00:00:00.267-->00:00:05.506 >>So everybody thank you for uh coming. Uh it's a big honor for us uh, this is a- a big event 00:00:05.506-->00:00:07.507 for me personally it's a sort of a career highlight as far as public speaking goes. Um this is 00:00:07.507-->00:00:12.513 Eden, I'm Inbar. We're gonna talk about uh uhh what we call "From uh One Country One Floppy 00:00:16.516-->00:00:21.521 to Startup Nation, a retrospective on the 25 Israeli uhh hacking years". From the 00:00:24.358-->00:00:29.363 early days of the community until uh where we are today. And um a disclaimer first because uh 00:00:32.099-->00:00:35.736 we're gonna be talking about hacking and this is all, you know, recorded and everything, 00:00:35.736-->00:00:40.741 whenever I say "I", or whenever one of us says "I" it means one of us. And whenever one of us 00:00:44.044-->00:00:49.049 says we that means uh the community, ok? Unless otherwise stated. Ok. [audience chuckles] 00:00:52.252-->00:00:58.091 So if I say we did that then it's not us it's cause you're we're speaking for a big 00:00:58.091-->00:01:03.030 community here. Uh a little bit about uhh, us, why we are here. Um as you can see I was born in 00:01:06.566-->00:01:11.571 1975. I got my first computer it was a Dragon 64. It was in 1984. Uh my first PC was an Amstrad PC 00:01:14.875-->00:01:19.880 1512 (That was uh...'88. Joined the military in '93 like most people in Israel; left the 00:01:23.250-->00:01:28.789 military 18 years later. Went to work for Checkpoints and then for Perimeter X. I'll let 00:01:28.789-->00:01:34.027 Eden... >>So we we shared the Amstrad in fact we actually got to know each other when we were 00:01:34.027-->00:01:39.599 13 and there's a story about that as well. But before moving over to the dark side of being a 00:01:39.599-->00:01:44.604 venture capitalist I built Aternity who I sold to RiverBed and then Face dot com that if 00:01:44.604-->00:01:49.609 you use Facebook, initially on Facebook, that's us. >>And uh why are we here? Every time we 00:01:52.813-->00:01:57.818 meet we tell war stories. And uh since we're old, relatively old, then we keep covering all all 00:02:01.121-->00:02:05.959 the time for you, since the late eighties early nineties. And we like telling the war stories and 00:02:05.959-->00:02:12.165 all of a sudden Defcon 25 had a theme that said 25 years of hacking and I'm like, okay. 00:02:12.165-->00:02:18.438 Let's put it in writing and let's share it with others. Uh but our story actually starts a 00:02:18.438-->00:02:24.444 long long time ago. Uh we're not exactly sure. I mean I I started reverse engineering at 14 so 00:02:24.444-->00:02:29.449 that puts it around 1989. Uh but this is all very vague because we're looking back a long time 00:02:31.752-->00:02:38.625 ago. Umm >>Some of the people in the story that you'll see during the conversation are pretty 00:02:38.625-->00:02:44.765 interesting. Alright the first one, this guy ran the biggest wares site in Israel, 1 man 00:02:44.765-->00:02:49.770 crew. This guy I knew only on QSD X25 as D'yer Mak'er This guy had BBS along with this guy. And 00:02:54.408-->00:02:59.413 then this some people know but he was just hacking around on the coders' channel on IRC. This 00:03:03.483-->00:03:08.488 ran the Lamer Slasher BBS doing some lyrics and copyright infringement at mass. He was 00:03:11.124-->00:03:17.798 before being arrested, three times, he was only arrested once [chuckles in crowd] and that's 00:03:17.798-->00:03:23.437 the two of us... >>Yeah >> ...there, basically around those ages. >>You can notice I still 00:03:23.437-->00:03:28.442 have two hands there. [crowd laughs] So that's old. >>That's old. >>Uh so why one country one 00:03:30.710-->00:03:37.050 floppy? The percentage back at the time was was amazing. It is estimated at 98 percent of the 00:03:37.050-->00:03:43.657 software in Israel back at the late eighties and early nineties was pirated. And the reason is 00:03:43.657-->00:03:48.662 basically that: why not? It's... you can and most of it wasn't really protected and uh we liked 00:03:51.431-->00:03:56.503 the challenge when it was protected and it was sort of a revolt because software was 00:03:56.503-->00:04:01.741 really expensive back then. I mean today we we've moved to a situation where what software 00:04:01.741-->00:04:07.514 that used to cost seven hundred dollars on your PC now costs 5 or 6 on your phone. But back 00:04:07.514-->00:04:11.952 then it was a lot of money and if you wanted to have a lot of stuff, that was very expensive. 00:04:11.952-->00:04:16.656 We couldn't afford it. Ss- so th- the Middle Eastern mentality and then then a bunch of other 00:04:16.656-->00:04:21.995 things kind of made it clear to us that no, we're not gonna pay for that. We can just, you know, 00:04:21.995-->00:04:27.501 have it. [crowd laughs] >>And talking about mentality, we'll we'll end the presentation also 00:04:27.501-->00:04:33.206 with this, the- at at some 60 slides from now. So the Isreal culture, you need to uh just to 00:04:33.206-->00:04:36.943 you give you the background. The Isreal culture is disrespect for authority. That's the biggest 00:04:36.943-->00:04:43.116 single most thing. Uh when my son tells me "No that's not smart. Go fill the tub and I'll 00:04:43.116-->00:04:49.022 stu- I'll then stop playing the iPad." I'm actually proud, alright? So and willingness to 00:04:49.022-->00:04:53.894 fail is a huge thing. Alright and just constantly and that's what you see most entrepreneurs 00:04:53.894-->00:04:59.132 do. Live today as there might be no tomorrow, that's another aspect of kinda the the Isreal 00:04:59.132-->00:05:04.538 culture. And if if you look at the US you have a one percent of the population that can write 00:05:04.538-->00:05:09.809 the book >>[offmic]Can you talk into the microphone? >>Yes, I will talk into the microph-. So 00:05:09.809-->00:05:13.180 yeah one percent of the population in the US that can write the book and then 00:05:13.180-->00:05:17.551 ninety-nine percent that actually follow what is written there. In Israel forty percent 00:05:17.551-->00:05:23.990 can write the book and then sixty percent don't listen. [crowd laughs] So period of time 00:05:23.990-->00:05:30.597 that we're talking about this is the late '80s early '90s um a great period. And it's a great 00:05:30.597-->00:05:35.769 period because of a few things. The first is this is the Israeli computer law that was passed 00:05:35.769-->00:05:42.008 1995 so at that time there's no law whatsoever you can do anything you want. And the 00:05:42.008-->00:05:47.013 second is um during that time the phone system did not have any filters, right? Uh so we 00:05:49.115-->00:05:55.956 could basically do whatever that we wanted and it was a very very very slow internet. >>So the 00:05:55.956-->00:06:01.761 this is the logo of the national phone company. Funny