[00:03.800 --> 00:05.640]  Actually, we are back to DEF CON.
[00:13.570 --> 00:16.050]  After two years, we are back to DEF CON.
[00:16.050 --> 00:19.730]  And this year, we wanted to talk about something new.
[00:19.730 --> 00:22.450]  Actually, also two years ago, we were talking about something new.
[00:24.950 --> 00:27.890]  We will talk about asymmetric digital warfare.
[00:28.710 --> 00:32.550]  What is it? What is the point today?
[00:33.430 --> 00:35.030]  What will happen in the future?
[00:35.030 --> 00:37.610]  And we will take a very good example,
[00:37.610 --> 00:42.410]  which is the Department of Defense FCS program,
[00:42.410 --> 00:45.430]  which stands for Future Combat System.
[00:46.870 --> 00:49.610]  Before starting, I want to tell you that
[00:49.610 --> 00:52.630]  you will not get all the information you need
[00:52.630 --> 00:55.630]  out from this speech directly,
[00:55.630 --> 00:58.050]  because the speech comes together
[00:58.050 --> 01:02.410]  with the release of the second episode of our comics.
[01:02.550 --> 01:06.050]  If you go on zoneh.org website,
[01:06.050 --> 01:09.050]  we already published, one month ago,
[01:10.050 --> 01:14.550]  the first sample, actually, of Hacker Comics ever,
[01:14.550 --> 01:16.950]  which was quite successful,
[01:16.950 --> 01:20.030]  and I suggest you to go there and download it.
[01:20.030 --> 01:21.290]  It's for free, of course.
[01:22.570 --> 01:25.430]  And the second episode, it is complementary
[01:25.430 --> 01:28.830]  to the speech we are going to have today.
[01:28.830 --> 01:31.590]  If you want to understand everything what we are going to talk,
[01:31.590 --> 01:35.030]  and if you want to get even more deep examples,
[01:35.030 --> 01:37.670]  you definitely have to go, either to download
[01:37.670 --> 01:40.390]  the comic from our website,
[01:40.390 --> 01:44.470]  or we will distribute later, to all of you,
[01:44.970 --> 01:49.290]  a CD, which is actually, was signed originally also by us.
[01:49.290 --> 01:51.970]  We are the authors of the comic.
[01:51.970 --> 01:57.050]  And this is the PDF file containing the comic book.
[01:58.370 --> 02:02.930]  There will not be any questions and answers section.
[02:02.930 --> 02:03.970]  We don't have the time,
[02:03.970 --> 02:06.230]  but we will ask you a couple of questions.
[02:06.230 --> 02:08.030]  To those who are capable to answer,
[02:08.590 --> 02:12.150]  we will give a nice T-shirt,
[02:12.150 --> 02:16.830]  with the cover of our comic book,
[02:16.830 --> 02:18.070]  which is that one.
[02:19.210 --> 02:21.570]  Anyway, my name is Roberto Preatoni.
[02:21.570 --> 02:24.230]  I am the founder of zonedge.org,
[02:24.230 --> 02:28.130]  which is the last mirror,
[02:28.130 --> 02:30.230]  the defacement mirror archive.
[02:30.230 --> 02:31.490]  All of the others, they closed.
[02:31.490 --> 02:32.610]  It's a hell of a job to do it.
[02:32.610 --> 02:34.430]  Maybe the next year in DEF CON,
[02:34.430 --> 02:35.830]  I will try to explain to the people
[02:35.830 --> 02:38.150]  what is a mirror archive,
[02:38.150 --> 02:40.590]  the reason of existing of such thing,
[02:40.590 --> 02:44.010]  and the efforts which are behind.
[02:44.250 --> 02:45.790]  But not today.
[02:46.230 --> 02:47.250]  First of all, the credits.
[02:47.250 --> 02:48.950]  I have to give two credits.
[02:48.950 --> 02:52.570]  The first credit goes to the MIT Technology Magazine.
[02:52.570 --> 02:54.890]  I was on vacation the last year.
[02:54.890 --> 02:56.270]  I was reading a very good article
[02:56.270 --> 02:58.630]  on the MIT Technology Magazine.
[02:58.670 --> 03:00.730]  And this article brought to my attention
[03:00.730 --> 03:04.970]  the problem that the American army
[03:04.970 --> 03:08.950]  had during the Second Gulf War.
[03:09.450 --> 03:11.530]  We will see what kind of problems.
[03:11.770 --> 03:14.650]  And the second credit,
[03:14.650 --> 03:16.850]  I want to credit globalsecurity.org.
[03:16.850 --> 03:18.670]  It is a very nice website.
[03:18.670 --> 03:21.070]  You can get any kind of possible information
[03:21.070 --> 03:22.790]  about military system.
[03:22.950 --> 03:25.870]  You can spend years downloading material
[03:25.870 --> 03:27.690]  and watching stuff.
[03:27.690 --> 03:28.770]  Of course, most of the things
[03:28.770 --> 03:30.810]  are traditionally military weapons.
[03:30.810 --> 03:32.910]  But due to the fact that the FCS,
[03:32.910 --> 03:33.890]  Future Combat System,
[03:33.890 --> 03:37.930]  it is a known program under development,
[03:37.930 --> 03:39.130]  you can find also references
[03:39.710 --> 03:41.810]  on globalsecurity.org.
[03:43.570 --> 03:46.550]  Another thing I want to say before starting,
[03:46.550 --> 03:49.570]  it is all the material you will find here,
[03:49.570 --> 03:52.010]  and on the slide which you have on your CD, I guess.
[03:52.070 --> 03:53.310]  It's public.
[03:53.330 --> 03:54.870]  We didn't hack anything.
[03:54.870 --> 03:56.370]  So you can get it by yourself.
[03:56.370 --> 03:58.790]  If Johnny Lang is around,
[03:58.790 --> 04:00.350]  he can teach you how to use Google
[04:00.350 --> 04:02.930]  in the proper way to download such material
[04:02.930 --> 04:04.410]  and to find it.
[04:04.770 --> 04:06.670]  First of all,
[04:06.670 --> 04:08.670]  there are several good reasons
[04:08.670 --> 04:11.350]  to download Zone H comic
[04:12.050 --> 04:14.290]  beside the fact that it is necessary
[04:14.290 --> 04:16.170]  to understand our speech.
[04:16.850 --> 04:19.030]  We have the Dark Tangent,
[04:19.030 --> 04:20.870]  DEFCON's mastermind,
[04:20.870 --> 04:22.670]  himself playing as a guest star
[04:22.670 --> 04:25.350]  in the comic.
[04:25.350 --> 04:27.350]  And the second reason,
[04:28.070 --> 04:29.330]  you can see my ass,
[04:29.330 --> 04:30.010]  basically.
[04:31.750 --> 04:33.330]  Which, I don't want to tell you
[04:33.330 --> 04:35.430]  it's even better than the first reason,
[04:35.430 --> 04:36.450]  but up to you.
[04:36.450 --> 04:37.830]  Actually, I don't have it so flat,
[04:37.830 --> 04:39.350]  it's a little bit more rounded.
[04:43.130 --> 04:46.350]  My friend here is Fabio Ghioni,
[04:48.550 --> 04:54.550]  and he is one of the best experts
[04:54.550 --> 04:57.890]  in asymmetric warfare,
[04:57.890 --> 04:58.970]  anti-terrorism.
[04:58.970 --> 05:00.750]  If you read his CV,
[05:00.750 --> 05:01.890]  it's very long.
[05:02.530 --> 05:03.770]  You can get it actually
[05:03.770 --> 05:06.170]  from the DEFCON website.
[05:06.710 --> 05:08.410]  Actually, it's your turn.
[05:08.410 --> 05:10.030]  We will talk a little bit me,
[05:10.110 --> 05:11.070]  a little bit him.
[05:11.990 --> 05:13.790]  Now it's a little bit me.
[05:14.590 --> 05:16.450]  So, asymmetric warfare.
[05:16.450 --> 05:18.510]  I don't want to bore anybody
[05:18.510 --> 05:20.570]  with conventional things,
[05:20.570 --> 05:22.870]  but some things must be said before.
[05:23.550 --> 05:25.690]  And there are a lot of things
[05:25.690 --> 05:27.490]  which are misunderstood.
[05:27.490 --> 05:28.750]  For example,
[05:28.750 --> 05:31.030]  the definition of asymmetric warfare
[05:31.030 --> 05:33.110]  and the definition of unconventional.
[05:33.650 --> 05:35.070]  For unconventional,
[05:35.070 --> 05:37.110]  so you understand the rest of the speech, of course.
[05:37.110 --> 05:39.910]  For unconventional weapons,
[05:39.910 --> 05:42.350]  or unconventional means,
[05:42.350 --> 05:43.330]  I give you an example.
[05:43.330 --> 05:44.490]  You have a fork.
[05:44.870 --> 05:46.790]  A fork you use it to eat, of course,
[05:46.890 --> 05:47.770]  a steak or whatever.
[05:47.770 --> 05:49.390]  Then an unconventional use of this fork
[05:49.390 --> 05:51.710]  is to stick it in the eye of this guy over here.
[05:52.150 --> 05:54.190]  So, that's a thing.
[05:55.050 --> 05:56.110]  Then there is another thing,
[05:56.110 --> 05:57.530]  an image, a very good drawing
[05:57.530 --> 05:59.170]  that I saw in a newspaper
[05:59.390 --> 06:00.690]  a few years back, where there was
[06:01.290 --> 06:02.430]  a big marine soldier
[06:02.430 --> 06:05.810]  and a small, I would say, Iraqi guy.
[06:05.810 --> 06:08.290]  You know, these drawers on newspapers.
[06:08.590 --> 06:09.530]  And the small Iraqi guy
[06:09.530 --> 06:10.830]  said, you know,
[06:11.330 --> 06:12.810]  huge marine soldier with
[06:12.810 --> 06:14.090]  full of weapons everywhere
[06:14.090 --> 06:17.490]  and millions of dollars of research.
[06:17.490 --> 06:18.410]  And the small Iraqi guy
[06:18.410 --> 06:20.430]  with some sand in his hand,
[06:20.430 --> 06:22.830]  threw the sand in the eyes of the big soldier.
[06:22.830 --> 06:25.470]  And he said, ah, that's not fair, that's unconventional.
[06:25.770 --> 06:27.770]  So, that's unconventional.
[06:27.770 --> 06:28.850]  And then asymmetric.
[06:28.850 --> 06:31.890]  For asymmetric, there is a thing very interesting.
[06:31.930 --> 06:32.810]  When I was in Cuba
[06:32.810 --> 06:34.110]  about a year ago
[06:34.110 --> 06:37.410]  to see Ramiro Valdez.
[06:37.410 --> 06:39.510]  Ramiro Valdez is one of the heroes of the revolution
[06:39.510 --> 06:40.630]  in Cuba.
[06:41.490 --> 06:42.970]  Hero in Cuba.
[06:42.970 --> 06:44.990]  Not everywhere else, of course.
[06:44.990 --> 06:47.350]  And I remember that he said
[06:47.350 --> 06:49.010]  among other things, he said,
[06:49.010 --> 06:50.970]  ah, Americans, they invented the term
[06:50.970 --> 06:52.970]  asymmetric because they want to
[06:52.970 --> 06:55.030]  invade us and they say that we are preparing
[06:55.030 --> 06:57.170]  for asymmetric warfare. Actually, they are not
[06:57.170 --> 06:59.110]  because they don't have even lines, phone lines
[06:59.110 --> 07:00.510]  to get connection
[07:01.230 --> 07:02.470]  on the internet. But
[07:03.130 --> 07:04.890]  that's one thing.
[07:04.970 --> 07:06.950]  And what does that mean?
[07:06.950 --> 07:08.790]  That a country,
[07:08.790 --> 07:11.010]  it means that a country that doesn't have the means
[07:11.010 --> 07:12.990]  to combat the war, which is
[07:12.990 --> 07:14.950]  systemic, which is a huge
[07:14.950 --> 07:17.110]  expensive war, uses
[07:17.890 --> 07:18.950]  whatever it has
[07:18.950 --> 07:21.070]  unconventional means. That is one
[07:21.070 --> 07:23.150]  of the meanings of asymmetric. The other thing is
[07:23.150 --> 07:24.710]  for example, Islam
[07:25.330 --> 07:27.270]  and a nation, like for example
[07:27.270 --> 07:29.110]  the USA or another nation.
