [22:13.180 --> 22:16.520] And there's a lot of ex-Delphi programmers that found that out the hard way. [22:19.480 --> 22:21.020] This, for some reason, [22:21.600 --> 22:25.760] I put this up and this is like the single most red graph on my site. [22:27.080 --> 22:29.860] The guys are just fanatical about scripting languages. [22:29.860 --> 22:33.560] It's very strange. Here you see [22:34.580 --> 22:38.160] Perl. Very clear rise. Very clear fall. [22:38.400 --> 22:42.360] Should have got out of it right around here. Maybe. Maybe should have. [22:43.060 --> 22:45.820] PHP. Same thing. Rises. Inflection [22:45.820 --> 22:49.800] points are roughly out here. It's not a true S-curve. It's not identical. But in real life that never [22:49.800 --> 22:53.760] happens because you get all kinds of variations. You just have to kind of guesstimate between peak and fall. [22:53.760 --> 22:56.800] And then Python and Ruby. [22:56.860 --> 23:01.740] Python, this doesn't show enough detail, but Python to me [23:01.740 --> 23:05.760] is the choice out of these four. If you were going to have to do a project right now [23:05.760 --> 23:09.220] I would choose Python. Assuming I could fit it into [23:09.760 --> 23:14.520] the requirements of the project. I mean you always get languages that fit a certain set of things. [23:14.580 --> 23:17.120] And you can't just choose a language in order to boost [23:17.740 --> 23:20.900] your employability. You have to look at what you're doing for the customer. [23:20.900 --> 23:24.680] There's also a very interesting thing that happens in the past year [23:24.680 --> 23:29.140] in that all scripting languages have suddenly got a high level of interest [23:29.140 --> 23:32.180] out of nowhere. And I don't know what drives that. [23:35.420 --> 23:37.740] YMAX. How many people know YMAX? [23:38.300 --> 23:41.000] YMAX is going to be big. I believe YMAX is going to [23:41.000 --> 23:44.380] be a big technology. YMAX basically replaces 802.11b [23:44.900 --> 23:46.880] with the same [23:49.840 --> 23:52.920] imagine 802.11b with a 30 mile range. [23:53.560 --> 23:55.580] And also I think, you guys can correct me [23:55.580 --> 23:58.840] I'm far from perfect. You can correct me if I'm wrong. [23:58.840 --> 24:03.260] But I believe that YMAX already has permission to be able to tap into cell phone [24:03.260 --> 24:06.920] networks. So you're going to see a huge amount of grassroots competition [24:06.920 --> 24:11.300] against the major wireless carriers from people setting up their own shops [24:11.300 --> 24:15.440] in YMAX. I can easily imagine someone getting a few million dollars [24:15.440 --> 24:19.540] of capital, dumping a few YMAX things in the center of maybe 30 cities [24:19.540 --> 24:22.920] and just cutting the hell out of Verizon's market or [24:23.260 --> 24:24.240] Singular's market. [24:27.900 --> 24:29.760] Blogs. This is an interesting one. [24:31.100 --> 24:32.420] This is a little bit more [24:35.720 --> 24:38.260] This is a question. This is a t-shirt question. [24:39.420 --> 24:43.160] You can see pretty clearly here. This is the moving average. You got to do a moving average. [24:43.160 --> 24:46.160] There's too many spikes that happen on the internet. Too many weird nuances. [24:46.420 --> 24:50.920] But basically by looking at a moving average you can get an idea. And we can see that blogs are clearly rising since 2002. [24:50.920 --> 24:55.020] And it was probably a good technology to get on around January 2004, which a lot of people did. [24:56.720 --> 24:59.040] Did anybody read the article that was in [24:59.040 --> 25:02.920] USA Today or one of the major papers about two months ago where they said that [25:02.920 --> 25:06.860] 27% of the public does not know what a blog is. Did anybody read that? [25:08.480 --> 25:11.280] Now tie those two numbers together. I have an inflection graph [25:11.280 --> 25:15.180] here, right? It hasn't reached a peak point yet. I know it's an [25:15.180 --> 25:19.260] exponential function and I know that 27% of the people have not [25:19.260 --> 25:23.600] been exposed to the meme yet. What kind of [25:24.360 --> 25:27.840] thing can I derive from that? I can make a prediction from that. [25:28.460 --> 25:31.420] T-shirt. Anybody that can tell me gets a t-shirt. Anybody that makes a good [25:31.420 --> 25:32.900] guess gets a t-shirt. [25:41.060 --> 25:47.760] Can you give me more detail? I don't want to go down the calculus path. [25:47.760 --> 25:51.780] It's too much stuff for me. I took what I