WEBVTT 00:06.280 --> 00:09.260 Welcome to the Aerospace Village at DEF CON Safe Mode. 00:09.260 --> 00:10.760 My name is Kaylin Tricon. 00:10.760 --> 00:19.780 I'm the Director of Communications at the Aerospace Village and Vice President at RockSolutions, a public affairs agency where I lead the firm's cybersecurity practice. 00:19.780 --> 00:25.140 I am thrilled to be moderating this panel on Hacking Cybersecurity Aerospace Regulation. 00:25.140 --> 00:29.900 The aerospace industry is highly regulated with a great deal of focus on cybersecurity. 00:30.200 --> 00:39.860 Aerospace regulators play a key role in understanding risk and putting in place the legal frameworks in creating rules, regulations, and best practice around good faith research. 00:39.860 --> 00:48.080 Today's panel will look at how the aerospace industry is approaching cybersecurity regulation and its relationship to good faith hackers and researchers. 00:48.080 --> 00:55.000 We will look at how other sectors have approached regulation and partnered with this community to increase resilience and highlight vulnerability. 00:55.160 --> 00:58.640 Now I'd like to introduce our esteemed panelists. 00:58.760 --> 01:00.640 Nikki, will you kick us off? 01:00.880 --> 01:03.460 Sure, so my name is Nikki Keeley. 01:03.460 --> 01:08.450 I'm the Head of Cybersecurity at the oversight of the UK Civil Aviation Authority. 01:09.180 --> 01:21.000 So I work for the UKCA and as the UK's aviation regulator, we're responsible for overseeing the implementation of cyber requirements in regulation for regulated aviation organizations. 01:21.000 --> 01:28.600 So that could vary from airlines, through to airports, through to air navigation service providers, or even drone operators. 01:28.600 --> 01:42.100 And it's really important for us that we have a proportionate and effective approach and that most importantly we enable aviation to manage their own cyber security risks without compromising aviation safety, security, or resilience. 01:43.760 --> 01:44.540 Thanks. 01:44.540 --> 01:45.400 Harley? 01:45.860 --> 01:50.720 Hi, I'm Harley Geiger and I'm Director of Public Policy at Rapid7. 01:54.180 --> 01:56.100 With offices around the world. 01:56.100 --> 02:01.640 I'm in the DC area and I run Rapid7's public policy and government engagement activities. 02:01.640 --> 02:10.400 I've worked in privacy and cyber security technology policy and law for about 10 years and I'm excited to be here. 02:10.400 --> 02:12.260 Thanks for having me. 02:12.400 --> 02:13.240 Thanks. 02:13.240 --> 02:14.100 And Saulo? 02:14.940 --> 02:17.420 Well, thanks Katelyn for the invitation. 02:17.420 --> 02:19.120 My name is Saulo da Silva. 02:19.120 --> 02:21.320 I work for ICAO. 02:21.320 --> 02:30.460 ICAO is the United Nations Agency responsible for the regulatory framework of aviation on a global basis. 02:30.460 --> 02:34.500 I'm particularly chief of the global interoperable systems section. 02:34.500 --> 02:51.340 It's a weird name, but basically what we do is take care of regulations regarding information management, operational and safety critical information management, including the aspects related to cyber safety and resilience. 02:51.340 --> 02:59.520 Basically keep the system going no matter the type of problem that may happen coming from our new actors. 02:59.520 --> 03:00.440 Thank you. 03:01.640 --> 03:03.060 Thanks, Saulo. 03:03.060 --> 03:04.940 All right, let's get started. 03:04.940 --> 03:12.500 I think it only makes sense to start with where the industry is right now when it comes to aerospace cyber security regulation. 03:12.500 --> 03:21.920 Nikki, I know that the UK has made significant strides when it comes to building bridges between security researchers and industry and how that helps drive regulation. 03:22.000 --> 03:27.960 I'd love if you could kick us off and talk a little bit about that evolution and where the UK is today. 03:28.660 --> 03:29.960 Sure, thanks. 03:29.960 --> 03:32.220 I don't know about significant strides. 03:32.220 --> 03:36.500 I think we are starting to build the bridge, which is positive. 03:36.500 --> 03:48.420 So in terms of lessons learned, I'd say the first hurdle that we really had to overcome was this misconception that all a regulator wants to do is fine people, which is absolutely not the case. 03:48.660 --> 03:51.400 At the end of the day, we're all here for the same reason. 03:51.400 --> 03:57.200 We know that our industry and good faith hackers ultimately want to make aviation safer and more resilient. 03:57.220 --> 04:00.020 So I think it's about breaking down that misconception. 04:00.860 --> 04:04.720 I think the second hurdle is around how do you actually report? 04:04.720 --> 04:10.380 What mechanisms do you give individuals and good faith hackers to actually report things? 04:10.380 --> 04:12.200 And we're lucky in one sense. 04:12.200 --> 04:18.480 In Europe, there's a regulation which is focused on what we call mandatory involuntary occurrence reporting. 04:18.540 --> 04:29.000 So that's all about making sure that safety information is reported, that it's collected, protected, analyzed, so that appropriate safety action can be taken. 04:29.000 --> 04:41.440 And where there's a cyber vulnerability or a cyber incident, and that would impact on those safety critical environments, then we believe that it's really important that that information should be reported and acted on. 04:41.540 --> 04:51.020 And for organizations who aren't in scope of that regulation, I just mentioned, then we also have a whistleblowing option available in the UK under the Public Interest Disclosure Act. 04:51.020 --> 04:53.200 So that's all available on our website. 04:53.200 --> 05:00.280 So I think the starting to build that bridge was making sure that it was clear that we want people to get into contact. 05:00.280 --> 05:02.420 It's not about taking punitive action. 05:02.420 --> 05:12.260 It's about starting that dialogue and conversation, and then showing that there's a mechanism for them to be able to do that, and making those options available for contact. 05:13.620 --> 05:16.200 So I think that's really important for us. 05:16.460 --> 05:17.080 That's great, Nikki. 05:17.080 --> 05:21.880 Has there been any significant challenges in communicating that message to the community? 05:21.880 --> 05:24.060 Do you think that's where the hurdle lies? 05:24.540 --> 05:28.180 Yeah, I think it's, you know, all regulators are different. 05:28.180 --> 05:32.940 I can only talk about aviation, but different regulators might have different approaches. 05:32.940 --> 05:36.500 And I think it has been about how do you get that message out there? 05:36.500 --> 05:41.820 And I think that's been developing slowly through our relationship with industry. 05:41.820 --> 05:45.680 We started to build a really positive relationship with our industry. 