as it may sound it was actually officially 00:06:01.761-->00:06:07.834 formed in 1982 as a government owned company. And because of being a government owned company 00:06:07.834-->00:06:11.271 there was a lot of conflict going there, not everybody agreed on what they should do, 00:06:11.271-->00:06:16.276 it actually only started operating in 1984. Um the country was formed in 1948 so 00:06:18.278-->00:06:23.283 you can, you know. The the the concept of mess is gonna be around this conversation the- 00:06:23.283-->00:06:29.990 th- this talk so that's one of the things we're gonna show you. Uh on the right you can see the 00:06:29.990-->00:06:34.995 um token operated uh pay phones. Uh these were later uh switched for uh uh plastic cards but uh 00:06:37.964-->00:06:43.303 we started with the tokens. On the left you can see the rotary dial uh everybody had those and 00:06:43.303-->00:06:48.174 it took a long time before we switched over to tone dial which is the one you see in the 00:06:48.174-->00:06:55.148 middle. A very long time and this is gonna come up in this uh talk as well. Umm many of the 00:06:55.148-->00:07:01.554 things you will see in this uh uh talk are actually from our private collections. We I 00:07:01.554-->00:07:06.359 wouldn't say we hoard but we collect stuff from those days and this is a scan that I 00:07:06.359-->00:07:12.632 actually made uh 5 days ago. I actually have the floppies, they were actually working. Uh I just 00:07:12.632-->00:07:17.904 moved uh 4 months ago and I hired a company that also did the packing and they put the 00:07:17.904-->00:07:22.909 floppies together with the speakers so I guess [disappointed sounds from crowd] 00:07:22.909-->00:07:28.648 yes yes uh thank you for your support. Umm [crowd laughs] So this is about as much as I can 00:07:28.648-->00:07:32.886 get. This is the floppy that we were using to communicate with some of the services uh of the 00:07:32.886-->00:07:37.891 phone company. Now before we continue I want to talk a little bit about terminology because 00:07:37.891-->00:07:42.896 back then uh it was not exactly as it is today. Uh we had uh 4 common terms when when we 00:07:45.198-->00:07:50.437 considered uh the hacking community. We had the hacking, cracking, phreaking, and 00:07:50.437-->00:07:55.442 carding. Now hacking uh was the act of no >>Going into somebody else's system. >>That's it. I 00:07:57.911-->00:08:04.217 suppose everybody recognizes that. Cracking was the act of removing protections almost 00:08:04.217-->00:08:10.924 always copy protections. Uh we copied games, games came with codes or sheets of numbers that 00:08:10.924-->00:08:16.162 you needed. Uh we didn't like that. There were some tougher copy protections like lazer 00:08:16.162-->00:08:20.800 holds and uh in the floppy so anything dealing with removing the protection that was 00:08:20.800-->00:08:27.407 cracking. Phreaking was any hacking on the phone system but most commonly to uh make phone 00:08:27.407-->00:08:32.412 calls without paying. And carding was using credit cards that were not yours. Uh so 00:08:34.447-->00:08:38.918 here's an example we start with phreaking. As I mentioned before it took a while before the phone 00:08:38.918-->00:08:43.590 company switched over to tone dial, uh when that happened most of the payphones were still 00:08:43.590-->00:08:47.927 token operated. So if you brought one of those little devices, this is actually a 00:08:47.927-->00:08:52.832 remote control from old days uh answering machines with cassettes. So you could, th- 00:08:52.832-->00:08:56.636 it's a remote control you could call home, get the machine to answer you then you punch in a 00:08:56.636-->00:09:02.242 code you can check for messages. But this is normal DTMF. So if you just pick up the receiver of 00:09:02.242-->00:09:07.781 the payphone and use DTMF to dial, then you can make a phone call without paying. Alright. 00:09:07.781-->00:09:14.020 Umm call waiting. So that's very annoying when you have a modem because uh it actually drops the 00:09:14.020-->00:09:20.326 carrier tone. Uhh we had a lot of problem with that and one of the creative solution we had uh 00:09:20.326-->00:09:25.465 early in the day we had uh call forwarding as well. Well it turns out that uh the phone 00:09:25.465-->00:09:29.002 company didn't do any contingencies and it turns out that you could do call 00:09:29.002-->00:09:35.208 forwarding to your own number. So uh what happened was that in the beginning it crashed the 00:09:35.208-->00:09:40.113 phone company. Uh we have a friend that told us the story. Uh his trunk crashed, the phone 00:09:40.113-->00:09:44.951 company actually reached out to him and they fixed it, but the trick still worked later. 00:09:44.951-->00:09:51.691 [indistinguishable] >>So alri- eh so we were using phones and in in the phones the first thing 00:09:51.691-->00:09:58.231 that you do is you actually af- after hacking it through but you you wanna do you wanna use the 00:09:58.231-->00:10:04.971 BBS seed. And B you need to realize that BBS just in changes the phone cost was immense it 00:10:04.971-->00:10:10.977 was 3 dollars a minute to call the US from Israel. So everything was was local. It was 00:10:10.977-->00:10:16.316 a local ecosystem even though it was a very very small system. Actually Bezek, that same phone 00:10:16.316-->00:10:21.321 company, told us and disapproved the importing of 96 hundred bought modems because they said 00:10:23.456-->00:10:29.395 they would burn the the phone lines. [audience laughs] Seriously. So we had to smuggle 00:10:29.395-->00:10:34.400 96 hundred bought modems from the US in carry ons. The, much like every war it's a small 00:10:36.636-->00:10:41.641 community so it's like we have less than a hundred people with BBSs but there are already 2 00:10:41.641-->00:10:47.680 groups there, the XMLF and the ICCA that fight each other. And this is a hacking cracking 00:10:47.680-->00:10:52.819 community so how do they fight is they write software in order to crash the other network's 00:10:52.819-->00:10:57.824 hard drives. So the- each of those networks is hiring coders in order to create virii so they 00:11:00.994-->00:11:03.930 would crash the other ones because they're starting to take money and they don't want to 00:11:03.930-->00:11:08.935 have competition. On the free side, those same people are now re-writing uh Z modem, B modem, 00:11:11.404-->00:11:17.911 if people here still know them. Just not to report the last CRC. Because they didn't want the 00:11:17.911-->00:11:21.848 files to be counted. So you would download the whole the whole file but not report the 00:11:21.848-->00:11:27.287 whole- the last byte. The last CRC of the byte and then that wouldn't be counted. So you have 00:11:27.287-->00:11:32.926 a bunch of people trying to hack through and that creates the first first uh instances of the 00:11:32.926-->00:11:38.698 copyright, uh people or the wares software right. So LyricsInn is by Yaniv Taigmin 00:11:38.698-->00:11:43.703 the CTO of face dot com, the one that sold to Facebook. And he puts in the repository the the 00:11:45.872-->00:11:52.045 world's biggest repository of lyrics but Israel doesn't have not the computer law and very 00:11:52.045-->00:11:57.617 lack very uh relaxed uh also copyright laws. So that becomes the biggest repository that then 00:11:57.617-->00:12:02.288 moves over to the internet. But we still do in-fighting so Ultinet and C-Net are the 2 00:12:02.288-->00:12:07.293 first networks in Israel and each hate each other for both free but have different value 00:12:09.963-->00:12:14.400 systems. So they also want the other ones to crash. And so these were the infightings. 