needed from it and I threw the rest away. [25:52.420 --> 25:55.320] Anybody else? Down there. Black. Black shirt. [26:00.280 --> 26:02.420] It's going to peak within the next year. [26:02.540 --> 26:03.260] T-shirt. [26:20.770 --> 26:22.450] It's not going to be a big money maker. [26:22.530 --> 26:26.750] What you'll see is you'll see a lot of hysteria in the media over the next year [26:26.750 --> 26:30.650] and then that'll be it. It'll have peaked and it'll be ramping down. That doesn't mean you can't make [26:30.650 --> 26:34.770] money in it. All it is is an indicator. There are technologies that have peaked that you can [26:34.770 --> 26:38.810] still make money in. That's one thing I don't want to tell you [26:38.810 --> 26:42.350] is that if it goes through an inflection point and it peaks that you can't make money in anymore [26:42.350 --> 26:46.610] it's a warning indicator that tells you you need to look at the surroundings [26:46.610 --> 26:49.950] you need to look at your competition, you need to look at your skill set and make [26:51.470 --> 26:54.210] a knowledgeable decision about what you're going to do. You can make money in post [26:54.850 --> 26:58.430] like J2EE. I don't know, probably nobody here has read my site. I put a [26:58.430 --> 27:02.650] controversial article out about 3 months ago [27:02.650 --> 27:06.490] that got a lot of Java people riled up which basically says that J2EE is about to go [27:06.490 --> 27:10.550] through its inflection point. That it's peaked out as a technology. I have no [27:11.210 --> 27:14.350] interest in moving on to another technology right now because I still make money in it [27:14.350 --> 27:18.190] and I'll probably ride it for 3 or 4 more years but if I were an entry level [27:18.190 --> 27:22.350] person getting into the market I don't think I would choose J2EE because [27:22.350 --> 27:26.410] there's already going to be a bunch of guys like me that have experience and knowledge that are going to compete against you [27:26.410 --> 27:29.030] and the market isn't expanding anymore. [27:31.630 --> 27:34.050] Now, it's time for the half time here. [27:40.040 --> 27:42.640] How many people think so far that this [27:42.640 --> 27:46.520] has been more interesting than you thought it would be? Oh, that's so [27:46.520 --> 27:50.660] gratifying. I mean, I kind of took this [27:50.660 --> 27:54.600] as a lark. I sent in like a basic program, you know, basic speech [27:55.020 --> 27:57.800] People that have looked on the disk realize now that it's like about [27:57.800 --> 28:01.860] one third of what I'm doing right now. It was like a perfunctory effort and then I decided [28:02.360 --> 28:05.140] a couple days ago, well, I really need to do something serious on this. [28:05.540 --> 28:09.820] So that's nice. That's what was my aim was to get, to have people interested and have some kind of [28:09.820 --> 28:11.340] value out of this presentation. [28:13.300 --> 28:17.820] Wi-Fi phone. How many people know Wi-Fi phone? That's another big one. [28:17.820 --> 28:19.720] It's going to be tied into WiMAX, I think. [28:22.080 --> 28:25.840] Okay, so we already talked about this. Inflection point tends to be at about the 50% saturation [28:25.840 --> 28:29.640] point. That's not always true. That's just a rule of thumb. It's very easy to get [28:30.180 --> 28:33.500] and we'll look at another graph here later on where you get a quick ramp up [28:33.500 --> 28:37.660] but the infrastructure is not in place to support a technology. There's two technologies [28:38.940 --> 28:42.120] that tried to go through inflection points. They tried to go through a [28:42.120 --> 28:46.480] growth phase and the support just wasn't there. One of them is Bluetooth. I was here two years ago [28:46.480 --> 28:49.820] and there was a lot of Bluetooth fervor. There was a lot of Bluetooth hacking, things like that. [28:49.820 --> 28:53.920] So I went back and I did a graph on Bluetooth and I was surprised to see that Bluetooth [28:53.920 --> 28:57.960] tried to take off three or four years ago and it died out because there wasn't [28:58.880 --> 29:01.980] a critical mass to make it go. And then within the last two years [29:01.980 --> 29:05.980] it's picked up a lot. So a lot of times you'll see new technologies sputter and try and [29:05.980 --> 29:09.740] start and then they'll die out because there's some missing factor there. Service-oriented [29:09.740 --> 29:14.020] architecture is another one. It came out around 2000, 2001, the buzzword, [29:14.020 --> 29:17.360] all that, and it tried to take off and it died. But for the past [29:18.200 --> 29:21.580] 17 or 18 months it's been rising steadily. It's now something that [29:22.360 --> 29:25.400] organizations either understand and feel that they need or [29:25.400 --> 29:28.280] there's some critical component there that makes it viable. [29:30.240 --> 29:33.400] We already did the blogging. RSS feeds. [29:33.700 --> 29:37.440] This is very highly correlated to blogs. Same difference. By doing a search on [29:37.440 --> 29:41.540] and you can see here I used a qualifier. RSS RDF. I don't know if [29:41.540 --> 29:45.960] everybody can see that or not. People in back probably can't. So I used a [29:45.960 --> 29:48.420] qualified word here because RSS wasn't a good search. [29:51.300 --> 29:52.420] And now we're going to talk about the [29:52.420 --> 29:56.360] problems with this. The biggest single problem that I run into is that I'm part [29:56.360 --> 30:00.140] of the meme. How do I know to search for something? How do I know about RSS? [30:00.140 --> 30:04.360] I read it in an article. I'm part of the meme propagation and statistically [30:04.360 --> 30:08.860] I will learn about the meme at about the 50% mark which means I can't make any money in it. [30:10.660 --> 30:12.380] So I've got to figure out a way to [30:12.380 --> 30:16.320] track the meme before it gets to the 50% mark. I don't want to be like everybody [30:16.320 --> 30:20.420] else and be the average. So that's one problem [30:20.420 --> 30:24.620] with the methodology I'm using right now. What it requires is me to be reading articles all the time [30:25.460 --> 30:28.360] I have to spend a lot of time trying to be at the forefront of technology [30:28.360 --> 30:32.280] when there are easier ways to do it. It is subject to manipulation although [30:32.280 --> 30:36.400] not anywhere near as much as you would think. When you do a search off Deja News you are doing a search [30:36.400 --> 30:40.260] against hundreds of thousands and millions of people. It's very [30:40.260 --> 30:44.900] hard to inject a meme and create an artificial result. I know because I've tried. [30:45.420 --> 30:48.900] It's not statistically rigorous. There's a lot of criticism from [30:48.900 --> 30:52.980] people that are mathematicians. I've heard a lot of criticism about it and it is kind of flaky [30:53.520 --> 30:56.840] but it's worked well for me for 13 years. It's helped me make [30:56.960 --> 31:00.400] a lot of decisions where I could have easily gone off onto a bad path and ended up [31:00.960 --> 31:04.600] in another industry. Maybe that would be good, maybe that would be bad but [31:04.600 --> 31:08.780] that's not the path I chose. It works very well for [31:08.780 --> 31:12.980] technical trends. It does not work as well for social trends. It doesn't work [31:12.980 --> 31:16.980] for things that have lifetimes of [31:16.980 --> 31:21.020] 20 years or 30 years. It works very well for a range of 4 to 5 years and we'll [31:21.020 --> 31:24.900] look at why in a few minutes. If I were [31:25.740 --> 31:29.040] serious about using this as a technology to drive my company [31:29.040 --> 31:33.660] and make decisions with, I would throw away the current methodology of using Deja News. [31:34.120 --> 31:37.180] I would start capturing RSS feeds and I would build my own [31:37.180 --> 31:41.160] database and that will allow me to capture trends as [31:41.160 --> 31:45.620] they happen in real time and I guarantee you that there's people out there right now that are doing it. [31:46.200 --> 31:49.600] I did it. I wrote a little piece about 6 months ago. [31:49.660 --> 31:53.220] It has some technical problems but you can easily get around them if you spend [31:53.220 --> 31:57.180] enough time on it. I have a lot of other things to do but there is a lot of value [31:57.180 --> 32:01.320] to be done in applying this methodology to pulling down real time [32:01.320 --> 32:05.240] RSS feeds, building a database and looking at rates of change that are [32:05.240 --> 32:07.940] happening in keywords. I believe there's a lot of value there. [32:09.040 --> 32:12.100] We already talked about skewing factor. One of the problems is [32:12.100 --> 32:15.720] you lose abstract relationships with the way you store the RSS. [32:15.720 --> 32:18.220] There's some things there but they can be gotten around. [32:20.580 --> 32:23.700] Okay, so now we did the business process. [32:23.700 --> 32:28.500] We did a tactical implementation that