WEBVTT 00:00.000 --> 00:01.300 Uh, good morning everyone. 00:01.300 --> 00:15.180 So as Larry just mentioned, today we're gonna talk about an ICS specific talk and we will discuss, uh, the specific use of some Modbus function by, uh, Schneider in order to perform some, uh, bad actions on PLC. 00:15.240 --> 00:18.260 Just a quick introduction, this is nothing new. 00:18.260 --> 00:27.100 Uh, everything that I'm gonna mention today was discovered, uh, maybe 10 years ago, mostly by, uh, reverse ICS from Digital Bond at the time. 00:27.100 --> 00:37.700 However, um, I will try to show how it is still relevant even in newer PLCs and, uh, also how we can use that to perform a new kind of attack. 00:39.020 --> 00:44.700 So just a few words about me, my name is Arnaud Soulier, I'm French as you can probably hear. 00:44.700 --> 00:48.320 Um, I mostly do pen tests, a bit of research and development. 00:48.320 --> 00:51.620 I'm a manager at WaveStone, that doesn't mean I manage anyone. 00:51.660 --> 01:06.320 Um, I really, really love ICS, really fun to play with and I've given a lot of, um, ICS workshop where I teach people how to perform, uh, entry level pen testing on ICS at, uh, Black Hat Europe, Brucon, Defcon, besides Las Vegas. 01:06.480 --> 01:13.460 And, um, I also like other things like Active Directory security and other stuff I'm not gonna talk about today. 01:14.940 --> 01:23.120 So I'm not sure that everyone is familiar with ICS here so I'm just gonna try to give a crash course in 1 minute or something like that. 01:23.440 --> 01:26.380 So ICS mean industrial control systems. 01:26.380 --> 01:33.560 Those are the system in charge of, uh, let's say managing all the automation at plants and factories in all kind of sector. 01:33.560 --> 01:42.140 If we take a look at this diagram you will see that an ICS is composed, um, on the far right side of sensors and actuators. 01:42.140 --> 01:48.580 A sensors will give you an information, for example a switch will tell you if it's, uh, switched on and off. 01:48.580 --> 01:51.660 And, uh, one actuators will perform an action. 01:51.660 --> 01:55.020 For example, if you take the simplest example, it's a light bulb. 01:55.020 --> 01:57.260 You see that it emits light or not. 01:57.560 --> 02:00.500 Those physical device, they are managed by PLCs. 02:00.500 --> 02:02.600 That's the device we're gonna talk about today. 02:02.600 --> 02:05.220 That stands for programmable logic controllers. 02:05.220 --> 02:10.100 And mostly it's an embedded computer with electrical inputs and outputs. 02:10.100 --> 02:13.700 That's the main difference between a standard computer and a PLC. 02:13.860 --> 02:22.980 Those PLCs are then managed by, uh, some classical IT stuff like, uh, Windows servers and workstation running what we will call today a SCADA software. 02:22.980 --> 02:27.160 I'm not digging into the detail of SCADA versus DCS and stuff like that. 02:27.160 --> 02:29.160 Today we're gonna call that SCADA. 02:29.180 --> 02:36.940 And somehow this is connected to the corporate network to get some information or send some, uh, batch, uh, orders. 02:39.370 --> 02:42.290 Okay, so there are a lot of ICS protocols. 02:42.290 --> 02:44.910 Today we're gonna talk about, uh, Modbus. 02:45.010 --> 02:55.590 It's one of the most widely used I think, uh, discovered, um, invented in 1979 by a company that was at the time called Modicon and later bought by Schneider Electric. 02:55.790 --> 03:01.730 Um, it was designed to work over serial lines, um, so RS, uh, 485 mostly. 03:01.890 --> 03:05.190 There are two versions of the protocol, the binary and the ASCII. 03:05.190 --> 03:11.030 And if you take a look at a frame format, you will see that it's composed of the address of the PLC. 03:11.590 --> 03:23.770 Then what is called the PDU, the protocol data unit with one function code and the data and, uh, some kind of cyclic or linear, um, redundancy check to make sure that we have data integrity. 03:24.110 --> 03:26.230 So what do I talk about the frame format? 03:26.230 --> 03:30.410 Just to show you that, uh, there is no security built into the protocol. 03:30.410 --> 03:32.590 There is no encryption, there is no authentication. 03:32.830 --> 03:36.730 So that was not really a problem when we were using that over serial lines. 