[07:29.110 --> 07:30.990]  So if you have France against Germany,
[07:30.990 --> 07:32.970]  it's symmetric. You have territory,
[07:32.970 --> 07:34.770]  you have people, you have whatever, a nation
[07:34.770 --> 07:37.010]  against another nation. If you have
[07:37.010 --> 07:39.290]  Islam, Islam is scattered everywhere.
[07:39.290 --> 07:40.550]  You can have people working
[07:40.550 --> 07:42.610]  in your country.
[07:42.730 --> 07:44.490]  You can have people
[07:44.490 --> 07:46.910]  everywhere. That's asymmetric.
[07:46.910 --> 07:48.570]  Religious matters and everything
[07:48.570 --> 07:49.810]  like that.
[07:50.830 --> 07:51.430]  So...
[07:53.570 --> 07:54.490]  when it is
[07:54.490 --> 07:55.950]  used, this is...
[07:55.950 --> 07:57.830]  I just basically explained it.
[07:58.570 --> 08:00.770]  When you are invading a
[08:00.770 --> 08:02.570]  country or you are combating
[08:02.570 --> 08:04.690]  an enemy which has means
[08:04.690 --> 08:06.770]  which are too big to be
[08:06.770 --> 08:08.170]  compared to, like for example, the
[08:08.170 --> 08:09.930]  United States right now is the only country
[08:09.930 --> 08:12.370]  which can fight a systemic war, which is a war
[08:14.310 --> 08:16.130]  where you have like bombs, intelligent
[08:16.130 --> 08:18.090]  bombs. Hit the third window
[08:18.090 --> 08:20.070]  on the left on the 20th floor and
[08:20.070 --> 08:22.050]  kill the man who is taking
[08:22.270 --> 08:24.250]  a pee in that moment. But don't kill the cat
[08:24.250 --> 08:26.310]  that is in the room. So that's
[08:27.850 --> 08:28.250]  intelligent
[08:28.250 --> 08:30.030]  bomb. Then if you kill the cat,
[08:30.030 --> 08:32.070]  it says, shit, it didn't work, so we didn't spend that
[08:32.070 --> 08:33.670]  much money. And
[08:35.230 --> 08:36.210]  the country where
[08:36.210 --> 08:38.110]  this man is and he is taking a pee and the cat
[08:38.110 --> 08:40.390]  was killed but he didn't have to be killed, etc,
[08:40.390 --> 08:42.170]  etc, they don't have the money to
[08:42.170 --> 08:44.310]  fight this war, so they use whatever they have.
[08:44.830 --> 08:45.770]  So it's called
[08:46.590 --> 08:48.250]  asymmetric. It's also called dirty war.
[08:48.250 --> 08:49.630]  It's called it in many ways.
[08:54.760 --> 08:55.200]  So,
[08:55.200 --> 08:57.080]  for example, did
[08:57.080 --> 08:59.040]  everybody see the Black Hawk Down movie?
[08:59.680 --> 09:00.980]  So whoever didn't see it, I mean
[09:00.980 --> 09:03.040]  that's a very famous
[09:03.040 --> 09:04.720]  or very important
[09:04.720 --> 09:07.460]  example of
[09:08.120 --> 09:10.040]  asymmetry in a war.
[09:10.540 --> 09:11.540]  Okay? And the use
[09:11.540 --> 09:13.520]  of unconventional means. So you have this
[09:14.340 --> 09:14.820]  big
[09:16.740 --> 09:17.220]  Sikorsky
[09:17.220 --> 09:19.260]  helicopter, which is very
[09:19.260 --> 09:21.360]  expensive and it costs a lot of money
[09:21.360 --> 09:23.780]  in research and development.
[09:23.880 --> 09:25.820]  You have soldiers, you have weapons,
[09:25.820 --> 09:27.480]  you have maintenance.
[09:27.820 --> 09:29.520]  I mean, you would never believe how much
[09:29.520 --> 09:31.320]  it costs to maintain
[09:31.320 --> 09:33.500]  an helicopter after 100 hours of
[09:33.500 --> 09:35.060]  flight. It must be maintained for
[09:35.600 --> 09:37.180]  a lot of million dollars again.
[09:37.200 --> 09:39.060]  So you have all this thing and then you had
[09:40.240 --> 09:41.000]  a little boy
[09:41.780 --> 09:43.280]  with, you know,
[09:43.440 --> 09:45.500]  a watch and a cell phone.
[09:45.500 --> 09:47.860]  Actually it was a satellite phone.
[09:47.880 --> 09:49.000]  And he saw the helicopters coming
[09:49.000 --> 09:51.060]  and he called the guys on the base and he said,
[09:51.060 --> 09:53.140]  they are coming. And the
[09:53.140 --> 09:56.180]  whole thing went, you know,
[09:56.180 --> 09:57.100]  went like that.
[09:57.100 --> 09:58.880]  The Black Hawk went down and
[09:59.520 --> 10:01.380]  that battle was lost.
[10:01.560 --> 10:03.040]  So the big expense, the
[10:03.040 --> 10:05.020]  Delta Force and all the millions of dollars
[10:05.020 --> 10:07.300]  spent on satellite recognition
[10:07.300 --> 10:08.940]  and everything, all was spent
[10:08.940 --> 10:10.940]  for nothing because this little guy, which
[10:10.940 --> 10:13.160]  I mean, how much does it cost, this little guy?
[10:13.160 --> 10:15.060]  You only have to feed him something
[10:15.840 --> 10:17.020]  and a satellite
[10:17.020 --> 10:19.660]  phone, so you have to pay the phone bill and that's it.
[10:19.660 --> 10:21.180]  And he destroyed everything.
[10:23.260 --> 10:24.840]  This is, you know, I mean,
[10:24.840 --> 10:26.880]  everybody nowadays does the example of the
[10:26.880 --> 10:29.140]  Twin Towers. So you have the 19 men,
[10:29.140 --> 10:30.900]  19 cutters and then you have the 11th
[10:30.900 --> 10:32.240]  September thing.
[10:32.240 --> 10:34.900]  All the intelligence expenses that have been done
[10:35.860 --> 10:37.120]  in the years before
[10:37.120 --> 10:38.660]  didn't prevent this episode
[10:38.660 --> 10:40.860]  like many other episodes. Of course, there are
[10:41.000 --> 10:42.860]  a lot of things that have been prevented, but we
[10:42.860 --> 10:44.460]  will never know what they are.
[10:46.560 --> 10:48.840]  So, why are we saying
[10:48.840 --> 10:49.920]  this? Because in this
[10:51.020 --> 10:52.580]  years, the electronic
[10:53.400 --> 10:54.660]  warfare, the electronic
[10:54.660 --> 10:56.640]  men is the best way to hit
[10:57.180 --> 10:58.800]  the countries which are
[10:58.800 --> 11:00.900]  technologically developed.
[11:00.900 --> 11:02.800]  So we have, for example, all the
[11:02.800 --> 11:04.560]  western bloc countries.
[11:04.580 --> 11:06.320]  These countries depend
[11:06.320 --> 11:08.660]  almost totally on digital
[11:08.660 --> 11:11.160]  systems, on telematic systems,
[11:11.160 --> 11:13.260]  on electronic systems.
[11:13.260 --> 11:15.480]  So the critical infrastructures,
[11:15.480 --> 11:17.120]  telecommunication infrastructures,
[11:17.380 --> 11:19.300]  food supply, banking systems,
[11:19.300 --> 11:20.700]  military systems, even
[11:20.700 --> 11:23.040]  for example in the United States, missiles,
[11:23.040 --> 11:25.060]  I think they have IP addresses.
[11:25.060 --> 11:26.540]  So everything depends on
[11:26.540 --> 11:28.940]  electronic and telematic systems.
[11:29.280 --> 11:30.680]  So, what do you need to
[11:30.680 --> 11:32.620]  do to hit such a country?
[11:32.620 --> 11:34.520]  You might use electronic means
[11:34.520 --> 11:36.540]  if you know where to hit, of course.
[11:36.540 --> 11:39.300]  So you need to do some research before, some intelligence.
[11:39.440 --> 11:39.640]  But
[11:40.660 --> 11:42.420]  both the intelligence and the
[11:42.420 --> 11:44.400]  fighting, you do it using
[11:44.980 --> 11:46.240]  a computer like this one.
[11:46.240 --> 11:48.740]  You connect to the network and if you
[11:48.740 --> 11:50.420]  are good to search
[11:50.420 --> 11:52.600]  or to find things and you are good also
[11:52.600 --> 11:54.760]  on exploiting them,
[11:54.760 --> 11:56.680]  then you might hit a critical
[11:56.680 --> 11:58.800]  infrastructure and create a blackout.
[11:59.860 --> 12:00.860]  You know that in the past
[12:00.860 --> 12:02.580]  years there have been several blackouts around
[12:02.580 --> 12:04.700]  the western countries. For example in Italy, where
[12:04.700 --> 12:06.660]  I come from, there was a huge blackout
[12:06.660 --> 12:09.120]  about two years ago where all the country went black.
[12:09.120 --> 12:09.800]  Totally.
[12:10.820 --> 12:12.580]  The government said that it was
[12:12.880 --> 12:14.640]  a tree, some tree that fell over
[12:14.640 --> 12:16.800]  some type of wire. It was a totally impossible
[12:16.800 --> 12:18.720]  explanation. So who will ever
[12:18.720 --> 12:21.060]  know what happened? Nobody.
[12:21.140 --> 12:22.700]  And the same thing happened also in the United
[12:22.700 --> 12:23.620]  States.
[12:24.740 --> 12:26.760]  Three years ago, I think. Or a couple of years
[12:26.760 --> 12:29.200]  ago too. And in other countries.
[12:29.360 --> 12:30.720]  So they said it was Switzerland.
[12:31.040 --> 12:32.620]  In Italy they said it was Switzerland.
[12:32.620 --> 12:34.800]  The tree fell over some kind of wire
[12:34.800 --> 12:36.880]  and then everything went blackout. The whole country
[12:36.880 --> 12:38.500]  was incredible. I was there
[12:39.220 --> 12:40.520]  at night. I was out
[12:40.520 --> 12:42.540]  tapping at night actually. I never saw
[12:42.540 --> 12:44.500]  this type of darkness.
[12:44.540 --> 12:45.960]  It was totally scary.
[12:46.280 --> 12:48.200]  So you can hit
[12:48.880 --> 12:50.440]  these critical infrastructures
[12:50.440 --> 12:52.180]  and the thing is that
[12:52.180 --> 12:54.300]  you can create more damage doing this
[12:54.300 --> 12:56.540]  than doing a lot of other things.
[12:56.720 --> 12:58.260]  So for example, the bombings that were
[12:58.260 --> 13:00.000]  in London last week
[13:00.000 --> 13:02.400]  or two weeks ago. What did they do?
[13:02.400 --> 13:04.900]  They killed people. Fifty people died.
[13:05.360 --> 13:05.600]  But
[13:06.520 --> 13:08.620]  after these fifty people died
[13:09.620 --> 13:10.440]  the country
[13:10.440 --> 13:12.240]  what did it suffer? Okay, there was
[13:12.360 --> 13:13.460]  a human life.
[13:14.720 --> 13:16.360]  Nobody can contest the fact
[13:16.360 --> 13:18.120]  that it is valuable.
[13:18.120 --> 13:20.340]  But nothing changed.
[13:20.400 --> 13:21.780]  The structures were totally
[13:21.780 --> 13:23.980]  there. It was psychological.
[13:23.980 --> 13:25.500]  It was mediatic. It was
[13:26.000 --> 13:28.400]  public opinion. It was all these kind of things.
[13:28.400 --> 13:30.280]  So that's what terrorists want to hit
[13:30.280 --> 13:32.080]  at that moment. But if they
[13:32.080 --> 13:33.920]  really wanted to create damage,
[13:33.920 --> 13:35.940]  they didn't have to kill those fifty people.
[13:35.940 --> 13:37.440]  They could just stop a nuclear
[13:38.030 --> 13:39.120]  power reactor or
[13:39.940 --> 13:42.280]  damage it somehow. You don't need to do
[13:42.280 --> 13:43.900]  very sophisticated things to
[13:43.900 --> 13:45.960]  exploit critical infrastructures.
[13:45.960 --> 13:47.560]  You just need to do a little
[13:47.560 --> 13:50.640]  thing that just creates havoc.
[13:51.100 --> 13:51.780]  Okay?
[13:51.800 --> 13:53.960]  So this is the thing. Then I will go on
[13:53.960 --> 13:56.060]  later and I give the microphone back
[13:56.060 --> 13:57.680]  to this guy.
