start	end	text
6980	11960	So, hi to everybody at the Aerospace Village and dialing in for our panel,
11960	15280	where we're going to be talking about the hacker community and ISACs.
15280	20460	I'm Pete Cooper, the Director of the Aerospace Village, and I'm going to be hosting for the next 50 minutes.
20860	26960	Now, across the aerospace sector, good faith security research has played a hugely key role
26960	29400	in highlighting both risks and vulnerabilities.
29600	32620	But if the researcher or hacker can't find a good point of contact,
32620	35060	then approaches about potential vulnerabilities
35560	38920	hasn't always been potentially welcomed with open arms.
39380	43280	The Aerospace Village really looks to help build bridges and trust
43280	46160	between the hacker research community and the aerospace sector
46160	50800	so that we can have those pathways to talk about what potential challenges there are
50800	53800	and that we can work better and be more safe and secure.
54120	59120	ISACs are seen often as a key point of contact for researchers and hackers
59120	61840	who want to reach out if they think they've found an issue,
61840	65240	but also struggle potentially with reaching the vendors.
65660	69060	So how best do we create those relationships across hackers and ISACs
69060	72500	to learn the lessons of the past and build the trust that we need?
73080	76160	To see what's worked, what hasn't worked, and what we can do going forwards,
76160	79700	it's fantastic to have just the right people to talk about this.
79780	85520	So on the panel, we've got Erin Miller, who's VP of Operations for the, I think fair to say,
85520	91380	newly minted Space ISAC, and soon reaching IOC this year.
91380	95200	We've got Jeff Troy, who's President and CEO of the Aviation ISAC.
95380	100760	We've got Ken Monroe, partner and founder of Pentest Partners, and also Carpool Karaoke today.
100960	108840	And then Matt Gaffney, who is Managing Director of BSSI, who actually has an aviation backdrop in his photo.
109600	113260	So I'll pass over to you for short introductions, and then we'll get on to the panel.
113260	115140	So Erin, over to you first.
115940	118840	Hey, good day, everyone. Glad to be here.
119720	125000	As Pete mentioned, and thank you, Pete, for that great intro, we are a new ISAC.
125000	129460	I came to the Space ISAC actually from a public-private partnership background.
129460	136220	So I've been working to bring together the commercial sector and the public sector for some time, several years.
136580	144060	Traditionally, just working in rapid prototype development and ideation brainstorm sessions to generate solutions,
144060	147680	in particular for the warfighter, so that's more of my background.
147680	154440	Very excited for the future of the Space ISAC, and I've been working for over a year, about 18 months or so,
154440	160140	to stand up the Space ISAC and get it towards the initial operating capability that we need for the sector.
161140	164420	Thanks, Erin, and looking forward to seeing where it goes.
164420	166500	And then over to Jeff.
167500	173100	Thanks, Pete. So I'm the President of the Aviation ISAC for the last three and a half years.
173100	177240	I've been with the ISAC for five years since its inception.
177240	181120	It's just helping them stand up initially in their project.
181260	187340	I'm also on the Board of Directors of the National Defense ISAC, and I also work for General Electric Aviation.
188840	190940	Fantastic, and then Ken.
191360	198200	Hi, so I'm sorry about the backdrop. Two days ago, I was sat on the cockpit of a 747, so that would have been better, surely.
198200	203160	Anyway, I work for a firm called Pentest Partners, and usually several of us are pilots.
203160	208560	I'm not a very good pilot. I'm the guy who landed at the wrong airfield once, but we do have a keen interest in aviation.
208560	217160	And for the last couple of years, we've been working on decommissioned airframes, starting to understand how the networks work and how the security of airplane systems fits together.
218460	222560	Fantastic, and then last but not least, Gaffers or Matt.
222560	231940	Hi everyone, Matthew Gaffney. I am the Managing Director of BSSI UK, where I work with multiple clients across various sectors.
231940	239520	But I have worked several years at the airline or operator level, working with the entry into service of new e-enabled aircraft.
239540	251180	So, coming across challenges and obstacles in the entry into service of aircraft and basically doing assurance across the whole piece.
252020	256700	Fantastic, and great to have you all, and it's a great spread of experience across the entire panel.
256740	265100	So, I'm going to start off with Ken, and you've been working with ISACs across various sectors for quite a long time now.
265960	273900	So, finding vulnerabilities, potentially not getting much out of a vendor, and then working with the ISAC is fairly common for you.
273900	281740	So, from your perspective, from what you've seen, how do ISACs fit into the picture for researchers and hackers?
282000	285880	Yeah, I find actually ISACs make a really good set of connections for us.
285880	292420	So, if you read our blog many times over, you'll see that when we find a vulnerability, often it's not the vulnerability that's the story.
