[00:06.880 --> 00:10.080]  Thank you. Thank you all for coming.
[00:11.300 --> 00:15.960]  This is a sort of a modification of a talk I've been giving for a while.
[00:15.960 --> 00:21.340]  At Usenix Lisa they refer to this as Vixie's Internet Governance Rant.
[00:21.420 --> 00:27.620]  But I realized I wasn't doing much good and that I needed to behave more like a bomb-tossing revolutionary
[00:27.620 --> 00:29.680]  and less like a politician.
[00:30.120 --> 00:34.060]  And Jeff gave me an opportunity to test-pilot the new talk here,
[00:34.060 --> 00:38.220]  where apparently bomb-tossing revolutionaries are more prevalent.
[00:49.260 --> 00:54.120]  Okay. One of my favorite authors, Barbara Tuchman, wrote a book.
[00:54.600 --> 01:00.200]  And you need to go to Amazon.com and get a copy of that book for yourselves.
[01:00.520 --> 01:05.780]  Trust me on this. If you hate it, then send it to me and I will give you your money back.
[01:15.090 --> 01:19.670]  Can I talk closer to the microphone? Yes, I'm concerned about the echo.
[01:22.230 --> 01:28.970]  So what Tuchman had to say about folly, of course, takes a book to say.
[01:29.590 --> 01:36.210]  But qualifications, as you can see on the slides, it has to be seen as counterproductive in its own time.
[01:36.210 --> 01:41.010]  It's very easy to look back with the benefit of history, a lot of perspective, and say,
[01:41.010 --> 01:45.590]  well, that was very stupid. To be folly, it has to be obviously stupid,
[01:45.590 --> 01:48.690]  even at the time the decisions are getting made and implemented.
[01:50.470 --> 01:54.550]  There had to be a feasible alternative, right? You can't really call it a decision
[01:54.550 --> 01:58.750]  if all you were doing was running away from some circumstance right there.
[01:58.750 --> 02:03.690]  There had to be some choice that you could have made, that a sensible person in your place would have made,
[02:03.690 --> 02:05.370]  and then it can be called folly.
[02:06.170 --> 02:12.650]  And lastly, it can't be the action of just one guy, one person,
[02:12.650 --> 02:16.050]  because that could be a simple matter of mistake, right?
[02:16.050 --> 02:19.050]  You don't have all the facts or you drank too much or something.
[02:19.050 --> 02:23.230]  But if you had a group of people together and they all sort of nod sagely at each other
[02:23.230 --> 02:27.110]  and say, yes, this is the right thing, but it's completely boneheaded,
[02:27.110 --> 02:30.850]  that, in Tuchman's definition, can be called folly.
[02:32.250 --> 02:39.930]  And the examples that I picked out for this slide would be Troy and the Greek horse.
[02:39.930 --> 02:44.210]  We call it a Trojan horse. It's actually a Greek horse.
[02:44.910 --> 02:51.290]  But anyway, the signs and portents, if you read the original Homer on that,
[02:51.290 --> 02:54.430]  are really, really obvious, right?
[02:54.430 --> 02:58.090]  They didn't just put a wooden horse in front of the city and disappear,
[02:58.090 --> 03:00.890]  as you might read in the Cliff Notes version.
[03:00.890 --> 03:03.850]  There were all kinds of different things.
[03:03.950 --> 03:09.930]  Just everything from the weather to, you know, hints and tips and so forth
[03:09.930 --> 03:16.470]  to really let you know that Homer was saying that the people inside the walls of Troy were morons, right?
[03:16.470 --> 03:18.110]  They were not simply fooled.
[03:21.390 --> 03:28.710]  Britain used to rule the sand where we are sitting, and they don't now.
[03:28.710 --> 03:35.710]  The story of how they avoided it, how they let control go away, spans decades,
[03:35.710 --> 03:39.550]  and it required a lot of people to do a lot of really, really stupid things
[03:40.870 --> 03:46.150]  when, frankly, the colonists at that time were strong.
[03:46.150 --> 03:51.630]  They started out that period of decades as strong British monarchists, loyalists.
[03:51.830 --> 03:56.610]  They just didn't feel like they wanted to pay taxes unless they had seats in Parliament,
[03:56.610 --> 04:01.970]  and it would have been easier to give them seats and have the British Empire be a little larger.
[04:02.790 --> 04:04.750]  People said that at the time.
[04:06.050 --> 04:10.090]  I said that Hitler invaded Russia or tried to invade Russia.
[04:10.130 --> 04:13.090]  What I really mean is his general staff said,
[04:13.090 --> 04:18.350]  Clearly this can be done. Napoleon was just incompetent. We can do it.
[04:19.390 --> 04:23.250]  Everyone who's ever tried to invade Russia suffered the same fate.
[04:24.910 --> 04:29.470]  And interestingly, oil production in this world, right?
[04:29.470 --> 04:32.270]  There are some countries that produce a lot more than they consume,
[04:32.270 --> 04:35.710]  and then there are other countries that consume a lot more than they produce.
[04:35.930 --> 04:41.630]  And so we have OPEC as an example of how prices are controlled by the producer side.
[04:41.630 --> 04:46.670]  But can you imagine how long the oil-producing countries of the world would be able to hold out
[04:46.670 --> 04:51.270]  if somehow the oil-consuming nations also had a union and said,
[04:51.270 --> 04:54.590]  We just are not going to pay more than a certain number of dollars per barrel.
[04:54.810 --> 04:59.490]  It turns out that it's not a one-sided, they need us more than we need them,
[04:59.490 --> 05:08.670]  and yet the oil-consuming nations just continue paying rather than getting some stiffness in their backbone.
[05:08.810 --> 05:10.830]  These are all examples of folly.
[05:10.830 --> 05:14.490]  These are all things that you could have known at the time that that wasn't going to work
[05:14.490 --> 05:16.950]  or was going to have a very bad outcome.
[05:21.000 --> 05:24.240]  Two quotes, and then I'll launch into the Internet side of all of this.
[05:25.220 --> 05:28.020]  For those of you who are vision-impaired, I shall read them aloud.
[05:28.020 --> 05:34.940]  Wooden-headedness, the source of self-deception, is a factor that plays a remarkably large role in government.
[05:35.060 --> 05:39.180]  It consists of assessing a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions
[05:39.180 --> 05:42.800]  while ignoring or rejecting any contrary signs.
[05:42.800 --> 05:47.460]  In other words, the power to command frequently causes failure to think.
[05:47.660 --> 05:52.660]  You have seen this, perhaps, if you have a pointy-haired boss, especially if that boss was me.
[05:52.920 --> 05:55.700]  It works at any scale you want.
[05:55.700 --> 06:00.260]  The power to command frequently causes failure to think.
[06:07.680 --> 06:14.460]  So, this Internet thing that has taken the world, pretty much taken over the world,
[06:14.460 --> 06:18.400]  started as a research and engineering project.
[06:18.560 --> 06:24.400]  It was built by the academic people, people who had government contracts,
[06:25.020 --> 06:29.060]  and it was built for other people who had government contracts to use.
[06:29.940 --> 06:35.360]  And they made a number of design decisions that were appropriate for the community that they were building it for.
[06:37.660 --> 06:44.940]  The traditional example is, they were telnetting back and forth from host to host,
[06:44.940 --> 06:50.820]  and typing their passwords in the clear, not because they were stupid, but because it was a totally trusted network.
[06:50.820 --> 06:53.800]  That was a completely safe, sane thing to do.
[06:54.580 --> 06:59.860]  But, they kept saying in the early days, and if you go read any history of the Internet,
[06:59.860 --> 07:04.660]  you're going to see some marketing terminology along the lines of,
[07:04.660 --> 07:08.340]  we always intended this to be a global domination force.
[07:08.420 --> 07:10.400]  Well, I don't know if that can be true.
[07:11.240 --> 07:16.660]  For example, John Postel, who was a friend and whom I miss very much,
[07:16.660 --> 07:22.480]  once wrote that you ought to be liberal in what you accept, and conservative in what you generate.
[07:22.640 --> 07:28.840]  And he thought that that would lead to a kinder, gentler Internet, where implementations could be robust.
[07:28.840 --> 07:31.940]  But if you're liberal in what you accept, you'll get more spam.
[07:32.180 --> 07:36.660]  And if you're conservative in what you generate, you will make less money from phishing.
[07:37.140 --> 07:42.920]  And so, I don't think there's any evidence that anyone involved early on
[07:42.920 --> 07:48.460]  ever thought that this would really be a global dominating force the way that we know it today.
[07:49.520 --> 07:52.240]  And that underlies most of what I have to say today.
[07:56.980 --> 08:03.440]  First thing they did, they only let research and engineering and contractors people connect.
[08:04.540 --> 08:11.320]  The DCA's job early on was to keep people off the network, because there was a lot of interest.
[08:11.320 --> 08:17.120]  And I'm sure a number of you can tell stories, as I can tell, of being at some company
[08:17.120 --> 08:23.540]  where you really wanted to be able to go FTP files from somewhere on the then ARPANET or NSFNET,
[08:23.540 --> 08:25.780]  but you weren't allowed to get a connection.
[08:26.260 --> 08:31.800]  And please realize, these were 9600 VOD analog leased line circuits connected to an IMP somewhere,
[08:31.800 --> 08:34.720]  but every IMP port was controlled by the DCA.
[08:34.800 --> 08:38.000]  And if you didn't have a contract, and they couldn't do a background check on you,
[08:38.000 --> 08:39.660]  you weren't going to get connected.
[08:39.900 --> 08:42.500]  It's almost as though they knew their network was very fragile,
[08:42.500 --> 08:46.060]  and if they let any bad people on it, then the whole thing would fall down and go boom.
[08:47.120 --> 08:49.400]  Although that's not the excuse they used.
[08:51.720 --> 08:57.220]  What they could have done is to build a network that was expecting to grow,
[08:57.220 --> 09:02.700]  instead of building a network that was expecting to sort of reach a certain size and then stop.
[09:02.820 --> 09:07.360]  They could build a network that was expecting to have strangers on it and not just friends.
[09:07.920 --> 09:10.020]  And they could certainly have thought about scale.
[09:10.020 --> 09:12.340]  What if 6 billion people used this?
[09:12.340 --> 09:15.020]  How would that change the design decisions we're making today?
[09:15.020 --> 09:20.080]  Now I'm not suggesting that they should have adopted a boil the ocean strategy
[09:20.080 --> 09:25.440]  and said we're not going to do anything until we have a complete design in our head
[09:25.440 --> 09:27.420]  as to how it could scale globally.
[09:27.420 --> 09:29.060]  That's not what I'm asking for.
[09:29.060 --> 09:32.460]  What I'm asking for is just ask us a couple of questions.
[09:34.360 --> 09:41.280]  How will the decisions we're making today limit this from being acceptable to 6 billion people?
[09:41.280 --> 09:44.580]  I think that they didn't need to spend more money.
[09:44.580 --> 09:48.040]  They just needed to spend the time and money they spent a little more wisely.
[09:51.530 --> 09:52.690]  What happened?
[09:53.350 --> 09:54.870]  It's a matter of history.
[09:54.870 --> 09:59.990]  A bunch of other networks started up and started connecting to each other.
[09:59.990 --> 10:02.990]  Eventually it was commercialized and privatized.
[10:02.990 --> 10:13.530]  And most of the problems that we face today in terms of high cost to go with the high benefit of Internet use
[10:13.530 --> 10:20.230]  is traced to what happened instead of the right thing at this early, early moment.
[10:23.370 --> 10:26.190]  Let's talk about SMTP.
[10:28.110 --> 10:32.710]  I once sent Eric Allman, what amounts to a flame, saying,
[10:32.710 --> 10:37.670]  look, this send-mail policy that you have about being an open relay is bad.
[10:37.670 --> 10:39.250]  And there are spammers out there.
[10:39.250 --> 10:43.370]  And they're going to systematically find all of these open relays
[10:43.370 --> 10:47.990]  and use them to sort of send things that they could never send from their own T1
[10:47.990 --> 10:51.350]  because people would refuse to accept traffic from them.
[10:51.690 --> 10:55.730]  And Eric said, well, you know, you've got to be liberal in what you accept and so forth.
[10:55.730 --> 10:58.210]  A year later, he sent me an apology.
[10:58.210 --> 11:03.350]  And he put in logic in send-mail to lock out relay by default
[11:03.350 --> 11:08.230]  unless you were on some trusted list of hosts or networks or whatever.
[11:08.230 --> 11:12.730]  But it's worth noting that send-mail was not the first SMTP implementation.
[11:12.730 --> 11:16.990]  It was the most widely popular in the early years, but it was not the first one.
[11:16.990 --> 11:20.750]  They all did this because it was a reasonable thing to do.
[11:20.750 --> 11:22.870]  For that matter, LPD used to do this.
[11:22.870 --> 11:27.310]  You could print on other people's printers and use other people for your print queue
[11:27.310 --> 11:28.770]  and they would send the stuff back to you.
[11:28.770 --> 11:32.270]  And it all just worked because we were all friends, I guess.
[11:33.950 --> 11:39.510]  Some of you, this is not on the slide, but some of you will recall our login D hole
[11:40.130 --> 11:44.350]  where you just made the assumption that whatever the PTR value was
[11:44.350 --> 11:48.510]  associated with someone else's address could be looked up in your .rhosts file
[11:48.510 --> 11:50.570]  and if it matched, then it was okay.
[11:50.570 --> 11:55.450]  The fact that the other person, the owner of the IP address, was in control of that string
[11:55.450 --> 11:57.530]  just didn't occur to people.
[11:58.270 --> 11:59.990]  So, I don't know.
[12:00.830 --> 12:03.370]  What were they thinking? Where were they thinking?
[12:04.710 --> 12:09.890]  None of the headers have really ever been validated by most of the implementations.
[12:09.890 --> 12:15.690]  I know I've gotten mail from various robots running on big mainframes saying,
[12:15.690 --> 12:19.650]  syntax error in the received header you added to this mail message
[12:19.650 --> 12:21.870]  as it was going through, so we're bouncing it.
[12:22.130 --> 12:25.910]  But for the most part, you can put anything anywhere and it just goes through.
[12:27.390 --> 12:31.350]  So, spammers are currently allowed to add a lot of extra received headers
[12:31.870 --> 12:35.210]  with or without funky time zones in order to frustrate our desires
[12:35.210 --> 12:37.230]  to find out where things come from.
[12:38.150 --> 12:41.850]  There was an assumption that every host would have a postmaster mailbox.
[12:41.850 --> 12:45.470]  After all, what host would be on the internet and send mail
[12:45.470 --> 12:47.850]  without wanting to hear complaints about it?
[12:48.490 --> 12:49.890]  What host, indeed.
[12:51.270 --> 12:53.790]  There was a turn command. Very interesting.
[12:53.790 --> 12:58.110]  You could connect to somebody, use the hello command in the SMTP protocol
[12:58.110 --> 12:59.690]  to tell it who you were.
[12:59.690 --> 13:02.990]  It probably wouldn't compare that to your PTR or anything else.
[13:02.990 --> 13:04.830]  It would just say, okay, that's who you are.
[13:04.830 --> 13:06.950]  And when you got to the end of sending your mail to it,
[13:06.950 --> 13:10.310]  you could use the turn command and it would dump its entire mail queue
[13:10.310 --> 13:14.630]  toward you on the basis of what you had put into the hello command.
[13:16.050 --> 13:17.610]  Fascinating logic.
[13:19.650 --> 13:21.510]  What could they have done differently?
[13:21.510 --> 13:27.170]  Well, frankly, IBM Profs, which was junk by today's standards,
[13:27.810 --> 13:30.670]  had a pretty large user base.
[13:30.670 --> 13:33.810]  They had attachments, they were multilingual,
[13:34.490 --> 13:38.950]  they didn't do a lot in terms of one host sending mail to another,
[13:38.950 --> 13:42.030]  but they had a good user base.
[13:42.030 --> 13:45.590]  They dominated what was then the Fortune 500
[13:45.590 --> 13:48.290]  in terms of all the email in the world.
[13:48.570 --> 13:51.010]  And if they had just looked at the feature list and said,
[13:51.010 --> 13:53.730]  you know, if we're going to present this as better,
[13:53.730 --> 13:56.010]  let's make sure it's at least as good.
[14:01.440 --> 14:04.800]  Let's talk about classful IP addressing.
[14:05.880 --> 14:12.600]  In 1989, I was a network administrator at Digital Equipment Corporation,
[14:13.240 --> 14:16.820]  and we had two class B networks.
[14:17.500 --> 14:22.580]  And I was responsible for handing out address blocks
[14:22.580 --> 14:24.800]  to other people anywhere in the world,
[14:24.800 --> 14:27.920]  and DEC at that time was still a major corporation.
[14:27.920 --> 14:32.800]  We had like 130,000 employees in a lot of time zones.
[14:32.840 --> 14:35.380]  So it was getting a little bit cramped,
[14:35.380 --> 14:38.360]  and I was about to ask for a couple of more class Bs,
[14:38.360 --> 14:42.160]  and my boss said, oh, what the hell, go ask for a class A.