[14:01.320 --> 14:02.040]  It might
[14:02.040 --> 14:03.740]  sound strange, but the main difference
[14:04.460 --> 14:06.160]  between the first and the second
[14:06.160 --> 14:07.700]  Gulf War was a bandwidth
[14:08.240 --> 14:09.280]  difference.
[14:10.740 --> 14:12.080]  In the next ten years
[14:12.080 --> 14:13.360]  the US has developed
[14:14.680 --> 14:15.240]  a way to
[14:16.560 --> 14:17.260]  distribute
[14:17.260 --> 14:19.700]  information, to collect information.
[14:20.720 --> 14:21.000]  And
[14:21.000 --> 14:23.240]  basically, in the second
[14:23.240 --> 14:25.320]  Gulf War, the US troops were enjoying
[14:25.320 --> 14:27.260]  forty-two times more bandwidth
[14:27.260 --> 14:29.480]  than in the first Gulf
[14:29.480 --> 14:31.020]  War. How
[14:31.020 --> 14:34.220]  this bandwidth was actually used?
[14:35.420 --> 14:37.120]  Well, the picture on the center is
[14:37.500 --> 14:38.380]  a typical
[14:39.960 --> 14:41.450]  command center,
[14:41.450 --> 14:43.790]  command and control center,
[14:43.790 --> 14:45.810]  which collects
[14:46.210 --> 14:48.310]  a lot of data,
[14:48.310 --> 14:49.810]  which could be
[14:49.810 --> 14:51.590]  data and voice interception
[14:51.590 --> 14:53.530]  or data coming from spies
[14:53.530 --> 14:55.630]  deployed on the territory. They are going
[14:55.630 --> 14:58.490]  to be fed, actually, into the system.
[14:59.290 --> 14:59.650]  From
[14:59.650 --> 15:01.490]  stealth planes,
[15:01.490 --> 15:03.750]  which are actually flying over the
[15:03.750 --> 15:06.090]  territory and watching the situation,
[15:06.090 --> 15:07.510]  taking pictures,
[15:07.510 --> 15:09.210]  spy drones, unmanned
[15:09.210 --> 15:10.850]  vehicles, from
[15:10.850 --> 15:13.270]  satellites, and also
[15:13.270 --> 15:15.410]  from the Blue Force Tracker, which is a very important
[15:15.410 --> 15:16.630]  system for
[15:17.490 --> 15:19.270]  the American Army. It is the
[15:19.270 --> 15:21.290]  system, if you see in the movie, when they
[15:21.290 --> 15:23.130]  are, I don't know, on the enemy
[15:23.130 --> 15:25.490]  territory, and they open the laptop,
[15:25.490 --> 15:26.830]  and the laptop is showing
[15:26.830 --> 15:28.410]  some red triangles
[15:28.990 --> 15:31.110]  on the map, which is, this is the
[15:31.110 --> 15:33.210]  enemy, and some blue triangles,
[15:33.210 --> 15:35.350]  this is us. Actually, this system
[15:35.350 --> 15:37.170]  is not science fiction. It is
[15:37.170 --> 15:39.030]  existing, and they are already using it
[15:40.030 --> 15:41.070]  successfully.
[15:41.930 --> 15:43.310]  Well, I want to tell
[15:43.310 --> 15:44.390]  you one thing.
[15:45.050 --> 15:47.270]  If you open Google Maps, or
[15:47.270 --> 15:48.790]  if you ever used
[15:49.350 --> 15:51.070]  downloading the trial version, not
[15:51.070 --> 15:52.810]  cracked, of course, of
[15:52.810 --> 15:55.050]  Keyhole, the software which
[15:55.050 --> 15:57.050]  was used by CNN to
[15:57.050 --> 15:59.050]  show you, basically, the
[15:59.050 --> 16:01.010]  toilet in which the guy was pissing,
[16:01.010 --> 16:03.070]  and beside it was the cat from the
[16:03.070 --> 16:05.070]  satellite. Do you have any
[16:05.070 --> 16:06.450]  idea how many
[16:07.370 --> 16:09.190]  megabytes, gigs,
[16:09.190 --> 16:10.910]  it's actually taking a picture
[16:12.350 --> 16:12.950]  taken
[16:12.950 --> 16:15.230]  from a satellite? Huge
[16:15.230 --> 16:17.230]  amount. Now, if you have a satellite
[16:17.230 --> 16:19.570]  which is taking picture on the territory,
[16:19.570 --> 16:21.030]  on the enemy territory, and you have to
[16:21.030 --> 16:22.650]  download to give this picture
[16:22.650 --> 16:24.930]  to the troops, then you need
[16:24.930 --> 16:26.850]  bandwidth. You can't do the
[16:26.850 --> 16:29.290]  800 x 600 JPEG picture.
[16:29.290 --> 16:30.990]  This is good for browsing Britney
[16:30.990 --> 16:32.290]  Spears' website, but not
[16:32.290 --> 16:34.330]  to go at
[16:34.330 --> 16:36.290]  war. This is the reason why
[16:36.290 --> 16:38.650]  U.S. Army developed such a large
[16:38.650 --> 16:40.770]  bandwidth network.
[16:41.210 --> 16:42.620]  Was it working?
[16:42.970 --> 16:43.910]  No.
[16:44.470 --> 16:45.850]  When U.S. troops
[16:47.030 --> 16:48.390]  entered into
[16:48.390 --> 16:50.370]  the territory, they started to
[16:51.170 --> 16:52.450]  experience a lot
[16:52.450 --> 16:54.490]  of troubles. Now,
[16:54.490 --> 16:56.290]  focus your attention.
[16:56.290 --> 16:58.430]  Do you remember exactly the day
[16:58.430 --> 17:00.190]  when they started to
[17:00.190 --> 17:01.630]  invade Iraq?
[17:01.630 --> 17:04.190]  The guy was sitting, the CNN
[17:04.190 --> 17:06.230]  guy, was sitting on the top
[17:06.230 --> 17:08.090]  of a U.S. tank which was
[17:08.090 --> 17:10.190]  running 120
[17:10.190 --> 17:12.230]  kilometers per hour. I don't know
[17:12.230 --> 17:14.530]  it in miles. You can do calculations by yourself.
[17:15.070 --> 17:15.750]  And it was
[17:15.750 --> 17:18.170]  75. And it was running
[17:18.170 --> 17:20.170]  and running and running. And the
[17:20.170 --> 17:22.110]  journalist was saying, there is nobody
[17:22.110 --> 17:23.830]  nobody is facing us.
[17:23.830 --> 17:25.930]  We don't see the enemy. And that
[17:25.930 --> 17:27.250]  was the problem. Because
[17:27.250 --> 17:29.430]  they were running
[17:29.430 --> 17:31.310]  too fast. And they were losing
[17:31.310 --> 17:33.130]  connectivity. Try to
[17:33.910 --> 17:35.830]  hook yourself into a
[17:35.830 --> 17:37.590]  Wi-Fi network while you are
[17:37.590 --> 17:39.610]  on your car and you are driving fast.
[17:39.610 --> 17:42.070]  You can't.
[17:42.070 --> 17:43.610]  And basically the
[17:43.610 --> 17:46.090]  Humvees which were in front of the U.S.
[17:46.090 --> 17:49.250]  troops, they had to stop
[17:49.250 --> 17:50.690]  even for 12
[17:50.690 --> 17:52.350]  hours to download the
[17:52.350 --> 17:54.030]  tactical data. Now,
[17:54.030 --> 17:54.870]  do you know the difference between
[17:55.470 --> 17:56.910]  strategical and tactical
[17:56.910 --> 17:58.930]  data? Tactical data are the data
[17:58.930 --> 18:00.930]  which are necessary to survive in the next 5
[18:00.930 --> 18:02.870]  minutes. Because it's telling
[18:02.870 --> 18:04.890]  you where the enemy is.
[18:05.250 --> 18:06.930]  From which point you should
[18:07.590 --> 18:09.110]  expect to be attacked.
[18:09.110 --> 18:10.750]  Where should you go not to be
[18:10.750 --> 18:12.690]  attacked. What you should do.
[18:12.770 --> 18:14.730]  Because the command and control center is
[18:14.730 --> 18:17.290]  telling you to do this, this and that.
[18:17.950 --> 18:18.910]  And if you rely on
[18:18.910 --> 18:19.410]  connectivity
[18:20.530 --> 18:22.830]  for having such service, it's good
[18:22.830 --> 18:24.770]  as long as you have connectivity.
[18:24.770 --> 18:26.790]  But if you don't have any more connectivity, what is
[18:26.790 --> 18:28.550]  happening? You don't know where your enemy is
[18:28.550 --> 18:30.930]  while your enemy knows very well where you
[18:30.930 --> 18:32.830]  are. Because you are stopped in the
[18:32.830 --> 18:34.250]  middle of the desert.
[18:36.970 --> 18:37.450]  And
[18:39.010 --> 18:40.790]  how was organized the system
[18:40.790 --> 18:43.190]  for the second Gulf War?
[18:43.190 --> 18:44.270]  Basically we had
[18:45.050 --> 18:46.870]  two command and control centers.
[18:46.870 --> 18:48.770]  One was located in Qatar. The second
[18:48.770 --> 18:50.390]  was located in Kuwait.
[18:50.390 --> 18:52.330]  And all
[18:52.330 --> 18:52.950]  the data
[18:54.110 --> 18:56.410]  gathered by the probes
[18:56.410 --> 18:58.410]  was actually fed into a system
[18:58.410 --> 19:00.270]  which was producing too much
[19:00.270 --> 19:01.610]  of intelligence.
[19:02.590 --> 19:04.030]  It is like if you
[19:04.030 --> 19:06.170]  enable all of your
[19:06.170 --> 19:07.330]  IDS messaging
[19:07.990 --> 19:10.210]  or if you are using zone alarm and
[19:10.210 --> 19:12.130]  you tell to zone alarm
[19:12.130 --> 19:14.290]  to pop up the window each time you
[19:14.290 --> 19:16.630]  are receiving a
[19:16.630 --> 19:18.310]  strange packet. It will pop up
[19:18.310 --> 19:19.930]  every five seconds. And
[19:19.930 --> 19:22.330]  what will be the end? You will switch
[19:22.330 --> 19:24.230]  off the pop up thing.
[19:24.230 --> 19:25.830]  Too much of information equals
[19:25.830 --> 19:27.470]  no information.
[19:28.230 --> 19:29.810]  And this was a problem.
[19:30.030 --> 19:32.430]  The second problem was that the information
[19:32.430 --> 19:34.590]  was fed into a satellite system.
[19:34.590 --> 19:36.410]  The satellite system was downloading
[19:37.210 --> 19:38.490]  sending, sorry,
[19:39.310 --> 19:40.510]  through a traditional
[19:40.510 --> 19:42.310]  radio streaming
[19:44.050 --> 19:45.370]  to a
[19:45.370 --> 19:46.370]  vehicle which was located
[19:46.370 --> 19:48.370]  back of the US troops and from
[19:48.370 --> 19:50.290]  the vehicle which was
[19:50.290 --> 19:52.310]  actually supposed to act as a router
[19:52.310 --> 19:54.310]  to distribute the information
[19:55.370 --> 19:56.570]  the data
[19:56.570 --> 19:58.450]  were sent using
[19:58.450 --> 20:00.290]  an eye
[20:00.290 --> 20:01.210]  of sight
[20:02.730 --> 20:04.750]  microwave beam.
[20:04.750 --> 20:06.750]  I guess for security
[20:06.750 --> 20:08.470]  reason they didn't want to
[20:08.470 --> 20:10.490]  have the high technology
[20:10.490 --> 20:12.050]  enemy which is the
[20:12.050 --> 20:13.970]  Iraqi troops
[20:15.290 --> 20:15.810]  intercepting
[20:15.810 --> 20:17.770]  the data of the US troops
[20:20.290 --> 20:21.970]  but this system is working
[20:21.970 --> 20:23.770]  as long as you can see
[20:24.530 --> 20:26.030]  the vehicle which is on your
[20:26.030 --> 20:27.490]  back. But if you are running
[20:27.490 --> 20:30.110]  75 miles per hour because you don't
[20:30.110 --> 20:31.930]  face the enemy, then you are
[20:31.930 --> 20:34.010]  losing this link and you are not
[20:34.010 --> 20:35.910]  capable to get any data. This was the reason
[20:35.910 --> 20:38.150]  why they had to stop and wait 12 hours
[20:38.150 --> 20:39.870]  to get the data.
[20:39.870 --> 20:42.230]  And they were killed, actually.
