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Our speaker is Punky Duero.

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He's with ICANN, and he's going to be talking about

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the key management facility of the root zone DNSSEC key signing key.

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I got that right?

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So let's welcome him, and thank you.

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Thank you. Hold on. Let me just set this up.

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All right. Thank you.

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You guys survived Las Vegas. It's Sunday.

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Thanks for coffee and Red Bull.

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So let me clarify the purpose of this talk.

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I'm not going to talk about DNSSEC in detail,

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but rather, because there are prior talks from Richard Lamb,

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and they're the expert on the DNSSEC,

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along with Tomofumi Okubo, who's part of VeriSign.

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They've been a major player, led by David Conrad, our CTO.

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But rather, I'm going to show you something unique,

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basically the key management facility.

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I'm going to provide a show-and-tell,

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which is...

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Some of you may have seen a key management facility,

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but it's typically behind closed doors,

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because activities are not public and stuff like that.

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And I'm going to show you how we protect the crypto,

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the private key, the root zone DNSSEC key signing key.

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Again, Punky Duero, one of the cryptographic key managers for ICANN,

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and I help implement or perform the IANA functions.

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So just very quickly, I'm going to talk about ICANN,

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because there's a couple of misconceptions on what ICANN does.

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Let me get this cable.

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You know, we assign IP addresses for people, domain names.

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That's actually true, but we do it on a top level,

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meaning we assign chunks of IP addresses to five Internet registries in the world.

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These are ARIN for America, LACNIC, APNIC for Asia, and stuff like that.

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So when we assign it to...

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These Internet registries,

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they're the ones who assign it to your ISP providers,

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and ISP providers to everyone of us, users.

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Same thing with the domain names.

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We don't deal with DEF CON.org,

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but rather we work with our root zone management partners for the top level,

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the .com, .net, .gov, .edu, and .org.

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And there's actually .xxx nowadays.

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I mean, God knows what are those in there.

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So ICANN is...

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ICANN is a multi-stakeholder in three groups, just very quickly, just one minute.

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So the community on the right and left side,

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it's, you know, folks that are part of the Internet community,

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engineers, operators that want to make...

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that helps us to make the Internet work.

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And they develop process policies, procedures,

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that's submitted to or reviewed and approved by the ICANN board.

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These are representatives from the ICANN community.

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And once they approve the policies and procedures,

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it gets given to ICANN,

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ICANN organization, which is where I'm a part of.

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We implement it via the IANA functions.

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And there's three IANA functions.

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Protocol parameters, these are the ports, the QoS, the Kerberos.

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These are...

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We maintain a database of these unique registries

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that help communicate...

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the computers communicate via network.

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I'm not the expert on that.

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There's Michelle Cotton, Nayela Saras on our team.

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Numbers, resources, I mentioned earlier, and domain names.

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Under domain names, we also perform...

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SSEC, Domain Name Security Extension.

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System Security Extension.

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And basically, the whole idea of ICANN is to help make...

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There's only one Internet for the entire world, or else...

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Basically, if you want to connect to Facebook.com,

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you have to connect to Time Warner.

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And Google.com, you have to connect to maybe AT&T.

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So that's not going to work.

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Before I move forward with my presentation,

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let me show real quickly a short clip.

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Because...

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I have to warn you, this is a little bit cheesy.

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But anyway, I'll present it.

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Where is my mouse?

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Okay.

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My goddess is because of the key ceremony.

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The what ceremony?

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My husband is one of the seven.

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He holds one of the keys to the Internet.

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Seven keys control the Internet?

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That can't be possible.

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No, they don't control what's on it.

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It's just how to secure it.

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Seven security experts randomly selected by ICANN.

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The Internet Corporation for Sign Names and Notes.

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This ceremony, walk me through how it works.

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They pull out all the stops.

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PIN codes, smart cards, biometric hand scans.

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That is not an easy room to get yourself into.

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Steps are divided up amongst a bunch of people

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to prevent anyone from compromising the process.

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For terms of year, the key holders meet to generate a master key.

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So, yeah, I mean...

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That is... Thank you.

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It's a long clip.

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But I just compressed it.

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The interesting part.

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It's Hollywood.

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Thank you for, I mean, making it...

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Key ceremony is interesting.

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That's the...

