[00:11.220 --> 00:12.220] Go ahead. [00:13.320 --> 00:20.820] All right. Hi, everybody. Wow, I can't believe I'm getting to speak to so many of you at once. [00:20.820 --> 00:26.960] This is really exciting. If you didn't know, my name is Caitlin Bowden. I am the CEO and founder [00:26.960 --> 00:33.040] of BADASS, which stands for Battling Against Demeaning and Abusive Selfish Sharing. I'm going [00:33.040 --> 00:37.680] to be doing a brief intro real quick of who we are, what we do, and then I'm going to introduce [00:37.680 --> 00:46.560] you to my amazing team. So here we go. Well, BADASS started out originally because I found [00:46.560 --> 00:52.260] out that I myself was a victim and, you know, I saw the scope of the issue, how big it is. [00:52.440 --> 01:00.480] I was a victim of non-consensual pornography or non-consensual intimate images being shared online [01:01.700 --> 01:06.580] when I didn't want them to be. I started researching the websites that were surrounding [01:06.580 --> 01:12.280] this kind of stuff and saw how big the problem was and how there were no resources for this sort [01:12.280 --> 01:17.640] of stuff. I got really sick of feeling helpless, so I started reaching out to other victims. [01:18.040 --> 01:24.820] I kind of wanted to crowdsource justice and, you know, I found all these amazing, [01:24.820 --> 01:31.860] wonderful human beings who were just as just as sick of being as helpless as I was. [01:32.000 --> 01:36.260] And we just got together and started brainstorming different ways we could fight back. [01:37.100 --> 01:43.240] Now, before all this happened, I was a bartender and didn't have any experience in any sort of, [01:43.240 --> 01:48.340] you know, tech field or really much of anything other than making the best Long Island you'll [01:48.340 --> 01:53.900] ever have in your entire life. You know, but I went from being a bartender to, you know, [01:53.900 --> 01:57.980] helping introduce legislation in the state of Ohio that would criminalize revenge porn, [01:57.980 --> 02:04.620] which we did get cast, you know, to organizing, you know, a huge group and helping out thousands [02:04.620 --> 02:11.740] of victims, helping them remove their photos and collect evidence and seizing justice. [02:12.920 --> 02:18.620] You know, and then I got to go and introduce a federal bill, you know, which is still, [02:18.620 --> 02:24.240] you know, going through the process, but hopefully pretty soon it might be a criminal [02:24.240 --> 02:29.860] act in the United States, which is what we'd like to see. You know, and now I get to talk [02:29.860 --> 02:37.280] to you guys. So really, this is like the peak of my career thus far. You know, but why am I [02:37.280 --> 02:42.460] speaking to you? This is DEF CON. You don't want to hear about, you know, legislation right now. [02:42.460 --> 02:49.240] You're supposed to be here talking about hacking and tech. And, you know, [02:50.220 --> 02:59.400] and I'm here kind of because y'all keep insisting on it. Everyone keeps insisting I'm a hacker. I [02:59.400 --> 03:03.960] have helped organize a thousand victims to fight back and we've gotten to do a lot of really cool [03:03.960 --> 03:11.480] stuff. You know, from, you know, posting thousands of pictures of Shrek to drown out threads of nudes [03:11.480 --> 03:17.540] being shared without consent. And, you know, teaching them some tips and tricks on how to be [03:17.540 --> 03:23.920] secure and, you know, still express their sexuality online. You know, and there's other things that [03:23.920 --> 03:29.320] we've done that are best left for Sky Talks. My lawyer is here. She will yell at me. So [03:29.960 --> 03:37.520] got to be quiet on that one. And here we are. I would love to introduce you to this amazing [03:37.520 --> 03:42.760] and wonderful team. I'm actually just going to be moderating this panel. I'm going to be letting [03:42.760 --> 03:48.200] them speak because I get a lot of chances too and it's time for their voices to get heard. [03:48.200 --> 03:55.920] So without further ado, let me introduce you to my badasses. All right. First off, we have Kate [03:55.920 --> 04:04.340] Venable, the aforementioned lawyer. She is our head of legal. She keeps us out of trouble and, [04:04.340 --> 04:12.340] you know, helps victims with their own specific cases. Next, we have Rachel Lamp, who's my COO. [04:12.340 --> 04:19.220] She is amazing and wonderful and has more empathy, I think, than any other human being [04:19.220 --> 04:25.660] I've ever met in my entire life. Coming next, we have Marlee Farlow, who's our CMO. She is creative. [04:25.660 --> 04:33.640] She is fun. She is organized, which is the opposite of me. I'm very disorganized. Next, [04:33.640 --> 04:41.180] we have Allie Barnes, who is our CTO, who explains all the things that, you know, you guys talk about [04:41.180 --> 04:47.180] when I have dumb questions and teaches me a little bit about tech. And then finally, [04:47.180 --> 04:57.180] we have Timmy Doomsday, who is our CISO, however that's said. And he is a blast. He's hilarious [04:57.180 --> 05:01.740] to be around, and he is really focused on making sure that we have all of our security locked on [05:01.740 --> 05:09.320] tight. And I'm going to be asking them some questions, and you can ask them some questions. [05:10.740 --> 05:13.500] Let's get this thing started. Hey! [05:16.100 --> 05:18.660] Hi! What's happening? [05:20.800 --> 05:26.600] So I just did a really brief recap of what we've, you know, done thus far and what we've [05:26.600 --> 05:32.420] accomplished with Badass. But I would love to hear... let's start this out, you know, [05:32.420 --> 05:36.540] on the positive. I want to hear y'all brag and talk about your favorite thing that has happened [05:36.540 --> 05:41.300] thus far with Badass. What is your favorite accomplishment? Let's start with Rachel. [05:41.980 --> 05:48.940] I'd say my favorite accomplishment with Badass is definitely getting that law passed in Ohio. [05:48.940 --> 05:54.340] It absolutely was life-changing. It was so great to be able to take something that would assist so [05:54.340 --> 06:00.140] many victims, because a lot of us, like in the beginning, we were based in Ohio. So being able [06:00.140 --> 06:07.100] to have a course of action for our immediate base was just really life-changing. [06:08.620 --> 06:17.420] Yeah. Kate, I know you've gotten a lot. Yeah, the law was awesome. Never really expected [06:17.420 --> 06:24.640] that to happen. In the same vein of things I never expected to happen was, you know, [06:24.640 --> 06:31.080] my best friend is like, let's start a non-profit. And here we are. I really, [06:31.080 --> 06:36.720] like when I went to law school, never thought ever that this was anything remotely close to [06:36.720 --> 06:41.960] what I would be doing. And it's so cool. And it's so awesome. And it's so much more interesting than [06:42.560 --> 06:49.120] half of what all my friends do. So I really enjoy it. All right, Marley. [06:50.280 --> 06:56.400] So as a team, I'd say like every time we help a victim is just like a huge accomplishment when I [06:56.400 --> 07:01.820] see one of our victims come into our group and let us know that they actually received justice. [07:02.720 --> 07:05.840] Definitely something to rejoice about. And then on a personal level, [07:06.420 --> 07:11.180] my favorite professor from my university asked me to come and teach a course with her [07:12.200 --> 07:17.880] to like hundreds of students about this issue. I did it once and she's asked me to come back [07:17.880 --> 07:23.880] definitely. And I'm just super pumped about that. All right, Allie. [07:26.340 --> 07:31.580] So favorite accomplishment that I've gotten to like be around and witness is definitely [07:32.660 --> 07:39.760] TITS for DEF CON was great to witness. And on a personal level, you know, just getting to, [07:39.760 --> 07:43.780] I think one of my favorite things has been like the cybersecurity awareness month that we did [07:44.280 --> 07:47.220] and stuff like that has been my favorite. [07:47.520 --> 07:52.200] All right. And finally, Timmy, the newest member of this team. [07:52.860 --> 07:58.620] Right. So I'm like the