[20:42.230 --> 20:43.050]  Sorry.
[20:44.390 --> 20:46.230]  US soldiers lost life
[20:46.230 --> 20:48.050]  also due to this.
[20:48.050 --> 20:50.170]  Because they didn't have the backup of the
[20:50.170 --> 20:52.230]  intelligence telling them where the enemy
[20:52.230 --> 20:54.030]  is. They were facing the enemy
[20:54.030 --> 20:56.890]  in the same moment they realized it was existing.
[20:56.950 --> 20:58.210]  And at the same time
[20:58.210 --> 20:59.930]  the bullets, they were
[21:00.550 --> 21:02.450]  flying over their head.
[21:04.870 --> 21:06.070]  Now,
[21:06.750 --> 21:08.150]  the blue force tracking
[21:08.150 --> 21:09.690]  system, it's the system
[21:09.690 --> 21:12.490]  who tells you where the enemy is.
[21:12.830 --> 21:13.750]  Luckily,
[21:13.750 --> 21:16.670]  when they developed it,
[21:16.670 --> 21:17.510]  they assigned
[21:17.710 --> 21:19.430]  a certain amount of bandwidth
[21:19.430 --> 21:21.690]  to the BFT, which is
[21:21.690 --> 21:23.790]  actually working using
[21:23.790 --> 21:25.350]  the satellites. It doesn't work using
[21:26.510 --> 21:27.890]  direct microwave
[21:27.890 --> 21:29.190]  beams.
[21:29.470 --> 21:31.730]  It means you can always receive it
[21:31.730 --> 21:33.730]  actually the same system you are using on your
[21:33.730 --> 21:36.070]  car for your GPS system.
[21:36.070 --> 21:37.610]  Very similar.
[21:39.090 --> 21:40.090]  Luckily,
[21:40.090 --> 21:41.790]  the amount of bandwidth developed
[21:41.790 --> 21:43.970]  from the very beginning to supply
[21:43.970 --> 21:45.730]  information through the BFT
[21:45.730 --> 21:48.070]  system was more
[21:48.070 --> 21:50.010]  than it was actually needed.
[21:50.010 --> 21:51.630]  So, the developers
[21:51.630 --> 21:53.910]  having such extra bandwidth,
[21:53.910 --> 21:54.810]  they were thinking,
[21:55.450 --> 21:57.970]  what are we going to do? Are we going to use
[21:57.970 --> 21:59.770]  this bandwidth or not? Yes.
[21:59.770 --> 22:01.390]  What do we do? Let's build
[22:01.390 --> 22:03.270]  an email system.
[22:03.930 --> 22:05.890]  You never know. It might come
[22:05.890 --> 22:07.650]  in handy. It actually came in handy
[22:07.650 --> 22:10.170]  because the whole Iraqi invasion
[22:11.030 --> 22:11.670]  having
[22:11.670 --> 22:13.590]  the first system not working
[22:13.590 --> 22:16.570]  was actually organized through emails.
[22:17.430 --> 22:18.070]  USA
[22:18.070 --> 22:20.030]  was at war
[22:20.030 --> 22:21.930]  in the sense that through the email
[22:21.930 --> 22:23.950]  coming from the BFT system,
[22:23.950 --> 22:25.790]  they were capable to finally coordinate
[22:25.790 --> 22:27.450]  their own action.
[22:29.570 --> 22:31.570]  This was the past.
[22:32.090 --> 22:33.310]  Now, a question for you.
[22:33.310 --> 22:35.170]  To the one who is going to answer to me,
[22:35.170 --> 22:37.210]  I'm going to give a T-shirt.
[22:37.210 --> 22:38.130]  What is this?
[22:39.090 --> 22:40.530]  Can you tell me what is this?
[22:43.650 --> 22:44.490]  Excuse me?
[22:45.690 --> 22:46.650]  What is it?
[22:47.890 --> 22:49.250]  A trigger. No, no, no, no, no, no.
[22:49.250 --> 22:50.770]  Not a landmine. No, no, no, no, no.
[22:53.390 --> 22:53.930]  No?
[22:55.550 --> 22:57.290]  No, diesel pump? No, no, no, no?
[22:57.730 --> 22:59.050]  You have it in your kitchen.
[22:59.050 --> 23:01.310]  You have diesel pumps in your kitchen. What are you doing?
[23:03.970 --> 23:05.030]  What, what?
[23:06.610 --> 23:07.530]  Microwave?
[23:09.410 --> 23:10.330]  Magnetron.
[23:11.670 --> 23:13.690]  Please, it's a magnetron.
[23:13.690 --> 23:14.610]  And you have it in your
[23:15.930 --> 23:17.530]  microwave oven.
[23:17.570 --> 23:19.050]  And it's a system that can be used
[23:19.050 --> 23:20.270]  actually to disrupt
[23:22.430 --> 23:23.030]  direct
[23:23.030 --> 23:25.250]  microwave beams as it
[23:25.250 --> 23:27.110]  was used in the
[23:27.110 --> 23:29.390]  Iraq invasion. We will see later
[23:29.390 --> 23:30.950]  some other examples
[23:30.950 --> 23:33.090]  how to use such thing.
[23:33.090 --> 23:35.070]  Anyway, this was the
[23:35.070 --> 23:36.670]  past. And US Army
[23:37.470 --> 23:38.970]  actually didn't want to
[23:38.970 --> 23:41.150]  experience anymore such problem.
[23:41.150 --> 23:43.050]  No bandwidth, no connectivity,
[23:43.050 --> 23:44.910]  no tactical data, equal
[23:44.910 --> 23:46.710]  death. So
[23:46.710 --> 23:48.930]  they decided to
[23:48.930 --> 23:50.730]  develop a new system which is called
[23:50.730 --> 23:52.950]  FCS, which stands
[23:52.950 --> 23:55.370]  for Future Combat System.
[23:55.370 --> 23:57.450]  And it is a
[23:57.450 --> 23:59.090]  21 billion dollar program
[23:59.090 --> 24:00.910]  but it is going to be upgraded
[24:00.910 --> 24:03.370]  already. It's exactly in the middle
[24:03.370 --> 24:04.930]  of its own development.
[24:04.930 --> 24:06.710]  It's not science fiction.
[24:06.710 --> 24:09.270]  Some prototypes have been already developed.
[24:09.610 --> 24:11.030]  And this is the system which is
[24:11.030 --> 24:12.890]  meant to totally
[24:14.210 --> 24:14.730]  substitute
[24:14.730 --> 24:16.750]  the way the US
[24:16.750 --> 24:19.470]  is doing the war in the future.
[24:21.490 --> 24:22.970]  In which way?
[24:23.610 --> 24:25.170]  We will come to the hacking part
[24:25.170 --> 24:26.570]  later, don't worry.
[24:28.150 --> 24:29.630]  The old war
[24:29.630 --> 24:31.610]  concept was that you should have
[24:31.610 --> 24:33.330]  heavy war equipment.
[24:33.330 --> 24:34.950]  The big Abram tank
[24:35.730 --> 24:37.410]  with having massive
[24:37.410 --> 24:39.410]  fire powers. I want to shoot once
[24:39.410 --> 24:41.490]  and I want to kill them all.
[24:43.250 --> 24:43.970]  Large
[24:43.970 --> 24:45.450]  battlefronts. Full
[24:45.450 --> 24:48.050]  division deployed on the territory.
[24:48.230 --> 24:49.850]  Let's occupy, hit,
[24:49.850 --> 24:50.950]  destroy.
[24:52.350 --> 24:53.590]  Having low tech
[24:53.590 --> 24:55.350]  infantry because
[24:55.350 --> 24:57.270]  high tech infantry cost
[24:57.510 --> 24:59.410]  a lot. And of
[24:59.410 --> 25:01.110]  course having vehicles
[25:01.110 --> 25:01.930]  which were
[25:02.970 --> 25:05.330]  driven by real people.
[25:05.330 --> 25:07.370]  Now, under the FCS program
[25:07.370 --> 25:09.590]  things are going to be changed.
[25:09.990 --> 25:11.150]  Not anymore
[25:11.150 --> 25:13.410]  heavy war equipment, but light
[25:13.410 --> 25:15.470]  war equipment. Instead of the big
[25:15.470 --> 25:17.350]  Abram tank, they are going to develop
[25:17.350 --> 25:20.170]  small, lighter tank.
[25:21.790 --> 25:22.910]  Faster than
[25:22.910 --> 25:24.850]  the Abram one.
[25:24.890 --> 25:27.330]  Having not a massive fire power,
[25:27.330 --> 25:29.330]  but having a minimal fire power.
[25:29.550 --> 25:30.790]  But they are so fast
[25:30.790 --> 25:32.790]  that they can shoot you and then move
[25:32.790 --> 25:34.810]  and shoot you again and then move and shoot
[25:34.810 --> 25:36.930]  again and again and again. Like if you
[25:36.930 --> 25:39.170]  are surrounded by a
[25:39.170 --> 25:41.830]  lot of bees. Basically you don't know.
[25:41.830 --> 25:42.950]  You are going to
[25:43.790 --> 25:47.110]  get hit from a lot of different
[25:47.110 --> 25:48.390]  directions.
[25:48.390 --> 25:49.770]  Instead of a large
[25:49.770 --> 25:50.890]  division of soldiers
[25:50.890 --> 25:52.910]  deployed on the territory, they are going
[25:52.910 --> 25:54.690]  to deploy small
[25:54.690 --> 25:57.030]  families, called families of
[25:57.030 --> 25:58.890]  soldiers. Typically in
[25:58.890 --> 25:59.410]  12
[26:02.290 --> 26:02.850]  12
[26:02.850 --> 26:04.110]  people unit.
[26:04.930 --> 26:06.930]  So I put 12 people here,
[26:06.930 --> 26:09.090]  12 people there, 12 people there.
[26:09.190 --> 26:10.950]  If you know where they are, they
[26:10.950 --> 26:12.830]  are very much vulnerable.
[26:13.110 --> 26:14.670]  You can kill them very easily.
[26:14.670 --> 26:17.150]  But there is a trick. We have a
[26:17.150 --> 26:18.570]  large use of intelligence.
[26:18.570 --> 26:20.170]  What does it mean?
[26:20.170 --> 26:22.550]  It means that I must be capable
[26:22.550 --> 26:24.730]  to supply through the FCS system
[26:24.730 --> 26:26.630]  information, immediate information, to the
[26:26.630 --> 26:28.610]  people, to the troops deployed on the
[26:28.610 --> 26:30.690]  battlefield, so that even if
[26:30.690 --> 26:32.710]  they are small families of soldiers,
[26:32.710 --> 26:33.690]  they will be constantly
[26:34.930 --> 26:37.150]  aware about what is going on.
[26:37.270 --> 26:38.410]  And the trick is that
[26:38.410 --> 26:40.570]  when the enemy thinks
[26:40.570 --> 26:42.370]  that they
[26:42.370 --> 26:44.530]  identified our troops,
[26:44.530 --> 26:46.670]  we are already capable to understand
[26:46.670 --> 26:48.590]  it, we move the troops somewhere else,
[26:48.590 --> 26:50.670]  and we hit the enemy. And then we are going to move them
[26:50.670 --> 26:52.690]  and again and again and again.
[26:53.570 --> 26:55.110]  And finally, having a
[26:55.110 --> 26:59.510]  large use of automatic vehicles.
[26:59.510 --> 27:00.990]  We have some examples here.
[27:00.990 --> 27:03.730]  Public data from globalsecurity.org.
[27:03.730 --> 27:04.830]  Some of them, especially
[27:04.830 --> 27:06.930]  the one in the box, you already
[27:06.930 --> 27:09.570]  saw the drones, the spy drones,
[27:09.570 --> 27:11.010]  they are already
[27:11.010 --> 27:12.990]  in force. Some other
[27:12.990 --> 27:14.590]  are prototypes. You can see also
[27:14.590 --> 27:16.750]  the size of the vehicle compared
[27:16.750 --> 27:18.690]  to the human being. They are much
[27:18.690 --> 27:20.370]  smaller than what we were used to see
[27:20.970 --> 27:22.170]  a long time ago.
[27:23.290 --> 27:24.930]  And these are the working prototypes
[27:24.930 --> 27:26.910]  of combat drones.