292420	305520	It's how the vendor actually responds and interfaces with a security researcher that makes a difference between a really smooth, seamless, and straightforward vulnerability disclosure process, through to being a bit of a train wreck, frankly.
305520	310920	And I find that the work we've done with ISACs over the last few years has really smoothed that process.
311280	318460	Typically, when we're working on, I don't know, embedded components, maybe in IoT, you find something, and the vendor just doesn't listen.
318460	326540	They don't get it. They don't understand. But you tend to find different problems in organizations that are perhaps a member of ISACs, because they're just so big.
326800	338560	And how does a little research operation like ours get through to the very right person within a large, whether it's an auto manufacturer, or a CNI operator, or an airline?
338560	342300	How do you find that right person, and how do you get them to listen to you?
342300	348660	And that's where we found the ISACs have been really, really helpful, is by having a connection, by establishing trust.
348920	356900	It's great to get those connections that mean that it's not just scrabbling around on LinkedIn, or sending emails into some generic mailbox.
356900	363780	It's actually, it's a conversation, and then a private broker discussion, which is where the ISACs have been so unbelievably helpful.
363780	365360	It makes a real difference.
365920	371260	Okay, that sounds great. And it sounds like it's worked. It has worked well in the past.
371260	386380	I mean, Jeff, from your perspective, having been at the front of the ISAC for quite a while now, I mean, so you first got introduced to Hacker Summer Camp in Vegas when you came on a panel with me at B-Sides a couple of years ago.
387080	396880	And the conversation we had around that, because you were dealing with some vulnerabilities at the time, it was great to see some of the ideas that you were coming up with about working with the hacker community.
396880	404360	So what's been your experience as the ISAC with starting to work with the hacker community now?
404700	408840	So our experience has actually been a lot like Kent's.
409360	424700	Initially, what we're finding is hackers are coming to us, they're either coming through a friend that they know, they're coming through us because of connections that we've made with government agencies.
424700	432680	Or in some instances, we've actually had some companies call us and say, can you talk to this person first, because we're not sure we even want to talk with them.
433200	448240	So there was a lot of, I think, a couple of years ago, hesitation or just a little skepticism with respect to dealing with people who were just calling in and saying that they had some information about a particular vulnerability.
448660	452340	So that was probably one of the first challenges.
452340	462260	And, you know, in our discussions with these folks, we found, you know, most importantly, that they come with great intentions, just good intentions.
462260	465260	We want to really show you something that we found.
465420	476000	And most importantly, also, they're coming in, they're saying, I'm not telling anybody about this, because one, I'm not really sure what I found, because that's one of the problems, too, that we find.
476000	485620	If someone finds, for example, a vulnerability within a component of a system, they're not really sure how that impacts the whole system.
485620	494640	So really good that people have come in and had, you know, one, good research, two, good intentions.
494720	498740	And then three, you know, Ken highlighted this as well.
498740	500900	We act really as a connector.
500900	506500	I mean, if you come into the Aviation ISAC, we don't have a setup like Matt Gaffney behind him there.
506500	507760	And we don't have any airplanes.
507760	509840	We don't have a lab.
509840	514020	We can't test for this vulnerability, but we do do that connection.
514220	522080	So the ISAC is a community of researchers in product security and network security and threat analysts.
522080	529580	So one thing we do have is just a great, you know, network where most times a researcher will call us.
529580	539260	And within about 24 hours, we've got them in touch with a product security incident response or a similar type person inside that company.
539260	543960	And we're starting to, you know, help that conversation along.
543960	558900	But once that connection is made, actually, we pretty much step to the side and let the people who actually built the technology and the researcher who has, you know, this vulnerability information, let them have that direct conversation.
559780	574800	Thanks, Ken. And that's actually a nice segue through to chatting to Gaffers, because Gaffers, you've just gone through this process of finding a potential snag or two on some systems.
575640	586460	And actually started working with the ISAC and other organizations to try sort of getting to the bottom of it and closing off.
586460	592860	So what's been your perspective of that journey from finding something to trying to close it off?
593980	612460	Yes. So I was writing a paper about some of the things I'd seen, and I was curious about how much detail I could go into without causing alarm distress or basically overstepping the boundaries.
612460	619160	So, you know, through the community, I reached out to the Indonesian ISAC to get some advice.
620340	627700	And one thing I noticed was within 24 hours, I noticed the hits on my LinkedIn profile just exploded.
628200	632940	It was just full of people from all sorts of manufacturers.
633740	649500	And it was in stark contrast, really, with similar interactions, which I'd had whilst I was working at the airline, where, you know, maybe a week later you get a response and the response was very, very tepid indeed.