[14:42.160 --> 14:44.300]  And I said, but we don't need a class A.
[14:44.300 --> 14:46.880]  We're never going to have 16 million hosts here.
[14:47.680 --> 14:51.120]  And my boss said, well, you know, just ask.
[14:51.120 --> 14:52.440]  Maybe they'll give it to us.
[14:52.440 --> 14:55.380]  It will sure be a lot more convenient for us if they say yes.
[14:55.380 --> 14:56.420]  And they did.
[14:57.920 --> 15:01.520]  So net16 is currently the property of HP,
[15:01.520 --> 15:03.320]  along with a couple of other class As
[15:03.320 --> 15:05.740]  that have come into their possession over the years.
[15:06.940 --> 15:10.280]  If you want to know sort of why the people around the world,
[15:10.280 --> 15:11.280]  especially in China,
[15:11.280 --> 15:12.800]  where they would like to get enough addresses
[15:12.800 --> 15:16.640]  to deploy billions of DSL lines,
[15:16.640 --> 15:18.240]  they're a little bit concerned
[15:18.240 --> 15:21.560]  about the way we wasted address space early on in IPv4,
[15:21.560 --> 15:24.380]  and they want to keep that from happening again in IPv6.
[15:24.380 --> 15:26.080]  And who can blame them?
[15:31.060 --> 15:33.340]  So what could they have done differently?
[15:34.740 --> 15:36.460]  They might have asked the question,
[15:36.460 --> 15:38.380]  look, on this whole class C thing,
[15:38.380 --> 15:41.260]  where you get a slash 24 network block
[15:41.260 --> 15:43.900]  capable of handling about 250 hosts,
[15:43.900 --> 15:47.660]  if we gave out all the ones that are in the allocation plan,
[15:47.660 --> 15:49.720]  that would call for a global routing table
[15:49.720 --> 15:51.540]  of two million entries.
[15:51.560 --> 15:53.100]  How would we route that?
[15:53.940 --> 15:55.520]  And then they might have said,
[15:55.520 --> 15:58.620]  well, you know, over a backbone of 9,600 bought analog links,
[15:58.620 --> 16:00.220]  we're probably not going to be able to send
[16:00.220 --> 16:01.840]  that much routing material.
[16:01.920 --> 16:03.420]  So let's come up with a plan
[16:03.420 --> 16:05.680]  that we could actually do something about, right?
[16:05.680 --> 16:06.920]  It's 20 years later.
[16:06.920 --> 16:08.180]  We still don't know how to route
[16:08.180 --> 16:10.780]  two million different destinations.
[16:10.940 --> 16:12.360]  Right around 100,000,
[16:12.360 --> 16:14.980]  you start to hit some hard limits
[16:14.980 --> 16:17.220]  on the way that BGP and other sorts of
[16:17.220 --> 16:19.100]  global routing protocols work.
[16:19.300 --> 16:22.840]  So they didn't need to be rocket scientists.
[16:22.840 --> 16:24.600]  Unfortunately, they were rocket scientists.
[16:24.600 --> 16:25.960]  Maybe that was the problem.
[16:26.680 --> 16:28.220]  What they needed to do was just ask
[16:28.220 --> 16:30.040]  some simple, straightforward questions.
[16:30.040 --> 16:33.620]  How would we route this if this allocation plan filled up?
[16:34.580 --> 16:36.760]  They could also have asked,
[16:36.760 --> 16:38.300]  you know, Stanford is a university.
[16:38.300 --> 16:39.320]  They have one campus.
[16:39.320 --> 16:41.140]  What are they going to do with a net block
[16:41.140 --> 16:43.780]  capable of supporting 16 million hosts?
[16:44.800 --> 16:47.220]  And they could certainly have wondered,
[16:47.220 --> 16:48.560]  how's this going to scale?
[16:53.780 --> 16:57.340]  So the rescue for classful IP addressing,
[16:57.340 --> 16:58.560]  class A, class B, class C,
[16:58.560 --> 17:01.000]  was classless IP addressing,
[17:01.000 --> 17:02.300]  so-called CIDR.
[17:04.140 --> 17:05.800]  And it works.
[17:05.800 --> 17:07.160]  It's what we're using today.
[17:07.420 --> 17:09.600]  But it's important to note
[17:09.600 --> 17:11.240]  that the people who designed it
[17:11.240 --> 17:12.380]  were the stakeholders.
[17:12.380 --> 17:14.360]  They were the owners of the routers.
[17:14.620 --> 17:18.020]  And it seemed obvious to all of us
[17:18.020 --> 17:19.660]  that the people who had the routers
[17:19.660 --> 17:20.740]  that had to run this code
[17:20.740 --> 17:22.900]  ought to have a strong hand in determining
[17:23.580 --> 17:25.360]  sort of how much complexity and cost
[17:25.360 --> 17:27.080]  and whatnot they would be bearing.
[17:28.140 --> 17:29.820]  What we didn't quite realize
[17:29.820 --> 17:31.660]  was that they would design something
[17:31.660 --> 17:34.180]  that would have a lock-in effect.
[17:34.180 --> 17:36.440]  In other words, since renumbering
[17:36.440 --> 17:39.220]  these address blocks is very tough,
[17:39.220 --> 17:41.000]  we now have a system
[17:41.000 --> 17:43.160]  where you have to get your address blocks
[17:43.160 --> 17:44.440]  from your provider.
[17:44.860 --> 17:47.320]  And if your provider is not responding well
[17:47.320 --> 17:49.280]  to market pressures or your own pressures
[17:49.280 --> 17:52.300]  and is, for example, overcharging you for transit
[17:52.300 --> 17:54.860]  and giving you poor service,
[17:54.860 --> 17:56.280]  you can't leave that provider
[17:56.280 --> 17:57.920]  unless you are willing to pay
[17:58.380 --> 17:59.980]  a renumbering penalty.
[18:01.800 --> 18:05.500]  So this was really kind of the fox guarding the chicken house
[18:05.500 --> 18:07.880]  as far as design was concerned.
[18:07.880 --> 18:10.280]  What could they have done differently?
[18:11.620 --> 18:15.780]  Okay, so Class A and Class B were too granular.
[18:15.780 --> 18:18.040]  Having to choose between 16 million hosts
[18:18.040 --> 18:20.800]  or 65,000 hosts or 250 hosts
[18:20.800 --> 18:22.900]  was clearly too granular.
[18:22.900 --> 18:24.720]  But that doesn't mean that we needed to
[18:24.720 --> 18:27.120]  have every possible bit boundary
[18:27.120 --> 18:29.540]  be a network block.
[18:30.120 --> 18:32.200]  It's possible that we could have just come up
[18:32.200 --> 18:34.180]  with less granular classes
[18:34.940 --> 18:36.620]  and come up with something
[18:36.620 --> 18:38.000]  that fit the size of the community
[18:38.000 --> 18:39.840]  and fit the size of what routing table
[18:39.840 --> 18:41.140]  we thought we could support.
[18:41.140 --> 18:43.880]  And then we would still have address portability.
[18:44.020 --> 18:45.980]  Not that it would have been in the interests
[18:45.980 --> 18:47.740]  of the designers of this
[18:47.740 --> 18:50.680]  that we would all have address portability.
[18:50.740 --> 18:52.740]  So maybe there would have needed to be some reform
[18:52.740 --> 18:54.520]  as to how these things get decided
[18:54.520 --> 18:56.720]  in addition to some new thoughts
[18:56.720 --> 18:59.000]  as to how to make this decision.
[19:05.280 --> 19:06.720]  But wait!
[19:07.180 --> 19:08.840]  IPv6 is going to save us, right?
[19:08.840 --> 19:11.840]  It doesn't matter that classless routing was bad
[19:11.840 --> 19:13.480]  because it was only a placeholder
[19:13.480 --> 19:15.560]  to keep the internet growing
[19:15.560 --> 19:17.660]  until we could get IPv6.
[19:20.140 --> 19:22.480]  But I ran out of room on this slide
[19:22.480 --> 19:23.900]  when I was trying to come up
[19:23.900 --> 19:25.520]  with the things they did wrong.
[19:26.720 --> 19:28.520]  They widened the address space
[19:29.280 --> 19:31.280]  by a factor of four.
[19:31.460 --> 19:33.280]  So instead of four billion,
[19:33.280 --> 19:35.040]  which is 2 to the 32nd power,
[19:35.040 --> 19:37.360]  we have some other number I can't pronounce,
[19:37.360 --> 19:39.420]  which is 2 to the 128th power
[19:39.420 --> 19:40.900]  of possible addresses.
[19:41.180 --> 19:42.380]  And that's because they thought
[19:42.380 --> 19:43.740]  the problem they had was
[19:43.740 --> 19:45.620]  that they didn't have enough addresses.
[19:45.940 --> 19:47.460]  Okay, well, we're still not out
[19:47.460 --> 19:49.920]  of IPv4 address space.
[19:49.920 --> 19:53.020]  The original Address Lifetime Extension Project
[19:53.020 --> 19:55.480]  said that by 2005 we'd be out.
[19:55.480 --> 19:58.180]  And so we had to rush this IPv6 thing through
[19:59.320 --> 20:00.840]  because the world will end
[20:00.840 --> 20:02.620]  if we run out of IPv4 space.
[20:03.660 --> 20:06.420]  We didn't run out of IPv4 space.
[20:06.960 --> 20:09.340]  And so, clearly, they solved a problem
[20:09.340 --> 20:10.480]  we weren't having.
[20:11.000 --> 20:12.180]  But in addition to that,
[20:12.180 --> 20:13.580]  they failed to solve some problems
[20:13.580 --> 20:15.780]  that we were having and are still having.
[20:15.880 --> 20:18.400]  In fact, they made some of those problems worse.
[20:20.900 --> 20:22.580]  They did not put any kind
[20:22.580 --> 20:23.860]  of automatic renumbering in.
[20:23.860 --> 20:25.260]  There was a lot of pressure to do that,
[20:25.260 --> 20:26.080]  but they just said,
[20:26.080 --> 20:27.420]  oh, that's too complicated.
[20:27.420 --> 20:28.720]  That'll make it take too long
[20:28.720 --> 20:30.060]  to get this protocol out the door,
[20:30.060 --> 20:31.700]  so we're not going to support that.
[20:31.700 --> 20:34.120]  So once you get your provider-assigned addresses
[20:34.120 --> 20:36.660]  in IPv6, you'll be just as locked in
[20:36.660 --> 20:38.560]  as you were in IPv4.
[20:39.700 --> 20:43.160]  They assumed that once we had IPv6,
[20:43.160 --> 20:44.300]  that NAT would die.
[20:44.300 --> 20:45.920]  They thought NAT was only being used
[20:45.920 --> 20:48.540]  to expand the address space
[20:48.540 --> 20:50.020]  and make it possible for people
[20:50.020 --> 20:51.060]  to have address space
[20:51.060 --> 20:51.960]  who couldn't get enough
[20:51.960 --> 20:52.940]  from their provider
[20:52.940 --> 20:54.080]  or from the Internet
[20:54.080 --> 20:56.060]  or Internet or whoever.
[20:56.160 --> 20:57.860]  They didn't realize that NAT
[20:57.860 --> 20:59.080]  would work its way
[20:59.080 --> 21:01.480]  into the world's consciousness
[21:01.480 --> 21:03.880]  as kind of an adjunct to firewalls
[21:03.880 --> 21:07.160]  in terms of how we provision things
[21:07.160 --> 21:09.380]  and how we do access control.
[21:09.680 --> 21:11.560]  And so now there is a proposal
[21:11.560 --> 21:14.900]  to do NAT for IPv6.
[21:14.960 --> 21:16.620]  Not because people are out of addresses,
[21:16.620 --> 21:17.900]  as you can see,
[21:18.660 --> 21:20.720]  but because they need NAT.
[21:20.720 --> 21:21.820]  They just need NAT.
[21:21.820 --> 21:23.800]  It's not an addressing thing anymore.
[21:26.220 --> 21:28.060]  They really wanted to keep using
[21:28.060 --> 21:29.800]  provider-assigned addressing.
[21:29.800 --> 21:31.080]  I don't know if that's because
[21:31.080 --> 21:31.940]  they had corruption
[21:31.940 --> 21:33.320]  and they knew that somehow
[21:33.320 --> 21:35.000]  they needed to keep letting
[21:35.000 --> 21:36.460]  bad Internet providers
[21:36.460 --> 21:38.220]  lock their customers in,
[21:38.220 --> 21:40.180]  or if they were just dolts.
[21:40.180 --> 21:41.380]  I don't know.
[21:41.840 --> 21:43.140]  But I know that they gave
[21:43.140 --> 21:46.320]  each LAN a slash 64.
[21:47.740 --> 21:49.960]  So every Ethernet segment,
[21:49.960 --> 21:51.340]  every VLAN you have,
[21:51.340 --> 21:52.220]  is able to have
[21:52.220 --> 21:55.280]  18 billion billion hosts on it.
[21:57.840 --> 21:59.980]  Every house that gets
[22:00.060 --> 22:01.220]  a DSL connection gets
[22:01.340 --> 22:02.380]  a slash 48,
[22:02.730 --> 22:04.240]  which is 1.2 million
[22:04.240 --> 22:06.300]  billion billion addresses.
[22:06.300 --> 22:07.620]  My house is large,
[22:07.620 --> 22:09.020]  but it's not that large.
[22:10.960 --> 22:13.420]  And every multi-homed enterprise,
[22:13.420 --> 22:14.200]  for example,
[22:14.200 --> 22:15.440]  my employer,
[22:15.440 --> 22:16.320]  or ISP,
[22:16.320 --> 22:18.130]  starts out with a slash 32,
[22:19.300 --> 22:20.980]  which is 79 billion
[22:21.840 --> 22:24.360]  billion billion addresses.
[22:24.720 --> 22:26.800]  There are 6 billion people
[22:26.800 --> 22:28.060]  on the planet.
[22:28.060 --> 22:29.560]  If you gave each one of them
[22:29.560 --> 22:31.460]  an IP address
[22:31.460 --> 22:32.500]  for every light switch
[22:32.500 --> 22:33.180]  in their house,
[22:33.180 --> 22:35.020]  assuming they have electricity,
[22:35.020 --> 22:36.580]  and gave them 10 cell phones
[22:36.580 --> 22:37.760]  and 10 laptops
[22:37.760 --> 22:38.980]  and so forth,
[22:38.980 --> 22:40.560]  it is potentially
[22:40.560 --> 22:41.560]  going to be necessary
[22:41.560 --> 22:42.760]  that each one of them
[22:42.760 --> 22:45.400]  might have 20 addresses
[22:45.400 --> 22:46.440]  and, you know,
[22:46.440 --> 22:47.360]  16 times,
[22:47.360 --> 22:48.720]  or 6 times 20.
[22:49.080 --> 22:51.620]  180 billion would have been enough.
[22:52.840 --> 22:54.800]  And I just don't know
[22:54.800 --> 22:55.860]  what they were thinking,
[22:55.860 --> 22:57.720]  except they thought
[22:57.720 --> 22:58.920]  the problem that they were having
[22:58.920 --> 22:59.920]  is that they didn't have
[22:59.920 --> 23:01.260]  enough address space.
[23:01.260 --> 23:01.940]  And, boy,
[23:01.940 --> 23:02.720]  that's not the problem
[23:02.720 --> 23:03.940]  we were having.
[23:04.560 --> 23:05.640]  But now we're having
[23:05.640 --> 23:06.520]  all the same problems
[23:06.520 --> 23:07.520]  we were having before,
[23:07.520 --> 23:08.780]  except they're bigger.
[23:10.940 --> 23:12.860]  What could they have done?
[23:13.000 --> 23:13.760]  They could have asked
[23:13.920 --> 23:15.020]  a simple question,
[23:15.020 --> 23:16.200]  what else is wrong
[23:16.200 --> 23:16.880]  with V4
[23:16.880 --> 23:18.880]  besides the address space?
[23:18.880 --> 23:20.040]  What are the other things
[23:20.040 --> 23:21.740]  that people complain about?
[23:24.080 --> 23:26.020]  And they just didn't.
[23:26.300 --> 23:27.900]  And I was there,
[23:27.900 --> 23:28.900]  and I tried to raise
[23:29.020 --> 23:30.020]  a number of these issues,
[23:30.020 --> 23:32.520]  and perhaps they all put me
[23:32.520 --> 23:33.720]  into their kill files
[23:33.720 --> 23:34.760]  because they're tired
[23:34.760 --> 23:35.540]  of listening to me
[23:35.540 --> 23:36.540]  rant about stuff.
[23:36.540 --> 23:38.320]  But I wasn't the only one.
[23:39.040 --> 23:40.780]  These questions were asked,
[23:40.780 --> 23:42.500]  but they were dismissed.
[23:46.730 --> 23:48.870]  Let's talk about TCP.
[23:51.050 --> 23:52.090]  TCP assumes
[23:52.090 --> 23:53.390]  that all the other flows
[23:53.390 --> 23:54.950]  that you share your path with
[23:54.950 --> 23:57.430]  are going to be fair.
