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4230	6250	Hello, this is Ismail Mejitas.
6490	11490	I will present practical web pan testing using the most up-to-date version of Mr.SIP Pro.
11910	14110	Mr.SIP is a SIP-based audit and attack tool.
14110	20910	It's a software product that helps organizations to manage their communication infrastructure to perform web-specific security tests.
21410	23970	The companies can also measure their risks.
24530	26530	Please do start in our GitHub.
26530	28870	Please follow our Twitter account for updates.
28870	33810	And please subscribe our YouTube channel if you need 100 subscribers to update the URL.
40500	42740	Let's talk about our agenda here.
42860	44820	I will have a very short introduction.
44820	48140	Then I will briefly talk about the timeline and the story of Mr.SIP.
48440	52200	I would like to mention about some facts about voice over IP security.
52420	56420	I will then share some information about Pro version modules of Mr.SIP.
56600	59440	I will explain the functionalities and interaction between the modules.
59440	61960	We will also look at our roadmap.
62380	69840	And after briefly showing some basics of voice over IP and SIP, I will mention about today's voice over IP security threats.
69840	73320	Then I will show the lab setup we will use during the demo.
73640	75860	And the interesting part begins here.
76300	80900	I will talk about three cool hacking stories which I will demonstrate using Mr.SIP Pro.
80980	84160	The first story is actually based on a real incident.
84160	90580	And we will show you how hackers made millions of dollars in large-scale cold fraud.
90720	100660	For each hacking story, I will give baseline information, lab setup, steps to perform, the demo itself and the short conclusion.
100820	105120	In addition, I will talk about how we developed advanced novel attacks.
105120	108440	These novel attacks appear in academic literature using Mr.SIP.
108440	114060	Finally, we will review how Mr.SIP fits to the overall voice over IP methodology.
118690	121010	And here I will mention about my profile.
121010	122130	You can call me Mele.
122290	124890	I am a security researcher from Istanbul, Turkey.
125010	128110	I mostly do offensive security research about voice over IP.
128510	134470	I work as a principal pentest in a private bank and I have a PhD in computer engineering.
134790	136210	I am an entrepreneur.
136210	138030	In my free time, I do bug hunting.
138110	141730	If you want to reach me out, please find me on LinkedIn, Twitter or GitHub.
143770	145990	And here is my friend Kubilay.
145990	148450	We gathered together since 2016.
148670	150770	He is a PhD from Oxford University.
150770	153350	He works at the cyber security center there.
153350	156490	And he is an alumni from ETH3.
156670	163010	He is mainly working in trusted computing, hardware-assisted security and Intel's SGX technology.
163650	167810	You can reach him on LinkedIn for your questions or projects.
169090	173050	Mr.SIP is a web security product that started as a hobby project.
173050	177010	Mr.SIP resulted several academic research papers and journal articles.
177010	180750	It is the most comprehensive attack-oriented voice over IP product ever.
180750	182530	And you will see the reasons today.
184170	188070	First time Mr.SIP appeared in a private company where I worked before.
188570	193890	We have raised about 8 million Turkish Liras, near to 2 million Euros in research funds.
194470	197710	First prototypes are funded and used by Turkish government.
199450	205130	Between 2011 and 2015, Mr.SIP remained as a closed source.
205390	208910	One independent project sequence began in a similar timeline.
209390	212590	In 2012, we planned to employ Fatih.
213030	217330	After some meetings and due to no NDA, he forked our project.
217950	220750	It was our mistake that we did not have an NDA.
221110	225970	In rest of the years, all the tools remained closed source and I left the company.
227710	229970	We gathered a new team in 2016.
230630	235850	We dedicated to reprogram all the tools utilizing all of our past experiences.
236370	238190	The open source period began.
238510	241770	We published the first open source version in 2017.
242170	246490	And Mr.SIP appeared in Black Hat USA, Europe and Asia arsenals.
246650	248690	And also the off-zone Moscow.
249670	254110	We currently have 10 modules and we plan to add 5 new more modules.
254890	258930	We will be gradually open sourcing more modules once they are mature.
258930	262130	We aim to integrate in Kali Linux and Metasploit.
262130	266230	And we look for collaboration from big Voice over IP vendors.
268170	272350	Various reports show the current security risk in Voice over IP sector.
272350	279290	According to CSCS 2019 report, the total loss of telecom fraud was $28.2 billion.
279290	285550	And this corresponds to 1.74% of total telecom revenues.