650820	657340	So that was really the first difference I've noticed in going through the aviation ISAC.
658960	670060	The second time around, the official vulnerability disclosure procedure had been developed at manufacturer level, again, I think with help from the aviation ISAC.
670800	673640	So we decided to use that mechanism.
674240	684920	And although the initial holding response was quite quick, it was about a working day in response, the actual full response took four and a half weeks.
684920	690620	And that was because I was chasing, which I thought was a little bit slow myself.
690820	696660	It wasn't a highly technical issue. It was quite, quite simple.
696660	704820	And the response was no different than the first time I went through disclosing a vulnerability with a manufacturer.
705420	716420	And basically it was the scenarios and the hypothesis are not credible, therefore there's no vulnerability, which is a very strange opinion to have on risk management myself.
716420	725980	But I rebutted with some comments from the official response and they were left unanswered.
725980	729660	Until eventually I got a this matter is closed email and that was it.
730760	753320	So the difference, I suppose the outcome was very similar, but I would say the response, the initial response was much better because the first time I went through this, it took several months to get to any kind of, any kind of satisfactory resolution, which it wasn't in the end really, it was only a halfway house.
753320	760160	But with the Aviation ISAC going through the official process, it took weeks instead of months.
761000	769760	Thanks for that. I want to come to that in a second, but can I just go for a straightaway follow up question to Jeff on that?
769760	781380	Which is, if on one hand you've got a researcher such as Gaffers who's saying, I think I've found something, but the response from the manufacturer, the vendor is, well, actually there's nothing there.
781380	791420	But we can't really tell you there's nothing there. With the ISAC in the middle, and you're funded by the manufacturers, how do you reconcile that?
791880	800800	That's a great question. And I think it's kind of like that great abyss that is so hard for us to get across.
800800	810900	So when you have a researcher who has information and they believe that, you know, this is a vulnerability, particularly one that needs to be addressed.
811400	822520	As I said, we can't validate it. I don't have the equipment. I don't have the specialists to be able to do that. The best I can do is get you in touch with the right people who do have it.
822520	833700	And hopefully through the relationship builds that have happened over the years that, you know, there'll be a good exchange there.
834360	847360	When you get to a situation where the process has been completed and the manufacturer is not validating that vulnerability has any impact.
847360	857740	I think it is an extremely difficult situation at that point in time, because you've got someone, you know, like Gaffer's, they've got an incredible mindset, right?
857740	865500	It's, hey, I'm challenging things that people are saying are secure. And I am not sure, you know, that this is because of something that I've found.
865500	881180	And that is what I think is the treasured trait of every security researcher. Their ability to dig in and try and find a way around the system that someone said there's no way around is what leads to the great security research that we have.
881180	895440	The unfortunate part is, is that if someone has tested it against that system, and they know why it doesn't work, and they don't want to pass that information over back over to the researcher, then you have this gap.
895440	914720	Because the researcher's mindset is, hey, I think this is great. You need to show me how come. And there's a... now you have that question of, well, where does my intellectual property and my security controls stop, you know, in respect to trying to protect them?
914720	921840	And where does the research information, you know, kind of come together? How do we meet in the middle there?
921840	938260	And that is something that I think is going to take some more time in terms of that conversation and how much people are willing to, manufacturers specifically, are going to be willing to share in that area.
939420	946860	There's been a lot of great work. Pete, you've done a lot of work trying to bridge the discussions between these communities.
946860	959760	And, you know, we've seen pretty much a community that really wasn't talking to researchers at all really starting to embrace them now and have a lot more conversations, which has been good for both.
959760	972400	I think the researchers are finding out, hey, you know, these are good people trying to secure really high technology, and the companies are saying these are really good people who are trying to make sure that technology is well secured and I haven't found a way.
972400	980860	So this is all good in my mind in that the process of building trust takes a long time.
981020	999940	And I think things are moving in the right direction. And it's these types of conversations, these environments, the village, these things that are happening that are going to continue to bring together the parties and try and close that gap of when you have these types of situations.
999940	1008120	In terms of what the manufacturers will be willing to share in terms of information with the researchers.
1008780	1022300	Thanks, Jeff. And yeah, that brings it around nicely to probably the newest ISAC on the block in the aerospace sector, which is Erin and the space team.
1022300	1041280	I mean, Erin, all of the conversations that have been sort of like going on there with the challenges and the opportunities that the aviation ISAC has gone through and Gaffers and Ken as examples of the researcher and hacker community.
1041280	1056540	With you sort of being the newly minted IOC later on this year, Space ISAC, what's your sort of vision going forwards for how you want to play this and how you want to take the Space ISAC forwards?
1058500	1059780	Muted.