[23:57.430 --> 23:58.050]  They're going to do
[23:58.050 --> 24:00.230]  their own fair share scheduling.
[24:00.470 --> 24:01.410]  It has no provision
[24:01.410 --> 24:03.150]  for what I'm calling
[24:03.330 --> 24:04.310]  a congestive flow
[24:04.310 --> 24:06.050]  that will be bursty.
[24:06.050 --> 24:06.850]  Like, for example,
[24:06.850 --> 24:08.490]  voice over IP or NFS
[24:08.490 --> 24:10.030]  or something like that.
[24:12.030 --> 24:13.410]  They assume that
[24:13.410 --> 24:14.770]  nobody between you
[24:14.770 --> 24:15.550]  and your destination
[24:15.550 --> 24:16.730]  will put any restrictions
[24:16.730 --> 24:18.410]  on ICMP.
[24:18.810 --> 24:19.470]  In other words,
[24:19.470 --> 24:20.410]  they designed
[24:20.410 --> 24:21.870]  path MTU discovery
[24:21.870 --> 24:23.190]  without looking at
[24:23.190 --> 24:24.450]  what providers were doing
[24:24.450 --> 24:25.910]  even in that day.
[24:26.270 --> 24:27.390]  A number of providers
[24:27.390 --> 24:29.230]  are now putting
[24:30.910 --> 24:32.390]  private RFC 1918
[24:32.390 --> 24:34.530]  addresses on their core routers.
[24:34.530 --> 24:36.230]  If they wanted to send you an ICMP,
[24:36.230 --> 24:36.670]  they couldn't
[24:36.670 --> 24:37.630]  because it would be coming
[24:37.630 --> 24:38.590]  from an address space
[24:38.590 --> 24:39.910]  you couldn't reach.
[24:42.710 --> 24:44.330]  The initial sequence number
[24:44.330 --> 24:46.310]  used to start out at zero.
[24:46.310 --> 24:47.330]  Now it's random.
[24:47.330 --> 24:48.170]  And the reason is
[24:48.170 --> 24:49.690]  spam.
[24:49.690 --> 24:50.290]  It turned out
[24:50.290 --> 24:51.270]  that you could script
[24:51.670 --> 24:52.830]  a TCP session.
[24:52.830 --> 24:53.630]  You could figure out
[24:53.630 --> 24:54.370]  which segments
[24:54.370 --> 24:55.390]  you needed to send
[24:55.390 --> 24:56.630]  and each segment
[24:56.630 --> 24:57.430]  you send
[24:57.430 --> 24:58.330]  has to include
[24:58.330 --> 24:59.690]  some kind of an ACK
[24:59.690 --> 25:01.670]  for what they will send you.
[25:02.130 --> 25:03.510]  And you can script
[25:03.510 --> 25:04.270]  the whole thing
[25:04.270 --> 25:05.010]  if you know
[25:05.010 --> 25:05.950]  what the other guy's
[25:05.950 --> 25:06.970]  initial sequence number
[25:06.970 --> 25:08.030]  will be.
[25:08.050 --> 25:08.530]  And spammers
[25:08.530 --> 25:09.670]  were doing that.
[25:09.670 --> 25:10.330]  They were emitting
[25:11.150 --> 25:12.110]  a stream of
[25:12.110 --> 25:13.110]  TCP segments
[25:13.710 --> 25:14.950]  from an address
[25:14.950 --> 25:15.990]  that was not their own
[25:15.990 --> 25:16.810]  so they would not have
[25:16.810 --> 25:17.690]  received your ACKs
[25:17.690 --> 25:18.830]  had you sent any.
[25:18.830 --> 25:19.810]  And they were successfully
[25:19.810 --> 25:21.410]  getting spam out.
[25:21.430 --> 25:21.810]  And then
[25:21.810 --> 25:22.950]  there was a big
[25:22.950 --> 25:23.770]  scare about that
[25:23.770 --> 25:24.650]  and so now everyone
[25:24.650 --> 25:25.530]  uses a random
[25:25.530 --> 25:26.530]  initial sequence
[25:26.530 --> 25:27.430]  number.
[25:27.690 --> 25:28.530]  If you were
[25:28.650 --> 25:29.210]  a Linux user
[25:29.210 --> 25:29.730]  and you saw
[25:29.730 --> 25:30.450]  devrandom
[25:30.450 --> 25:31.450]  come into existence
[25:31.450 --> 25:32.290]  that was the year
[25:32.290 --> 25:33.710]  and that was the reason.
[25:36.590 --> 25:38.330]  So, basically
[25:38.330 --> 25:39.010]  they assumed
[25:39.010 --> 25:39.710]  everyone else
[25:39.710 --> 25:40.710]  would do a good job
[25:40.710 --> 25:41.830]  and would be on
[25:41.830 --> 25:43.150]  the same side.
[25:43.630 --> 25:44.730]  And they're not.
[25:44.850 --> 25:45.510]  There are a lot
[25:45.510 --> 25:46.470]  of people out there
[25:46.470 --> 25:47.970]  who are
[25:48.550 --> 25:49.130]  stupider
[25:49.130 --> 25:50.870]  than you
[25:52.310 --> 25:53.470]  or malevolent
[25:54.290 --> 25:54.870]  and
[25:54.870 --> 25:55.510]  even
[25:55.510 --> 25:55.790]  it's
[25:55.790 --> 25:56.210]  bizarre
[25:56.210 --> 25:57.070]  to see this
[25:57.070 --> 25:57.490]  protocol
[25:57.490 --> 25:57.890]  and it's what
[25:57.890 --> 25:58.490]  most traffic
[25:58.490 --> 25:58.950]  on the internet
[25:58.950 --> 25:59.490]  is.
[25:59.490 --> 26:00.430]  It's TCP.
[26:00.510 --> 26:01.190]  And it's bizarre
[26:01.190 --> 26:01.670]  to see this
[26:01.670 --> 26:02.030]  protocol
[26:02.030 --> 26:02.990]  even still in
[26:02.990 --> 26:03.830]  use.
[26:04.170 --> 26:04.930]  It's very easy
[26:04.930 --> 26:05.870]  for, in fact,
[26:05.870 --> 26:06.310]  I remember
[26:06.310 --> 26:07.890]  some marketing
[26:07.890 --> 26:08.370]  literature
[26:08.370 --> 26:09.090]  back in
[26:09.090 --> 26:09.770]  maybe mid
[26:09.770 --> 26:10.870]  90s.
[26:10.910 --> 26:11.530]  Somebody was
[26:11.530 --> 26:13.210]  offering a
[26:13.210 --> 26:14.130]  TCP stack
[26:14.130 --> 26:15.490]  for probably
[26:15.490 --> 26:15.710]  Windows, I
[26:15.710 --> 26:17.870]  don't know,
[26:23.510 --> 26:24.510]  whose claim
[26:17.870 --> 26:18.230]  to fame
[26:18.230 --> 26:18.650]  was that it
[26:18.650 --> 26:18.950]  was more
[26:18.950 --> 26:19.770]  aggressive.
[26:20.030 --> 26:21.090]  It would get
[26:21.090 --> 26:21.490]  more than
[26:21.490 --> 26:21.890]  its fair
[26:21.890 --> 26:22.930]  share of
[26:22.930 --> 26:23.830]  the path
[26:23.830 --> 26:24.690]  bandwidth.
[26:24.730 --> 26:25.010]  And it
[26:25.010 --> 26:25.450]  would cause
[26:25.450 --> 26:26.070]  other TCP
[26:26.070 --> 26:26.630]  flows that
[26:26.630 --> 26:28.750]  were sharing
[26:28.750 --> 26:29.130]  the same
[26:29.130 --> 26:29.870]  path to
[26:29.870 --> 26:30.890]  back off.
[26:32.790 --> 26:33.470]  And, you
[26:33.470 --> 26:34.110]  know, naturally
[26:34.670 --> 26:35.430]  some people
[26:35.430 --> 26:36.190]  actually paid
[26:36.190 --> 26:36.750]  for that,
[26:36.750 --> 26:37.250]  bought it,
[26:37.250 --> 26:37.790]  installed it,
[26:37.790 --> 26:38.150]  got some
[26:38.150 --> 26:38.650]  benefit out
[26:38.650 --> 26:38.990]  of it, I
[26:38.990 --> 26:39.750]  assume.
[26:39.750 --> 26:40.830]  But we know
[26:40.830 --> 26:41.410]  that if everybody
[26:41.410 --> 26:42.310]  acts that way,
[26:42.310 --> 26:42.870]  then actually
[26:42.870 --> 26:43.470]  you'll end up
[26:43.470 --> 26:44.310]  overflowing all
[26:44.310 --> 26:44.870]  the lines and
[26:44.870 --> 26:45.450]  everybody will
[26:45.450 --> 26:46.150]  get less.
[26:46.150 --> 26:46.710]  This is kind
[26:46.710 --> 26:47.070]  of like the
[26:47.070 --> 26:47.490]  prisoner's
[26:47.490 --> 26:48.210]  dilemma.
[26:49.470 --> 26:50.410]  But still,
[26:50.410 --> 26:50.870]  you have to
[26:50.870 --> 26:51.330]  wonder what
[26:51.330 --> 26:51.650]  was in
[26:51.650 --> 26:52.010]  the minds
[26:52.010 --> 26:52.250]  of the
[26:52.250 --> 26:52.610]  designers
[26:52.610 --> 26:52.950]  of this
[26:52.950 --> 26:53.790]  protocol.
[26:54.630 --> 26:54.990]  Building
[26:54.990 --> 26:55.470]  things that
[26:55.470 --> 26:55.790]  work in
[26:55.910 --> 26:56.290]  a lab
[26:56.290 --> 26:57.150]  is an
[26:57.150 --> 26:57.850]  achievement.
[26:57.850 --> 26:58.070]  Building
[26:58.070 --> 26:58.610]  things that
[26:58.610 --> 26:59.010]  can make
[26:59.010 --> 26:59.310]  it from
[26:59.310 --> 26:59.690]  the lab
[26:59.690 --> 26:59.990]  into the
[26:59.990 --> 27:00.450]  real world
[27:00.450 --> 27:00.830]  and still
[27:00.830 --> 27:01.610]  be useful
[27:01.610 --> 27:02.710]  is a
[27:02.710 --> 27:03.150]  greater
[27:03.150 --> 27:04.670]  achievement.
[27:04.670 --> 27:04.990]  And we
[27:04.990 --> 27:05.910]  should strive
[27:05.910 --> 27:06.210]  for the
[27:06.210 --> 27:06.650]  greater
[27:06.650 --> 27:09.670]  achievement.
[27:09.670 --> 27:11.730]  There are
[27:11.730 --> 27:12.390]  a number
[27:12.390 --> 27:12.870]  of codecs
[27:12.870 --> 27:13.410]  that you
[27:13.410 --> 27:13.870]  can use
[27:13.870 --> 27:15.530]  for voice
[27:15.930 --> 27:16.110]  over IP
[27:16.110 --> 27:16.630]  and a
[27:16.630 --> 27:17.910]  couple of
[27:17.910 --> 27:18.510]  them are
[27:18.510 --> 27:19.070]  fixed in
[27:19.070 --> 27:19.350]  the amount
[27:26.070 --> 27:27.070]  of bandwidth
[27:19.350 --> 27:19.750]  that they
[27:19.750 --> 27:20.190]  use.
[27:20.190 --> 27:20.430]  In other
[27:20.430 --> 27:20.930]  words,
[27:20.930 --> 27:21.550]  whether you're
[27:21.550 --> 27:22.110]  talking or
[27:22.110 --> 27:22.610]  not, they
[27:22.610 --> 27:23.030]  are sending
[27:23.030 --> 27:23.510]  the same
[27:23.510 --> 27:24.010]  number of
[27:24.010 --> 27:25.170]  packets and
[27:25.170 --> 27:25.570]  the packets
[27:25.570 --> 27:25.950]  have the
[27:25.950 --> 27:26.690]  same size
[27:26.690 --> 27:26.970]  and the
[27:26.970 --> 27:27.190]  same
[27:27.190 --> 27:27.490]  inter
[27:27.490 --> 27:27.750]  packet
[27:27.750 --> 27:28.730]  gap.
[27:28.850 --> 27:29.130]  And the
[27:29.130 --> 27:29.710]  reason is
[27:29.710 --> 27:30.150]  if they
[27:30.150 --> 27:30.790]  only send
[27:30.790 --> 27:31.450]  packets when
[27:31.450 --> 27:31.650]  you're
[27:31.650 --> 27:32.350]  talking and
[27:32.350 --> 27:32.590]  if they
[27:32.590 --> 27:33.090]  turn your
[27:33.090 --> 27:33.610]  silence
[27:33.610 --> 27:34.330]  into a
[27:34.330 --> 27:34.910]  lack of
[27:34.910 --> 27:35.810]  packets,
[27:35.810 --> 27:36.490]  then they
[27:36.490 --> 27:36.870]  will end
[27:36.870 --> 27:37.590]  up competing
[27:37.590 --> 27:38.410]  with TCP
[27:38.410 --> 27:38.750]  when you
[27:38.750 --> 27:39.430]  do finally
[27:39.430 --> 27:40.530]  start talking.
[27:40.530 --> 27:40.950]  So what they
[27:40.950 --> 27:41.350]  want to do
[27:41.350 --> 27:41.890]  is compete
[27:41.890 --> 27:42.650]  with TCP
[27:42.650 --> 27:43.330]  the whole
[27:43.330 --> 27:43.750]  time, even
[27:43.750 --> 27:44.090]  when you're
[27:44.090 --> 27:46.070]  not talking.
[27:46.070 --> 27:46.610]  Okay?
[27:46.610 --> 27:47.470]  I understand
[27:47.470 --> 27:48.190]  everybody wants
[27:48.190 --> 27:48.670]  to adapt
[27:48.670 --> 27:49.270]  to other
[27:49.270 --> 27:49.830]  people's
[27:49.830 --> 27:50.610]  mistakes,
[27:50.610 --> 27:51.010]  but could
[27:51.010 --> 27:51.330]  this not
[27:51.330 --> 27:51.810]  have been
[27:51.810 --> 27:52.350]  foreseen?
[27:57.380 --> 27:58.920]  There is a
[27:58.920 --> 27:59.860]  mantra in
[27:59.860 --> 28:00.460]  the ivory
[28:00.460 --> 28:01.100]  tower of
[28:01.100 --> 28:02.000]  the IETF
[28:02.000 --> 28:02.720]  that stateless
[28:02.720 --> 28:04.100]  is good.
[28:04.100 --> 28:04.360]  They don't
[28:04.360 --> 28:04.880]  want to put
[28:04.880 --> 28:05.260]  state in
[28:05.260 --> 28:05.700]  the routers
[28:05.700 --> 28:05.980]  in the
[28:05.980 --> 28:06.180]  middle.
[28:06.180 --> 28:06.600]  That was
[28:06.600 --> 28:07.200]  something
[28:07.200 --> 28:08.220]  X25 and
[28:08.220 --> 28:08.460]  the rest
[28:08.460 --> 28:09.340]  of the
[28:09.340 --> 28:09.980]  ISO protocols
[28:09.980 --> 28:10.340]  did.
[28:10.340 --> 28:10.680]  They didn't
[28:10.680 --> 28:11.060]  want to do
[28:11.060 --> 28:11.420]  that.
[28:11.420 --> 28:12.080]  They wanted
[28:12.080 --> 28:12.660]  to keep
[28:12.660 --> 28:12.980]  all state
[28:12.980 --> 28:13.760]  at the
[28:23.540 --> 28:24.540]  end points.
[28:13.760 --> 28:16.320]  Now, it
[28:16.320 --> 28:16.820]  turns out
[28:16.820 --> 28:17.420]  that with
[28:17.420 --> 28:18.040]  route caching
[28:18.040 --> 28:18.420]  and all
[28:18.420 --> 28:18.880]  the other
[28:18.880 --> 28:19.340]  things that
[28:19.340 --> 28:19.640]  modern
[28:19.640 --> 28:20.220]  routers have
[28:20.220 --> 28:20.720]  to do in
[28:20.720 --> 28:21.040]  order to
[28:21.040 --> 28:21.460]  run at
[28:21.460 --> 28:22.600]  10 gigabit
[28:22.600 --> 28:23.560]  line rates,
[28:23.560 --> 28:24.140]  you have
[28:24.140 --> 28:24.940]  state in
[28:24.940 --> 28:25.260]  those
[28:25.260 --> 28:25.820]  routers
[28:25.820 --> 28:26.880]  anyway.
[28:27.320 --> 28:27.920]  And so
[28:29.240 --> 28:30.040]  it might
[28:30.040 --> 28:30.400]  have been
[28:30.400 --> 28:31.240]  worthwhile to
[28:31.240 --> 28:31.800]  get somebody
[28:31.800 --> 28:33.160]  to come
[28:33.160 --> 28:33.640]  in and
[28:33.640 --> 28:34.160]  try and
[28:34.160 --> 28:34.880]  separate out
[28:34.880 --> 28:35.380]  religion
[28:35.380 --> 28:35.800]  from
[28:36.700 --> 28:37.380]  engineering
[28:37.380 --> 28:38.700]  requirements in
[28:38.700 --> 28:39.100]  the original
[28:39.100 --> 28:39.640]  design of
[28:39.640 --> 28:39.900]  all of
[28:39.900 --> 28:41.080]  this stuff.
