WEBVTT 00:06.980 --> 00:15.280 So, hi to everybody at the Aerospace Village and dialing in for our panel, where we're going to be talking about the hacker community and ISACs. 00:15.280 --> 00:20.460 I'm Pete Cooper, the Director of the Aerospace Village, and I'm going to be hosting for the next 50 minutes. 00:20.860 --> 00:29.400 Now, across the aerospace sector, good faith security research has played a hugely key role in highlighting both risks and vulnerabilities. 00:29.600 --> 00:38.920 But if the researcher or hacker can't find a good point of contact, then approaches about potential vulnerabilities hasn't always been potentially welcomed with open arms. 00:39.380 --> 00:53.800 The Aerospace Village really looks to help build bridges and trust between the hacker research community and the aerospace sector so that we can have those pathways to talk about what potential challenges there are and that we can work better and be more safe and secure. 00:54.120 --> 01:05.240 ISACs are seen often as a key point of contact for researchers and hackers who want to reach out if they think they've found an issue, but also struggle potentially with reaching the vendors. 01:05.660 --> 01:12.500 So how best do we create those relationships across hackers and ISACs to learn the lessons of the past and build the trust that we need? 01:13.080 --> 01:19.700 To see what's worked, what hasn't worked, and what we can do going forwards, it's fantastic to have just the right people to talk about this. 01:19.780 --> 01:31.380 So on the panel, we've got Erin Miller, who's VP of Operations for the, I think fair to say, newly minted Space ISAC, and soon reaching IOC this year. 01:31.380 --> 01:35.200 We've got Jeff Troy, who's President and CEO of the Aviation ISAC. 01:35.380 --> 01:40.760 We've got Ken Monroe, partner and founder of Pentest Partners, and also Carpool Karaoke today. 01:40.960 --> 01:48.840 And then Matt Gaffney, who is Managing Director of BSSI, who actually has an aviation backdrop in his photo. 01:49.600 --> 01:53.260 So I'll pass over to you for short introductions, and then we'll get on to the panel. 01:53.260 --> 01:55.140 So Erin, over to you first. 01:55.940 --> 01:57.500 Hey, good day, everyone. 01:57.500 --> 01:58.840 Glad to be here. 01:59.720 --> 02:05.000 As Pete mentioned, and thank you, Pete, for that great intro, we are a new ISAC. 02:05.000 --> 02:09.460 I came to the Space ISAC actually from a public-private partnership background. 02:09.460 --> 02:16.220 So I've been working to bring together the commercial sector and the public sector for some time, several years. 02:16.580 --> 02:27.680 Traditionally, just working in rapid prototype development and ideation brainstorm sessions to generate solutions, in particular for the warfighter, so that's more of my background. 02:27.680 --> 02:40.140 Very excited for the future of the Space ISAC, and I've been working for over a year, about 18 months or so, to stand up the Space ISAC and get it towards the initial operating capability that we need for the sector. 02:41.140 --> 02:44.420 Thanks, Erin, and looking forward to seeing where it goes. 02:44.420 --> 02:46.500 And then over to Jeff. 02:47.500 --> 02:48.640 Thanks, Pete. 02:48.820 --> 02:53.100 So I'm the President of the Aviation ISAC for the last three and a half years. 02:53.100 --> 02:57.240 I've been with the ISAC for five years since its inception. 02:57.240 --> 03:01.120 It's just helping them stand up initially in their project. 03:01.260 --> 03:07.340 I'm also on the Board of Directors of the National Defense ISAC, and I also work for General Electric Aviation. 03:08.840 --> 03:10.940 Fantastic, and then Ken. 03:11.360 --> 03:13.900 Hi, so I'm sorry about the backdrop. 03:13.900 --> 03:18.200 Two days ago, I was sat on the cockpit of a 747, so that would have been better, surely. 03:18.200 --> 03:23.160 Anyway, I work for a firm called Pentest Partners, and usually several of us are pilots. 03:23.160 --> 03:24.260 I'm not a very good pilot. 03:24.260 --> 03:28.560 I'm the guy who landed at the wrong airfield once, but we do have a keen interest in aviation. 03:28.560 --> 03:37.160 And for the last couple of years, we've been working on decommissioned airframes, starting to understand how the networks work and how the security of airplane systems fits together. 03:38.460 --> 03:42.560 Fantastic, and then last but not least, Gaffers or Matt. 03:42.560 --> 03:45.000 Hi everyone, Matthew Gaffney. 03:45.000 --> 03:51.940 I am the Managing Director of BSSI UK, where I work with multiple clients across various sectors. 03:51.940 --> 03:59.520 But I have worked several years at the airline or operator level, working with the entry into service of new e-enabled aircraft. 03:59.540 --> 04:11.180 So, coming across challenges and obstacles in the entry into service of aircraft and basically doing assurance across the whole piece. 04:12.020 --> 04:16.700 Fantastic, and great to have you all, and it's a great spread of experience across the entire panel. 04:16.740 --> 04:25.100 So, I'm going to start off with Ken, and you've been working with ISACs across various sectors for quite a long time now. 04:25.960 --> 04:33.900 So, finding vulnerabilities, potentially not getting much out of a vendor, and then working with the ISAC is fairly common for you. 04:33.900 --> 04:41.740 So, from your perspective, from what you've seen, how do ISACs fit into the picture for researchers and hackers? 04:42.000 --> 04:45.880 Yeah, I find actually ISACs make a really good set of connections for us. 04:45.880 --> 04:52.420 So, if you read our blog many times over, you'll see that when we find a vulnerability, often it's not the vulnerability that's the story. 04:52.420 --> 05:05.520 It's how the vendor actually responds and interfaces with a security researcher that makes a difference between a really smooth, seamless, and straightforward vulnerability disclosure process, through to being a bit of a train wreck, frankly. 05:05.520 --> 05:10.920 And I find that the work we've done with ISACs over the last few years has really smoothed that process. 05:11.280 --> 05:18.460 Typically, when we're working on, I don't know, embedded components, maybe in IoT, you find something, and the vendor just doesn't listen. 05:18.460 --> 05:18.920 They don't get it. 05:18.920 --> 05:20.020 They don't understand. 05:20.140 --> 05:26.540 But you tend to find different problems in organizations that are perhaps a member of ISACs, because they're just so big. 05:26.800 --> 05:38.560 And how does a little research operation like ours get through to the very right person within a large, whether it's an auto manufacturer, or a CNI operator, or an airline? 