00:12:14.400-->00:12:19.405 >>Umm another front of the fighting was the ANSI umm screens these as you can see 00:12:22.942-->00:12:26.980 this is one of the uh things that I found in my repository of all the old stuff that I 00:12:26.980-->00:12:33.252 collected. Umm I don't have an old machine any more, this was actually uhh, I ran a VM of XP I 00:12:33.252-->00:12:39.626 think it was and uh VDraw, who remembers VDraw? Alright we have some people in the crowd here. 00:12:39.626-->00:12:46.265 So that was a program used to create ANSI screens and you could do animation and the BBSs 00:12:46.265-->00:12:52.739 competed for who has uh the the nicer animation or who was making fun of of the other ones 00:12:52.739-->00:12:59.078 as well. And as Eden mentioned before the rivalry made it far. This actually says... >>There's 00:12:59.078-->00:13:03.950 a good amount of Hebrew speakers here I see >>Yes it says you're an SOB. This is recorded so I'll 00:13:03.950-->00:13:08.955 be gentle umm. Uh when you were trying to con your way into uh improving your download ratio or 00:13:11.791-->00:13:15.895 uh maybe you know... >>rewriting B modem I think. >>rewriting B modem Z modem, or maybe you're 00:13:15.895-->00:13:21.034 username was suddenly associated with the other group. Then you received a warm welcome. >>And 00:13:21.034-->00:13:26.039 so you have you have many people that are tryna, there's a a lot of mess going on and many groups 00:13:29.742-->00:13:36.549 and so the only option at that point, I'm 13 Inbar is 14 at the time and then we meet my place. 00:13:36.549-->00:13:41.421 We say there are too many people and there's too much fighting going on, what do we need to do? 00:13:41.421-->00:13:45.925 We need to move from the techies world to the organized world, right, "organized." So the only 00:13:45.925-->00:13:51.431 sensible thing being 13 is we need to take over the network. [audience laughter] So how'd you 00:13:51.431-->00:13:56.369 do that when you are 13? Uh you start a council you convince people that you need a council 00:13:56.369-->00:14:01.841 because there is all this infighting going on and but but obviously someone needs to guard 00:14:01.841-->00:14:05.978 the council, right? So you need an ethics committee. Meet the ethics committee [laughs] 00:14:08.448-->00:14:13.186 [audience chuckles] And it's the early intro how you run company board of directors uh also some 00:14:13.186-->00:14:16.522 some of the prominent people at that time actually the second member of the ethics committee 00:14:16.522-->00:14:21.527 is a guy called Yoram Shamir um in RSA eh Shamir the s- so the prodigy of of uh Shamir is his 00:14:25.465-->00:14:29.802 Onfulma who is that early participant in the ethics committee. So many of those 00:14:29.802-->00:14:34.841 people started building also more of a community around it. >>So just to give you a small 00:14:34.841-->00:14:40.680 example of what the community was uh like back then, despite the fights, despite the the 00:14:40.680-->00:14:45.718 rivalries we were a community. Uh mostly because we were all geeks and we were outcasts to a 00:14:45.718-->00:14:49.856 certain extent some more than others but there was a community. There was this 00:14:49.856-->00:14:54.594 feeling that we are all part of a bigger thing. And every now and then we would have uh C soft 00:14:54.594-->00:14:59.799 meetings. All the BBS owners would meet the house of one of the participants everybody would 00:14:59.799-->00:15:06.005 go there we would talk talk talk Eden and I we would you know run things ethics committee whatever 00:15:06.005-->00:15:11.244 and on one of those uh meetings that was in the north of Israel I used to live south of Tel Aviv 00:15:11.244-->00:15:17.784 and on the way back we were on the train and it was a rainy day it was winter. And the roof was 00:15:17.784-->00:15:22.955 leaking so we were like 3 people we had to uh switch cars went to another car of course it was 00:15:22.955-->00:15:29.729 crowded so we end up sitting at a table uh with a beautiful girl and her mother. Now back then I 00:15:29.729-->00:15:35.234 wasn't yet able to uh hit on girls in front of their mothers, that is no longer the case but 00:15:35.234-->00:15:40.239 uh back then it was a problem. I was 17 or 18 umm so all I could do was try to get as much 00:15:42.608-->00:15:47.880 information as I could. Umm the the trip ended with me knowing 4 things about that girl. I knew 00:15:47.880-->00:15:53.419 her first name, I knew what grade she was on,I know what city she lived in, and I knew 00:15:53.419-->00:15:59.559 the name of her mother. Now this is Friday afternoon. I get home and I frantically write a 00:15:59.559-->00:16:05.431 message on the EchoMail to all my friends in the north this is what I know, help me find that 00:16:05.431-->00:16:10.436 girl. [crowd laughs] Within less than 24 hours, I had her phone number. [crowd laughs and 00:16:13.172-->00:16:18.177 shouts] Swear to G*d .[applause] Now uh sadly uh she had a boyfriend. [crowd laughs] Which 00:16:21.647-->00:16:27.153 which does not decrease any of the achievement and uh as a little anecdote actually uh 00:16:27.153-->00:16:32.124 found her on facebook um a few weeks ago and apparently she remembers the story and they 00:16:32.124-->00:16:37.129 actually tell it in the family. So uh it was kinda fun. >>So [laughs] so rememb- so Fidonet 00:16:39.932-->00:16:45.204 EchoMail, right remember the thing that actually calls in every night in order to pull 00:16:45.204-->00:16:51.377 email from another note so this is this is not the internet this is not even leased lines. There 00:16:51.377-->00:16:55.114 were calls made multiple times through the night in order to push email towards a certain 00:16:55.114-->00:17:00.052 direction. But we wanted to go global. Right? We we didn't feel that it made sense for that 00:17:02.321-->00:17:08.027 small 200 people community in Israel to to stay dormant there. So if we're stuck in our little 00:17:08.027-->00:17:13.966 pond how do we go global? Alright and just to frame the reference is this is the history 00:17:13.966-->00:17:19.839 of of the evolvement of the speed of the internet in the US. Uhh and pretty staggering and in 00:17:19.839-->00:17:24.844 '90 eh '94 you have you only have uh 50kilo BPS uh 90- 80- 80- '84 '86 is pretty still a 00:17:29.882-->00:17:34.887 bit of the same speed, another link, '91 already it uh I think it's 65 and then 165 iiiiin '94. 