286230	289630	When we look at the most common weaknesses in the graphs on the left side,
289630	294650	in the top three, we see that web users and VBA systems are targeted most.
295350	303610	In the graphic on the right, we see that biggest risk for communication systems are denial of service attacks and caller ID information fraud.
305690	309850	InstaSip is evolving and actively being used by researchers and practitioners.
310110	313730	This demand from the sector confirms that we should make InstaSip better.
314430	319310	It was shared on various popular forums and news sources including Black Hat's homepage.
319430	321830	InstaSip was cited in Cisco publications.
321830	330770	It was used in caller ID scoping tests as part of Turkish Standards Institute collaboration for national Voice over IP standard setting studies.
330770	335450	It also has been used in various prestigious academic publications.
338210	341950	Voice over IP technologies have unavoidable security threats.
341950	344490	Voice over IP protocols are not designed securely.
344490	348790	The products developed so far could not catch today's security requirements.
349270	356830	Voice over IP security cannot be addressed correctly in corporate information security policies because they have low awareness about Voice over IP security.
356830	361410	We foresee that Voice over IP security will gain more importance in the near future.
361410	364610	And InstaSip is here to solve all the problems.
367250	369970	InstaSip contains 10 modules in three categories.
369970	373570	Information Gathering, Vulnerability Scanning, and Offensive modules.
373830	377850	There are two helper components called IP Securing Engine and Message Generator.
378190	381950	Green modules are included in the open source version, the public version.
381950	384870	In pro version, we have added five more modules.
384870	389310	We also extended the public modules with new features.
390090	393810	Also in our roadmap, there are five new attack modules.
393810	397370	In addition, we will develop an easy-to-use GUI.
398030	405270	I will not go through each module one by one, but you will see in the live demos how we combine them to deploy large-scale attacks.
405990	410290	If you have time in Q&A, we can discuss and explain the modules further.
410490	412830	You can also read the documentation in our GitHub.
417600	421040	It offers many innovative and competitive features.
421040	428580	For example, high-performance multi-training, IP superfing, smart SIP message generation, self-hiding and intervention skills.
428780	433820	MrSIP has also a customizable scenario development framework for stateful attacks.
434500	439680	We have seen practitioners also use MrSIP as a client simulator and traffic generator.
441860	447560	Banks, service providers and public institutions who has weighted infrastructure use MrSIP.
447980	452740	Service integrators and consulting firms serving in the security field use MrSIP.
453160	456480	We welcome if you have any novel use case of MrSIP.
459140	463620	MrSIP is a tool that should be in every PAN testers' and red teamers' toolbox.
463860	469220	It is also used to perform unit tests during the development of voice-over IP and security products.
470120	475500	It is also useful at quality checking stage before purchasing such voice-over IP products.
477880	483480	Now, before we go into technical details of MrSIP, let's understand how SIP works.
483760	488620	There are three approaches of how voice-over IP is deployed and configured within organizations.
488620	494060	These are internal voice-over IP implementation, managed services and online SIP tracking.
494320	498200	For this presentation, we will target internal voice-over IP implementations.
500260	503280	SIP is a text-based protocol very similar to HTTP.
503540	506300	You can see the request methods and response types here.
506960	510380	If you need more information on SIP itself, please ask in the Q&A.
512980	516680	This is the very basic call flow for SIP.
517560	520100	Normally, call flows can be more complex.
520440	523180	This is between two users and the server in the middle.
523520	527560	Although SIP is similar to HTTP, it is more complex than HTTP.
527560	529600	RTP means the media.
531500	534360	And this is a sample of an invite message.
534700	540880	There are some specific headers and parameters which need to be vendor-specific and unique for each call.
543640	548320	SIP uses a similar mechanism to HTTP known as HTTP digest.
548420	550920	The user password is symmetrical and pressured.
551260	558560	In SIP 2.0, MD5 hashing algorithm is applied to the authentication data before they are sent to the server.
559320	562340	This is a sample of SIP register method.
562340	565860	It shows the packet capture of SIP authentication request.
566080	570840	This packet capture contains useful information to execute the authentication attack.
574800	579380	We will demonstrate the VoIP security threats over three hacking scenarios.
579920	583180	We will identify SIP servers and enumerate user extensions.
583420	587900	We will talk about registration hijacking using SIP digest authentication cracking.
588160	591320	We will do man-in-the-middle attack and sniff the SIP traffic.
591320	598760	Call ID swiping, call e-mail swiping, telephony denial-of-service attacks are other security threats we are going to demonstrate.
