1 00:00:00,620 --> 00:00:07,100 Thanks for coming in, everybody. This is Ambassador Doug Lute, the most recent U.S. Ambassador 2 00:00:07,100 --> 00:00:13,460 to NATO. He would have loved to attend, but I think slipped a disc in his back and couldn't 3 00:00:13,460 --> 00:00:19,320 get on the plane, so he's talking to us from his home in Washington. So without further 4 00:00:19,320 --> 00:00:21,740 ado, I will put the microphone down to him. 5 00:00:24,580 --> 00:00:32,600 Okay. How does it sound now? Yeah, we're good. Okay, we should probably stop right 6 00:00:32,600 --> 00:00:41,100 here and consider this a success. Look, thanks, first of all, for gathering today. I have 7 00:00:41,100 --> 00:00:46,500 to apologize. I'm in Arlington, Virginia. I could not make the trip to DEFCON this year, 8 00:00:46,620 --> 00:00:51,720 although I was very much looking forward to it. So this has to pass for a moment. 9 00:00:51,740 --> 00:00:57,660 This is my opportunity to share some time with you. Jake mentioned that I most recently 10 00:00:57,660 --> 00:01:04,980 served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO in Brussels for the last three and a half years, but actually 11 00:01:04,980 --> 00:01:11,280 I've spent my entire adult life in the national security arena. I served in Europe as an Army 12 00:01:11,280 --> 00:01:18,360 officer during the Cold War, in the Balkans in the mid-1990s, in the Middle East and 13 00:01:18,360 --> 00:01:20,880 South Asia since 9-11. 14 00:01:21,740 --> 00:01:26,280 I've served in the Pentagon, in the White House, and most recently at NATO headquarters. 15 00:01:26,560 --> 00:01:34,420 In short, I've studied national security issues my entire life, beginning at West Point, through 16 00:01:34,420 --> 00:01:39,540 my Army career, my time at the White House, and with a degree at Harvard. So you might 17 00:01:39,540 --> 00:01:47,140 ask, why am I piped into DEFCON? What am I doing talking to you, this audience of cybersecurity 18 00:01:47,140 --> 00:01:48,180 experts? 19 00:01:49,420 --> 00:01:51,080 I have really just won. 20 00:01:51,740 --> 00:01:59,320 Here is my simple main point. Last year's attacks on the American voting process are 21 00:01:59,320 --> 00:02:09,060 as serious a threat to our democracy as any I have seen in over 40 years. The attacks 22 00:02:09,060 --> 00:02:17,560 last year may prove to be more serious than any physical attack at the core of our nation. 23 00:02:18,620 --> 00:02:21,720 Physical attacks, obviously, increase the level of security. In fact, security attacks 24 00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:26,600 occur loss of life, damage to materiel, and those losses are tragic. 25 00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:31,860 But ultimately, America is a rich, strong country. 26 00:02:32,000 --> 00:02:34,300 We can recover from those attacks. 27 00:02:34,680 --> 00:02:35,380 We're resilient. 28 00:02:36,960 --> 00:02:43,380 However, if we were to lose confidence in the security of our voting process, 29 00:02:44,200 --> 00:02:49,660 the voting process, this most fundamental link between the American citizen 30 00:02:49,660 --> 00:02:54,680 and his and her government, if we lost confidence in that, 31 00:02:55,620 --> 00:02:58,080 the damage could be much more severe. 32 00:02:58,880 --> 00:03:02,640 In short, in my view, as a national security guy, 33 00:03:03,540 --> 00:03:07,120 this is a serious national security issue. 34 00:03:08,220 --> 00:03:14,100 Now, my remarks this afternoon are not about what happened last year. 35 00:03:14,180 --> 00:03:16,980 I think you've heard other speakers talk about that. 36 00:03:17,020 --> 00:03:18,200 You've read about this. 37 00:03:18,200 --> 00:03:23,860 And I frankly think that the forensics on last year's Russian attacks 38 00:03:23,860 --> 00:03:29,660 will come fully to light by way of the several investigations that are currently underway. 39 00:03:29,900 --> 00:03:34,900 And I think, frankly, we should have confidence that the investigations in the Senate 40 00:03:34,900 --> 00:03:38,860 and with the special counsel will bring out the facts. 41 00:03:39,460 --> 00:03:44,640 But some things are already clear while these investigations are underway. 42 00:03:44,940 --> 00:03:48,180 First of all, Russia tried to infiltrate. 43 00:03:48,200 --> 00:03:51,220 They tried to influence the election outcome in favor of one candidate. 44 00:03:52,020 --> 00:03:57,840 And second, at a very minimum, Putin tried to discredit the process. 45 00:03:58,220 --> 00:04:05,680 He tried to discredit the election outcome by casting doubt on its legitimacy, on its credibility. 46 00:04:06,900 --> 00:04:08,900 So why is this so serious? 47 00:04:09,700 --> 00:04:11,240 Why should we act now? 48 00:04:11,860 --> 00:04:14,140 I've got essentially five points. 49 00:04:15,060 --> 00:04:17,240 And let me run through these five. 50 00:04:17,380 --> 00:04:18,180 And then I hope you understand. 51 00:04:18,200 --> 00:04:19,700 I hope we have a bit of time for questions. 52 00:04:20,080 --> 00:04:23,940 So first of all, this is a serious national security issue 53 00:04:23,940 --> 00:04:32,780 because Putin has demonstrated successfully that he can use cyber tools against the U.S. election process. 54 00:04:33,760 --> 00:04:35,780 This is not academic theory. 55 00:04:36,360 --> 00:04:38,020 This is not hypothetical. 56 00:04:38,560 --> 00:04:39,920 It is real. 57 00:04:40,460 --> 00:04:43,120 He influenced our election process. 58 00:04:43,960 --> 00:04:46,660 He cast doubt on our democracy. 59 00:04:46,660 --> 00:04:52,900 And he has gridlocked Washington, D.C. at a very low cost to Russia. 60 00:04:53,960 --> 00:04:56,900 Now, in military terms, if you go to the military dictionary, 61 00:04:57,160 --> 00:05:02,320 there's actually a very clear definition of what constitutes a threat. 62 00:05:02,940 --> 00:05:06,580 And what that definition says is that a threat has two components. 63 00:05:07,400 --> 00:05:11,540 There must be a capability and there must be intent. 64 00:05:11,940 --> 00:05:15,200 So a threat is capability plus intent. 65 00:05:15,200 --> 00:05:22,520 And Russia's attack last year meets very clearly that dictionary definition. 66 00:05:22,960 --> 00:05:25,260 So this is a proven credible threat. 67 00:05:25,400 --> 00:05:28,800 And that's the first reason that we have to take this seriously. 68 00:05:29,140 --> 00:05:36,300 Second, this is a national security issue because Russia is not going away. 69 00:05:36,900 --> 00:05:42,160 Putin himself can be in office until 2029. 70 00:05:43,820 --> 00:05:44,580 2029. 71 00:05:45,300 --> 00:05:58,300 Even when he is replaced someday, any Russian successor leader would likely use similar tactics to inflame Russian nationalism, 72 00:05:58,560 --> 00:06:05,860 that is, to cause Russians to rally around the flag and to weaken international opponents, 73 00:06:06,100 --> 00:06:08,760 especially if they could do it at such low cost. 74 00:06:09,320 --> 00:06:10,940 Why would Russia do this? 75 00:06:12,000 --> 00:06:13,560 What are Putin's objectives? 76 00:06:13,560 --> 00:06:15,160 What's he actually up to? 77 00:06:15,420 --> 00:06:18,100 I want to get into this in a bit of detail here. 78 00:06:18,160 --> 00:06:19,980 So let me spend a couple minutes on this question. 79 00:06:20,140 --> 00:06:21,080 What is Putin up to? 80 00:06:22,160 --> 00:06:29,960 Very simply, the Russian experts I know and have worked with believe that he has one overriding objective, 81 00:06:30,560 --> 00:06:35,140 and that is simply to stay in power atop the Russian state. 