1062770	1086330	Thanks, Pete. I think since Space ISAC is new and we have sort of a clean slate here, then there's a lot of opportunity to leverage the lessons learned. There's almost like a legacy of how ISACs operate and some things good, some things bad, and we want to make sure that we fully explore and understand what we can do the best.
1086330	1106250	So listening to everyone talk, then I think, you know, there's some great takeaways, you know, having that open line of communication available and we have that today. So we are currently accepting communication, you know, to the Space ISAC at our info at s-isac.org email address from anyone.
1106250	1120650	So I would say that part of our vision is starts now. Like I would encourage anyone to contact us with ideas on how Space ISAC can be that broker between the public and private sector, but also that extends to researchers.
1121710	1131130	Part of the vision of Space ISAC does include that we have universities as members. So that makes us a little bit different than some other ISACs, not all.
1131130	1147390	We also have international members. So that makes us a little different too. I think it's really cool to think about space as a global community. And so other ISACs have done and we intend to expand out and have members from all across the globe.
1149170	1158970	Since not everyone here is familiar with Space ISAC, just a little bit of history. It was launched by the White House. So that's interesting in and of itself.
1158970	1169870	The White House for representing the US government came forward and said, you know, we really want to see the public private sector come together and share information about threats and vulnerabilities about
1169870	1186310	regarding the space community. And after they made that announcement, then we were able to start going out and asking members to join the board. So we're still very new and that we just opened our general membership on May 1 of this year.
1186310	1202730	And when we hit our IOC, that will mean that we have the ability to actively share threat intel through an intel platform. We'll also have workshops and events that are available to the space community published at that time. And that's coming later this summer.
1202730	1219590	So now is the time definitely for us to open that line of communication. And we would invite, you know, like I said, anyone's perspective on how to stand up the best vulnerability disclosure program. I've already talked to some of our board members about doing that.
1219590	1238910	So really looking forward to the opportunities that we can bring to the space community. This one will make us even better. I believe that an ISAC really is the prime organization to be able to have this type of dialogue and to engage in this way. So thank you.
1238910	1261350	And that's great. And it's great to hear all the work that's going on in the background. I mean, have you... so with space, I mean, a lot of the focus is on mission critical. So that's the mantra that always gets talked about with space ops. I mean, a lot of the discussion for aviation will be safety and security.
1261350	1290390	So driving risk as low as reasonably practicable. With the space sector and your members and what you're hearing from your side of it, is there still this... what's the general feeling at the moment when it comes to cyber security? Because people tend to banter that cyber security of space assets is generally... I mean, I think the expression I heard the other day was in the 80s.
1292070	1315110	But obviously, that is going to be something which is openly debatable. But what's the general feeling about the maintaining that mission critical status and having cyber security upfront and focused on that? And then looking for the vulnerabilities and working and open to working with researchers? Are you getting that feeling from your members and the people you're speaking to?
1315790	1333530	The feeling I get is that more information is better. So if information comes to the ISAC, then it's our job to get it shared with the members that it is most relevant to. So we are already operating in that role right now.
1333530	1348690	Cyber security for space or security for space is very broad. And the general feeling is that we should have stood up a space ISAC two decades ago. Maybe that's what your comments were indicating.
1348690	1369390	Because there's a lot of vulnerabilities that hit cyber security, hit the business system. And they actually have a lot of relevance specifically to space applications. And other entities might view them differently. But if you're a space company, then you really need to know the direct implications of that threat to the space mission.
1369390	1394170	So it is definitely all about space mission and protecting the space critical infrastructure. And that's where our entire focus will be. So if somebody has access to information that is related to a threat to space critical infrastructure, which will eventually publish what that means to our members, what is space critical infrastructure, and that'll help scope some of that discussion.
1394170	1416550	But I mean, if you define it as space critical infrastructure, and you think that the space ISAC should know about it, then I would say that's what our members are going to care about, from what I can tell. We've actually also engaged in a partnership, I should mention, with the Air Force Research Lab that runs that hack-a-sack that's happening this year right now.
1416550	1429430	And so just even that step forward shows me that the members are really excited about partnering on challenges or developing our own challenges that will be open to the broader researcher community.
1429430	1447850	Thanks, Aaron. Yeah, and to be honest, it's just nice talking about aerospace cybersecurity and having hackers and researchers working together because it felt like three years ago that talking about vulnerabilities in aerospace systems is something that we didn't really want to do.
1447850	1469130	So actually, part of this is building up this dialogue so we can have that as an informed dialogue. But as we go forwards, I think, I mean, we've all had conversations in the past about trying to make sure we learn from what's happened in the past. So really trying to dig into some of these challenges is...