599320	603620	We will also abuse to non-vulnerabilities and exploits specific to SIP components.
604360	606640	We have several live demos.
606660	615540	In the long-distance call routing crowd demo, we will show how hackers deploy large-scale attacks to telecom companies' infrastructures.
617460	620820	This is our VoIP security laboratory environment.
621320	624100	We have three IP PBXs on the network.
624220	627160	We use three SPACs and three PBXs as SIP servers.
627820	632420	We have one attacker machine, which is Kali Linux, and MrSIP Pro is installed on it.
633040	636900	There are some users registered on those PBX systems.
636900	640120	We use Zoeper, Jitsi, and Minfone as soft clients.
642680	645160	MrSIP is a console-based Python 3 tool.
645160	649420	In order to run MrSIP in your Kali, you need to install some Python libraries.
649420	652660	Please see our GitHub for full instructions.
653640	657580	Here we will see how MrSIP modules work together to deploy an attack.
657620	659400	Green modules are core modules.
659400	661100	Blue ones are attack modules.
661380	663860	External inputs such as dictionaries are in yellow.
664000	666880	And gray ones are outputs of MrSIP modules.
667500	678140	As you can see in the graphic above, SIP message generator feeds the network scanner, enumerator, vulnerability scanner, signaling manipulator, DOS attack simulator, and attack scenario player.
678140	683840	The output of network scanner is given as an input to the enumerator and vulnerability scanner.
684700	690920	In the graphic below, Sniffer, along with many of the middle attack modules, feeds evilspropper and cracker.
690920	696340	The list of valid SIP users are the bold output of enumerator and evilspropper.
696680	701860	Then all these outputs feed the predefined user agent and SIP extension dictionaries.
703000	707780	Our first hacking story is registration hijacking for long-distance co-routing fraud.
708140	710600	This attack is based on fraudulent traffic carrying.
711020	714000	Hackers made millions of dollars in this fraud business.
714100	716560	I will expose the details right now.
717000	724620	With this attack, we target an enterprise that can make voice over IP calls over the internet, which means that they have SIP trunk services.
725400	730980	As a result of this attack, the voice over IP infrastructure will be abused and will hit expensive bills.
730980	738740	The underlying causes of the attack are the weak or no password policies specific to voice over IP services.
738900	741660	This situation is often experienced in enterprises.
742220	748780	Another reason we can say is that voice over IP communication takes place over unencrypted channels using UDP.
749980	757960	The attacker's motivation is to gain user access, execute voice over IP wholesale carrier voice business through the stolen user accounts,
757960	763540	and repeat this for hundreds of enterprises, resulting in million-dollar benefits.
764600	768820	Our attack scenarios are authentication attack and registration hijacking.
768860	776060	The techniques we will use are man-in-the-middle sniffing, digest authentication calculation, and dictionary-based password cracking.
776380	780420	When we talk about our setup and attack steps, we have two assumptions.
780680	784260	First, we were hired to make an internal voice over IP process.
784260	787760	Second, the target SIP server can make voice over IP calls over the internet.
787960	790400	And we know our target subnet.
791000	795600	We will use network scanner, enumerator, sniffer, and cracker module of MrSIP Pro.
795720	800560	We will use dictionary files as external input for user extensions and passwords.
801420	809080	Our steps are, first, we will discover active SIP servers on the network and identify valid users on these servers.
809600	814240	Then we will need man-in-the-middle and sniffing skills to capture SIP digest authentication data.
814240	820560	And we will perform the necessary calculation in order to get the hash we need to crack.
821000	824680	And then crack the password real-time with our built-in module.
826420	830600	Our attacker machine is Kali Linux and MrSIP Pro is installed on it.
832620	835040	For this demo, we will use two terminals.
835620	843300	And the first thing we want to do is to start a SIP sniffer in terminal 2 using the IP address of our attack machine.
844240	847140	Here we can see the SIP traffic activities performed there.
857100	860440	We are launching our network scanner in terminal 1.
860740	869720	And what SIPnest does is sending SIP option messages to all IP addresses in the given subnet to identify SIP servers according to their response status and user agent headers.
870720	876100	And since we scan a subnet, we want it to be completed quickly and we gave the trading count 50.
876180	877640	And the default one is 10.
880440	883480	We could also give another message type instead of SIP options.
883480	886120	Some servers may not respond to options.
907920	915200	As a result, we detected two active SIP servers by scanning the entire network in 20 seconds and both are asterisk-based.