squid, right? So, you know, my biggest accomplishment, honestly, [07:58.620 --> 08:05.880] is to just be here with these wonderful people on this panel today. You know, I started out, [08:05.880 --> 08:12.360] Rachel recruited me as just a, you know, humdrum volunteer working victim intake, [08:12.360 --> 08:16.580] and now I get to sit here with these wonderful people and talk to all you. [08:19.140 --> 08:24.120] All right. So now that we've gone over the past a little bit, let's talk about the present. [08:24.480 --> 08:29.540] I know lately we've been a little bit absent on our social media pages. We've been taking [08:29.540 --> 08:35.360] just a teensy bit of a hiatus, although we are still reachable in case of emergency, [08:35.360 --> 08:39.900] if victims need to reach out. But so where have we been? [08:43.020 --> 08:50.380] Well, I think we all took a break to reflect on pretty much what we wanted badass to be [08:50.380 --> 08:57.760] in the future going forward. And also, we were just really out of spoons. As most of us are [08:57.760 --> 09:05.090] victims of some sort of sexual abuse or image abuse. It really, it takes a toll to continuously [09:05.340 --> 09:10.820] have to, you know, go through and reopen those wounds and assist victims. [09:11.940 --> 09:13.160] Mm-hmm. [09:14.300 --> 09:15.340] We also... [09:15.340 --> 09:16.360] Oh, go on. [09:16.540 --> 09:22.400] Sorry. I was just gonna say, and I think like, we're not, I mean, while we do a lot of remote [09:22.400 --> 09:29.800] stuff, we're not immune from, you know, the effects of quarantine that everybody else is [09:29.800 --> 09:34.380] feeling. Like, we're all still here trying to figure out what in the world it means to work [09:34.380 --> 09:41.780] from home and how we have to change our model. Like, nobody knows what, like, the next day brings [09:41.780 --> 09:49.600] in terms of COVID and all of that. So, I think that went a lot, like, went into our decision to [09:49.600 --> 09:55.500] just, like, take a step back because we're all trying to figure it out along with everybody else. [09:56.520 --> 10:04.760] Yeah. I think a big thing also is that we, you know, we started this and it just blew up. [10:04.760 --> 10:11.040] And we were just learning as fast as we could, you know, the best ways to go about doing things [10:11.040 --> 10:18.100] and to run an organization at this size. I mean, we went from being a group of 10 of us to a global [10:18.100 --> 10:25.840] thing. And, you know, we were just scrambling to catch up, but nothing, we didn't have any, [10:26.540 --> 10:33.100] you know, procedures and things in place that were long-term sustainable. We were just doing [10:33.100 --> 10:37.920] whatever we needed to do in that moment and we needed to organize. We needed to figure [10:37.920 --> 10:44.500] out the best ways to do things. Yeah. And I think, like, because of a lot of us being victims, like, [10:44.500 --> 10:50.920] we just coming into this organization came into it, like, crazy passionate and wanting to take on, [10:50.920 --> 10:56.580] like, anything and everything. So, a lot of us were, like, I'm in marketing, but then I'm going [10:56.580 --> 11:02.180] out and trying to do law enforcement training and I'm doing classes at colleges and, like, [11:02.180 --> 11:07.040] taking on so much because I want to and I'm excited to help and move this forward. [11:07.680 --> 11:14.060] And then, of course, you know, burnout comes into play and we have to look at ourselves as an [11:14.060 --> 11:19.860] organization and look at what we want to do, what we want to focus on and do well and then expand [11:19.860 --> 11:26.380] from there. So, exactly. And you mentioned law enforcement training. So, let's talk a little bit [11:26.380 --> 11:33.740] about the laws and responses from law enforcement. Just quick thumbs up or thumbs down from the team [11:33.740 --> 11:40.820] here. Do you think that law enforcement is doing an excellent job of handling reports [11:40.820 --> 11:47.060] and complaints about when it comes to non-consensual image abuse? What do we think? [11:47.860 --> 11:54.260] All right. So, let's talk about that. What do you think can be done to change that? [11:56.420 --> 12:03.760] Training, for one. Yeah, well, like, for me, as a victim, going through my own personal case, [12:03.760 --> 12:11.860] it took nine times to report my own victimization and a lot of the reason was nobody knew that they [12:11.860 --> 12:17.400] handled cybercrimes and that they didn't have cybercrime units and they told me to call the [12:17.400 --> 12:23.480] FBI and it just, like, blew my mind. I'm looking at a statute saying, like, it literally says [12:23.480 --> 12:29.600] number four, local law enforcement handles this issue. So, like, why is there this disconnect [12:29.600 --> 12:34.680] between you understanding that you can do something for victims? And, yeah. So, [12:34.680 --> 12:38.560] I'm just going to say training is one of the biggest issues here. [12:40.900 --> 12:46.380] Okay. Something else that I noticed, and maybe, Kate, you can speak to this a little bit more, [12:46.380 --> 12:51.540] but, like, when I was first brought on, you know, I was working on building resources for victims [12:51.540 --> 12:56.480] and one of that was going through and just making the law a little bit more digestible [12:56.480 --> 13:04.280] and it seems like a lot of the laws that are on the books can't even decide what a nude is and [13:04.280 --> 13:09.320] that seems to be, like, the basis of the entire conversation. So, if we can't even agree on a [13:09.760 --> 13:14.860] vocabulary to talk about these things, how are we going to push effective legislation? [13:15.980 --> 13:23.640] Yeah, I mean, I would definitely agree with that. Like, it's not only just, like, what is a nude, [13:23.640 --> 13:29.800] but I know Marianne Franks has talked about this a lot in a lot of the stuff that she does with [13:29.800 --> 13:39.280] CCRI and, I mean, most of the laws have these intent to harm clauses and basically what it [13:39.280 --> 13:46.960] says, basically you have to prove that the poster intended to harm the victim in whatever way by [13:46.960 --> 13:51.020] posting it and it's next to impossible to prove and it's next to impossible to enforce. [13:51.020 --> 13:55.180] Maliciously, yeah. Yeah, that vocabulary, malicious. [13:56.260 --> 14:04.540] Yeah, it makes it pretty much impossible to enforce at all and I think, [14:04.540 --> 14:12.540] um, yeah, I mean, it just goes on what you said, Timmy, like, we have to agree on something and [14:12.540 --> 14:18.360] then we write these laws and we think they sound all good and great and with an intent to harm [14:18.360 --> 14:26.320] makes it, I wouldn't say useless per se, but it makes it hard. And it even complicates it further [14:26.320 --> 14:32.400] once you get into crossing state lines or country lines because the language of each state law is so [14:32.400 --> 14:38.780] entirely different and, you know, it's hard enough getting police to want to pursue [14:39.360 --> 14:43.420] justice for these victims, but once it crosses state lines, they just give up pretty much [14:43.420 --> 14:51.740] altogether. Yeah, the language has definitely been an issue. Speaking of language, most people know [14:51.740 --> 14:57.340] about the type of abuse that we're fighting against. They know it as revenge porn. [14:58.040 --> 15:00.540] What do you guys think about just that wording? [15:02.660 --> 15:12.740] I'm gonna go. I hate it. Like, I get it. It's like, the media kind of jumped on that term [15:12.740 --> 15:17.960] and sensationalized it, especially with the fappening and things like that happening, but [15:17.960 --> 15:23.220] when you really break it down, revenge porn specifically deals with, like, intimate partners [15:24.540 --> 15:32.360] abusing one another, and it really only represents 8% of non-consensual image abuse cases. [15:32.700 --> 15:38.380] So I don't like it for that reason, but, like, more than that, the term revenge automatically [15:38.380 --> 15:43.700] implies that the victim did something wrong. So there's, like, victim blaming built into it, [15:43.700 --> 15:49.880] and then the term