1469130	1483350	What's been, and I'll pass it over to Ken, what's been the standout sort of examples of where things have really worked well and made a difference and where things really haven't worked well?
1484050	1490410	Gosh, there's a few of those. I want to pick up on a point that Jeff made, and you used the word new, which I think is actually really important here.
1491770	1498830	Because cybersecurity research in aviation is pretty new. I mean, we've been working on airframes for two, two and a half years now.
1499070	1511230	And you've got to remember, this is an industry that perhaps is very heavily regulated. It believes it has safety well in hand, so it's extremely open to inspection, but also fiercely protective of intellectual property, rightly so too.
1511230	1524050	So this is a new thing. The industry is also hurting at the moment with the COVID-19 issues, and also smarting at it from some of perhaps less helpful coverage in the past around aviation cyber.
1524050	1534430	So I think it's really important we talk about building trust in this community. And what's often raised as a subject when you're doing vulnerability disclosure of non-disclosure.
1534430	1541210	And that's a really sensitive area. So it's pretty rare outside this space that you'd be asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement.
1541210	1546790	But also, you have to balance that with, as a researcher, do you want to know more? Do you want to understand in detail?
1546790	1559250	But at that point, you might consider signing a non-disclosure agreement in certain areas that allow the manufacturer to talk to you in more detail, feel more like they've got more trust in you, that you're not going to take everything that they've told you and splatter it across the press.
1559250	1575250	And I think that's a really, really important point. So I think many researchers should think carefully about that. Or maybe we should consider actually NDAs for certain areas. Perhaps certain bits of discussion do need to be covered by non-disclosure and certain, well, maybe not so.
1575250	1584070	And I think that's a really important learning point. And I think that also leads us back into some examples of where things have gone really well, and some examples of where things have gone really badly.
1584070	1599510	I can think of the biggest issue just being generally where there's no communication. So where the researcher does what they believe to be the right thing, makes communication, establishes, discloses everything they've got, and then things go quiet for a while.
1599510	1617690	And it may be that the vendor in that case is actually working really diligently exploring every option and trying to add some detail, but they don't communicate. And I think in Gaffer's case, that's potentially what went wrong there. Perhaps if there'd been a more regular dialogue with the vendor reaching out and going, hey, I know we haven't spoken to you for a while.
1619770	1623550	I think that would have made you feel a lot happier about things, hey Matt?
1623550	1639190	Yeah, absolutely. I just felt that the communication was a bit cut, in general. And it wasn't an open flowing dialogue at all. It was very much, yep, thank you for your submission, we'll look at it. And then nothing else.
1639670	1650330	There was no questioning of what I had proposed, no questioning of what I'd submitted. It was just that, yeah, we'll take it away and look at it.
1650330	1656430	And that was it. It was just, and then when I chased them for an update, it was like, oh, here's the response.
1657370	1658870	There it is, that's it.
1659930	1665410	And, you know, annoyingly, with my work at the operator level, I actually knew a lot of these people.
1665970	1677410	Anyway, you know, it's not like I've never actually met them in person. I have. So to not have that level of trust, I think, is really disappointing.
1677410	1685410	And it is something where I think, you know, the whole industry, researchers and the manufacturers could really improve.
1685730	1696290	A good example of that. So, you know, compare us to where we were perhaps a year ago with DEF CON and Black Hat in 2019, which was perhaps partly a difficult time for the aviation cyberspace.
1696290	1704790	But yeah, here we are a year later. And for example, Boeing is going to set up a Cyber Technical Advisory Council, actually inviting researchers onto the inside.
1704790	1709890	I mean, what a huge win that is, both for researchers and for the industry. It's fantastic progress.
1709890	1722430	And I think it's amazing that a vendor who was perhaps really hurting from some difficult coverage last year and a difficult interaction with researchers has now completely come around and engaged practically.
1722430	1723830	And I think that's a huge step forward.
1723830	1730350	So it is new. It is new to the industry. But yes, it will take time. But trust is being established.
1732330	1733970	Jeff, do you want to come back on that?
1735290	1741550	Yeah, I just actually took down a note here because I want to make sure I share it with all the members across the ISAC.
1741910	1747890	And what I wrote down basically is a vulnerability disclosure program does not equal a link on a website.
1747890	1751550	And I think that's a really important point here, right?
1751550	1760610	I mean, we've got all these companies out there who are now making it easier for them to be contacted, but it doesn't end there, right?
1760610	1767210	So I got your submission. I need to have that conversation. I need to engage with this researcher.
1767550	1775290	And I think that's just a really important point. I'm really glad you brought that up because that's a part of the maturation process.
1775290	1783190	You know, okay, the door's there, but if you don't answer the door and welcome the people in for the conversation, then, you know, it's kind of an odd relationship.