928980	937300	This automatically writes SIPnest output to the ip__list.txt file for other modules to use.
940410	948570	And we will run our SIP enumerator using the predefined user extension dictionary file named from.txt to detect users on the target server.
955170	961610	And what it does is sending subscribe messages to the servers by default.
961610	964230	We can use different messages too such as register.
964230	968190	And it identifies wallet users according to their response status.
968630	979470	And as output, it found wallet users through these servers and informed us if these users require an authentication or not.
979830	983290	It detected 8 users in 10 seconds in total.
983290	986570	Three of them don't have passwords at all.
986570	988690	We can get these users directly.
988690	995530	Now our goal is to get the passwords of five others on the list.
1002510	1009090	For this, we are running our password cracker which performs SIP digest authentication breaking operation.
1010290	1012990	We determined one server as target.
1012990	1017790	As input, we need a password dictionary named wordlist__test.txt.
1018770	1028310	What it does is listening the network using man-in-the-middle and sniffing skills, capturing SIP register messages and obtaining authentication data.
1028310	1034530	And using the data it obtains, breaking the SIP digest authentication real-time and retrieving the passwords.
1036010	1043910	With a soft client called Zoeper, for demo purposes, I trigger register and unregister activities for different users.
1043910	1066710	And so our SIP crack module instantly involves and reveals the passwords.
1080880	1089160	In summary, we found servers and users, we listened to the server, cracked the authentication and we took the users and committed fraud.
1089480	1100600	As a final step, in case these users may force single registration, we can perform SIP registration erasure attack and drop their existing registrations and hijack them.
1100600	1107820	By making this process periodic, we can repeat it over a wide network and increase the number of users we hijack.
1108300	1121100	We can operate Osu! IP wholesale carrier voice or call shop or prepaid postpaid card business to make calls when the users we hijack are not using their accounts according to the country they are located in.
1121260	1125300	Indeed, this is one of the most common hacker's attack methods.
1125300	1132560	For example, in the night time, when real users sleep, we can start selling long distance calls in their accounts.
1133260	1143140	This type of attacks earns millions of dollars by doing business only through hijacked VoIP accounts without running any telecom infrastructure.
1143500	1149280	More than once, I was involved in the forensic examination of this type of attack in enterprises.
1149500	1152340	And I will not mention about the company names.
1153120	1158140	Our second hacking story is caller ID spoofing for a spear phishing campaign.
1158780	1162520	Our target is any enterprise with VoIP infrastructure.
1163180	1169620	As a result of the attack, the attacker may gain access to the systems or they can leak sensitive data.
1170560	1179620	Reasons underlying the attack, we can say that VoIP communication takes place over unencrypted channels and the security awareness in the organization is low.
1179620	1185400	The attacker's motivation may be to infect malicious software or steal sensitive data.
1185620	1189680	Attacker may also steal credentials for remote access to the system.
1190520	1196020	Our attack vectors, we can say caller ID spoofing attack and social engineering in combination.
1196540	1200820	We will use techniques such as man-in-the-middle spoofing and SIP signaling manipulation.
1204340	1210120	When we talk about our attack setup and attack steps, our assumption 1 is still valid.
1210120	1213760	And we already know the target server IP address.
1214140	1217840	We will use enumerator and eavesdropper modules of MrSIP Pro.
1217960	1222580	We will use user extension dictionary file as external input.
1223460	1228440	Our attack steps, we have already discovered the target server and wallet extensions.
1228800	1233780	Then we will listen the active calls with our man-in-the-middle and sniffer-equipped modules.
1234380	1240100	And we will both enumerate and use the obtained information in order to perform caller ID spoofing attack.
1244550	1246850	Our attack setup is the same again.
1247050	1250590	From the step in the previous attack, we target one of the SIP server.
1251150	1255230	And let's run the enumerator and keep a record of which users are valid.
1268740	1273140	And we have detected 5 active users and some users don't require authentication.
1273980	1278940	However, keep in mind that with this attack method, we can guess valid users.
1284990	1290330	Now, we will eavesdrop SIP calls by listening to the network with man-in-the-middle and sniffer.
1290350	1295310	And we will both learn about the SIP call flow on the server.
1295310	1301110	And we will make an alternative enumeration with the more real data.
1306420	1310320	I made calls with two soft client applications for demo purposes.
1310640	1314340	And when it gets, it shows the call with ongoing tag.
1315060	1321700	And when the call ends, it can calculate the call duration.