05:45.960 --> 05:52.540 You know, we've tried to make it clear that we want them to engage with us and collaborate with us. 05:52.540 --> 05:56.460 And that it's not the case of never having a cyber incident. 05:56.460 --> 06:01.600 We expect that organizations will have cyber incidents, and will find vulnerabilities. 06:01.600 --> 06:08.900 And it's more about, you know, following what we call just culture in the safety sense, and reporting those that they can be fixed. 06:10.600 --> 06:11.480 Thanks. 06:11.700 --> 06:22.500 And just keeping with, you know, laying the landscape out, Saulo, from a global perspective, how do you think states are dealing with the challenge of aerospace cybersecurity regulation? 06:22.540 --> 06:26.080 You know, what are some of the greatest challenges you think the industry faces? 06:27.740 --> 06:29.000 Thanks, Kayleigh. 06:29.000 --> 06:35.740 You mentioned actually two important words here, that regulations and a challenge. 06:36.080 --> 06:42.360 And I would put a little bit of spice and add one more, that is interoperability. 06:42.360 --> 06:50.420 That for us in the aviation industry, is actually a bigger problem than just cybersecurity regulation. 06:50.420 --> 06:55.820 It's really, it's really, how can I say, it's a problem of divergence. 06:55.820 --> 07:11.200 So when we talk about unity in aviation in ICAO for the future, we need to consider the impact of this digital transformation that is happening, and that we are living right now, this digital evolution. 07:11.200 --> 07:22.680 And it's something that comes because we have several economic drivers that are basically encouraging this digital transformation of the business. 07:22.680 --> 07:27.940 So this will happen if we want or not. 07:27.940 --> 07:31.140 And we have to be prepared for that. 07:31.140 --> 07:36.020 We have to have this increased digital data and information exchange. 07:36.020 --> 07:43.140 We know that this is necessary to guarantee not only safety, but also to improve the efficiency of the system. 07:43.140 --> 07:51.720 And of course, we know that everybody's taking actions to secure their part of the system. 07:51.720 --> 07:56.260 But as I mentioned before, it's a problem of divergence. 07:56.260 --> 08:26.020 So one example of a divergent digital process, we can say that, for example, manufacturers who needed to upload software critical parts onto their craft, they are doing everything they should do to secure, for example, the supply chain and to guarantee that they have a certified identity and the integrity of the data being uploaded. 08:26.020 --> 08:33.740 So if you, for example, want to connect to the cockpit of the aircraft, you will do the same thing. 08:33.740 --> 08:37.340 You take the actions to connect on a secure way. 08:37.340 --> 08:46.640 If you want to connect to the back of the airplane, also you're going to do things to connect to the back using a different certificate system. 08:46.640 --> 09:01.260 So if you are one manufacturer of avionics, for example, and if you are using different ways to connect it to the supply chain or to the equipments on board, we know, for example, also airports. 09:01.260 --> 09:06.540 Airports are also establishing their system to guarantee the security of the operation. 09:06.540 --> 09:14.860 So basically, you have everybody doing what they think is correct, what they need to do. 09:14.860 --> 09:30.820 So we are going to a point that we are finding ourselves with thousands of different certificates floating around the ecosystem with little or sometimes completely no compatibility. 09:30.820 --> 09:36.280 And that's when the issue of compatibility or interoperability comes. 09:36.280 --> 09:48.500 And we believe that these certificates, they, like other things, they have to be maintained along hundreds of different processes and procedures. 09:48.500 --> 09:59.660 And the big challenge is to create a convergence on all these important activities that are being taken nowadays. 10:00.220 --> 10:04.960 I don't want to say in an uncoordinated way, but in a very loose way. 10:04.960 --> 10:15.380 So the challenge for the states right now is to have a global harmonized regulations through coordination and cooperation. 10:15.380 --> 10:26.920 The coordination and cooperation to face this challenge to have a global harmonized regulatory framework is really necessary because aviation is international by default. 10:26.920 --> 10:28.860 Airplanes do not recognize borders. 10:28.860 --> 10:34.180 I keep saying that we have checkpoints on the ground, but we don't have checkpoints in the air. 10:34.180 --> 10:42.140 So cooperation and coordination to develop a harmonized set of regulations is a big challenge that states are facing right now. 10:42.580 --> 10:54.860 And, you know, that's a really interesting point is that challenge of it being so global and each kind of state having its own rules, regulations, you know, that framework that you're talking about. 10:54.860 --> 10:58.700 Are we currently in a process where that's being discussed and worked on? 10:58.700 --> 11:05.100 Or is it still in the stages of, you know, it would be a nice to have and we need to work on it? 11:05.980 --> 11:16.920 From an international perspective, the International Civil Aviation Organization is working on that with the help, obviously, from the states, because that's where the expertise relies. 11:17.300 --> 11:22.360 And we have Nikki here with us, who is helping us a lot on that subject. 11:22.360 --> 11:25.200 But this effort is already ongoing. 11:25.320 --> 11:27.900 It's not an easy effort. 11:27.900 --> 11:38.100 As you mentioned, we have a challenge because we have national security requirements, we have national culture, we have national ways of trust. 11:38.300 --> 11:45.500 And when we have to expand this to a global environment, it keeps us awake. 11:45.660 --> 11:57.760 But we are sure that cooperation and coordination with the help from experts from the states like Nikki, who is here with us, we will face and we will win that challenge. 11:57.760 --> 11:58.520 We'll get there, Zalo. 11:58.520 --> 11:59.800 We'll get there eventually. 12:01.220 --> 12:02.140 Yeah, let's do it. 12:02.140 --> 12:06.460 Do you have anything to add to that, just from your perspective? 12:06.460 --> 12:09.340 Yeah, I think Zalo raises a really good point. 12:09.340 --> 12:12.700 And sometimes it's easy to forget this. 12:12.700 --> 12:17.400 I did cyber for an operator back in the day before I joined the regulator. 12:17.600 --> 12:21.920 And sometimes you can think of it just in terms of that one organization. 12:21.920 --> 12:35.200 But when you're having to talk about regulations and international frameworks and standards, and you have to think about what's proportionate and appropriate, not just for me as the state, all of the airports of all sizes that we regulate. 