1783190	1790550	They're just standing on the front step, right? And so we need to bring them in the living room and sit down and have the conversation.
1792390	1799610	Researchers spend their own time, their own money, their own efforts doing this. And it's great when we feel valued.
1799850	1804030	And, you know, we can help, you know, the aviation industry can benefit from what we do.
1804030	1807630	It's just that level of value and interaction makes such a difference.
1807850	1818570	And actually, if you look at the... if a researcher and a hacker find something and then tries to approach and do the right thing in talking through good faith research and saying,
1818570	1824170	I think there's an issue here, a lot of the risk is really on the researcher. It's not really on the manufacturer.
1824170	1832050	So a lot of that effort, I think, really has got to come from the vendor to say, we're open and we're willing to engage in all of this.
1832050	1839750	Geoff, one of the areas I think is quite contentious in security research in aviation is the subject of non-disclosure. I mean, where does the ISAC sit on that?
1840510	1852950	So, great question. Really, the issue with the non-disclosure is that if you sign a non-disclosure agreement with someone, there's still a risk that they're going to violate the non-disclosure agreement.
1852950	1866710	And although there's recourse if someone violates a non-disclosure agreement, what you wanted to keep protected from being publicly disclosed ends up getting out there. So this is, again, a matter of trust.
1866710	1888410	And you've seen this, Ken, because you have a company that does pen testing, right? Not every company wants to hire every pen tester. And, you know, that's one of the problems. It's like they're looking a lot of times for companies that, hey, have you worked with these guys before? Have you worked with these pen testers? Do you think they do a good job?
1888410	1914290	Do they, you know, actually hold your intellectual property close? Those are the types of questions that I'm sure you've had grilled, right, as you walk into different engagements. And that is one of the problems, particularly for newer researchers, because it's like, well, what if you don't know me, right? I've still got great research. I'm a very trustable person, but we just don't have a history yet.
1914290	1937290	And that is a situation where I think it may be solved by the community building itself up. As the community builds itself up, other researchers who do have, let's call it street cred, right, out there, they're able to vouch for people who have come in and say, well, I've worked with that person. I know that person.
1937290	1950410	You know, those types of trust building activities, I think, are going to have to happen to support the idea of entering into an NDA with a new researcher.
1977890	1997270	I mean, can I just... we've got to be... I just want to unpick some of the language, because when we talk about building up and using street cred and things like that, I mean, surely we need to get to a position where, irrespective of who is bringing it up, if it's being brought up in good faith, and being engaged on good faith, then it's going to work.
1997270	2021750	But if it's being brought up in bad faith, whether somebody's got street cred or not, we've got to make sure that they are listened to. Because if we go to the safety critical aspect, or from the space perspective with Erin and her team from a mission critical aspect, if anybody brings up a potential safety issue, then the safety management team are behoven to listen to it, irrespective of who it is.
2021750	2040070	So surely we've got to go for the same perspective when it comes to researchers and them trying to flag issues. It shouldn't be... I don't feel there should be a gate of entry of credibility or not. It should be, we've just got to have that dialogue, and they've got to be able to reach people. Gaffer, you're nodding a lot.
2040070	2062330	Well, yeah, because I mean, I get a lot of, you know, imposter syndrome in this industry, because I'm not a pen test. I'm not like Ken. I don't spend my life, you know, reverse engineering IoT and doing all this kind of stuff. I was just doing information assurance on behalf of my client and found these things. And, yeah, like I said, I'm not a pen test.
2062330	2082170	I haven't really called myself a researcher until recently when I kind of thought to myself, well, yeah, I'm actually doing things in my spare time, looking at things, using open source documentation, et cetera, et cetera. And, yeah, I suppose I am a researcher, but I never really thought of myself that way, especially when I did these disclosures.
2082170	2093050	So, yeah, the bar has to be not your cred. It has to be, you know, you're coming in with an issue and, like I said, we're doing it in good faith.
2093430	2109830	I mean, Erin, from your perspective and how you're building out the space ISAC team, are you looking at the structures and processes of how you can potentially engage in this way to try and make sure these doors are fully open?
2113480	2141380	Yes. So I've started the conversation with the current members of the space ISAC. And as the space ISAC grows, then I think this will be a conversation that we have with everyone who joins the organization to ask them about having a vulnerability disclosure program, what their experience is with that, and making sure that we can shepherd the conversation from the point, you know, where someone knocks on the door to us opening it to us having the conversation to then
2142100	2160140	brokering the conversation with the member. And I think the only way to really do that is to, like I said, talk to members when they join the organization about their perspectives on this, because otherwise you don't have a cultural adoption of it.