1325540	1328860	And we caught two calls for demo purposes.
1328960	1334360	We know that 5,000 and 1,001 users are available to receive calls.
1345710	1348330	Now, let's open a second terminal.
1352520	1357760	And here, we can start our sniffer and observe our SIP traffic activities.
1379810	1384550	Let's go back to terminal one and start the ColorID spoofing attack.
1386010	1394230	And what we want to do is make a call from 1,000 to user 1,001.
1401170	1408450	And when we send the custom invite package, we see that the call is taking place.
1415280	1422960	In the same way, we have seen that we can make a call to the user 5,000.
1431180	1436540	By using this attack systematically, we can make calls as insiders and perform phishing activities.
1437420	1446200	As another attack scenario, we can create a list of target users, perform automatic calls to everyone, and play a pre-recorded media content to everyone.
1446880	1449120	It may be an advertisement content.
1449840	1452960	We carried out this demo attack on the internal network.
1452960	1462640	But if the target server could receive and make calls over the internet, we would also be able to call and automate this job on the number we want.
1463120	1467460	Of course, if you could make voice over IP calls over the internet on the attacker side.
1468680	1476240	The only thing not here is to check if the voice over IP provider on the attacker side allows us to use custom invite message.
1476240	1484540	Some countries and states may have regulation related to this and service providers may have implemented partial solutions to prevent this.
1489200	1494320	Our third hacking story is abusing non-fluid-based telephone denial of service vulnerability.
1494740	1498640	Our target is again any enterprise with voice over IP infrastructure.
1499300	1504860	As a result of the attack, we can overload the capacity of the SIP server and cause a service interruption.
1504860	1511620	Having the non-denial-of-service vulnerability of the target SIP server helps these attacks to take place.
1512680	1519040	The attacker's motivation may be to cut off the accessibility of the target server and all the components it serves.
1519460	1525120	Hackers can manipulate company's attention and carry out other insidious attacks.
1525660	1533240	Our attack vectors are version-based scan for non-vulnerabilities and exploits and, of course, telephone denial-of-service attacks.
1533240	1538500	We will use fluid-based T-DOS and IP spoofing techniques when performing the attack.
1544830	1551110	Similarly, we assume that we are hired to punctest the company or any other similar ways to match this assumption.
1551750	1554710	We have set the target server IP address.
1555070	1560030	We use MrSIP Pro's vulnerability scanner and DOS attack simulator modules.
1560130	1562450	We don't need any external input.
1563210	1567230	Our attack steps. We already know the target server.
1567230	1572730	We will scan for non-vulnerabilities and exploits using the server version information.
1572830	1581310	And we will make the server inaccessible by performing fluid-based telephone denial-of-service attacks using the DOS vulnerability we have obtained.
1587020	1589540	Our attack setup is the same again.
1590480	1594420	Here I will work at three terminals this time for demo purposes.
1595080	1602900	Two are offensive callings of which MrSIP Pro is installed and one of them is the target Twixbox SIP server.
1620020	1624860	We have investigated non-vulnerabilities and exploits for our target server.
1624980	1628700	We discovered 22 non-vulnerabilities and one exploit.
1629420	1633120	And some weaknesses and exploits are familiar to me.
1634240	1637300	I want to check the details immediately.
1639320	1649380	Yes, as I guess, we know that there is a denial-of-service vulnerability against SIP invite fluid attack that I will perform with random users.
1653170	1663610	I want to monitor the CPU and memory usage information of Twixbox in one terminal and I want to run sniffer in another to see our SIP traffic.
1674520	1685720	In the last terminal, I will send 1000 SIP invite messages using random spoofed source IP addresses for the target SIP server.
1736980	1740800	I started the attack and we can see the progress on the screen.
1742220	1749800	Invite messages are starting to go away because these messages go from spoofed IP addresses and use UDP.
1749800	1758760	Each response was retransmitted 7 times for 32 seconds due to SIP's own retransmission mechanism.
1762840	1768620	And we can see that the output of top command is frozen at the terminal of Twixbox.
1769320	1774920	In fact, this shows that the SIP server is no longer able to respond.
1803540	1816650	I want to enter the web interface from the browser to verify, but I see that it's not accessible.
1833070	1837670	Ping packets are reaching, but TTL seems to be strange.
1845960	1849800	And I'm sure now that we are overloaded the server.
1862320	1870160	I can stop the attack and can show that web interface is accessible right now.
1880480	1885860	Although the main problem here seems to be that the SIP server works in a vulnerable version,
1886200	1890300	we know that most networks are vulnerable to TTL attacks.