82 00:06:36,060 --> 00:06:40,700 But he knows that in the long run, he has a very weak hand. 83 00:06:40,700 --> 00:06:45,160 Russia is a state in steady decline. 84 00:06:46,100 --> 00:06:47,460 Decline economically. 85 00:06:47,700 --> 00:06:51,120 It's a single resource economy, oil and gas. 86 00:06:51,240 --> 00:06:54,380 It produces nothing else that anybody else wants to buy. 87 00:06:54,760 --> 00:07:04,140 It's in decline by way of all health indicators, by way of demographics, by way of all political social indicators. 88 00:07:04,480 --> 00:07:06,800 Russia is a state in decline. 89 00:07:07,080 --> 00:07:10,680 So in order to stay in control of such a state, 90 00:07:10,680 --> 00:07:16,260 Putin centralizes power very narrowly around himself, 91 00:07:16,580 --> 00:07:19,080 and he plays to a few key supporters, 92 00:07:19,340 --> 00:07:23,120 the Russian military, the intelligence services, 93 00:07:23,360 --> 00:07:27,880 and a reasonably small set of Russian oligarchs, the very rich. 94 00:07:28,660 --> 00:07:32,000 Meanwhile, he suppresses all internal opposition. 95 00:07:32,460 --> 00:07:37,240 He inflames Russian nationalism, Russian pride, 96 00:07:37,600 --> 00:07:39,760 the Russian sense of greatness, 97 00:07:40,680 --> 00:07:47,120 the Russian sense of being victimized over the last 25 years after the fall of the Soviet Union. 98 00:07:48,380 --> 00:07:52,240 If you are Putin and you want to stay in power, 99 00:07:52,480 --> 00:07:54,600 you eliminate internal opposition, 100 00:07:55,420 --> 00:07:58,480 and if you don't have a real external enemy, 101 00:07:58,720 --> 00:07:59,980 you create one. 102 00:08:00,300 --> 00:08:02,540 And that is exactly what he has done. 103 00:08:02,920 --> 00:08:04,980 This is all to stay in power. 104 00:08:05,760 --> 00:08:09,360 Now, beyond staying in power himself, he has other objectives. 105 00:08:09,360 --> 00:08:12,300 Not as primary as staying in power, 106 00:08:12,440 --> 00:08:13,720 but closely related. 107 00:08:14,040 --> 00:08:17,860 He also wants to create a geographic buffer zone 108 00:08:17,860 --> 00:08:19,960 around Russia. 109 00:08:20,960 --> 00:08:24,040 This buffer zone being a friendly, 110 00:08:24,160 --> 00:08:26,920 or at least weak and compliant countries 111 00:08:26,920 --> 00:08:29,980 along Russia's periphery. 112 00:08:30,120 --> 00:08:33,160 This is why he invaded Georgia 113 00:08:33,160 --> 00:08:36,260 in the caucuses in 2008, 114 00:08:36,260 --> 00:08:39,360 and why he still occupies Georgian territory. 115 00:08:39,680 --> 00:08:42,360 This is why he seized the Crimean Peninsula 116 00:08:42,360 --> 00:08:46,540 from Ukraine in 2014, just three years ago. 117 00:08:46,780 --> 00:08:49,080 This is why he continues to this day 118 00:08:49,080 --> 00:08:51,720 to destabilize eastern Ukraine 119 00:08:52,260 --> 00:08:54,920 by sponsoring proxy militias, 120 00:08:54,960 --> 00:08:57,720 providing military support, and so forth. 121 00:08:57,960 --> 00:09:01,560 All of this activity on his border, on his periphery, 122 00:09:01,560 --> 00:09:04,400 is to destabilize these neighbors 123 00:09:04,400 --> 00:09:07,480 so that they will not lean towards the West. 124 00:09:07,680 --> 00:09:10,420 They will not lean towards the European Union 125 00:09:10,420 --> 00:09:12,540 or towards NATO. 126 00:09:13,140 --> 00:09:16,200 Because if Georgia or Ukraine 127 00:09:16,200 --> 00:09:18,940 were successful as democracies 128 00:09:19,900 --> 00:09:23,060 integrated into the EU and NATO, 129 00:09:23,240 --> 00:09:26,800 that example would be disastrous for Putin. 130 00:09:27,180 --> 00:09:29,660 It would be an example to the Russian people 131 00:09:29,660 --> 00:09:32,540 that they don't have to live in a state of decline. 132 00:09:32,780 --> 00:09:34,380 That there is greater opportunity 133 00:09:34,400 --> 00:09:38,460 if their next-door neighbors demonstrate this opportunity, 134 00:09:38,840 --> 00:09:41,220 Russia would be at risk. 135 00:09:41,380 --> 00:09:43,200 Putin would be at risk. 136 00:09:43,420 --> 00:09:45,200 Russians would essentially ask, 137 00:09:45,440 --> 00:09:46,580 why not us? 138 00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:50,360 And Putin will not tolerate that question. 139 00:09:50,820 --> 00:09:53,740 And then finally, Putin has even broader objectives. 140 00:09:54,760 --> 00:09:56,580 He would like to take advantage 141 00:09:56,580 --> 00:10:00,460 of any opportunity to crack the solidarity, 142 00:10:00,480 --> 00:10:03,940 the cohesion of the West. 143 00:10:03,940 --> 00:10:08,600 That is, the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO, 144 00:10:08,840 --> 00:10:11,120 the cohesion of the European Union, 145 00:10:11,240 --> 00:10:13,920 and ultimately the cohesion of the United States 146 00:10:13,920 --> 00:10:15,500 as a member of NATO 147 00:10:15,500 --> 00:10:18,240 and as a partner of the European Union. 148 00:10:18,940 --> 00:10:22,400 He wants the sanctions imposed by the European Union 149 00:10:22,400 --> 00:10:24,240 and the US to end. 150 00:10:24,780 --> 00:10:27,420 These sanctions are an insult to him 151 00:10:27,920 --> 00:10:31,240 and they're further weakening his already weak economy. 152 00:10:32,180 --> 00:10:34,420 He will try to divide the West, 153 00:10:35,200 --> 00:10:39,660 create cracks, fissures, erode cohesion. 154 00:10:40,260 --> 00:10:43,320 That's why he conducts large military exercises 155 00:10:43,320 --> 00:10:44,560 on the borders of NATO 156 00:10:45,240 --> 00:10:47,960 while he sort of rattles his military saber, 157 00:10:48,080 --> 00:10:50,160 even with nuclear threats. 158 00:10:51,260 --> 00:10:53,540 That's why he supported Marie Le Pen 159 00:10:54,020 --> 00:10:56,660 and her party in the French elections 160 00:10:57,180 --> 00:10:58,500 just a couple months ago. 161 00:10:58,780 --> 00:11:00,480 And that's fundamentally why 162 00:11:01,240 --> 00:11:05,220 he tried to interfere with US elections last year. 163 00:11:05,360 --> 00:11:07,160 He is very pleased. 164 00:11:07,940 --> 00:11:09,720 He is very pleased today 165 00:11:10,040 --> 00:11:12,160 that the White House is ensnarled 166 00:11:12,160 --> 00:11:13,400 in this controversy, 167 00:11:14,260 --> 00:11:15,740 ensnarled by this issue, 168 00:11:15,880 --> 00:11:18,780 that Washington is all gridlocked 169 00:11:18,780 --> 00:11:21,940 by the controversy that he promoted. 170 00:11:22,200 --> 00:11:25,280 If he can weaken the West at low cost, 171 00:11:26,200 --> 00:11:28,640 he sees himself as strengthening Russia 172 00:11:29,240 --> 00:11:30,820 and he will do so 173 00:11:31,240 --> 00:11:32,460 every single time. 174 00:11:33,100 --> 00:11:36,340 So when I say that Russia is not going away, 175 00:11:36,900 --> 00:11:40,400 I mean that Russian leaders will continue 176 00:11:40,400 --> 00:11:41,400 to centralize power 177 00:11:41,400 --> 00:11:43,460 and do what they can to stay in power. 178 00:11:43,700 --> 00:11:46,260 They will continue to weaken their next door neighbors 179 00:11:46,260 --> 00:11:48,200 and they will take every opportunity 180 00:11:48,200 --> 00:11:50,660 to crack the cohesion of the West. 181 00:11:51,900 --> 00:11:53,780 So the Russian threat is real 182 00:11:53,780 --> 00:11:55,180 and it's here to stay 183 00:11:55,180 --> 00:11:58,880 even beyond the person of Vladimir Putin. 184 00:11:59,760 --> 00:12:01,680 Now, the third reason 185 00:12:01,680 --> 00:12:03,860 that election security here in the States 186 00:12:04,640 --> 00:12:06,880 should be a national security issue 187 00:12:06,880 --> 00:12:09,400 is because other states are watching. 