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0	6560	Hi, everyone. Welcome to the biohacking village at DEF CON. This is our sixth year. I am Nina
6560	11600	Ali. I am the executive director. This is my fifth year of running the village. Thank
11600	18600	you for coming. I want to let you know that this year has been quite an adventure. It's
18600	25240	been very similar to one of those choose your adventure books where it's just so many options
25240	30660	and you're working through everything trying to make it all work. I decided last year that
30660	35880	I was going to do the keynote, but I knew that I didn't want to do it myself. So what I have
35880	44540	done is accumulated folks that I know, folks that I trust, and people that have very strong
44540	51340	expertise in their field. And I talked to them. And I want you to know that I did not prep them
51340	55660	for these interviews. I did not give them questions beforehand. Everything you see is
55660	63860	raw emotion, raw gut reactions. And I think the information is really important, especially right
63860	71420	now and for the future of where we are going to go with healthcare and how we can secure it and
71420	81120	make patient safety a priority. Thanks for watching. Hey, how are you? I'm getting you.
81200	88680	I'm okay. So I brought you here because I want the biohacking community to see the people that
88680	94320	I talk to, see who I engage with, see where my brain thoughts lie and who I talk to at three
94320	104160	in the morning, Eastern Time, when my brain isn't stopping. So quick origin story on you is...
104160	109120	I met you three years ago. Jason Street gave us the introduction of Black Hat. And yes,
109120	118960	I do remember everything. Good brain. And then my talk got accepted home to own my own pacemaker at
118960	126920	Biohack Village. We kind of just fell into a friendship, I think. It was just instantaneous,
126920	133160	like I knew my whole life. I remember, like with my first talk, we shared tequila. I really needed
133160	143040	it. And now, three years later, we're still kicking ass, taking names and planning big things.
143040	149590	We became instant friends. And we have continuous dialogues at 3 a.m. Eastern,
151080	158360	depending on times here, between like 8 and 9 a.m. your time. What are you working on right now?
159360	165600	Working on standardizing and defining shit. I'm slightly tired of us, you know,
165600	171060	having this cookie-cutter approach to medical security and healthcare security. Because let's
171060	175480	face it, you know, this is not a Windows 10 machine or the standard endpoint we're dealing
175480	182500	with. Each one has a different way. So why are we making it harder on ourselves by not
182500	187900	defining and standardizing? So that's my pet project, is just to get the shit right, define
187900	193480	it out. And let's understand what we're dealing with. Let's listen to the devices. Let's not do
193480	200020	all the talking. Let the data speak. What's your call to action to the community?
200560	206040	I think the biggest thing I've realized is as a community, we can't work together, can't listen
206040	212760	to diverse objective stories. So just because someone disagrees with you, doesn't mean they're
212760	218540	wrong or you're wrong. I think the community as a whole, we should approach this not just about
218540	223140	finding problems, we should be finding the solutions. So we should be the builders, the
223140	230460	breakers and the pioneers going forward. But it takes a village, but intended, right? Yeah,
230460	241660	I did it. I did a mom joke. We need to do better. Shameless plug. Hey, don't always
242500	249480	see someone that's five foot nothing. I have an opinion, I have a voice. It's not refined,
249480	254840	it's not pretty, right? I'm going to call it as I see it. But don't always take offense. It comes
254840	261740	from a good place. And if you want someone to do log analysis, it is what I eat for breakfast,
261740	268440	lunch and supper. I love logs. I love data. Because I believe we can't wait for something
268440	273860	to happen and ask where's the data, where's the evidence? I want to build this shit in now.
273860	278900	Because come 10 years, I can turn around and say, hey, you claim you hacked this device?
279020	285540	Well, motherfucker, you did not. Who do you want to collaborate with? Everyone.