03:36.790 --> 03:40.950 However, later they tried to use Modbus over TCP. 03:41.290 --> 03:48.370 So they just removed the integrity checks because that's handled by, uh, the, uh, TCP, uh, layer. 03:48.590 --> 03:54.750 And, uh, a Modbus TCP frame format also has the PDU, so the function code and the data. 03:54.810 --> 04:04.510 And as a transaction identifier, that's, uh, let's say, um, a random number that is used to make sure that, uh, the request and the response match. 04:04.970 --> 04:09.790 A protocol identifier which is usually, uh, has the value 1, not really useful. 04:09.790 --> 04:12.530 The length of the packet and the unit identifier. 04:12.530 --> 04:18.570 Most of the time the unit identifier is set to 1 because we already have the IP address to identify which PLC we talk to. 04:18.570 --> 04:20.770 So we do not need to use this, uh, field. 04:21.510 --> 04:25.010 Mostly Modbus is used to perform read and write actions. 04:25.010 --> 04:28.430 So here you have the most function, uh, most common function code. 04:28.490 --> 04:31.590 Um, it's mostly used to read some information. 04:31.590 --> 04:35.330 A coil which is 1 byte or, um, a register that is 8 byte. 04:35.470 --> 04:41.150 As you can see, when Modbus was transferred to TCP, they did not added, uh, any kind of security. 04:41.150 --> 04:42.870 So still no security. 04:42.910 --> 04:45.050 So this is a protocol that's used for ICS. 04:45.050 --> 04:47.170 There is no authentication, no encryption. 04:48.810 --> 04:51.050 You can perform other kind of actions. 04:51.050 --> 04:57.750 For example, there are some basic diagnostic functions built in like the, um, function read device information. 04:57.790 --> 05:05.910 Um, that's a screenshot of, um, this kind of, uh, request to this PLC which is a Schneider M340. 05:06.050 --> 05:13.050 As you can see, we can, uh, know the fact that it's a Schneider Electric PLC and also get the detailed hardware information. 05:13.050 --> 05:14.930 So BMX P34. 05:15.330 --> 05:16.610 So that's interesting. 05:16.610 --> 05:22.770 But there are other kind of Modbus function codes that are used and not part of the standard. 05:23.470 --> 05:25.950 So we will focus on the Schneider PLC. 05:25.950 --> 05:30.210 So, uh, I do not have knowledge of all the PLCs that are produced by Schneider. 05:30.210 --> 05:34.710 However, I've encoded, uh, several, uh, kind of products. 05:34.710 --> 05:40.530 The first one and the, the oldest are the Quantum 1, then the Premium, then this one, the M340. 05:40.530 --> 05:47.210 And then we have newer, newer models, the TM221 or 241 and the M580. 05:47.330 --> 05:54.370 So those PLCs, they are programmed, uh, by engineers using a specific Schneider software which is called Unity Pro. 05:54.730 --> 06:03.990 And, um, what we're gonna see is that Unity Pro is actually relying on some specific Modbus function code to discuss with the PLC and to program it. 06:04.650 --> 06:05.910 So how do we do that? 06:05.910 --> 06:06.930 It's quite simple. 06:07.010 --> 06:13.410 You install a demo PLC, you install Unity Pro, you launch Wireshark and you take a look at the packet dump. 06:13.650 --> 06:19.010 So as you can see, here's a packet dump when I log in to a, to a PLC and I upload a new program. 06:19.010 --> 06:20.870 It runs on top of Modbus TCP. 06:21.110 --> 06:22.790 Uh, the function code is 90. 06:22.790 --> 06:25.070 It's already part of the Wireshark de-sector. 06:25.070 --> 06:29.750 So as mentioned, uh, the use of Modbus function code 90 is not something new. 06:29.750 --> 06:31.250 It has been known for years. 06:31.310 --> 06:42.370 And when I first started working on it, uh, I had a chat with, um, I think it's Alex Lagut, a Wireshark developer in France, and he was kind enough to add this to the Wireshark Modbus TCP de-sector. 06:42.370 --> 06:50.910 So now if you take a look at, um, Modbus traffic, you will be able to know when there is, uh, somebody performing admin actions on a Schneider PLC. 06:53.190 --> 07:01.090 Um, something else that's really important, I mentioned that in the introduction, uh, all of this is already known. 07:01.090 --> 07:06.170 The fact that you can upload a road program to a PLC is known, uh, since at least 2012. 