pornography also has a false sense of consent built into it because generally [15:49.880 --> 15:58.420] people who are creating pornography content are consenting to be taped and shared, which none of [15:58.420 --> 16:04.780] these victims are. So personally, I don't like the term. I will use it in cases where I'm trying to [16:04.780 --> 16:08.400] get some awareness out and people aren't understanding what I'm talking about, so more [16:08.400 --> 16:14.400] as a reference point, or if I'm specifically dealing with somebody whose former partner [16:14.400 --> 16:26.200] or current partner is abusing them. Yeah, I like the way that you just dropped that stat out there, [16:26.200 --> 16:31.920] like, it's only 8%. Are there any more stats that you think are really important to share? [16:32.380 --> 16:39.160] Actually, since you are our stats person, you know this stuff better than any of us. [16:39.160 --> 16:47.560] Stats on stats. Yeah, it's actually kind of interesting because there's not a ton of [16:47.560 --> 16:54.720] resources dedicated to researching this topic. Like, CCRI is amazing. They so far have put out [16:54.720 --> 17:01.240] the most research on the topic. I did recently see one that came out in February that said [17:01.240 --> 17:07.290] that the rate in which this is happening is one in three people are being victimized, [17:07.290 --> 17:14.030] and that was just two months ago. But that was geared more towards European countries [17:14.030 --> 17:19.810] and wasn't a worldwide view. The most recent stat we have as far as worldwide is concerned [17:19.810 --> 17:26.030] is 2017, which said it was one in eight people. And I'm sure we'll get into lots of reasons why [17:26.030 --> 17:33.590] that is rising quickly, but it's hard to say. I'm going to go with probably something closer [17:33.590 --> 17:39.510] to one in five, one in six as of currently, but it's something that we really need research on. [17:39.970 --> 17:47.050] And then I know another interesting fact is that, you know, this affects three out of four women. [17:47.050 --> 17:54.930] Victims are women in most cases, or female-identifying people. But in cases where [17:54.930 --> 18:01.710] the victim does identify as male, it's 90% of those cases incorporate sex torsion as well [18:01.710 --> 18:13.270] as the image abuse. So that's just some facts. And yeah, those are scary, scary figures to hear. [18:13.550 --> 18:20.430] Yeah, that many people this is happening to, this is a huge problem. You know, but the biggest thing [18:20.430 --> 18:25.370] that we hear when we discuss these sorts of things with the public or in the press, [18:25.370 --> 18:30.010] immediately the first thing we hear is, well, this wouldn't be a problem if you just didn't [18:30.010 --> 18:36.290] take those pictures. And so we hear it so much. I know we all have a ton of different responses [18:36.290 --> 18:42.090] that we go to. So let's share all those responses. Let's just get that out of the way. [18:42.970 --> 18:47.690] Rachel, I can see it. You're about to explode with things to say. [18:48.010 --> 18:55.570] I have so many words for people who say such things, but I'm going to keep it professional-ish. [18:56.990 --> 19:06.050] It is not the victim's fault. Like, it's 2020. We have cell phones attached to us. They're basically [19:06.050 --> 19:12.990] part of us. It only makes sense that, you know, people would be using their cell phones in their [19:12.990 --> 19:20.270] sex lives as well. I mean, we use it to record when we sleep, like to tell us when we fart, [19:20.270 --> 19:24.990] like when we talk in our sleep. Like, of course, it's going to be incorporated into [19:24.990 --> 19:32.430] sexual relationships as well. So I think the thought of excluding that or blaming the person [19:32.430 --> 19:36.910] because of them using and expressing their sexuality within a consenting [19:36.910 --> 19:41.850] form and that being abused, it's just, it's senseless. [19:45.350 --> 19:50.710] One thing that bugs me is that people always say that when the fact is we, [19:51.710 --> 19:54.950] you don't even need to take a nude to become a victim anymore. [19:56.090 --> 20:00.950] You know, I see deepfakes are already being brought up here in the chat, [20:00.950 --> 20:09.670] and that is, you know, something we have been monitoring. So what should we do about the [20:09.670 --> 20:20.080] deepfakes? Do we see that becoming more of a problem? Yeah, I mean, I feel like the media [20:20.080 --> 20:26.360] recently has just realized that that's a thing. But it's something I think our organization has [20:26.360 --> 20:33.600] been talking about amongst ourselves and within the community of victims and activists for over [20:33.880 --> 20:39.440] a year now, I would say. And then all of a sudden, like within the last, like, I think six months or [20:39.440 --> 20:45.360] so, the media is like, oh, deepfakes. And I'm just like, looking at the headlines, like, duh, [20:46.220 --> 20:53.180] where have y'all been? But yeah, no, I mean, it's, it doesn't necessarily mean you took a nude or [20:53.180 --> 20:59.200] anything anymore. Like, it means some jerk put your face on some random naked person and is now [20:59.200 --> 21:06.540] exploiting you on the internet. I believe our first deepfake victim came to us about a year [21:06.540 --> 21:13.880] and a half ago. And since then, it's, it's, it's going to continue to rise, like, human [21:13.880 --> 21:18.940] curiosity, and then us just being bored and quarantined. People have a lot of free time on [21:18.940 --> 21:28.020] their hands. Deepfakes are going to continue to be on the rise. Yeah, I'm actually interested to [21:28.020 --> 21:36.380] find out what the stats are on that, just because, like, being quarantined, people are just stuck in [21:36.380 --> 21:41.320] their computers. And there's all these apps coming out all the time that allow people to create [21:41.320 --> 21:46.880] deepfakes. I know that there's that one, I think, a year ago, or a little less than a year ago, that [21:46.880 --> 21:54.360] came out and was kind of making waves. And I really wish I, like, I knew how to how to stop that or [21:54.360 --> 22:01.860] any advice to prevent that from happening. But it's just, it's cropping up everywhere. And so [22:01.860 --> 22:07.000] quickly that I'm just, I'm not, I'm at a loss, personally, as to what to do. [22:07.540 --> 22:14.980] And I mean, it doesn't help that, you know, the, think about the processing power it takes to do [22:14.980 --> 22:21.100] some of that stuff. It wasn't just sitting on your desk two or three years ago. Whereas now, [22:21.100 --> 22:26.380] I have a laptop that could probably generate a deepfake in an hour or two, you know, with the [22:26.380 --> 22:34.020] right settings. And never underestimate, you know, someone that's time rich and money poor, [22:34.020 --> 22:39.900] which is a lot of us right now. Yeah, I was gonna say that's exactly it. People have so much more [22:39.900 --> 22:52.940] time to write these tools and stuff now. Yeah. But beyond deepfakes, I mean, that's a, it still [22:52.940 --> 22:58.300] is a problem that is growing. And it's something we're anticipating. But you know, the majority of [22:58.300 --> 23:04.200] the people coming to us, you know, their images that have been leaked, or something that they [23:04.200 --> 23:10.700] took, or allowed a trusted partner to take, and that were leaked without their consent. [23:11.840 --> 23:16.500] So say someone wants to, you know, still continue doing that, which we encourage, [23:16.500 --> 23:19.960] we encourage that sort of thing. But we want them to do it safely. [23:20.820 --> 23:26.880] What tips do you have for people to sext and take nudes and not become victims? [23:29.960 --> 23:34.900] So there's a few things I feel like that we tell people. And I mean, I feel like this is [23:34.900 --> 23:39.060] the perfect time where I love how we do Cybersecurity Awareness Month, because I feel [23:39.060 --> 23:44.240] like it's a perfect time to like, flood everyone with all the tips every day. And Rachel did such [23:44.420 --> 23:50.360] a good job last year. Yeah, I almost said yesterday, last year, putting stuff