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Basically, first of all, we don't control nor secure the Internet traffic.

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And there's no such thing as a master key.

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Just to clarify.

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It would be nice.

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I mean, just like having a unicorn.

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Agenda.

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My agenda for today, I have three topics.

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KSK rollover.

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Just, you know, what's going on.

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Reminder.

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KMF.

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The key management facility.

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Again.

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Show and tell.

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I'll take you guys on a tour.

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That's why.

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Try to go closer if you want to see the pictures later on.

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And then the key ceremony is what the f...

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Is it?

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How is it related?

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So, DNSSEC KSK.

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For folks who are not aware of DNSSEC,

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I mean, it's basically an added security layer to the DNS.

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By incorporating the public key cryptography to the DNS hierarchy.

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You know, making it a global PKI for domain names.

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And for this topic, we're only going to talk about

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key management facility for the key signing key,

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which is the very top cryptography key for the root zone DNSSEC KSK.

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And since 2010, we have a functional and operational KSK.

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This basically has been used.

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And back in October, we've created a new key.

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We generated a new key here.

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RSA 2048.

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You know, just basically part of a hygiene, security hygiene.

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You know, you guys change passwords every so often.

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And it's been seven years since we, you know,

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we haven't updated the very top key of the root zone DNSSEC.

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And basically, it's not, you know,

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it took some time because there's careful planning

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and testing with the community that helped us.

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And it's not easy to swap the keys.

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It's just like, you know, put it in that.

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We try to maintain the...

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chain of trust.

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So, we're using the trusted KSK 2010

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to introduce the KSK 2017.

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And again, there are talks from Ed Lewis,

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from Richard Lamb,

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that details about that guy right there with the white shirt.

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So, simple dig that, you know, to the root DNS key

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will show the public key representation of the KSK 2017.

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And then it has been published on the DNS since July 11.

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If, you know, there are two ways to update your system.

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If you're running DNSSEC validating DNS resolver,

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one is automated.

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Basically, RFC 5011, go to IETF website,

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which pulls that DNS key automatically

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and starts the trusting process of 30 days.

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The other one is manual,

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which is you download the trust anchor

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through the website data.ayana.org

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slash root anchors.

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So, if you...

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If you're an operator would like to play around

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or, you know, somebody would like to play around with DNS,

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want to implement DNSSEC,

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want to know how to configure the DNS recursive server,

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it's different.

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I mean, there's different software,

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PowerDNS, Bind, Unbound.

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I would recommend to read the manual.

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You guys know what to do.

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RTFM.

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So, this is the timeline.

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The KSK rollover have started,

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you know,

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ever since from planning.

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So, the next milestone is September 19, 2017,

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because, you know, how DNSSEC works,

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every quarter we introduce,

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that's the zone signing key

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that kind of like signs the records on the DNS zone.

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We're introducing it,

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that's why there's a packet increase on September 19.

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But the main thing is October 11.

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If your DNS recursive server that's supporting DNSSEC

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validating,

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if you don't have the DNS,

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the KSK 2017 trusted by that time,

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your internet's not going to work

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because, you know,

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most of the top-level domains are signed

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and it's going to fail, basically.

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So, October 11,

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we're using the new KSK 2017.

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So, ICANN, we offer testbeds,

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go.icann.org.

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You know, Paul Hoffman have implemented that

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and other folks on our CTO team,

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led by Dan,

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David Conrad,

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for those who wanted to try.

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So, I mentioned about KSK rollover.

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You guys may wonder,

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where is this KSK stored?

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I just mentioned the public key resides

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on the DNSSEC resolvers, recursive servers.

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And the private key is stored on an HSM.

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The guy earlier that did a talk on CypherPunks

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highlighted the HSM.

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This HSM that we use

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is certified with FIPS 142.

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40-2, level 4,

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meaning that it's just a certification

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for cryptographic modules

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that stores the digital keys.

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And we have two on a facility,

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both having the KSK 2010 and 2017,

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until we stopped using the KSK 2010.

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This HSM has a lot of sensors.

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You shake it, you apply incorrect power,

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it blows up the keys, not the HSM.

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So, basically, I mean, it's just too sensitive.

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The idea is to detect tamper

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and to try to avoid compromise of you

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gaining access, you know,

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unapproved access to the key.