188 00:12:10,140 --> 00:12:13,460 If Russia can attack the US election, 189 00:12:13,680 --> 00:12:15,500 then others are saying, 190 00:12:15,660 --> 00:12:16,580 so can we. 191 00:12:16,740 --> 00:12:18,660 Think here of Iran, 192 00:12:19,680 --> 00:12:20,460 North Korea, 193 00:12:20,620 --> 00:12:22,440 even non-state actors 194 00:12:22,440 --> 00:12:24,360 like the so-called Islamic State 195 00:12:24,360 --> 00:12:25,860 and perhaps others. 196 00:12:25,860 --> 00:12:27,760 So others are watching. 197 00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:30,420 The fourth reason out of five 198 00:12:30,420 --> 00:12:33,120 that this is a national security issue 199 00:12:33,640 --> 00:12:35,580 is because our next election, 200 00:12:35,700 --> 00:12:37,960 the 2018 off-cycle elections 201 00:12:37,960 --> 00:12:40,220 and the 2020 presidential elections 202 00:12:40,680 --> 00:12:43,260 are actually just around the corner. 203 00:12:43,660 --> 00:12:46,060 And these will be lucrative targets 204 00:12:46,680 --> 00:12:48,640 to any cyber opponent. 205 00:12:49,600 --> 00:12:51,680 Time is actually quite short 206 00:12:52,600 --> 00:12:54,780 to repair our vulnerabilities. 207 00:12:54,780 --> 00:12:58,180 We have to have a sense of urgency now. 208 00:12:58,360 --> 00:12:59,660 And that's one of the messages 209 00:12:59,660 --> 00:13:01,500 that we're trying to communicate 210 00:13:01,500 --> 00:13:04,900 with our partners there at DEFCON this week, 211 00:13:05,000 --> 00:13:06,760 this sense of urgency. 212 00:13:07,520 --> 00:13:09,580 And finally, fifth and finally, 213 00:13:09,740 --> 00:13:11,860 this is a national security issue 214 00:13:11,860 --> 00:13:13,920 because other democracies 215 00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:15,560 beyond the United States 216 00:13:15,560 --> 00:13:17,420 are also vulnerable. 217 00:13:18,080 --> 00:13:19,780 Putin tried to vote, 218 00:13:19,940 --> 00:13:20,960 quote unquote. 219 00:13:21,200 --> 00:13:23,660 He tried to vote in the US elections 220 00:13:23,660 --> 00:13:24,960 last fall. 221 00:13:25,480 --> 00:13:27,780 He voted in favor of one party 222 00:13:27,780 --> 00:13:28,660 in the French elections 223 00:13:28,660 --> 00:13:30,160 just a couple months ago. 224 00:13:30,560 --> 00:13:32,800 He will likely try to vote 225 00:13:32,800 --> 00:13:34,620 in the German elections 226 00:13:34,620 --> 00:13:36,540 in several months from now. 227 00:13:37,540 --> 00:13:39,440 Earlier, past years, 228 00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:41,800 he has voted in Georgia, 229 00:13:41,980 --> 00:13:44,360 Ukraine, and Montenegro. 230 00:13:45,060 --> 00:13:47,500 So this is a threat to the United States. 231 00:13:47,680 --> 00:13:48,940 This is a United States 232 00:13:48,940 --> 00:13:50,600 national security issue. 233 00:13:50,780 --> 00:13:52,580 But beyond us alone, 234 00:13:52,580 --> 00:13:54,660 it's a national security issue 235 00:13:54,660 --> 00:13:55,840 because friends and allies 236 00:13:56,380 --> 00:13:57,920 are also under threat. 237 00:13:58,140 --> 00:13:59,620 So for these five reasons, 238 00:14:01,100 --> 00:14:03,660 the security of the US election process 239 00:14:03,660 --> 00:14:07,280 is a top national security issue. 240 00:14:07,620 --> 00:14:09,040 And that's what brings me 241 00:14:09,040 --> 00:14:10,440 to DEFCON this afternoon. 242 00:14:10,700 --> 00:14:13,960 Now look, I'm not the expert 243 00:14:13,960 --> 00:14:16,340 on securing, on how to secure 244 00:14:16,340 --> 00:14:19,080 our voting process. 245 00:14:19,660 --> 00:14:22,120 But there are well-established experts 246 00:14:22,120 --> 00:14:24,040 in that room with you today 247 00:14:24,040 --> 00:14:26,480 and elsewhere around DEFCON. 248 00:14:26,940 --> 00:14:28,000 In the community, 249 00:14:28,140 --> 00:14:30,280 there are well-established experts 250 00:14:30,280 --> 00:14:31,800 on what needs to be done. 251 00:14:31,940 --> 00:14:33,860 In particular, I would point 252 00:14:33,860 --> 00:14:35,980 to two nonprofit efforts 253 00:14:35,980 --> 00:14:37,240 of verified voting 254 00:14:38,120 --> 00:14:40,200 and the Center for Internet Security 255 00:14:40,980 --> 00:14:43,060 as providing standards 256 00:14:43,880 --> 00:14:45,480 and well-thought-out, 257 00:14:45,980 --> 00:14:48,880 well-reasoned remedial steps 258 00:14:48,880 --> 00:14:50,660 that need to be taken 259 00:14:50,660 --> 00:14:52,040 to ensure we never have 260 00:14:52,040 --> 00:14:54,240 a repeat of last fall. 261 00:14:54,700 --> 00:14:56,060 The good news here, 262 00:14:57,080 --> 00:14:59,680 despite all that sort of bleak outlook, 263 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:01,260 the good news here 264 00:15:01,260 --> 00:15:02,900 is that we actually know 265 00:15:02,900 --> 00:15:03,860 what needs to be done 266 00:15:04,520 --> 00:15:06,780 to secure our 50 states 267 00:15:06,780 --> 00:15:10,480 and the over 6,000 voting jurisdictions 268 00:15:10,480 --> 00:15:11,800 around the country. 269 00:15:12,000 --> 00:15:13,460 One of the challenges, of course, 270 00:15:13,480 --> 00:15:14,500 is that we do have 271 00:15:14,500 --> 00:15:16,800 so many points of entry, 272 00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:18,980 so many potential vulnerabilities. 273 00:15:18,980 --> 00:15:22,780 It is now time, in my view, 274 00:15:22,860 --> 00:15:25,140 to elevate this issue 275 00:15:25,140 --> 00:15:27,400 to the level of a national campaign, 276 00:15:27,680 --> 00:15:29,360 a national campaign 277 00:15:29,360 --> 00:15:30,920 that is bipartisan 278 00:15:30,920 --> 00:15:33,300 or, frankly, nonpartisan. 279 00:15:33,960 --> 00:15:37,480 I've served under presidential administrations 280 00:15:37,480 --> 00:15:38,160 of both parties. 281 00:15:38,600 --> 00:15:40,060 George Bush hired me 282 00:15:40,060 --> 00:15:41,920 into his White House in 2007. 283 00:15:42,240 --> 00:15:45,200 Barack Obama invited me to stay in 2009. 284 00:15:45,680 --> 00:15:47,420 I'm about as bipartisan 285 00:15:47,420 --> 00:15:48,960 and nonpartisan as he is. 286 00:15:48,980 --> 00:15:53,200 This campaign needs to have 287 00:15:53,200 --> 00:15:54,420 that same feature. 288 00:15:54,600 --> 00:15:55,920 This is not about 289 00:15:55,920 --> 00:15:57,980 which party was attacked 290 00:15:57,980 --> 00:16:00,840 or which party could be vulnerable 291 00:16:00,840 --> 00:16:02,220 or which benefit. 292 00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:03,580 This is about 293 00:16:03,580 --> 00:16:06,340 our American election process 294 00:16:06,340 --> 00:16:08,100 and the very foundation 295 00:16:08,100 --> 00:16:09,400 of our democracy. 296 00:16:09,960 --> 00:16:12,120 It is the fundamental link. 297 00:16:12,240 --> 00:16:13,740 Just think about this. 298 00:16:13,900 --> 00:16:15,460 It is the fundamental link 299 00:16:15,460 --> 00:16:16,360 between everyone 300 00:16:16,360 --> 00:16:18,160 who lines up on voting day 301 00:16:18,160 --> 00:16:18,960 and the people 302 00:16:18,980 --> 00:16:21,560 and casts his ballot, 303 00:16:21,800 --> 00:16:22,760 his or her ballot, 304 00:16:23,620 --> 00:16:26,520 and his role in the democracy 305 00:16:26,520 --> 00:16:29,060 and the elected government officials that follow. 306 00:16:29,600 --> 00:16:32,460 That fundamental link is under assault. 307 00:16:33,220 --> 00:16:34,120 So, look, 308 00:16:34,240 --> 00:16:35,580 for over 40 years, 309 00:16:35,600 --> 00:16:37,200 as a military officer, 310 00:16:37,320 --> 00:16:38,240 as a government official, 311 00:16:38,500 --> 00:16:40,640 I didn't even line up to vote. 312 00:16:41,120 --> 00:16:43,320 I voted by absentee ballot 313 00:16:43,980 --> 00:16:45,680 from wherever I was stationed 314 00:16:45,680 --> 00:16:46,760 around the world. 