05:38.560 --> 05:42.300 How do you find that right person, and how do you get them to listen to you? 05:42.300 --> 05:48.660 And that's where we found the ISACs have been really, really helpful, is by having a connection, by establishing trust. 05:48.920 --> 05:56.900 It's great to get those connections that mean that it's not just scrabbling around on LinkedIn, or sending emails into some generic mailbox. 05:56.900 --> 06:03.780 It's actually, it's a conversation, and then a private broker discussion, which is where the ISACs have been so unbelievably helpful. 06:03.780 --> 06:05.360 It makes a real difference. 06:05.920 --> 06:07.340 Okay, that sounds great. 06:07.340 --> 06:09.040 And it sounds like it's worked. 06:09.120 --> 06:11.260 It has worked well in the past. 06:11.260 --> 06:26.380 I mean, Jeff, from your perspective, having been at the front of the ISAC for quite a while now, I mean, so you first got introduced to Hacker Summer Camp in Vegas when you came on a panel with me at B-Sides a couple of years ago. 06:27.080 --> 06:36.880 And the conversation we had around that, because you were dealing with some vulnerabilities at the time, it was great to see some of the ideas that you were coming up with about working with the hacker community. 06:36.880 --> 06:44.360 So what's been your experience as the ISAC with starting to work with the hacker community now? 06:44.700 --> 06:48.840 So our experience has actually been a lot like Kent's. 06:49.360 --> 07:04.700 Initially, what we're finding is hackers are coming to us, they're either coming through a friend that they know, they're coming through us because of connections that we've made with government agencies. 07:04.700 --> 07:12.680 Or in some instances, we've actually had some companies call us and say, can you talk to this person first, because we're not sure we even want to talk with them. 07:13.200 --> 07:28.240 So there was a lot of, I think, a couple of years ago, hesitation or just a little skepticism with respect to dealing with people who were just calling in and saying that they had some information about a particular vulnerability. 07:28.660 --> 07:32.340 So that was probably one of the first challenges. 07:32.340 --> 07:42.260 And, you know, in our discussions with these folks, we found, you know, most importantly, that they come with great intentions, just good intentions. 07:42.260 --> 07:45.260 We want to really show you something that we found. 07:45.420 --> 07:56.000 And most importantly, also, they're coming in, they're saying, I'm not telling anybody about this, because one, I'm not really sure what I found, because that's one of the problems, too, that we find. 07:56.000 --> 08:05.620 If someone finds, for example, a vulnerability within a component of a system, they're not really sure how that impacts the whole system. 08:05.620 --> 08:14.640 So really good that people have come in and had, you know, one, good research, two, good intentions. 08:14.720 --> 08:18.740 And then three, you know, Ken highlighted this as well. 08:18.740 --> 08:20.900 We act really as a connector. 08:20.900 --> 08:26.500 I mean, if you come into the Aviation ISAC, we don't have a setup like Matt Gaffney behind him there. 08:26.500 --> 08:27.760 And we don't have any airplanes. 08:27.760 --> 08:29.840 We don't have a lab. 08:29.840 --> 08:34.020 We can't test for this vulnerability, but we do do that connection. 08:34.220 --> 08:42.080 So the ISAC is a community of researchers in product security and network security and threat analysts. 08:42.080 --> 08:49.580 So one thing we do have is just a great, you know, network where most times a researcher will call us. 08:49.580 --> 08:59.260 And within about 24 hours, we've got them in touch with a product security incident response or a similar type person inside that company. 08:59.260 --> 09:03.960 And we're starting to, you know, help that conversation along. 09:03.960 --> 09:18.900 But once that connection is made, actually, we pretty much step to the side and let the people who actually built the technology and the researcher who has, you know, this vulnerability information, let them have that direct conversation. 09:19.780 --> 09:20.700 Thanks, Ken. 09:20.700 --> 09:34.800 And that's actually a nice segue through to chatting to Gaffers, because Gaffers, you've just gone through this process of finding a potential snag or two on some systems. 09:35.640 --> 09:46.460 And actually started working with the ISAC and other organizations to try sort of getting to the bottom of it and closing off. 09:46.460 --> 09:52.860 So what's been your perspective of that journey from finding something to trying to close it off? 09:53.980 --> 09:54.340 Yes. 09:54.340 --> 10:12.460 So I was writing a paper about some of the things I'd seen, and I was curious about how much detail I could go into without causing alarm distress or basically overstepping the boundaries. 10:12.460 --> 10:19.160 So, you know, through the community, I reached out to the Indonesian ISAC to get some advice. 10:20.340 --> 10:27.700 And one thing I noticed was within 24 hours, I noticed the hits on my LinkedIn profile just exploded. 10:28.200 --> 10:32.940 It was just full of people from all sorts of manufacturers. 10:33.740 --> 10:49.500 And it was in stark contrast, really, with similar interactions, which I'd had whilst I was working at the airline, where, you know, maybe a week later you get a response and the response was very, very tepid indeed. 10:50.820 --> 10:57.340 So that was really the first difference I've noticed in going through the aviation ISAC. 10:58.960 --> 11:10.060 The second time around, the official vulnerability disclosure procedure had been developed at manufacturer level, again, I think with help from the aviation ISAC. 11:10.800 --> 11:13.640 So we decided to use that mechanism. 11:14.240 --> 11:24.920 And although the initial holding response was quite quick, it was about a working day in response, the actual full response took four and a half weeks. 11:24.920 --> 11:30.620 And that was because I was chasing, which I thought was a little bit slow myself. 11:30.820 --> 11:33.340 It wasn't a highly technical issue. 11:33.340 --> 11:36.660 It was quite, quite simple. 11:36.660 --> 11:44.820 And the response was no different than the first time I went through disclosing a vulnerability with a manufacturer. 11:45.420 --> 11:56.420 And basically it was the scenarios and the hypothesis are not credible, therefore there's no vulnerability, which is a very strange opinion to have on risk management myself. 11:56.420 --> 12:05.980 But I rebutted with some comments from the official response and they were left unanswered. 