[28:46.460 --> 28:47.280]  This is
[28:47.280 --> 28:47.660]  near and
[28:47.660 --> 28:48.260]  dear to
[28:48.260 --> 28:48.800]  the hearts
[28:48.800 --> 28:49.140]  of many
[28:49.140 --> 28:49.500]  in this
[28:49.500 --> 28:50.400]  room.
[28:52.540 --> 28:53.780]  For most
[28:54.280 --> 28:54.620]  DSL
[28:54.620 --> 28:55.600]  customers or
[28:55.600 --> 28:56.440]  cable modem
[28:56.440 --> 28:57.180]  customers or
[28:57.180 --> 28:57.720]  other sort
[28:57.720 --> 28:58.100]  of high
[28:58.100 --> 28:58.460]  bandwidth
[28:58.460 --> 28:59.300]  full-time
[29:00.080 --> 29:00.760]  fully
[29:00.760 --> 29:01.140]  connected
[29:01.140 --> 29:02.860]  people from
[29:02.860 --> 29:03.660]  data centers
[29:03.660 --> 29:04.380]  to houses
[29:04.380 --> 29:05.400]  to whatever,
[29:05.400 --> 29:06.100]  you can put
[29:06.100 --> 29:07.140]  any source
[29:07.140 --> 29:07.640]  address you
[29:07.640 --> 29:08.480]  want on
[29:08.480 --> 29:09.020]  your outgoing
[29:09.020 --> 29:09.920]  packets.
[29:10.060 --> 29:10.540]  You can make
[29:10.540 --> 29:11.180]  them come from
[29:11.180 --> 29:12.260]  net 10,
[29:12.260 --> 29:12.660]  you can make
[29:12.660 --> 29:13.260]  them come from
[29:13.260 --> 29:13.760]  the loopback
[29:13.760 --> 29:14.240]  address,
[29:14.240 --> 29:14.600]  you can make
[29:14.600 --> 29:15.340]  them come from
[29:15.340 --> 29:16.720]  net zero,
[29:16.720 --> 29:17.700]  or most
[29:17.700 --> 29:18.120]  appropriately
[29:18.120 --> 29:18.720]  you can make
[29:18.720 --> 29:19.160]  them come
[29:19.160 --> 29:19.820]  from some
[29:19.820 --> 29:20.620]  victim who
[29:20.620 --> 29:20.860]  you would
[29:20.860 --> 29:21.240]  like to
[29:21.240 --> 29:22.040]  destroy.
[29:22.480 --> 29:22.960]  And then you
[29:22.960 --> 29:23.300]  can send
[29:23.300 --> 29:23.820]  them to a
[29:23.820 --> 29:23.940]  lot of
[29:23.940 --> 29:24.420]  people and
[29:24.420 --> 29:24.680]  then the
[29:24.680 --> 29:25.260]  replies all
[29:25.260 --> 29:25.740]  go back to
[29:25.740 --> 29:26.580]  the victim.
[29:27.840 --> 29:28.960]  And this is
[29:28.960 --> 29:29.840]  hard to fix,
[29:29.840 --> 29:30.460]  as it turns
[29:30.460 --> 29:30.800]  out.
[29:30.800 --> 29:31.360]  It sounds
[29:31.360 --> 29:32.220]  simple and
[29:32.220 --> 29:32.580]  there are
[29:32.580 --> 29:33.480]  fixes in
[29:33.480 --> 29:33.980]  various
[29:33.980 --> 29:34.660]  routers and
[29:34.660 --> 29:34.940]  there are
[29:34.940 --> 29:35.400]  all sorts
[29:35.400 --> 29:38.560]  of online
[29:38.560 --> 29:39.280]  documents
[29:39.280 --> 29:39.760]  exhorting
[29:39.760 --> 29:40.220]  people to
[29:40.220 --> 29:40.640]  turn those
[29:40.640 --> 29:41.300]  things on,
[29:41.300 --> 29:42.000]  but it
[29:42.000 --> 29:42.500]  turns out
[29:42.500 --> 29:45.140]  that the
[29:45.140 --> 29:45.860]  equipment most
[29:45.860 --> 29:46.780]  providers are
[29:46.780 --> 29:47.740]  using doesn't
[29:47.740 --> 29:48.320]  quite have the
[29:48.320 --> 29:48.880]  ability to do
[29:48.880 --> 29:49.480]  this and still
[29:49.480 --> 29:50.040]  run at line
[29:50.040 --> 29:51.180]  rate.
[29:51.460 --> 29:52.080]  And the ones
[29:52.080 --> 29:53.660]  that do can't
[29:53.660 --> 29:54.520]  turn it on,
[29:54.520 --> 29:54.980]  because there
[29:54.980 --> 29:55.780]  are some
[29:55.780 --> 29:56.300]  beneficial
[29:56.300 --> 29:56.900]  flows,
[29:56.900 --> 29:57.340]  benevolent
[29:57.340 --> 29:57.800]  flows that
[29:57.800 --> 29:58.280]  depend on
[29:58.280 --> 29:58.940]  this.
[29:58.940 --> 29:59.520]  Third-party
[29:59.520 --> 30:00.520]  TCP that
[30:00.520 --> 30:01.220]  has a
[30:01.220 --> 30:01.500]  satellite
[30:01.500 --> 30:01.840]  leg going
[30:01.840 --> 30:02.420]  in one
[30:02.420 --> 30:02.900]  direction
[30:02.900 --> 30:03.500]  would be an
[30:03.500 --> 30:04.360]  example.
[30:04.360 --> 30:04.820]  It is
[30:04.820 --> 30:05.360]  sometimes
[30:05.360 --> 30:05.940]  necessary to
[30:05.940 --> 30:06.460]  spoof.
[30:06.460 --> 30:07.380]  Well, okay, in
[30:07.380 --> 30:08.000]  my opinion,
[30:08.000 --> 30:08.780]  you can, as
[30:08.900 --> 30:09.540]  a provider,
[30:09.540 --> 30:10.080]  you're a
[30:10.080 --> 30:10.580]  slacker if
[30:10.580 --> 30:11.280]  you use that
[30:11.280 --> 30:11.580]  excuse.
[30:11.580 --> 30:12.600]  You need to
[30:12.600 --> 30:13.200]  find the
[30:13.200 --> 30:13.660]  customers that
[30:13.660 --> 30:13.980]  need that
[30:13.980 --> 30:14.420]  and give
[30:14.420 --> 30:14.780]  them a
[30:14.780 --> 30:15.440]  little bit
[30:15.440 --> 30:15.960]  more latitude
[30:15.960 --> 30:16.260]  and anybody
[30:16.260 --> 30:16.760]  who doesn't
[30:16.760 --> 30:17.020]  need it
[30:17.020 --> 30:17.560]  needs to
[30:17.560 --> 30:18.040]  get no
[30:18.040 --> 30:19.660]  latitude at
[30:19.660 --> 30:20.340]  all.
[30:20.340 --> 30:20.820]  I spend a
[30:20.820 --> 30:21.580]  fair amount
[30:21.580 --> 30:22.280]  of my
[30:22.280 --> 30:22.740]  time tracking
[30:33.460 --> 30:34.460]  down denial
[30:34.460 --> 30:35.460]  of service
[30:22.740 --> 30:23.900]  attacks against
[30:23.900 --> 30:24.760]  DNS servers
[30:24.760 --> 30:25.940]  and my
[30:26.280 --> 30:27.420]  job gets a
[30:27.420 --> 30:28.820]  lot easier
[30:28.820 --> 30:30.080]  when I know
[30:30.280 --> 30:30.500]  that a
[30:30.500 --> 30:31.400]  given flow
[30:31.400 --> 30:32.140]  really does
[30:32.140 --> 30:33.020]  have valid
[30:33.020 --> 30:34.900]  source addresses.
[30:34.900 --> 30:35.260]  What could
[30:35.260 --> 30:36.020]  they have done
[30:36.020 --> 30:37.900]  differently?
[30:37.900 --> 30:38.420]  Well, it all
[30:38.420 --> 30:38.840]  needed to be
[30:38.840 --> 30:39.480]  done on day
[30:39.480 --> 30:40.020]  one because
[30:40.020 --> 30:41.020]  once you
[30:41.020 --> 30:42.080]  sort of
[30:42.080 --> 30:42.560]  let this
[30:42.560 --> 30:42.980]  genie out
[30:42.980 --> 30:43.360]  of the
[30:43.360 --> 30:43.680]  bottle,
[30:43.680 --> 30:44.220]  then it
[30:44.220 --> 30:44.800]  can dictate
[30:44.800 --> 30:45.600]  terms to
[30:45.640 --> 30:45.960]  you.
[30:45.960 --> 30:46.140]  But on day
[30:46.140 --> 30:46.560]  one, they
[30:46.560 --> 30:46.940]  needed to
[30:46.940 --> 30:47.420]  fix it so
[30:47.420 --> 30:47.840]  that source
[30:47.840 --> 30:48.580]  addresses had
[30:48.580 --> 30:49.200]  to be right
[30:49.200 --> 30:49.560]  from the
[30:49.560 --> 30:49.980]  moment they
[30:49.980 --> 30:50.640]  entered your
[30:51.920 --> 30:52.440]  network.
[30:52.440 --> 30:52.780]  At every
[30:52.780 --> 30:53.300]  edge, you
[30:53.300 --> 30:54.400]  know what
[30:54.400 --> 30:55.240]  destination
[30:55.240 --> 30:56.040]  addresses would
[30:56.040 --> 30:56.940]  possibly reach
[30:56.940 --> 30:57.700]  that customer.
[30:57.700 --> 30:57.900]  You could
[30:57.900 --> 30:58.380]  just demand
[30:58.380 --> 30:58.680]  that they
[30:58.680 --> 30:59.280]  only use
[30:59.280 --> 30:59.940]  source addresses
[30:59.940 --> 31:00.380]  that are in
[31:00.380 --> 31:00.720]  the same
[31:00.720 --> 31:01.540]  range.
[31:01.580 --> 31:01.900]  It's not
[31:01.900 --> 31:02.680]  that hard.
[31:02.680 --> 31:03.160]  Even in
[31:03.940 --> 31:04.700]  1980, it
[31:04.700 --> 31:04.980]  was not
[31:04.980 --> 31:05.940]  that hard.
[31:06.420 --> 31:06.800]  You can
[31:06.800 --> 31:07.320]  also make
[31:07.320 --> 31:08.100]  sure at
[31:08.100 --> 31:08.360]  every
[31:08.360 --> 31:09.020]  core router
[31:09.020 --> 31:09.300]  on the
[31:09.300 --> 31:09.560]  internet
[31:09.560 --> 31:11.280]  that, well,
[31:11.280 --> 31:11.580]  maybe you
[31:11.580 --> 31:11.840]  don't know
[31:11.840 --> 31:12.160]  where it
[31:12.160 --> 31:12.680]  came from
[31:12.680 --> 31:13.260]  because by
[31:13.260 --> 31:13.700]  that time
[31:13.700 --> 31:14.040]  you don't
[31:14.040 --> 31:14.460]  know which
[31:14.460 --> 31:15.080]  edge it
[31:15.080 --> 31:15.380]  started
[31:15.380 --> 31:16.180]  at, but
[31:16.180 --> 31:16.720]  you could
[31:16.720 --> 31:17.840]  just demand
[31:17.840 --> 31:18.380]  that the
[31:18.380 --> 31:18.660]  source
[31:18.660 --> 31:19.220]  address be
[31:19.220 --> 31:19.620]  in the
[31:19.620 --> 31:19.820]  routing
[31:19.820 --> 31:20.240]  table
[31:20.240 --> 31:21.280]  somewhere.
[31:21.720 --> 31:22.280]  Just drop
[31:22.280 --> 31:22.960]  it as soon
[31:22.960 --> 31:23.940]  as possible
[31:23.940 --> 31:24.600]  inside the
[31:24.600 --> 31:25.140]  core if it
[31:25.140 --> 31:25.720]  has net
[31:25.720 --> 31:26.520]  zero as
[31:26.520 --> 31:27.960]  its source
[31:27.960 --> 31:28.580]  address or
[31:28.580 --> 31:29.380]  net 10 or
[31:29.380 --> 31:30.400]  what have you.
[31:30.740 --> 31:31.560]  This is not
[31:31.560 --> 31:32.020]  hard.
[31:32.020 --> 31:32.440]  It would
[31:32.440 --> 31:32.700]  not have
[31:32.700 --> 31:33.020]  been hard
[31:33.020 --> 31:34.120]  in 1980.
[31:34.640 --> 31:35.260]  As to
[31:35.260 --> 31:35.560]  why they
[31:35.560 --> 31:35.920]  didn't do
[31:35.920 --> 31:36.780]  it, it's
[31:36.900 --> 31:37.600]  a mystery.
[31:45.520 --> 31:46.220]  Okay, this
[31:46.220 --> 31:47.760]  is my
[31:47.760 --> 31:48.200]  special
[31:48.200 --> 31:49.460]  area.
[31:50.000 --> 31:50.720]  I can
[31:50.720 --> 31:51.580]  rant longer
[31:51.580 --> 31:51.920]  and harder
[31:51.920 --> 31:52.540]  about DNS
[31:52.540 --> 31:53.100]  than any
[31:53.100 --> 31:53.620]  other topic
[31:53.620 --> 31:54.160]  I can think
[31:54.160 --> 31:54.520]  of and
[31:54.520 --> 31:55.100]  maybe more
[31:55.100 --> 31:55.440]  than any
[31:55.440 --> 31:55.940]  other person
[31:55.940 --> 31:56.280]  you can
[31:56.280 --> 31:57.040]  meet.
[31:58.140 --> 31:58.860]  A lot
[31:58.860 --> 31:59.180]  has been
[31:59.180 --> 31:59.700]  done wrong
[31:59.700 --> 32:00.500]  here.
[32:03.600 --> 32:04.560]  They said
[32:04.560 --> 32:05.180]  that .mil
[32:05.180 --> 32:05.860]  and .gov
[32:05.860 --> 32:06.380]  were for
[32:06.380 --> 32:07.100]  military and
[32:07.100 --> 32:07.600]  government,
[32:07.600 --> 32:07.800]  but they
[32:07.800 --> 32:08.220]  really meant
[32:08.220 --> 32:08.540]  their own
[32:08.540 --> 32:08.980]  military
[32:08.980 --> 32:09.240]  and
[32:09.240 --> 32:10.060]  government.
[32:10.140 --> 32:10.440]  Probably
[32:10.440 --> 32:11.180]  meant that
[32:11.180 --> 32:12.280]  com, edu
[32:12.280 --> 32:13.180]  and net
[32:13.180 --> 32:13.740]  were also
[32:13.740 --> 32:14.780]  for American
[32:14.780 --> 32:16.060]  companies,
[32:16.060 --> 32:16.760]  universities
[32:16.760 --> 32:17.360]  and network
[32:17.360 --> 32:18.580]  providers too,
[32:18.580 --> 32:19.060]  but they
[32:19.060 --> 32:19.580]  failed to
[32:19.580 --> 32:20.160]  get that
[32:20.160 --> 32:20.500]  out.
[32:20.500 --> 32:23.020]  This has a
[32:23.020 --> 32:24.040]  distinctly
[32:24.040 --> 32:24.280]  American
[32:24.280 --> 32:24.520]  feel to
[32:24.520 --> 32:24.900]  it, in
[32:24.900 --> 32:25.280]  the same
[32:25.280 --> 32:26.160]  way the
[32:26.160 --> 32:26.480]  telephone
[32:26.480 --> 32:26.540]  system
[32:26.540 --> 32:26.700]  does.
[32:26.700 --> 32:27.500]  I don't
[32:27.500 --> 32:27.780]  know about
[32:27.780 --> 32:28.060]  most of
[32:28.060 --> 32:29.260]  you, but
[32:37.180 --> 32:38.180]  the
[32:38.180 --> 32:39.180]  country
[32:39.180 --> 32:40.180]  code
[32:29.260 --> 32:29.420]  for
[32:29.420 --> 32:29.620]  my
[32:29.620 --> 32:29.880]  cell
[32:29.880 --> 32:30.080]  phone
[32:30.080 --> 32:30.340]  is
[32:30.340 --> 32:31.540]  one.
[32:32.440 --> 32:33.300]  They needed
[32:33.300 --> 32:33.560]  to get
[32:33.560 --> 32:34.200]  ITU
[32:34.200 --> 32:34.880]  involved
[32:34.880 --> 32:35.580]  early,
[32:35.580 --> 32:36.400]  so they
[32:36.400 --> 32:37.060]  were not
[32:37.060 --> 32:38.240]  trying to
[32:39.860 --> 32:40.520]  legislate
[32:40.520 --> 32:41.000]  things that
[32:41.000 --> 32:41.380]  affected
[32:41.380 --> 32:42.060]  national
[32:42.060 --> 32:43.200]  sovereignty.
