Our speaker is Punky Duero.
He's with ICANN, and he's going to be talking about
the key management facility of the root zone DNSSEC key signing key.
I got that right?
So let's welcome him, and thank you.
Thank you. Hold on. Let me just set this up.
All right. Thank you.
You guys survived Las Vegas. It's Sunday.
Thanks for coffee and Red Bull.
So let me clarify the purpose of this talk.
I'm not going to talk about DNSSEC in detail,
but rather, because there are prior talks from Richard Lamb,
and they're the expert on the DNSSEC,
along with Tomofumi Okubo, who's part of VeriSign.
They've been a major player, led by David Conrad, our CTO.
But rather, I'm going to show you something unique,
basically the key management facility.
I'm going to provide a show-and-tell,
which is...
Some of you may have seen a key management facility,
but it's typically behind closed doors,
because activities are not public and stuff like that.
And I'm going to show you how we protect the crypto,
the private key, the root zone DNSSEC key signing key.
Again, Punky Duero, one of the cryptographic key managers for ICANN,
and I help implement or perform the IANA functions.
So just very quickly, I'm going to talk about ICANN,
because there's a couple of misconceptions on what ICANN does.
Let me get this cable.
You know, we assign IP addresses for people, domain names.
That's actually true, but we do it on a top level,
meaning we assign chunks of IP addresses to five Internet registries in the world.
These are ARIN for America, LACNIC, APNIC for Asia, and stuff like that.
So when we assign it to...
These Internet registries,
they're the ones who assign it to your ISP providers,
and ISP providers to everyone of us, users.
Same thing with the domain names.
We don't deal with DEF CON.org,
but rather we work with our root zone management partners for the top level,
the .com, .net, .gov, .edu, and .org.
And there's actually .xxx nowadays.
I mean, God knows what are those in there.
So ICANN is...
ICANN is a multi-stakeholder in three groups, just very quickly, just one minute.
So the community on the right and left side,
it's, you know, folks that are part of the Internet community,
engineers, operators that want to make...
that helps us to make the Internet work.
And they develop process policies, procedures,
that's submitted to or reviewed and approved by the ICANN board.
These are representatives from the ICANN community.
And once they approve the policies and procedures,
it gets given to ICANN,
ICANN organization, which is where I'm a part of.
We implement it via the IANA functions.
And there's three IANA functions.
Protocol parameters, these are the ports, the QoS, the Kerberos.
These are...
We maintain a database of these unique registries
that help communicate...
the computers communicate via network.
I'm not the expert on that.
There's Michelle Cotton, Nayela Saras on our team.
Numbers, resources, I mentioned earlier, and domain names.
Under domain names, we also perform...
SSEC, Domain Name Security Extension.
System Security Extension.
And basically, the whole idea of ICANN is to help make...
There's only one Internet for the entire world, or else...
Basically, if you want to connect to Facebook.com,
you have to connect to Time Warner.
And Google.com, you have to connect to maybe AT&T.
So that's not going to work.
Before I move forward with my presentation,
let me show real quickly a short clip.
Because...
I have to warn you, this is a little bit cheesy.
But anyway, I'll present it.
Where is my mouse?
Okay.
My goddess is because of the key ceremony.
The what ceremony?
My husband is one of the seven.
He holds one of the keys to the Internet.
Seven keys control the Internet?
That can't be possible.
No, they don't control what's on it.
It's just how to secure it.
Seven security experts randomly selected by ICANN.
The Internet Corporation for Sign Names and Notes.
This ceremony, walk me through how it works.
They pull out all the stops.
PIN codes, smart cards, biometric hand scans.
That is not an easy room to get yourself into.
Steps are divided up amongst a bunch of people
to prevent anyone from compromising the process.
For terms of year, the key holders meet to generate a master key.
So, yeah, I mean...
That is... Thank you.
It's a long clip.
But I just compressed it.
The interesting part.
It's Hollywood.
Thank you for, I mean, making it...
Key ceremony is interesting.
That's the...
Basically, first of all, we don't control nor secure the Internet traffic.
And there's no such thing as a master key.
Just to clarify.
It would be nice.
I mean, just like having a unicorn.
Agenda.
My agenda for today, I have three topics.
KSK rollover.
Just, you know, what's going on.
Reminder.
KMF.
The key management facility.
Again.
Show and tell.
I'll take you guys on a tour.
That's why.
Try to go closer if you want to see the pictures later on.
And then the key ceremony is what the f...
Is it?
How is it related?
So, DNSSEC KSK.
For folks who are not aware of DNSSEC,
I mean, it's basically an added security layer to the DNS.