286060	290640	But I see it as a trifecta, right? It's this triangle. Engineering is awesome. And I'm
290640	296240	geeking out on it because recently I got exposed to an MDM and I got to see the engineering pipeline,
297100	302060	which led me to build parsers in Python I never thought I'd do because I was convinced the
302060	309580	internet would blow up if I designed something. And I realized that we have a regulatory body,
309580	315520	we have an MDM and we have researchers. And that's what's going to make the future better,
315520	322040	these three elements working together to strengthen healthcare and medical security.
322640	329820	But we shouldn't be imposing things that break healthcare or medical devices further. Because
329820	336400	people like me, this one sitting here, I need this device. And if we make it so hard
336400	342100	that manufacturers stop doing it, you know, people like me won't have a second chance.
342600	346620	So I think you know me well enough that I'm going to throw random things at you.
346880	350480	I can see your brain going. I've been expecting it to bring it on.
350480	352120	What's your controversial opinion?
352960	359320	My controversial opinion is this, that imposing S-bombs into healthcare and expecting them to
359320	365620	take on the manufacturer role is going to lead to it breaking. And the reason being is the
365620	371440	manufacturer has the responsibility, the ownership to maintain their ship, build them better and keep
371440	379440	them safe. But here's the thing, we're expecting hospitals to do this. COVID-19 came in worldwide,
379440	385080	globally, swept it, broke it. And this is something they built to do. They're supposed to deal with
385820	392660	viruses and pandemics. So if we make cyber security of medical devices their responsibility,
393240	399500	we're expecting them to thrive in something they're not built to do and they're not ready to do.
400360	405180	So yes, S-bomb for manufacturers, hell yes, bring it on, they should be doing this shit.
405180	409420	It's manufacturing. This is not a hospital function.
411140	420060	As a biohacker that works in technology, how do you want to better integrate with regulatory folks,
420060	425780	with political entities, with hospitals, etc.?
426380	431260	I just want to be given the opportunity to be heard and I want to listen. I want to listen
431260	438680	what they need to have done, what help they need. This is not a me against them. This is saying,
438680	445500	let's put our brains together. One collective brain is not enough. We need this diverse
445500	452300	group. And this is why us talking is so awesome. Because I never knew that patient record was as
452300	461120	important as it is until we had the discussion and we had an argument. We had that, we disagreed.
461120	467040	But the fact is, you showed the data, you brought the data and you changed my mind.
467660	473400	And the thing is, we shouldn't be scared to be wrong. We should be acknowledging that, hey,
473400	478840	this is not going to work. Or hey, we made a mistake. Because it takes a stronger entity
479440	487900	to do that than trying to hide it. And that counts for MDM, hackers, anyone. I have big
487900	493400	enough balls to tell you if I was wrong. Because that's the person that I am. I own my shit.
495560	499020	How do you want to leave this? What's your message after this?
499460	504380	That together, we can change the world of healthcare and medical device security.
504400	512380	Because we're dealing with a legacy of devices, an ocean full of them. 600,000 new implanted
512380	520080	devices a year. They last 10 years at a minimum. Right? That is a legacy that I don't want to see
520080	527920	increase yearly. The time for change is now. Not yesterday, not tomorrow. Now. Because otherwise,
527920	532880	we face legacy that's going to come back and bite us in the ass. And patients like me
532880	538540	won't have access to these devices. Because their first and foremost function
539200	547340	is to keep us alive and give us clinical and healthcare-related support. They're not there
547340	552640	to be secure. I mean, for fuck's sakes, if I have to tell the doctor, hold on, you need my username
552640	562080	and password, or you need my cryptographic keys, I'll be dead. I saw that. It's in a split second.
562180	567900	So let's get this shit right. Let's do it now before legacy comes back and bites us in the ass.
568100	573120	What's your controversial opinion on recording as well, seeing as you're fucking throwing us all
573120	576980	under the bus? What's your controversy? Well played.
578380	584200	My controversial opinion. Electronic medical records are not looked at by anyone,
584200	591200	and it's exhausting. You and I had this conversation. Everybody looks at medical
591200	594400	devices because they're tangible. They're something you can hold on to and you can
594400	602360	pick up off of eBay and, you know, find a thing. But electronic medical records are hoarded so
602360	607060	intensely, and they're not in a lot of legislature. They're not really defined.