12:35.200 --> 12:45.600 But if you look at it from Zalo's perspective, at an international level, for all the states, all the organizations, all the aviation entities, it does become a challenge. 12:45.600 --> 12:47.960 But I think the work is well underway. 12:47.960 --> 12:49.420 So I'm hopeful. 12:50.960 --> 12:52.020 That's great. 12:52.020 --> 12:53.340 Thank you both. 12:53.840 --> 12:56.140 And I'm just turning to Harley. 12:56.160 --> 13:07.120 We've talked a little bit about building bridges between the security researcher community and regulators in order to help the disclosure process, help things become more transparent and safe and effective. 13:07.120 --> 13:16.680 And, you know, can you talk a little bit just about, you know, the current disclosure process and environment for security researchers when it comes to this in this particular industry? 13:18.560 --> 13:19.920 Sure. 13:20.000 --> 13:29.660 So, overall, the security vulnerability disclosure environment is greatly improving. 13:30.460 --> 13:43.540 There's a lot more adoption of coordinated vulnerability disclosure within government agencies for themselves, recognition that it is valuable in industries, in the different sectors that those agencies regulate. 13:43.560 --> 13:50.900 And it is becoming more accepted as a basic cybersecurity practice, both in the United States and I would say internationally. 13:50.900 --> 14:00.840 And two great examples of agencies that are doing this are the FDA and the Department of Justice, CISA within DHS. 14:00.840 --> 14:06.460 Within the aviation industry, our experience is that it is not yet quite normalized. 14:06.480 --> 14:09.720 It is still somewhat difficult. 14:10.060 --> 14:24.700 And there is a, I think, in part because it is such a highly regulated industry, and because the potential negative effects on the industry of undermining passenger confidence can be so negative, so catastrophic. 14:25.600 --> 14:34.860 And unfortunately, we have a media environment that when it comes to anything related to aircraft safety, tends to sensationalize it. 14:34.860 --> 14:41.620 But in part for these reasons, our experience is that aviation has a ways to catch up. 14:41.660 --> 14:46.300 And it's unfortunate because there is a great deal of innovation that is happening in aviation right now. 14:46.300 --> 14:55.980 And the systems that are put in place in the sky and satellites, a lot of them stay in place for many years, as long as a generation. 14:55.980 --> 15:00.420 And so you have rapid innovation where security issues might be missed. 15:00.420 --> 15:05.360 And then you have equipment that stays in operation for a very long time. 15:05.360 --> 15:09.580 And then you have legacy issues with those security problems. 15:09.580 --> 15:13.940 So we think that this is an area where security research can really play a valuable role. 15:13.940 --> 15:22.460 But it is important to integrate security researchers and cybersecurity community into the manufacturer design. 15:22.780 --> 15:27.580 And once they're deployed, the vulnerability disclosure processes. 15:30.780 --> 15:32.040 Thanks. 15:32.320 --> 15:48.820 You brought up a point about just sensationalization and how the media, you know, can catch wind, or certain entities catch wind and kind of make this out to be something bigger than it actually is to kind of get the headlines and get the hype. 15:49.060 --> 15:54.700 Do you think that that is a barrier when it comes to wanting to disclose? 15:54.820 --> 16:04.600 Or do you think that there's kind of two tracks where people want the flash and they want the publicity, so they they do kind of make it a little bit more sensationalized than it is? 16:04.600 --> 16:11.320 Or do you think there's also that, I don't want to say anything because I don't want that to happen. 16:11.320 --> 16:21.340 I don't want my words to be misconstrued and turned into this sensationalized like, oh, you can get into the to the TV on the plane and it's going to crash down. 16:21.520 --> 16:24.520 So our impression is that it's both. 16:24.520 --> 16:30.360 You know, it depends on the individual researcher, their risk tolerance and sort of what their goals are. 16:30.380 --> 16:40.220 If there is a legitimate vulnerability in an aircraft, I don't think that sensationalism is really necessary in order to get headlines. 16:41.100 --> 16:49.220 And if you're just disclosing it for flash purposes and credibility purposes, then question whether you're disclosing it for the right reasons. 16:49.220 --> 16:56.100 That doesn't necessarily mean that it's not a security vulnerability and that there's not attention that should be paid to it, but it is really not the way to build trust. 16:56.180 --> 17:05.040 And it is, I think that it's also very much a barrier to engagement with the industry and the agencies with the security research community. 17:05.040 --> 17:07.420 So I think that there's work that has to be done on both sides. 17:07.420 --> 17:12.820 I will say that, you know, I don't want to let the agencies off the hook and just say that sensationalism is the issue. 17:12.920 --> 17:17.260 I mentioned the FDA, DOJ and other agencies earlier. 17:17.280 --> 17:33.960 Those agencies have made great strides in the past couple of years to engage a security research community, including attending DEF CON and just working within those agencies, areas of jurisdiction, like FDA for medical devices and DOJ, they're being more transparent on things like coordinated disclosure, 17:33.960 --> 17:38.380 prosecutions and researcher protection under DMCA. 17:38.440 --> 17:41.760 Shout outs to Leonard Bailey and Suzanne Schwartz. 17:41.780 --> 17:47.460 But FAA and the aviation industry have a ways to go. 17:47.460 --> 18:02.340 I know that there's good work on cybersecurity being done at FAA, like by Susan Kaebler, but they're not really being clear, in our opinion, publicly clear, that they care a lot about cybersecurity and that they want to build relationships with the cybersecurity community. 18:02.340 --> 18:03.740 It's just not clear. 18:03.740 --> 18:13.640 It's quite difficult right now to find much cybersecurity specific guidance on aviation systems from FAA, both on manned aircraft and unmanned aircraft. 18:13.640 --> 18:20.520 Unmanned aircraft being a huge area of concern since that is consumer level devices. 18:20.640 --> 18:26.300 And there's even less information out about how security researchers can work with these agencies. 18:26.380 --> 18:29.020 So our advice is twofold. 18:29.020 --> 18:41.780 One, for researchers to work to gain understanding about the unique context and pressures that the aviation industry is under, to be respectful, manage media to avoid sensationalism and work to build trust. 