00:17:37.857-->00:17:42.862 So. To frame that. This is israel, alright. '89, Bezek that phone company informs Machba 00:17:46.265-->00:17:51.704 that's the backbone of the internet in Israel that they are not able to provide 56 kilo BPS. 00:17:51.704-->00:17:56.709 Uh to the US. For at least next 10 months. And so um they do the backup and they do a 9.6kilo BPS 00:17:59.278-->00:18:04.216 to the US. Wonderful. '91 Bezek gets an order for 64k to Europe. 7 months later there is that 00:18:10.890-->00:18:15.895 first line to Europe. Then just '92, '92 the first high speed is happening in Israel. Up until 00:18:18.030-->00:18:23.436 that point the only way to get onto the internet was hack into the universities or be a 00:18:23.436-->00:18:28.874 student, uh and the second is be part of a multinational. So '92 first high speed is '95 the 00:18:28.874-->00:18:33.879 first bankrolled IPs. Uh '93 the line to the US has been upgraded to 128. Wonderful. So we need to 00:18:39.418-->00:18:44.423 take uh care of ourselves. >>So one of the uh, the things that we wanted to do was uh you know 00:18:46.592-->00:18:51.831 meet other people and CompuServe was one of the leading platforms back then. I don't know how many 00:18:51.831-->00:18:58.104 of you remember that. And CompuServe was a paid service so uh it turned out that in order 00:18:58.104-->00:19:04.243 to access CompuServe you can sign up for a temporary uh account you need to uh give your 00:19:04.243-->00:19:08.014 credit card number and a billing address. Then you get a temporary account for uh, I 00:19:08.014-->00:19:13.486 think it was what, 30 days? >>30 days. >>30 days. And after 30 days you start uh you know being 00:19:13.486-->00:19:19.925 charged for that. It turns out that when you enter the uh credit card information it 00:19:19.925-->00:19:24.930 doesn't get billed immediately. What they do is they just check the uh uh Luhn Modi- Mod 10 00:19:26.932-->00:19:32.872 formula so if you're you take a credit card number a valid credit card number and you make 00:19:32.872-->00:19:38.711 some alterations you can still generate a card number that doesn't exist but validates the 00:19:38.711-->00:19:44.850 formula. So what we would do is we would make up credit card numbers and then get an account 00:19:44.850-->00:19:49.021 for 30 days. 30 days later when they figured they couldn't charge the account, they closed 00:19:49.021-->00:19:55.127 it. And then we repeated that again. >>Yeah I I think at one point we were the largest 00:19:55.127-->00:20:02.101 consumers of uh the uh evaluation accounts of CompuServe in the world. >>Oh 00:20:02.101-->00:20:07.039 and eventually CompuServe deleted or canceled the reverse billing. Cause when we were 00:20:07.039-->00:20:10.743 accessing CompuServe we weren't paying, so they stopped that from Israel. >>[laughs] Yeah 00:20:10.743-->00:20:17.516 what a surprise but, and you laugh right this is 25 years back but um a very good friend 00:20:17.516-->00:20:23.489 of mine, Sam Lessin umm had started his company called his Fin. just recently as as of last 00:20:23.489-->00:20:29.662 year and he for the alpha he went to his friends and he said "Hey would you want to test it 00:20:29.662-->00:20:34.233 out? But I want to see that you have I want to see that you have value and so I'm asking for 00:20:34.233-->00:20:40.506 credit cards from the get-go." And I'm thinking oh I know Sam uh he's an MVP type of a guy ok 00:20:40.506-->00:20:46.812 he probably didn't implement the billing code just yet. Uh he did do the CRC check, you reverse 00:20:46.812-->00:20:52.351 the last 4 digits of your first two- er last two groups; works, maybe I'll use this stage to 00:20:52.351-->00:20:56.789 apologize to Sam that I haven't been paying for the past year. Uh but it's a great service try 00:20:56.789-->00:21:03.429 it out. [laughs] [chuckles from crowd] >>Another way to call uh BBSs in other countries was 00:21:03.429-->00:21:09.268 using calling cards. Back then uh you would get a card that was loaded with minutes you would 00:21:09.268-->00:21:14.273 call uh a number of an operator, a person would pick it up. Um you would give them the number. 00:21:16.442-->00:21:20.312 Many years later was already all touch tone but back then you actually spoke to someone. You 00:21:20.312-->00:21:25.251 said "Hi this is card number 1 2 3 4 5" and they said "Yes uh where should I connect you to?" 00:21:25.251-->00:21:29.588 and you you would give them a number. It turns out that some of the people that were 00:21:29.588-->00:21:34.793 operators and I just put AT&T because that's the image I found but I'm pretty sure this was 00:21:34.793-->00:21:39.798 correct for other uh carriers as well. Uh they would make a note of the calling card number and 00:21:42.101-->00:21:47.940 then later share it with their friends. So people were making phone calls, uhh on somebody 00:21:47.940-->00:21:52.945 else's expense. Now back than optic was not a term yet, we didn't know anything about that 00:21:55.447-->00:22:00.386 and we used uh those things to call BBSs, friends, I mean, if anyone had investigated that, 00:22:05.691-->00:22:12.464 that wouldn't b- be a challenge. Because it's all traceable. But back then there was no awareness 00:22:12.464-->00:22:18.470 on any of the involved authorities. OK? So I guess you can say we were taking advantage 00:22:18.470-->00:22:24.076 of the situation and we were kinda lucky. >>And also it's a story we didn't intend to share 00:22:24.076-->00:22:29.348 but I I totally forgot that. So what you could do, you'd you'd call this toll free number. Uh 00:22:29.348-->00:22:36.188 say AT&T, right. And you'd give them a calling card number and they'd say well well that's an 00:22:36.188-->00:22:41.860 invalid number and there was a different prefix for the MCI ones and the AT&T ones and you'd 00:22:41.860-->00:22:45.297 say "Oh oh oh you're right, can you transfer me to MCI?" And they said "Sure" and they would 00:22:45.297-->00:22:51.971 transfer you and then to MCI you just say "Uh can you just bill me?" And they'de be billing 00:22:51.971-->00:22:57.176 AT&T, [audience laughs] because AT&T transferred the call. Uh which that that worked for a 00:22:57.176-->00:23:02.114 full 2 months [audience chuckles] Uh so uh and so you you you can't remember these 00:23:05.618-->00:23:09.688 things after a while. Uh so no filters meant meant the obvious thing right. You you all know 00:23:09.688-->00:23:15.861 Captain Crunch. Umm