[32:43.240 --> 32:43.760]  They needed
[32:43.760 --> 32:44.100]  to get
[32:44.100 --> 32:44.440]  the
[32:44.440 --> 32:44.980]  existing
[32:44.980 --> 32:45.760]  organization
[32:45.760 --> 32:46.900]  that had
[32:46.900 --> 32:47.140]  already
[32:47.140 --> 32:47.580]  had that
[32:47.580 --> 32:47.840]  power
[32:47.840 --> 32:48.400]  delegated
[32:48.400 --> 32:48.780]  to them
[32:48.780 --> 32:49.220]  by all
[32:49.220 --> 32:50.080]  those sovereign
[32:50.080 --> 32:51.080]  nations,
[32:51.080 --> 32:51.380]  get them
[32:51.380 --> 32:51.700]  involved
[32:51.700 --> 32:52.080]  early,
[32:52.080 --> 32:52.660]  so the
[32:52.660 --> 32:53.540]  whole
[32:53.540 --> 32:54.080]  argument
[32:54.080 --> 32:54.660]  could be
[32:54.660 --> 32:55.200]  moved to
[32:55.200 --> 32:55.620]  the other
[32:55.620 --> 32:56.140]  guy's
[32:56.140 --> 32:56.640]  backyard
[32:56.640 --> 32:57.300]  instead of
[32:57.300 --> 32:57.820]  having them
[32:57.820 --> 32:58.340]  come visit
[32:58.340 --> 32:59.320]  us.
[33:00.800 --> 33:01.560]  They needed
[33:01.700 --> 33:01.860]  a much
[33:01.860 --> 33:02.540]  better plan
[33:02.540 --> 33:03.020]  for adding
[33:03.020 --> 33:04.620]  new TLDs.
[33:04.620 --> 33:06.380]  Right now,
[33:07.660 --> 33:08.780]  it's ICANN,
[33:08.780 --> 33:09.060]  but for
[33:09.060 --> 33:09.800]  many years,
[33:09.800 --> 33:10.180]  there was
[33:10.180 --> 33:10.720]  an RFC
[33:10.720 --> 33:12.160]  that said
[33:12.160 --> 33:13.240]  that IETF
[33:13.240 --> 33:14.100]  was responsible
[33:14.100 --> 33:14.920]  for determining
[33:14.920 --> 33:15.660]  when a new
[33:15.660 --> 33:16.160]  top-level
[33:16.160 --> 33:17.000]  domain would
[33:17.000 --> 33:17.520]  exist.
[33:17.520 --> 33:18.200]  Well, the
[33:18.200 --> 33:19.320]  E in IETF
[33:19.320 --> 33:19.820]  stands for
[33:19.820 --> 33:21.080]  engineering,
[33:21.080 --> 33:21.880]  and the
[33:21.880 --> 33:22.340]  creation of
[33:22.340 --> 33:22.780]  top-level
[33:22.780 --> 33:23.380]  domains and
[33:23.380 --> 33:23.860]  the selection
[33:23.860 --> 33:24.220]  of which
[33:24.220 --> 33:24.700]  ones ought
[33:24.700 --> 33:25.200]  to exist
[33:25.200 --> 33:26.080]  and who
[33:26.080 --> 33:26.320]  they ought
[33:26.320 --> 33:26.860]  to belong
[33:26.860 --> 33:27.320]  to is
[33:27.320 --> 33:27.880]  not an
[33:27.880 --> 33:28.280]  engineering
[33:28.280 --> 33:29.380]  decision.
[33:30.140 --> 33:39.180]  And you
[33:39.180 --> 33:39.420]  can't
[33:39.420 --> 33:40.180]  say, you
[33:40.180 --> 33:40.600]  know, dot
[33:40.600 --> 33:41.160]  black hat
[33:41.160 --> 33:41.960]  or dot
[33:42.320 --> 33:42.680]  Microsoft
[33:42.680 --> 33:43.480]  or whatever,
[33:43.480 --> 33:44.280]  but I think
[33:44.280 --> 33:44.600]  there ought to
[33:44.600 --> 33:45.320]  be more.
[33:45.320 --> 33:45.600]  I think
[33:45.600 --> 33:46.000]  that this
[33:46.000 --> 33:46.240]  ought to
[33:46.240 --> 33:47.200]  be a
[33:47.200 --> 33:47.980]  more open
[33:47.980 --> 33:48.600]  vehicle,
[33:48.600 --> 33:48.800]  and we
[33:48.800 --> 33:48.980]  ought to
[33:48.980 --> 33:49.620]  be trying
[33:49.620 --> 33:50.120]  a lot of
[33:50.120 --> 33:50.320]  things,
[33:50.320 --> 33:50.680]  and if some
[33:50.680 --> 33:50.920]  of them
[33:50.920 --> 33:51.440]  don't work
[33:51.440 --> 33:52.060]  out, we
[33:52.060 --> 33:52.380]  should say,
[33:52.380 --> 33:52.740]  okay, that
[33:52.740 --> 33:53.220]  didn't work
[33:53.220 --> 33:53.580]  out, we'll
[33:53.580 --> 33:54.040]  delete it
[33:54.040 --> 33:54.780]  now.
[33:55.560 --> 33:56.160]  Had they done
[33:56.160 --> 33:57.140]  that, then
[33:57.140 --> 33:58.060]  the current
[33:58.060 --> 33:58.680]  food fight
[33:58.680 --> 33:59.280]  over who
[33:59.280 --> 34:00.000]  controls the
[34:00.000 --> 34:00.420]  top-level
[34:00.420 --> 34:01.420]  domain space
[34:01.980 --> 34:02.840]  would be, I
[34:02.840 --> 34:03.240]  think, a lot
[34:03.240 --> 34:03.760]  more polite
[34:03.760 --> 34:04.780]  than it is.
[34:06.640 --> 34:07.360]  They also
[34:07.360 --> 34:08.800]  allowed Network
[34:08.800 --> 34:09.780]  Solutions, which
[34:09.780 --> 34:10.660]  is a predecessor
[34:10.660 --> 34:12.280]  of Verisign,
[34:12.280 --> 34:12.820]  to begin
[34:12.820 --> 34:13.640]  charging for
[34:13.640 --> 34:15.580]  domains back
[34:16.400 --> 34:16.740]  when it was
[34:16.740 --> 34:17.200]  still a Navy
[34:17.200 --> 34:18.060]  contract, and
[34:18.060 --> 34:18.680]  there was no
[34:18.680 --> 34:19.500]  provision at all
[34:19.500 --> 34:20.020]  for what we
[34:20.020 --> 34:20.700]  have now, which
[34:20.700 --> 34:20.940]  is the
[34:20.940 --> 34:21.980]  registry-registrar
[34:21.980 --> 34:22.980]  split.
[34:23.060 --> 34:23.440]  And so they
[34:23.440 --> 34:24.440]  let NSI
[34:24.440 --> 34:25.200]  collect $30
[34:25.680 --> 34:26.180]  a year per
[34:26.180 --> 34:27.360]  domain for
[34:27.360 --> 34:28.340]  years, while
[34:28.340 --> 34:28.760]  the whole
[34:28.760 --> 34:29.280]  white-paper
[34:29.280 --> 34:30.020]  process and
[34:30.020 --> 34:30.500]  the whole
[34:31.100 --> 34:31.980]  RRP and
[34:31.980 --> 34:32.720]  EPP and
[34:32.720 --> 34:33.120]  the rest of
[34:33.120 --> 34:33.500]  that stuff
[34:33.500 --> 34:34.780]  got done,
[34:35.680 --> 34:36.360]  we're going
[34:36.360 --> 34:36.820]  to be stuck
[34:36.820 --> 34:37.400]  with
[34:37.400 --> 34:38.080]  Verisign
[34:38.080 --> 34:39.000]  forever as
[34:39.140 --> 34:39.420]  a result
[34:39.420 --> 34:39.900]  of this
[34:39.900 --> 34:40.880]  decision.
[34:43.080 --> 34:43.800]  What could
[34:43.800 --> 34:44.040]  they have
[34:44.040 --> 34:44.880]  done?
[34:48.020 --> 34:48.820]  How did
[34:48.820 --> 34:49.500]  we decide
[34:50.720 --> 34:51.540]  to do,
[34:51.540 --> 34:51.900]  I don't
[34:51.900 --> 34:53.200]  know,
[34:53.200 --> 34:53.800]  international
[34:53.800 --> 34:54.580]  telephony?
[34:54.580 --> 34:54.820]  How did
[34:54.820 --> 34:55.300]  we decide
[34:55.300 --> 34:55.680]  to do
[34:55.680 --> 34:56.240]  international
[34:56.240 --> 34:57.220]  post?
[34:57.700 --> 34:58.480]  Who decided
[34:58.480 --> 34:58.820]  what the
[34:58.820 --> 34:59.420]  settlements would
[34:59.420 --> 35:01.080]  be for,
[35:01.080 --> 35:01.480]  gee, I bought
[35:01.620 --> 35:01.980]  a stamp in
[35:01.980 --> 35:02.560]  this country,
[35:02.560 --> 35:02.880]  but you're
[35:02.880 --> 35:03.400]  delivering it
[35:03.400 --> 35:03.680]  in that
[35:03.680 --> 35:04.300]  country, and
[35:04.300 --> 35:05.140]  vice versa,
[35:05.140 --> 35:05.600]  and I sent
[35:05.600 --> 35:05.980]  you more
[35:05.980 --> 35:06.420]  mail than
[35:06.420 --> 35:06.800]  you sent
[35:06.800 --> 35:07.260]  me.
[35:07.260 --> 35:07.880]  How did we
[35:07.880 --> 35:08.340]  carve up
[35:08.340 --> 35:09.280]  Antarctica?
[35:09.820 --> 35:10.980]  How will we
[35:10.980 --> 35:11.580]  carve up the
[35:11.580 --> 35:11.860]  moon?
[35:11.860 --> 35:12.280]  Well, we're
[35:12.280 --> 35:12.860]  going to get
[35:12.860 --> 35:13.440]  diplomats
[35:13.440 --> 35:14.020]  involved and
[35:14.020 --> 35:14.420]  say, go
[35:14.420 --> 35:15.400]  handle it.
[35:15.920 --> 35:16.660]  For this,
[35:16.660 --> 35:16.980]  we didn't
[35:16.980 --> 35:17.360]  do that,
[35:17.360 --> 35:17.760]  we said,
[35:17.760 --> 35:18.080]  oh, we're
[35:18.080 --> 35:18.600]  engineers,
[35:18.600 --> 35:18.920]  we know
[35:18.920 --> 35:19.300]  how to
[35:19.300 --> 35:19.920]  get this
[35:19.920 --> 35:20.620]  done.
[35:20.800 --> 35:21.200]  The
[35:21.200 --> 35:21.740]  evidence to
[35:21.740 --> 35:21.880]  date
[35:21.880 --> 35:22.380]  suggests
[35:22.380 --> 35:23.320]  otherwise.
[35:32.150 --> 35:32.870]  I have
[35:32.870 --> 35:33.610]  been a
[35:34.430 --> 35:35.330]  member of
[35:35.330 --> 35:35.470]  the
[35:35.470 --> 35:36.270]  IETF,
[35:36.270 --> 35:36.530]  which is
[35:36.530 --> 35:37.070]  to say I'm
[35:37.070 --> 35:37.430]  on some
[35:37.430 --> 35:37.690]  of their
[35:37.690 --> 35:37.950]  mailing
[35:37.950 --> 35:38.470]  lists and
[35:38.470 --> 35:38.850]  I attend
[35:38.850 --> 35:39.470]  some of
[35:39.470 --> 35:39.570]  their
[35:39.570 --> 35:39.970]  meetings
[35:42.250 --> 35:43.370]  for,
[35:44.210 --> 35:45.050]  I think
[35:45.050 --> 35:46.770]  12 years,
[35:46.770 --> 35:48.310]  and I've
[35:48.310 --> 35:50.010]  seen a
[35:50.010 --> 35:50.790]  lot of
[35:50.790 --> 35:51.450]  bad stuff
[35:51.450 --> 35:51.790]  come and
[35:51.790 --> 35:54.850]  go.
[35:54.850 --> 35:55.730]  They built
[35:55.730 --> 35:57.010]  a standards
[35:57.450 --> 35:57.730]  organization
[35:57.730 --> 35:58.290]  originally that
[35:58.290 --> 35:58.870]  was 50
[35:58.970 --> 35:59.150]  friends and
[36:01.610 --> 36:02.610]  a white
[35:59.150 --> 35:59.850]  board.
[36:00.630 --> 36:01.510]  And I
[36:01.510 --> 36:01.950]  think you
[36:01.950 --> 36:02.190]  can
[36:02.190 --> 36:03.330]  imagine,
[36:03.330 --> 36:03.670]  you know,
[36:03.670 --> 36:04.150]  if you
[36:04.150 --> 36:04.570]  could pick
[36:04.570 --> 36:05.290]  50 people
[36:05.290 --> 36:05.730]  on a
[36:05.730 --> 36:07.050]  white board
[36:07.050 --> 36:07.570]  and you
[36:08.110 --> 36:08.690]  could come
[36:08.690 --> 36:08.950]  up with
[36:08.950 --> 36:09.470]  some pretty
[36:09.470 --> 36:09.990]  cool stuff
[36:09.990 --> 36:10.210]  and it
[36:10.210 --> 36:10.750]  would work
[36:10.750 --> 36:11.030]  and it
[36:11.770 --> 36:12.650]  would be
[36:12.650 --> 36:12.850]  successful
[36:12.850 --> 36:13.170]  in the
[36:13.170 --> 36:13.390]  market
[36:13.390 --> 36:13.750]  and so
[36:13.750 --> 36:15.310]  on.
[36:15.310 --> 36:15.610]  And so
[36:15.610 --> 36:16.010]  they did
[36:16.010 --> 36:16.470]  that because
[36:16.470 --> 36:16.650]  they knew
[36:16.650 --> 36:16.930]  that it
[36:16.930 --> 36:17.310]  would work
[36:17.310 --> 36:17.530]  and it
[36:17.530 --> 36:17.750]  would be
[36:17.750 --> 36:18.250]  successful
[36:18.250 --> 36:18.530]  and it
[36:18.530 --> 36:18.790]  would be
[36:18.790 --> 36:19.210]  fun and
[36:19.210 --> 36:19.450]  they had
[36:19.450 --> 36:19.690]  many
[36:19.690 --> 36:19.990]  fine
[36:19.990 --> 36:20.310]  lunches
[36:20.310 --> 36:20.470]  and
[36:20.470 --> 36:20.710]  dinners
[36:20.710 --> 36:21.570]  around it.
[36:22.410 --> 36:22.770]  They
[36:24.490 --> 36:25.210]  planned for
[36:25.210 --> 36:25.490]  global
[36:25.490 --> 36:26.350]  domination.
[36:26.350 --> 36:26.730]  They wanted
[36:26.730 --> 36:27.070]  it to be
[36:27.070 --> 36:27.490]  the case
[36:27.490 --> 36:28.070]  that IP
[36:28.070 --> 36:28.830]  would beat
[36:28.830 --> 36:29.630]  ISO.
[36:29.850 --> 36:30.170]  They did
[36:30.170 --> 36:30.630]  not ever
[36:30.630 --> 36:30.870]  want to
[36:30.870 --> 36:31.130]  have to
[36:31.130 --> 36:31.330]  run
[36:31.330 --> 36:32.010]  TP4
[36:32.010 --> 36:32.970]  or X25
[36:32.970 --> 36:33.450]  or anything
[36:33.450 --> 36:33.950]  like that
[36:33.950 --> 36:34.270]  in their
[36:34.270 --> 36:34.710]  enterprise
[36:34.710 --> 36:35.790]  or ATM.
[36:36.250 --> 36:36.910]  So they
[36:36.910 --> 36:37.250]  really
[36:37.250 --> 36:39.330]  thought hard
[36:39.330 --> 36:39.790]  about how
[36:39.790 --> 36:40.070]  to make
[36:40.070 --> 36:40.490]  sure this
[36:40.490 --> 36:40.970]  would be
[36:40.970 --> 36:41.130]  the
[36:41.130 --> 36:41.430]  dominant
[36:41.430 --> 36:42.610]  technology.
[36:42.610 --> 36:43.050]  But what
[36:43.050 --> 36:43.430]  they didn't
[36:43.430 --> 36:44.310]  realize is
[36:44.310 --> 36:45.650]  if you
[36:45.650 --> 36:46.210]  span the
[36:46.210 --> 36:46.730]  globe,
[36:46.730 --> 36:47.490]  then people
[36:47.490 --> 36:47.930]  from all
[36:47.930 --> 36:48.290]  over the
[36:48.290 --> 36:48.710]  globe are
[36:48.710 --> 36:49.010]  going to
[36:49.010 --> 36:49.330]  want to
[36:49.330 --> 36:49.850]  come and
[36:49.850 --> 36:50.790]  help with
[36:50.790 --> 36:51.010]  this
[36:51.010 --> 36:51.330]  protocol
[36:51.330 --> 36:51.770]  development
[36:51.770 --> 36:52.790]  process.