18:41.780 --> 18:50.320 But our advice also to the FAA is to encourage the aviation community to build bridges with the security community and to actually facilitate that engagement. 18:50.320 --> 18:59.580 Make clear that you are making an effort to bring in experts from the cybersecurity community, not just the aviation industry, for input on their guidance and their activities. 19:00.600 --> 19:02.360 Carly, thank you so much for that. 19:02.360 --> 19:05.300 You make a great point just about building trust. 19:05.300 --> 19:19.520 And you know, at the Aerospace Village, that is our core mission is to build the bridges of trust between the security researcher community and the aerospace industry itself to kind of formulate those relationships so that we can have these conversations. 19:19.520 --> 19:28.820 And so I'd like to kind of spend some time talking with you all about, you know, what we can do to forge those relationships in order to build that trust. 19:29.340 --> 19:41.620 You know, Nikki, I know in a prior conversation, we had talked about, you know, how in the UK industry has acted as, you know, a conduit between GoodFaith, the hacking community and the regulators. 19:41.760 --> 19:53.640 And, you know, I wonder if you think this approach is sustainable, or do you hope that that, you know, relationship evolves to where that community feels like they can go straight to the regulator? 19:53.640 --> 19:57.180 Because right now, it seems like if you have that conduit, it's working. 19:57.260 --> 20:02.180 But I wonder if you hope that it evolves so that they go directly to you. 20:02.380 --> 20:04.160 Yeah, that's a really good point, Caitlin. 20:04.160 --> 20:07.120 And I think Carly's raised some really good points as well. 20:07.120 --> 20:19.460 And at the moment, we have had reports come to us, largely through researchers or cyber specialists that have been asked by our industry to perform specific testing. 20:19.580 --> 20:27.740 And that's great, because that shows that we're building that relationship with our industry, that they trust us and want to report to us about issues like that. 20:27.880 --> 20:35.240 But going forward, I'd absolutely love to have the research community feel like they can get in touch with us. 20:35.660 --> 20:43.580 And I think importantly, and Harley, you mentioned, you know, customer confidence and passenger confidence, which I think is so important. 20:43.580 --> 20:48.620 And I think the media and sensationalism element doesn't help. 20:48.620 --> 20:52.580 And I have to admit that as a safety regulator, you know, we do get nervous. 20:52.680 --> 20:55.940 When it's safety critical systems, we do get nervous. 20:56.740 --> 21:00.680 So I think it's about how the reporting is done and how that engagement works. 21:00.680 --> 21:07.080 But for me, you know, my absolute perfect scenario would be to have early engagement with researchers. 21:07.140 --> 21:24.600 Like, you know, when you're planning on what research you want to be doing, having a good conversation then, because sometimes there are aviation contextual elements that might be helpful for the researcher to know about, because it might impact how they decide they want to do that research even. 21:25.220 --> 21:31.700 You know, there's an air navigation service provider guy that I talk to, and he always goes, well, Nikki, that's not an issue, because I can just look out the window. 21:31.700 --> 21:38.040 So sometimes there are, you know, non-technical, but aviation contextual elements that could be helpful in that research. 21:38.620 --> 21:41.480 So I think, you know, earlier the better. 21:41.480 --> 21:51.000 And it'd be great to be part of that discussion about focusing on areas that need more research, because either industry aren't able to do it themselves, or we aren't able to do that. 21:51.000 --> 21:53.880 And we need that research community to help with that. 21:53.880 --> 22:03.340 But to have those good conversations early on between the operators and the manufacturers and ourselves and the researchers, that can be kind of well planned. 22:04.100 --> 22:16.400 I was just thinking, so the Oxford University published a really great research paper on pilot reactions to hacked avionics, and had a great conversation with the researchers afterwards. 22:16.400 --> 22:19.780 And they were talking about ideas for the next research paper. 22:19.780 --> 22:28.140 And, you know, it's something we'd love to get involved in and help support, and see how we can, at the end of it, end up with a safer aviation environment. 22:28.140 --> 22:30.720 So I think that would be great. 22:30.920 --> 22:38.220 Nikki, I'm so glad you brought up that talk, as it is going to be featured, or that research is going to be featured in the Aerospace Village. 22:38.220 --> 22:43.740 So if you are interested, there will be a discussion and a presentation on that. 22:43.740 --> 22:45.140 So thank you for the plug. 22:47.240 --> 22:55.540 Salo, I do know that, and Pete Cooper tipped me off to this, that ICO has released a cybersecurity strategy. 22:55.540 --> 23:00.040 And in there, there's a line about security researchers, and how you'll work together. 23:00.040 --> 23:06.980 And just kind of curious to your thoughts about how that will work, and kind of what's being done to bring that to life. 23:08.000 --> 23:09.020 Thanks, Kaylee. 23:09.020 --> 23:15.700 And just before addressing that point, that is, it's very, it's such a good provocative question, actually. 23:15.700 --> 23:21.540 And I'm a researcher myself, so I like that point, because I'm playing on both sides. 23:21.540 --> 23:37.700 But just to just add one point that Harley mentioned before, I think sometimes we don't have much information nowadays about aviation, and the cyber aspects related to aviation, because lots of the concepts and decisions are still to be made. 23:37.700 --> 23:45.360 There are lots of ongoing developments right now, lots of, let's call, like we call in IKEA, some uncertainties. 23:45.360 --> 23:55.940 And sometimes it's better not to to spread some information that's not mature to the community, because it may create lots of confusions. 23:55.940 --> 23:58.140 So we try to spread the information. 23:58.140 --> 23:59.740 I'm not trying to defend FAA. 23:59.740 --> 24:11.020 I'm just saying that sometimes we do not spread the information, just to avoid the creation of a situation that may actually not be helpful to our system. 24:11.020 --> 24:25.900 But coming back to what you said, and I mentioned to you that it's a very provocative question, and I can't, honestly, I hope I can be short in my answer, although I really think that this would be the specific discussion. 24:25.900 --> 24:28.760 I'm going to talk about research and trust. 