gives us real decision making tools. [32:28.560 --> 32:31.800] Now what we're going to do is we're going to push this back up into a strategic framework [32:32.500 --> 32:36.260] that will let us make decisions about more than just about what technology [32:36.260 --> 32:39.540] I choose. And this, I admit, this is going to be kind of flaky. [32:42.000 --> 32:44.360] One of the big justifications for Moore's Law [32:44.360 --> 32:47.640] people like to quote Moore's Law. Everybody knows Moore's Law, right? [32:47.640 --> 32:49.540] How many people don't know Moore's Law? [32:52.620 --> 32:56.220] It's a trade off. I can't let Moore's Law go. [32:57.520 --> 33:00.140] It gets quoted a lot because it's used as a justification [33:00.140 --> 33:02.960] that the number of transistors will double every year [33:04.040 --> 33:07.960] so there will always be an IT industry that will continue booming. [33:09.260 --> 33:10.660] And I would agree with that [33:10.660 --> 33:12.720] if there were no other factors. [33:15.360 --> 33:19.160] People have a finite amount of time and effort to spend on anything. [33:21.940 --> 33:23.320] Geeks, techno geeks, [33:23.320 --> 33:26.460] they like technical things, they like trends, they like [33:27.240 --> 33:30.660] detail, but ultimately people are social animals. [33:30.660 --> 33:34.540] They will spend time on things that they enjoy [33:34.540 --> 33:38.680] or things that they're forced to do. Other things they will throw [33:38.680 --> 33:42.520] away in favor of things that they enjoy or things that they're forced to do. [33:42.800 --> 33:46.640] And this is part of the reason why the Memminer works off of Deja News. People talk about [33:46.640 --> 33:50.120] things that they enjoy or that they're forced to do. [33:51.200 --> 33:54.660] For the average person, they spend their time sleeping, [33:55.280 --> 33:58.900] working, I'm glad I got a laugh, that's good, shopping, [33:58.900 --> 34:02.780] eating, having sex. The range of that [34:02.780 --> 34:07.480] variance is not a lot from person to person on average. [34:07.840 --> 34:10.900] So if I want somebody to read the internet two hours a day and I get [34:11.020 --> 34:14.800] a certain level of growth, now to double that, I've got to have them read the internet [34:14.800 --> 34:18.840] four hours a day, it's not going to happen. They've got other things they want to go do. [34:18.840 --> 34:22.280] They want to go eat, they want to go have sex, they want to go visit Las Vegas. [34:22.380 --> 34:27.580] So there is a fundamental limiting factor in the growth of the internet based on what people's time is. [34:27.580 --> 34:31.600] There's other factors on top of that. Now for some people, [34:32.660 --> 34:34.440] you do get a wide variance. [34:36.860 --> 34:37.580] For instance... [34:41.670 --> 34:44.650] But I don't think we're going to see a society that looks like this. [34:47.700 --> 34:50.260] Now we're going to look at Deja News again, and what we're going to do [34:50.260 --> 34:54.180] is we're going to invert. What I was looking for was uniqueness, right? [34:54.800 --> 34:58.440] What we're going to look for now is the ether of [34:58.440 --> 35:01.300] Deja News. We're going to look for the rate of growth of Deja News [35:03.080 --> 35:04.600] abstracted of all uniqueness. [35:06.040 --> 35:09.800] What I'm going to do is I'm going to use keywords that have no [35:10.660 --> 35:13.560] identifying ability, that are used in anything, anytime. [35:14.120 --> 35:17.820] This, have, one, all, them, will, other. That comes out of the top number [35:17.820 --> 35:22.900] of people that do crypto analysis. E-T-A-O-N-R-I-S-H-D, right? [35:22.900 --> 35:26.420] That's what you do a frequency analysis to be able to crack codes that are not well done. [35:26.420 --> 35:30.640] Well, you can do the same thing with keywords. What I did was I went through the top 100 keywords [35:30.640 --> 35:34.240] and I picked out ones that were fairly generic, and then I did a search [35:34.240 --> 35:38.280] and you can see very clearly exponential growth in Deja News. [35:38.400 --> 35:42.420] This is one reason why the MemMiner works is because over any small period [35:42.420 --> 35:44.660] like from here to here, it looks linear. [35:45.800 --> 35:50.400] There's not skew being introduced by Deja News into the uniqueness of a meme. [35:50.400 --> 35:52.260] There's a little bit, but not enough to matter. [35:52.260 --> 35:57.320] Okay, so this is what the ether of Deja News looks like. [35:57.960 --> 35:58.920] The transport. [36:00.020 --> 36:04.340] If you do a really detailed search, you can pick out events that cause excitement on the internet. [36:05.520 --> 36:09.720] And these are admittedly, I guessed at them, I think I'm right on most of them. [36:09.800 --> 36:12.780] JFK crash, a lot of people can't see this, but there's a spike right here. [36:14.220 --> 36:17.020] Y2K causes a spike, there's a spike here I didn't hunt down. [36:17.180 --> 36:20.020] Bush election 2000, that definitely caused a controversy. [36:20.020 --> 36:23.160] 9-11 causes a big spike. What's interesting about 9-11 [36:24.020 --> 36:25.860] is that if you do keyword searches [36:28.520 --> 36:31.860] on other terms, you get spikes. [36:31.860 --> 36:35.940] If you look for death around that time period, you get a spike. If you look for [36:36.400 --> 36:39.980] peace, you get a spike. What you don't get a spike in... [36:39.980 --> 36:43.060] Okay, remember, we're talking about people that have finite bandwidth, right? [36:43.060 --> 36:47.300] They're using more bandwidth to talk about 9-1-1, they're using more bandwidth to talk about death, [36:47.300 --> 36:51.420] they're using more bandwidth to talk about peace. What is being cut out [36:51.420 --> 36:54.660] of the equation to free up that bandwidth for those things? [36:54.920 --> 36:58.700] Can anybody give me an idea or a guess? It took me weeks to figure this out. [37:00.360 --> 37:03.100] No, there's, well, there's a particular thing that [37:03.100 --> 37:05.940] it cuts into, and I think it'll make sense to everybody once they hear. [37:06.700 --> 37:14.380] No. Work, who said work? [37:14.460 --> 37:18.880] T-shirt. Work goes down. And I remember 9-1-1, what did I do on 9-1-1? [37:18.880 --> 37:21.140] We all sat around talking, we didn't do any work. [37:25.550 --> 37:27.410] Now, here's the bad news. [37:29.990 --> 37:32.450] Deja News gets very flaky after 2004. [37:33.530 --> 37:35.590] I got a couple theories about it. [37:37.530 --> 37:39.390] I have three theories about it. [37:39.910 --> 37:44.270] One is the shift of blogging, clearly. What people were using Deja News for, they now use blogging for. [37:44.270 --> 37:47.890] But that does not account for the rate of change that you see here. This is almost instantaneous. [37:47.890 --> 37:52.110] You see the moving average here, but the actual numbers, [37:52.110 --> 37:56.870] it changes within like two months, and I know that's not happening. Blogging is taking away chunks. [37:57.390 --> 38:00.110] Google changes their methodology, their search methodology. [38:00.110 --> 38:03.930] If I go back and I run a query two or three months later, it changes. They're doing subtle [38:03.930 --> 38:08.290] shifts in the way they do things, and it shows up. And I do think that there's some kind of [38:08.290 --> 38:12.090] error in the way that they're manipulating or accounting for things [38:12.090 --> 38:15.730] after 2004. But I think a lot of what you're seeing [38:15.730 --> 38:19.030] is the inflection point in the internet itself. [38:19.250 --> 38:23.610] If you read enough articles, you see a couple articles came up in the past year or two [38:23.610 --> 38:27.830] that talk about a slowing rate of growth in the internet. I think that that's what you're seeing. [38:27.830 --> 38:31.870] I think you're seeing a slowing rate of growth in the internet, and it will impact [38:31.870 --> 38:36.450] all the other industries that are associated with that, mostly consumer-related industries. [38:36.630 --> 38:39.910] Chip industry, business software, it won't affect [38:39.910 --> 38:44.110] niche markets so much. And it probably won't affect security very much. [38:44.110 --> 38:47.850] And now, we're going to take a look at a couple concepts [38:49.630 --> 38:52.310] to make strategic [38:52.310 --> 38:54.610] decisions about how you're going to spend your resources. [38:58.030 --> 39:01.330] Very abstract concept. What caused the IT boom? [39:02.070 --> 39:05.790] If I were to create a market basket of all the items [39:05.790 --> 39:09.810] that create a cost of how I get information, chips cost [39:09.810 --> 39:13.630] me money, people cost me money, I have to develop methodologies, there's a lot of [39:13.630 --> 39:17.570] communications costs, I could create a market basket of the cost of [39:17.570 --> 39:21.590] information, assign it to a unit of information, and I would be able to get a rough number [39:21.590 --> 39:24.950] that each unit of information