By incorporating the public key cryptography to the DNS hierarchy.
You know, making it a global PKI for domain names.
And for this topic, we're only going to talk about
key management facility for the key signing key,
which is the very top cryptography key for the root zone DNSSEC KSK.
And since 2010, we have a functional and operational KSK.
This basically has been used.
And back in October, we've created a new key.
We generated a new key here.
RSA 2048.
You know, just basically part of a hygiene, security hygiene.
You know, you guys change passwords every so often.
And it's been seven years since we, you know,
we haven't updated the very top key of the root zone DNSSEC.
And basically, it's not, you know,
it took some time because there's careful planning
and testing with the community that helped us.
And it's not easy to swap the keys.
It's just like, you know, put it in that.
We try to maintain the...
chain of trust.
So, we're using the trusted KSK 2010
to introduce the KSK 2017.
And again, there are talks from Ed Lewis,
from Richard Lamb,
that details about that guy right there with the white shirt.
So, simple dig that, you know, to the root DNS key
will show the public key representation of the KSK 2017.
And then it has been published on the DNS since July 11.
If, you know, there are two ways to update your system.
If you're running DNSSEC validating DNS resolver,
one is automated.
Basically, RFC 5011, go to IETF website,
which pulls that DNS key automatically
and starts the trusting process of 30 days.
The other one is manual,
which is you download the trust anchor
through the website data.ayana.org
slash root anchors.
So, if you...
If you're an operator would like to play around
or, you know, somebody would like to play around with DNS,
want to implement DNSSEC,
want to know how to configure the DNS recursive server,
it's different.
I mean, there's different software,
PowerDNS, Bind, Unbound.
I would recommend to read the manual.
You guys know what to do.
RTFM.
So, this is the timeline.
The KSK rollover have started,
you know,
ever since from planning.
So, the next milestone is September 19, 2017,
because, you know, how DNSSEC works,
every quarter we introduce,
that's the zone signing key
that kind of like signs the records on the DNS zone.
We're introducing it,
that's why there's a packet increase on September 19.
But the main thing is October 11.
If your DNS recursive server that's supporting DNSSEC
validating,
if you don't have the DNS,
the KSK 2017 trusted by that time,
your internet's not going to work
because, you know,
most of the top-level domains are signed
and it's going to fail, basically.
So, October 11,
we're using the new KSK 2017.
So, ICANN, we offer testbeds,
go.icann.org.
You know, Paul Hoffman have implemented that
and other folks on our CTO team,
led by Dan,
David Conrad,
for those who wanted to try.
So, I mentioned about KSK rollover.
You guys may wonder,
where is this KSK stored?
I just mentioned the public key resides
on the DNSSEC resolvers, recursive servers.
And the private key is stored on an HSM.
The guy earlier that did a talk on CypherPunks
highlighted the HSM.
This HSM that we use
is certified with FIPS 142.
40-2, level 4,
meaning that it's just a certification
for cryptographic modules
that stores the digital keys.
And we have two on a facility,
both having the KSK 2010 and 2017,
until we stopped using the KSK 2010.
This HSM has a lot of sensors.
You shake it, you apply incorrect power,
it blows up the keys, not the HSM.
So, basically, I mean, it's just too sensitive.
The idea is to detect tamper
and to try to avoid compromise of you
gaining access, you know,
unapproved access to the key.
Okay, he's flagging me, 10 minutes.
So, to access the HSM,
basically, we need smart cards to enable it.
At least three of the seven smart cards.
And these smart cards are assigned
to crypto officers.
I hope you guys know this guy.
I mean, if you guys use the internet, you better.
I mean, this is Vint Cerf, along with Bob Kahn.
They helped invent the internet.
So, these crypto officers are well diversified.
They came from across the world,
internet community representatives
or members of the internet community
that we call trusted community representatives.
We implemented rigorous background checks,
vetting process.
And, by the way,
just to let you know,
just to make sure you guys understand,
internet community representatives
doesn't mean that they're like Kanye West,
Miley Cyrus, or Jennifer Lopez.
Those are different celebrities of the internet
that are not part of this.
These are operators, engineers
that help make the internet work.
I mean, like, probably some of you guys as well.
So, those smart cards are placed
inside safe deposit box.
Deposit box inside the safe.
And, in return,
the keys to the deposit box
are given to the TCRs to keep
while they're still active.
And then, to open the safe,
it requires a different individual,
which is our ICANN staff.
Same thing.
We did a rigorous process,
background checks,
to make sure they say who they are.
And this HSM have a lot of sensors as well.