315 00:16:47,120 --> 00:16:48,520 I filled out the ballot. 316 00:16:48,520 --> 00:16:49,720 I sealed it. 317 00:16:49,820 --> 00:16:50,920 I signed it. 318 00:16:51,040 --> 00:16:53,580 And I assumed that when I mailed it 319 00:16:53,580 --> 00:16:55,300 that voting security 320 00:16:55,960 --> 00:16:57,720 was somebody else's job. 321 00:16:58,220 --> 00:17:00,220 Someone else was going to take care of this. 322 00:17:00,320 --> 00:17:02,200 I frankly didn't worry about it. 323 00:17:02,480 --> 00:17:04,560 I felt that my ballot, 324 00:17:04,700 --> 00:17:06,620 when I posted it in the mail, 325 00:17:06,740 --> 00:17:08,700 was secure. 326 00:17:10,060 --> 00:17:11,940 After last year's experience, 327 00:17:13,040 --> 00:17:15,000 I don't feel that way anymore. 328 00:17:17,140 --> 00:17:18,200 I'm convinced 329 00:17:18,200 --> 00:17:20,760 that I personally, as a citizen, 330 00:17:21,000 --> 00:17:22,600 have to get involved in this. 331 00:17:22,760 --> 00:17:24,220 And I am involved in this. 332 00:17:24,420 --> 00:17:26,160 And I hope you will come 333 00:17:26,160 --> 00:17:27,740 to a similar conclusion 334 00:17:27,740 --> 00:17:30,100 and that you will join this effort, 335 00:17:30,220 --> 00:17:32,700 either as technical experts 336 00:17:32,700 --> 00:17:35,760 committed to finding good remedies 337 00:17:35,760 --> 00:17:37,800 and appropriate safeguards 338 00:17:37,800 --> 00:17:41,980 or simply as concerned citizens. 339 00:17:42,640 --> 00:17:43,640 Let's get involved. 340 00:17:44,500 --> 00:17:45,760 Let's get this fixed. 341 00:17:46,100 --> 00:17:47,400 Look, I'm happy now 342 00:17:47,400 --> 00:17:48,280 to take your questions 343 00:17:48,280 --> 00:17:50,180 and I hope that we can actually engineer that 344 00:17:50,180 --> 00:17:52,400 with this sort of video connection. 345 00:17:52,640 --> 00:17:53,300 So, thanks. 346 00:18:08,480 --> 00:18:10,020 I can hear you, Julia. 347 00:18:11,020 --> 00:18:11,980 Sorry, Jacqueline. 348 00:18:17,400 --> 00:18:17,900 Great. 349 00:18:18,020 --> 00:18:18,900 That'll work. 350 00:18:20,080 --> 00:18:21,260 I understand that 351 00:18:21,260 --> 00:18:22,940 NATO has defined cyber 352 00:18:22,940 --> 00:18:24,060 as the fourth domain 353 00:18:24,060 --> 00:18:25,860 along with the air, land, and sea. 354 00:18:26,160 --> 00:18:27,540 And I understand also 355 00:18:27,540 --> 00:18:28,640 that an act of war 356 00:18:28,640 --> 00:18:30,340 against one member of NATO 357 00:18:30,340 --> 00:18:32,300 is an act of war against all. 358 00:18:32,540 --> 00:18:34,540 Does General Luke believe 359 00:18:34,540 --> 00:18:36,080 that the act of war, 360 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:38,000 the definition of an act of war 361 00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:39,360 in the cyber domain 362 00:18:39,360 --> 00:18:41,280 has been well defined? 363 00:18:42,840 --> 00:18:44,600 I have a question about 364 00:18:44,600 --> 00:18:46,580 how NATO defines cyber. 365 00:18:46,580 --> 00:18:49,940 It's an attack on one ally 366 00:18:49,940 --> 00:18:52,240 and it's an attack on all of them. 367 00:18:52,400 --> 00:18:54,140 It's cybernality 368 00:18:54,140 --> 00:18:55,580 and it's a new domain 369 00:18:55,580 --> 00:18:56,400 and it's a new airplane. 370 00:18:58,060 --> 00:19:00,580 How has NATO thought about 371 00:19:00,580 --> 00:19:02,180 or defined this? 372 00:19:05,260 --> 00:19:07,320 Yeah, this is a very fundamental question 373 00:19:07,320 --> 00:19:09,220 that was at the centerpiece 374 00:19:09,220 --> 00:19:11,320 of my work at NATO 375 00:19:11,320 --> 00:19:12,860 beginning in 2013. 376 00:19:13,820 --> 00:19:16,060 Let me take you back a little bit 377 00:19:16,060 --> 00:19:17,220 and give you a little context. 378 00:19:17,580 --> 00:19:20,420 So NATO came into being in 1949 379 00:19:21,000 --> 00:19:23,440 and the key clause in the treaty 380 00:19:23,440 --> 00:19:24,880 that brought those original 381 00:19:24,880 --> 00:19:27,700 12 allies together is Article 5. 382 00:19:27,880 --> 00:19:29,380 It's the fifth paragraph, right? 383 00:19:29,600 --> 00:19:31,080 And basically it says 384 00:19:31,080 --> 00:19:33,500 an attack on one is an attack on all. 385 00:19:33,920 --> 00:19:35,900 And the treaty defines an attack, 386 00:19:36,220 --> 00:19:37,460 which gets to this question, 387 00:19:37,600 --> 00:19:39,120 as an armed attack. 388 00:19:39,360 --> 00:19:40,640 And of course in 1949, 389 00:19:40,920 --> 00:19:42,760 four years after the end of World War II, 390 00:19:42,840 --> 00:19:43,480 everybody knew what 391 00:19:43,480 --> 00:19:45,080 armed attack looked like, right? 392 00:19:46,060 --> 00:19:48,740 And that definition of armed attack 393 00:19:48,740 --> 00:19:52,360 persisted all the way up to 2014. 394 00:19:52,940 --> 00:19:54,640 And at a summit 395 00:19:54,640 --> 00:19:56,380 with Barack Obama in the chair 396 00:19:56,860 --> 00:19:58,780 and in the United Kingdom, 397 00:19:59,240 --> 00:20:01,540 the then 28 allies 398 00:20:02,060 --> 00:20:03,760 updated the Washington Treaty 399 00:20:03,760 --> 00:20:05,100 by way of a policy decision. 400 00:20:05,360 --> 00:20:08,340 And what they decided and codified 401 00:20:08,340 --> 00:20:12,180 was that NATO will treat cyber attacks 402 00:20:13,060 --> 00:20:15,700 as capable of triggering 403 00:20:17,060 --> 00:20:17,960 Article 5. 404 00:20:18,260 --> 00:20:21,180 So being equated to an armed attack. 405 00:20:21,260 --> 00:20:22,180 So in a way they updated 406 00:20:22,180 --> 00:20:23,660 the 1949 language. 407 00:20:23,860 --> 00:20:26,660 Now that usually follows by the question, 408 00:20:26,780 --> 00:20:28,700 well, what kind of cyber attack? 409 00:20:28,920 --> 00:20:30,600 So did the cyber attack 410 00:20:31,220 --> 00:20:33,220 on the United States last year, 411 00:20:33,260 --> 00:20:33,580 for example, 412 00:20:33,620 --> 00:20:36,220 or the cyber attack on Estonia in 2007, 413 00:20:36,840 --> 00:20:37,980 Georgia in 2008, 414 00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:39,880 or Ukraine repeatedly 415 00:20:39,880 --> 00:20:41,060 over the last couple of years, 416 00:20:41,100 --> 00:20:42,020 do those constitute, 417 00:20:43,100 --> 00:20:45,000 do those trigger Article 5 418 00:20:45,000 --> 00:20:46,460 and therefore a NATO response? 419 00:20:46,940 --> 00:20:50,280 NATO left the answer to that question ambiguous 420 00:20:51,060 --> 00:20:52,680 and not well defined. 421 00:20:52,940 --> 00:20:55,380 And the idea here was that NATO, 422 00:20:55,520 --> 00:20:57,580 while it wanted to be on the record 423 00:20:57,580 --> 00:21:00,340 of signaling that cyber could trigger 424 00:21:00,340 --> 00:21:02,720 the treaty and a response, 425 00:21:03,020 --> 00:21:05,320 it wanted to be ambiguous about exactly 426 00:21:05,320 --> 00:21:07,460 where that line was to be drawn. 427 00:21:07,880 --> 00:21:09,900 And it also wanted to be ambiguous 428 00:21:09,900 --> 00:21:11,840 in terms of the nature of NATO's response. 429 00:21:12,400 --> 00:21:14,700 So NATO has not taken the decision 430 00:21:15,000 --> 00:21:16,240 that cyber attacks 431 00:21:16,240 --> 00:21:19,600 will be responded to by cyber responses. 