607060	612120	They are not medical devices. And because they're not medical devices, we don't necessarily, we,
612120	618860	the group, don't necessarily treat them well. But when you look at it, I can have a medical
618860	623540	device that does one thing. It holds one source of information, right? Like your heart pacemaker
623540	629100	holds your heart information, where the electronic medical record holds all of the information.
629100	633340	So when you look for that wealth of data, and I'm going to find this one thing that's very
633340	640700	specific, or I can find all of it. And that's what I've done. Again, I did it for so long that
640700	645260	when people say, like, this is the most important thing, I'm like, yeah, but you're getting that
645260	653960	information how? There's so many links into this one small piece, and just no regard to it.
654400	659340	Yeah, but I think the problem is because we're not defining the ship, right? Because that is like
659340	665180	the ultimate goldmine. It's not necessarily a device, but it's a container that holds
666220	671720	everything, right? If those are the keys to the kingdom, it's the ultimate...
671720	677220	Exactly. How does that even happen? You can have the one thing, you can have the pacemaker,
677220	684480	but you need all of the other things to make an educated device. Educated to system. There's
684480	689720	educated decision. There's decision support built into this thing that will say,
690640	695640	you're going to give this person a defibrillator of some sort. Oh, BTW, did you know that this
695640	703600	person, you can't give them this one because of whatever reason this is. It's a support system.
703600	708000	It's a container. It does all the things. Now you've got me riled up. Thank you.
709200	711940	It's a treasure trove. That's what it is.
711940	716800	I've done talks about this. I can own your pacemaker and like, oh, I got a thing.
717480	724840	It's worth how much? 50? 500? I can own a hospital because that's essentially what you're doing once
724840	728740	you get the EMR. Because you get into the EMR, you get into everything else because it's all
728740	737380	the APIs, because whatever is going on and it's just gone. And that is mind-blowing to me.
737540	743540	But I mean, the purpose of cybercrime, right, is about money. So what can I sell and what can I
743540	750580	keep on selling? And how can I get, you know, have persistence? Exactly. I mean, it's the product
750580	754400	that, you know, forever paying because everyone's going to want to have that.
755060	762760	Because now I'm upset about life. They're not even connected. So like New York does not connect
762760	767740	to DC, which doesn't connect to Seattle, which doesn't connect to anything. So me as a human,
767740	772300	I now have to regurgitate my whole life history of all the things that are right and wrong with me,
772300	779100	because you don't know. I can make all of the things up. I can negate so much information.
779740	785980	Did you know that 18% of healthcare workers indicated that for the right price,
785980	790800	they would sell their data? Yeah. Insider threat, right? We just over,
790800	798880	we overlook it. And there's a print mechanism on these things. You just boop. You're good.
798880	803420	How do you feel about zero trust, Nina? Tell us how you really feel.
809860	812240	We currently work on least privilege, right?
814120	819420	Least privilege is still an indication of trust. It's trust, but verify in a way.
820100	826400	Not in healthcare. We shouldn't have that. There's, this is, this is sanctified information.
826400	831340	This is literally you in data form. And we're just like, here, it's fine. Go get it. We're cool.
831340	835180	We trust you. You trust me because I work here, but you don't know who I am as a person.
835180	841100	You know that I have a certain skill set. But zero trust needs to be better incorporated.
841620	847180	It needs to be incorporated better in technology and industry generally, but healthcare needs it
847180	853600	more because of the sensitivity and the specificity of the information. You, you roll somebody up
854660	860440	on their labs and they're off by whatever number this is. You can overdose them.
860440	865960	You cannot do a thing. You can treat them. You can give them the wrong blood. You,
865960	871080	there's so many different options. You need to know that everything is, is in their place.