together. But [23:50.360 --> 23:56.460] you know, basic things are like, simple things, but you know, turning off the location on your [23:56.460 --> 24:02.660] phone and making sure your address is not attached to your data that's coming from your camera roll. [24:02.860 --> 24:08.640] Pay attention to what apps you're using and what data they're storing of yours. [24:09.000 --> 24:13.620] Something that a lot of people don't think of that I've seen people get bit on is like Snapchat [24:13.620 --> 24:19.040] memories. You take a picture on Snapchat and you think it goes away, but Snapchat saves it and is [24:19.040 --> 24:24.240] like, trying to remind you about it later. But all it takes at that point is someone to get your [24:24.240 --> 24:30.420] Snapchat password if you don't have everything protected properly. So those things, you know, [24:30.420 --> 24:38.320] things we say, keep two-factor on for all of the things that you can. You know, pay attention to [24:38.320 --> 24:42.740] what's in the pictures that you're sending to people that you don't know or trust. Make sure [24:42.740 --> 24:48.920] there's maybe no random box in the background with your home address on it. Yeah, those are [24:48.920 --> 24:52.580] the things come to mind off the top of my head. Speaking of making sure you know what's in your [24:52.580 --> 24:57.860] pictures, exit data. You want to make sure to wipe that so you're not accidentally sharing [24:58.520 --> 25:05.220] location and stuff like that. What else? Oh, I was just, sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt. No, [25:05.220 --> 25:10.520] no, I was done. Go. No, I was just gonna say like, so in my day job, [25:11.040 --> 25:17.640] when I'm lawyering and stuff, this has like actually really helped my practice and me helping [25:19.200 --> 25:26.160] victims and, you know, like just raising awareness in general as to like how to protect your own [25:26.160 --> 25:32.080] privacy, not just in terms of image abuse, but like if there's domestic violence or stalking [25:32.080 --> 25:39.180] or some other, you know, like menacing or whatever crime you can think of that involves [25:39.180 --> 25:47.540] somebody being creepy, like it's basic privacy info. Change your passwords, turn on two-factor, [25:47.540 --> 25:53.960] turn off your location, don't give your significant other like unfettered access to [25:53.960 --> 26:01.540] where you are 24-7 because that's creepy anyway, but that's neither here nor there. But I mean, [26:02.140 --> 26:08.380] it's just, I mean, basically what Allie said, like it's stuff that people don't think about [26:08.380 --> 26:17.500] and with the way that all these companies like Google and Apple and whoever like track [26:17.500 --> 26:23.320] our data these days, it's important to know what data we're sharing and who is seeing it [26:23.320 --> 26:28.960] and what control we have over who it goes to and where it goes to and when. [26:28.960 --> 26:37.180] And also, sorry, I was going to say to add on to that, you could, you can simply [26:38.480 --> 26:43.020] watermark your photos with the name of the person you're sending them to. [26:43.340 --> 26:49.860] And also you can, you can create kind of a contract between each other by like asking [26:49.860 --> 26:58.180] your partner explicitly like not to send these photos or it will cause me harm. Those are really [26:58.180 --> 27:03.840] important words because we know that that's how the laws really frame them is that intent to harm. [27:03.840 --> 27:09.240] So if you can just check that box immediately and screenshot it, keep it in a file with their name, [27:09.240 --> 27:13.520] then I think that would really do a lot in the way of prevention and also [27:13.520 --> 27:17.400] assisting in your own legal case if it comes to that point. [27:20.430 --> 27:24.750] Yeah. I always want to remind people, you know, you want to think about the future [27:25.490 --> 27:31.870] and always hope for the best, prepare for the worst. You know, make that screen, that contract [27:31.870 --> 27:38.730] screenshot at your lawyer. If they ever need one, we'll thank you for that. So yeah, that's really [27:38.730 --> 27:45.230] important. I know that we had discussed Snapchat and other various apps that are being used to [27:45.230 --> 27:54.190] share these images. And what, you know, responsibility do they have, do you think, [27:54.190 --> 27:58.330] to, you know, prevent this sort of thing from happening? And what are you seeing [27:59.450 --> 28:04.150] platforms and companies doing that they're just falling short and letting, [28:04.150 --> 28:08.270] you know, victims, victimization happen on their platform? [28:12.740 --> 28:14.600] I mean, do you want the real answer? [28:18.520 --> 28:26.780] I mean, from my perspective, like, Facebook could like respond to subpoenas that are from [28:26.780 --> 28:34.320] not law enforcement, maybe, possibly, at some point in time, that might be helpful. [28:34.700 --> 28:40.220] Like, if somebody sends stuff during mess, like using Facebook Messenger, it's next to impossible [28:40.220 --> 28:47.900] to get anything useful for court. And you're, I'm not law enforcement, so they don't care. [28:49.820 --> 28:54.720] I mean, other people can speak to what they've experienced, but that's the first thing that [28:54.720 --> 28:59.940] comes to mind for me. Well, the other thing that, the first thing that comes to mind for me are [28:59.940 --> 29:05.440] hosting companies, right? There's usually a blanket AUP policy that says, [29:05.440 --> 29:12.560] don't post these kinds of things. But image abuse, if there's, especially if there's not [29:12.560 --> 29:19.240] minors involved, right, they may or may not be on their abuse priority list. So I think it's [29:19.240 --> 29:23.400] important to hold these hosting companies accountable and keep letting them know when [29:23.400 --> 29:31.340] they're willingly hosting, you know, websites and clients that are committing image abuse, [29:31.340 --> 29:36.000] like Cloudflare. Oh, wait, wait, what did we have planned for Cloudflare when we said that [29:36.420 --> 29:45.260] at some point? I just want to throw that out there. Yeah, just, we're waving, we're saying hi. [29:47.680 --> 29:51.540] Now, we've run into these issues with Cloudflare for a very long time. [29:52.880 --> 29:58.220] They have repeatedly, you know, and it's not just them, but they are the most egregious when it [29:58.220 --> 30:04.200] comes to this. What, you know, other apps, let's call them out. Like, who is just doing a really [30:04.200 --> 30:09.660] shitty job of letting victim, of letting victimization happen on their platform? And [30:09.660 --> 30:13.520] versus who do you think is doing all right? Like, who's actually trying? [30:14.080 --> 30:20.920] I think that Twitter is quite a shame. They could really respond to reports. I remember that there [30:20.920 --> 30:30.860] was an actual Twitter account that was for one of these hosting sites. And it took two years for it [30:30.860 --> 30:37.310] to be removed. And they openly boasted about having specifically leaked images and revenge porn. [30:38.100 --> 30:40.190] So, Twitter. [30:44.080 --> 30:45.140] Anyone else? [30:45.140 --> 30:51.560] Twitter. I can speak to a couple of ones that have at least been trying. And mind you, their [30:51.560 --> 30:57.140] methods aren't perfect. And obviously, victimization still happens quite a bit on their [30:57.140 --> 31:02.200] platform. But at least they are a either trying to address the problem or prevent it. You know, [31:02.200 --> 31:08.740] Facebook, they came out with a pilot to try to prevent images from being uploaded in the first [31:08.740 --> 31:13.920] place. And yes, it's Facebook, and nobody's going to trust them. As I believe the press, you know, [31:13.920 --> 31:20.100] kind of twisted it to, you know, send Facebook your nudes, which is the worst idea ever. But [31:20.100 --> 31:25.540] they were trying, they addressed that there was an issue. And, you know, they acknowledged it, [31:25.540 --> 31:30.840] and they are trying something. And the other one that has been actually good to work with, [31:30.840 --> 31:34.560] and I know this is, you know, a