432 00:21:20,760 --> 00:21:24,500 So there's a little benefit here of ambiguity 433 00:21:24,500 --> 00:21:27,820 in the sense of signaling to potential opponents 434 00:21:27,820 --> 00:21:29,700 that first of all, 435 00:21:29,720 --> 00:21:31,520 you can't get away with a cyber attack 436 00:21:32,180 --> 00:21:34,840 if it generates the kind of impact 437 00:21:34,840 --> 00:21:36,300 that an armed attack might have. 438 00:21:36,460 --> 00:21:37,580 And that second, 439 00:21:38,980 --> 00:21:40,600 as an opponent, 440 00:21:40,720 --> 00:21:42,720 you should not feel certain about 441 00:21:42,720 --> 00:21:44,160 how NATO exactly 442 00:21:45,000 --> 00:21:45,240 responds. 443 00:22:31,740 --> 00:22:33,140 Right. 444 00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:34,000 Right. 445 00:22:43,840 --> 00:22:44,540 Well, 446 00:22:45,000 --> 00:22:46,100 I mean, 447 00:22:46,120 --> 00:22:47,140 I take it by the question 448 00:22:47,140 --> 00:22:48,160 that you, 449 00:22:48,220 --> 00:22:49,060 like me, 450 00:22:49,280 --> 00:22:50,680 think that this will be a challenge 451 00:22:50,680 --> 00:22:52,400 and that there will be 452 00:22:53,240 --> 00:22:54,360 partisan politics 453 00:22:55,920 --> 00:22:57,860 that some try to play 454 00:22:57,860 --> 00:22:59,640 on this issue. 455 00:22:59,880 --> 00:23:00,600 I mean, 456 00:23:00,620 --> 00:23:02,080 you have only to look at the other 457 00:23:02,080 --> 00:23:03,540 contentious issues 458 00:23:03,540 --> 00:23:07,180 in terms of updating our democracy. 459 00:23:08,020 --> 00:23:08,680 You know, 460 00:23:08,700 --> 00:23:10,000 the outline of voting districts, 461 00:23:10,640 --> 00:23:11,200 partisan. 462 00:23:12,680 --> 00:23:13,480 Candidate selection, 463 00:23:13,880 --> 00:23:14,600 partisan. 464 00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:16,300 Campaign financing, 465 00:23:17,220 --> 00:23:17,840 partisan. 466 00:23:19,320 --> 00:23:20,900 And term limits, 467 00:23:21,140 --> 00:23:22,180 very partisan, 468 00:23:22,280 --> 00:23:22,640 right? 469 00:23:22,780 --> 00:23:24,600 So there are other issues underway. 470 00:23:24,840 --> 00:23:26,700 There are other initiatives underway, 471 00:23:26,900 --> 00:23:30,240 all of which have drawn partisan fire 472 00:23:30,790 --> 00:23:33,700 in terms of the pros and cons, 473 00:23:33,900 --> 00:23:35,880 the winners and the losers on those issues. 474 00:23:36,120 --> 00:23:37,420 The reason I think 475 00:23:38,000 --> 00:23:39,420 there's a shot here 476 00:23:40,160 --> 00:23:41,700 for this issue, 477 00:23:41,860 --> 00:23:44,000 the election of our voting system, 478 00:23:44,000 --> 00:23:46,000 is to be nonpartisan 479 00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:47,160 or bipartisan 480 00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:50,140 is because of the National Security Act. 481 00:23:50,660 --> 00:23:52,800 It's really only by way 482 00:23:52,800 --> 00:23:54,760 of the sorts of assaults 483 00:23:54,760 --> 00:23:55,820 that we saw last year 484 00:23:55,820 --> 00:23:57,860 that an outside power, 485 00:23:58,880 --> 00:24:00,320 a foreign power, 486 00:24:00,640 --> 00:24:02,380 can threaten 487 00:24:03,000 --> 00:24:04,960 our democracy from inside. 488 00:24:05,100 --> 00:24:06,320 All those other issues, 489 00:24:06,500 --> 00:24:06,960 districts, 490 00:24:07,280 --> 00:24:07,480 candidates, 491 00:24:07,900 --> 00:24:08,520 financing, 492 00:24:08,820 --> 00:24:09,780 term limits, 493 00:24:09,940 --> 00:24:11,120 those are all internal issues. 494 00:24:11,280 --> 00:24:12,760 Russia doesn't get to vote 495 00:24:12,760 --> 00:24:13,720 on those issues. 496 00:24:14,100 --> 00:24:16,040 And our system will deal 497 00:24:16,040 --> 00:24:16,760 with those issues. 498 00:24:16,980 --> 00:24:17,920 And they will draw 499 00:24:17,920 --> 00:24:19,660 partisan pros and cons. 500 00:24:20,420 --> 00:24:21,500 This one, though, 501 00:24:21,560 --> 00:24:23,300 our voting system security, 502 00:24:23,600 --> 00:24:25,220 I think has the potential 503 00:24:25,220 --> 00:24:27,140 to rise above that partisanship. 504 00:24:27,620 --> 00:24:29,000 And that's why, 505 00:24:29,080 --> 00:24:29,940 in my remarks, 506 00:24:30,140 --> 00:24:32,340 I emphasize over and over 507 00:24:32,340 --> 00:24:32,920 and over again 508 00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:35,920 that this is a national security issue. 509 00:24:36,600 --> 00:24:37,720 National security, 510 00:24:37,980 --> 00:24:38,660 typically, 511 00:24:38,760 --> 00:24:40,360 over the long history 512 00:24:40,360 --> 00:24:41,180 of our democracy, 513 00:24:41,360 --> 00:24:42,020 has been 514 00:24:42,020 --> 00:24:43,680 a bipartisan issue. 515 00:24:43,820 --> 00:24:45,240 So that's my hope. 516 00:24:45,480 --> 00:24:46,460 But I take your, 517 00:24:47,060 --> 00:24:48,740 it's a very partisan atmosphere. 518 00:25:12,020 --> 00:25:12,560 It's propaganda, 519 00:25:12,960 --> 00:25:13,480 media, 520 00:25:13,840 --> 00:25:15,320 social engineering, 521 00:25:15,720 --> 00:25:16,600 and so on and so forth. 522 00:25:17,940 --> 00:25:20,000 What's your observation on that? 523 00:25:21,280 --> 00:25:23,500 Separate from voting machines 524 00:25:23,500 --> 00:25:24,000 security, 525 00:25:24,020 --> 00:25:24,940 community security, 526 00:25:25,340 --> 00:25:26,120 what do you think 527 00:25:26,120 --> 00:25:27,880 of the underlying 528 00:25:29,320 --> 00:25:30,920 information operations 529 00:25:30,920 --> 00:25:32,060 and things 530 00:25:32,060 --> 00:25:33,200 from Russia 531 00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:34,020 are going to be 532 00:25:34,020 --> 00:25:34,700 invested 533 00:25:34,700 --> 00:25:35,740 in class 534 00:25:35,740 --> 00:25:36,240 and in 535 00:25:36,940 --> 00:25:37,880 national security? 536 00:25:38,100 --> 00:25:39,460 And what do you think 537 00:25:39,460 --> 00:25:40,320 of the information 538 00:25:40,640 --> 00:25:41,040 operations 539 00:25:41,040 --> 00:25:42,000 and things 540 00:25:42,020 --> 00:25:42,760 that are going 541 00:25:44,220 --> 00:25:44,960 Right. 542 00:25:45,060 --> 00:25:45,420 Now, 543 00:25:45,480 --> 00:25:46,520 this is another tool 544 00:25:46,520 --> 00:25:48,520 in Putin's kit bag, 545 00:25:48,680 --> 00:25:49,340 right, 546 00:25:49,420 --> 00:25:50,100 in his toolbox. 547 00:25:50,720 --> 00:25:51,460 And, 548 00:25:51,620 --> 00:25:52,340 again, 549 00:25:52,460 --> 00:25:53,400 he can do this 550 00:25:54,220 --> 00:25:54,960 remotely, 551 00:25:55,240 --> 00:25:56,240 sometimes 552 00:25:56,240 --> 00:25:57,040 with fingerprints 553 00:25:57,040 --> 00:25:57,860 and sometimes 554 00:25:57,860 --> 00:25:59,420 not for attribution. 555 00:25:59,980 --> 00:26:01,440 He can do it 556 00:26:01,440 --> 00:26:01,920 at scale. 557 00:26:02,020 --> 00:26:03,100 It's relatively 558 00:26:03,100 --> 00:26:03,540 inexpensive. 559 00:26:04,440 --> 00:26:05,180 And 560 00:26:05,180 --> 00:26:06,800 he can use, 561 00:26:06,880 --> 00:26:07,340 especially, 562 00:26:07,380 --> 00:26:08,700 modern social media 563 00:26:08,700 --> 00:26:09,540 platforms 564 00:26:09,540 --> 00:26:11,240 to amplify 565 00:26:11,240 --> 00:26:12,260 these messages. 566 00:26:12,420 --> 00:26:12,580 I mean, 567 00:26:12,600 --> 00:26:13,260 if you think back 568 00:26:13,260 --> 00:26:13,900 to the time 569 00:26:13,900 --> 00:26:14,140 that, 570 00:26:14,160 --> 00:26:14,660 you know, 571 00:26:14,660 --> 00:26:16,600 sort of the media 572 00:26:16,600 --> 00:26:17,240 post-war, 573 00:26:17,320 --> 00:26:18,680 post-World War II period, 574 00:26:19,640 --> 00:26:20,740 1950s and 60s, 575 00:26:20,780 --> 00:26:21,440 Russia, 576 00:26:21,720 --> 00:26:22,540 at that time, 577 00:26:22,560 --> 00:26:23,060 Russian leaders 578 00:26:23,060 --> 00:26:23,620 at that time 579 00:26:23,620 --> 00:26:24,640 tried to influence 580 00:26:24,640 --> 00:26:26,240 Western election campaigns. 