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Okay, he's flagging me, 10 minutes.

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So, to access the HSM,

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basically, we need smart cards to enable it.

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At least three of the seven smart cards.

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And these smart cards are assigned

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to crypto officers.

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I hope you guys know this guy.

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I mean, if you guys use the internet, you better.

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I mean, this is Vint Cerf, along with Bob Kahn.

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They helped invent the internet.

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So, these crypto officers are well diversified.

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They came from across the world,

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internet community representatives

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or members of the internet community

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that we call trusted community representatives.

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We implemented rigorous background checks,

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vetting process.

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And, by the way,

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just to let you know,

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just to make sure you guys understand,

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internet community representatives

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doesn't mean that they're like Kanye West,

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Miley Cyrus, or Jennifer Lopez.

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Those are different celebrities of the internet

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that are not part of this.

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These are operators, engineers

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that help make the internet work.

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I mean, like, probably some of you guys as well.

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So, those smart cards are placed

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inside safe deposit box.

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Deposit box inside the safe.

266
00:12:23,540 --> 00:12:24,420
And, in return,

267
00:12:25,060 --> 00:12:26,980
the keys to the deposit box

268
00:12:27,140 --> 00:12:29,340
are given to the TCRs to keep

269
00:12:29,340 --> 00:12:31,260
while they're still active.

270
00:12:31,840 --> 00:12:33,940
And then, to open the safe,

271
00:12:34,080 --> 00:12:36,740
it requires a different individual,

272
00:12:36,840 --> 00:12:38,080
which is our ICANN staff.

273
00:12:38,460 --> 00:12:38,960
Same thing.

274
00:12:39,240 --> 00:12:40,900
We did a rigorous process,

275
00:12:40,980 --> 00:12:42,000
background checks,

276
00:12:42,080 --> 00:12:44,820
to make sure they say who they are.

277
00:12:45,400 --> 00:12:49,140
And this HSM have a lot of sensors as well.

278
00:12:49,300 --> 00:12:50,540
You know, defense in depth

279
00:12:50,540 --> 00:12:51,580
that we try to implement.

280
00:12:51,800 --> 00:12:52,900
It has seismic sensors.

281
00:12:53,060 --> 00:12:54,920
Let's say somebody wants to drill on it.

282
00:12:55,240 --> 00:12:56,280
And, also,

283
00:12:57,140 --> 00:12:58,980
the triple-biased door contacts

284
00:12:58,980 --> 00:13:00,420
to avoid tamper.

285
00:13:00,620 --> 00:13:01,080
So, let's say,

286
00:13:01,140 --> 00:13:02,060
because some contacts,

287
00:13:02,320 --> 00:13:03,300
when you open it,

288
00:13:03,320 --> 00:13:04,440
you can actually place a magnet

289
00:13:04,440 --> 00:13:05,520
to fool the system.

290
00:13:05,680 --> 00:13:06,460
But this one,

291
00:13:06,460 --> 00:13:07,900
it's like it has some balancing that,

292
00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:10,500
I don't know.

293
00:13:10,980 --> 00:13:11,820
And, also,

294
00:13:11,900 --> 00:13:14,260
it's certified GSA Class 5.

295
00:13:15,160 --> 00:13:16,780
I don't know what that means,

296
00:13:16,900 --> 00:13:17,560
but, basically,

297
00:13:17,760 --> 00:13:18,100
I mean,

298
00:13:18,120 --> 00:13:20,840
it's what the federal government uses

299
00:13:20,840 --> 00:13:23,420
for keeping their top-secret documents.

300
00:13:23,780 --> 00:13:24,320
It's the same.

301
00:13:24,660 --> 00:13:26,080
So, that's the smart cards.

302
00:13:26,140 --> 00:13:26,740
You may wonder,

303
00:13:26,740 --> 00:13:27,760
what about the equipment?

304
00:13:28,220 --> 00:13:30,800
The equipment is on another safe,

305
00:13:30,960 --> 00:13:32,640
which is what we call hardware safe.

306
00:13:33,120 --> 00:13:35,820
We put the HSM,

307
00:13:36,060 --> 00:13:37,960
which is we have two on a facility,

308
00:13:38,200 --> 00:13:41,120
and it's opened by a different individual.