[36:52.790 --> 36:53.110]  They will
[36:53.110 --> 36:53.410]  have their
[36:53.410 --> 36:53.970]  own ideas
[36:53.970 --> 36:54.650]  and you
[36:54.650 --> 36:54.970]  will have
[36:54.970 --> 36:55.390]  to have
[36:55.550 --> 36:55.850]  a standards
[36:55.850 --> 36:56.470]  organization
[36:56.470 --> 36:56.910]  that is
[36:56.910 --> 36:57.570]  capable of
[36:57.570 --> 36:57.850]  letting
[36:57.850 --> 36:58.290]  all those
[36:58.290 --> 36:58.870]  people in
[36:58.870 --> 36:59.390]  but not
[36:59.390 --> 36:59.890]  turning the
[36:59.890 --> 37:00.290]  discussion
[37:00.290 --> 37:01.570]  to mud.
[37:01.990 --> 37:02.730]  They had
[37:02.730 --> 37:03.150]  no such
[37:03.150 --> 37:03.930]  plan.
[37:03.930 --> 37:04.270]  They still
[37:04.270 --> 37:04.690]  have no
[37:04.690 --> 37:04.890]  such
[37:04.890 --> 37:05.290]  plan.
[37:05.290 --> 37:05.410]  They
[37:05.410 --> 37:05.930]  periodically
[37:05.930 --> 37:06.690]  reform it
[37:07.570 --> 37:08.330]  based on
[37:08.330 --> 37:09.510]  hindsight.
[37:10.970 --> 37:11.270]  In other
[37:11.270 --> 37:11.730]  words, they
[37:11.730 --> 37:12.410]  say how
[37:12.410 --> 37:12.750]  can we
[37:12.750 --> 37:13.110]  avoid the
[37:13.110 --> 37:13.790]  problems of
[37:13.790 --> 37:14.490]  recent years
[37:14.490 --> 37:14.870]  in what
[37:14.870 --> 37:15.150]  we do
[37:15.150 --> 37:15.950]  next.
[37:16.290 --> 37:16.790]  But they
[37:16.790 --> 37:17.230]  never asked
[37:17.230 --> 37:17.770]  the question
[37:18.270 --> 37:18.910]  how can
[37:18.910 --> 37:19.150]  we get
[37:19.150 --> 37:19.650]  back to
[37:19.650 --> 37:19.930]  the good
[37:19.930 --> 37:20.610]  old days.
[37:20.610 --> 37:20.870]  How
[37:20.870 --> 37:21.110]  could
[37:21.110 --> 37:21.550]  something
[37:21.550 --> 37:22.350]  like
[37:22.350 --> 37:23.570]  DNS or
[37:23.570 --> 37:24.390]  SMTP
[37:24.390 --> 37:25.050]  possibly
[37:25.050 --> 37:26.510]  survive the
[37:26.510 --> 37:27.010]  current
[37:27.010 --> 37:27.710]  IETF
[37:27.710 --> 37:28.610]  process or
[37:28.610 --> 37:29.210]  the one we
[37:29.210 --> 37:29.590]  plan to
[37:29.590 --> 37:30.030]  have after
[37:30.030 --> 37:30.370]  the next
[37:30.370 --> 37:31.270]  reform.
[37:31.310 --> 37:31.970]  That's not a
[37:31.970 --> 37:32.710]  litmus test
[37:32.710 --> 37:33.070]  they use.
[37:33.070 --> 37:33.610]  All they're
[37:33.610 --> 37:34.130]  trying to
[37:34.130 --> 37:34.890]  do is
[37:34.890 --> 37:35.110]  fix
[37:35.110 --> 37:35.270]  whatever
[37:35.270 --> 37:35.830]  they think
[37:35.830 --> 37:36.150]  is wrong
[37:36.150 --> 37:36.830]  looking at
[37:36.830 --> 37:36.990]  the
[37:36.990 --> 37:37.170]  previous
[37:37.170 --> 37:38.190]  year or
[37:38.310 --> 37:38.570]  two.
[37:38.570 --> 37:38.670]  As a
[37:57.380 --> 37:58.380]  result,
[37:38.670 --> 37:38.710]  the
[37:38.710 --> 37:39.390]  reform is
[37:39.390 --> 37:39.910]  continuous
[37:39.910 --> 37:40.310]  and
[37:40.310 --> 37:41.570]  ineffective.
[37:49.800 --> 37:50.600]  The
[37:50.600 --> 37:50.800]  Internet
[37:50.800 --> 37:51.380]  activities
[37:51.380 --> 37:52.100]  board is
[37:52.100 --> 37:52.620]  logically
[37:52.620 --> 37:53.720]  separate from
[37:53.720 --> 37:55.100]  the IETF
[37:55.100 --> 37:55.600]  although it
[37:55.600 --> 37:56.040]  is the
[37:56.040 --> 37:56.420]  titular
[37:56.420 --> 37:57.020]  head of
[37:57.020 --> 37:58.480]  IETF.
[37:58.500 --> 37:58.700]  There's
[37:59.320 --> 37:59.600]  a whole
[37:59.600 --> 38:00.120]  hairball
[38:00.120 --> 38:00.480]  of
[38:00.480 --> 38:01.500]  organizations
[38:01.500 --> 38:02.100]  starting
[38:02.100 --> 38:02.340]  with
[38:02.340 --> 38:03.460]  I.
[38:03.620 --> 38:04.420]  IAB
[38:04.420 --> 38:05.280]  is where
[38:05.280 --> 38:05.600]  the
[38:05.600 --> 38:06.160]  architectural
[38:06.160 --> 38:06.880]  vision is
[38:06.880 --> 38:07.340]  supposed to
[38:07.340 --> 38:08.320]  come from.
[38:08.420 --> 38:08.980]  These people
[38:08.980 --> 38:10.880]  are selected
[38:10.880 --> 38:11.700]  by a
[38:11.700 --> 38:12.220]  nominations
[38:12.220 --> 38:12.900]  committee of
[38:12.900 --> 38:14.500]  the IETF
[38:14.500 --> 38:15.240]  body.
[38:15.240 --> 38:15.780]  I've been
[38:15.780 --> 38:16.200]  asked to be
[38:16.200 --> 38:16.840]  on that
[38:16.840 --> 38:17.220]  committee a
[38:17.220 --> 38:17.600]  couple of
[38:17.600 --> 38:18.060]  times and
[38:18.060 --> 38:20.800]  have said
[38:20.800 --> 38:21.140]  no.
[38:21.140 --> 38:21.280]  In other
[38:21.280 --> 38:21.960]  words, it
[38:21.960 --> 38:22.500]  is selected
[38:22.500 --> 38:22.840]  by people
[38:22.840 --> 38:23.360]  like me
[38:23.360 --> 38:23.540]  who said
[38:23.540 --> 38:24.280]  yes, I
[38:24.280 --> 38:24.940]  will help
[38:24.940 --> 38:26.420]  make those
[38:26.420 --> 38:26.740]  selections.
[38:34.160 --> 38:35.160]  The IAB
[38:26.740 --> 38:27.200]  has in
[38:27.200 --> 38:27.560]  the past
[38:27.560 --> 38:28.140]  said that
[38:28.140 --> 38:28.820]  firewalls
[38:28.820 --> 38:29.120]  were an
[38:29.120 --> 38:29.620]  unnecessary
[38:29.620 --> 38:30.500]  evil.
[38:30.500 --> 38:30.660]  And that
[38:32.960 --> 38:33.860]  hosts just
[38:33.860 --> 38:34.120]  ought to
[38:34.120 --> 38:35.320]  be hardened.
[38:35.480 --> 38:36.200]  Well, okay,
[38:36.200 --> 38:36.620]  you can say
[38:36.620 --> 38:37.140]  that, but
[38:37.140 --> 38:37.680]  that's not
[38:37.680 --> 38:38.160]  what people
[38:38.160 --> 38:39.020]  are doing.
[38:39.540 --> 38:39.940]  They said
[38:39.940 --> 38:40.340]  that NAT
[38:40.340 --> 38:40.760]  was an
[38:40.760 --> 38:41.220]  unnecessary
[38:41.220 --> 38:42.340]  evil and
[38:42.340 --> 38:42.780]  that rather
[38:42.780 --> 38:43.260]  than
[38:43.260 --> 38:44.200]  promote NAT
[38:44.200 --> 38:44.540]  and come
[38:44.540 --> 38:44.840]  up with
[38:44.840 --> 38:45.240]  firewall
[38:45.240 --> 38:45.920]  traversal
[38:45.920 --> 38:46.700]  protocols and
[38:46.700 --> 38:47.220]  just make
[38:47.220 --> 38:47.860]  everybody use
[38:47.860 --> 38:48.260]  NAT and
[38:48.260 --> 38:48.680]  only have
[38:48.680 --> 38:49.240]  real addresses
[38:49.240 --> 38:49.540]  in the
[38:49.540 --> 38:50.060]  core which
[38:50.060 --> 38:51.220]  worked,
[38:51.220 --> 38:51.800]  they said,
[38:51.800 --> 38:52.180]  no, we
[38:52.180 --> 38:52.560]  just think
[38:52.560 --> 38:53.320]  NAT is a
[38:53.320 --> 38:53.920]  bad design
[38:53.920 --> 38:54.160]  and we're
[38:54.160 --> 38:54.500]  going to
[38:54.500 --> 38:54.720]  come up
[38:54.720 --> 38:55.460]  with
[38:55.460 --> 38:55.800]  IPv6
[38:55.800 --> 38:56.260]  and that
[38:56.260 --> 38:57.060]  will kill
[38:57.060 --> 38:57.480]  NAT.
[38:57.480 --> 38:57.600]  And once
[38:57.600 --> 38:58.040]  again, I
[38:58.040 --> 38:58.640]  have to
[38:58.760 --> 38:59.020]  say that
[38:59.020 --> 38:59.480]  is a
[39:14.580 --> 39:15.580]  fine
[39:15.580 --> 39:16.580]  philosophy
[38:59.480 --> 39:00.000]  to have,
[39:00.000 --> 39:00.340]  but that's
[39:00.340 --> 39:00.800]  not what
[39:00.800 --> 39:01.180]  people are
[39:01.180 --> 39:01.900]  doing.
[39:05.880 --> 39:07.100]  Tony Lee,
[39:07.100 --> 39:07.480]  who was
[39:07.480 --> 39:08.300]  then at
[39:08.300 --> 39:08.700]  that time
[39:08.840 --> 39:09.080]  a Cisco
[39:09.080 --> 39:09.720]  employee,
[39:09.720 --> 39:10.060]  made the
[39:10.060 --> 39:10.380]  famous
[39:10.380 --> 39:10.800]  comment
[39:10.800 --> 39:11.040]  about
[39:11.040 --> 39:11.760]  IPv6,
[39:11.760 --> 39:11.980]  he said
[39:11.980 --> 39:12.340]  it's too
[39:12.340 --> 39:12.580]  little
[39:12.580 --> 39:12.820]  too
[39:12.820 --> 39:13.680]  soon.
[39:14.040 --> 39:14.480]  We don't
[39:14.480 --> 39:14.800]  need it
[39:14.800 --> 39:15.380]  yet and
[39:15.380 --> 39:15.700]  the things
[39:15.700 --> 39:16.160]  we need
[39:16.160 --> 39:16.800]  are way
[39:16.800 --> 39:17.580]  bigger and
[39:17.580 --> 39:18.200]  the list
[39:18.200 --> 39:18.580]  is way
[39:18.580 --> 39:19.120]  longer than
[39:19.120 --> 39:19.880]  what people
[39:19.880 --> 39:20.360]  are planning
[39:20.360 --> 39:22.040]  on providing,
[39:22.740 --> 39:23.460]  but that's
[39:23.460 --> 39:23.740]  what the
[39:23.740 --> 39:24.600]  IAV decided
[39:24.600 --> 39:25.460]  on and it
[39:25.460 --> 39:25.980]  was there
[39:25.980 --> 39:26.340]  that the
[39:26.340 --> 39:26.880]  decision was
[39:26.880 --> 39:27.600]  made.
[39:28.980 --> 39:30.040]  And those of
[39:30.040 --> 39:30.380]  you in
[39:30.380 --> 39:31.060]  business know
[39:31.060 --> 39:31.400]  what the
[39:31.400 --> 39:31.720]  feasible
[39:31.720 --> 39:32.520]  alternative is
[39:32.520 --> 39:32.820]  in this
[39:32.820 --> 39:33.140]  case.
[39:33.140 --> 39:33.500]  You find
[39:33.500 --> 39:33.800]  out who
[39:33.800 --> 39:33.940]  the
[39:33.940 --> 39:34.300]  customer
[39:34.300 --> 39:35.000]  is, ask
[39:35.000 --> 39:35.300]  them what
[39:35.300 --> 39:35.660]  they want
[39:35.660 --> 39:36.020]  and build
[39:36.020 --> 39:36.300]  it for
[39:36.300 --> 39:37.480]  them, rather
[39:37.480 --> 39:38.620]  than saying
[39:38.620 --> 39:39.240]  yes, we are
[39:39.240 --> 39:39.800]  in the
[39:39.800 --> 39:40.380]  ivory tower
[39:40.380 --> 39:40.820]  and we will
[39:40.820 --> 39:41.200]  tell you
[39:41.200 --> 39:41.660]  whether you
[39:41.660 --> 39:41.860]  need
[39:41.860 --> 39:42.440]  NAT or
[39:42.440 --> 39:43.180]  not.
[39:45.000 --> 39:45.580]  Foolishness on
[39:45.580 --> 39:46.540]  its face.
[39:47.040 --> 39:47.380]  And yet
[39:47.380 --> 39:47.800]  they're still
[39:47.800 --> 39:48.460]  defending that
[39:48.460 --> 39:49.240]  policy.
[39:53.860 --> 39:54.300]  ICANN,
[39:54.300 --> 39:54.500]  and I'm
[39:54.500 --> 39:54.840]  down to my
[39:54.840 --> 39:55.260]  last ten
[39:55.260 --> 39:56.000]  minutes,
[39:56.000 --> 39:56.320]  so we'll
[39:56.320 --> 39:56.640]  be doing
[39:56.640 --> 39:57.080]  Q&A
[39:57.080 --> 39:57.320]  out in
[39:57.320 --> 39:57.560]  the hall
[39:57.560 --> 39:58.380]  perhaps.
[39:59.020 --> 39:59.660]  They should
[39:59.660 --> 40:00.060]  never have
[40:00.060 --> 40:00.540]  taken any
[40:00.540 --> 40:01.340]  money from
[40:01.340 --> 40:01.860]  the Department
[40:01.860 --> 40:03.240]  of Commerce,
[40:03.240 --> 40:03.860]  NTIA being
[40:03.860 --> 40:04.300]  the part of
[40:04.300 --> 40:04.740]  the Department
[40:04.740 --> 40:05.200]  of Commerce
[40:05.200 --> 40:05.800]  that faces
[40:06.540 --> 40:07.120]  ICANN,
[40:07.600 --> 40:08.280]  should never
[40:08.280 --> 40:08.600]  have taken
[40:08.600 --> 40:09.100]  money.
[40:09.100 --> 40:09.500]  Once you
[40:09.500 --> 40:09.880]  take money
[40:09.880 --> 40:10.480]  from somebody,
[40:10.480 --> 40:10.940]  they can tell
[40:10.940 --> 40:11.300]  you what to
[40:11.300 --> 40:11.960]  do.
[40:12.280 --> 40:12.960]  They needed
[40:12.960 --> 40:13.580]  to cherish
[40:13.580 --> 40:13.860]  their
[40:13.860 --> 40:14.300]  independence
[40:14.300 --> 40:14.840]  from day
[40:14.840 --> 40:15.580]  one.
[40:17.100 --> 40:17.840]  They also
[40:17.840 --> 40:18.940]  let NTIA
[40:18.940 --> 40:19.420]  guide the
[40:19.420 --> 40:20.040]  charter and
[40:20.040 --> 40:20.420]  the initial
[40:20.420 --> 40:21.160]  board.
[40:21.800 --> 40:22.540]  And, you know,
[40:22.540 --> 40:22.880]  what's up
[40:22.880 --> 40:23.680]  with that?
[40:23.820 --> 40:24.120]  Where did
[40:24.120 --> 40:24.500]  these people
[40:24.500 --> 40:25.080]  come from and
[40:25.080 --> 40:25.400]  why should
[40:25.400 --> 40:25.680]  we be
[40:25.680 --> 40:26.140]  listening to
[40:26.140 --> 40:26.420]  them?
[40:26.420 --> 40:27.140]  That's a
[40:27.140 --> 40:27.540]  question they
[40:27.540 --> 40:27.880]  failed to
[40:27.880 --> 40:29.260]  ask.
[40:29.260 --> 40:29.520]  They used
[40:29.520 --> 40:30.060]  to have a
[40:30.060 --> 40:30.560]  bottom-up
[40:30.560 --> 40:31.140]  at-large
[40:31.140 --> 40:31.880]  sort of
[40:31.880 --> 40:32.880]  representation.