581 00:26:26,360 --> 00:26:27,120 But they had to do it 582 00:26:27,120 --> 00:26:27,440 with, 583 00:26:27,460 --> 00:26:28,020 you know, 584 00:26:28,100 --> 00:26:29,260 communist parties 585 00:26:29,260 --> 00:26:30,840 in those countries 586 00:26:30,840 --> 00:26:31,960 and posters 587 00:26:31,960 --> 00:26:33,140 and pamphlets 588 00:26:33,140 --> 00:26:34,160 and flyers 589 00:26:34,160 --> 00:26:34,760 and so forth, 590 00:26:34,880 --> 00:26:35,020 right? 591 00:26:35,160 --> 00:26:35,500 Well, 592 00:26:35,500 --> 00:26:36,580 consider the difference 593 00:26:36,580 --> 00:26:36,980 today, 594 00:26:37,220 --> 00:26:38,400 where bots 595 00:26:38,400 --> 00:26:39,840 and social media 596 00:26:39,840 --> 00:26:41,520 and fake news 597 00:26:41,520 --> 00:26:43,540 and disinformation, 598 00:26:43,540 --> 00:26:44,120 misinformation 599 00:26:44,120 --> 00:26:45,900 gets flooded 600 00:26:46,040 --> 00:26:46,800 onto our 601 00:26:46,800 --> 00:26:47,260 airways. 602 00:26:47,440 --> 00:26:47,860 So, 603 00:26:47,900 --> 00:26:48,540 this is a 604 00:26:48,540 --> 00:26:49,800 big challenge 605 00:26:49,800 --> 00:26:50,580 as well. 606 00:26:51,000 --> 00:26:51,840 And 607 00:26:52,220 --> 00:26:53,420 I don't list 608 00:26:53,420 --> 00:26:53,800 this 609 00:26:54,400 --> 00:26:55,500 as the same 610 00:26:55,500 --> 00:26:56,300 national security 611 00:26:56,300 --> 00:26:57,240 level challenge 612 00:26:57,240 --> 00:26:58,480 as voting security. 613 00:26:58,780 --> 00:26:59,480 But there's 614 00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:00,140 no question 615 00:27:00,140 --> 00:27:00,920 that there's 616 00:27:00,920 --> 00:27:01,760 a Russian attempt 617 00:27:02,160 --> 00:27:03,200 to influence 618 00:27:03,200 --> 00:27:04,000 the politics 619 00:27:04,000 --> 00:27:04,960 outside Russia 620 00:27:05,500 --> 00:27:06,280 by way of this 621 00:27:06,280 --> 00:27:06,780 mass 622 00:27:07,800 --> 00:27:08,380 misinformation 623 00:27:09,400 --> 00:27:09,980 campaigning. 624 00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:51,580 Yeah. 625 00:28:02,480 --> 00:28:03,060 So, 626 00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:04,480 for me, 627 00:28:04,580 --> 00:28:05,260 and this 628 00:28:05,260 --> 00:28:05,480 is 629 00:28:05,500 --> 00:28:05,840 I think 630 00:28:05,840 --> 00:28:06,040 as much 631 00:28:06,040 --> 00:28:06,540 a personal 632 00:28:06,540 --> 00:28:06,920 judgment 633 00:28:06,920 --> 00:28:07,440 as anything 634 00:28:07,440 --> 00:28:07,860 else, 635 00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:09,820 I still have 636 00:28:09,820 --> 00:28:10,360 confidence 637 00:28:10,360 --> 00:28:11,840 in the American 638 00:28:11,840 --> 00:28:12,500 public's 639 00:28:12,500 --> 00:28:12,780 ability 640 00:28:12,780 --> 00:28:14,460 to discriminate, 641 00:28:14,740 --> 00:28:15,700 distinguish 642 00:28:15,700 --> 00:28:16,520 between 643 00:28:17,420 --> 00:28:18,540 real news 644 00:28:18,540 --> 00:28:19,300 and fake news 645 00:28:19,300 --> 00:28:21,000 and to be 646 00:28:21,000 --> 00:28:22,120 a pretty 647 00:28:23,160 --> 00:28:23,560 sophisticated 648 00:28:24,500 --> 00:28:25,060 consumer 649 00:28:25,060 --> 00:28:25,720 of 650 00:28:26,160 --> 00:28:26,560 news. 651 00:28:27,840 --> 00:28:29,020 I think 652 00:28:29,020 --> 00:28:30,600 that arena 653 00:28:30,600 --> 00:28:31,200 right now 654 00:28:31,200 --> 00:28:31,720 is flooded 655 00:28:31,720 --> 00:28:32,140 with 656 00:28:32,140 --> 00:28:33,140 misinformation 657 00:28:33,140 --> 00:28:34,220 and 658 00:28:34,220 --> 00:28:34,860 and 659 00:28:35,500 --> 00:28:36,080 disinformation. 660 00:28:36,460 --> 00:28:37,000 And I think 661 00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:37,640 social media 662 00:28:37,640 --> 00:28:38,180 platforms 663 00:28:38,180 --> 00:28:39,220 amplify that. 664 00:28:39,400 --> 00:28:39,740 So, 665 00:28:39,780 --> 00:28:40,740 it's a challenge. 666 00:28:40,940 --> 00:28:41,460 And I think 667 00:28:41,460 --> 00:28:42,400 it's more difficult 668 00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:42,720 today 669 00:28:42,720 --> 00:28:44,320 to get the facts 670 00:28:44,320 --> 00:28:46,120 because there are 671 00:28:46,120 --> 00:28:46,620 so many 672 00:28:47,700 --> 00:28:48,300 contrary 673 00:28:48,300 --> 00:28:48,800 facts 674 00:28:48,800 --> 00:28:49,440 or competing 675 00:28:49,440 --> 00:28:49,980 facts, 676 00:28:50,300 --> 00:28:50,920 quote unquote, 677 00:28:51,140 --> 00:28:51,640 if you will, 678 00:28:51,780 --> 00:28:53,120 in opposition. 679 00:28:54,440 --> 00:28:55,040 But 680 00:28:55,040 --> 00:28:55,540 fundamentally, 681 00:28:55,600 --> 00:28:56,280 I believe 682 00:28:56,280 --> 00:28:56,920 that 683 00:28:56,920 --> 00:28:58,000 Americans 684 00:28:58,000 --> 00:28:58,420 can 685 00:28:58,420 --> 00:28:59,020 distinguish. 686 00:29:00,440 --> 00:29:01,240 I hope 687 00:29:01,240 --> 00:29:01,620 I'm right 688 00:29:01,620 --> 00:29:01,900 on that. 689 00:29:05,500 --> 00:29:06,220 I think 690 00:29:06,220 --> 00:29:06,380 from the 691 00:29:06,380 --> 00:29:06,660 voting 692 00:29:06,660 --> 00:29:06,980 security 693 00:29:06,980 --> 00:29:07,560 challenge 694 00:29:08,420 --> 00:29:09,540 is because 695 00:29:09,540 --> 00:29:10,360 if the 696 00:29:10,360 --> 00:29:10,640 voting 697 00:29:10,640 --> 00:29:11,320 process, 698 00:29:11,680 --> 00:29:12,280 if the 699 00:29:12,280 --> 00:29:12,700 security 700 00:29:12,700 --> 00:29:13,060 of the 701 00:29:13,060 --> 00:29:13,320 voting 702 00:29:13,320 --> 00:29:13,780 process 703 00:29:13,780 --> 00:29:15,520 is believed 704 00:29:15,520 --> 00:29:16,160 to be 705 00:29:17,660 --> 00:29:18,380 sacrificed, 706 00:29:19,440 --> 00:29:20,160 jeopardized, 707 00:29:21,020 --> 00:29:21,740 compromised, 708 00:29:22,460 --> 00:29:23,180 then 709 00:29:23,180 --> 00:29:24,140 what I'm 710 00:29:24,140 --> 00:29:24,500 concerned 711 00:29:24,500 --> 00:29:24,760 about 712 00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:25,780 is that 713 00:29:25,780 --> 00:29:26,320 Americans 714 00:29:26,320 --> 00:29:27,000 could draw 715 00:29:27,000 --> 00:29:27,540 the conclusion 716 00:29:35,500 --> 00:29:35,520 that 717 00:29:35,880 --> 00:29:36,340 It's 718 00:29:36,340 --> 00:29:36,800 not worth 719 00:29:36,800 --> 00:29:37,260 bothering. 720 00:29:37,460 --> 00:29:37,740 It's 721 00:29:37,740 --> 00:29:38,160 not worth 722 00:29:38,160 --> 00:29:38,420 paying 723 00:29:38,420 --> 00:29:38,900 attention 724 00:29:38,900 --> 00:29:39,700 to 725 00:29:39,700 --> 00:29:40,180 election 726 00:29:40,180 --> 00:29:40,680 campaigns. 727 00:29:42,080 --> 00:29:42,960 And 728 00:29:42,960 --> 00:29:44,060 if that 729 00:29:44,060 --> 00:29:44,380 link 730 00:29:44,380 --> 00:29:45,300 between 731 00:29:45,300 --> 00:29:45,740 the 732 00:29:45,740 --> 00:29:46,220 voter 733 00:29:46,220 --> 00:29:47,620 and 734 00:29:47,620 --> 00:29:48,660 his or 735 00:29:48,660 --> 00:29:49,160 her elected 736 00:29:49,160 --> 00:29:49,640 officials 737 00:29:49,640 --> 00:29:50,520 is broken, 738 00:29:51,280 --> 00:29:52,120 I'm not 739 00:29:52,120 --> 00:29:52,740 sure how 740 00:29:52,740 --> 00:29:53,260 you repair 741 00:29:53,260 --> 00:29:53,520 it. 742 00:29:54,320 --> 00:29:54,960 So 743 00:29:54,960 --> 00:29:56,820 to me, 744 00:29:57,540 --> 00:29:58,220 there is a 745 00:29:58,220 --> 00:29:58,720 line that's 746 00:29:58,720 --> 00:29:59,040 crossed. 