2160140	2183180	Because that's really, from what I'm hearing from everyone, then that's what this is all about. And that's great for me, because that's the kind of stuff that I love. Like when I did design sprints with the private sector and the government, then that was all about changing culture. And so shaping culture is mostly driven by conversations and introducing new ideas and then kind of testing them.
2183180	2206240	So I think that's what we'll be doing in the space, Isaac, is if someone knocks on our door, then they, people, someone has to realize that if they knock on our door right now, then it's the first time it's ever happened. But we're willing and open to taking, walking the path with them and having the conversation with the company or the member that has the vulnerability that they're approaching us with.
2206240	2220260	And I'm just going to pick up though, because culture, yeah, massively important, but with both aviation and space, as have been previously mentioned, it's massively highly regulated. So regulators are there for both safety and security.
2221740	2239160	And last year, there was a massive step forwards where, for example, ICAO, which is the UN body for aviation, actually has a line in their cyber strategy now, which says that states must give adequate protection to good faith security researchers, which is great.
2239160	2252980	So from a very top level at ICAO and the UN, this is sort of being recognized and hopefully will filter down. But what's the relationship like with, for example, the regulators in this space?
2253660	2272780	Because this is a safety critical industry. If a researcher is flagging potentially a safety critical issue, who really gets to decide whether it's safety critical or not? And from Erin, from your perspective, is there that structure yet, whereas you would see in the space sector?
2274220	2283340	So obviously the space sector is regulated, but it's not as regulated as it could be, and maybe will be in the future in terms of cybersecurity.
2283720	2293240	So I think the Space ISAC, part of the intention of standing it up is to promote dialogue with prospective regulators.
2293240	2312900	So, you know, in the future, there will be agencies that are responsible for managing space traffic management. They could send regulation down as a result of that designation. And the communication between the private sector and that agency is critical. And that's what the Space ISAC is for.
2312900	2339620	So we have at least 18 different agencies that we're partnered with informally right now, and we're working on formalizing those partnerships. So I believe there's a lot of opportunity for the interactive dialogue. We are seeing it today with certain agencies contacting us and asking for information to be shared in both ways. So they share information with us, and as we're able to, we share information with them.
2339620	2362600	And hopefully, and you can tell us how this goes, potentially, whether yourselves can be an advocate of why good faith security research and working with the research community would be good across the space sector. I mean, the work from what you're talking about there, it sounds like that you're going to be quite well at the forefront of that as the Space ISAC.
2363500	2381840	Going back to the regulator's perspective from an aviation side, Jeff, from the Aviation ISAC perspective, if somebody comes to you with something that you think could be a safety-critical issue, do you deal with that differently compared to if it was an issue on a non-safety-critical system?
2382880	2400300	No, we really don't. So what we do is, again, we don't have the capacity to validate whether or not it is a safety-critical issue or not. I mean, there may be an assertion from the researcher that it is, but we don't have the ability to make that conclusion.
2400300	2430280	So we're going to be providing the information by linking the researcher up to the manufacturer and letting them go through that process. If it's a safety-critical issue, the manufacturer may be required under their regulatory requirements to actually make a report to their regulator as to what the particular issue is and then how that's going to be resolved.
2430300	2441960	So there's a whole body of governance over the manufacturers to have to make those types of notifications.
2442220	2455560	And there are also lots of other front doors that the researchers can use, for example. So DHS has a front door for researchers. I don't think the FAA has a front door for researchers.
2456580	2462300	But, I mean, Ken, have you seen the different pathways that have been used?
2463220	2472720	Yes, so we haven't struggled so much recently. And I think that's partly because we've had access to ISAC, who know who to ask or can make a subtle introduction if required.
2472840	2478980	But I have seen other researchers publishing on Twitter saying, has anyone got a security contact at X?
2478980	2485300	And that's a really difficult way of... I think sometimes it draws attention, sometimes it's unhelpful.
2485400	2493860	And I don't know if that's the most constructive way, but it does reflect a lack of ability of the industry to receive researchers.
2493920	2500040	So I'd say to researchers, try a bit harder, but I'd also say to the industry, listen a bit harder and make it a bit easier.
2500900	2505280	Well, that sounds like quite a good segue to start wrapping up.
2505760	2517300	So, Gaffers, have you got a sort of like final thoughts that you want to sort of, having been talking about this for a while now and having gone through it yourself, have you got some wrap up thoughts for yourself?
2517300	2530080	Yeah, I mean, so from an airline perspective, a lot of the cyber security controls come down to the airline as recommendations.
2530180	2537160	You know, so when you look at all the documentation and the regulation paperwork, there's nothing that says you have to do this.
2537160	2547440	They're all recommendations. And a lot of the documentation, they will, you know, dedicate 95% or more of the words towards non-cyber stuff.