871100	875040	You need to know that you can get into things and you can't get into things. And this is,
875040	882580	this is why the hierarchy is as such. And we're not doing that. And medical is so,
882960	888000	it's very flawed, but it's also one of the last technologies to go live with any sort of tech
888000	893480	and any sort of security because we've had that cloak of, you know, we're cool. We're good because
893480	898940	we are the doctors and we know the things. And if I tell you that this is wrong and this is the
898940	902360	medication you need, you're going to trust me because you don't have that information.
902480	907240	And you're going to trust me because I'm giving you that information. It's the same thing. And
907240	913300	we did that Hippocratic, I Am The Calvary did that Hippocratic Oath of medical device manufacturers
913920	919420	should have taken that Hippocratic Oath. If you read down the article, I go further. I said,
919420	923860	the hospitals need to also take that Hippocratic Oath because that is your information. That is
923860	930520	them holding you in digital format. What is the difference? There is none. There is absolutely
930520	938140	none. You're sly. You knew this was going to happen. I didn't think this was going to,
938140	944220	I thought this was going to be like, oh my God, I should, I should turn this, you asshole. I
944220	949600	should be like, this is everybody grilling me about shit. It's us having a conversation and
949600	956820	this is how this goes. But I like the fact that, you know, we verify but never trust.
957440	963220	I like that about zero trust. Because for long we've done trust but verify. But I mean,
963220	967780	do you think, I'm going to throw this out, that an APT is above attaching a medical
967780	973320	device or implanting it into a COVID operative and sending them into a hospital? Absolutely not.
973320	979040	Absolutely not. So yeah, we shouldn't be trusting bring your own medical device.
979040	983400	It should not be a thing. I always love our chats. I just want to say that.
984260	991240	So Yusef Enriquez, two sentences about you. What's your origin story? Okay, origin story,
991240	997160	prior FDA, worked in medical devices and medical countermeasure for the FDA.
997160	1003020	And currently working with Chemical Bio Threat Reduction Agency.
1003520	1009100	Okay, so all those things that you just said, what's the most interesting thing that you're
1009100	1014440	working on right now? Most interesting I'm working on is using quantum dots to test for COVID
1014440	1022680	antibodies. Just started working with the Aberdeen folks at the ChemBio center up there in Aberdeen.
1023360	1029960	Hopefully we could start using quantum dots to test for other infectious disease and maybe
1030980	1038400	explosives. Okay, if you were going to rip the guts out of healthcare, what would that entail?
1039320	1043300	The data set? Expand.
1044320	1050320	I think over the last 50 years, it's been 95% European white males. So I don't understand
1050320	1055700	the term precision medicine, given the fact that we've been doing race-based therapy for the last
1055700	1062000	60 years. Okay, how are you going to do that? How are you going to rip this up? How are you going
1062000	1067240	to change the paradigm? Well, I thought about calling Dr. Collins at NIH and tell him to stop
1067240	1073620	funding all white male scientists, but that might be a little bit above his pay grade. But I truly
1073620	1078020	believe that we're going to have to start building data sets from the ground up, scratch what's
1078020	1084420	already there, because I think it's complete bullshit. So is your call to action that
1085660	1092100	all white male clinical studies be ended and then bring other folks in? Because traditionally,
1092100	1098260	there's been historic issues with people of color not being particularly keen on signing the paper
1098260	1107700	of a clinical trial. So what is the best way to get those folks involved? Well, the first thing
1107700	1112340	is take the bias out of the folks that's reviewing the clinical trial R01s. Okay,
1112340	1114960	so how are you going to take the bias out? Because that's ingrained, no?
1115420	1121720	Yeah, Dr. Collins is going to have to do a better job of hiring more African Americans,
1121720	1128840	minorities, and women at the NIH, because it starts there. I mean, the socioeconomic bias
1128840	1133820	that's already implanted, once they look at the application, anything that refers to lack
1133820	1141640	diversity or diversity gets thrown in the trash. Is that going to solve the problem in its entirety?