747 00:29:59,220 --> 00:30:00,060 If the 748 00:30:00,060 --> 00:30:00,640 credibility 749 00:30:01,480 --> 00:30:02,660 of our 750 00:30:02,660 --> 00:30:03,220 election 751 00:30:03,220 --> 00:30:03,780 process 752 00:30:04,780 --> 00:30:05,420 is 753 00:30:05,420 --> 00:30:06,380 compromised. 754 00:30:06,580 --> 00:30:07,580 So for me, 755 00:30:07,600 --> 00:30:07,880 it's a 756 00:30:07,880 --> 00:30:08,240 different 757 00:30:08,980 --> 00:30:09,620 character. 758 00:30:09,940 --> 00:30:10,760 And I think 759 00:30:10,760 --> 00:30:11,320 more severe. 760 00:30:21,980 --> 00:30:22,840 Don't states, 761 00:30:22,940 --> 00:30:23,480 in fact, 762 00:30:23,580 --> 00:30:23,920 try to 763 00:30:23,920 --> 00:30:24,280 influence 764 00:30:24,280 --> 00:30:24,660 the 765 00:30:24,660 --> 00:30:25,140 election? 766 00:30:26,120 --> 00:30:27,060 Is it what 767 00:30:27,060 --> 00:30:27,700 did the 768 00:30:27,700 --> 00:30:28,220 technology? 769 00:30:29,740 --> 00:30:30,840 I would refer 770 00:30:30,840 --> 00:30:31,460 to some reports 771 00:30:31,460 --> 00:30:32,200 I've seen 772 00:30:32,200 --> 00:30:32,840 on our own 773 00:30:32,840 --> 00:30:33,160 intelligence 774 00:30:33,160 --> 00:30:33,820 operatives 775 00:30:33,820 --> 00:30:34,680 in Iran 776 00:30:34,680 --> 00:30:35,660 and some of 777 00:30:35,660 --> 00:30:36,520 their presidential 778 00:30:36,520 --> 00:30:36,980 elections 779 00:30:36,980 --> 00:30:37,800 this century. 780 00:30:38,120 --> 00:30:38,940 And what 781 00:30:38,940 --> 00:30:39,400 they did 782 00:30:39,400 --> 00:30:40,980 any different 783 00:30:40,980 --> 00:30:41,420 from what 784 00:30:41,420 --> 00:30:41,940 anyone else 785 00:30:41,940 --> 00:30:42,160 did? 786 00:30:46,940 --> 00:30:47,700 So the 787 00:30:47,700 --> 00:30:52,220 The question is about internal respect. 788 00:30:52,860 --> 00:30:56,280 No, no, I'm saying that I'm saying that countries, 789 00:30:56,440 --> 00:30:59,640 countries of the United States 790 00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:02,160 and Iranian elections in this century 791 00:31:03,060 --> 00:31:05,440 attempting to having on the ground 792 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:08,780 trying to incite all of the influence, 793 00:31:09,000 --> 00:31:12,600 you know, students and other things in that environment. 794 00:31:12,920 --> 00:31:16,140 And how is that having traditional intelligence assets 795 00:31:16,140 --> 00:31:17,520 working on the ground to be different 796 00:31:17,520 --> 00:31:18,560 than coming from the side, 797 00:31:18,560 --> 00:31:20,520 other than it's much faster, much cheaper, 798 00:31:20,660 --> 00:31:21,920 gonna change a much better. 799 00:31:22,820 --> 00:31:25,440 Right, this is a question about do you, 800 00:31:25,520 --> 00:31:26,960 how do you weigh this? 801 00:31:27,480 --> 00:31:29,820 Is Russia just evolving in their methodology 802 00:31:30,080 --> 00:31:33,020 but traditionally, especially in the last century, 803 00:31:33,320 --> 00:31:36,020 you may have seen other states try to influence 804 00:31:36,020 --> 00:31:40,900 how come elections, you know, that are not there. 805 00:31:40,920 --> 00:31:45,380 For instance, has the US manipulated elections in Iran? 806 00:32:03,900 --> 00:32:08,100 Right, so look, like most things in life, 807 00:32:08,220 --> 00:32:11,740 the track record here is not clean cut. 808 00:32:12,200 --> 00:32:15,580 And I'm not suggesting by way 809 00:32:15,580 --> 00:32:20,360 of my rather pointed and maybe even passionate remarks 810 00:32:20,360 --> 00:32:21,920 about what happened to us, 811 00:32:23,080 --> 00:32:27,020 I'm not suggesting that our track record is clean 812 00:32:27,280 --> 00:32:28,740 as you go back into history. 813 00:32:29,960 --> 00:32:34,160 What I am suggesting is that this assault last year 814 00:32:35,000 --> 00:32:37,560 is the first serious assault 815 00:32:37,880 --> 00:32:40,800 at the heart of our election process. 816 00:32:41,980 --> 00:32:45,500 And because we have another election in 18 months, 817 00:32:45,580 --> 00:32:48,640 and one after that in 2020, 818 00:32:49,660 --> 00:32:55,620 we don't have much time to do the forensics on this 819 00:32:56,450 --> 00:33:01,860 and to review the history before we actually take 820 00:33:01,860 --> 00:33:05,760 the practical steps required to repair the vulnerabilities. 821 00:33:06,140 --> 00:33:09,240 So look, I'm a reader of history as well. 822 00:33:09,890 --> 00:33:12,680 There are things in our history that all Americans 823 00:33:12,680 --> 00:33:15,500 should take a moment to think about. 824 00:33:17,380 --> 00:33:20,260 And look, this country's not perfect. 825 00:33:21,380 --> 00:33:22,940 We've made mistakes in the past. 826 00:33:23,620 --> 00:33:27,780 But this would be a mistake of huge historic proportions 827 00:33:28,560 --> 00:33:31,920 if we imagine this threat away. 828 00:33:32,800 --> 00:33:35,980 And we run the gamble, we run the risk 829 00:33:37,060 --> 00:33:42,080 that the next national election is so corrupted 830 00:33:42,920 --> 00:33:45,560 that we break the confidence of the American people, 831 00:33:45,560 --> 00:33:48,760 and the whole progress process of democracy. 832 00:33:49,320 --> 00:33:50,780 That's what's at risk here. 833 00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:55,720 And I don't think the US process has been at such a risk ever 834 00:33:56,260 --> 00:33:59,100 in the over 200 years of American voting, 835 00:33:59,820 --> 00:34:01,180 the voting record. 836 00:34:03,320 --> 00:34:06,020 And if you're asking me for a personal view, 837 00:34:06,060 --> 00:34:07,160 I'm no longer in the government. 838 00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:08,740 If you're asking me for a personal view, 839 00:34:09,160 --> 00:34:13,740 I think it's wrong for any outside power 840 00:34:14,220 --> 00:34:15,540 to try to manipulate the American people. 841 00:34:15,560 --> 00:34:16,460 I think it's wrong for any outside power 842 00:34:16,460 --> 00:34:16,480 to try to manipulate the American people. 843 00:34:16,480 --> 00:34:18,140 to try to manipulate or delegitimize 844 00:34:19,180 --> 00:34:21,820 another's internal electoral process. 845 00:34:48,600 --> 00:34:49,440 . 846 00:34:54,060 --> 00:34:58,520 Well, to the extent that we can attribute 847 00:34:59,220 --> 00:35:02,940 the specific individuals or organizations 848 00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:05,180 within the Russian government 849 00:35:05,800 --> 00:35:10,760 that are responsible for last year's activities against us, 850 00:35:10,840 --> 00:35:12,260 then those should be included. 851 00:35:12,440 --> 00:35:15,480 And some of those are included in the current sanctions. 852 00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:21,940 regime. But if this situation becomes more clear and we can further attribute, then obviously those 853 00:35:21,940 --> 00:35:26,740 organizations or individuals should be added. Meanwhile, what else can we do? Well, first of 854 00:35:26,740 --> 00:35:31,580 all, we should do exactly what we've been talking about for the last hour here. We should become a 855 00:35:31,580 --> 00:35:40,000 much harder target. Right now, in classic military terms, we're a soft target. The American election 856 00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:44,940 system is a soft target. Why? Because we're still operating voting machines connected to the 857 00:35:44,940 --> 00:35:50,600 internet. We're still, in some jurisdictions, conducting elections without the ability to 858 00:35:50,600 --> 00:35:56,880 audit them by way of a paper audit trail. We still have voter registry databases hanging on the 859 00:35:56,880 --> 00:36:02,860 internet, and everybody there obviously knows how vulnerable those databases are. So what happens 860 00:36:02,860 --> 00:36:12,940 when we just talk about this for the next 18 months or 36 months, and then it happens again? 