12:05.980 --> 12:09.660 Until eventually I got a this matter is closed email and that was it. 12:10.760 --> 12:29.880 So the difference, I suppose the outcome was very similar, but I would say the response, the initial response was much better because the first time I went through this, it took several months to get to any kind of, any kind of satisfactory resolution, 12:29.880 --> 12:33.320 which it wasn't in the end really, it was only a halfway house. 12:33.320 --> 12:40.160 But with the Aviation ISAC going through the official process, it took weeks instead of months. 12:41.000 --> 12:42.200 Thanks for that. 12:42.280 --> 12:49.760 I want to come to that in a second, but can I just go for a straightaway follow up question to Jeff on that? 12:49.760 --> 13:01.380 Which is, if on one hand you've got a researcher such as Gaffers who's saying, I think I've found something, but the response from the manufacturer, the vendor is, well, actually there's nothing there. 13:01.380 --> 13:03.420 But we can't really tell you there's nothing there. 13:03.560 --> 13:11.420 With the ISAC in the middle, and you're funded by the manufacturers, how do you reconcile that? 13:11.880 --> 13:13.580 That's a great question. 13:13.580 --> 13:20.800 And I think it's kind of like that great abyss that is so hard for us to get across. 13:20.800 --> 13:30.900 So when you have a researcher who has information and they believe that, you know, this is a vulnerability, particularly one that needs to be addressed. 13:31.400 --> 13:33.420 As I said, we can't validate it. 13:33.420 --> 13:34.300 I don't have the equipment. 13:34.300 --> 13:37.480 I don't have the specialists to be able to do that. 13:37.480 --> 13:42.520 The best I can do is get you in touch with the right people who do have it. 13:42.520 --> 13:53.700 And hopefully through the relationship builds that have happened over the years that, you know, there'll be a good exchange there. 13:54.360 --> 14:07.360 When you get to a situation where the process has been completed and the manufacturer is not validating that vulnerability has any impact. 14:07.360 --> 14:17.740 I think it is an extremely difficult situation at that point in time, because you've got someone, you know, like Gaffer's, they've got an incredible mindset, right? 14:17.740 --> 14:21.120 It's, hey, I'm challenging things that people are saying are secure. 14:21.120 --> 14:25.500 And I am not sure, you know, that this is because of something that I've found. 14:25.500 --> 14:32.180 And that is what I think is the treasured trait of every security researcher. 14:32.240 --> 14:41.180 Their ability to dig in and try and find a way around the system that someone said there's no way around is what leads to the great security research that we have. 14:41.180 --> 14:55.440 The unfortunate part is, is that if someone has tested it against that system, and they know why it doesn't work, and they don't want to pass that information over back over to the researcher, then you have this gap. 14:55.440 --> 15:00.680 Because the researcher's mindset is, hey, I think this is great. 15:00.680 --> 15:02.440 You need to show me how come. 15:02.440 --> 15:14.720 And there's a... now you have that question of, well, where does my intellectual property and my security controls stop, you know, in respect to trying to protect them? 15:14.720 --> 15:19.520 And where does the research information, you know, kind of come together? 15:19.520 --> 15:21.840 How do we meet in the middle there? 15:21.840 --> 15:38.260 And that is something that I think is going to take some more time in terms of that conversation and how much people are willing to, manufacturers specifically, are going to be willing to share in that area. 15:39.420 --> 15:41.140 There's been a lot of great work. 15:41.140 --> 15:46.860 Pete, you've done a lot of work trying to bridge the discussions between these communities. 15:46.860 --> 15:59.760 And, you know, we've seen pretty much a community that really wasn't talking to researchers at all really starting to embrace them now and have a lot more conversations, which has been good for both. 15:59.760 --> 16:12.400 I think the researchers are finding out, hey, you know, these are good people trying to secure really high technology, and the companies are saying these are really good people who are trying to make sure that technology is well secured and I haven't found a way. 16:12.400 --> 16:20.860 So this is all good in my mind in that the process of building trust takes a long time. 16:21.020 --> 16:25.000 And I think things are moving in the right direction. 16:25.000 --> 16:39.940 And it's these types of conversations, these environments, the village, these things that are happening that are going to continue to bring together the parties and try and close that gap of when you have these types of situations. 16:39.940 --> 16:48.120 In terms of what the manufacturers will be willing to share in terms of information with the researchers. 16:48.780 --> 16:49.720 Thanks, Jeff. 16:49.720 --> 17:02.300 And yeah, that brings it around nicely to probably the newest ISAC on the block in the aerospace sector, which is Erin and the space team. 17:02.300 --> 17:21.280 I mean, Erin, all of the conversations that have been sort of like going on there with the challenges and the opportunities that the aviation ISAC has gone through and Gaffers and Ken as examples of the researcher and hacker community. 17:21.280 --> 17:36.540 With you sort of being the newly minted IOC later on this year, Space ISAC, what's your sort of vision going forwards for how you want to play this and how you want to take the Space ISAC forwards? 17:38.500 --> 17:39.780 Muted. 17:42.770 --> 17:44.110 Thanks, Pete. 17:44.370 --> 17:52.630 I think since Space ISAC is new and we have sort of a clean slate here, then there's a lot of opportunity to leverage the lessons learned. 17:52.630 --> 18:06.330 There's almost like a legacy of how ISACs operate and some things good, some things bad, and we want to make sure that we fully explore and understand what we can do the best. 18:06.330 --> 18:16.710 So listening to everyone talk, then I think, you know, there's some great takeaways, you know, having that open line of communication available and we have that today. 18:16.710 --> 18:26.250 So we are currently accepting communication, you know, to the Space ISAC at our info at s-isac.org email address from anyone. 18:26.250 --> 18:29.930 So I would say that part of our vision is starts now. 18:29.930 --> 18:40.650 Like I would encourage anyone to contact us with ideas on how Space ISAC can be that broker between the public and private sector, but also that extends to researchers. 