You know, defense in depth
that we try to implement.
It has seismic sensors.
Let's say somebody wants to drill on it.
And, also,
the triple-biased door contacts
to avoid tamper.
So, let's say,
because some contacts,
when you open it,
you can actually place a magnet
to fool the system.
But this one,
it's like it has some balancing that,
I don't know.
And, also,
it's certified GSA Class 5.
I don't know what that means,
but, basically,
I mean,
it's what the federal government uses
for keeping their top-secret documents.
It's the same.
So, that's the smart cards.
You may wonder,
what about the equipment?
The equipment is on another safe,
which is what we call hardware safe.
We put the HSM,
which is we have two on a facility,
and it's opened by a different individual.
I mean, unlike the other one,
which is the credential safe controller,
this is a hardware safe controller person,
which is they don't share the combination.
And that safe has the same protection mechanism.
Laptop,
HSM,
and other equipment.
You see that circle right there,
the kids that don't recognize nowadays,
that's basically a CD
where the operating system,
this circle,
where the operating system
and the key management software is used.
And this laptop that we use is basically bare.
It doesn't have wireless connectivity.
It doesn't have a hardware
because we boot it through the CD.
And the software is published on the IONM website.
You guys can download it.
Rick developed the first version of it,
and then you can criticize it.
Sorry.
So I just described,
it's basically AirGap, the laptop.
There's no internet connection.
Regardless if there's vulnerability
on the older CentOS operating system,
it doesn't matter.
It doesn't connect to the internet.
So I just described two safes.
Obviously, it's stored on a safe room.
Because in the safe room, there's two safe.
And that safe room is a cage.
And I think, what is my time?
This room requires two-factor authentication.
Different individuals with different roles.
Normally, I would say we use Iris Scanner
because it's awesome, just like Mission Impossible.
It's pretty cool.
But since I'm talking to a lot of technical people,
it's BS.
It's bullshit.
I mean, honestly.
But it's just for show.
I mean, when we speak with media,
it is pretty cool and stuff like that.
We try several times.
Because the issue, it's an old...
We're actually trying to improve it
in the process of upgrading it.
The issue is the credential swipes in between.
It times out, which is rejecting us.
I guess it's too much security, which is good.
But we use the alternate card reader instead.
We use card and PIN.
It's still a dual occupancy requirement.
And dual access.
So two people with different roles.
And...
Yeah, that.
So this room is enclosed inside a larger room.
A larger cage.
So, again, defense in-depth.
That larger cage is covered in wall to make it beautiful.
It has surveillance cameras.
A lot of them.
Backup connection.
Backup monitoring.
Same thing.
Dual occupancy.
Two-man rule.
Two people access the room.
And we have a lot of sensors.
Actually, in the past, speaking about the sensors,
we have passive infrared sensors.
And the issue with that is...
Man, it's bad.
Because, I mean, change of temperature or a fly flying by,
we get calls at night at 2 a.m.
It's just horrible.
And then...
And my...
And my ringtone actually...
Actually, it's...
It's...
So, yeah.
And my ringtone is like this.
So, waking me up at 2 a.m. in the morning.
It's just horrible.
So we decided to upgrade it.
And we've adopted, you know, dual technology, microwave sensors and passive infrared
to kind of, like, compensate with sensor detect heat and stuff like that.
It rejects it.
Less...
Pulse alarms.
So, whenever we perform maintenance or key ceremonies,
which I'll talk about in a little bit,
there's another role that we have to notify,
whether courtesy notification or ask them to contact our monitoring station,
which is separate from us, other than...
Because we receive notification, the staff, and the...
We receive alarms, staff, and the monitoring station.
So, basically, we ask this...
Another role, which is access control manager to either disable the monitoring station
or just a courtesy note.
So, to get into that room, there's a small room, which is what we call the man trap.
Same thing.
I mean, man trap, basically, if one door is open, the other cannot be open.
Actually, it's the same thing with the entire facility.
So, that's the key management facility.
What about the key ceremony?
It's not tea ceremony.
Pardon me.
Asian accent.
I try to say key, not tea.
So, that's me, two decades ago, looking at a lady cooking green stuff.
I mean, it's not pot.
It's Japanese green tea.
So, just like a key ceremony, it's a ritual.
And we observe the process.
So, we kind of like look at the tea and then turn the cup and stuff like that.
It's interesting, I think.
Japanese tea ceremony.
Same thing with the key ceremony.
It's a ritual.
And then we gather around.
I mean, you can see this is the ceremony room.
You see that cages in there.
These are the TCRs and the staff in combination.