bit of a controversial opinion, but Pornhub has [31:35.800 --> 31:42.340] had their moderators involved with us from the very beginning, and given us a direct line to [31:42.340 --> 31:48.100] making sure that things get taken down really quickly, as soon as, you know, anyone discovers [31:48.100 --> 31:52.560] there's a problem. And no one has even, you know, really tried to make sure the problem never [31:52.560 --> 31:57.100] happens in the first place yet. But I'm waiting to see that happen next. And I'm really excited [31:57.100 --> 32:05.380] about that. Anyone else? Want to call someone out? Want to call a platform? Start a fight? Let's do [32:05.380 --> 32:16.940] it. I mean, we've had issues with Instagram forever. Like, reporting. I mean, I personally [32:16.940 --> 32:26.080] know someone who, it's not necessarily, like, revenge porn or image abuse per se, but it started, [32:26.080 --> 32:34.840] like, his victimization started with Instagram. And it's been years. And it's taken thousands of [32:34.840 --> 32:44.620] people reporting, and millions of dollars extorted for them to even do anything. They finally, like, [32:44.620 --> 32:51.800] CNN got the story recently. But other than that, like, I mean, it's insane. Like, everybody I know [32:51.800 --> 33:00.780] who has been victimized on Instagram has had the worst time even getting them to listen. [33:01.980 --> 33:08.100] Yeah, and that's a shame because I feel like a lot of, like, high school leaps end up on Instagram. [33:08.100 --> 33:13.680] And the fact that they're not very responsive in a very fast way, really, it's a shame because [33:13.680 --> 33:17.980] that stuff should be snuffed out relatively quickly, you know. [33:19.100 --> 33:35.580] I have one. Reddit. So, like, they try sometimes. My qualm with them is that they don't, [33:35.580 --> 33:42.920] they have moderators who do remove content, which is great, but they don't retain that content so [33:42.920 --> 33:50.320] that victims can claim it and use it as evidence, which is kind of a huge problem. Like, and where, [33:50.320 --> 33:57.160] I'm in Florida, and it's a stackable offense here. In my case, my image was posted on Reddit and also [33:57.160 --> 34:04.660] on another site. And the person who did it was only facing a misdemeanor because Reddit took [34:04.660 --> 34:10.280] down the image, and I had no proof that it was ever there. So, you know, I reached out to them [34:10.280 --> 34:15.000] directly and asked them, like, what's going on? Can you put something in place? If you can flag [34:15.000 --> 34:20.780] images as non-consensual image abuse, then you should also be able to, like, keep them in a [34:20.780 --> 34:30.660] repository that's saved for law enforcement to contact and get later. But alas, there's nothing. [34:30.660 --> 34:32.860] Absolutely. And how could we forget Discord? [34:32.860 --> 34:33.990] Discord. [34:37.180 --> 34:43.800] That's actually the first time I ever came to Discord was because of my images being in [34:43.800 --> 34:51.500] an entire revenge porn Discord server, which is lovely. And they also remove content without [34:51.500 --> 34:57.700] preserving any of the data. You just have to really hope that the officer you're working with [34:57.700 --> 35:03.620] is able to send the preservation of data quick enough before that content is just gone forever. [35:04.560 --> 35:07.740] Smash cut to the stream getting dropped immediately. [35:07.740 --> 35:14.640] I mean, and that's not even in just, you know, image abuse cases with adults. We've run into [35:14.640 --> 35:22.240] that issue as well. A lot of our work, you know, does involve CSAM, which is exploitation of [35:22.240 --> 35:29.640] children. And so it's been really frustrating to see companies drop the ball on that a lot. [35:32.080 --> 35:37.200] So we've discussed, you know, the platforms and their responsibility. And I know a little [35:37.200 --> 35:42.240] bit ago, I just saw a really great talk, actually, you know, just a couple hours ago, [35:42.240 --> 35:47.900] it was in Crypto Village, and it was regarding Section 230, as well as the upcoming, you know, [35:47.900 --> 35:55.440] Earn It Act, which is gaining momentum, you know, through the process. And, you know, [35:55.440 --> 36:06.140] what are your thoughts on those? Yeah, I mean, with CDA 230, it has a lot of nuance [36:07.380 --> 36:15.500] to it. It has some good points. And it also has, it also creates loopholes that I don't know, [36:15.500 --> 36:19.500] I don't want to like criticize it too much, because I'm not sure that the loopholes were [36:19.500 --> 36:25.920] necessarily intentional. But I mean, when we were talking about Cloudflare earlier, [36:25.920 --> 36:32.820] I mean, their web hosts aren't responsible for the content that they're hosting because of laws [36:32.820 --> 36:41.780] like CDA 230. And while they are meant to be helpful, like they also create more problems. [36:41.780 --> 36:50.560] And I just, it needs to be retooled so that it's a better law and has less room for wiggle, [36:50.560 --> 36:56.400] like less wiggle room. You know, the biggest argument that I've really heard when it comes to [36:56.400 --> 37:02.120] that, you know, and a lot of what our work is, whenever we're trying to talk about legislation [37:02.120 --> 37:08.400] regarding this form of abuse, the biggest argument I hear about is about how, you know, [37:08.400 --> 37:17.300] NCP is, it's a free speech thing. And people claim that, you know, this is free speech. [37:17.300 --> 37:22.330] And what are your thoughts on that? Well, [37:27.420 --> 37:36.380] I think that nudity and nude photographs could be free speech, but once it enters into the realm [37:36.380 --> 37:43.800] of harming people, that's when it exits, you know, free speech up until a point. [37:44.060 --> 37:51.100] But what, at what point do we consider things to be harmful? I think it comes down to the consent, [37:51.100 --> 37:58.860] personally. Yeah, I'd agree with that. I think that's where the, I think that's part of the [37:58.860 --> 38:07.260] argument behind the intent to harm thing, intent to harm clause, is that's what makes it not free [38:07.260 --> 38:14.800] speech anymore. But we can't define it that broadly and make it that vague because it becomes [38:14.800 --> 38:21.700] unenforceable. Free speech is complicated. It's way more complicated than the average person would [38:21.700 --> 38:28.780] think it is. And yes, we have free speech, but it doesn't mean that you can say what you want [38:28.780 --> 38:35.960] and do what you want without repercussions. And it doesn't mean that, it also doesn't mean that [38:35.960 --> 38:41.520] just because it's free speech, it's the right or moral thing to do. Like, there's a difference [38:41.520 --> 38:47.680] between what our country allows us to say and what is morally and ethically correct. [38:49.120 --> 38:59.280] Yeah, legality doesn't always equal morality, nor vice versa. Yep. So yeah, I know this, [38:59.280 --> 39:06.700] I've seen quite a few questions in the chat. Also, big props to my amazing husband, TC, [39:06.700 --> 39:11.720] if you haven't noticed, he has been helping us field these questions. He's making sure that we [39:11.720 --> 39:17.860] get them. And any messages that I might be missing, because I'm also moderating the panel [39:17.860 --> 39:23.040] and don't always have time to look at this chat, he's making sure we see them. And just basically [39:23.040 --> 39:33.020] being the most amazing personal assistant in the world. So thank you, TC. So I would like to start [39:33.020 --> 39:39.800] addressing some audience questions. All right, and the first one is, given the type of victims [39:39.800 --> 39:44.580] that you help, do you find that you as an organization are now targeted in order to gain [39:44.580 --> 39:50.900] access to lists of clients by harassers and such like? And they aimed that toward Ali. [39:52.200 --> 40:01.740] So I mean, let's start that off with you. Yeah. So I would say it definitely, you know, [40:01.740 --> 40:07.640] makes us more at risk. I don't know if I would say that it's for people wanting to get a list [40:07.640 --> 40:14.320] of our victims or clients, people