18:41.710 --> 18:46.710 Part of the vision of Space ISAC does include that we have universities as members. 18:46.710 --> 18:51.130 So that makes us a little bit different than some other ISACs, not all. 18:51.130 --> 18:53.770 We also have international members. 18:53.770 --> 18:56.090 So that makes us a little different too. 18:56.090 --> 19:00.010 I think it's really cool to think about space as a global community. 19:00.010 --> 19:07.390 And so other ISACs have done and we intend to expand out and have members from all across the globe. 19:09.170 --> 19:14.230 Since not everyone here is familiar with Space ISAC, just a little bit of history. 19:14.230 --> 19:16.130 It was launched by the White House. 19:16.130 --> 19:18.970 So that's interesting in and of itself. 19:18.970 --> 19:32.190 The White House for representing the US government came forward and said, you know, we really want to see the public private sector come together and share information about threats and vulnerabilities about regarding the space community. 19:32.190 --> 19:39.230 And after they made that announcement, then we were able to start going out and asking members to join the board. 19:39.230 --> 19:46.310 So we're still very new and that we just opened our general membership on May 1 of this year. 19:46.310 --> 19:54.330 And when we hit our IOC, that will mean that we have the ability to actively share threat intel through an intel platform. 19:54.330 --> 20:00.750 We'll also have workshops and events that are available to the space community published at that time. 20:00.750 --> 20:02.730 And that's coming later this summer. 20:02.730 --> 20:08.870 So now is the time definitely for us to open that line of communication. 20:09.030 --> 20:16.290 And we would invite, you know, like I said, anyone's perspective on how to stand up the best vulnerability disclosure program. 20:16.290 --> 20:19.590 I've already talked to some of our board members about doing that. 20:19.590 --> 20:24.590 So really looking forward to the opportunities that we can bring to the space community. 20:24.790 --> 20:27.450 This one will make us even better. 20:27.670 --> 20:37.190 I believe that an ISAC really is the prime organization to be able to have this type of dialogue and to engage in this way. 20:37.190 --> 20:38.910 So thank you. 20:38.910 --> 20:39.950 And that's great. 20:39.950 --> 20:42.830 And it's great to hear all the work that's going on in the background. 20:42.970 --> 20:48.990 I mean, have you... so with space, I mean, a lot of the focus is on mission critical. 20:49.730 --> 20:56.490 So that's the mantra that always gets talked about with space ops. 20:56.490 --> 21:01.350 I mean, a lot of the discussion for aviation will be safety and security. 21:01.350 --> 21:07.550 So driving risk as low as reasonably practicable. 21:08.830 --> 21:19.950 With the space sector and your members and what you're hearing from your side of it, is there still this... what's the general feeling at the moment when it comes to cyber security? 21:20.510 --> 21:30.390 Because people tend to banter that cyber security of space assets is generally... I mean, I think the expression I heard the other day was in the 80s. 21:32.070 --> 21:38.870 But obviously, that is going to be something which is openly debatable. 21:38.870 --> 21:46.990 But what's the general feeling about the maintaining that mission critical status and having cyber security upfront and focused on that? 21:47.510 --> 21:51.990 And then looking for the vulnerabilities and working and open to working with researchers? 21:51.990 --> 21:55.110 Are you getting that feeling from your members and the people you're speaking to? 21:55.790 --> 21:59.690 The feeling I get is that more information is better. 21:59.930 --> 22:09.410 So if information comes to the ISAC, then it's our job to get it shared with the members that it is most relevant to. 22:09.410 --> 22:13.530 So we are already operating in that role right now. 22:13.530 --> 22:19.130 Cyber security for space or security for space is very broad. 22:19.130 --> 22:26.050 And the general feeling is that we should have stood up a space ISAC two decades ago. 22:26.050 --> 22:28.690 Maybe that's what your comments were indicating. 22:28.690 --> 22:34.590 Because there's a lot of vulnerabilities that hit cyber security, hit the business system. 22:34.590 --> 22:39.150 And they actually have a lot of relevance specifically to space applications. 22:39.150 --> 22:42.090 And other entities might view them differently. 22:42.090 --> 22:49.390 But if you're a space company, then you really need to know the direct implications of that threat to the space mission. 22:49.390 --> 22:54.830 So it is definitely all about space mission and protecting the space critical infrastructure. 22:54.910 --> 22:58.050 And that's where our entire focus will be. 22:58.050 --> 23:14.170 So if somebody has access to information that is related to a threat to space critical infrastructure, which will eventually publish what that means to our members, what is space critical infrastructure, and that'll help scope some of that discussion. 23:14.170 --> 23:25.510 But I mean, if you define it as space critical infrastructure, and you think that the space ISAC should know about it, then I would say that's what our members are going to care about, from what I can tell. 23:25.630 --> 23:36.550 We've actually also engaged in a partnership, I should mention, with the Air Force Research Lab that runs that hack-a-sack that's happening this year right now. 23:36.550 --> 23:49.430 And so just even that step forward shows me that the members are really excited about partnering on challenges or developing our own challenges that will be open to the broader researcher community. 23:49.430 --> 23:50.470 Thanks, Aaron. 23:50.470 --> 24:07.850 Yeah, and to be honest, it's just nice talking about aerospace cybersecurity and having hackers and researchers working together because it felt like three years ago that talking about vulnerabilities in aerospace systems is something that we didn't really want to do. 24:07.850 --> 24:14.070 So actually, part of this is building up this dialogue so we can have that as an informed dialogue. 24:14.290 --> 24:23.390 But as we go forwards, I think, I mean, we've all had conversations in the past about trying to make sure we learn from what's happened in the past. 24:23.390 --> 24:29.130 So really trying to dig into some of these challenges is... 24:29.130 --> 24:43.350 What's been, and I'll pass it over to Ken, what's been the standout sort of examples of where things have really worked well and made a difference and where things really haven't worked well? 24:44.050 --> 24:45.310 Gosh, there's a few of those. 