[27:27.190 --> 27:28.770]  In our comic,
[27:28.770 --> 27:30.730]  our heroes, they have
[27:30.730 --> 27:32.790]  to actually get
[27:32.790 --> 27:34.790]  rid of one of these combat drones
[27:34.790 --> 27:36.730]  which gets hijacked by
[27:36.730 --> 27:38.190]  an enemy's hacker,
[27:38.190 --> 27:40.290]  and it's used against
[27:40.290 --> 27:41.910]  its own troops.
[27:43.830 --> 27:44.790]  Now,
[27:45.690 --> 27:47.330]  always from public data,
[27:47.330 --> 27:49.190]  we can see that this is the
[27:49.190 --> 27:51.070]  timing, the
[27:51.070 --> 27:53.030]  Gantt diagram, basically,
[27:53.030 --> 27:54.990]  on how the FCS is meant
[27:54.990 --> 27:56.890]  to be deployed in the following
[27:56.890 --> 27:58.770]  years, when they
[27:58.770 --> 28:00.930]  developed this in 2001.
[28:01.010 --> 28:03.070]  And one thing you can note, it is that
[28:03.070 --> 28:04.610]  it's saying
[28:05.670 --> 28:07.190]  that the problem,
[28:07.190 --> 28:08.590]  actual problem, is that
[28:08.590 --> 28:11.570]  there is a lack of artificial intelligence.
[28:11.570 --> 28:13.250]  So they are drones,
[28:13.250 --> 28:15.290]  but they have limited capability of
[28:15.290 --> 28:17.150]  understanding the surroundings.
[28:17.150 --> 28:17.710]  Which means
[28:19.190 --> 28:21.890]  they can drive around by themselves,
[28:21.890 --> 28:24.050]  but in combat situations,
[28:24.050 --> 28:25.770]  if you have the risk
[28:25.770 --> 28:27.630]  to kill one of your own
[28:27.630 --> 28:29.970]  soldiers, better not to take such risk.
[28:29.970 --> 28:31.650]  Such vehicles will be taken over
[28:31.650 --> 28:33.450]  by a U.S. Army
[28:35.190 --> 28:36.190]  soldier,
[28:36.190 --> 28:37.210]  and they will be remotely
[28:37.210 --> 28:40.050]  controlled by him,
[28:40.050 --> 28:42.110]  which will actually tell to the drone
[28:42.110 --> 28:44.110]  where to shoot and how to shoot.
[28:45.150 --> 28:47.070]  Now, the question is,
[28:47.070 --> 28:49.110]  from the hacker point of view,
[28:50.550 --> 28:51.850]  to receive the
[28:52.570 --> 28:54.410]  signal, the control signal,
[28:54.410 --> 28:56.230]  it must be hooked to a network,
[28:56.230 --> 28:58.390]  and there is a network, we will see later.
[28:58.750 --> 29:00.050]  If there is a network,
[29:00.050 --> 29:01.810]  it means such thing is
[29:01.810 --> 29:05.030]  permanently connected and authenticated to the network.
[29:05.490 --> 29:06.150]  Good.
[29:07.070 --> 29:08.550]  But it can get, for example,
[29:08.550 --> 29:10.830]  it can get stuck into a hole
[29:10.830 --> 29:12.870]  or the wheels
[29:12.870 --> 29:14.690]  can blow up and the thing,
[29:14.690 --> 29:16.410]  the whole thing will be stopped
[29:16.410 --> 29:17.850]  in the middle of somewhere.
[29:17.910 --> 29:20.690]  So what if the enemy is going to put its own hands
[29:20.690 --> 29:22.470]  over it? It is dangerous to have
[29:22.710 --> 29:25.130]  a thing which is permanently connected to your network.
[29:25.130 --> 29:26.570]  Because the enemy can put
[29:26.570 --> 29:28.030]  the hands over the network.
[29:28.070 --> 29:30.210]  So I guess, I didn't find any reference,
[29:30.210 --> 29:32.530]  but I expect there are some,
[29:32.530 --> 29:33.570]  there might be some
[29:34.570 --> 29:36.390]  system to protect
[29:36.390 --> 29:38.030]  in such situation,
[29:38.030 --> 29:39.770]  like self-destroying system.
[29:39.770 --> 29:43.090]  Self-destroying, it doesn't mean it is going to be blown up.
[29:43.110 --> 29:44.430]  Because it might be dangerous.
[29:44.430 --> 29:47.170]  Because it might be close to your own soldiers.
[29:47.290 --> 29:48.510]  Self-destroying means
[29:48.510 --> 29:50.090]  that you will destroy
[29:50.090 --> 29:51.970]  the digital contents of the drones,
[29:51.970 --> 29:53.630]  leaving just basically a piece of art.
[29:53.630 --> 29:55.970]  You remember this, the American spy plane,
[29:55.970 --> 29:58.370]  which was landing on the Chinese island
[29:58.890 --> 30:00.130]  a few years ago?
[30:01.170 --> 30:02.790]  The American soldiers,
[30:02.790 --> 30:04.610]  before landing on the Chinese island,
[30:04.610 --> 30:05.630]  it was a spy plane.
[30:05.630 --> 30:07.950]  Basically, it was connected to the US Army network.
[30:07.950 --> 30:10.610]  They destroyed, not physically, but logically,
[30:10.610 --> 30:12.670]  all the content in the airplane.
[30:13.030 --> 30:14.670]  The Chinese authorities, they were capable
[30:14.670 --> 30:16.490]  to put their hands over
[30:16.810 --> 30:18.710]  a piece of hardware without the software.
[30:18.710 --> 30:20.370]  And you know better than me that if you have
[30:20.370 --> 30:21.890]  the hardware without the software,
[30:21.890 --> 30:25.210]  it's basically a little bit more than nothing.
[30:26.990 --> 30:28.250]  Now, then,
[30:28.250 --> 30:30.110]  if it has really such
[30:30.750 --> 30:32.610]  auto-destruction system,
[30:33.910 --> 30:35.210]  the smart hacker
[30:35.210 --> 30:38.130]  employed by the enemy
[30:38.810 --> 30:39.810]  might think
[30:39.810 --> 30:41.810]  ways to trigger the system
[30:41.810 --> 30:44.090]  of the self-destruction.
[30:44.090 --> 30:45.530]  Not doing it today,
[30:45.530 --> 30:47.190]  but doing it the day you need it
[30:47.190 --> 30:50.010]  and this thing is deployed on the battlefield.
[30:50.090 --> 30:50.930]  You are relying
[30:50.930 --> 30:53.350]  on its usage,
[30:53.350 --> 30:54.970]  but the hacker will actually
[30:56.350 --> 30:57.770]  destroy the content,
[30:57.770 --> 31:00.390]  triggering the self-destruction mechanism.
[31:00.390 --> 31:00.670]  Now,
[31:02.070 --> 31:03.810]  how this thing works?
[31:03.810 --> 31:05.970]  The FCS system,
[31:05.970 --> 31:08.390]  it is managed
[31:08.390 --> 31:10.870]  by a huge network,
[31:10.870 --> 31:12.210]  the largest network after
[31:12.210 --> 31:14.650]  Internet, actually, if I think,
[31:14.650 --> 31:16.230]  which is called Mosaic.
[31:16.290 --> 31:18.230]  Mosaic network, it is meant
[31:18.230 --> 31:19.690]  to manage the whole
[31:20.210 --> 31:21.250]  war infrastructure
[31:21.250 --> 31:24.550]  of US Army.
[31:26.750 --> 31:28.670]  Ships, submarines,
[31:28.670 --> 31:30.410]  airplanes,
[31:30.410 --> 31:32.510]  infantry, drones, everything
[31:32.510 --> 31:34.370]  will be connected somehow
[31:34.370 --> 31:36.070]  to this network.
[31:36.170 --> 31:38.250]  The network, the Mosaic network,
[31:38.250 --> 31:40.790]  it is meant to have a kind of quality of service
[31:42.890 --> 31:43.570]  feature
[31:44.390 --> 31:45.570]  based on
[31:46.510 --> 31:48.450]  the importance of
[31:48.450 --> 31:50.510]  the packet. If the packet
[31:50.510 --> 31:52.470]  is coming from the command and control
[31:52.470 --> 31:54.530]  center,
[31:54.530 --> 31:56.270]  this packet has priority
[31:56.270 --> 31:58.390]  in the mesh network
[31:58.390 --> 32:00.970]  because it is a mesh network.
[32:01.310 --> 32:02.030]  It means
[32:02.030 --> 32:04.390]  even if the network is
[32:04.390 --> 32:06.490]  congested, blocked
[32:06.490 --> 32:09.030]  somehow, overloaded,
[32:09.030 --> 32:10.430]  the packets coming
[32:10.430 --> 32:12.230]  from the high priority centers
[32:12.230 --> 32:14.250]  will be routed
[32:14.250 --> 32:16.190]  correctly to the end,
[32:16.190 --> 32:18.390]  having the other packets waiting for
[32:18.390 --> 32:20.310]  that. And in our comic,
[32:20.310 --> 32:22.390]  we can't say it here, but we can say it
[32:22.390 --> 32:24.130]  on the comic because the comic is
[32:24.130 --> 32:25.670]  science fiction.
[32:25.670 --> 32:28.150]  We actually imagine the way to
[32:28.150 --> 32:30.110]  exploit such
[32:30.430 --> 32:31.710]  a system just
[32:31.710 --> 32:34.230]  flooding it by high priority
[32:34.230 --> 32:36.050]  packets, by replicating
[32:36.050 --> 32:38.450]  them and saturating the network.
[32:39.350 --> 32:40.130]  Now,
[32:43.370 --> 32:46.050]  the FCS system, it is a system,
[32:46.150 --> 32:47.630]  a daring system.
[32:47.630 --> 32:49.010]  They already tried some
[32:49.010 --> 32:51.650]  of the pieces, some of the equipment
[32:51.650 --> 32:53.630]  and the network, it is
[32:53.630 --> 32:55.350]  TCP IP based
[32:55.350 --> 32:57.090]  and it's basically using
[32:57.630 --> 32:59.750]  traditional network
[32:59.750 --> 33:01.870]  equipment and
[33:01.870 --> 33:03.130]  several of the
[33:03.130 --> 33:06.350]  drones are actually Linux based.
[33:06.350 --> 33:07.870]  A miniaturized version of Linux
[33:07.870 --> 33:09.630]  of course, with
[33:09.630 --> 33:10.730]  harder
[33:11.730 --> 33:13.370]  stacks,
[33:13.370 --> 33:16.690]  maybe less holes, you never know.
[33:17.630 --> 33:19.890]  But it's still something which is public
[33:19.890 --> 33:21.810]  and based on
[33:21.810 --> 33:24.010]  public networking system.
[33:24.970 --> 33:25.270]  And
[33:25.670 --> 33:27.370]  now comes the problem.
[33:27.710 --> 33:29.310]  What I call the
[33:29.310 --> 33:31.910]  Apollo 13 effect.
[33:31.910 --> 33:33.950]  Do you actually know what was the
[33:33.950 --> 33:35.810]  real reason why
[33:35.810 --> 33:37.530]  the Apollo 13
[33:38.530 --> 33:39.670]  had the problem?
[33:39.670 --> 33:41.470]  You remember that the oxygen tank
[33:41.470 --> 33:42.670]  exploded.
[33:43.070 --> 33:45.570]  If you know the reason, you can get a second
[33:45.570 --> 33:47.390]  T-shirt. Which was the real reason
[33:47.390 --> 33:49.030]  why the oxygen tank
[33:49.030 --> 33:51.370]  of the Apollo 13 exploded.
[33:52.510 --> 33:53.190]  Not
[33:53.190 --> 33:54.890]  communication problems.
[33:55.390 --> 33:57.210]  Wiring? Almost.
[34:01.810 --> 34:02.770]  Excuse me?
[34:03.670 --> 34:06.790]  A short in the oxygen center, but why?
[34:10.360 --> 34:12.340]  Electrical? Yes, almost.
[34:12.340 --> 34:13.480]  We are close.
[34:20.380 --> 34:22.020]  No, no, no, no.
[34:22.020 --> 34:23.460]  Well, if nobody is...
[34:23.820 --> 34:24.820]  You?
[34:27.790 --> 34:29.150]  No?
[34:29.150 --> 34:31.070]  No?
[34:31.070 --> 34:32.390]  Voltage.
[34:32.750 --> 34:34.270]  Voltage.
[34:35.270 --> 34:36.390]  The Apollo 13
[34:37.150 --> 34:39.310]  project was a huge project.
[34:40.010 --> 34:41.210]  A lot of suppliers
[34:42.210 --> 34:43.290]  Rockwell,
[34:43.290 --> 34:45.390]  Boeing, and so on.