that we help so much as it's people that are pissed off that [40:14.320 --> 40:20.520] we're doing what we're doing. And they kind of, you know, feel this need to, like, plot a revenge [40:20.520 --> 40:29.460] against us kind of thing. We're taking away their control, right? So they're revenging revenge porn. [40:30.320 --> 40:37.600] Revenge. I mean, I think Caitlin can tell you this. We have a whole lot of trolls. [40:40.200 --> 40:45.720] And yeah. Can we talk real quick, though? Like, speaking of trolls, can we just talk real quick [40:45.720 --> 40:51.600] about tits for DEF CON from last year? And how that went? If anyone remembers that. [40:52.160 --> 40:58.160] And I remember. Yeah, that was fun. People were mad. [41:00.060 --> 41:07.640] But yeah, I mean, we've gotten, like, I mean, yeah, we've gotten trolls. [41:07.640 --> 41:13.900] We've gotten, it's not just trolls. You can only use, you can only use money you've made in InfoSec [41:13.900 --> 41:19.780] to come to DEF CON. That's the only money you're allowed to use. Yeah, whore money should be spent [41:19.780 --> 41:26.580] on poor things. Exactly. Just what we did. Right? [41:26.700 --> 41:44.240] I like that. Yeah. And we've had, like, members of the org be, you know, threatened, [41:44.240 --> 41:51.980] re-victimized, doxxed, like, all kinds of things. So I'd say, yeah, 100%. People do target us. [41:52.060 --> 42:00.000] They try to. And, you know, we all support one another. And do our best to fight against that, [42:00.000 --> 42:06.860] too. I just wanted to show off the whore dollars, the stickers that we had for DEF CON last year. [42:06.860 --> 42:13.440] That says, I spent my whore money at DEF CON. And she's got a titty out. Her favorite one. [42:13.440 --> 42:19.780] Just one. I think I have three whore dollars. Three whore dollars? What are you going to buy? [42:19.780 --> 42:26.940] What whore things are you going to buy? Something special. I don't know where it came from. [42:27.620 --> 42:31.980] I don't know. All right. So the next question. All right. So we discussed, [42:31.980 --> 42:36.840] you know, do we see ourselves more of a target? I think so. We have had people try to infiltrate [42:36.840 --> 42:42.700] our, you know, private spaces that we have for victims. We have a lot of different things that [42:42.700 --> 42:48.880] we do to make sure that when people contact us, they are who they say they are. You know, [42:48.880 --> 42:55.740] because there have been some, you know, threats made of people trying to gain access to victims [42:55.740 --> 43:00.480] or, you know, looking to, you know, there's a whole separate there's a whole separate [43:01.680 --> 43:06.820] fetish for people that enjoy seeing victims reactions when they find out their photos are [43:06.820 --> 43:10.900] out there. They like to get the screenshots of them notifying victims, hey, your pictures [43:10.900 --> 43:15.880] are out there and they freak out. You know, and I had somebody tried to do that to me, [43:15.880 --> 43:21.380] actually, on Twitter rather recently. And I just made fun of them. It was great, [43:21.380 --> 43:28.500] because I no longer give a shit. But that is a thing. So gaining access to victims and watching [43:28.500 --> 43:34.680] them in their most vulnerable states, you know, that's the how awful is it that people get off [43:34.680 --> 43:42.220] that? Just saying. Next question is, what are some privacy tips that parents can pass on to [43:42.220 --> 43:48.760] their kids or teens? You know, recognition of exploitative behavior, protecting oneself online [43:48.760 --> 43:55.580] from malicious X, so on and so forth. I'm going to like repeat what we said a little bit earlier. [43:55.580 --> 44:01.080] And just like, in general, have a talk about consent with your kids and your teens, [44:01.080 --> 44:05.820] even starting at a really, really young age, like consent applies to everything. It's never [44:05.820 --> 44:14.360] not sexy. And it's never weird to bring up that, like, I want you to do this or that with my body [44:14.360 --> 44:22.260] or images of my body, and only that. So yeah, just impress upon them the importance of consent [44:22.260 --> 44:27.640] and having those conversations with their partners. So if they are sharing images, which [44:27.640 --> 44:32.320] it probably will be, they do need to have those conversations about what [44:32.320 --> 44:35.840] is allowed to happen with those images that they do share. [44:36.620 --> 44:44.480] Yeah. Oh, sorry. No, go on. You were clapping. I was gonna say, do not force your kids to hug [44:44.480 --> 44:51.160] people. That, I can't agree more. You can start talking about consent at a very early age. [44:51.160 --> 44:55.820] And it's not just consent that you want to cover. You also want to cover what your agency is. [44:55.820 --> 45:01.140] Having agency over your own body, how to say no, how to speak out when something is making you [45:01.140 --> 45:04.760] uncomfortable. These are conversations that people don't want to have because they're [45:04.760 --> 45:11.000] uncomfortable, but they need to. Because having them later after a victimizing incident or after [45:11.000 --> 45:16.920] trauma is going to be way more awkward, I promise. Not to mention traumatic. [45:18.500 --> 45:22.760] No, and I'm just going to pop in real fast too, like, because you're right, [45:22.760 --> 45:26.800] consent and agency go hand in hand. And actually just kind of recently, [45:26.800 --> 45:31.020] in the last couple of years, there's a new kind of method of looking at consent [45:31.020 --> 45:37.240] called the triangle of consent. I encourage everybody to look it up. But that incorporates [45:37.240 --> 45:43.880] power, agency, and communication, and all three of those things come together to create consent. [45:43.880 --> 45:48.160] So I think that's a really good starting point for talking to your kids and teens. [45:49.000 --> 45:56.440] I also think that a really important addition to that is once your kids reach the teen years and [45:56.440 --> 46:02.060] you notice that they start to look at pornography, I think that talking about consensual pornography [46:02.060 --> 46:07.120] and what that looks like and what they should be recognizing and what they should be consuming, [46:07.120 --> 46:13.820] I think that's really important as well. Yeah, I think that, yeah, having just healthy [46:13.820 --> 46:20.080] talks surrounding sex is really important, but it's also really important to talk to them about, [46:20.080 --> 46:23.520] you know, security and things like that, because they, you know, that is, [46:23.520 --> 46:30.040] this is a really big place of where both things, you know, intersect. Because... [46:31.980 --> 46:38.600] I was gonna say, I agree with that. Like, you know, I mean, if your child isn't comfortable [46:38.600 --> 46:43.280] doing something with their boyfriend or their girlfriend, they should be able to say, [46:43.280 --> 46:49.700] yo, I'm not comfortable with this. Like, teaching your kids the way to stand up for themselves [46:49.700 --> 46:56.420] will go a long way. And, I mean, I know it's not necessarily, like, image abuse related, [46:56.420 --> 47:05.020] but, I mean, it really is, like, all about teaching consent. And recognizing threats. [47:05.520 --> 47:11.480] And, like, teaching, just teaching kids to be careful when they're online and talking to people, [47:11.480 --> 47:16.260] when they're on TikTok and interacting with people that they think are one person, [47:16.260 --> 47:20.980] but they might be somebody else. Like, don't put your private information or your personal [47:20.980 --> 47:27.260] information anywhere. Just general abstract, I think, is really important to start that [47:27.260 --> 47:31.700] conversation as soon as your kids have access to a device. [47:32.580 --> 47:42.520] Mm-hmm. All right, next question, and I was told to ask this one next, is Jordan White wanted [47:42.520 --> 47:46.380] to know, they have a famous friend named, you know, I'm going to redact the name because [47:46.380 --> 47:50.920] the Streisand effect was real, and she has a very bad stalker who has now been stalking [47:50.920 --> 47:55.100] my other