so 3 dollars per minute is just too expensive so what did we do? Uh if if we 00:23:15.861-->00:23:21.100 do do blue boxing there are 2 things, it's cheap meaning zero and then it's also untraceable 00:23:21.100-->00:23:27.239 because you you hop between multiple switchboards. And so what you see here this is the CI 00:23:27.239-->00:23:32.311 the CCITT doc. CCITT 5 still had inband trunking, inband signaling, so you basically 00:23:32.311-->00:23:38.617 would call up a trunk, you would call up a number and you could signal the trunk. Initially just 00:23:38.617-->00:23:43.622 at 26 hundred, then 24 26, so it it went on to multiple combinations but what what you 00:23:45.958-->00:23:50.996 did have is people that are willing to um borrow books from the different switchboards. So 00:23:50.996-->00:23:57.803 you'd you'd know the different signalings that they were using. So this is '92 see the doc far 00:23:57.803-->00:24:04.410 far far after the US did not have blue boxing working. And in '92 what you see there is a call 00:24:04.410-->00:24:11.050 out to Amos Keron. Amos Keron was the runner he was the sisoft of uh NetOne which was another 00:24:11.050-->00:24:16.855 big wares sight in Israel. So en em Amos Keron is supposed it's just a name in Hebrew. It's like 00:24:16.855-->00:24:23.462 Justin. Right so years later I finally realized that I can't find Amos Keron uh so that was 00:24:23.462-->00:24:28.467 an alias. But for a while it it was not that clear. So '92 he was leading the blue boxing in 00:24:31.303-->00:24:38.243 Israel. And basically mid and south America uh were controlled by the Israel phreakers so Cuba, 00:24:38.243-->00:24:43.849 full control uh for very long time. There was no uhh for 2-3 years you would call the 177 00:24:43.849-->00:24:47.986 number which is the 800 number that would get you to the operator over there and you 00:24:47.986-->00:24:52.524 could signal at that point and from that point on you were a switchboard yourself and you 00:24:52.524-->00:24:57.529 could call basically anywhere. >>So other than the actual calling of uh BBSs there was a 00:25:01.066-->00:25:07.172 pre-internet network that was called the eh X-25. It's a packet switching data network 00:25:07.172-->00:25:13.679 around across the entire uh world and every country had its own uh prefix. Uh here you can 00:25:13.679-->00:25:20.152 see a list of the country prefixes. Uh Israel was uh 4251. Funny thing is there was very 00:25:20.152-->00:25:24.656 little in Israel that was using that and in any case it was in Israel we didn't use we didn't 00:25:24.656-->00:25:30.129 need X-25 to access it so we didn't actually remember that this was the code for Israel. We 00:25:30.129-->00:25:35.134 do remember uh other networks, and the United States for example, 310 3110 and that was 00:25:38.704-->00:25:44.243 the pretty much equivalent of, of uh IP address. It was called the NUA network user uh address 00:25:44.243-->00:25:50.983 and the most I think prominent uh I guess you could call it site because back then it wasn't 00:25:50.983-->00:25:57.022 called that, uh was uh QSD. QSD was a chat server... >>Ah ah- anyone here remembers QSD? 00:25:57.022-->00:26:01.960 Anyone was on QSD? >>Alright >>Yeah >>Shout out for you guys. So QSD was the chat server in 00:26:04.630-->00:26:09.635 France. Umm something like IRC a little bit uh more sophisticated at the time. And everybody would 00:26:12.671-->00:26:18.010 hang out there, uh talk to one another, and that was the trading arena. You would uh find 00:26:18.010-->00:26:23.982 people uhh you would create stuff with them. You would get codes uhh or whatever it is that 00:26:23.982-->00:26:28.987 you were uh trading. And this is the NUA we remember that by heart. Um wake me up at 2am I 00:26:31.924-->00:26:36.929 will recite that number. And uhh yeah that most of what we did revolved around QSD. And these 00:26:38.997-->00:26:45.304 are umm... >>What about NUIs? That was really simple. >>Okay NUIs so this is not in the 00:26:45.304-->00:26:49.875 presentation but we're gonna uh talk about that. Thank you for reminding me of them. NUI the 00:26:49.875-->00:26:55.314 network user identity is how you logged onto the network. And back then uh in Israel at least 00:26:55.314-->00:27:00.118 there was uh a number a dial up number you would call it. I think it was like 133 or 135 00:27:00.118-->00:27:05.824 something like that. And then you had to log in. And there was no login and password. You know 00:27:05.824-->00:27:11.296 what we guy was we call today 2 factor authentication, that's a 3 factor authentication. You 00:27:11.296-->00:27:15.667 have a name, and er a log on, and then you have a password, and then you have another thing. 00:27:15.667-->00:27:20.672 Back then, it was just a log on. And we uh discovered that some of them had a pattern. Uh so we 00:27:24.243-->00:27:30.983 wrote uh scripts over some of the uh telecommunication programs such as uh Telex or uh 00:27:30.983-->00:27:37.489 Procam- Procom Place if you remember those. Uh Telecom. And we enumerated on logins because 00:27:37.489-->00:27:42.494 we figured out what the prefix was, which was NBezek and then a code, the 6 digit code. And it 00:27:45.397-->00:27:49.902 turns out that these codes were actually technician codes so no one was being billed for that 00:27:49.902-->00:27:55.607 and no one ever found out about it. Um so that's one part of the story. And what you're seeing 00:27:55.607-->00:28:00.546 now is a list of uh alt-dials. These were actually um modems connected to the X25 network. 00:28:03.382-->00:28:09.588 They would have an NUA. And when you connected to them you ended up having a terminal of a modem, 00:28:09.588-->00:28:15.260 which enabled you to dial a local number. So the list that you see in- in the bottom those 00:28:15.260-->00:28:20.365 are local out dials. There was one for every area code in the United States, and probably 00:28:20.365-->00:28:25.237 other places as well but back then the United States was where everybody was looking uh up to. 00:28:25.237-->00:28:30.242 And you can see that for every area code you had a couple or sometimes even 4 outdials uh 00:28:33.378-->00:28:38.417 changing in connection speeds. And we also had global out dials. These were actually 00:28:38.417-->00:28:44.022 modems that had an international phone line. Now 'til this very day I have no idea who was 00:28:44.022-->00:28:49.528 paying for that, because local local calls back in the US were not being charged. So I can't 00:28:49.528-->00:28:53.699 understand why someone would put a system and connect it to the entire world but a global out 00:28:53.699-->00:28:58.236 dial was a modem that could call anywhere in the world. Uh one of the things that we could do with 00:28:58.236-->00:29:03.175 that, for example is uh call Israel or harass neighbors or you know, whatever. >>Uh Inbar 00:29:06.378-->00:29:11.149 is being too nice to Bezek. So the first codes were NBezek000001. That's code number 00:29:11.149-->00:29:16.154 1, code number 2 was 2. 