07:06.170 --> 07:08.670 It was done by, uh, reverse ICS. 07:08.930 --> 07:29.170 Um, so what I did was during a, an assessment, I think it was maybe 5 years ago, I was, uh, facing a Schneider PLC so I take a deep look at what, um, uh, Red did and what I try to do is try to build on that to add additional features or to make the, the Metasploit modules more reliable. 07:30.290 --> 07:39.490 Okay, so now we, we see that using Modbus function called 90 we can do everything that can be done with Unity Pro, the programming software. 07:39.490 --> 07:41.970 So what kind of evil things can we do? 07:42.230 --> 07:49.390 First thing, not really offensive, is to gather some information about the, the PLC and the project and I'm gonna try to demo that. 07:49.990 --> 08:02.050 So here on my setup, just to, to be clear, I have a Schneider PLC M340 and this is my laptop that will host both the attacking VM and the legitimate, uh, HMI workstation. 08:35.850 --> 08:41.950 Well, actually I did not plan on how I was going to type and, uh, have the mic at the same time. 08:42.570 --> 08:43.670 Thanks a lot. 08:43.690 --> 08:52.470 Okay, so the idea is that I'm using a, a new Metasploit module that I just developed this week and, uh, I'm gonna try to see what kind of information we can gather from, uh, the PLC. 09:01.500 --> 09:03.200 And hopefully it will work. 09:03.200 --> 09:03.700 Yes. 09:03.700 --> 09:10.640 So as you can see, um, I'm able to get the same information as, uh, using the Modbus function code, uh, 43. 09:10.660 --> 09:14.140 So the BMX is the hardware CPU of the PLC. 09:14.380 --> 09:17.480 That's the name of the project that's on the, the PLC. 09:17.560 --> 09:29.180 And from time to time I'm also able to get the host name running the, the, the name of the workstation running this programming software, the version of, uh, the Unity software and the comments in this project. 09:29.180 --> 09:30.080 I think there are no comments. 09:30.080 --> 09:31.800 That's why we are, do not have anything here. 09:33.160 --> 09:34.620 Uh, okay. 09:38.600 --> 09:40.900 So that was the, the, the first thing. 09:40.980 --> 09:43.760 Uh, next we can start and stop the PLC. 09:43.760 --> 09:49.540 So, uh, that's, does not mean we are gonna have to shut it on or off, but actually the PLC will stay on. 09:49.540 --> 09:53.160 We can still perform admin action, but it will not execute the program. 09:53.160 --> 09:54.780 That's basically what start sub did. 09:54.800 --> 09:56.540 I'm not gonna demo that today. 09:56.540 --> 09:56.940 Why? 09:56.940 --> 09:58.020 It's quite simple. 09:58.040 --> 09:59.800 Uh, there is a module in Metasploit. 09:59.900 --> 10:00.800 It works. 10:01.020 --> 10:05.660 It works greatly when you want to stop the PLC, but it does not work so well when you want to start it again. 10:05.660 --> 10:10.460 You actually have to unplug the electrical, uh, plug of the PLC and put it back again. 10:10.520 --> 10:17.520 So in order to, let's say, do not waste too much time today, I'm not gonna demo that, but it works quite well starting and stopping the PLC. 10:18.100 --> 10:21.680 Uh, another thing that I want to show you is how to download the ladder logic. 10:21.680 --> 10:26.680 What I call ladder logic is actually the, the program that the PLC is executing. 10:28.340 --> 10:36.460 So that is also something that Red had worked on, but during my assessment a few years back, I discovered that it was not working correctly. 10:36.460 --> 10:36.920 Why? 10:36.920 --> 10:38.060 It's quite simple. 10:38.060 --> 10:42.680 Um, I think he used a demo, uh, program, so really small in size. 10:42.680 --> 10:48.500 So he, there was a misconfiguration with the, the size of a counter in the specific Schneider protocol. 11:12.080 --> 11:18.500 Okay, so here you can see that I'm gonna attempt to download the program and to store it at this, uh, location. 11:25.310 --> 11:28.830 Okay, so there are a few Modbus requests that are sent to the PLC. 11:30.170 --> 11:34.150 The Ethernet card is flashing and in a few seconds we should have the program. 11:34.150 --> 11:40.270 It's a very simple program, just, um, managing a traffic light, so it's quite, uh, it's quite fast. 11:43.670 --> 11:45.690 Okay , so here I have my file. 11:45.710 --> 11:49.730 So now what I'm gonna do, I want to make sure that the file that I downloaded is the real one. 11:49.810 --> 11:53.790 So I'm gonna switch to the other VM, which is a, uh, Windows one. 11:54.950 --> 11:57.390 Uh, I'm gonna connect to the PLC. 11:57.830 --> 11:59.470 Oh yeah, it's not working. 