cost me a certain amount of money. [39:25.830 --> 39:29.530] Now, up until 2000, everybody was making money, right? That's because [39:29.530 --> 39:33.570] I have a price of information. I'm selling that information to somebody somewhere [39:33.570 --> 39:38.770] and I'm making a profit margin on it. As we get down to 2000, [39:38.770 --> 39:41.930] cost of information is not decreasing like it used to, [39:41.930 --> 39:46.370] and companies that are used to this curve, you know, they get into this mindset of seeing this, [39:46.370 --> 39:49.250] they overran it and they went into debt and they went out of business. [39:49.630 --> 39:53.570] Some companies veered off to the side and adapted and survived. [39:53.770 --> 39:58.010] But ultimately, if the cost of information stops falling, [39:58.010 --> 40:02.270] there are fundamental changes in the marketplace that companies are going to have to adapt to. [40:02.270 --> 40:05.750] And ultimately what you have to do, because market forces [40:05.750 --> 40:10.150] force you to adapt to a pricing model that the public sets, or governments, [40:10.150 --> 40:14.250] you have to find some way to drop your cost of information. [40:14.250 --> 40:17.950] And that's why you see outsourcing over the last 3 or 4 years. Companies have to. [40:17.950 --> 40:23.110] They have no choice. Otherwise they'll go out of business, because there is a ceiling on what they can charge. [40:23.590 --> 40:25.370] That's a very strategic concept. [40:25.990 --> 40:30.070] It sets the stage. You can't do anything with it directly. It's not a tool. [40:31.390 --> 40:34.050] And this is another picture that shows you roughly the same thing [40:34.050 --> 40:37.970] from an economic standpoint. As a market matures, your marginal cost [40:37.970 --> 40:41.890] of processing stuff rises. Your marginal return falls. [40:41.890 --> 40:46.310] You eventually reach a point where there is no profit margin, as you pick up all the easy things. [40:46.710 --> 40:49.250] What that means is that there is money in hard things. [40:50.170 --> 40:54.510] And the same difference. Now this is a theory of my own, just from watching the market. [40:55.030 --> 40:58.830] Watching the IT market for the last 10 or 15 years, [40:58.830 --> 41:01.990] the market rewarded diversity. As I created programs [41:01.990 --> 41:05.710] that did more and more stuff like Word, it does all the bells and whistles and stuff, [41:05.710 --> 41:09.250] I got a bigger and bigger share of the market, and people bought my product. [41:09.930 --> 41:12.950] But once I reached the point, the inflection point, [41:12.950 --> 41:16.850] the inflection point punishes diversity, and it rewards cost-cutting. [41:16.850 --> 41:21.290] And that's the point that we're at right now, for consumer-related industries. [41:21.290 --> 41:24.810] Like I said, there are niche markets that don't get impacted this way right now. [41:26.170 --> 41:28.810] So, from my standpoint, this is what I see. [41:29.430 --> 41:33.110] I see the up-cycle favoring diversity, and everyone pursuing that, [41:33.110 --> 41:36.530] and they get into a mindset over the last 20 years that diversity, diversity, diversity, [41:36.530 --> 41:39.550] I want to create a diverse product and get as much market share as possible. [41:39.550 --> 41:45.030] We've seen a fundamental change around 2000, which now punishes diversity and rewards cost. [41:45.090 --> 41:48.130] And most people's minds are still in this state. [41:54.300 --> 41:56.540] I don't know if I should go into this or not. [41:59.920 --> 42:03.380] This is the single most read picture on my site. [42:05.680 --> 42:07.240] And it surprised me a little bit. [42:08.780 --> 42:11.240] In a nutshell, [42:17.060 --> 42:20.600] diversity functions on contexts that are mismatched. [42:21.480 --> 42:25.020] If I had two clones, and they had identical information sets, [42:25.020 --> 42:27.360] and they know the exact same information, [42:27.360 --> 42:32.300] and they've had the exact same experiences, their communications and teamwork will be perfect. [42:32.300 --> 42:34.760] There will be no miscommunications, correct? [42:34.760 --> 42:38.900] As those clones have different life experiences, [42:38.900 --> 42:43.260] their contexts will shift apart, and there will be a set in the middle that they share, [42:43.260 --> 42:48.220] but there will be unique features that they each have, and then you'll start getting miscommunications. [42:48.340 --> 42:50.780] If I wanted to cut my cost