24:45.310 --> 24:50.410 I want to pick up on a point that Jeff made, and you used the word new, which I think is actually really important here. 24:51.770 --> 24:55.090 Because cybersecurity research in aviation is pretty new. 24:55.090 --> 24:58.830 I mean, we've been working on airframes for two, two and a half years now. 24:59.070 --> 25:03.150 And you've got to remember, this is an industry that perhaps is very heavily regulated. 25:03.190 --> 25:11.230 It believes it has safety well in hand, so it's extremely open to inspection, but also fiercely protective of intellectual property, rightly so too. 25:11.230 --> 25:13.430 So this is a new thing. 25:13.430 --> 25:24.050 The industry is also hurting at the moment with the COVID-19 issues, and also smarting at it from some of perhaps less helpful coverage in the past around aviation cyber. 25:24.050 --> 25:27.810 So I think it's really important we talk about building trust in this community. 25:27.810 --> 25:34.430 And what's often raised as a subject when you're doing vulnerability disclosure of non-disclosure. 25:34.430 --> 25:36.450 And that's a really sensitive area. 25:36.450 --> 25:41.210 So it's pretty rare outside this space that you'd be asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement. 25:41.210 --> 25:45.310 But also, you have to balance that with, as a researcher, do you want to know more? 25:45.310 --> 25:46.790 Do you want to understand in detail? 25:46.790 --> 25:59.250 But at that point, you might consider signing a non-disclosure agreement in certain areas that allow the manufacturer to talk to you in more detail, feel more like they've got more trust in you, that you're not going to take everything that they've told you and splatter it across the press. 25:59.250 --> 26:01.330 And I think that's a really, really important point. 26:01.330 --> 26:04.810 So I think many researchers should think carefully about that. 26:04.810 --> 26:08.550 Or maybe we should consider actually NDAs for certain areas. 26:08.650 --> 26:15.250 Perhaps certain bits of discussion do need to be covered by non-disclosure and certain, well, maybe not so. 26:15.250 --> 26:17.230 And I think that's a really important learning point. 26:17.290 --> 26:24.070 And I think that also leads us back into some examples of where things have gone really well, and some examples of where things have gone really badly. 26:24.070 --> 26:31.470 I can think of the biggest issue just being generally where there's no communication. 26:31.710 --> 26:39.510 So where the researcher does what they believe to be the right thing, makes communication, establishes, discloses everything they've got, and then things go quiet for a while. 26:39.510 --> 26:47.990 And it may be that the vendor in that case is actually working really diligently exploring every option and trying to add some detail, but they don't communicate. 26:48.030 --> 26:51.910 And I think in Gaffer's case, that's potentially what went wrong there. 26:51.910 --> 26:57.690 Perhaps if there'd been a more regular dialogue with the vendor reaching out and going, hey, I know we haven't spoken to you for a while. 26:59.770 --> 27:03.550 I think that would have made you feel a lot happier about things, hey Matt? 27:03.550 --> 27:04.790 Yeah, absolutely. 27:05.370 --> 27:11.030 I just felt that the communication was a bit cut, in general. 27:11.710 --> 27:14.270 And it wasn't an open flowing dialogue at all. 27:14.270 --> 27:17.550 It was very much, yep, thank you for your submission, we'll look at it. 27:17.710 --> 27:19.190 And then nothing else. 27:19.670 --> 27:27.250 There was no questioning of what I had proposed, no questioning of what I'd submitted. 27:27.730 --> 27:30.330 It was just that, yeah, we'll take it away and look at it. 27:30.330 --> 27:31.610 And that was it. 27:31.610 --> 27:36.430 It was just, and then when I chased them for an update, it was like, oh, here's the response. 27:37.370 --> 27:38.870 There it is, that's it. 27:39.930 --> 27:45.410 And, you know, annoyingly, with my work at the operator level, I actually knew a lot of these people. 27:45.970 --> 27:49.470 Anyway, you know, it's not like I've never actually met them in person. 27:49.470 --> 27:50.410 I have. 27:50.710 --> 27:57.410 So to not have that level of trust, I think, is really disappointing. 27:57.410 --> 28:05.410 And it is something where I think, you know, the whole industry, researchers and the manufacturers could really improve. 28:05.730 --> 28:07.070 A good example of that. 28:07.070 --> 28:16.290 So, you know, compare us to where we were perhaps a year ago with DEF CON and Black Hat in 2019, which was perhaps partly a difficult time for the aviation cyberspace. 28:16.290 --> 28:18.550 But yeah, here we are a year later. 28:18.550 --> 28:24.790 And for example, Boeing is going to set up a Cyber Technical Advisory Council, actually inviting researchers onto the inside. 28:24.790 --> 28:28.010 I mean, what a huge win that is, both for researchers and for the industry. 28:28.010 --> 28:29.890 It's fantastic progress. 28:29.890 --> 28:42.430 And I think it's amazing that a vendor who was perhaps really hurting from some difficult coverage last year and a difficult interaction with researchers has now completely come around and engaged practically. 28:42.430 --> 28:43.830 And I think that's a huge step forward. 28:43.830 --> 28:45.610 So it is new. 28:45.610 --> 28:47.110 It is new to the industry. 28:47.310 --> 28:48.750 But yes, it will take time. 28:48.750 --> 28:50.350 But trust is being established. 28:52.330 --> 28:53.970 Jeff, do you want to come back on that? 28:55.290 --> 29:01.550 Yeah, I just actually took down a note here because I want to make sure I share it with all the members across the ISAC. 29:01.910 --> 29:07.890 And what I wrote down basically is a vulnerability disclosure program does not equal a link on a website. 29:07.890 --> 29:11.550 And I think that's a really important point here, right? 29:11.550 --> 29:20.610 I mean, we've got all these companies out there who are now making it easier for them to be contacted, but it doesn't end there, right? 29:20.610 --> 29:22.070 So I got your submission. 29:22.070 --> 29:23.930 I need to have that conversation. 29:23.930 --> 29:27.210 I need to engage with this researcher. 29:27.550 --> 29:30.890 And I think that's just a really important point. 29:30.890 --> 29:35.290 I'm really glad you brought that up because that's a part of the maturation process. 29:35.290 --> 29:43.190 You know, okay, the door's there, but if you don't answer the door and welcome the people in for the conversation, then, you know, it's kind of an odd relationship. 