[34:45.390 --> 34:47.070]  They were helping NASA to develop
[34:47.070 --> 34:48.430]  the systems.
[34:49.070 --> 34:50.750]  From Apollo 12
[34:50.750 --> 34:52.950]  to Apollo 13, the difference
[34:52.950 --> 34:54.970]  is that they decided
[34:54.970 --> 34:56.950]  to increase the voltage
[34:56.950 --> 34:58.730]  which was used
[34:58.730 --> 35:01.090]  to run the systems
[35:01.090 --> 35:03.350]  in the Apollo 13.
[35:04.070 --> 35:04.710]  So
[35:04.710 --> 35:06.870]  all the developers,
[35:06.870 --> 35:09.630]  all the subcontractors, they were informed, of course,
[35:09.630 --> 35:10.890]  except one.
[35:11.190 --> 35:12.230]  Rockwell.
[35:13.270 --> 35:15.070]  And, which is
[35:15.070 --> 35:16.950]  by the way, one of the subcontractors
[35:16.950 --> 35:19.290]  of the SCS system, but anyway.
[35:19.570 --> 35:20.950]  Not being informed about
[35:20.950 --> 35:23.110]  such increase in the voltage,
[35:23.110 --> 35:25.250]  they were supplying the oxygen tank
[35:25.250 --> 35:26.770]  and it blown up.
[35:26.770 --> 35:29.530]  Because it was overloaded by voltage.
[35:30.230 --> 35:31.130]  You can get the T-shirt
[35:31.130 --> 35:32.030]  anyway.
[35:33.470 --> 35:35.590]  Now, why it happened?
[35:35.590 --> 35:37.030]  It's actually normal. In my
[35:37.030 --> 35:38.990]  experience, when I work
[35:38.990 --> 35:41.370]  besides Zone H, I do penetration tests
[35:41.370 --> 35:43.110]  with my own company.
[35:43.130 --> 35:44.910]  And one of the things
[35:44.910 --> 35:47.250]  I noticed is when you have complex systems
[35:47.250 --> 35:49.410]  made up, for example, by different
[35:50.190 --> 35:51.270]  subcontractors,
[35:51.270 --> 35:53.330]  the implementation of such systems
[35:53.330 --> 35:55.750]  it is introducing more vulnerabilities.
[35:55.750 --> 35:56.790]  Rockwell was one of
[35:57.390 --> 35:58.850]  a new vulnerability for the Apollo
[35:58.850 --> 36:01.430]  13 program.
[36:02.030 --> 36:02.870]  Now, I expect
[36:02.870 --> 36:05.410]  given the fact that we have
[36:05.410 --> 36:05.970]  FCS
[36:07.770 --> 36:09.050]  being a consortium
[36:09.050 --> 36:11.330]  much bigger than the Apollo 13
[36:11.330 --> 36:13.010]  one of company,
[36:13.010 --> 36:15.110]  mostly American company.
[36:15.230 --> 36:17.550]  The leader of the consortium is Boeing.
[36:17.550 --> 36:19.510]  You can see actually advertising on CNN
[36:19.510 --> 36:21.070]  in these days, not
[36:21.070 --> 36:22.930]  specifically related to the FCS
[36:22.930 --> 36:25.050]  system, but the images they are showing
[36:25.050 --> 36:27.290]  are belonging to the FCS system.
[36:27.770 --> 36:28.990]  So the general
[36:28.990 --> 36:31.130]  public start to be aware
[36:31.130 --> 36:32.730]  about such system.
[36:33.830 --> 36:35.070]  The Apollo 13
[36:35.070 --> 36:36.930]  sorry, the FCS
[36:36.930 --> 36:39.110]  system, it is led by Boeing, having
[36:39.110 --> 36:41.470]  also a large consortium
[36:41.470 --> 36:42.270]  of company
[36:44.530 --> 36:45.290]  to be
[36:45.290 --> 36:47.510]  actually managed as a project manager.
[36:47.830 --> 36:49.070]  We can say actually Boeing
[36:49.070 --> 36:51.370]  is the FCS project manager
[36:52.430 --> 36:53.270]  on behalf
[36:53.270 --> 36:55.490]  of the Department of Defense.
[36:57.350 --> 36:58.390]  Now,
[37:00.130 --> 37:01.750]  how does it work?
[37:01.750 --> 37:03.090]  The U.S. Congress tell
[37:03.090 --> 37:04.950]  to U.S. Army, yes, you have to develop
[37:05.090 --> 37:06.830]  a new system. They assign a budget
[37:06.830 --> 37:09.030]  and then they name
[37:09.170 --> 37:10.810]  a project leader, Boeing.
[37:11.310 --> 37:12.470]  Then the system are
[37:13.070 --> 37:14.710]  divided in subsystems
[37:14.710 --> 37:16.970]  and in consortium. There is the consortium
[37:16.970 --> 37:18.990]  of companies which
[37:18.990 --> 37:21.110]  are developing robotics, artificial
[37:21.110 --> 37:23.190]  intelligence. Then there is a consortium
[37:23.490 --> 37:25.010]  of companies which is developing
[37:25.690 --> 37:27.130]  unmanned vehicles.
[37:27.130 --> 37:29.090]  Another consortium of companies which is
[37:29.090 --> 37:31.790]  developing weaponry, and so on.
[37:31.790 --> 37:33.110]  Each company has to
[37:33.110 --> 37:35.130]  report to Boeing how things are going
[37:35.130 --> 37:36.950]  on. And
[37:36.950 --> 37:39.310]  of course, each consortium
[37:39.310 --> 37:41.470]  itself has a consortium leader.
[37:41.470 --> 37:42.930]  The consortium leader has to
[37:42.930 --> 37:45.150]  act as a sub project manager
[37:45.150 --> 37:47.030]  to the rest of the companies
[37:47.030 --> 37:49.530]  belonging to the same consortium.
[37:50.530 --> 37:51.810]  Each consortium
[37:51.810 --> 37:53.110]  and each company
[37:53.110 --> 37:55.530]  in the consortium has its own
[37:55.530 --> 37:57.310]  project manager, internal
[37:57.310 --> 37:59.390]  company project manager, who has to lead
[37:59.390 --> 38:01.550]  the activity of the programmers,
[38:01.550 --> 38:02.990]  for example,
[38:02.990 --> 38:05.030]  which are developing within the company
[38:05.290 --> 38:07.810]  a particular piece of the SES system.
[38:08.010 --> 38:09.170]  Now, you can imagine,
[38:09.170 --> 38:11.790]  if you add all the programmers,
[38:11.790 --> 38:12.670]  each programmer
[38:13.690 --> 38:15.370]  developing the system,
[38:15.370 --> 38:16.890]  by the way, FCS system,
[38:16.890 --> 38:19.130]  it is 31 millions of code,
[38:19.130 --> 38:20.850]  the software, 31 millions
[38:20.850 --> 38:23.010]  of lines of code. You can imagine
[38:23.010 --> 38:25.030]  how many conceptual and practical
[38:25.030 --> 38:27.030]  vulnerabilities there might be introduced
[38:27.030 --> 38:28.890]  by people who never developed, for
[38:28.890 --> 38:30.790]  example, such software, because nobody
[38:30.790 --> 38:32.890]  did it before. It is a totally
[38:32.890 --> 38:34.730]  new thing. And when
[38:35.230 --> 38:36.930]  a lot of programmers belonging to
[38:37.110 --> 38:39.030]  a company, which is put together
[38:39.030 --> 38:41.010]  with a lot of other different companies
[38:41.010 --> 38:43.450]  which are belonging to a consortium,
[38:43.450 --> 38:45.150]  which are put together with several
[38:45.150 --> 38:47.250]  other consortiums, are going, finally,
[38:47.250 --> 38:49.630]  to integrate what they produced,
[38:49.630 --> 38:51.090]  the software, you can imagine
[38:51.090 --> 38:52.890]  the huge amount of shit
[38:52.890 --> 38:54.810]  that can come out.
[38:58.190 --> 38:59.390]  Now,
[39:00.350 --> 39:01.410]  as a personal
[39:01.410 --> 39:03.130]  experience, and also analyzing
[39:03.130 --> 39:05.870]  the data coming from Zone H,
[39:05.870 --> 39:07.110]  we have
[39:07.110 --> 39:08.890]  one million of cyber crimes
[39:08.890 --> 39:10.550]  web defacement,
[39:10.550 --> 39:12.790]  let's call it web defacement,
[39:12.790 --> 39:15.070]  filed in our archives. For each,
[39:15.070 --> 39:16.530]  we know how it happened
[39:16.530 --> 39:19.790]  and the reason of the attacks.
[39:20.930 --> 39:23.110]  We can say, today,
[39:23.450 --> 39:25.030]  most of the hacks which we
[39:25.030 --> 39:26.910]  see every day,
[39:26.910 --> 39:28.710]  two and a half thousand servers hacked
[39:28.710 --> 39:30.850]  per day. This is the amount of data
[39:30.850 --> 39:33.130]  we are receiving at zoneh.org.
[39:33.690 --> 39:35.070]  80% of
[39:35.070 --> 39:36.870]  the time, the system is
[39:36.870 --> 39:38.910]  hacked through the application layer.
[39:38.910 --> 39:41.730]  And FCS system is mostly application.
[39:42.230 --> 39:42.670]  Now,
[39:42.670 --> 39:44.850]  I want to say they are better
[39:44.850 --> 39:46.110]  than the average.
[39:46.110 --> 39:48.770]  It will be vulnerable, maybe
[39:50.090 --> 39:51.070]  40%
[39:51.070 --> 39:53.170]  on the application level,
[39:53.490 --> 39:54.950]  but still there are
[39:54.950 --> 39:57.190]  possible vulnerabilities to be introduced
[39:57.190 --> 39:59.730]  by the system integration, for example,
[39:59.730 --> 40:00.990]  the protocol might be
[40:00.990 --> 40:02.890]  bugged, the transmission protocol might be
[40:02.890 --> 40:05.110]  bugged, the hardware
[40:05.110 --> 40:07.030]  integration might introduce vulnerabilities
[40:07.030 --> 40:09.190]  and also, of course,
[40:09.190 --> 40:11.450]  information leakage.
[40:11.730 --> 40:13.110]  Hackers are
[40:13.890 --> 40:15.310]  actively looking
[40:15.310 --> 40:17.050]  to get information about the
[40:17.050 --> 40:19.210]  FCS. I met, personally,
[40:19.370 --> 40:21.330]  a guy in Rome
[40:21.330 --> 40:23.490]  which was representing
[40:23.490 --> 40:24.170]  US Navi
[40:25.110 --> 40:27.270]  and he was investigating on
[40:27.270 --> 40:29.170]  leaks. He didn't
[40:29.170 --> 40:31.430]  name to me the FCS system
[40:31.430 --> 40:32.970]  itself. He told me
[40:32.970 --> 40:35.170]  we are looking for information
[40:35.170 --> 40:35.950]  about
[40:37.030 --> 40:38.830]  hackers coming from the
[40:38.830 --> 40:41.010]  East Europe, stealing a piece of
[40:41.010 --> 40:42.450]  information about military
[40:43.150 --> 40:44.850]  software or military
[40:44.850 --> 40:47.010]  programs under development.
[40:47.390 --> 40:48.870]  Well, the only military program
[40:48.870 --> 40:50.850]  under development so far, big, is the
[40:50.850 --> 40:52.230]  FCS system. And
[40:53.030 --> 40:54.810]  no need to name it, actually.
[40:54.810 --> 40:56.850]  It was clear to me that they are having
[40:56.850 --> 40:59.050]  such problem already. There are spies
[40:59.050 --> 41:00.570]  who are actually using
[41:00.570 --> 41:01.330]  hacker
[41:03.050 --> 41:04.850]  means to get information
[41:04.850 --> 41:06.770]  about this new system.
[41:15.140 --> 41:16.300]  Now,
[41:19.590 --> 41:20.170]  if
[41:21.790 --> 41:23.350]  there are software
[41:23.350 --> 41:25.370]  problems, that might be software
[41:25.370 --> 41:27.270]  problems, again, read the comic
[41:27.270 --> 41:29.290]  and you will get a very good hint on how
[41:29.290 --> 41:31.830]  to hack the mosaic network.
[41:33.130 --> 41:35.650]  There are also other problems. First of all,
[41:35.650 --> 41:37.610]  the FCS system is organized
[41:37.610 --> 41:39.050]  following the lobbying
[41:39.610 --> 41:40.850]  standard procedure
[41:41.610 --> 41:43.310]  in the American way.