309
00:13:41,580 --> 00:13:42,940
I mean, unlike the other one,

310
00:13:42,980 --> 00:13:44,600
which is the credential safe controller,

311
00:13:44,860 --> 00:13:47,820
this is a hardware safe controller person,

312
00:13:47,920 --> 00:13:50,200
which is they don't share the combination.

313
00:13:51,560 --> 00:13:55,320
And that safe has the same protection mechanism.

314
00:13:56,060 --> 00:13:56,620
Laptop,

315
00:13:56,740 --> 00:13:57,140
HSM,

316
00:13:57,320 --> 00:13:59,020
and other equipment.

317
00:13:59,200 --> 00:14:00,880
You see that circle right there,

318
00:14:00,960 --> 00:14:02,720
the kids that don't recognize nowadays,

319
00:14:03,120 --> 00:14:04,640
that's basically a CD

320
00:14:04,640 --> 00:14:06,080
where the operating system,

321
00:14:06,200 --> 00:14:06,600
this circle,

322
00:14:06,740 --> 00:14:08,340
where the operating system

323
00:14:08,340 --> 00:14:12,220
and the key management software is used.

324
00:14:12,500 --> 00:14:15,400
And this laptop that we use is basically bare.

325
00:14:15,580 --> 00:14:17,120
It doesn't have wireless connectivity.

326
00:14:17,240 --> 00:14:18,320
It doesn't have a hardware

327
00:14:18,320 --> 00:14:22,500
because we boot it through the CD.

328
00:14:23,200 --> 00:14:26,220
And the software is published on the IONM website.

329
00:14:26,220 --> 00:14:27,540
You guys can download it.

330
00:14:27,800 --> 00:14:29,960
Rick developed the first version of it,

331
00:14:30,040 --> 00:14:31,420
and then you can criticize it.

332
00:14:31,500 --> 00:14:31,680
Sorry.

333
00:14:33,220 --> 00:14:34,840
So I just described,

334
00:14:35,020 --> 00:14:37,000
it's basically AirGap, the laptop.

335
00:14:37,260 --> 00:14:38,120
There's no internet connection.

336
00:14:38,360 --> 00:14:39,500
Regardless if there's vulnerability

337
00:14:39,500 --> 00:14:42,980
on the older CentOS operating system,

338
00:14:43,260 --> 00:14:44,140
it doesn't matter.

339
00:14:44,200 --> 00:14:45,060
It doesn't connect to the internet.

340
00:14:45,540 --> 00:14:47,420
So I just described two safes.

341
00:14:49,140 --> 00:14:51,440
Obviously, it's stored on a safe room.

342
00:14:52,300 --> 00:14:54,740
Because in the safe room, there's two safe.

343
00:14:54,740 --> 00:14:58,520
And that safe room is a cage.

344
00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:00,340
And I think, what is my time?

345
00:15:01,720 --> 00:15:05,060
This room requires two-factor authentication.

346
00:15:06,200 --> 00:15:08,260
Different individuals with different roles.

347
00:15:09,480 --> 00:15:13,160
Normally, I would say we use Iris Scanner

348
00:15:13,160 --> 00:15:15,880
because it's awesome, just like Mission Impossible.

349
00:15:16,080 --> 00:15:16,920
It's pretty cool.

350
00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:20,860
But since I'm talking to a lot of technical people,

351
00:15:21,740 --> 00:15:22,580
it's BS.

352
00:15:22,600 --> 00:15:23,200
It's bullshit.

353
00:15:23,380 --> 00:15:24,040
I mean, honestly.

354
00:15:24,740 --> 00:15:25,920
But it's just for show.

355
00:15:26,100 --> 00:15:27,320
I mean, when we speak with media,

356
00:15:27,400 --> 00:15:28,960
it is pretty cool and stuff like that.

357
00:15:29,060 --> 00:15:30,000
We try several times.

358
00:15:30,660 --> 00:15:32,740
Because the issue, it's an old...

359
00:15:32,740 --> 00:15:35,860
We're actually trying to improve it

360
00:15:35,860 --> 00:15:37,260
in the process of upgrading it.

361
00:15:38,960 --> 00:15:43,400
The issue is the credential swipes in between.

362
00:15:43,480 --> 00:15:45,620
It times out, which is rejecting us.