29:43.190 --> 29:44.930 They're just standing on the front step, right? 29:44.930 --> 29:50.550 And so we need to bring them in the living room and sit down and have the conversation. 29:52.390 --> 29:56.890 Researchers spend their own time, their own money, their own efforts doing this. 29:56.890 --> 29:59.610 And it's great when we feel valued. 29:59.850 --> 30:04.030 And, you know, we can help, you know, the aviation industry can benefit from what we do. 30:04.030 --> 30:07.630 It's just that level of value and interaction makes such a difference. 30:07.850 --> 30:22.370 And actually, if you look at the... if a researcher and a hacker find something and then tries to approach and do the right thing in talking through good faith research and saying, I think there's an issue here, a lot of the risk is really on the researcher. 30:22.570 --> 30:24.170 It's not really on the manufacturer. 30:24.170 --> 30:32.050 So a lot of that effort, I think, really has got to come from the vendor to say, we're open and we're willing to engage in all of this. 30:32.050 --> 30:37.690 Geoff, one of the areas I think is quite contentious in security research in aviation is the subject of non-disclosure. 30:37.690 --> 30:39.750 I mean, where does the ISAC sit on that? 30:40.510 --> 30:42.230 So, great question. 30:42.870 --> 30:52.950 Really, the issue with the non-disclosure is that if you sign a non-disclosure agreement with someone, there's still a risk that they're going to violate the non-disclosure agreement. 30:52.950 --> 31:03.910 And although there's recourse if someone violates a non-disclosure agreement, what you wanted to keep protected from being publicly disclosed ends up getting out there. 31:03.910 --> 31:06.710 So this is, again, a matter of trust. 31:06.710 --> 31:12.550 And you've seen this, Ken, because you have a company that does pen testing, right? 31:12.550 --> 31:16.150 Not every company wants to hire every pen tester. 31:16.250 --> 31:18.350 And, you know, that's one of the problems. 31:18.350 --> 31:24.750 It's like they're looking a lot of times for companies that, hey, have you worked with these guys before? 31:24.750 --> 31:26.150 Have you worked with these pen testers? 31:26.150 --> 31:28.410 Do you think they do a good job? 31:28.410 --> 31:33.150 Do they, you know, actually hold your intellectual property close? 31:33.150 --> 31:41.110 Those are the types of questions that I'm sure you've had grilled, right, as you walk into different engagements. 31:41.170 --> 31:49.210 And that is one of the problems, particularly for newer researchers, because it's like, well, what if you don't know me, right? 31:49.210 --> 31:50.650 I've still got great research. 31:50.650 --> 31:54.290 I'm a very trustable person, but we just don't have a history yet. 31:54.290 --> 32:03.930 And that is a situation where I think it may be solved by the community building itself up. 32:03.930 --> 32:16.010 As the community builds itself up, other researchers who do have, let's call it street cred, right, out there, they're able to vouch for people who have come in and say, well, I've worked with that person. 32:16.010 --> 32:17.290 I know that person. 32:17.290 --> 32:30.410 You know, those types of trust building activities, I think, are going to have to happen to support the idea of entering into an NDA with a new researcher. 32:57.890 --> 33:13.570 I mean, can I just... we've got to be... I just want to unpick some of the language, because when we talk about building up and using street cred and things like that, I mean, surely we need to get to a position where, irrespective of who is bringing it up, 33:13.570 --> 33:17.270 if it's being brought up in good faith, and being engaged on good faith, then it's going to work. 33:17.270 --> 33:24.510 But if it's being brought up in bad faith, whether somebody's got street cred or not, we've got to make sure that they are listened to. 33:24.510 --> 33:41.750 Because if we go to the safety critical aspect, or from the space perspective with Erin and her team from a mission critical aspect, if anybody brings up a potential safety issue, then the safety management team are behoven to listen to it, irrespective of who it is. 33:41.750 --> 33:48.250 So surely we've got to go for the same perspective when it comes to researchers and them trying to flag issues. 33:48.770 --> 33:53.770 It shouldn't be... I don't feel there should be a gate of entry of credibility or not. 33:53.770 --> 33:57.890 It should be, we've just got to have that dialogue, and they've got to be able to reach people. 33:58.230 --> 34:00.070 Gaffer, you're nodding a lot. 34:00.070 --> 34:08.910 Well, yeah, because I mean, I get a lot of, you know, imposter syndrome in this industry, because I'm not a pen test. 34:08.910 --> 34:09.950 I'm not like Ken. 34:09.950 --> 34:13.990 I don't spend my life, you know, reverse engineering IoT and doing all this kind of stuff. 34:13.990 --> 34:18.810 I was just doing information assurance on behalf of my client and found these things. 34:18.950 --> 34:22.330 And, yeah, like I said, I'm not a pen test. 34:22.330 --> 34:35.230 I haven't really called myself a researcher until recently when I kind of thought to myself, well, yeah, I'm actually doing things in my spare time, looking at things, using open source documentation, et cetera, et cetera. 34:35.850 --> 34:42.170 And, yeah, I suppose I am a researcher, but I never really thought of myself that way, especially when I did these disclosures. 34:42.170 --> 34:46.890 So, yeah, the bar has to be not your cred. 34:46.890 --> 34:53.050 It has to be, you know, you're coming in with an issue and, like I said, we're doing it in good faith. 34:53.430 --> 35:09.830 I mean, Erin, from your perspective and how you're building out the space ISAC team, are you looking at the structures and processes of how you can potentially engage in this way to try and make sure these doors are fully open? 35:13.480 --> 35:14.160 Yes. 35:14.160 --> 35:18.940 So I've started the conversation with the current members of the space ISAC. 35:19.180 --> 35:36.460 And as the space ISAC grows, then I think this will be a conversation that we have with everyone who joins the organization to ask them about having a vulnerability disclosure program, what their experience is with that, and making sure that we can shepherd the conversation from the point, 35:36.460 --> 35:44.840 you know, where someone knocks on the door to us opening it to us having the conversation to then brokering the conversation with the member. 