3. So these died fairly quickly, the other ones less so. Um so so 00:29:20.759-->00:29:25.764 that was kind of X25. How does the internet look like from the eyes of the 13 14 15 year old 00:29:28.333-->00:29:32.371 kids at the time because you remember we don't have any internet. Right we don't we 00:29:32.371-->00:29:39.011 can't buy an ISP account so this logo is the logo of the Technion the Israeli Technion and it's 00:29:39.011-->00:29:44.816 located in the HiFi it's very similar to uh to MIT it's a fairly highly regarded. Um one 00:29:44.816-->00:29:51.790 of the less regarded things uh there was security at the time, so if you wanted to postpone a 00:29:51.790-->00:29:58.130 class you had or uh the filing of homework uh you could just crash T2. T2 was the students' 00:29:58.130-->00:30:03.135 uh system. But this T2 was actually much worse if you think about security so. At one point 00:30:05.337-->00:30:10.509 it was clear that uh s- bit login was actually modified, that it would accept the 00:30:10.509-->00:30:15.514 password f**k you for any user. Including root. [laughter in crowd] So just to preserve the 00:30:17.582-->00:30:23.588 rights on on that computer. Then interestingly new users right new students, how do you set 00:30:23.588-->00:30:28.593 passwords for new students? Nobody knew how to do it and so what they decided on is hash. So 00:30:30.629-->00:30:36.168 they hash on their ID numbers, so your student number was S and then an ID number, and then your 00:30:36.168-->00:30:42.874 default password was a hash on it. They also did not want to publish the results of tests in 00:30:42.874-->00:30:49.614 an identified manner so they had very big filings of them with the ID number of the student and 00:30:49.614-->00:30:54.619 the mark he got. So you'd go up a bus it's a 2 it's a 1-2 hour ride and you take photos, er 00:30:58.557-->00:31:05.097 pictures, of the student marks you go back you hash it out and you have the passwords for any 00:31:05.097-->00:31:10.102 student on the T2. [audience laughs] Yes. Uh so I wish that was the security to I I I could 00:31:14.172-->00:31:18.410 tell you this was uh uh really bad security at the time. But Mashbir yeah cause this is like 00:31:18.410-->00:31:23.415 the Sears of Israel. Alright so Sears, fairly large chain Mashbir, um on their primary 00:31:25.851-->00:31:32.591 computer on the primary computer system they had root root.[crowd laughter] And somebody found it 00:31:32.591-->00:31:38.130 out which is fine so they were dialed and they found the dial in for that computer and they 00:31:38.130-->00:31:43.335 got scared so they posted the number for the Mashbir uh cause see the central computer they 00:31:43.335-->00:31:50.041 posted as a BBS on a BBS list. And the reason was to have other people discover that root root 00:31:50.041-->00:31:55.313 is possible and basically cover their tracks. [audience chuckles] Hah. So and for a full 00:31:55.313-->00:32:00.252 year and a half it was listed on a BBS on one of the BBS lists as an open BBS for the com- 00:32:03.655-->00:32:09.961 community. And I mentioned that uh one of the ISPs uh went bankrupt '95. So that ISP is 00:32:09.961-->00:32:14.966 called DataServ, obviously no longer with us. The CEO of the Dataserv was called GiIl Benun. 00:32:17.169-->00:32:22.174 His password is IMGBN1 maybe I should apologize uh years later. Uh and and the interesting thing 00:32:26.878-->00:32:30.715 is how was that discovered? Just remember the old days. It was slash dot slash net you could 00:32:30.715-->00:32:35.720 listen in on the network interface and that was clear text being posted. So that 00:32:35.720-->00:32:40.725 episode was was absolutely open for fairly long while. >>So um how did we learn? Back then, 00:32:43.161-->00:32:47.132 there wasn't internet we actually had to buy books. Uh and sometimes wait for them for 00:32:47.132-->00:32:51.736 a long time, because you went to the store either it was there or he didn't know it existed. Um 00:32:51.736-->00:32:56.374 the thing on the left you see Machshavot hose were very elementary books I think many of 00:32:56.374-->00:33:02.914 us started our computer uh education there. That was mostly Basic and sometimes uh Logo and 00:33:02.914-->00:33:08.019 Pascal. Uh I learned to understand a simple language from the book in the middle uh 00:33:08.019-->00:33:13.191 and Pascal from the book over there. And that led rather quickly at least with the 00:33:13.191-->00:33:18.630 curious guys to reverse engineering. Because we wanted to know why things happened how 00:33:18.630-->00:33:23.935 they happened and how we can modify them to our benefit. Uh one of the reasons we did that 00:33:23.935-->00:33:27.772 was to contribute back to the community. There was also a community back then, if you guys 00:33:27.772-->00:33:32.611 recognize this, this is the Ralph Brown interrupt list. Back then this was like the Holy 00:33:32.611-->00:33:37.616 Grail of inter ops uh on the 8086 platform and uh I made some contribution I would reverse 00:33:40.185-->00:33:46.925 engineer my bios, I don't know why I did that. Umm but I did. And then uh one day Eden comes 00:33:46.925-->00:33:52.297 to me already back then we has delegating and he said "Inbar how bout you write uh a piece 00:33:52.297-->00:33:58.970 about uh anti-debugging tricks?" And I actually did, umm not entirely by myself, and actually 00:33:58.970-->00:34:03.508 th- this can be found all over the internet. Um back then we didn't think that you know that 00:34:03.508-->00:34:09.147 this stuff was gonna be recorded but complete archives of emails and EchoMails are somewhere to 00:34:09.147-->00:34:14.586 be found and this is all over the internet and we have an exclusive we're gonna release 00:34:14.586-->00:34:19.925 the 6th edition that was never actually published. Ehh I actually found it uhh in my 00:34:19.925-->00:34:24.930 stuff. Now reverse engineering was not only code. Uh these are two games by Microprose. I liked 00:34:26.965-->00:34:31.970 flights simulators my dad used to be a pilot and it turns out the uh engine on these two games 00:34:34.205-->00:34:38.877 is identical which means that all of the data files are identical. Now they didn't have 00:34:38.877-->00:34:45.317 the same umm uh places you could fly, right? One of them had the Persian gulf and the other one 00:34:45.317-->00:34:50.989 had, Eur- uh I don't know uh, South Africa. And you wanted to do both. So we figured out that 00:34:50.989-->00:34:55.994 you could just copy the files and then enjoy all the arenas in the same game. >>So games were, 00:34:58.396-->00:35:03.468 were a major part of growing up much like everyone here and this guy has is one