2547440	2550700	And there's a tiny little bit at the end about, well, think about doing this.
2551620	2560280	And I think that the manufacturers as well, they will provide their own recommendations of security controls to put in place.
2560280	2564960	But then there's a disconnect because the manufacturer will have done their risk assessment.
2564960	2572680	They will know what the risks are, produce recommendations for the operator to implement.
2573100	2585520	But then the operator implements them with no way of assessing their quality because there's that disconnect between the risk assessment, which the manufacturer has done, which is obviously secret, and the work that the operator does.
2585520	2590580	And I think that there's something in the middle there that's missing. And it could be the regulator. It could be the ISACs.
2591040	2593280	I don't know, but I think there's a better way we can do this.
2594580	2604380	Really from the, although there might be one front door for the researchers, it's all of the network of communications and information sharing behind that that also challenges remain.
2604860	2605520	Yeah.
2605660	2606640	OK.
2607260	2611740	Ken, you were very pithy earlier, so I'll give you one last chance.
2612080	2618520	So I think one key point is security research is happening in aviation more and more.
2618560	2621660	Partly on the back of COVID-19, airframes are being retired.
2621660	2629280	I was offered an entire operational 747-400 that last flew a month ago for 200,000 bucks just this week.
2629280	2633800	OK, I didn't have engines, but everything else was intact. Plug it into ground power, the whole thing works.
2633800	2640360	So yeah, 200Gs is a lot of cash, but it's starting to come into the price range of research firms.
2640360	2642480	So more and more research is going to happen.
2642480	2647680	So now's the time to take the opportunity, engage with researchers, make it easy to interact with them.
2647680	2649500	And let's step up.
2650340	2655260	Fantastic. And then I'll come across to Erin for yourself next.
2657400	2667720	Yeah, so I think the way forward for the Space ISAC is to take the advice and the lessons learned from this group in particular and others.
2667800	2675520	I've talked to some other ISACs as well out there to get insights and perspectives on how to do this the best.
2675520	2680940	Space ISAC does have some interesting things in its future.
2680940	2684820	We will, in 2022, have a vulnerability lab.
2684820	2693840	So that may bring in a different dynamic to the Space ISAC and open some great opportunities to do testing of vulnerabilities.
2694280	2701500	Definitely don't want to have anyone leave thinking that just because it's in space doesn't mean it can't be hacked.
2701500	2708820	So we're really looking forward to the future and engaging the researcher community.
2709280	2715900	And hope that someone actually reaches out and shares their ideas because I really want to read them and follow up.
2715900	2722680	So I'll drop the address that I gave before, info, I-N-F-O at s-isac.org.
2722680	2724920	Feel free to hit me up. Thanks.
2724920	2736520	And I think we all look forward to hearing about your IOC coming up and look forward to how you take it forward and being there to help you and the community as it goes forward.
2736520	2740500	And then, Jeff, you and I have had these conversations a lot.
2740780	2746480	So it's great to have you here. Wrap up thoughts from yourself, please.
2747040	2752080	So I think something that Ken highlighted is just critically important.
2752080	2766520	I mean, the fact that people, particularly because of COVID-19, can now get more access to equipment, that is going to absolutely open up more research being done on planes.
2766520	2770300	So that fact is critically important.
2770300	2781120	The other thing, I think it's been a theme through the whole conversation we've been having here, is that communication and building bridges is just critically important between the community and the industry.
2781120	2795260	And so as we continue to strengthen that bridge and have more of those conversations and good exchanges, again, I think people are just going to continue to see that on both sides of the equation here,
2795260	2812800	there's just really good, smart people who have common ground with respect to safety in the industry. And keeping that conversation open and that mindset open is going to help these great ideas get passed back and forth and just make the whole industry more secure.
2813480	2815380	Thanks, Jeff. And thanks to all of you.
2815380	2825900	I think it really shows from all of the themes that have been picked up that actually there is no straight path to building trust across such a diverse group of stakeholders.
2826680	2835120	There is no one right answer for how best we can help the researcher and hacker community work with industry.
2835120	2855960	But the one thing we do know that will help is conversations like this, learning from each other and actually trying to positively engage across all of those different stakeholders and have a good drumbeat of communication so that when people are flagging things up,
2855960	2870780	then it's actually a good positive engagement all the way through. And that's the way we learn all of us together. And that's the way that we can help the industry be safer and more secure. So I just want to make a huge thanks out to all of you.
2871320	2889760	This is in the heart of the envelope of exactly what the Aerospace Village is about to try and help build bridges and the community around such a great topic. Please stay safe and look forward to chatting with everybody on Discord straight after this for about an hour. Thank you very much.