24:28.900 --> 24:33.240 It's a specific discussion that needs to start, that needs to have. 24:33.240 --> 24:51.000 And I would start just making a small statement, or what you call an observation, on how, and I think Nick mentioned that point, or you mentioned too, and how trust affects that relationship between different stakeholders. 24:51.000 --> 24:53.600 Because this is really important to be aware. 24:53.600 --> 25:02.320 And we see trust like a form of faith in the outcome of another's actions. 25:02.320 --> 25:04.000 So we have to think about that. 25:04.080 --> 25:17.380 Trust exists in a context of kind of imperfect knowledge, like not mature or imperfect knowledge, and also thinking about a possible future contingency. 25:17.380 --> 25:24.640 And as I said, you know, it is a form of belief despite uncertainties. 25:24.640 --> 25:26.760 That's how we see trust. 25:26.760 --> 25:45.460 And also, since the beginning of the century, but in all modern society, trust has been conceived as a mechanism that will help us to reduce the bureaucracy, the complexity, and enhance, obviously, communications between or among different stakeholders. 25:45.600 --> 25:59.160 And also, we can use the trust to reduce the need of a very strict regulation, like a contract, for example. 25:59.160 --> 26:07.080 So in the international aviation, there is a very sensitive ecosystem. 26:07.080 --> 26:09.920 You know, aviation, it goes to the headlines. 26:09.920 --> 26:15.620 You know, aviation, the media does not forgive us. 26:16.100 --> 26:22.600 The small incident goes to the first page, goes to any media headline. 26:22.600 --> 26:29.680 So we have to be conscious that the ecosystem is really sensitive to that. 26:29.680 --> 26:42.580 And we see in aviation, from an international perspective, the human element of it is the core, is in the core, at the core of cybersecurity. 26:42.700 --> 27:03.200 It is critically important for the international aviation community that, obviously, the civil aviation sector increases the number of personnel that is qualified and knowledgeable in both, and Harley correctly mentioned, that's not only aviation, but also aviation and cybersecurity. 27:03.260 --> 27:05.420 And this is a new area that is coming now. 27:05.420 --> 27:10.240 For example, I have to be honest, I'm 36 years in aviation, so I know a lot about aviation. 27:10.240 --> 27:11.780 I know a lot about aviation. 27:11.780 --> 27:16.640 But the last five years, that's when I started learning about cybersecurity, actually. 27:16.640 --> 27:19.520 So I can't consider myself a cybersecurity expert. 27:19.520 --> 27:20.560 No, I cannot. 27:20.560 --> 27:26.140 I can't consider myself an aviation expert, for sure, but not a cyber. 27:26.140 --> 27:32.100 And we have to have disqualified people in aviation and cybersecurity. 27:32.160 --> 27:39.900 And this, obviously, you have a different process to achieve that through recruitment, through education, training. 27:39.980 --> 27:44.160 But one significant way to advance is through research. 27:44.160 --> 27:45.380 Research is very important. 27:45.380 --> 27:50.700 And that's why I decided to go back to the research community, and I've been doing research with these states. 27:50.700 --> 28:08.300 And as such, as part of the ICAO strategy, as part of the international strategy, we, the International Civil Aviation Organization, we encourage all these states to set up the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation with what we call the good faith, you know, 28:08.300 --> 28:24.940 the good faith research, which is basically the research activity that's carried out in an environment that is appropriate, and is designed to avoid affecting what we, for us as a part of all that is safe, the security, and like we are seeing nowadays, 28:24.940 --> 28:26.920 the continuity of operations. 28:26.920 --> 28:30.760 So, ICAO encourages states to do that approach. 28:30.760 --> 28:35.480 But obviously, again, we go back to the aspects of trust. 28:35.480 --> 28:38.120 They are different in different societies. 28:38.120 --> 28:40.160 There are different ways of cooperation. 28:40.160 --> 29:00.300 So, we have to encourage and help the states to do that, because at least from this area that we see nowadays, cybersecurity research is the one will allow us to advance faster and achieve the results that we want to keep safety and continuity of operations as we have been doing for the last 100 years. 29:02.900 --> 29:13.140 Thanks, I think that's a great answer and also gives me a lot to think about too, just in terms of how, you know, the point about everybody thinks about trust differently in different communities. 29:13.140 --> 29:21.060 And so, you know, when we say that, oh, it's important to build trust, you know, what does that actually mean to the different stakeholders in the different groups? 29:21.060 --> 29:29.500 Harley, I'd be interested to get your thoughts on this, as we talk about, you know, what needs to happen and where we need to go. 29:30.240 --> 29:38.840 From your perspective, you know, what are some things that the aviation industry can do to kind of build that bridge and that trust? 29:39.180 --> 29:56.220 So, first of all, I think the aviation industry, there's a number of things, but focusing just on the relationship with security researchers, mentioned a few things before, but it would really be helpful to have guidance for researchers on vulnerability disclosure. 29:56.320 --> 30:02.920 And this can come in the form, perhaps ideally, in the form of model guidance from the FAA. 30:02.920 --> 30:10.020 Essentially, something that tells people what the FAA wants them to do in a situation where they have a vulnerability to disclose. 30:10.020 --> 30:20.560 What is the mechanism for the FAA to know about a vulnerability, since it is, you know, just the FAA that can decide whether a vulnerability is safety critical. 30:20.820 --> 30:32.020 And unfortunately, there's a, you know, the alphabet soup of agencies in the United States kind of makes understanding what the agency roles are a bit difficult , right? 30:32.020 --> 30:40.760 So, FAA is safety critical features in aviation, but CISA and DHS is the lead cybersecurity agency. 30:40.760 --> 30:44.400 So what, you know, where do researchers go if they're trying to disclose? 30:44.400 --> 30:45.300 Is it both? 30:46.140 --> 30:54.880 You know, this is not something that researchers who, you know, are focused on technical subjects and not necessarily on managing government bureaucracy should have to try to figure out on their own. 30:54.880 --> 30:57.160 There should be clear public guidance about that. 30:57.260 --> 31:07.280 And FAA, in particular, can play a great role in leading the charge on distributing that type of guidance and encouraging industry stakeholders to do it as well. 31:07.280 --> 31:18.140 A note of caution, though, for the industry as well as for the FAA is that there may be an impulse to say, well, aviation is special because there is, you know, safety components. 