[41:43.310 --> 41:45.710]  So, the president got
[41:45.950 --> 41:47.250]  a lot of money for his
[41:47.250 --> 41:49.390]  campaign from Boeing.
[41:49.390 --> 41:52.090]  Therefore, Boeing, for example,
[41:53.410 --> 41:55.470]  doing some science fiction.
[41:55.490 --> 41:57.690]  Boeing is named as a project leader,
[41:57.690 --> 41:59.330]  but then also other people, they were
[41:59.330 --> 42:01.230]  sustaining the campaign, then
[42:01.230 --> 42:03.490]  they also have to have a little
[42:03.490 --> 42:05.470]  piece. So, it is
[42:05.470 --> 42:07.410]  not always distributed as it
[42:07.410 --> 42:10.170]  should be, the work.
[42:10.850 --> 42:11.530]  Lobbyism
[42:11.530 --> 42:13.370]  has a big part in the decision
[42:13.370 --> 42:15.550]  to which company assign a project
[42:15.550 --> 42:17.610]  or not. Then,
[42:17.610 --> 42:19.570]  the military software is not open
[42:19.570 --> 42:21.310]  sourced, of course. You know,
[42:21.310 --> 42:23.310]  Linux is the most audited
[42:23.310 --> 42:25.630]  code ever. Still, we are finding
[42:25.630 --> 42:27.930]  vulnerabilities. Still.
[42:28.230 --> 42:29.470]  Firefox.
[42:30.550 --> 42:31.230]  Everybody
[42:31.230 --> 42:33.330]  using Firefox because it was open sourced
[42:33.330 --> 42:34.550]  two years ago.
[42:36.130 --> 42:37.350]  I don't know
[42:37.350 --> 42:39.230]  anybody who was actually reading the
[42:39.230 --> 42:41.210]  source, but they were saying, oh, it's open
[42:41.210 --> 42:43.770]  sourced, so I can use it. It's safe.
[42:43.770 --> 42:45.370]  But still, are coming
[42:45.370 --> 42:46.810]  out new vulnerabilities.
[42:47.110 --> 42:49.310]  Because it's open sourced. A closed
[42:49.310 --> 42:51.350]  source platform, basically
[42:51.350 --> 42:53.690]  it is a never audited platform.
[42:53.710 --> 42:55.050]  Because who is going to audit
[42:55.050 --> 42:57.330]  the FCS system? The same people
[42:57.330 --> 42:59.330]  who are developing it. And you know better
[42:59.330 --> 43:01.190]  than me that you can't audit
[43:01.190 --> 43:02.570]  your own job.
[43:03.170 --> 43:05.350]  The job should be outsourced by somebody
[43:05.350 --> 43:07.270]  else, but because it's
[43:07.270 --> 43:09.430]  military, you can't do it.
[43:09.430 --> 43:11.170]  Therefore, I expect, by my
[43:11.170 --> 43:13.310]  experience, to find a lot
[43:13.310 --> 43:15.090]  of vulnerability in the application level
[43:15.090 --> 43:17.450]  and within the lines.
[43:19.170 --> 43:20.970]  Then, if the FCS
[43:20.970 --> 43:23.090]  system is leading your
[43:23.090 --> 43:25.190]  troops on the battlefield,
[43:26.310 --> 43:27.430]  losing somehow
[43:27.430 --> 43:28.930]  connectivity, or being
[43:28.930 --> 43:29.890]  hacked,
[43:31.670 --> 43:33.230]  leads to a lot of trouble.
[43:33.230 --> 43:35.390]  Because you don't have anymore a large battlefront
[43:35.390 --> 43:37.270]  which is capable to defend itself.
[43:37.270 --> 43:39.230]  Now you have small families of soldiers,
[43:39.230 --> 43:41.370]  12 soldiers, dispersed in the territory.
[43:41.370 --> 43:43.170]  They don't get shit from the satellite
[43:43.170 --> 43:45.110]  or information. They don't know where they are.
[43:45.110 --> 43:47.090]  They don't know where the enemy is. They don't get
[43:47.090 --> 43:49.030]  the command from
[43:49.030 --> 43:50.990]  the command and control center. They don't know what
[43:50.990 --> 43:52.950]  to do. They are blind, basically. They are
[43:52.950 --> 43:54.110]  slow, because they are
[43:55.150 --> 43:56.770]  without heavy equipment.
[43:56.770 --> 43:58.990]  And they are a very vulnerable
[43:58.990 --> 44:00.470]  target.
[44:01.070 --> 44:02.790]  Now, if I am
[44:02.790 --> 44:04.850]  an enemy of the United
[44:04.850 --> 44:06.470]  States today, definitely
[44:06.470 --> 44:08.230]  I would start
[44:08.910 --> 44:10.470]  a program for
[44:10.470 --> 44:12.390]  collecting as much
[44:12.390 --> 44:14.630]  information as I can about
[44:14.630 --> 44:16.730]  such FCS system.
[44:16.730 --> 44:18.790]  Because nobody can
[44:18.790 --> 44:20.870]  fight against
[44:20.870 --> 44:22.890]  the United States using the same
[44:22.890 --> 44:24.950]  system, because you need
[44:24.990 --> 44:26.230]  a lot of money. There is no
[44:27.370 --> 44:28.410]  symmetric power
[44:28.950 --> 44:30.890]  as an enemy for the United States.
[44:30.890 --> 44:33.130]  The only way you can fight
[44:33.130 --> 44:35.070]  the United States, if the United States
[44:35.070 --> 44:36.870]  is adopting such a system, is
[44:36.870 --> 44:39.190]  to use asymmetric ways.
[44:39.190 --> 44:40.790]  And one of the ways is to hack
[44:40.790 --> 44:42.870]  the servers of the companies
[44:42.870 --> 44:44.910]  which today are going to
[44:44.910 --> 44:46.290]  develop such
[44:47.170 --> 44:48.830]  a system, and to try to
[44:48.830 --> 44:51.110]  steal information. And one of the things
[44:51.110 --> 44:53.010]  which we did,
[44:53.010 --> 44:54.070]  we were imagining
[44:55.010 --> 44:55.930]  to be
[44:56.670 --> 44:58.610]  I don't know, hackers
[44:58.610 --> 45:00.950]  coming from North Korea,
[45:00.950 --> 45:03.230]  or hackers coming from Iran,
[45:03.230 --> 45:05.130]  and to see how much of information
[45:05.130 --> 45:07.030]  we could find
[45:07.030 --> 45:08.170]  on the Internet
[45:09.150 --> 45:11.370]  to hack the system.
[45:14.300 --> 45:15.820]  It's not done.
[45:19.280 --> 45:20.000]  So...
[45:20.820 --> 45:22.220]  This is a question
[45:22.220 --> 45:23.520]  I put there, just
[45:24.500 --> 45:26.940]  a little forward to the question.
[45:26.960 --> 45:28.180]  The most
[45:28.180 --> 45:30.020]  vulnerable system, as everybody knows,
[45:30.020 --> 45:32.360]  is our brain,
[45:32.360 --> 45:33.960]  right? So it's the human being.
[45:33.960 --> 45:35.880]  The human being with all its vulnerabilities
[45:35.880 --> 45:38.200]  and its ways to be bought
[45:38.200 --> 45:39.780]  or exploited.
[45:39.900 --> 45:41.880]  So, that's why I put
[45:41.880 --> 45:43.220]  this question there.
[45:43.220 --> 45:46.060]  Who are the best security-aware managers
[45:46.060 --> 45:48.840]  or people in the world's history?
[45:49.700 --> 45:50.920]  The Pharaohs.
[45:51.220 --> 45:52.960]  They got a lot
[45:52.960 --> 45:55.080]  of people to build the pyramids
[45:55.080 --> 45:56.800]  and then at the end they killed them all.
[45:56.800 --> 45:58.940]  I didn't find any slide with the people being killed
[45:58.940 --> 46:00.780]  afterwards, so I didn't put it, but
[46:00.780 --> 46:01.960]  that's the thing.
[46:02.520 --> 46:05.120]  So, we cannot do it now.
[46:05.360 --> 46:06.720]  The right way would be
[46:06.720 --> 46:09.100]  we build a future combat system
[46:09.100 --> 46:11.400]  and then we kill everybody that build it.
[46:11.400 --> 46:13.200]  Then we wouldn't have anybody to maintain it,
[46:13.200 --> 46:14.560]  but that's not a problem.
[46:14.860 --> 46:17.180]  It's illegal, but what the hell.
[46:18.880 --> 46:19.740]  So,
[46:20.820 --> 46:22.840]  this is just to explode
[46:22.840 --> 46:25.120]  what I was saying before.
[46:25.460 --> 46:26.700]  This slide,
[46:26.700 --> 46:28.780]  I borrowed it from a Swedish
[46:28.780 --> 46:31.500]  study from a university there.
[46:31.500 --> 46:32.840]  That's actually pretty...
[46:32.840 --> 46:34.540]  I liked it very much because it explains
[46:34.540 --> 46:37.100]  all the phases of the conflict.
[46:37.180 --> 46:38.440]  You have the
[46:38.440 --> 46:40.520]  mechanical war at the center, which is
[46:40.520 --> 46:42.520]  big armies facing each other
[46:42.520 --> 46:44.880]  with the guns and going forward and shooting
[46:44.880 --> 46:46.380]  and everybody falls down.
[46:46.380 --> 46:47.780]  At the end, only one soldier remains
[46:47.780 --> 46:49.420]  and that army won.
[46:50.060 --> 46:52.600]  There was the old way to fight.
[46:52.600 --> 46:54.180]  Then you have the dirty war,
[46:54.180 --> 46:56.360]  which is terrorism or resistance war.
[46:56.360 --> 46:57.860]  Depends from the viewpoint.
[46:58.000 --> 46:59.920]  If you win, it's resistance. If you lose,
[46:59.920 --> 47:01.200]  it's terrorism.
[47:01.940 --> 47:03.180]  Then you have
[47:03.800 --> 47:05.080]  peace war, which is
[47:05.760 --> 47:07.900]  the war that was fought between the Eastern
[47:07.900 --> 47:09.260]  Bloc and the Western Bloc when there was
[47:09.260 --> 47:11.280]  the Soviet Union.
[47:11.580 --> 47:12.900]  And the systemic war, which is
[47:12.900 --> 47:14.840]  the war that can be fought
[47:14.840 --> 47:17.280]  only by the United States right now, which has the money.
[47:17.280 --> 47:18.960]  It's the big difference between
[47:19.400 --> 47:20.800]  all the other types of war and
[47:20.800 --> 47:22.520]  systemic war is money
[47:22.520 --> 47:25.040]  and the other wars are people. More people,
[47:25.040 --> 47:25.800]  more money.
[47:27.160 --> 47:28.800]  And, you know, little windows
[47:28.800 --> 47:30.940]  that you can hit with the intelligent bombs.
[47:31.040 --> 47:32.960]  And then you have the ICT war. ICT war
[47:32.960 --> 47:35.000]  is a type of dirty war which can be fought
[47:35.000 --> 47:36.440]  only by
[47:38.280 --> 47:38.680]  subjects
[47:38.680 --> 47:40.840]  which have the capability or which
[47:40.840 --> 47:43.060]  are linked, which have a high technological
[47:44.200 --> 47:44.680]  situation
[47:44.680 --> 47:46.820]  in their countries and can be fought only
[47:46.820 --> 47:48.800]  against another country which
[47:48.800 --> 47:50.760]  has the same situation. For example, you cannot
[47:50.760 --> 47:52.540]  fight an ICT war against Iran
[47:52.540 --> 47:54.720]  because they have only two servers, I think.
[47:54.860 --> 47:56.380]  Last time I checked,
[47:56.380 --> 47:58.760]  it was a couple of mail servers
[47:58.760 --> 48:00.580]  in the mines and whatever
[48:00.580 --> 48:02.460]  ministry, etc.
[48:02.460 --> 48:04.260]  They don't have anything on the nuclear side, so
[48:04.260 --> 48:07.080]  that's unfortunate for the intelligent people here.
[48:07.960 --> 48:08.220]  And
[48:08.840 --> 48:10.160]  but you can fight an ICT
[48:10.160 --> 48:11.820]  war between, I don't know,
[48:11.820 --> 48:14.040]  I'm just doing fiction, Japan and
[48:14.040 --> 48:16.080]  whatever, Korea. They are not at war, but
[48:16.080 --> 48:17.620]  if they would, that would be
[48:18.070 --> 48:19.640]  the thing. So
[48:22.020 --> 48:24.200]  if you want to, this is taken from
[48:24.460 --> 48:26.320]  a book which is called Unrestricted Warfare.