friends who have worked for her, provided outfits, business, etc. Should she [47:55.100 --> 47:58.720] contact Badass for this or something? She and her friends are very lost. [48:00.100 --> 48:07.340] Um, how would you address that? Yeah, contact us. Yeah, definitely. [48:08.160 --> 48:10.420] Kimmy, you're the one that said we need to take this question. [48:10.440 --> 48:14.820] Absolutely. I mean, I think, I think if there's like that public cry for help, [48:14.820 --> 48:18.060] I definitely think that that's something you should contact us with. [48:19.080 --> 48:21.640] And that's the whole reason we have this org. [48:22.760 --> 48:30.680] Absolutely. I do want to mention that you're, um, that while we do focus squarely on image [48:30.680 --> 48:35.600] abuse, okay, which is non-consensual leaking of nude images, it also has to do with upskirting [48:35.600 --> 48:41.940] any sort of non-consensual behavior online or offline that involves images. Um, you know, [48:41.940 --> 48:48.940] we get approached a lot when it comes to questions about stalking, about, um, harassment, about, [48:48.940 --> 48:54.200] you know, abuse. And while we might not have every answer, [48:54.200 --> 49:00.100] um, we do know a lot of people that we can talk to, um, and we will always do our best [49:00.100 --> 49:06.860] to address these issues as much as we can. Um, so yeah, yeah, absolutely. [49:06.860 --> 49:11.380] I think the best way to sum it up, and I actually think Caitlin's the one that said that, [49:11.380 --> 49:16.400] said this to me when I first started, was if you think you need to contact badass, [49:16.400 --> 49:20.300] if that's even a question in your mind, reach out. [49:21.780 --> 49:26.620] Yeah, I mean, even if we can't necessarily, like, even if you don't think that it [49:27.480 --> 49:36.280] pertains to what we do, odds are somebody in this group will be able to help you. Um, [49:36.280 --> 49:44.440] somebody has experienced what you experienced. Somebody is, somebody's there. Um, that's the [49:44.440 --> 49:51.080] beauty of our group, is you're not alone, and you always have somebody to talk to. [49:51.320 --> 49:56.600] I will say that when this happens to you online, especially, you know, when it happens to you [49:56.600 --> 50:02.620] in my situation, I didn't understand the internet at all. I, uh, barely went outside Google and [50:02.620 --> 50:10.060] Facebook. And so when it happened to me, I felt really, really helpless and overwhelmed and alone. [50:10.060 --> 50:16.000] Above all, I felt isolated and scared because I didn't know who was doing this to me. I didn't [50:16.000 --> 50:20.260] know who had been helping them, who all these people making these horrible comments about my [50:20.260 --> 50:24.840] body. I didn't know who they were. So when I turned to somebody for help, it might be one [50:24.840 --> 50:31.340] of those people that's just looking to make fun of me more, um, or kick me when I'm down, when [50:31.340 --> 50:37.140] I'm feeling vulnerable. So I, you know, just knowing that you're not alone and that there [50:37.140 --> 50:41.620] is someone that you can talk to that you can trust and who isn't going to be judging you and [50:41.620 --> 50:47.740] isn't going to be re-victimizing you is important. And that can make a huge difference. [50:49.400 --> 50:56.760] So yeah, uh, that is absolutely have them, um, contact us. They can do so with any of our Twitter [50:56.760 --> 51:03.560] handles. Um, and we'll put those in the chat and, you know, or through our website, www.badassarmy.org, [51:03.560 --> 51:09.980] which also I saw one of the questions was, how can people support you guys? And, um, [51:09.980 --> 51:14.780] how can people support y'all? And, uh, the best way they can do that is through [51:14.780 --> 51:21.600] our website. We have some donation, uh, links that they can use as well as just [51:21.600 --> 51:29.980] letting people know we're here. Um, so next question, uh, what about cases outside of the [51:29.980 --> 51:43.430] U S like Ireland or the UK? Um, we have a UK group. Um, we know people, um, I mean, [51:43.430 --> 51:51.150] our organization has contacts like internationally for, I mean, we can, [51:52.290 --> 52:00.630] we can find someone who can help you pretty much is what my answer to that would be. Um, our, [52:00.630 --> 52:11.710] our net is wide and we can, um, we all know enough people who know people who can point you [52:11.710 --> 52:21.510] where you need to go. I just want to mention that the U S is really far behind everybody else. [52:22.070 --> 52:28.590] That's what I was going to say. The UK, they have a bunch of orgs, their laws are built stronger. [52:28.770 --> 52:34.570] Um, and Australia, oh my gosh, Australia is just really ahead of this. They have an entire [52:35.130 --> 52:40.410] section of their government that is just, um, you know, it's a government funded organization [52:40.410 --> 52:47.070] to prevent this. Uh, and they're already tackling things that the U S is still, [52:47.070 --> 52:52.070] you know, most people don't acknowledge that they're things that exist like deep fakes or, [52:52.070 --> 52:58.070] you know, how this all, you know, they're really starting to make things happen in Australia. So [52:58.510 --> 53:03.190] yeah, we have a lot of, we have a lot of ways to go. [53:07.270 --> 53:09.810] That's literally what I was going to say. So yay. [53:12.670 --> 53:17.310] All right. Um, somebody said it really comes down to this. How can a law or set of laws be [53:17.310 --> 53:22.150] created or phrased to fight this issue without being used to clamp down on speech or sex workers, [53:22.150 --> 53:28.890] similar to FOSTA-SESTA, which is, um, you know, something that by all means, it was meant to help [53:28.890 --> 53:35.810] people that are getting victimized and, um, you know, help prevent this sort of victimization by, [53:35.810 --> 53:41.190] you know, in making platforms, um, accountable, but at the same time, [53:41.190 --> 53:46.530] it hasn't really been used for that. Has it? No. What it's been used for is to attack and harm sex [53:46.530 --> 53:54.870] workers. Um, and it has a body count at this point. So how do you think that we should, um, [53:54.870 --> 54:01.990] be addressing this in a way that isn't going to either, A, be used to harm sex workers or, um, [54:01.990 --> 54:08.830] B, be used to infringe on our free speech? Yeah. Uh, that's really hard. Uh, but like my [54:08.830 --> 54:16.230] first initial thought is to just, is to kind of focus that language on like, uh, or I guess focus [54:16.230 --> 54:23.190] the law itself on proof of consent. So like you're responsible if you're posting content to [54:23.190 --> 54:30.770] prove that the subject and that content has consented to being in it. Like maybe if there's, [54:30.770 --> 54:39.840] if that comes into play somewhere that will help a lot. Like requiring websites that allow [54:39.840 --> 54:46.660] pornography to get a release from every person that is actively participating on screen? [54:47.600 --> 54:55.500] Yeah. I mean, that wouldn't be any different than other websites that posts. I mean, [54:55.500 --> 55:05.160] yeah. Like just verify the user. Um, I mean, I think the U.S. speaking of being behind and [55:05.660 --> 55:11.820] how other countries deal with it, I think the U.S. over criminalizes that behavior. Um, [55:12.660 --> 55:18.640] from my personal opinion on it, not my necessarily like legal opinion on it, but, [55:18.640 --> 55:27.600] um, yeah, I think there's a way to write these laws that doesn't make it like that makes [55:27.600 --> 55:36.040] consensual sex work legal and doesn't criminalize it and lets people do what people are going to do. [55:36.040 --> 55:42.120] Um, I mean, we're a country founded on privacy. Let people do what they want. [55:42.140 --> 55:50.420] And also a large portion of our, um, victim base are sex workers because, you know, you want your [55:50.420 --> 55:55.800] photos in a consensual way to be released to a certain market in a certain bubble. And once [55:55.800 --> 56:02.360] it releases outside of that, it can be just as harmful as for anyone else, you know? So I think [56:02.360 --> 56:10.800] that