363
00:15:45,740 --> 00:15:47,840
I guess it's too much security, which is good.

364
00:15:48,100 --> 00:15:51,600
But we use the alternate card reader instead.

365
00:15:51,760 --> 00:15:52,900
We use card and PIN.

366
00:15:52,980 --> 00:15:54,720
It's still a dual occupancy requirement.

367
00:15:54,740 --> 00:15:55,620
And dual access.

368
00:15:55,840 --> 00:15:57,340
So two people with different roles.

369
00:15:58,180 --> 00:15:58,780
And...

370
00:16:01,740 --> 00:16:02,660
Yeah, that.

371
00:16:03,300 --> 00:16:09,200
So this room is enclosed inside a larger room.

372
00:16:09,340 --> 00:16:10,260
A larger cage.

373
00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:12,780
So, again, defense in-depth.

374
00:16:13,060 --> 00:16:17,780
That larger cage is covered in wall to make it beautiful.

375
00:16:18,740 --> 00:16:20,740
It has surveillance cameras.

376
00:16:21,000 --> 00:16:22,000
A lot of them.

377
00:16:22,300 --> 00:16:23,180
Backup connection.

378
00:16:23,460 --> 00:16:24,140
Backup monitoring.

379
00:16:24,740 --> 00:16:25,460
Same thing.

380
00:16:25,760 --> 00:16:26,980
Dual occupancy.

381
00:16:26,980 --> 00:16:27,820
Two-man rule.

382
00:16:27,980 --> 00:16:29,160
Two people access the room.

383
00:16:29,920 --> 00:16:31,780
And we have a lot of sensors.

384
00:16:32,120 --> 00:16:34,280
Actually, in the past, speaking about the sensors,

385
00:16:34,580 --> 00:16:37,900
we have passive infrared sensors.

386
00:16:38,240 --> 00:16:40,600
And the issue with that is...

387
00:16:41,540 --> 00:16:42,660
Man, it's bad.

388
00:16:42,800 --> 00:16:45,400
Because, I mean, change of temperature or a fly flying by,

389
00:16:45,520 --> 00:16:48,100
we get calls at night at 2 a.m.

390
00:16:48,500 --> 00:16:49,580
It's just horrible.

391
00:16:49,860 --> 00:16:50,620
And then...

392
00:16:50,620 --> 00:16:51,360
And my...

393
00:16:52,300 --> 00:16:54,720
And my ringtone actually...

394
00:16:54,740 --> 00:16:55,540
Actually, it's...

395
00:16:58,940 --> 00:16:59,500
It's...

396
00:17:00,240 --> 00:17:01,380
So, yeah.

397
00:17:01,540 --> 00:17:03,360
And my ringtone is like this.

398
00:17:03,500 --> 00:17:07,340
So, waking me up at 2 a.m. in the morning.

399
00:17:07,820 --> 00:17:08,780
It's just horrible.

400
00:17:08,920 --> 00:17:11,100
So we decided to upgrade it.

401
00:17:11,240 --> 00:17:16,640
And we've adopted, you know, dual technology, microwave sensors and passive infrared

402
00:17:16,640 --> 00:17:20,760
to kind of, like, compensate with sensor detect heat and stuff like that.

403
00:17:20,860 --> 00:17:22,200
It rejects it.

404
00:17:22,960 --> 00:17:23,520
Less...

405
00:17:24,740 --> 00:17:25,020
Pulse alarms.

406
00:17:27,320 --> 00:17:32,560
So, whenever we perform maintenance or key ceremonies,

407
00:17:32,720 --> 00:17:34,100
which I'll talk about in a little bit,

408
00:17:35,000 --> 00:17:37,640
there's another role that we have to notify,

409
00:17:37,740 --> 00:17:42,960
whether courtesy notification or ask them to contact our monitoring station,

410
00:17:43,220 --> 00:17:45,060
which is separate from us, other than...

411
00:17:45,060 --> 00:17:47,980
Because we receive notification, the staff, and the...

412
00:17:48,820 --> 00:17:52,300
We receive alarms, staff, and the monitoring station.

413
00:17:52,640 --> 00:17:54,640
So, basically, we ask this...

414
00:17:54,740 --> 00:17:59,220
Another role, which is access control manager to either disable the monitoring station

415
00:17:59,220 --> 00:18:01,580
or just a courtesy note.