of information [42:52.340 --> 42:55.160] in teamwork or software development, [42:55.160 --> 42:58.660] what I would do is I would try to get contexts to be [42:58.660 --> 43:01.800] as matched as possible within a team framework. [43:02.800 --> 43:05.940] Like I said, this is very high level, and there's some other things I played around with it, [43:05.940 --> 43:09.720] but I put it in there just to maybe get people thinking about ways that they could [43:10.520 --> 43:15.240] drive their teams or their software development towards a [43:15.680 --> 43:18.160] competitive methodology, and what you have to focus on [43:19.120 --> 43:25.940] is reducing transaction costs internally in your organization. [43:26.040 --> 43:30.340] There's a couple other things here. I'm sitting in a microbrewery, and I realized, wow, microbreweries are a lot like the software industry [43:30.340 --> 43:33.900] in certain ways. The company that I work for right now [43:35.420 --> 43:38.360] basically resells IBM software, but what we do [43:38.360 --> 43:42.100] is we tweak it to a very minimum level, five or ten percent, [43:42.100 --> 43:45.760] and match it to that set of customers that are willing to deal with [43:46.180 --> 43:49.840] changing their business processes to map to what the software does, and that's a very [43:50.260 --> 43:54.200] efficient model that I think can last over time. I don't think a lot of very [43:54.200 --> 43:58.280] customized software, it's going to have a very hard time surviving in business software over the next [43:58.280 --> 44:02.280] ten years. And we'll [44:02.280 --> 44:04.620] let that go. I'll go ahead and I'll take some questions. [44:19.030 --> 44:22.050] The question is, do I think that the difference between [44:22.050 --> 44:26.710] the dichotomy between diversity and cost-cutting is driving some of the open source movement? [44:27.090 --> 44:30.330] I don't know. I don't... I've looked at the open source movement [44:30.330 --> 44:34.330] and I still honestly don't have an opinion about it one way or the other. I can't get a reading [44:34.330 --> 44:38.010] on it out of the graphs that I've run. I can't speak to it one way or the other. [44:44.450 --> 44:48.190] I haven't done any analysis of that, but I would say companies that are doing Six Sigma are probably [44:48.190 --> 44:51.530] unless they're in like a financial industry, I think they're probably [44:52.530 --> 44:56.570] at a competitive disadvantage. I think they're producing quality that the market isn't going to reward. [44:58.450 --> 45:00.350] That's a guess off the top of my head. [45:05.890 --> 45:07.670] Yeah, you can use the search engines. You can [45:07.670 --> 45:11.510] get a lot of the same data out of Google. It comes out in a different format [45:11.510 --> 45:15.270] and you've got to massage it and you've got to work with it and it's very crude. It doesn't give you the same [45:16.610 --> 45:19.390] detail. But yeah, you can pull it out [45:19.390 --> 45:23.350] of other sources. I used to use Monster. I used to run queries against Monster. I used to use Dice. [45:23.350 --> 45:27.630] I used to use Miscellaneous Jobs News Group for people that remember that far back. [45:36.010 --> 45:37.370] No, I haven't done anything on security [45:37.370 --> 45:41.470] because that's not my field. One more. [45:43.230 --> 45:45.390] A lot of what you just saw, not in so much detail. [45:45.390 --> 45:49.070] There's more business here than I have on my website because I haven't updated for a while. [45:49.070 --> 45:52.770] There's a lot more graphs that show you more detail [45:53.750 --> 45:57.050] in different industries like religion. I did some queries on religion, [45:57.050 --> 46:01.650] social trends, things like that. So you can get an idea of different things. And actually, I did mean to bring that up. [46:03.610 --> 46:04.890] I'm not out of time yet, but [46:05.610 --> 46:07.470] we can look at a couple of those real quick. [46:13.940 --> 46:35.200] Or maybe not. There's no doubt in my mind [46:35.880 --> 46:39.160] after watching what's going on in the marketplace, there are a lot of people [46:39.160 --> 46:42.860] that are smarter than me. MBA program teaches all these things. I haven't been through MBA. [46:42.860 --> 46:46.580] I did a little bit of an MBA, but they teach you these kind of concepts and there are guys out there that are applying them. [46:46.580 --> 46:51.480] I have no doubts. You can see it in the way the information has been changing over the