1142800	1148180	That'll begin some of the solving the problem. And then I think, you know, what you'll start
1148180	1154160	to see is that trust will come back. Minorities will trust other minorities to do study. I raised
1155360	1160460	clinical trial enrollment at the Bronx VA just because I was African American. I was able to
1160460	1166360	increase trials because they saw one African American guy in the entire psychiatry department
1166360	1171860	at the Bronx VA their entire time. They had veterans there that had been going to that VA
1171860	1177220	for 30 years that they've never seen an African American or minority scientist
1178120	1181900	asking them for their blood or asking them to do a sign up for a trial.
1183960	1191660	So, from conversations with you, you have a lot of opinions about the EUAs. So, what's an EUA?
1192220	1198660	What's your controversial opinion? I think I'm getting a little concerned. I think we're over
1198660	1203360	about 25. I feel like from our conversations, you're a little more than a little concerned. Yeah,
1204480	1210040	let's ratchet it up a little bit. I think we're in the red as far as these EUAs being
1210040	1217820	approved because the confidence interval that's required is 95%. We now have EUAs,
1217820	1222520	which is emergency use authorization for COVID testing, as low as 65%.
1223680	1229680	So, I mean, you don't have to be a mathematician to see. That's a D on your report card.
1229880	1234640	It's not even at a C level yet. And so, these are tests that's being administered.
1234640	1238480	And given the report, thinking that individuals are not,
1238480	1243680	doesn't have COVID when there's almost a 40% chance that they do.
1244700	1248960	So, what's the workaround for it? So, they get their 65. They get their D. Do they get extra
1248960	1255000	credit? Do they? Is it? What's the workflow? I mean, honestly, I think they all should be
1255000	1258580	taken off if they're not above 80%. I think we're about three months...
1258580	1261460	Then who does that leave? We're in a crisis right now.
1261460	1268380	Again, that's where I think America has kind of took their eye off the ball the last century or
1268380	1274720	so. We outsourced everything to China. That's the reason why we have slowness in testing now. We
1274720	1280980	don't have enough swabs. We can't manufacture a stick with a piece of cotton on it. And so,
1280980	1286600	now what we've done is we've rushed out and have all these device companies make these EUAs that
1286600	1295860	are charging $100. You take almost three to four days to get a result back. And oops, it might be
1295860	1302300	65% accurate. So, you're fucked either way. So, what's your shameless plug?
1303380	1308320	I mean, again, I think understandably there's only three that's met the 95%. I think they
1308320	1313560	should go ahead and ramp up. The rest should be scratched unless they have significant data.
1313560	1320240	How are they going to ramp up? The production line is not here. The supply chain is not here.
1320260	1321920	Get out. We're America.
1321920	1325340	That's not a viable answer when the whole world is in crisis.
1325380	1329900	Well, we're not responsible for the whole world. We're responsible for America.
1330400	1335960	And therefore, I think, you know, what has happened is America is focused on bullshit.
1336420	1342780	And, you know, now we can't even supply our own medical supplies. We can't supply our own API for
1342780	1349080	pharmaceutical because we've outsourced 93% in China and the drug manufacturing is in India.
1349260	1353220	So, somebody's going to have to take a hit on the chin for it. But it needs to start being
1353220	1356300	American-made products. So, if it's American-made products,
1356300	1360280	this also indicates that there's other things in the supply chain in that just workload
1360280	1365520	in its entirety that need to be changed. If we have sent so many things off to China,
1365520	1370720	they have different environmental protection laws, which means we would have to change them here.
1370720	1376720	So, this whole system needs to be recalibrated. How long does that take? What's the effort?
1376720	1381080	What's the funding? Who needs to get involved? I don't think it needs to be calibrated. I think
1381080	1386800	it needs to be detonated. It needs to be start from scratch because it's just not it.
1386800	1391220	So, that's right. We have the problem. So, you're bringing this up. So, what's the solution?
1391740	1394780	Solution is, I mean, again, we got to get back to manufacturing.