416
00:18:02,560 --> 00:18:07,640
So, to get into that room, there's a small room, which is what we call the man trap.

417
00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:08,780
Same thing.

418
00:18:08,980 --> 00:18:13,460
I mean, man trap, basically, if one door is open, the other cannot be open.

419
00:18:14,200 --> 00:18:16,120
Actually, it's the same thing with the entire facility.

420
00:18:17,500 --> 00:18:19,900
So, that's the key management facility.

421
00:18:20,120 --> 00:18:21,360
What about the key ceremony?

422
00:18:22,420 --> 00:18:23,800
It's not tea ceremony.

423
00:18:23,980 --> 00:18:24,620
Pardon me.

424
00:18:24,740 --> 00:18:25,340
Asian accent.

425
00:18:25,840 --> 00:18:28,220
I try to say key, not tea.

426
00:18:29,460 --> 00:18:35,300
So, that's me, two decades ago, looking at a lady cooking green stuff.

427
00:18:35,600 --> 00:18:36,320
I mean, it's not pot.

428
00:18:38,240 --> 00:18:39,900
It's Japanese green tea.

429
00:18:40,340 --> 00:18:44,620
So, just like a key ceremony, it's a ritual.

430
00:18:46,000 --> 00:18:48,020
And we observe the process.

431
00:18:48,120 --> 00:18:51,940
So, we kind of like look at the tea and then turn the cup and stuff like that.

432
00:18:52,220 --> 00:18:53,840
It's interesting, I think.

433
00:18:53,900 --> 00:18:54,720
Japanese tea ceremony.

434
00:18:54,740 --> 00:18:56,660
Same thing with the key ceremony.

435
00:18:56,940 --> 00:18:57,540
It's a ritual.

436
00:18:57,780 --> 00:18:59,820
And then we gather around.

437
00:19:00,140 --> 00:19:02,360
I mean, you can see this is the ceremony room.

438
00:19:02,480 --> 00:19:03,600
You see that cages in there.

439
00:19:03,780 --> 00:19:06,700
These are the TCRs and the staff in combination.

440
00:19:07,920 --> 00:19:10,560
And we use a script.

441
00:19:10,700 --> 00:19:12,620
So, it's a step-by-step process as well.

442
00:19:13,160 --> 00:19:14,800
It's typically three acts.

443
00:19:15,000 --> 00:19:19,520
The first act comprises of several steps to open the ceremony, extract the equipment.

444
00:19:20,160 --> 00:19:23,760
The second one is to use the HSM for signature.

445
00:19:23,940 --> 00:19:24,720
Again, DNI.

446
00:19:24,740 --> 00:19:26,120
The second act doesn't encrypt.

447
00:19:26,340 --> 00:19:30,620
We sign the key and then the key signs the zones and stuff.

448
00:19:31,720 --> 00:19:38,640
So, and then the third act is basically we return all materials, you know, all the...

449
00:19:39,340 --> 00:19:43,580
After we've assembled it, we perform the key ceremony, we return the materials.

450
00:19:43,820 --> 00:19:48,540
And we, in the end, we generated a signed key response.

451
00:19:48,820 --> 00:19:54,640
This is what we give VeriSign, our root zone partner, so that they can publish it to the

452
00:19:54,640 --> 00:19:55,800
DNS in the next quarter.

453
00:19:56,520 --> 00:19:58,720
So, this ceremony is highly audited.

454
00:19:59,780 --> 00:20:02,960
Every trace, we try to maintain chain of custody.

455
00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:08,620
You can actually trace each ceremony on the Ayano website from back in 2010 that you

456
00:20:08,620 --> 00:20:14,020
can see each tamper evident bags that we used and how we opened it and stuff like that.

457
00:20:14,560 --> 00:20:16,400
It is lengthy, three hours.

458
00:20:16,660 --> 00:20:17,420
It takes three hours.

459
00:20:17,680 --> 00:20:19,000
And then, oh shoot, what time is it?

460
00:20:19,200 --> 00:20:23,080
And so, it's actually boring.

461
00:20:23,280 --> 00:20:24,620
People compare it with...

462
00:20:25,540 --> 00:20:29,200
It's just the blacklist redemption earlier just showed it pretty interesting, but it's not.