861 00:36:13,320 --> 00:36:14,580 And so 862 00:36:14,580 --> 00:36:14,920 . . . 863 00:36:14,920 --> 00:36:22,120 I think much of what we've talked about, and I think what the voting, as I recall, the voting village, I think it's called. 864 00:36:22,460 --> 00:36:24,360 Sorry, I'm not in the voting village. 865 00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:31,080 What that's all about is simply to take this thing seriously, this threat seriously. 866 00:36:31,160 --> 00:36:32,880 So we obviously should do that. 867 00:36:32,880 --> 00:36:45,880 And then the other thing we should do is, as much as possible, share our experience from last year with like-minded democracies and have an open conversation, not only among ourselves, 868 00:36:46,200 --> 00:36:57,520 and sharing information among the 50 states, among the secretaries of state, typically the senior voting officials in every one of our 50 states, but also down to the individual jurisdictions. 869 00:36:57,900 --> 00:36:59,980 So we have to do that sharing internally. 870 00:37:00,320 --> 00:37:01,800 But we should share information. 871 00:37:03,040 --> 00:37:04,900 Externally, internationally as well. 872 00:37:05,220 --> 00:37:31,240 So, for example, a good example of this is that the U.S. intelligence community, when it reached its conclusion last fall, after the Russian activities, came to NATO headquarters and briefed all 27 other allies on our experience in classified setting, down to the who, the what, the when, and the where of the Russian activity. 873 00:37:31,520 --> 00:37:32,600 That's a good example. 874 00:37:32,880 --> 00:37:42,020 The kind of sharing that we should have among our, especially our European allies, especially among our other democratic partners around the world. 875 00:37:42,200 --> 00:37:46,840 Because, as I mentioned in my remarks, we have a responsibility to fix us. 876 00:37:47,040 --> 00:37:49,560 We have an at-home responsibility. 877 00:37:49,740 --> 00:38:02,580 But we also, as a leading democracy, have a responsibility beyond that to be the standard bearers for other democracies, many of which are not as wealthy, not as well-off, and not as historically. 878 00:38:02,880 --> 00:38:03,900 grounded as ours. 879 00:38:04,220 --> 00:38:12,300 So there's a big responsibility here, to get this right for us, but to get it right as the standard bearers for democracies around the world. 880 00:38:13,880 --> 00:38:14,740 Thank you. 881 00:38:15,380 --> 00:38:15,660 Thank you. 882 00:38:15,780 --> 00:38:16,840 Thank you. 883 00:38:18,180 --> 00:38:18,740 Thank you. 884 00:38:19,120 --> 00:38:19,860 Thank you. 885 00:38:20,400 --> 00:38:22,120 Thank you. 886 00:38:33,520 --> 00:38:34,500 I don't know. 887 00:38:36,240 --> 00:38:40,620 The question is, are there any other measures being taken? 888 00:38:43,180 --> 00:38:45,760 Like federal, is there any federal action? 889 00:38:46,900 --> 00:38:48,600 Is there any federal action? 890 00:38:49,440 --> 00:38:50,320 There are. 891 00:38:51,660 --> 00:38:53,100 I don't know if there's any other action. 892 00:38:53,560 --> 00:38:56,360 I don't know if there's any other action. 893 00:38:57,160 --> 00:38:57,800 Right. 894 00:38:58,300 --> 00:39:02,240 So, again, I'm not the technical expert here, 895 00:39:02,240 --> 00:39:03,980 and I'm sure there may be others in the room, 896 00:39:04,080 --> 00:39:07,100 perhaps representatives of the Department of Homeland Security, 897 00:39:07,460 --> 00:39:15,500 who ultimately has federal responsibility to assist the states and local authorities. 898 00:39:15,940 --> 00:39:18,220 And this assistance can come in a number of forms. 899 00:39:18,360 --> 00:39:20,320 I mean, first of all, it can come by way of funding assistance. 900 00:39:20,740 --> 00:39:24,500 And for a relatively modest amount of federal funding, 901 00:39:24,600 --> 00:39:29,580 we could do away with these vulnerable electronic machines. 902 00:39:30,920 --> 00:39:31,960 Modest funding. 903 00:39:32,240 --> 00:39:34,480 For modest funding from the federal government, 904 00:39:34,640 --> 00:39:41,500 we could mandate or make possible a paper audit trail for every election, 905 00:39:41,640 --> 00:39:48,660 which assures us that the outcome is credible and responsible. 906 00:39:50,980 --> 00:39:53,720 We should, and DHS, Homeland Security, 907 00:39:53,980 --> 00:39:58,740 has taken a decision that among other critical infrastructure systems around the country, 908 00:39:58,860 --> 00:40:01,700 so nuclear power plants, electrical power grids, 909 00:40:01,700 --> 00:40:02,920 our financial infrastructure, 910 00:40:03,160 --> 00:40:06,540 there's a whole set of critical infrastructure, 911 00:40:06,760 --> 00:40:09,660 that our voting systems are among those. 912 00:40:09,860 --> 00:40:10,700 That's a good step. 913 00:40:11,080 --> 00:40:14,060 And what that means is that federal funding is available 914 00:40:14,060 --> 00:40:18,000 to help state and local jurisdiction voting officials. 915 00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:20,660 A big thing that could be done here, 916 00:40:20,740 --> 00:40:25,220 and here I think the Center for Internet Security is a very credible voice, 917 00:40:25,380 --> 00:40:31,120 is to share information on tactics, techniques, procedures, and threats. 918 00:40:31,700 --> 00:40:38,200 That even the smallest voting district in all 50 of the states are subject to. 919 00:40:38,320 --> 00:40:44,920 So there's a combination of setting standards, sharing information, providing funding, 920 00:40:45,160 --> 00:40:49,520 all of which fall directly into the basket of DHS. 921 00:40:50,160 --> 00:40:55,500 So I think there are probably some DHS officials there who would agree. 922 00:40:55,680 --> 00:41:01,000 Now, my understanding of the experience last fall, or last year, during our election cycle, 923 00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:06,140 is that DHS, the federal government, in some instances offered assistance, 924 00:41:06,800 --> 00:41:11,020 only to be turned down by state and local authority. 925 00:41:11,900 --> 00:41:14,180 So I think this is a two-way street. 926 00:41:14,360 --> 00:41:19,320 This is, on the one hand, the potential of the federal government to help, 927 00:41:19,800 --> 00:41:24,520 but it's also, this is what's so important about organizations like DEFCON, 928 00:41:25,300 --> 00:41:28,240 that it's so important that the local authorities, 929 00:41:28,880 --> 00:41:30,920 who are not paying as close attention, 930 00:41:31,000 --> 00:41:37,320 and may not be as connected and aware of the vulnerabilities of the Internet 931 00:41:37,320 --> 00:41:41,040 and voting systems riding along the Internet, 932 00:41:41,280 --> 00:41:45,240 that those players, below the federal level, 933 00:41:45,480 --> 00:41:50,660 become more aware and be open and welcoming to federal support. 934 00:41:50,960 --> 00:41:52,800 So this has got to be a two-way street. 935 00:41:53,020 --> 00:41:55,560 And by the way, that goes back to the fundamental point, 936 00:41:55,700 --> 00:41:59,320 that this campaign needs to be national, 937 00:41:59,320 --> 00:42:01,540 and it needs to be bipartisan. 938 00:42:02,080 --> 00:42:05,960 We need to do this as Americans, for America. 939 00:42:06,360 --> 00:42:09,020 And that's probably the point on which to end.