And we use a script.
So, it's a step-by-step process as well.
It's typically three acts.
The first act comprises of several steps to open the ceremony, extract the equipment.
The second one is to use the HSM for signature.
Again, DNI.
The second act doesn't encrypt.
We sign the key and then the key signs the zones and stuff.
So, and then the third act is basically we return all materials, you know, all the...
After we've assembled it, we perform the key ceremony, we return the materials.
And we, in the end, we generated a signed key response.
This is what we give VeriSign, our root zone partner, so that they can publish it to the
DNS in the next quarter.
So, this ceremony is highly audited.
Every trace, we try to maintain chain of custody.
You can actually trace each ceremony on the Ayano website from back in 2010 that you
can see each tamper evident bags that we used and how we opened it and stuff like that.
It is lengthy, three hours.
It takes three hours.
And then, oh shoot, what time is it?
And so, it's actually boring.
People compare it with...
It's just the blacklist redemption earlier just showed it pretty interesting, but it's not.
Because it's three hours.
It's like people compared it watching a paint dry.
And it's actually, I think it's actually an insult to the paint, to be honest with you.
So, all in all, I don't know if you guys were counting, there are at least 12 people
required to perform a key ceremony, a typical key ceremony, minimum of 12, plus the one
that we need to notify to, you know, disable them.
Notifications on the monitoring side.
Again, segregation of duties.
This is to minimize collusion.
So, where is this key management facility?
Anyone know?
I mean, raise of hands.
No?
Okay.
It's in U.S.
Yes, that is correct.
And it is not a secret.
We have two locations, one in Virginia, the other one is in El Segundo.
Every quarter, we alternate both facilities to perform it, every key ceremony.
And so, you know, that right there, I just clicked it.
So, what happens if, five minutes, okay.
So, what happens if both facilities are inoperable?
Then, this is where, you know, another set of TCRs comes along.
Who doesn't know Dan Kaminsky, basically?
He's one of our TCRs, Recovery Key Shareholders.
Unlike other crypto officers, you know, they gather around as well to, along with critical
materials, to help reconstruct the TCRs.
To help reconstruct the KSK, the new key, the private key, and, you know, be able to
use it.
So, all in all, we have 21 TCRs.
I'm trying to rush.
Pardon me.
And then, they are experts in the DNS industry and highly critical.
And actually, we want that because we want to be criticized.
We show, I mean, we do what we say we do and then they point out our mistakes and stuff
like that.
We accept it.
We try to improve.
We discuss with them.
And how can we improve the process?
And, you know, we have 21 TCRs.
And on top of that, we also hired external auditors to help us review our internal control,
security for availability and integrity.
So, you guys may wonder why such a high security, so public, right?
Why am I doing this?
I mean, why am I showing these pictures to you guys?
It's because mostly it's behind closed doors.
Again, this is not a paid service, unlike, you know, the CAs and other folks.
That perform this.
And trust involves, trust, like most things on the internet, it's like adoption involves
trust.
And so, we try to set a high standard because KSK is very top crypto on DNSSEC.
And part of ICANN's mandate is to promote transparency and accountability.
Make sure we do what we say we do.
So, can it survive a tank or a mission impossible?
Can it survive a tank or a mission impossible attack by Tom Cruise?
No, definitely not.
Because, I mean, that's why we implemented defense in depth to delay the attacker and
us allowing us to detect the compromise.
And we activate certain protocols to respond to it.
This is also why we're doing the KSK rollover to check, you know, if we can handle it in
the process.
So, yeah, pictures.
That's Richard Lam looking at the KeyMatch software.
This is at the end of the key ceremony.
And this one, he's holding a tamper event bag, one of our TCRs, Olaf Kolkman.
I mean, this is one of them.
We've used a different model in the past that we did replace because, I mean, the tamper
village, right?
I mean, did tamper it.
So, it's like, oh, shit, we got to change it already.
Yeah.
And then led by, yeah, those folks right there.
So, yeah.
Yeah.
So, I mean, with that, I thank you.
Thank you to everyone's attention for, you know, for staying.
And I'm glad you guys are here.
And please feel free to reach out.
LinkedIn, my LinkedIn, ICANN's LinkedIn, my Twitter.
I just created my Twitter.
And those are the links that should be helpful.
And by the way, I mean, if you guys are interested and known in your community, I would suggest
to apply because we're replacing, not replacing.
I mean, we're looking for successors for the TCRs.
You know, they've been in there.
They're probably bored.
I mean, sitting there for like three, four hours a day or every quarter.
So, thank you very much.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.