12:00.590 --> 12:01.890 Yes, it works. 12:02.230 --> 12:07.070 Uh, I'm gonna download the project, uh, from the PLC to my PC. 12:22.750 --> 12:29.070 Okay, so now I have, I have on my PC the, the same program as the one running on the PLC using the legitimate software. 12:29.070 --> 12:31.630 I'm gonna save that as an archive on my desktop. 12:36.840 --> 12:37.720 Okay. 12:38.220 --> 12:42.560 If I take a look at the desktop, I'm gonna try to find the file. 12:42.700 --> 12:43.960 Okay, it's here. 12:44.860 --> 12:48.340 I just have to rename, rename it because it's actually a zip file. 12:50.600 --> 12:55.300 And if you take a look inside the zip file, you see that there's a hidden folder called binappli. 12:55.600 --> 13:03.940 And in this file we have, uh, uh, in this folder we have the station.apx file, which, uh, actually the one, uh, that has the, the PLC ladder logic. 13:03.940 --> 13:08.520 So I'm copying this file to, um, uh, to a share to the other VM. 13:08.540 --> 13:10.380 Okay, I'm replacing the file. 13:11.480 --> 13:29.400 And if I go back here on my Kali Linux machine, uh, okay, so I'm actually doing a binary diff between the file I just downloaded and the one that I just copied from the legitimate software. 13:30.040 --> 13:33.060 And as you can see, the files are identical. 13:33.120 --> 13:34.700 So the module works. 13:34.700 --> 13:37.280 It's possible to download the ladder logic. 13:37.640 --> 13:39.820 Uh, it should be possible to upload it as well. 13:39.820 --> 13:43.480 However, I have the same kind of issue with the counter and the size of the counter. 13:43.480 --> 13:49.000 So at the moment, the module in Metasploit, uh, or the one that I developed does not work correctly. 13:56.710 --> 13:59.830 Okay, so those were the thing that already existed. 13:59.830 --> 14:04.190 But since this is Defcon, I wanted to, to have something, uh, to have something new. 14:04.510 --> 14:09.930 Uh, so one feature that was really interesting to me was the, what we call forcing the outputs. 14:09.930 --> 14:12.970 Uh, I don't know if you have already worked on the PLC. 14:12.970 --> 14:25.990 Forcing the outputs is used during the development phase, uh, that allows you to bypass the control, uh, the, the ladder logic of the PLC and directly set the outputs to on or off or any kind of, uh, arbitrary value. 14:25.990 --> 14:31.990 Um, and that helps you debugging, uh, especially when working with, uh, other entities. 14:32.110 --> 14:41.810 So that's interesting why the way PLCs are developed, most of the time, um, on the SCADA HMI, you do not read the values of the outputs. 14:41.810 --> 14:45.710 You read the values of some intermediary, uh, variables. 14:45.710 --> 14:50.330 So for example, if I go back on my, um, Windows workstation. 14:55.420 --> 14:58.140 So here I'm gonna launch the, the SCADA software. 15:06.580 --> 15:10.040 Okay, so basically this controls the, the, um, the PLC. 15:10.040 --> 15:12.220 As you can see, I can switch the lights on and off. 15:13.300 --> 15:20.900 The way it works is that I'm not directly reading the outputs because that's not a feature , uh, that this, uh, specific software has. 15:20.960 --> 15:25.200 What I'm doing is actually, if I take a look at the code, 15:30.120 --> 15:32.220 let me zoom on that. 15:36.880 --> 15:45.180 So as you can see here, I have 3, uh, variables, red, green, and orange, that will set the outputs to, uh, 1 or 0. 15:45.180 --> 15:45.980 That's the way it works. 15:45.980 --> 15:52.000 So I have modbus values that are, uh, um, managing the values of the outputs. 15:52.000 --> 15:58.880 From what I've been able to discuss with, uh, people, engineers working in automation, most of the case that's how it works in ICS. 15:58.880 --> 16:01.220 You never use directly, uh, the outputs. 16:01.220 --> 16:11.760 You use some kind of intermediary variables because in real life, uh, you will use some complex function block and it's not as simple as just, uh, uh, 1, um, 1 switch. 16:12.060 --> 16:19.520 Okay, so that's interesting because what happens if I want to directly modify the, the outputs, uh, what will happen on the HMI screen? 