31:18.140 --> 31:21.280 Well, true, but that also exists for vehicles. 31:21.280 --> 31:23.060 It exists for medical devices. 31:23.440 --> 31:24.800 This has been done before. 31:24.800 --> 31:34.500 It's not going to be viewed, you know, by researchers as being so special that they would willingly submit to a process that is completely locked down, right? 31:34.500 --> 31:51.120 So if you are looking at having a vulnerability disclosure process and having it completely under NDA and, you know, restricting the ability of researchers to do anything with their research or to disclose in the event of a disagreement and so forth, that could very well backfire. 31:51.160 --> 31:53.840 I think the research is going to happen sort of regardless. 31:53.840 --> 31:57.060 Many of these components can be purchased on the second-hand market. 31:57.060 --> 32:02.820 Certainly when it comes for unmanned aircrafts, those are increasingly easy to purchase. 32:03.460 --> 32:14.420 And so the research is going to happen, you know, the key is going to be building an engagement that both sides can live with, not one that locks down researchers and then violates the trust that you're supposed to be trying to build in the first place. 32:15.380 --> 32:24.820 So I think you bring up a really good point about, you know, the second-hand market and like the research is going to happen with or without the industry. 32:24.820 --> 32:38.460 And I wonder if, you know, from my perspective, I feel like that should change and there should be this, you know, we don't want you going to get older equipment or second-hand equipment that's already been used. 32:38.460 --> 32:46.060 We want you to get the stuff before it's being used to identify, you know, what challenges or problems, vulnerabilities lie within. 32:46.160 --> 32:53.680 And I wonder, you know, from both your perspective, where do you think that barrier comes from? 32:53.680 --> 33:06.820 And then from, Nikki or Salo's perspective, you know, why isn't industry or regulators like approving, oh yeah, we want you to take a look at these components before they get put into use. 33:06.820 --> 33:10.880 And I wonder if that's back to Salo's earlier point of digital transformation. 33:10.880 --> 33:19.440 It happened ahead of security, it appears in a lot of cases across many industries, but now we're trying to play that catch up. 33:19.440 --> 33:26.780 But it's, is it a fear that, oh, we've been using this stuff and we don't want to know what's, you know, vulnerable. 33:26.940 --> 33:33.340 And so I just, I'd love to get all three of your perspectives on, you know, what you think needs to happen to kind of stop that. 33:33.340 --> 33:38.460 Oh, we have to go somewhere else besides the source to get the information to do the research. 33:39.640 --> 33:44.140 So Kaylin, just one, one thing, I think that it's maybe important to note here. 33:44.140 --> 33:50.640 So ICAO have published a cyber security strategy, which was published fairly recently. 33:50.640 --> 33:52.720 Salo probably knows this better than I do. 33:52.720 --> 34:03.540 But, but one of the things that's clearly called out in there is that states should be enabling mechanisms so that good faith researchers can collaborate. 34:03.860 --> 34:06.460 So, you know, ICAO recognize the importance of that. 34:06.460 --> 34:10.420 Hopefully more states will be recognizing the importance of that. 34:10.420 --> 34:11.940 I mean, Harley, I, you know, I get your point. 34:11.940 --> 34:15.860 Sometimes it is confusing and it's not always clear who you're supposed to report what to. 34:16.600 --> 34:28.920 But I think it's, you know, hopefully that's something that that is a quick win that many states can implement fairly easily, you know, to start kind of building at least the mechanisms for reporting in. 34:28.920 --> 34:30.780 So just my two cents on that one. 34:30.780 --> 34:32.780 Hopefully that's something we can move forward. 34:33.340 --> 34:40.040 So I don't want to diminish the fine work of ICAO and others in producing those types of guidance. 34:40.260 --> 34:43.660 I mean, I guess part of the point is that states should implement that guidance. 34:43.660 --> 34:46.520 Yeah, yeah, totally agree, totally agree. 34:47.860 --> 34:52.000 Yeah, I know that, Harley, you have a good point. 34:52.000 --> 34:56.240 And I want to say from a global perspective, we cannot enforce. 34:56.780 --> 35:03.340 We have to encourage the states to take actions and help them to take the necessary actions. 35:03.340 --> 35:06.820 That's what the International Civil Aviation does. 35:06.820 --> 35:15.860 But I may have a different perspective from you when we talk about cooperation and collaboration at a global level. 35:15.860 --> 35:18.460 As I'm saying, I'm a researcher myself. 35:18.680 --> 35:25.560 And I see mainly in Europe, a lot of cooperation and cooperation going on a lot of coordination. 35:25.620 --> 35:35.480 I participate every year in some what we call innovation days in Europe, where we put all the research community together, and we discuss several subjects. 35:35.480 --> 35:40.160 And last year, I was there to talk about exactly this subject. 35:40.160 --> 35:43.240 And I see the community very engaged on that. 35:43.240 --> 36:04.600 I can't specify to you now to the community how this happens all over the world, state by state, because again, there are some regional differences, there are some national differences, there are some different ways to produce regulation and to deal with the research community. 36:04.600 --> 36:10.700 But from a global perspective, I can tell you that the cooperation is ongoing. 36:10.700 --> 36:25.840 Obviously, sometimes there are some, although you may not agree with that aviation is a special industry, but I keep saying the same thing that thousands of people die on car accidents every day. 36:25.840 --> 36:27.840 And nobody knows and nobody cares. 36:27.840 --> 36:41.940 If you have one aircraft who crashes for a small thing that could be and kill 50 people, it will be on the first page of any newspaper, it will be on the headlines of any television channel. 36:42.080 --> 36:51.760 So that's what we call aviation as a special industry, because we are doing something that goes against the nature, right? 36:51.760 --> 36:53.840 We're not made to fly, okay? 36:53.840 --> 36:56.460 We are not made to fly, and we fly, and we fly. 36:56.460 --> 36:58.780 We're doing something against the nature. 36:58.780 --> 37:03.080 So this calls the attention of the community, because we're doing something that is special. 37:03.080 --> 37:05.380 We are flying and we are not made to fly. 37:05.540 --> 37:07.200 So that calls attention. 