last five years. [46:51.480 --> 46:55.660] There's someone that's taken a chunk, taken a slice of the profit margin out of it. [46:57.760 --> 46:59.300] Let's see, what can we look at? [46:59.300 --> 47:03.180] Oh, here's saving J2E. If you go through here, you can see that J2E [47:03.180 --> 47:05.160] looks a lot like it's topping out. [47:06.100 --> 47:08.740] Yeah, these are good right here, Republicans. [47:09.380 --> 47:11.520] Does anybody care about the federal deficit? [47:13.140 --> 47:18.200] You bet people care. Whether the media tells you they care or not, it's being talked about a lot. [47:18.720 --> 47:21.240] Trade deficit. Does anybody care about the trade deficit? [47:22.520 --> 47:25.980] Media doesn't talk about it, but people are talking about it. [47:27.040 --> 47:29.240] You can get a lot of interesting information that runs [47:29.240 --> 47:33.260] counter to what the media is telling you. As a closing comment, I'll tell you [47:33.260 --> 47:37.440] that when you see Alan Greenspan talking on TV, don't listen to his words [47:37.440 --> 47:41.760] anymore. Watch the beads of perspiration on his forehead. [47:41.760 --> 47:45.440] That's what matters. And that's it. [47:45.680 --> 47:49.460] I got two more t-shirts up here. Two more t-shirts if people want to nab them. [47:56.040 --> 47:58.140] Oh, am I out of time? [47:58.360 --> 48:00.180] Do I have like two more minutes? [48:06.420 --> 48:09.800] Real meme. R-E-A-L-M-E-M-E. [48:15.820 --> 48:17.940] Yeah, yeah, that's what I'm doing right now. I'm going to run it. [48:18.180 --> 48:19.420] I got like a minute. [48:30.500 --> 48:35.120] It's a very simple program. Send me an email and I'll send you the base to it. [48:35.120 --> 48:39.400] I'm not going to support it because it's got a couple bugs in it that I work around because I don't want to spend time on it. [48:41.360 --> 48:43.600] But we'll run one real quick here that might be funny. [49:00.470 --> 49:01.750] No, I think there's profit. [49:01.750 --> 49:05.750] I think ultimately what you're going to be driven into is, at least in the United States, [49:05.750 --> 49:07.710] I think you're going to be driven into niche markets. [49:10.990 --> 49:12.990] In a single phrase. [49:13.490 --> 49:17.910] Niche markets that are supported by small industries that have high profit margins [49:17.910 --> 49:21.550] that are willing to pay for some level of customized software development. [49:22.550 --> 49:25.670] But that's a trend that's going to run over, I think, five to ten years. [49:25.670 --> 49:29.930] It's hard to say. I do think, for anybody that cares, [49:29.930 --> 49:34.010] I do think J2EE has peaked. And if I were entering the market, I don't think I would put any effort [49:34.010 --> 49:39.250] into trying to learn J2EE as an enterprise system. [49:39.250 --> 49:41.790] I think there's alternatives that are on the horizon. [49:42.530 --> 49:45.570] I think your time would be better spent in other things that are built upon the infrastructure [49:45.570 --> 49:50.110] of the existing S-curve that's already run. [49:51.550 --> 49:53.690] Oh, I was going to mention Newbridge. [49:54.070 --> 49:57.430] The Newberry guys in there. The Newberry guys in there that are running that [49:57.890 --> 50:02.030] that tracker, that wireless tracker, that's an example of a technology that's built on [50:02.090 --> 50:05.530] a foundation that's been built over the last ten years. That's the kind of thing I would look at. [50:07.490 --> 50:08.210] Okay. [50:27.600 --> 50:32.120] I look for it. I see it. It comes up in different places [50:32.120 --> 50:35.240] in different ways. It's intuitive. It's from seeing it so often. [50:35.240 --> 50:38.260] It happens around 2004, 2005. [50:41.700 --> 50:44.540] Gosh, I'm really sorry here. One more minute. [51:06.720 --> 51:08.160] Well, if I have a good net connection [51:08.160 --> 51:11.120] and I'm running it threaded, probably 20, 30 seconds. [51:14.080 --> 51:16.680] Yeah, I have done run RFID and that's on my site. [51:17.740 --> 51:20.180] It's in an uptrend. It's in a pre-inflection state. [51:21.640 --> 51:23.300] Definitely worth putting money into. [51:25.880 --> 51:26.500] Hmm? [51:34.030 --> 51:38.610] That's a whole other session. That's a political session. [51:40.150 --> 51:41.390] No, I don't blame you. [51:42.290 --> 51:44.090] Anyway, here's Paris Hilton. [51:45.750 --> 51:49.590] She's still got some life there. I'm surprised. I didn't expect it. [51:50.470 --> 51:51.710] Okay, thank you.