[40:32.880 --> 40:33.140]  They would
[40:33.140 --> 40:33.600]  let people
[40:33.600 --> 40:34.060]  like us
[40:34.060 --> 40:34.360]  vote for
[40:34.360 --> 40:34.500]  who was
[40:34.500 --> 40:34.780]  on their
[40:34.780 --> 40:35.080]  board.
[40:35.080 --> 40:35.260]  They don't
[40:35.260 --> 40:35.600]  do that
[40:35.600 --> 40:37.320]  anymore because
[40:37.320 --> 40:37.820]  they got a
[40:37.820 --> 40:38.260]  board member
[40:38.260 --> 40:38.700]  they didn't
[40:38.700 --> 40:39.300]  like listening
[40:39.300 --> 40:42.700]  to.
[40:42.700 --> 40:43.100]  They needed
[40:43.100 --> 40:43.700]  to see this
[40:44.100 --> 40:44.480]  as a
[40:44.480 --> 40:44.960]  transnational
[40:44.960 --> 40:45.500]  entity,
[40:45.500 --> 40:45.660]  not a
[40:45.660 --> 40:46.440]  U.S.
[40:46.440 --> 40:46.620]  government
[40:46.620 --> 40:47.080]  entity,
[40:47.080 --> 40:48.560]  from day
[40:48.560 --> 40:49.100]  one.
[40:49.100 --> 40:49.460]  The governments
[40:49.460 --> 40:49.960]  they did
[40:49.960 --> 40:50.360]  not include
[40:50.360 --> 40:50.700]  on day
[40:50.700 --> 40:51.280]  one are
[40:51.280 --> 40:51.660]  now forming
[41:01.500 --> 41:02.500]  up their
[41:02.500 --> 41:03.500]  own
[40:51.660 --> 40:52.220]  thing through
[40:52.220 --> 40:52.400]  the
[40:52.400 --> 40:52.900]  I.T.U.
[40:52.960 --> 40:54.080]  mechanism.
[40:54.280 --> 40:54.500]  And it's
[40:54.500 --> 40:55.120]  toothless,
[40:55.120 --> 40:55.280]  but it's
[40:55.280 --> 40:55.460]  going to
[40:55.460 --> 40:56.000]  be a
[40:56.000 --> 40:59.800]  mess.
[40:59.800 --> 41:00.380]  True
[41:00.380 --> 41:01.000]  representative
[41:02.080 --> 41:03.200]  democracy is
[41:03.200 --> 41:04.020]  terrible.
[41:04.020 --> 41:04.260]  And the
[41:04.260 --> 41:04.760]  only thing
[41:04.760 --> 41:05.460]  worse is
[41:05.460 --> 41:05.920]  everything
[41:05.920 --> 41:06.780]  else.
[41:06.780 --> 41:07.180]  And they
[41:07.180 --> 41:07.480]  chose
[41:07.480 --> 41:07.800]  something
[41:07.800 --> 41:13.350]  else.
[41:13.350 --> 41:14.530]  So,
[41:14.530 --> 41:15.550]  I.T.U.,
[41:15.550 --> 41:16.090]  I've
[41:16.090 --> 41:16.430]  mentioned
[41:16.430 --> 41:16.470]  several
[41:22.090 --> 41:23.090]  times,
[41:16.470 --> 41:16.710]  we should
[41:16.710 --> 41:16.970]  have gone
[41:16.970 --> 41:17.210]  to them
[41:17.210 --> 41:17.550]  earlier.
[41:17.550 --> 41:17.930]  That doesn't
[41:17.930 --> 41:18.330]  mean that
[41:18.330 --> 41:18.610]  they had
[41:18.610 --> 41:19.030]  the wisdom
[41:19.030 --> 41:19.330]  and they
[41:19.330 --> 41:19.530]  would have
[41:19.530 --> 41:19.750]  done the
[41:19.750 --> 41:20.410]  right thing.
[41:20.430 --> 41:20.930]  What that
[41:20.930 --> 41:21.430]  really means
[41:21.430 --> 41:22.790]  is they
[41:22.790 --> 41:23.110]  could have
[41:23.110 --> 41:24.150]  been helped.
[41:24.330 --> 41:24.770]  And instead
[41:24.770 --> 41:26.390]  they were
[41:26.390 --> 41:26.730]  allowed to
[41:26.730 --> 41:26.990]  go do
[41:26.990 --> 41:27.350]  their own
[41:27.350 --> 41:27.770]  thing,
[41:27.770 --> 41:28.070]  which was
[41:28.070 --> 41:28.430]  fun to
[41:28.430 --> 41:29.010]  watch when
[41:29.010 --> 41:29.390]  it was
[41:30.310 --> 41:31.030]  foolishness.
[41:31.750 --> 41:32.230]  But it
[41:32.230 --> 41:32.970]  means that
[41:32.970 --> 41:33.490]  we didn't
[41:33.490 --> 41:33.830]  have their
[41:33.830 --> 41:34.810]  help.
[41:36.150 --> 41:37.070]  They should
[41:37.070 --> 41:37.770]  not have
[41:37.770 --> 41:38.970]  allowed Panama
[41:38.970 --> 41:40.130]  to turn
[41:40.130 --> 41:41.090]  telecom
[41:41.090 --> 41:41.830]  access fees
[41:41.830 --> 41:42.490]  into the
[41:42.490 --> 41:43.270]  major source
[41:43.270 --> 41:44.390]  of gross
[41:44.390 --> 41:44.750]  domestic
[41:44.750 --> 41:45.950]  product.
[41:45.950 --> 41:46.530]  But most
[41:46.530 --> 41:47.150]  of Panama's
[41:47.150 --> 41:47.510]  government
[41:47.510 --> 41:50.030]  and services
[41:50.030 --> 41:50.670]  are paid
[41:50.670 --> 41:51.690]  for by
[41:51.690 --> 41:52.590]  people in
[41:52.590 --> 41:53.090]  this country
[41:53.090 --> 41:53.770]  who pay
[41:53.770 --> 41:54.670]  heavy-duty
[41:54.670 --> 41:55.550]  international
[41:55.550 --> 41:56.530]  dialing rates
[41:56.530 --> 41:56.930]  to reach
[41:56.930 --> 41:57.610]  Panama.
[41:57.610 --> 41:58.350]  The result
[41:58.350 --> 41:58.850]  is it's
[41:58.850 --> 41:59.450]  illegal in
[41:59.450 --> 42:00.030]  Panama to
[42:00.030 --> 42:00.330]  run an
[42:00.330 --> 42:00.910]  ISP
[42:00.910 --> 42:01.830]  without a
[42:01.830 --> 42:02.010]  license,
[42:02.010 --> 42:02.610]  and that
[42:02.610 --> 42:03.170]  license
[42:03.170 --> 42:03.690]  dictates that
[42:03.690 --> 42:04.390]  you will
[42:04.390 --> 42:04.910]  block all
[42:04.910 --> 42:05.930]  voice-over
[42:05.930 --> 42:08.090]  IP port
[42:08.090 --> 42:08.370]  numbers.
[42:08.370 --> 42:09.070]  This is
[42:09.070 --> 42:09.370]  kind of
[42:09.370 --> 42:09.730]  incompatible
[42:09.730 --> 42:10.110]  with the
[42:10.110 --> 42:10.490]  way we
[42:10.490 --> 42:11.110]  do things
[42:11.110 --> 42:11.670]  on the
[42:11.670 --> 42:11.990]  Internet,
[42:11.990 --> 42:12.350]  and the
[42:12.350 --> 42:12.930]  ITU
[42:23.610 --> 42:24.610]  needed to
[42:24.610 --> 42:25.610]  be told
[42:25.610 --> 42:26.610]  early on
[42:13.930 --> 42:14.390]  that's
[42:14.890 --> 42:15.570]  crap.
[42:15.570 --> 42:16.110]  Just don't
[42:16.110 --> 42:16.930]  do it.
[42:17.730 --> 42:18.290]  They needed
[42:18.290 --> 42:18.590]  to see
[42:18.590 --> 42:19.110]  telecom
[42:19.110 --> 42:19.610]  as a
[42:19.610 --> 42:20.070]  type of
[42:20.070 --> 42:20.610]  data.
[42:20.610 --> 42:20.830]  Instead,
[42:20.830 --> 42:21.410]  they saw
[42:21.410 --> 42:21.930]  data as
[42:21.930 --> 42:22.590]  a type
[42:22.590 --> 42:23.050]  of
[42:23.270 --> 42:23.710]  telecom.
[42:23.710 --> 42:24.310]  We needed
[42:24.310 --> 42:25.410]  to invert
[42:26.690 --> 42:27.150]  their
[42:27.150 --> 42:27.530]  mindset.
[42:27.530 --> 42:27.930]  They
[42:27.930 --> 42:28.250]  needed to
[42:28.250 --> 42:28.510]  understand
[42:28.510 --> 42:29.150]  that the
[42:29.150 --> 42:29.330]  Internet
[42:29.330 --> 42:30.290]  was a
[42:30.290 --> 42:30.770]  force for
[42:39.930 --> 42:40.930]  democracy,
[42:40.930 --> 42:41.930]  and it
[42:30.770 --> 42:31.090]  wasn't
[42:31.090 --> 42:32.910]  just another
[42:32.910 --> 42:33.670]  way to
[42:33.670 --> 42:34.690]  enrich their
[42:34.690 --> 42:35.770]  members.
[42:39.070 --> 42:39.630]  I'm going
[42:39.630 --> 42:40.830]  to race
[42:40.830 --> 42:41.250]  through some
[42:41.250 --> 42:42.130]  of this.
[42:43.470 --> 42:44.410]  So,
[42:45.910 --> 42:46.590]  here's the
[42:46.590 --> 42:47.170]  hard part,
[42:47.170 --> 42:47.390]  because it
[42:47.390 --> 42:48.470]  involves you.
[42:51.090 --> 42:51.650]  Revolutions
[42:51.650 --> 42:52.370]  come about
[42:52.370 --> 42:53.170]  because people
[42:53.170 --> 42:54.130]  who had
[42:54.130 --> 42:54.590]  the land
[42:54.590 --> 42:54.810]  and the
[42:54.810 --> 42:55.110]  money and
[42:55.110 --> 42:55.450]  the power
[42:55.450 --> 42:56.190]  before you
[42:56.190 --> 42:56.830]  have deals
[42:56.830 --> 42:57.190]  with each
[42:57.190 --> 42:57.630]  other about
[42:57.630 --> 42:57.890]  how they're
[42:57.890 --> 42:58.070]  going to
[42:58.070 --> 42:58.950]  keep it.
[42:59.810 --> 43:01.070]  That's true of
[43:01.070 --> 43:01.510]  revolutions
[43:01.510 --> 43:01.850]  throughout
[43:01.850 --> 43:02.890]  history.
[43:04.350 --> 43:05.230]  It's always
[43:05.230 --> 43:05.770]  about land
[43:05.770 --> 43:06.390]  reform or
[43:06.390 --> 43:06.850]  it's about
[43:06.850 --> 43:07.270]  governance
[43:07.270 --> 43:08.210]  reform or
[43:08.210 --> 43:09.450]  whatever.
[43:11.250 --> 43:11.850]  ICANN is
[43:11.850 --> 43:12.350]  stuck with
[43:12.670 --> 43:13.310]  NTIA.
[43:13.310 --> 43:14.010]  NTIA is
[43:14.010 --> 43:14.450]  stuck with
[43:14.450 --> 43:15.450]  Verisign,
[43:15.450 --> 43:17.130]  but I'm
[43:17.130 --> 43:17.650]  starting to
[43:17.650 --> 43:18.010]  see that
[43:18.010 --> 43:18.430]  that's not
[43:18.430 --> 43:19.730]  our problem.
[43:20.950 --> 43:21.790]  We're not
[43:21.790 --> 43:22.230]  stuck with
[43:22.230 --> 43:22.690]  ICANN.
[43:22.690 --> 43:22.970]  We're not
[43:22.970 --> 43:23.370]  stuck with
[43:23.370 --> 43:24.670]  NTIA.
[43:26.510 --> 43:27.550]  The Internet
[43:28.650 --> 43:29.610]  has done
[43:29.610 --> 43:30.090]  for the
[43:30.090 --> 43:30.550]  world the
[43:30.550 --> 43:30.930]  same thing
[43:30.930 --> 43:31.350]  the fax
[43:31.350 --> 43:32.030]  machine did
[43:32.030 --> 43:32.890]  after Tiananmen
[43:32.890 --> 43:33.850]  Square.
[43:33.850 --> 43:34.690]  It has made
[43:34.690 --> 43:35.070]  it much
[43:35.070 --> 43:35.750]  harder for
[43:35.750 --> 43:36.510]  people to
[43:36.510 --> 43:37.250]  oppress other
[43:37.250 --> 43:38.170]  people.
[43:38.170 --> 43:38.570]  It's made
[43:38.570 --> 43:39.110]  anonymity
[43:39.110 --> 43:39.950]  possible.
[43:39.950 --> 43:40.510]  It's made
[43:40.510 --> 43:41.010]  freedom of
[43:41.010 --> 43:41.290]  speech
[43:41.290 --> 43:42.370]  possible.
[43:43.010 --> 43:44.450]  It is a
[43:44.450 --> 43:45.130]  huge thing.
[43:45.130 --> 43:46.210]  It's not
[43:46.210 --> 43:47.330]  just a
[43:49.370 --> 43:50.010]  technological
[43:50.010 --> 43:50.190]  toy.
[43:52.670 --> 43:53.670]  There are
[43:50.190 --> 43:50.650]  some people
[43:50.650 --> 43:51.110]  out there
[43:51.110 --> 43:51.370]  who are
[43:51.370 --> 43:51.950]  trying to
[43:51.950 --> 43:52.590]  pry this
[43:52.590 --> 43:53.750]  toy as
[43:53.750 --> 43:54.350]  they see
[43:54.350 --> 43:54.830]  it away
[43:54.830 --> 43:55.630]  from ICANN
[43:55.630 --> 43:56.390]  and monetize
[43:56.390 --> 43:57.090]  it.
[44:02.410 --> 44:03.370]  But I
[44:03.370 --> 44:03.930]  guarantee if
[44:03.930 --> 44:04.210]  you go to
[44:04.210 --> 44:04.710]  these people's
[44:04.710 --> 44:05.170]  houses there
[44:05.170 --> 44:05.330]  will be
[44:05.330 --> 44:05.890]  trailers in
[44:05.890 --> 44:06.290]  the woods
[44:06.290 --> 44:07.070]  and right
[44:07.070 --> 44:07.410]  under the
[44:07.410 --> 44:07.630]  kitchen
[44:07.630 --> 44:08.130]  window there
[44:08.130 --> 44:08.710]  will be a
[44:08.710 --> 44:09.190]  pile of
[44:09.190 --> 44:09.470]  Kentucky
[44:09.470 --> 44:09.750]  fried
[44:09.750 --> 44:10.150]  chicken
[44:10.150 --> 44:10.630]  boxes.
[44:10.630 --> 44:12.730]  And what we
[44:12.730 --> 44:13.030]  need is
[44:13.030 --> 44:13.930]  something a
[44:13.930 --> 44:14.370]  lot better
[44:14.370 --> 44:14.930]  than that,
[44:14.930 --> 44:15.610]  maybe even
[44:15.610 --> 44:16.410]  different from
[44:16.410 --> 44:16.950]  DNS,
[44:16.950 --> 44:17.310]  a different
[44:17.310 --> 44:17.830]  way of
[44:17.830 --> 44:18.250]  allocating
[44:18.250 --> 44:18.750]  and using
[44:18.750 --> 44:19.850]  names and
[44:19.850 --> 44:20.330]  addresses that
[44:20.330 --> 44:21.330]  does not
[44:21.330 --> 44:22.210]  rely on
[44:22.210 --> 44:22.550]  governance
[44:22.550 --> 44:23.770]  because the
[44:23.770 --> 44:24.270]  quality of
[44:24.270 --> 44:24.390]  governance
[44:24.390 --> 44:24.710]  in the
[44:24.710 --> 44:24.970]  world seems
[44:24.970 --> 44:26.070]  to be so
[44:28.990 --> 44:29.830]  low.
[44:29.830 --> 44:30.130]  I mentioned
[44:30.130 --> 44:30.730]  on the
[44:30.730 --> 44:37.630]  slide the
[44:39.250 --> 44:39.810]  technology
[44:38.630 --> 44:39.630]  counterculture.
[44:39.810 --> 44:40.810]  Guys in
[44:40.810 --> 44:41.410]  suits don't
[44:41.410 --> 44:41.910]  come up with
[44:41.910 --> 44:42.390]  stuff that's
[44:42.390 --> 44:42.890]  quite that
[44:42.890 --> 44:43.870]  innovative.
[44:44.970 --> 44:46.090]  It comes from
[44:46.090 --> 44:46.690]  rooms like
[44:46.690 --> 44:47.130]  this one
[44:47.130 --> 44:47.450]  full of
[44:47.450 --> 44:47.970]  people like
[44:47.970 --> 44:48.850]  us.