16:19.520 --> 16:20.480 Probably nothing. 16:20.480 --> 16:22.500 So that's what I'm gonna demo here. 16:23.120 --> 16:27.620 Uh, let me see, okay, I go back to Kelly. 16:29.720 --> 16:32.160 So here I'm just gonna use the other module. 16:32.160 --> 16:46.300 I will launch, uh, a specific action that will set, uh, every output value to 0 then 1 and, um, that for all the 8 outputs that I have on this, uh, specific, um, PLC. 16:46.300 --> 16:52.160 So the idea is that I should be able to modify the real process without the operator noticing anything on the screen. 16:52.160 --> 16:53.900 So that's what I'm gonna try to do. 17:25.000 --> 17:29.120 Okay, so the module is running so at some point we should see the light changing. 17:29.120 --> 17:33.760 It should not be, uh, part of the, the HMI screen. 17:33.940 --> 17:35.580 Let's wait a few seconds. 17:39.260 --> 17:39.860 Yes. 17:39.860 --> 17:42.760 So as you can see I'm switching the, the first output to 1. 17:43.160 --> 17:45.160 But that's not displayed on the screen. 17:45.360 --> 17:49.080 Then I'm gonna do the orange one, set to 1 then 0. 17:50.120 --> 17:52.500 But it's gonna stay orange on the screen. 17:59.100 --> 18:02.420 There's a 5 second delay that, that may be a bit much. 18:02.680 --> 18:04.980 And the light, the last one will be the green one. 18:05.520 --> 18:06.820 No, the orange again. 18:10.140 --> 18:10.900 Okay. 18:11.520 --> 18:19.620 So as you can see I was able to barely influence the physical process without having any kind of information displayed back to the, uh, to the operator. 18:26.460 --> 18:28.100 Okay, so that's interesting. 18:28.100 --> 18:32.840 Uh, other topics I'd like to work on in the future is the ability to hot patch the PLC. 18:32.840 --> 18:37.640 Because actually when you program the PLC you have to stop it, upload the program and start it again. 18:37.640 --> 18:41.340 So in the physical process anyone will notice that. 18:41.340 --> 18:44.040 However, using Unity 4 you can also hot patch. 18:44.040 --> 18:48.420 That means you can perform some small modification of the ladder logic without having to stop the PLC. 18:48.420 --> 18:50.100 So that's really interesting. 18:50.100 --> 18:52.620 And I'd like to have a Metasploit module that does the same. 18:53.040 --> 18:59.280 Uh, for the record I also have another module in the works that does not force the output's value but the register's value. 18:59.280 --> 19:04.700 So you can actually modify any action inside the ladder logic, uh, as you wish. 19:07.100 --> 19:12.820 Okay, so that was true for the premium, the quantum and the M340 PLCs. 19:12.820 --> 19:14.140 Uh, what about the new ones? 19:14.140 --> 19:19.420 So in 2015 I bought the, the new, uh, released TM221. 19:19.420 --> 19:31.480 So those are entry level PLCs and what I've discovered is that even if they are not programmed by Unity Pro but another soft, software called SoMachineBasic, they actually still use the same function code. 19:31.480 --> 19:43.620 So even the PLCs released 2 years ago, even if we know that there was no authentication on admin actions since, since, uh, almost 10 years, uh, the new PLCs still have the same problem. 19:43.620 --> 19:47.200 Uh, however, the, the exploits, they do not work out of the box. 19:47.200 --> 19:50.800 You actually have to perform some kind of modification, change some offsets. 19:50.800 --> 19:54.300 So it's vulnerable but you cannot prove it at the moment. 19:54.360 --> 20:06.640 Uh, one of my colleague, Alexandrine, the, she already had, uh, ported some modification to the Metasploit module so you can now start and stop those device, uh, without any kind of, uh, authentication directly from Metasploit. 20:07.000 --> 20:09.320 So that was, uh, 3 years ago. 20:09.360 --> 20:16.460 Um, I recently learned that the new high end, uh, M580 PLC adds IPSec authentication. 20:16.460 --> 20:19.140 So between the engineering station and the PLC. 20:19.140 --> 20:20.080 So that's a good thing. 20:20.080 --> 20:26.080 They actually use IPSec not for encryption but only the, uh, uh, authentication header part. 20:26.080 --> 20:32.540 So that allows you to make sure that, uh, if you want to program the PLC, you have to know the pre-shared key. 20:32.540 --> 20:33.680 So that's a good thing. 