463
00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:31,280
Because it's three hours.

464
00:20:31,340 --> 00:20:33,320
It's like people compared it watching a paint dry.

465
00:20:33,580 --> 00:20:37,640
And it's actually, I think it's actually an insult to the paint, to be honest with you.

466
00:20:39,300 --> 00:20:45,080
So, all in all, I don't know if you guys were counting, there are at least 12 people

467
00:20:46,700 --> 00:20:51,360
required to perform a key ceremony, a typical key ceremony, minimum of 12, plus the one

468
00:20:51,360 --> 00:20:54,160
that we need to notify to, you know, disable them.

469
00:20:55,020 --> 00:20:56,720
Notifications on the monitoring side.

470
00:20:56,980 --> 00:20:58,640
Again, segregation of duties.

471
00:20:58,720 --> 00:21:01,020
This is to minimize collusion.

472
00:21:02,860 --> 00:21:05,780
So, where is this key management facility?

473
00:21:06,120 --> 00:21:06,760
Anyone know?

474
00:21:06,900 --> 00:21:07,640
I mean, raise of hands.

475
00:21:08,180 --> 00:21:08,700
No?

476
00:21:09,300 --> 00:21:09,820
Okay.

477
00:21:10,060 --> 00:21:11,460
It's in U.S.

478
00:21:11,460 --> 00:21:12,260
Yes, that is correct.

479
00:21:12,520 --> 00:21:14,440
And it is not a secret.

480
00:21:14,660 --> 00:21:18,720
We have two locations, one in Virginia, the other one is in El Segundo.

481
00:21:19,320 --> 00:21:23,020
Every quarter, we alternate both facilities to perform it, every key ceremony.

482
00:21:24,640 --> 00:21:28,080
And so, you know, that right there, I just clicked it.

483
00:21:28,400 --> 00:21:32,860
So, what happens if, five minutes, okay.

484
00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:35,600
So, what happens if both facilities are inoperable?

485
00:21:36,080 --> 00:21:39,940
Then, this is where, you know, another set of TCRs comes along.

486
00:21:41,620 --> 00:21:43,780
Who doesn't know Dan Kaminsky, basically?

487
00:21:43,820 --> 00:21:46,220
He's one of our TCRs, Recovery Key Shareholders.

488
00:21:47,260 --> 00:21:52,940
Unlike other crypto officers, you know, they gather around as well to, along with critical

489
00:21:52,940 --> 00:21:54,620
materials, to help reconstruct the TCRs.

490
00:21:54,620 --> 00:21:59,140
To help reconstruct the KSK, the new key, the private key, and, you know, be able to

491
00:21:59,140 --> 00:21:59,740
use it.

492
00:22:00,580 --> 00:22:02,820
So, all in all, we have 21 TCRs.

493
00:22:02,820 --> 00:22:03,360
I'm trying to rush.

494
00:22:03,520 --> 00:22:03,960
Pardon me.

495
00:22:04,780 --> 00:22:09,340
And then, they are experts in the DNS industry and highly critical.

496
00:22:10,180 --> 00:22:12,900
And actually, we want that because we want to be criticized.

497
00:22:13,240 --> 00:22:17,880
We show, I mean, we do what we say we do and then they point out our mistakes and stuff

498
00:22:17,880 --> 00:22:18,200
like that.

499
00:22:18,260 --> 00:22:19,200
We accept it.

500
00:22:19,240 --> 00:22:19,920
We try to improve.

501
00:22:20,040 --> 00:22:20,920
We discuss with them.

502
00:22:21,080 --> 00:22:23,020
And how can we improve the process?

503
00:22:23,900 --> 00:22:24,600
And, you know, we have 21 TCRs.

504
00:22:24,600 --> 00:22:31,200
And on top of that, we also hired external auditors to help us review our internal control,

505
00:22:31,520 --> 00:22:34,760
security for availability and integrity.

506
00:22:37,320 --> 00:22:42,140
So, you guys may wonder why such a high security, so public, right?

507
00:22:42,200 --> 00:22:43,120
Why am I doing this?

508
00:22:43,260 --> 00:22:45,760
I mean, why am I showing these pictures to you guys?