[45:08.800 --> 45:10.300]  Last year I
[45:10.300 --> 45:11.120]  built a
[45:11.780 --> 45:12.780]  barn and
[45:13.820 --> 45:14.440]  it came
[45:14.440 --> 45:15.440]  about several
[45:15.440 --> 45:17.080]  times that
[45:17.080 --> 45:17.440]  one of us
[45:17.440 --> 45:17.900]  on the
[45:17.900 --> 45:18.300]  construction
[45:18.300 --> 45:18.660]  team would
[45:18.660 --> 45:19.020]  come around
[45:19.020 --> 45:20.400]  the corner
[45:20.400 --> 45:20.920]  with some
[45:20.920 --> 45:21.640]  bleeding body
[45:21.640 --> 45:22.660]  part and
[45:22.660 --> 45:23.320]  declare that
[45:23.320 --> 45:23.540]  rule number
[45:23.540 --> 45:23.940]  one had
[45:23.940 --> 45:24.080]  been
[45:24.080 --> 45:24.980]  violated.
[45:30.400 --> 45:31.360]  So humans
[45:31.360 --> 45:32.480]  are animals
[45:32.480 --> 45:35.400]  and most
[45:35.400 --> 45:35.880]  of my best
[45:35.880 --> 45:36.260]  friends are
[45:36.260 --> 45:37.020]  humans.
[45:37.140 --> 45:37.900]  But we
[45:37.900 --> 45:38.160]  have our
[45:38.160 --> 45:39.120]  dark side.
[45:40.160 --> 45:40.900]  We spend
[45:41.440 --> 45:41.920]  a hellacious
[45:41.920 --> 45:42.360]  amount of
[45:42.360 --> 45:42.840]  time trying
[45:42.840 --> 45:43.160]  to figure
[45:43.160 --> 45:43.600]  out how to
[45:43.600 --> 45:43.980]  make other
[45:43.980 --> 45:44.980]  people work
[45:44.980 --> 45:45.420]  so that we
[45:45.420 --> 45:45.820]  won't have
[45:45.820 --> 45:46.460]  to.
[45:47.620 --> 45:48.580]  If we're
[45:48.580 --> 45:48.920]  not doing
[45:48.920 --> 45:49.340]  that, we're
[45:49.340 --> 45:49.900]  probably spending
[45:50.080 --> 45:50.380]  a hellacious
[45:50.380 --> 45:50.820]  amount of
[45:50.820 --> 45:51.200]  time trying
[45:51.200 --> 45:51.540]  to keep
[45:51.540 --> 45:52.000]  other people
[45:52.000 --> 45:52.400]  from doing
[45:52.400 --> 45:53.500]  that to us.
[45:55.660 --> 45:56.620]  And I'm
[45:56.620 --> 45:57.400]  looking forward
[45:57.400 --> 45:58.420]  to a day
[45:58.420 --> 45:59.300]  when we
[45:59.300 --> 45:59.740]  have some
[45:59.740 --> 46:00.400]  other mode
[46:00.400 --> 46:01.300]  of operation,
[46:01.300 --> 46:01.580]  some other
[46:01.580 --> 46:02.080]  thing that is
[46:02.080 --> 46:03.420]  driving us,
[46:03.420 --> 46:04.120]  and I think
[46:04.120 --> 46:04.440]  that the
[46:04.440 --> 46:05.360]  Internet is
[46:05.680 --> 46:06.200]  a wonderful
[46:06.200 --> 46:07.460]  potential tool
[46:07.460 --> 46:07.960]  toward that
[46:07.960 --> 46:08.720]  end.
[46:11.040 --> 46:12.200]  I could ask
[46:12.200 --> 46:12.640]  for a show
[46:12.640 --> 46:13.320]  of hands and
[46:13.500 --> 46:13.780]  a bunch of
[46:13.780 --> 46:14.100]  you would
[46:14.100 --> 46:15.400]  say yes,
[46:15.400 --> 46:15.980]  I started
[46:15.980 --> 46:16.580]  an Internet
[46:16.580 --> 46:17.280]  consulting
[46:17.280 --> 46:19.360]  business in
[46:19.360 --> 46:20.320]  my house,
[46:20.320 --> 46:21.480]  and because
[46:21.480 --> 46:21.980]  I was able
[46:21.980 --> 46:22.620]  to get a
[46:22.620 --> 46:23.280]  domain name
[46:23.280 --> 46:24.220]  and get
[46:24.220 --> 46:24.940]  some bandwidth
[46:24.940 --> 46:25.520]  and whatnot,
[46:25.520 --> 46:26.440]  I was equal
[46:26.440 --> 46:27.080]  to everyone
[46:27.080 --> 46:27.420]  else in
[46:27.420 --> 46:27.940]  that business,
[46:27.940 --> 46:28.420]  and the only
[46:28.420 --> 46:28.840]  thing that
[46:28.840 --> 46:29.580]  mattered was
[46:29.580 --> 46:30.120]  whether I was
[46:30.120 --> 46:30.560]  any damn
[46:30.560 --> 46:30.780]  good at
[46:30.780 --> 46:31.300]  what I did
[46:31.300 --> 46:31.640]  and how
[46:31.640 --> 46:32.240]  much I
[46:32.240 --> 46:33.760]  charged.
[46:33.760 --> 46:34.800]  That's not
[46:34.800 --> 46:35.100]  generally
[46:35.260 --> 46:36.240]  true.
[46:43.980 --> 46:44.980]  I own
[46:36.240 --> 46:36.640]  the land
[46:36.640 --> 46:36.900]  that you
[46:36.900 --> 46:37.240]  would need
[46:37.240 --> 46:37.540]  for that
[46:37.540 --> 46:38.060]  factory,
[46:38.060 --> 46:38.260]  so you
[46:38.260 --> 46:38.420]  have to
[46:38.420 --> 46:39.140]  pay me
[46:39.140 --> 46:40.720]  my tithe.
[46:40.720 --> 46:41.000]  I've been
[46:41.000 --> 46:41.420]  holding on
[46:41.420 --> 46:41.820]  to it for
[46:41.820 --> 46:42.400]  you.
[46:43.100 --> 46:43.500]  The
[46:43.500 --> 46:43.620]  Internet
[46:43.620 --> 46:43.920]  works
[46:43.920 --> 46:44.500]  differently,
[46:44.500 --> 46:44.680]  and it
[46:44.680 --> 46:45.020]  could make
[46:45.020 --> 46:45.420]  humanity
[46:45.420 --> 46:45.700]  work
[46:45.700 --> 46:46.480]  differently.
[46:48.320 --> 46:48.900]  And I
[46:48.900 --> 46:49.420]  love things
[46:49.420 --> 46:49.860]  like free
[46:49.860 --> 46:50.260]  and open
[46:50.260 --> 46:50.760]  source
[46:50.760 --> 46:51.660]  software.
[46:51.660 --> 46:52.100]  I've been
[46:52.100 --> 46:52.960]  doing open
[46:52.960 --> 46:53.180]  source
[46:53.180 --> 46:53.980]  software since
[46:53.980 --> 46:54.560]  before that
[46:54.560 --> 46:55.080]  name was
[46:55.080 --> 46:55.980]  coined.
[46:56.160 --> 46:56.640]  I'm glad
[46:56.640 --> 46:57.060]  that somebody
[46:57.060 --> 46:57.800]  finally came
[46:57.800 --> 46:58.340]  up with a
[46:58.340 --> 46:58.680]  name for
[46:58.680 --> 46:59.200]  what I was
[46:59.200 --> 46:59.460]  doing.
[46:59.460 --> 47:01.260]  That's good.
[47:01.260 --> 47:01.620]  I love
[47:01.620 --> 47:02.260]  the onion
[47:02.260 --> 47:02.600]  router.
[47:02.600 --> 47:03.060]  I'd like
[47:03.060 --> 47:03.600]  to see
[47:03.600 --> 47:04.340]  voice over
[47:04.340 --> 47:05.200]  IP come
[47:05.200 --> 47:06.400]  along and
[47:06.400 --> 47:07.120]  destroy the
[47:07.120 --> 47:07.380]  existing
[47:07.380 --> 47:08.320]  voice dial
[47:08.720 --> 47:09.560]  market.
[47:09.560 --> 47:10.140]  Not because
[47:10.140 --> 47:10.520]  I hate
[47:20.100 --> 47:21.100]  the voice
[47:10.520 --> 47:11.180]  dial market,
[47:11.180 --> 47:11.880]  although frankly
[47:11.880 --> 47:12.560]  it tends not
[47:12.560 --> 47:13.600]  to work well,
[47:13.600 --> 47:14.820]  but because it's
[47:14.820 --> 47:15.500]  an instance of
[47:15.500 --> 47:16.020]  old power
[47:16.020 --> 47:16.600]  structures
[47:16.600 --> 47:17.760]  self-perpetuating
[47:17.760 --> 47:18.420]  themselves at
[47:18.420 --> 47:18.940]  the cost of
[47:18.940 --> 47:19.440]  all of us
[47:19.440 --> 47:19.680]  and our
[47:19.680 --> 47:20.500]  children.
[47:23.120 --> 47:24.160]  And before
[47:24.160 --> 47:24.560]  the Internet
[47:24.560 --> 47:25.760]  can be that
[47:25.760 --> 47:26.400]  force for
[47:26.400 --> 47:27.160]  improving human
[47:27.160 --> 47:27.980]  nature and
[47:28.560 --> 47:29.360]  being that
[47:30.040 --> 47:30.560]  intermediator
[47:30.560 --> 47:31.080]  that I'd like
[47:31.080 --> 47:31.880]  it to be,
[47:31.880 --> 47:32.460]  we have got
[47:32.460 --> 47:32.880]  to get the
[47:32.880 --> 47:33.520]  governance of
[47:33.520 --> 47:33.900]  the Internet
[47:33.900 --> 47:34.660]  out of the
[47:34.660 --> 47:35.200]  hands of the
[47:35.200 --> 47:35.860]  existing power
[47:35.860 --> 47:36.840]  structure.
[47:37.160 --> 47:38.320]  Thank you.
[47:47.060 --> 47:48.020]  I can
[47:48.020 --> 47:48.600]  take a
[47:48.600 --> 47:49.100]  couple of
[47:49.100 --> 47:58.500]  questions.
[47:58.500 --> 48:00.120]  We're exiting
[48:00.120 --> 48:00.540]  on that
[48:00.540 --> 48:00.680]  side.
[48:00.800 --> 48:01.420]  I have a
[48:01.420 --> 48:01.700]  question
[48:07.900 --> 48:08.740]  here.
[48:08.740 --> 48:09.200]  I see
[48:09.200 --> 48:11.360]  OASIS as
[48:11.360 --> 48:11.920]  a competitive
[48:11.920 --> 48:12.800]  standards body
[48:12.800 --> 48:13.360]  for
[48:13.800 --> 48:14.640]  W3C.
[48:14.640 --> 48:15.260]  And I
[48:15.260 --> 48:15.920]  think OASIS
[48:15.920 --> 48:16.160]  is a
[48:16.160 --> 48:16.240]  wonderful
[48:16.240 --> 48:17.180]  thing.
[48:17.180 --> 48:17.520]  For that
[48:18.780 --> 48:19.780]  matter, I
[48:19.780 --> 48:20.780]  think W3C
[48:20.780 --> 48:21.780]  with all
[48:17.520 --> 48:17.900]  its warts
[48:17.900 --> 48:18.480]  is a
[48:18.480 --> 48:18.880]  wonderful
[48:18.880 --> 48:19.760]  thing.
[48:19.760 --> 48:20.280]  If you can
[48:20.280 --> 48:20.640]  imagine what
[48:20.640 --> 48:21.240]  the web
[48:21.240 --> 48:21.640]  standards would
[48:21.640 --> 48:22.060]  look like
[48:22.060 --> 48:22.340]  had they
[48:22.340 --> 48:22.700]  been left
[48:22.700 --> 48:23.040]  in the
[48:23.040 --> 48:23.280]  hands of
[48:23.280 --> 48:23.940]  the
[48:23.940 --> 48:24.420]  IETF,
[48:24.420 --> 48:24.920]  then you
[48:26.200 --> 48:26.980]  should be
[48:26.980 --> 48:27.140]  thanking
[48:27.140 --> 48:27.400]  Tim
[48:27.400 --> 48:28.160]  Berners-Lee
[48:28.160 --> 48:31.360]  for doing
[48:31.360 --> 48:32.300]  what he
[48:34.620 --> 48:35.500]  did.
[48:40.310 --> 48:40.750]  More
[48:40.750 --> 48:42.010]  questions?
[48:42.010 --> 48:43.470]  Here.
[48:43.470 --> 48:43.710]  I think
[48:47.430 --> 48:48.430]  that in
[48:48.430 --> 48:49.430]  Tunis, the
[48:43.710 --> 48:44.330]  WSIS
[48:44.330 --> 48:44.990]  people will
[48:44.990 --> 48:45.750]  say, you
[48:45.750 --> 48:46.110]  know that
[48:46.110 --> 48:46.570]  cat?
[48:46.570 --> 48:47.290]  That cat's a
[48:47.290 --> 48:47.730]  pain in the
[48:47.730 --> 48:48.150]  butt.
[48:48.150 --> 48:48.890]  And us
[48:48.890 --> 48:49.410]  mice, we
[48:49.410 --> 48:49.710]  need to
[48:49.710 --> 48:49.890]  do
[48:49.890 --> 48:50.170]  something
[48:50.170 --> 48:50.310]  about
[48:50.310 --> 48:50.490]  it.
[48:50.490 --> 48:50.730]  One of
[48:50.730 --> 48:51.050]  us needs
[48:51.050 --> 48:51.330]  to go
[48:51.450 --> 48:51.610]  put a
[48:51.610 --> 48:51.970]  bell on
[48:51.970 --> 48:52.290]  that
[48:52.290 --> 48:53.090]  cat.
[48:53.450 --> 48:53.810]  And
[48:53.810 --> 48:54.150]  they're
[48:54.150 --> 48:54.390]  going to
[48:54.390 --> 48:54.770]  look at
[48:54.770 --> 48:55.250]  each
[49:10.710 --> 49:11.710]  other
[49:11.710 --> 49:12.710]  and
[48:55.250 --> 48:55.490]  wonder
[48:55.490 --> 48:55.770]  who's
[48:55.770 --> 48:55.950]  going to
[48:55.950 --> 48:56.190]  do
[48:56.190 --> 48:56.550]  that.
[48:56.550 --> 48:56.730]  But the
[48:56.730 --> 48:57.310]  fact is
[48:57.310 --> 48:58.190]  the
[48:58.190 --> 48:58.990]  United
[48:58.990 --> 48:59.590]  States is
[48:59.590 --> 48:59.790]  the
[48:59.790 --> 49:00.230]  largest
[49:00.230 --> 49:01.070]  payer of
[49:01.070 --> 49:01.430]  dues
[49:01.430 --> 49:01.950]  into the
[49:01.950 --> 49:02.270]  United
[49:02.270 --> 49:03.150]  Nations.
[49:03.270 --> 49:03.490]  And if
[49:03.490 --> 49:04.030]  they say
[49:04.030 --> 49:04.490]  as they
[49:04.490 --> 49:04.850]  did,
[49:04.850 --> 49:05.970]  three weeks
[49:05.970 --> 49:07.230]  ago,
[49:07.230 --> 49:07.550]  we're
[49:07.550 --> 49:07.730]  going to
[49:07.730 --> 49:07.930]  keep
[49:07.930 --> 49:08.070]  the
[49:08.070 --> 49:08.210]  root
[49:08.210 --> 49:08.910]  zone.
[49:09.230 --> 49:09.810]  If they
[49:09.810 --> 49:10.510]  say that,
[49:10.510 --> 49:11.010]  then they
[49:11.010 --> 49:11.550]  mean it.
[49:11.550 --> 49:11.750]  And it
[49:11.750 --> 49:11.970]  doesn't
[49:11.970 --> 49:12.490]  really matter
[49:12.490 --> 49:12.930]  what the
[49:12.930 --> 49:13.590]  UN thinks
[49:13.590 --> 49:13.870]  they can
[49:13.870 --> 49:14.230]  do about
[49:14.230 --> 49:14.870]  it.
[49:16.230 --> 49:16.810]  I don't
[49:16.810 --> 49:17.210]  like it,
[49:17.210 --> 49:17.530]  but that's
[49:17.530 --> 49:18.450]  the fact.
[49:22.250 --> 49:22.690]  Any
[49:22.690 --> 49:22.870]  more
[49:22.870 --> 49:23.750]  questions?
[49:25.170 --> 49:25.710]  Thank you
[49:25.710 --> 49:26.570]  very much.
[49:28.790 --> 49:29.410]  You can
[49:29.410 --> 49:30.090]  see me in
[49:30.090 --> 49:30.190]  the
[49:30.190 --> 49:30.650]  hallway if
[49:30.650 --> 49:30.790]  you have
[49:30.790 --> 49:30.930]  more
[49:30.930 --> 49:31.730]  questions.
[49:31.730 --> 49:32.830]  Thank you.