1891340	1897280	Because the current security parameters cannot manage voice over IP protocols well in the application layer,
1897280	1905020	and therefore cannot distinguish them from real traffic in the face of methods such as retransmission and reflection in the UDP usage.
1905020	1913460	On the other hand, the approach of the attackers can attract attention and perform another insidious attack at the time.
1916560	1922940	So far, we demonstrated three hacking stories. Now, we will further explain specific features.
1923680	1927660	Attack scenario player allows you to perform stateful SIP call scenarios.
1927660	1930380	We have predefined eight attack scenarios.
1930380	1939640	It also allows you to develop new attack scenarios such as Distributed Reflected Denial-of-Service or Retransmission-Based Distributed Denial-of-Service.
1943030	1947350	And these are the attack scenarios are developed for our connect studies.
1947390	1952230	We named the first one Incomplete Invite Transaction DDoS with non-responding destination attack,
1952230	1956690	and the second one Incomplete Invite Dialog DDoS without ACK attack.
1957230	1960530	Both of them abuse SIP's retransmission mechanism.
1960530	1966850	Since SIP often uses UDP in the retransmission layer, it has its own retransmission mechanism.
1966890	1975670	In our academic research, we developed these two attack methods by using the weaknesses of the retransmission mechanism and brought them to the academic literature.
1976190	1980930	This article was published in Elsevier's Computers and Security Journal.
1981830	1985430	There is a prerequisite for the target in the first attack method.
1985430	1992750	The target user should be registered to the SIP server, but they should not have access to the internet at that time,
1992750	1997530	or their registration should be removed in some way at that time.
1997530	2008430	No problem, we can provide this condition using the registration arranger attack we have added to the SIP ASP scenarios,
2008430	2013910	or we can satisfy this precondition by performing Denial-of-Service attack to the target client.
2015110	2024810	Then, what we want to do is send an invite message and wait for the SIP server to send the same invite message seven times for 32 seconds in total,
2024810	2029090	using the retransmission mechanism to transmit this message to the other party.
2029870	2039790	When no response is received from the other party, the SIP server will send us a 408 request timeout message and wait for an egg message from us.
2039790	2050390	If we don't answer, it will assume that it cannot deliver the package and will retransmit it seven times for 32 seconds in total.
2050710	2058390	Thus, by sending only an invite message, we occupy the source on the target server for 64 seconds.
2059530	2065970	And we don't have a prerequisite in our attack in the second figure, the target users will be registered and accessible.
2065970	2078450	Since we only leave the responses coming to us unanswered, we will potentially occupy server and target client resources for a minimum of 32 seconds.
2081020	2085500	There is another attack scenario that we have developed for our academic studies.
2085560	2089520	We named it SIP Request Reflection Attack, SR-DOS in short.
2089920	2096740	Just like the ICMP SMURF attack, we also worked on attack methods that could reflect SIP requests and responses.
2096740	2101920	And we brought our study results to the literature through our academic papers.
2102560	2110980	Here, we have been able to enable these attacks by combining the weaknesses of some SIP headers priority and IP spoofing technique.
2111120	2114420	This work was published in IEEE Access Journal.
2115180	2119740	This is to visualize the waypoint test steps that we can do using MrSIP Pro.
2119760	2123080	Maybe we can call it as workflow instead of methodology.
2123080	2128180	If we call the open source version as version 1, we can call this one as version 2.
2128620	2133980	This workflow shows what MrSIP Pro can do today and it will do more.
2134060	2137280	Its scope will expand further with more advanced features.
2138240	2141120	We thank our friends for their contributions.
2141760	2144260	We also thank our lead maintainer Hakkı.
2144260	2149660	He is a great programmer and he is available to hire for internships or full-time jobs.
2150440	2153060	And we would like to expand our dictionaries.
2153080	2158100	If you have any useful worklists in a related field, please share with us.
2159200	2161740	And here are our references.
2162020	2166740	If anyone is interested to further read, we have more details here.
2168480	2170300	Thanks everyone for listening.
2170300	2173500	And again, please give star in our YouTube.
2173500	2177660	Please follow us on Twitter and please subscribe our YouTube channel.
2177660	2179360	So we will update the world.
2180040	2182980	These are my contact information if you want to reach out.
2183080	2184460	I am Melih Tas on LinkedIn.
2184840	2186020	Art and Science on Twitter.
2186020	2187260	And Melih T on GitHub.