37:07.200 --> 37:16.100 So sometimes in the aviation industry, we try to be very conservative in our approach, just to avoid people. 37:16.180 --> 37:18.760 I will use killing as an example. 37:18.780 --> 37:21.180 I don't want killing going on a holiday. 37:21.180 --> 37:32.540 I don't want you guys going to the airport thinking, oh my gosh, am I going to arrive to my destination today or not? 37:32.880 --> 37:34.720 We don't want you to think about that. 37:34.720 --> 37:36.880 I want you to go to the airport like you go today. 37:36.880 --> 37:46.920 You go there and say the maximum reward is my flight is going to be 30 minutes late, 10 minutes late, one hour late, but you never think about the safety of flight. 37:46.920 --> 37:54.080 You never think about that, because you know that our industry has a high level of safety and is very conservative. 37:54.080 --> 38:07.260 I have to be honest to you, and we are evolving, we are improving this, but we are very conservative because of the attention that the industry attracts from the media when something goes wrong. 38:07.260 --> 38:17.640 But I think I see the research community coming very, very closer to the aviation stakeholders and producing very good material. 38:17.640 --> 38:28.220 And I always give the example of Europe, although I'm not European, but I always give the example of Europe because I can see the cooperation going there. 38:28.220 --> 38:36.580 And I'm quite happy with the scenario that I see there in terms of cooperation, industry and research community. 38:36.620 --> 38:46.240 Just to clarify, so the comment about aviation not being special, that was more from the researcher's perspective on whether they're going to perform the research or not. 38:46.240 --> 38:56.700 I absolutely agree that the way the media handles safety issues with aviation is different from things like cars, like vehicles. 38:56.700 --> 39:14.380 And that is something that I think is important for researchers in particular to consider as they're conducting their research, and I think it requires special outreach from both the researcher as well as whoever's facilitating the disclosure, whether it's FAA or CISA, 39:14.380 --> 39:18.680 to help manage the media to avoid unnecessary sensationalism. 39:18.860 --> 39:22.860 And on the collaboration point, I don't want to sound all doom and gloom. 39:22.860 --> 39:25.220 Remember, I opened with saying that I do think it is changing. 39:25.220 --> 39:29.540 It is changing, and it's changing in a lot of different industries, aviation included. 39:29.540 --> 39:34.800 The fact that we have an aerospace village at DEFCON is proof positive of that. 39:35.080 --> 39:43.680 It's just there is a sense that it is lagging behind in some other industries, I do think medical devices being a really good example. 39:44.160 --> 39:45.600 But it is happening. 39:45.600 --> 39:48.420 The collaboration is increasing, and I do think that that's very positive. 39:49.640 --> 39:59.880 And Harley, I know that within, I believe, the last year, you know, your organization has worked with the aviation industry and the aerospace industry on a disclosure. 40:00.140 --> 40:10.900 And so I'd be interested just to get your perspective on that process, and if it was what you expected, or if it was better than you expected, or, you know, just kind of talk us through, you know, that process. 40:11.100 --> 40:18.100 Because I do think, you know, it gives a good picture of where things stand now, and hopefully where they'll go. 40:18.380 --> 40:22.040 Okay, well, so it's a happy story. 40:22.040 --> 40:24.120 It's a positive ending. 40:25.920 --> 40:29.940 And ultimately, you know, vulnerability disclosure ought to be a positive thing. 40:29.940 --> 40:39.180 It ought to be a, hey, we, you know, an independent genius found a security flaw, and worked with the industry, and worked with regulators, and now it's fixed, and everybody's safer. 40:39.180 --> 40:41.360 That's the ideal scenario. 40:41.360 --> 40:43.500 And ultimately, that's how it went for us. 40:43.500 --> 40:51.780 One of our brilliant researchers, Patrick Kiley, who is also a pilot, discovered a flaw in CANBUS. 40:51.780 --> 40:57.240 So, of course, that's, you know, the network standard that enables control over vehicle launches. 40:57.260 --> 41:10.440 And he demonstrated that it was possible to send false messages through CANBUS that could, among other things, display incorrect information to the pilots, such as compass, and altitude, and engine data. 41:10.440 --> 41:12.220 And that can have a serious impact. 41:12.220 --> 41:20.320 So, Rapid7 worked for about a year to coordinate the vulnerability disclosure with government agencies, as well as the industry. 41:20.320 --> 41:24.340 There wasn't, you know, like a single manufacturer whose CANBUS is used so widely. 41:24.340 --> 41:33.820 And it involved a lot of collaboration with the FAA, with CISA, and the aviation ISAC, and, as I mentioned, with the media. 41:33.820 --> 41:37.640 And honestly, our experience was a bit mixed. 41:37.640 --> 41:52.000 Initially, the ISAC and the FAA were inclined to dismiss the CANBUS flaw, because to exploit it required some level of physical access to the craft's wiring. 41:52.000 --> 41:57.680 But that could be done, for example, by compromising an existing device on the craft. 41:57.900 --> 42:05.200 But the ISAC and the FAA had argued that their physical security controls around aircraft prevented this from ever happening. 42:05.340 --> 42:18.120 And from our perspective, you know, this was us learning about this and learning, you know, learning more about the, you know, the unique other controls that are around aircraft, but also deciding that they were right that physical controls reduce the risk, 42:18.120 --> 42:27.300 but that physical controls alone were not a complete substitute for secure network design, and that relying just on physical security was unwise. 42:27.300 --> 42:34.400 And, you know, unfortunately, to be real frank, at least in the early days, it felt like the priority was avoiding that pressure of the industry. 42:34.840 --> 42:43.180 On the other hand, we found CISA, within DHS, to be excellent facilitators of the coordinated disclosure process. 42:43.180 --> 42:51.420 And they actually went out of their way to independently verify Rapid7's findings and to put out their own advisory on the CANBUS flaw. 42:51.420 --> 43:00.820 And this lent additional credibility to the seriousness of our research, which was ultimately helpful in getting buy-in from the industry, from the ISAC, from FAA. 43:00.820 --> 43:05.900 And importantly, Rapid7, we were also, you know, very responsible as researchers. 