35:45.520 --> 36:00.140 And I think the only way to really do that is to, like I said, talk to members when they join the organization about their perspectives on this, because otherwise you don't have a cultural adoption of it. 36:00.140 --> 36:05.620 Because that's really, from what I'm hearing from everyone, then that's what this is all about. 36:05.620 --> 36:08.560 And that's great for me, because that's the kind of stuff that I love. 36:08.560 --> 36:15.700 Like when I did design sprints with the private sector and the government, then that was all about changing culture. 36:15.700 --> 36:23.180 And so shaping culture is mostly driven by conversations and introducing new ideas and then kind of testing them. 36:23.180 --> 36:34.080 So I think that's what we'll be doing in the space, Isaac, is if someone knocks on our door, then they, people, someone has to realize that if they knock on our door right now, then it's the first time it's ever happened. 36:34.080 --> 36:46.240 But we're willing and open to taking, walking the path with them and having the conversation with the company or the member that has the vulnerability that they're approaching us with. 36:46.240 --> 36:57.320 And I'm just going to pick up though, because culture, yeah, massively important, but with both aviation and space, as have been previously mentioned, it's massively highly regulated. 36:57.320 --> 37:00.260 So regulators are there for both safety and security. 37:01.740 --> 37:19.160 And last year, there was a massive step forwards where, for example, ICAO, which is the UN body for aviation, actually has a line in their cyber strategy now, which says that states must give adequate protection to good faith security researchers, which is great. 37:19.160 --> 37:25.840 So from a very top level at ICAO and the UN, this is sort of being recognized and hopefully will filter down. 37:26.900 --> 37:32.980 But what's the relationship like with, for example, the regulators in this space? 37:33.660 --> 37:36.280 Because this is a safety critical industry. 37:36.400 --> 37:44.580 If a researcher is flagging potentially a safety critical issue, who really gets to decide whether it's safety critical or not? 37:44.580 --> 37:52.780 And from Erin, from your perspective, is there that structure yet, whereas you would see in the space sector? 37:54.220 --> 38:03.340 So obviously the space sector is regulated, but it's not as regulated as it could be, and maybe will be in the future in terms of cybersecurity. 38:03.720 --> 38:13.240 So I think the Space ISAC, part of the intention of standing it up is to promote dialogue with prospective regulators. 38:13.240 --> 38:19.560 So, you know, in the future, there will be agencies that are responsible for managing space traffic management. 38:19.560 --> 38:24.060 They could send regulation down as a result of that designation. 38:24.100 --> 38:30.820 And the communication between the private sector and that agency is critical. 38:30.820 --> 38:32.900 And that's what the Space ISAC is for. 38:32.900 --> 38:42.200 So we have at least 18 different agencies that we're partnered with informally right now, and we're working on formalizing those partnerships. 38:42.500 --> 38:46.500 So I believe there's a lot of opportunity for the interactive dialogue. 38:46.500 --> 38:54.160 We are seeing it today with certain agencies contacting us and asking for information to be shared in both ways. 38:54.160 --> 38:59.620 So they share information with us, and as we're able to, we share information with them. 38:59.620 --> 39:15.400 And hopefully, and you can tell us how this goes, potentially, whether yourselves can be an advocate of why good faith security research and working with the research community would be good across the space sector. 39:15.400 --> 39:22.600 I mean, the work from what you're talking about there, it sounds like that you're going to be quite well at the forefront of that as the Space ISAC. 39:23.500 --> 39:41.840 Going back to the regulator's perspective from an aviation side, Jeff, from the Aviation ISAC perspective, if somebody comes to you with something that you think could be a safety-critical issue, do you deal with that differently compared to if it was an issue on a non-safety-critical system? 39:42.880 --> 39:44.640 No, we really don't. 39:44.640 --> 39:53.540 So what we do is, again, we don't have the capacity to validate whether or not it is a safety-critical issue or not. 39:53.540 --> 40:00.300 I mean, there may be an assertion from the researcher that it is, but we don't have the ability to make that conclusion. 40:00.300 --> 40:11.360 So we're going to be providing the information by linking the researcher up to the manufacturer and letting them go through that process. 40:11.500 --> 40:30.280 If it's a safety-critical issue, the manufacturer may be required under their regulatory requirements to actually make a report to their regulator as to what the particular issue is and then how that's going to be resolved. 40:30.300 --> 40:41.960 So there's a whole body of governance over the manufacturers to have to make those types of notifications. 40:42.220 --> 40:47.520 And there are also lots of other front doors that the researchers can use, for example. 40:47.520 --> 40:51.420 So DHS has a front door for researchers. 40:51.600 --> 40:55.560 I don't think the FAA has a front door for researchers. 40:56.580 --> 41:02.300 But, I mean, Ken, have you seen the different pathways that have been used? 41:03.220 --> 41:06.160 Yes, so we haven't struggled so much recently. 41:06.160 --> 41:12.720 And I think that's partly because we've had access to ISAC, who know who to ask or can make a subtle introduction if required. 41:12.840 --> 41:18.980 But I have seen other researchers publishing on Twitter saying, has anyone got a security contact at X? 41:18.980 --> 41:25.300 And that's a really difficult way of... I think sometimes it draws attention, sometimes it's unhelpful. 41:25.400 --> 41:33.860 And I don't know if that's the most constructive way, but it does reflect a lack of ability of the industry to receive researchers. 41:33.920 --> 41:40.040 So I'd say to researchers, try a bit harder, but I'd also say to the industry, listen a bit harder and make it a bit easier. 41:40.900 --> 41:45.280 Well, that sounds like quite a good segue to start wrapping up. 41:45.760 --> 41:57.300 So , Gaffers, have you got a sort of like final thoughts that you want to sort of, having been talking about this for a while now and having gone through it yourself, have you got some wrap up thoughts for yourself? 41:57.300 --> 42:10.080 Yeah, I mean, so from an airline perspective, a lot of the cyber security controls come down to the airline as recommendations. 