of the biggest 00:35:03.468-->00:35:08.106 contributors to that in Israel. This is I showed his picture initially, Asi Azulay 1 Man 00:35:08.106-->00:35:14.379 Crew. The really zero day the original zero day intent ha meaning of it which is these are 00:35:14.379-->00:35:19.551 the we- the latest wares that you can find. And that was on on on his BBS. Now the problem is 00:35:19.551-->00:35:26.024 or the thing that was really annoying is that he was [music plays] putting in intros, demos 00:35:26.024-->00:35:32.130 before the games that he was distributing. So that was really annoying, alright, so. Uh just 00:35:32.130-->00:35:37.736 to take credit, so we we inspected the code and found which bytes to change to jump 00:35:37.736-->00:35:42.741 and just to get rid of that and, and that started a war and well here I can say we, that's this 00:35:45.243-->00:35:51.883 kind of a we. Um so we found how to to reverse engineer and rem- remove that code but then they 00:35:51.883-->00:35:57.589 added self modifying code and encrypting of the intro which was a real bummer so what we did 00:35:57.589-->00:36:03.328 if people here are code assembly uh we actually captured into 10 and 10 is a transr- eh the 00:36:03.328-->00:36:09.067 changing to mode 13 which was the VGA mode because they needed that to do the demo. And would 00:36:09.067-->00:36:15.106 just send failure. [crowd chuckles] So nevermind how they he encrypted the code nevermind 00:36:15.106-->00:36:19.511 what they did the demo just wouldn't come come up so then as soon as the game goes and does 00:36:19.511-->00:36:26.351 mode 10, mode 13 and and 10 fine yeah go ahead, let's play the game. >>And we called it, as you 00:36:26.351-->00:36:31.356 can see unAsi. >>[laughs] >>Now uh Asi wasn't the only one using uh uh file uh compressors there 00:36:35.160-->00:36:40.165 were many of them you had Ice and uh uh PK Lite and some of them had versions that didn't 00:36:42.834-->00:36:47.839 have extractors and one of those was TINYPROG. TINYPROG um was uh created by uh Alex Robinson and 00:36:51.843-->00:36:56.848 there was no decrypter for that so uh I wrote one, uh also not entirely by myself. And it 00:36:58.883-->00:37:04.222 actually worked and back then when you contacted someone it was by sending them a letter. I 00:37:04.222-->00:37:09.194 actually found a guy. His company was called Trenzoa, I sent him a letter and he kindly 00:37:09.194-->00:37:14.966 asked me not to uh give the source away. He said "This is how I make my uh, my income. 00:37:14.966-->00:37:19.404 Please don't spread it because people buy the product and I want it to keep working." And I 00:37:19.404-->00:37:24.409 uh I actually agreed and at a certain stage... >>hmm yeah I I was uh I was cracking games for 00:37:26.911-->00:37:31.916 a living. Uh if you played uh Larry Suit Larry [crowd laughs] VGA edition ummm so but so 00:37:35.320-->00:37:41.426 TINYPROG was a problem. And so Inbar was visiting me one day and I uh found a source code and 00:37:41.426-->00:37:46.431 I copied that over. Umm. >>Stole it. >>Yes. Well, copied. Zero cost. Um and then the the the 00:37:49.400-->00:37:54.305 crazy amazing thing is that we did have the relationship in place for him to, just before 00:37:54.305-->00:37:59.377 leaving, say "I just want to run something on your computer." And he did a find to the file size 00:37:59.377-->00:38:01.312 the byte file size of UnTINYPROG. And found it on my drive. >>Oh so but but that did 00:38:01.312-->00:38:06.317 start a fight. Right so >>A friendly fight. >>A friendly fight, so um this is um a crack 00:38:11.723-->00:38:16.728 for a uh software called Oren. Oren was the primary typewriter in Israel at the time. And they 00:38:19.964-->00:38:25.703 had a really good protection system uh it was actually a parallel port driver that you'd 00:38:25.703-->00:38:32.243 you'd put in and it had part of the challenge response it had part of the code in it and so 00:38:32.243-->00:38:38.383 because Inbar was refusing to give me TINYPROG, UnTINYPROG so I wrote Openall. Openall was an 00:38:38.383-->00:38:42.887 X86 virtual machine that would listen that would emulate the running of the software find 00:38:42.887-->00:38:47.892 when to capture the executable but also um log the parallel port. Hence, uh the cracked 00:38:50.128-->00:38:56.334 Oren. The interesting thing like we we found all these while doing the research uh for this 00:38:56.334-->00:39:01.773 uh the interesting thing is I guess you all know Phrack, right, that's uh one of the holy 00:39:01.773-->00:39:06.778 bibles. Uh and Europe used to have no idea who that was, wrote a summary about the Israeli 00:39:09.414-->00:39:14.419 scene. Now if you look back, see this is before prefect, that was me. HaSP was my group and Phrack 00:39:19.424-->00:39:23.628 is talking about for the sake of the Pirates, and Israeli foreign group that also has American 00:39:23.628-->00:39:28.633 members is called HaSP. HaSP was a group of 1. No American members whatsoever but I did 00:39:32.003-->00:39:37.008 have a Phrack mention. Uh so so from from all those cracking uh started a new community called 00:39:39.978-->00:39:44.048 the Demo Scene in Israel. It was mostly newer there there wasn't much of a demo scene in the US 00:39:44.048-->00:39:50.021 which is interesting. And um at one point I became the coding coordinator of ICE. The Insane 00:39:50.021-->00:39:54.659 Creator Enterprise, which up until that point we're just creating ANSI so we were the 00:39:54.659-->00:40:00.632 first VGA coders on that platform. And you see that he's actually crediting 3 Israelis 00:40:00.632-->00:40:07.338 that joined uh the group at that point. And this is one, uh Thom Sofati one of the best engineers 00:40:07.338-->00:40:11.843 I know to this date, an entrepreneur in a in a group called Simply. This is Eaton 00:40:11.843-->00:40:16.848 Chaken he now is one of the leaders of uh uh what was Yahoo uh in Israel. And that was me. 00:40:19.751-->00:40:22.887 But the interesting thing is that we were clueless at the time that there was another 00:40:22.887-->00:40:28.893 group or a group of people that were about dozen two dozen people that were doing demos in 00:40:28.893-->00:40:33.698 Israel but were not communicating with one another. So these people are are awesome 00:40:33.698-->00:40:38.703 engineers to this date and this guy is one of the best Mod and S3M trackers to date and he's 00:40:41.439-->00:40:46.711 part of a group called Infected Mushroom. People know? [crowd noise] Yeah! So that was the 00:40:46.711-->00:40:52.750 demo scene, right? It's it's pretty crazy seeing that from the guy, eh Erez Eisen. >>Uh the 00:40:52.750-->00:40:57.755 virus scene was a very uh interesting place to be in the '90s and Israel did play a role 00:41:00.391-->00:41:05.396 also in the virus writing ummm let's call it scene. Uh the most