509
00:22:46,540 --> 00:22:49,060
It's because mostly it's behind closed doors.

510
00:22:49,260 --> 00:22:54,400
Again, this is not a paid service, unlike, you know, the CAs and other folks.

511
00:22:54,600 --> 00:22:55,220
That perform this.

512
00:22:55,580 --> 00:23:03,020
And trust involves, trust, like most things on the internet, it's like adoption involves

513
00:23:03,020 --> 00:23:03,440
trust.

514
00:23:03,900 --> 00:23:10,120
And so, we try to set a high standard because KSK is very top crypto on DNSSEC.

515
00:23:10,240 --> 00:23:14,840
And part of ICANN's mandate is to promote transparency and accountability.

516
00:23:16,380 --> 00:23:18,760
Make sure we do what we say we do.

517
00:23:19,120 --> 00:23:24,380
So, can it survive a tank or a mission impossible?

518
00:23:24,600 --> 00:23:25,640
Can it survive a tank or a mission impossible attack by Tom Cruise?

519
00:23:26,380 --> 00:23:27,700
No, definitely not.

520
00:23:27,980 --> 00:23:33,040
Because, I mean, that's why we implemented defense in depth to delay the attacker and

521
00:23:33,040 --> 00:23:35,440
us allowing us to detect the compromise.

522
00:23:35,780 --> 00:23:38,760
And we activate certain protocols to respond to it.

523
00:23:38,880 --> 00:23:44,660
This is also why we're doing the KSK rollover to check, you know, if we can handle it in

524
00:23:44,660 --> 00:23:45,160
the process.

525
00:23:46,600 --> 00:23:48,080
So, yeah, pictures.

526
00:23:49,360 --> 00:23:52,440
That's Richard Lam looking at the KeyMatch software.

527
00:23:52,680 --> 00:23:54,100
This is at the end of the key ceremony.

528
00:23:54,700 --> 00:23:58,860
And this one, he's holding a tamper event bag, one of our TCRs, Olaf Kolkman.

529
00:23:59,300 --> 00:24:01,020
I mean, this is one of them.

530
00:24:01,260 --> 00:24:07,320
We've used a different model in the past that we did replace because, I mean, the tamper

531
00:24:07,940 --> 00:24:08,700
village, right?

532
00:24:08,800 --> 00:24:10,020
I mean, did tamper it.

533
00:24:10,060 --> 00:24:12,000
So, it's like, oh, shit, we got to change it already.

534
00:24:13,240 --> 00:24:13,640
Yeah.

535
00:24:13,740 --> 00:24:16,320
And then led by, yeah, those folks right there.

536
00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:18,480
So, yeah.

537
00:24:19,840 --> 00:24:20,240
Yeah.

538
00:24:21,060 --> 00:24:24,220
So, I mean, with that, I thank you.

539
00:24:24,220 --> 00:24:27,280
Thank you to everyone's attention for, you know, for staying.

540
00:24:27,540 --> 00:24:29,320
And I'm glad you guys are here.

541
00:24:29,820 --> 00:24:31,680
And please feel free to reach out.

542
00:24:31,780 --> 00:24:34,700
LinkedIn, my LinkedIn, ICANN's LinkedIn, my Twitter.

543
00:24:34,900 --> 00:24:36,400
I just created my Twitter.

544
00:24:37,940 --> 00:24:39,960
And those are the links that should be helpful.

545
00:24:40,100 --> 00:24:45,200
And by the way, I mean, if you guys are interested and known in your community, I would suggest

546
00:24:45,200 --> 00:24:48,380
to apply because we're replacing, not replacing.

547
00:24:48,660 --> 00:24:51,540
I mean, we're looking for successors for the TCRs.

548
00:24:51,560 --> 00:24:52,760
You know, they've been in there.

549
00:24:52,840 --> 00:24:53,680
They're probably bored.

550
00:24:53,680 --> 00:24:57,380
I mean, sitting there for like three, four hours a day or every quarter.

551
00:24:57,980 --> 00:24:59,380
So, thank you very much.

552
00:25:00,120 --> 00:25:00,800
Thank you.

553
00:25:00,800 --> 00:25:02,020
Thank you.

554
00:25:02,020 --> 00:25:02,600
Thank you.

555
00:25:02,840 --> 00:25:03,320
Thank you.