43:05.900 --> 43:30.880 We, you know, worked privately with these entities and worked under embargo with the media long before going public in order to put the findings into context and to note that the risk was reduced because of physical security controls to avoid sensationalism and so that we could come go out publicly when there was a greater understanding of what exactly the issue was and what mitigations were possible. 43:30.900 --> 43:35.420 And we recommend that, you know, researchers take a similarly cautious approach. 43:35.420 --> 43:43.580 And so in the end, in the end, after about a year of verification and coordination, the flaw was disclosed publicly in the white paper. 43:43.580 --> 43:56.220 There was not a ton of hype in the media, although it was acknowledged in the media, and we think it was ultimately a win for collaboration, coordinated disclosure, and the value of security research in avionics systems. 43:58.810 --> 44:03.030 Thanks, Harley, for walking us through that and in your experience. 44:03.090 --> 44:07.870 I am glad that we were able to end it on a happy note of success. 44:08.450 --> 44:25.670 Coming from, I'm a media communications person, so I do know how hard it is, you know, in the cybersecurity space, especially, you know, it's hard to get the stakeholders at an organization to get on board with, you know, talking to the media and doing things like that. 44:25.670 --> 44:28.110 And then, you know, that only helps to build trust. 44:28.110 --> 44:36.650 I mean, there's a great core of cybersecurity journalists out there who truly want to get the story right and they want to get the facts out there and they're not about sensationalism. 44:36.670 --> 44:44.670 And so I do think that, you is going to help this process in a lot more ways than once. 44:44.670 --> 44:53.130 I'm glad that you brought it up because I do think there are trusted, you know, media advocates out there that want to get it right because they want to see this happen more. 44:53.130 --> 44:58.630 They want to see, you know, the communities working together, research being disclosed, and then acted on. 44:58.630 --> 45:05.190 And so I'm really happy to hear about your process and the success that you guys had at Rapid7. 45:05.550 --> 45:08.590 We're running up a little bit on our allotted time. 45:08.590 --> 45:13.830 So I just want to make sure that each of you have, you know, a few minutes to say any final parting thoughts. 45:14.290 --> 45:17.250 And again, just thank you so much for taking the time. 45:17.250 --> 45:19.810 It's been just a pleasure speaking with you. 45:23.090 --> 45:24.250 Legs first. 45:24.970 --> 45:25.870 Thanks, Paulo. 45:25.870 --> 45:33.610 I was going to say, Harley, that's, you know, such a great example of Rapid7's research and your own research and such a positive outcome. 45:33.710 --> 45:37.110 And I think, you know, hopefully in future it won't take a year. 45:37.110 --> 45:53.670 Hopefully in future people on both sides will be more aware of, you know, the context and the environment and the requirements, the situation, so that those disclosures can happen faster and you can have, you know, an overall positive experience, not just like partially positive. 45:53.990 --> 45:56.850 But no, that sounds like really, really great work. 45:56.850 --> 46:00.690 And I just want to say thank you to the Aerospace Village for having this panel today. 46:00.690 --> 46:02.110 I think it's really positive. 46:02.110 --> 46:06.430 And I'd also like to thank the GoodFaith researchers out there. 46:06.430 --> 46:08.990 I think that their work is really, really important. 46:09.770 --> 46:10.950 You know, we do need it. 46:10.950 --> 46:13.090 The aviation industry needs it. 46:13.130 --> 46:20.590 And the only ask that I have is that they don't give up on building those bridges and they do reach out and they do try to get in touch. 46:20.610 --> 46:24.230 Because I know, you know, we as a regulator really do want to have those conversations. 46:24.230 --> 46:25.710 So thank you. 46:28.390 --> 46:32.410 Just like to thank you for the opportunity to be here with you guys. 46:32.410 --> 46:33.930 I really appreciate that. 46:33.930 --> 46:51.150 And we encourage the research community to come closer and closer to the regulators, to the avionics manufacturers and the aircraft manufacturers, because they all need the work the research community does. 46:51.150 --> 46:53.630 For example, in ICAO, you also need. 46:53.630 --> 46:59.830 The only difference is that papers presented to ICAO, most of the time, they are not scientific papers. 46:59.830 --> 47:01.270 They are more technical papers. 47:01.270 --> 47:13.150 So you have to adequate the language because the community is a very broad community that sometimes they will not get if you go on the scientific language. 47:13.150 --> 47:21.450 So I really encourage anybody to come to us and present whatever research you're doing. 47:21.450 --> 47:25.710 We are always open to receive information from different sources. 47:25.710 --> 47:27.110 And we really appreciate that. 47:27.110 --> 47:27.930 And we need that. 47:27.930 --> 47:30.130 As I said, I'm a researcher by myself. 47:30.130 --> 47:42.230 And I really appreciate when I have to cooperate with my peers in the academia and translate what they are saying into international civil aviation language and put to the community to be discussed. 47:42.230 --> 47:43.510 I really appreciate it. 47:43.510 --> 47:45.290 And thank you for the opportunity again. 47:47.680 --> 47:50.000 And they kind of said it all. 47:50.700 --> 47:57.040 So at the risk of repeating, but thank you very much for having us on the panel. 47:57.040 --> 48:01.780 Thanks for hosting the aerospace village at all and DEFCON. 48:01.780 --> 48:05.880 Thanks for working so hard to build bridges between these different communities. 48:06.200 --> 48:09.500 Also thank you to the security researchers for the work that they're doing. 48:09.500 --> 48:14.660 The aviation industry for slowly changing, for changing and accepting this community. 48:14.660 --> 48:18.820 I know that it's painful and they're not always the easiest community to deal with. 48:19.340 --> 48:34.680 And I guess one last thing, I suppose, it's kind of poignant that we're doing this remotely and that everybody's under a lot of stress and probably missing this annual gathering of such a unique and colorful community. 48:34.680 --> 48:37.720 So just much love to that community and stay safe. 48:38.580 --> 48:40.200 Thank you all so much. 48:40.200 --> 48:50.540 And yes, I hope to Harley's point that next year or the year after we can do this panel again and we can be in person and I can meet all of you. 48:50.540 --> 48:52.520 But thanks again from the aerospace village. 48:52.520 --> 48:58.240 We so appreciate your time and your insights and just have a great rest of your day. 48:58.240 --> 48:59.200 Thanks.