famous uh 2 are the Jerusalem 00:41:07.665-->00:41:12.570 and the Haifa, remember we're talking back then there was a distinction between a virus and 00:41:12.570-->00:41:17.575 a worm and a trojan, so these 2 there was some local initiatives people wrote um um malware to uh 00:41:21.713-->00:41:28.186 inject uh cuss words into uh their uh school computers. But most of what we were doing in 00:41:28.186-->00:41:33.057 Israel was actually on the good side. Uh if you look at the anti-virus history you can see 00:41:33.057-->00:41:38.963 that uh a lot of companies were actually based in Israel. One of these companies uh one of the 00:41:38.963-->00:41:45.103 writers, Gilad Japhet is the uh cofounder and CEO of uh MyHeritage,uh one of the largest 00:41:45.103-->00:41:51.442 uh genome mapping companies was it. Um so some more collect- from my collection uh these are 00:41:51.442-->00:41:56.447 actually floppies of uh AVs, this one is by Iris and we had uh virus safe as well. And there 00:41:58.649-->00:42:04.455 was actually one that was uh written by two guys Yuval Tal and Uzi Apple uh you can see on 00:42:04.455-->00:42:08.860 the right Yuval Tal writing in one of the EchoMail channels that he's looking for some 00:42:08.860-->00:42:14.766 assistance. And then Uzi Apple joined the military so I was called in to replace him. So for 00:42:14.766-->00:42:19.771 a while I was actually writing uh uh AV engines, and that was '92 and an interesting story the 00:42:22.373-->00:42:28.679 Hypha virus I actually found it on my uh school computer and it was the first one of the first 00:42:28.679-->00:42:34.552 that was self encrypting self modifying. It was very very advanced uh at the time and I 00:42:34.552-->00:42:38.689 did a complete reverse engineering of that. And I hope you can see what it says, I'm 00:42:38.689-->00:42:43.694 I'm so uh so proud of myself uh just read the first sentence really it's pure gold and uh I 00:42:46.798-->00:42:51.836 wrote I created the generic signature and I sent it to the AV company and the interesting 00:42:51.836-->00:42:56.841 story is that uh not so many years later I ended up uhh serving in one of the units in 00:42:58.910-->00:43:04.215 the military and one of my colleagues uh admitted that he was the guy who wrote the virus. 00:43:04.215-->00:43:09.887 So it's a small world. This is the signature. It was uh very interesting. Now as far as 00:43:09.887-->00:43:16.260 carding goes I'll just say a few words. Um there were 2 big engines called CVI and TRW, they 00:43:16.260-->00:43:20.865 had a lot of credit information, they were completely unprotected, many people had 00:43:20.865-->00:43:26.404 access to that and they shared that. There was some ethical line in Israel between you know 00:43:26.404-->00:43:31.642 getting information and trading it and actually using it. Using other people's credit crumb er 00:43:31.642-->00:43:36.647 credit card was frowned upon. And let's also talk about uh some famous busts. Deri 00:43:38.850-->00:43:45.656 Schreibman the was the first uh casuality in Israel. He was caught back in '91 it was the 00:43:45.656-->00:43:50.194 first time that the police actually tackled this whole thing that we were doing. Uh it 00:43:50.194-->00:43:56.234 was said that he had technology that was never seen before by law enforcement. We had the The 00:43:56.234-->00:44:02.306 Aanalyzer this guy didn't learn from his mistakes and actually fell back into crime a number of 00:44:02.306-->00:44:08.379 times and someone told me this week that he might actually be uh uh in custody as we speak. 00:44:08.379-->00:44:15.086 This is a story from Eden. >>Yeah it's a so this guy was caught because he put a Trojan 00:44:15.086-->00:44:19.590 on his ex wife's machine who then suspected because he had information that he shouldn't 00:44:19.590-->00:44:24.595 have had. Interesting story but then that actually blew up and apparently more than 8 different 00:44:26.797-->00:44:31.802 private investigators in Israel used the same trojan in order to steal data from the largest 00:44:31.802-->00:44:37.942 corporates. So by him being stupid and putting it on his ex- wife's computer he actually 00:44:37.942-->00:44:44.549 destroyed his own business which was selling it to law enfor- to to private investigators. >>And 00:44:44.549-->00:44:49.787 the last one a guy from Ashkelon this is actually a minor uh this this happened in the states. He 00:44:49.787-->00:44:56.394 was making bomb threat calls, got arrested. Uh recent history, many of these people ended up in 00:44:56.394-->00:45:02.366 uh military intelligence. Uh the pioneer generation actually brought the knowledge with them, 00:45:02.366-->00:45:08.506 the younger ones picked it up there. And Checkpoint was the first companies that was founded 00:45:08.506-->00:45:12.577 based on stuff that people learned in the military. This happened in '93 and you can see 00:45:12.577-->00:45:16.714 a long list of companies that were formed by military colleagues, people that met in 00:45:16.714-->00:45:22.720 the Army and had comradeship and they shared you know work and knowledge and they trusted each 00:45:22.720-->00:45:29.293 other and this brings us to uh where they are now. >>Yeah so eh we we go through this whole 00:45:29.293-->00:45:34.298 story and then let's see so this is 1 Man Crew alright he's now running a big IT shop think big. 00:45:38.436-->00:45:44.308 Guy just sold his company 2 weeks ago for to Symantec for 250 million dollars, Le All 00:45:44.308-->00:45:50.381 founded the company which I was fortunate enough to fund and was the CTO of Git before that. This 00:45:50.381-->00:45:55.386 is actually in Inbar's ex boss uh who runs Perimeter X. Yagir went off to found ICQ and then 00:45:58.022-->00:46:02.960 ToToMe and he now runs ApCard uh. Yaniv El Slasher the guy with all the lyrics uh is one of 00:46:06.564-->00:46:12.336 the top AI researchers now at Facebook, he was my cofounder at Face dot com. Uh The Analyzer 00:46:12.336-->00:46:17.341 got caught again and again and again and in jail uhh. Demi uhhh Deri is actually running Hola If 00:46:21.345-->00:46:26.350 you use uh VPN the free VPN uh hugely hugely scalable which is pretty crazy. And Eres well Eres 00:46:29.453-->00:46:35.960 is with uhh... >>Tara Reid >>Tara Reid, so it it it comes to show you that it >>Was. >>Oh 00:46:35.960-->00:46:41.198 was? See, we're not up to date. Sorry apologies but the musicians always get uh the good 00:46:41.198-->00:46:46.437 stuff. >>And that's it. The this book happened uh that's why everybody knows the term Startup 00:46:46.437-->00:46:49.974 Nation. >>That's the Israeli culture. Disrespect for authority, willingness to fail, 00:46:49.974-->00:46:55.713 live today as there might be no tomorrow. That's the culture. >>And we're 32 seconds off off. 00:46:55.713-->00:47:00.651 Thank you. >>Thank you. [applause]