these, um, sorts of laws help and also harm, you know, it's double-ended. Yeah, Rachel, [56:10.800 --> 56:18.960] that's a good point too, is, um, I mean, you're, it's just because you're a sex worker doesn't [56:18.960 --> 56:25.440] mean that your copyrighted personal work isn't your intellectual property that you get to keep [56:25.440 --> 56:31.980] and that you're entitled to. It shouldn't matter. And consent for one doesn't consent to, to, [56:31.980 --> 56:37.460] if. Consent for one doesn't translate to consent for many, allowing a certain, I mean, even [56:37.460 --> 56:41.760] transactional consent is consent. And that is the thing that matters. And it's just as traumatic [56:41.760 --> 56:46.420] to have people that you didn't want to be seeing your images or, you know, often with sex workers, [56:46.420 --> 56:53.420] we find them doxxed, um, along with their images. So it's double the trauma right there. [56:53.420 --> 56:57.940] And I mean, I think it's the ultimate irony that we're speaking at a hacker conference where we [56:57.940 --> 57:04.420] talk about how broken copyright laws are in the DMCA. And at the same time, you know, that's one [57:04.420 --> 57:11.480] of our, as an organization, biggest tools to fight some of this, you know, is the copyright laws. [57:12.140 --> 57:17.540] Oh yeah. Um, hey, you know, we have a really important question I do want to address. Uh, [57:17.540 --> 57:24.040] this is from a friend of mine, Weems. Um, and they asked what should happen is allowing rules [57:24.040 --> 57:30.160] that help victims without removing liability protections platforms outside of CSAM and CP. [57:30.160 --> 57:34.720] I deeply, deeply concerned about the bills that have been proposed like earn it, which is [57:34.720 --> 57:39.580] definitely a pro-censorship law and even more worrying LAED Act, which would outlaw encryption [57:39.580 --> 57:45.000] in the US. And I want to know what the panel thinks about this. Um, anyone else want to take [57:45.000 --> 57:53.620] that one first or sort of cool. If I jump, you can do it. All right, cool. Um, you know, [57:53.620 --> 58:01.140] I kind of started in on this one with, you know, uh, foster SESTA and how, um, these laws they're [58:01.140 --> 58:09.540] you one, they're using CSAM as just, you know, a way to kind of put a friendly spin on this law. [58:09.540 --> 58:14.280] Like if, you know, your lawmakers aren't passing it, that's because they hate kids. Um, but really [58:14.280 --> 58:21.260] when it comes down to it, it's, um, removing the privacy of every user. Uh, and the fact is we've [58:21.260 --> 58:26.580] seen them be put in place and we see exactly how little they actually help the things that they're [58:26.580 --> 58:32.780] supposed to be, um, preventing. Um, what these laws are going to be doing is destroying censorship [58:32.780 --> 58:37.760] and freedom. And I don't think that's right. I hate these laws. They are, I feel like they've [58:37.760 --> 58:45.480] been, uh, bought and paid for by, you know, certain, um, you know, very specific lobbies. [58:45.480 --> 58:49.400] And I think they're bullshit and we've definitely, everybody needs to get involved. If there's [58:49.400 --> 58:53.540] anything that badass has proved, it's that everybody can get involved when it comes to [58:53.540 --> 58:58.660] legislation. And if you care about something, you need to start calling and making stuff happen. And [58:58.660 --> 59:05.160] you need to call your, um, lawmakers and talk to them about the earn it act and that, you know, [59:05.160 --> 59:10.360] encryption isn't really important. It should stay something that we have available. [59:11.200 --> 59:13.680] Yeah. I mean, Oh, sorry, Timmy, go ahead. [59:13.760 --> 59:20.000] Real quick. I'll take a, I'll take a line out of, uh, uh, talk Corey Doctorow gave at DefCon [59:20.120 --> 59:24.040] a couple of years ago about the war on general purpose computing. And something that I think [59:24.040 --> 59:30.260] these lawmakers forget is that it is not possible to make a general purpose computer that does [59:30.260 --> 59:36.600] everything except the one thing that you don't want it to do. Um, that's just not how computers [59:36.600 --> 59:44.800] work. That's not how math works. And that is a nuance that is lost by the old white men writing [59:44.800 --> 59:54.700] these laws. Yeah. And, um, that's a really good point. Oh, real quick. We got like a minute. So, [59:54.700 --> 59:59.320] Oh, I was just going to say, um, I thought you were telling me to stop. Um, sorry. Yeah. Uh, [59:59.320 --> 01:00:03.060] that's a really good point to me, but also like to go off what Caitlin was saying, like, [01:00:03.060 --> 01:00:10.680] um, there is a balance between free speech and censorship. And I think, um, if we're going to [01:00:10.680 --> 01:00:16.400] start doing things like outlawing encryption and censoring material, like we really need to [01:00:16.400 --> 01:00:23.160] take that into consideration and without boring y'all with Conwell jurisprudence, um, you know, [01:00:23.160 --> 01:00:29.160] that's, it's not something to be taken lightly. And I think we really need to examine how we do [01:00:29.160 --> 01:00:34.180] this and what precedent it could set for the future. I think Kate just really wanted to say [01:00:34.180 --> 01:00:40.460] jurisprudence. I did. Okay. All right. As long as we got that cleared up goal achieved. All right, [01:00:40.460 --> 01:00:46.140] real quick. Um, we are going to be going into the voice chat. I know I am. Um, cause frankly, [01:00:46.140 --> 01:00:53.360] y'all can't make me shut up. So yeah. Um, but I really quick, uh, I just want to see if anyone [01:00:53.360 --> 01:00:59.160] has one final message they'd like to share with the people watching and listening to this at [01:00:59.160 --> 01:01:06.580] DEF CON today. Anyone final message, Rachel. Um, I'd say, um, everyone, please reach out. If you [01:01:06.580 --> 01:01:11.260] have a question, comment, concern, we would love to hear you and we would love to, um, integrate [01:01:11.260 --> 01:01:22.460] you into our, our group of like, you know, sorry, I mean, I cut out the webcam. Um, I really feel [01:01:22.460 --> 01:01:27.420] that, you know, there's a place for everyone and you do not have to go through image abuse alone. [01:01:27.420 --> 01:01:40.380] We're here for you. And yeah. Oh, me. Yeah. Okay. I'll keep it quick. Uh, [01:01:40.380 --> 01:01:43.640] be awesome to one another. Fuck cloud flare. Black lives matter. [01:01:45.960 --> 01:01:47.620] All right. Allie. [01:01:48.780 --> 01:01:54.340] Going to echo Timmy's fuck cloud flare comment. Um, thanks for listening to us, [01:01:54.340 --> 01:01:58.320] reach out to us if y'all need anything. We're always around to answer questions and, [01:01:58.320 --> 01:02:03.500] um, we definitely are going to keep talking about this stuff. So. [01:02:04.980 --> 01:02:12.640] Marley. Uh, ditto on what everybody said. And to add to it, um, yeah, let's please keep talking [01:02:12.640 --> 01:02:20.700] about this, uh, conversation about how we can make laws that don't infringe on, um, speech and, [01:02:20.700 --> 01:02:25.620] um, encryption, but that will help victims. I think that's a really important conversation to [01:02:25.620 --> 01:02:31.820] have and your voices are really helpful. Okay. Do you just want us to do this again? [01:02:32.300 --> 01:02:40.720] No, ditto, uh, black lives matter and consent is key. I'll always get it. [01:02:40.720 --> 01:02:46.500] I'm gonna end this, uh, whole thing up by saying thank you to everyone out there watching. Thank [01:02:46.500 --> 01:02:51.740] you to the, you know, everyone organizing DEF CON this year. I know it has been crazy and chaotic [01:02:51.740 --> 01:02:58.440] and you haven't do a lot of things that is, that are brand new. And I just want to say it's been [01:02:58.440 --> 01:03:05.240] wonderful thus far. I miss you all. I can't wait to see you in Vegas next year. Um, and meanwhile, [01:03:05.240 --> 01:03:11.000] uh, you know, life is short, have all the orgasms, consensual, healthy orgasms, [01:03:11.000 --> 01:03:17.440] or cookies, depending on what you want. Um, and just stay badass. Peace.