[48:26.320 --> 48:27.060]  I think everybody
[48:28.140 --> 48:29.960]  that has some interest
[48:29.960 --> 48:32.060]  in this has read it. It was
[48:32.060 --> 48:33.400]  first translated by the CIA
[48:33.400 --> 48:36.080]  and then it was retranslated again because there were
[48:36.080 --> 48:37.940]  some points which were not totally
[48:37.940 --> 48:40.120]  clear. And they were the first
[48:40.120 --> 48:41.900]  that unrestricted because
[48:41.900 --> 48:42.360]  they
[48:44.280 --> 48:46.020]  hypothesized that any kind of
[48:46.020 --> 48:48.160]  means to fight a war,
[48:48.160 --> 48:50.160]  there are no rules in fighting a war,
[48:50.160 --> 48:52.340]  which means that you can do just about anything.
[48:52.340 --> 48:53.920]  The important thing is the result,
[48:53.920 --> 48:54.920]  to win.
[48:55.920 --> 48:58.080]  And they were the first to
[48:58.080 --> 49:00.140]  say that one of the
[49:00.140 --> 49:01.920]  best means to fight a war would be
[49:01.920 --> 49:03.920]  through electronic means,
[49:03.920 --> 49:05.660]  exploiting the electronics
[49:05.660 --> 49:07.200]  and the telematics.
[49:08.680 --> 49:09.740]  So, future
[49:09.740 --> 49:11.880]  combat system. This is all
[49:11.880 --> 49:13.960]  the material you will see from here
[49:13.960 --> 49:15.980]  on up to the last
[49:15.980 --> 49:16.680]  slide, which is
[49:17.740 --> 49:20.150]  done by some, I think, Accenture.
[49:20.480 --> 49:21.880]  They are all being
[49:21.880 --> 49:23.820]  taken from open source.
[49:23.960 --> 49:25.400]  Nothing has been hacked.
[49:26.200 --> 49:27.000]  Right?
[49:27.880 --> 49:29.040]  Okay.
[49:30.320 --> 49:31.960]  So, this is
[49:31.960 --> 49:34.280]  the distribution of the consortiums
[49:34.280 --> 49:36.060]  that work on the future combat
[49:36.060 --> 49:37.720]  system. So, if you want to do
[49:37.720 --> 49:40.060]  research from an intelligence point of
[49:40.060 --> 49:42.460]  view, you start from here.
[49:42.460 --> 49:43.920]  You see who is working for
[49:43.920 --> 49:45.760]  whom and on what.
[49:46.080 --> 49:48.020]  And then, you get...
[49:49.480 --> 49:50.480]  Wow!
[49:50.480 --> 49:51.940]  You get all the companies
[49:51.940 --> 49:53.480]  that work on what project
[49:53.480 --> 49:55.580]  and where they are located.
[49:57.380 --> 49:58.180]  One,
[49:58.180 --> 50:00.300]  two, three, four pages.
[50:00.300 --> 50:01.140]  Wow!
[50:01.840 --> 50:03.940]  Wow! What's that?
[50:04.360 --> 50:06.740]  You get all the...
[50:06.740 --> 50:08.180]  What is this?
[50:10.020 --> 50:11.000]  So, this is
[50:11.000 --> 50:14.360]  the specific project
[50:14.360 --> 50:15.800]  that has been
[50:17.100 --> 50:18.440]  assigned, the description
[50:18.440 --> 50:19.800]  of the project, the company
[50:19.800 --> 50:23.160]  and other little information about that.
[50:23.200 --> 50:24.380]  And then, you have one, two
[50:24.380 --> 50:26.760]  and here you go.
[50:27.060 --> 50:28.380]  So, this is all you
[50:28.380 --> 50:30.280]  need, actually, to do what
[50:30.280 --> 50:32.420]  you need to do if you want to start
[50:32.960 --> 50:34.500]  fighting this future combat
[50:34.500 --> 50:36.060]  system. You have
[50:36.060 --> 50:38.480]  the companies, you have the projects,
[50:38.480 --> 50:39.840]  you have the
[50:41.120 --> 50:42.300]  project managers,
[50:42.300 --> 50:44.180]  the people, the ICs, their
[50:44.180 --> 50:46.400]  email address, their email service and their
[50:46.400 --> 50:48.340]  phone number. So,
[50:48.340 --> 50:49.780]  what else do you want? We have
[50:49.780 --> 50:52.300]  two pages of that as an example because we didn't want
[50:52.300 --> 50:54.080]  to make the presentation too long.
[50:55.120 --> 50:55.980]  So,
[50:55.980 --> 50:58.060]  you know, of course, that if you have
[50:58.060 --> 51:00.120]  already an email address of a person,
[51:00.120 --> 51:01.680]  you can do a lot of things from remote
[51:01.680 --> 51:03.740]  because you can use modern
[51:03.740 --> 51:05.920]  Trojan horses technologies or
[51:06.460 --> 51:08.100]  things like that. And I assure
[51:08.100 --> 51:10.000]  you that in the industrial espionage
[51:10.000 --> 51:12.420]  business, which is a business right now,
[51:12.420 --> 51:13.620]  this type of
[51:14.040 --> 51:16.040]  methods and exploiting is
[51:16.040 --> 51:17.980]  being used constantly. And
[51:17.980 --> 51:19.620]  it is very well paid.
[51:19.900 --> 51:21.220]  Very well paid.
[51:22.100 --> 51:24.100]  In the other hand, if you don't have the technical
[51:24.100 --> 51:25.780]  capability, you can just send a person with
[51:26.660 --> 51:28.000]  a bag full of money and
[51:28.000 --> 51:30.080]  you just find out how much one of these
[51:30.080 --> 51:31.820]  people costs. Maybe he's not happy.
[51:32.220 --> 51:34.080]  How people are bought
[51:34.080 --> 51:36.020]  in companies. Maybe you didn't get your
[51:36.020 --> 51:38.220]  promotion. Maybe your boss was too harsh
[51:38.220 --> 51:40.220]  on you. Maybe, I don't know,
[51:40.220 --> 51:41.960]  your wife left you and then you are not
[51:41.960 --> 51:43.960]  happy. And then this person comes
[51:43.960 --> 51:45.460]  near to you at the bar and says,
[51:45.460 --> 51:48.140]  you are better than
[51:48.140 --> 51:49.740]  that. I think you should do
[51:50.280 --> 51:52.220]  something for a better cause.
[51:52.220 --> 51:54.100]  Here is $10,000.
[51:54.120 --> 51:56.800]  $10,000 is not too much. Here is $20,000.
[51:57.000 --> 51:58.280]  At the end, somebody says,
[51:58.280 --> 51:59.840]  okay, let's do it.
[52:00.920 --> 52:02.320]  So, another
[52:02.320 --> 52:04.160]  thing, which you can see here,
[52:04.160 --> 52:06.580]  is a system like the future combat system.
[52:06.620 --> 52:08.660]  What can exploit it? We said before,
[52:08.660 --> 52:10.180]  I mean, you just need to jam it. You don't need to
[52:10.180 --> 52:11.660]  hack it, actually. Because hackers
[52:12.170 --> 52:14.240]  are perfect. They want to
[52:14.240 --> 52:15.540]  do things.
[52:16.120 --> 52:18.360]  It's the act of hacking, which must be.
[52:18.360 --> 52:20.500]  It's not always the result.
[52:20.500 --> 52:22.520]  You want to do that thing
[52:22.520 --> 52:24.960]  and then you say, okay, it's easy to do it.
[52:24.960 --> 52:26.840]  The easy thing is
[52:26.840 --> 52:27.380]  for
[52:29.560 --> 52:30.720]  no good shit,
[52:30.720 --> 52:32.160]  you say in America.
[52:32.180 --> 52:34.740]  I want to do it in a very artistic way.
[52:34.740 --> 52:36.740]  Maybe you take six months and you never get
[52:36.740 --> 52:38.580]  the result because it's too old by the time you get
[52:38.580 --> 52:40.300]  the result. So you just
[52:40.300 --> 52:42.700]  sometimes need to jam something.
[52:42.700 --> 52:44.280]  The communication, for example.
[52:44.280 --> 52:46.200]  In this case, you have an EMP
[52:46.200 --> 52:48.760]  shock generator, which is an electromagnetic
[52:48.760 --> 52:50.760]  pulse shock generator.
[52:50.760 --> 52:52.380]  It's a bomb, basically.
[52:52.440 --> 52:55.040]  You can rent it for research
[52:55.040 --> 52:56.920]  and discovery or research and development
[52:56.920 --> 52:59.380]  purposes, if you can prove you are a researcher.
[52:59.600 --> 53:01.040]  And a lot of people can prove it
[53:01.040 --> 53:03.440]  for $1,500 a month.
[53:03.440 --> 53:04.140]  And then you can
[53:04.620 --> 53:06.680]  have the option to buy it for $11,000
[53:06.680 --> 53:07.840]  afterwards.
[53:09.760 --> 53:10.620]  So this is
[53:10.620 --> 53:12.600]  public. I mean, if you want to buy it, I
[53:12.600 --> 53:13.740]  thought about it, actually.
[53:15.580 --> 53:16.920]  You put it in the middle
[53:16.920 --> 53:18.700]  of a square
[53:18.700 --> 53:20.900]  somewhere and then you activate it.
[53:20.900 --> 53:22.880]  You run very fast because you need to
[53:22.880 --> 53:24.900]  get about three miles far.
[53:24.900 --> 53:26.620]  And then everything
[53:27.240 --> 53:28.440]  in three miles
[53:28.440 --> 53:30.740]  just burns out. Every circuit
[53:30.740 --> 53:32.780]  and all the people that are around the bomb
[53:32.780 --> 53:35.040]  also get suntanned
[53:35.200 --> 53:36.220]  a little bit.
[53:37.500 --> 53:37.760]  So
[53:40.000 --> 53:40.900]  this I put
[53:40.900 --> 53:42.840]  because in the company
[53:42.840 --> 53:44.900]  where I work for, there are a lot of
[53:44.900 --> 53:46.880]  consultants which are being paid a lot of money
[53:46.880 --> 53:49.060]  to do things like that.
[53:49.200 --> 53:50.640]  This is a security management
[53:50.640 --> 53:52.900]  learning model. And it's supposed
[53:52.900 --> 53:54.800]  to tell you how to do security
[53:54.800 --> 53:56.720]  in a company or whatever.
[53:57.220 --> 53:57.480]  And
[53:58.940 --> 54:00.960]  from my experience,
[54:00.960 --> 54:03.100]  all the things that we just said
[54:03.100 --> 54:04.660]  and all the things that we saw
[54:04.660 --> 54:07.040]  in the past, I can tell you that this is just
[54:07.040 --> 54:08.840]  if you work for a company, just
[54:08.840 --> 54:10.920]  don't pay people to do things like that. They are very
[54:10.920 --> 54:12.840]  good if you want to make a big
[54:12.840 --> 54:14.760]  picture. We say in Italy,
[54:14.760 --> 54:16.940]  if you want to wrap fish, you go and buy fish
[54:16.940 --> 54:18.960]  and you need paper to wrap it.
[54:19.060 --> 54:20.820]  That's the thing.
[54:20.820 --> 54:23.140]  So sorry if there is any big consultant in here.
[54:23.140 --> 54:24.920]  And if you have any questions, we don't
[54:24.920 --> 54:26.780]  have enough time. So just write us
[54:26.780 --> 54:27.560]  an email.
[54:28.260 --> 54:28.920]  Okay?
[54:32.620 --> 54:34.560]  You can come here.
[54:34.660 --> 54:37.140]  We have the CD with the comic. You can get it.
[54:37.140 --> 54:38.940]  And by the way, it was supposed to
[54:38.940 --> 54:40.820]  be signed by the Dark Tangent
[54:40.820 --> 54:42.580]  but you know the little Cisco problem
[54:42.580 --> 54:45.220]  he had in the Black Hat
[54:46.160 --> 54:46.940]  was keeping
[54:46.940 --> 54:48.800]  him busy. So basically he will
[54:48.800 --> 54:50.680]  sign it just
[54:50.680 --> 54:53.000]  if you show up yourself with a CD
[54:53.000 --> 54:54.640]  he will sign it. We'll be happy to sign it.
[54:54.640 --> 54:56.820]  CDs are there. And we have a few
[54:56.820 --> 54:58.620]  keystraps here.