1395340	1402120	That's the solution. I mean, we've spent more money on Pokemon Go's and other bullshit and
1402120	1406740	we've not been able to shore up our supply chain. Right now, if we shut the borders down,
1406740	1413660	we are dead. We don't produce enough insulin. We don't produce anything that is of necessity to us.
1413660	1419540	However, we've spent so much money on other shit. I just don't see how we can sustain. We are not
1419540	1422800	able to sustain ourselves right now if we closed all our borders.
1423220	1430440	So, Lilly makes insulin in Puerto Rico and that pushes over here. But we're still not addressing
1430440	1436940	what I just said. So, you can detonate. That's fine. But you are still not creating a chain of
1437980	1442720	you've destroyed this. What now? I mean, again, we have to...
1442720	1448560	How do we rebuild that trust? How do we rebuild the facilities and get the stuff to make this
1448560	1455100	cotton swab? How do we get from a four-day waiting period to a four-hour, a 24-hour turnaround?
1455160	1459000	Yeah, we got to shift the money. I mean, the money is being shifted to big corporations.
1459000	1463080	We have to shift the mindset though first, right? I don't necessarily think the money is the...
1463080	1466320	money is always the problem. Cash flows everything around me, correct. But
1468020	1473500	you have to change the mindset of those manufacturers, of the people that are in that
1473500	1477400	chain to make the difference before the funding is even considered.
1478460	1483120	Yeah, but again, going back to the individuals that's running those companies.
1483120	1489900	They're not diverse. There's no inclusion. And so, they get to make these decisions that are not
1489900	1495220	relevant to the diverse population that they say their medical devices to serve.
1495240	1498220	No, we're talking about COVID. We're still talking about the manufacturing.
1498400	1501420	Yeah, that's what we're talking about. The manufacturing, I mean, again,
1501420	1505440	name an African-American that runs a large pharmaceutical company.
1505820	1509580	I'm not well-versed in the pharmaceutical companies, to be honest. I'm better with the device.
1509580	1513800	Name an African-American that owns a medical device company, a large.
1513900	1515740	Valid. No, completely valid.
1515740	1519740	Again, when you talk about the mindset, you have individuals that's running
1519740	1525500	this particular industry that pretty much only have their interest in their group,
1525500	1530260	right? And so, that's where you see with the pharma. Nobody thought that it was alarming
1530260	1534520	that it's 95% European white males. I think everybody did.
1534980	1538540	I don't know, but the ones that do go... Oh, no, absolutely. Yes, not everybody.
1538540	1540140	Not everybody. Not everybody.
1540140	1543680	People that weren't involved and were like, why can't I have that med? I saw it on TV.
1543780	1549420	There you go. So, what's your shameless plug for you? What's your shameless plug?
1549580	1555300	I mean, again, like I said, I think for me is it needs to be understood that this is a systemic
1555300	1564180	racial issue from the beginning. I don't know how to Band-Aid fix it. So, the plug would be to
1564180	1572020	re-engineer the way science is being done, how the scientists are being hired at the agency,
1572020	1578200	because until you have diversity and inclusion, you're going to end up with another 50 years of
1578200	1584580	white, 95% European males in the drug trials trying to treat,
1584580	1590820	which is not going to be the majority anymore in the next 10 years. So, what are we doing?
1590940	1595400	Your shameless plug is about you, not fixing the system.
1595880	1601400	Oh, my shameless plug. I mean, I don't have a shameless plug. I just want to do good science
1601400	1608980	and individuals that, you know, I think what my big concern is, there's a lot of innovation going
1608980	1616440	on that's not being acknowledged because of who's behind it. And I think what I've seen over my
1616440	1622380	career is that we need to change that. Because again, I think all you're seeing is these Me Too
1622380	1627980	products. There's no innovation being done at large companies. Money has been spent on R&D
1627980	1632800	for absolutely nothing at all, because I haven't seen any value add to a lot of these
1632800	1640080	products, given the fact that it's being done in a bubble by white males and white institutions.