42:10.180 --> 42:17.160 You know, so when you look at all the documentation and the regulation paperwork, there's nothing that says you have to do this. 42:17.160 --> 42:18.560 They're all recommendations. 42:18.600 --> 42:27.440 And a lot of the documentation, they will, you know, dedicate 95% or more of the words towards non-cyber stuff. 42:27.440 --> 42:30.700 And there's a tiny little bit at the end about, well, think about doing this. 42:31.620 --> 42:40.280 And I think that the manufacturers as well, they will provide their own recommendations of security controls to put in place. 42:40.280 --> 42:44.960 But then there's a disconnect because the manufacturer will have done their risk assessment. 42:44.960 --> 42:52.680 They will know what the risks are, produce recommendations for the operator to implement. 42:53.100 --> 43:05.520 But then the operator implements them with no way of assessing their quality because there's that disconnect between the risk assessment, which the manufacturer has done, which is obviously secret, and the work that the operator does. 43:05.520 --> 43:07.840 And I think that there's something in the middle there that's missing. 43:07.840 --> 43:09.220 And it could be the regulator. 43:09.220 --> 43:10.580 It could be the ISACs. 43:11.040 --> 43:13.280 I don't know, but I think there's a better way we can do this. 43:14.580 --> 43:24.380 Really from the, although there might be one front door for the researchers, it's all of the network of communications and information sharing behind that that also challenges remain. 43:24.860 --> 43:25.520 Yeah. 43:25.660 --> 43:26.640 OK. 43:27.260 --> 43:31.740 Ken, you were very pithy earlier, so I'll give you one last chance. 43:32.080 --> 43:38.520 So I think one key point is security research is happening in aviation more and more. 43:38.560 --> 43:41.660 Partly on the back of COVID-19, airframes are being retired. 43:41.660 --> 43:49.280 I was offered an entire operational 747-400 that last flew a month ago for 200,000 bucks just this week. 43:49.280 --> 43:51.680 OK, I didn't have engines, but everything else was intact. 43:51.680 --> 43:53.800 Plug it into ground power, the whole thing works. 43:53.800 --> 44:00.360 So yeah, 200Gs is a lot of cash, but it's starting to come into the price range of research firms. 44:00.360 --> 44:02.480 So more and more research is going to happen. 44:02.480 --> 44:07.680 So now's the time to take the opportunity, engage with researchers, make it easy to interact with them. 44:07.680 --> 44:09.500 And let's step up. 44:10.340 --> 44:11.420 Fantastic. 44:11.420 --> 44:15.260 And then I'll come across to Erin for yourself next. 44:17.400 --> 44:27.720 Yeah, so I think the way forward for the Space ISAC is to take the advice and the lessons learned from this group in particular and others. 44:27.800 --> 44:35.520 I've talked to some other ISACs as well out there to get insights and perspectives on how to do this the best. 44:35.520 --> 44:40.940 Space ISAC does have some interesting things in its future. 44:40.940 --> 44:44.820 We will, in 2022, have a vulnerability lab. 44:44.820 --> 44:53.840 So that may bring in a different dynamic to the Space ISAC and open some great opportunities to do testing of vulnerabilities. 44:54.280 --> 45:01.500 Definitely don't want to have anyone leave thinking that just because it's in space doesn't mean it can't be hacked. 45:01.500 --> 45:08.820 So we're really looking forward to the future and engaging the researcher community. 45:09.280 --> 45:15.900 And hope that someone actually reaches out and shares their ideas because I really want to read them and follow up. 45:15.900 --> 45:22.680 So I'll drop the address that I gave before, info, I-N-F-O at s-isac.org. 45:22.680 --> 45:24.160 Feel free to hit me up. 45:24.160 --> 45:24.920 Thanks. 45:24.920 --> 45:36.520 And I think we all look forward to hearing about your IOC coming up and look forward to how you take it forward and being there to help you and the community as it goes forward. 45:36.520 --> 45:40.500 And then, Jeff, you and I have had these conversations a lot. 45:40.780 --> 45:42.920 So it's great to have you here. 45:44.020 --> 45:46.480 Wrap up thoughts from yourself, please. 45:47.040 --> 45:52.080 So I think something that Ken highlighted is just critically important. 45:52.080 --> 46:06.520 I mean, the fact that people, particularly because of COVID-19, can now get more access to equipment, that is going to absolutely open up more research being done on planes. 46:06.520 --> 46:10.300 So that fact is critically important. 46:10.300 --> 46:21.120 The other thing, I think it's been a theme through the whole conversation we've been having here, is that communication and building bridges is just critically important between the community and the industry. 46:21.120 --> 46:41.220 And so as we continue to strengthen that bridge and have more of those conversations and good exchanges, again, I think people are just going to continue to see that on both sides of the equation here, there's just really good, smart people who have common ground with respect to safety in the industry. 46:41.380 --> 46:52.800 And keeping that conversation open and that mindset open is going to help these great ideas get passed back and forth and just make the whole industry more secure. 46:53.480 --> 46:54.340 Thanks, Jeff. 46:54.340 --> 46:55.380 And thanks to all of you. 46:55.380 --> 47:05.900 I think it really shows from all of the themes that have been picked up that actually there is no straight path to building trust across such a diverse group of stakeholders. 47:06.680 --> 47:15.120 There is no one right answer for how best we can help the researcher and hacker community work with industry. 47:15.120 --> 47:35.960 But the one thing we do know that will help is conversations like this, learning from each other and actually trying to positively engage across all of those different stakeholders and have a good drumbeat of communication so that when people are flagging things up, 47:35.960 --> 47:38.880 then it's actually a good positive engagement all the way through. 47:39.120 --> 47:42.160 And that's the way we learn all of us together. 47:42.360 --> 47:47.580 And that's the way that we can help the industry be safer and more secure. 47:47.720 --> 47:50.780 So I just want to make a huge thanks out to all of you. 47:51.320 --> 47:59.180 This is in the heart of the envelope of exactly what the Aerospace Village is about to try and help build bridges and the community around such a great topic. 48:00.460 --> 48:08.800 Please stay safe and look forward to chatting with everybody on Discord straight after this for about an hour. 48:08.800 --> 48:09.760 Thank you very much.