20:33.680 --> 20:35.300 However, that's quite new. 20:35.400 --> 20:41.220 Uh, it's the high end PLC so the, uh, CPU is, uh, at least, uh, I think $4,000. 20:41.220 --> 20:44.120 So at the moment I haven't, do not have the money to have that in my lab. 20:44.120 --> 20:45.460 Uh, so I cannot vouch for it. 20:45.460 --> 20:49.420 But that's the good idea, that's a good idea and that's the way things should work. 20:49.760 --> 20:52.160 So we can hope that in the future it will work. 20:52.400 --> 20:59.280 However, this is something quite new and you will probably not see that in plants and factory for, uh, at least 5 to 10 years. 21:02.490 --> 21:04.950 Okay, so what do we do now? 21:05.050 --> 21:11.570 Um, is it possible to, let's say, configure the PLC in a way that allows you to, uh, defeat those kind of attacks? 21:11.570 --> 21:13.810 To the extent of my knowledge, no. 21:13.990 --> 21:18.030 Uh, actually there are very few things you can do on a PLC. 21:18.050 --> 21:31.290 Uh, I think that on some Schneider PLCs you can, there is some kind of integrated firewall but it works not like a firewall because you can actually send a modbus- it's at the application layer, let's say, not at the network layer. 21:31.290 --> 21:34.650 But you could use that to prevent, uh, unauthorized action. 21:35.450 --> 21:39.190 Using newer PLC will work only if you buy the light, the latest one. 21:39.190 --> 21:45.670 So it might also be difficult to implement in, uh, I would say in, uh, existing or legacy environment. 21:46.070 --> 21:49.230 And of course what you can do is perform network security monitoring. 21:49.230 --> 21:51.550 As mentioned, those attacks are not new. 21:51.550 --> 21:54.610 Uh, the exploits are new but the vulnerability is known for a long time. 21:54.610 --> 21:57.390 So there are signatures for this modbus function code. 21:57.390 --> 22:03.950 So if you're using, uh, any kind of network security monitoring in your ICS, you will be able to detect any kind of attack. 22:04.010 --> 22:09.970 I would say that you should log anytime, uh, an engineering station logs to a PLC to perform admin action. 22:09.970 --> 22:18.190 And of course if you have an unknown workstation doing modbus, uh, 90 traffic to a PLC , that should raise a really, really red alert. 22:19.810 --> 22:32.470 Okay, so to sum things up, uh, most China PLCs, uh, that you will find in, uh, ICS, in, uh, assessment are vulnerable for, uh, 10 years to this unauthorized access vulnerability. 22:32.570 --> 22:42.930 Uh, attackers can leverage that to do whatever the hell they want with the PLC, including, uh, forcing directly the outputs which might allow them to perform some kind of stealthy attacks on your process. 22:42.990 --> 22:44.170 So what can you do? 22:44.190 --> 22:47.130 Um, I would say at the moment you have to deal with it. 22:50.560 --> 22:55.820 Okay, so before I take any question, I'd like to say that everything is at this GitHub address at the moment. 22:55.820 --> 23:10.820 I really hope to be able to clean up the code and, uh, do a pull request to Metasploit, but they're quite picky about code quality and at the moment it's, uh, it's pretty shitty so, uh, in a few month, uh, I hope to be able to do a pull request to put that directly into Metasploit. 23:10.820 --> 23:17.940 Uh, but you can find that today on GitHub as well as the slides and a few videos of me, uh, pentesting PLCs. 23:18.260 --> 23:20.280 So do you have, uh, any questions? 23:26.590 --> 23:29.590 Also, I'd be happy to play with other kind of PLCs. 23:29.590 --> 23:35.730 If you have, for example, Schneider PLC that I do not have, it would be easier for me to try to understand the protocol. 23:35.730 --> 23:41.470 So if you have, uh, uh, M580 or TM241, I'd be interested in testing that. 23:41.470 --> 23:45.350 Or you can also download the modules, test on your own and give me some feedback on GitHub. 23:45.350 --> 23:46.530 I would love that. 23:49.670 --> 23:53.190 Okay, so if there are no question, thanks everyone. 23:53.190 --> 23:57.710 And, uh, I'll be around the ICS village, uh, a lot, I think during DEF CON. 23:57.710 --> 24:04.990 And if you are interested into ICS, of course, you just go, uh, across the hall and you will find a lot of PLCs to play with.