1640680	1649000	Okay, thank you. We met in Abu Dhabi on a plane and had extensive conversations about medicine,
1649000	1654860	because happenchance, you are a physician. What's your origin story?
1655920	1664120	So the work on what eventually became telehealth really began with a Facebook page. I, back in
1664120	1672320	like 2008, thought that the residents could benefit from having a professional Facebook page,
1672320	1675960	and that, you know, it's a good way to share information and can be used in a little
1675960	1682180	different way than kind of just the sharing pictures and family and friends aspect of it.
1682180	1687080	But the professional societies hadn't really come around to it. So really,
1687080	1695100	my career changed with a slide from Queen Elizabeth. Because when I showed Queen Elizabeth's
1695100	1700880	Facebook page, and that we were not, you know, adopting new technology, even at the speed of
1700880	1706620	Queen Elizabeth, I really do think that that was persuasive. So I think, while I have been given
1706760	1712640	a fair amount of credit for kind of ushering ACOG into social media, a lot of it was Queen
1712640	1719080	Elizabeth's influence. And so the work on social media began really with a legislative interest
1719080	1724580	to kind of share stories and new legislative items that were coming up and to kind of get
1724580	1730520	get awareness in a way that was a little more fun and socially engaging. That pretty quickly
1731300	1737900	transitioned from social media to anything that engaged with apps on your phone. And while they
1737900	1741880	are very different, you know, it's different to have an app on your phone that say is a step
1741880	1746920	counter from having a social media profile. There was enough of a connection through the mobile
1746920	1754720	devices that social media and mobile media, you know, overlapped. And I was doing my health policy
1754720	1760520	training at the University of Pennsylvania, where they very astutely had formed the Social Media
1760520	1767060	and Health Innovation Lab. So I joined them. And that was really the professional intersection of
1767060	1772440	studying the big data and the new types of metrics we get from things like Twitter, like
1772440	1780060	tracking flu season by tweets and those kinds of studies. And from there, you know, it really has
1780060	1786440	been just kind of a series of progressions where you go from tracking health information via
1786440	1792380	Twitter to health information via a wearable device, which, you know, has at least a commonality
1792380	1801000	of connecting through apps. And ultimately kind of landed where we are now, which is a
1801000	1805140	version of telehealth that is very different from social media profiles, but it relies on things
1805140	1812740	that, you know, engage through wearable devices, patient-generated data, app connections. And then
1812740	1817220	like what we're doing here, which has become routine in COVID era, which is the virtual visits.
1817920	1824020	And obviously it's exploding right now. So that's kind of a brief synopsis of how I went from
1824020	1828840	talking about Queen Elizabeth's Facebook page to doing virtual visits around the clock.
1829060	1833340	So you gave an acronym and I'm not sure if people know what it is. So what's ACOG?
1833340	1838040	Yeah. ACOG is the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.
1838240	1842160	So I want to dive into that because that's the kind of physician you are, correct? You
1842160	1846380	deliver babies, you take care of moms. Right. So I'm a board certified OBGYN
1847440	1851220	and the chair of telehealth for the professional society, ACOG.
1851400	1856040	Perfect. So I think a lot of people, when they think of going to the hospital now,
1856040	1859920	because of COVID, they're going in for tests and they're going in because they have COVID.
1859920	1866080	But the one surgical suite that stayed open the whole time, or at least generality,
1866080	1872060	stayed open the whole time was yours. So can you talk about what happened,
1872060	1876860	what changed during the COVID? Just get into that.
1877280	1881860	As with everything, it has been a series of moving targets and
1881860	1888220	adaptions and adapting to maybe an overreaction. So a lot of it has changed, but the overall
1888220	1895500	essence of it was the obvious necessity for still having inpatient care. So the recommendation has
1895500	1901840	always been to come and receive your maternal care in a hospital, whether it's a delivery or
1902160	1907280	a triage evaluation, management of blood pressure. In other words, not recommending going outside the
1907280	1916720	hospital. And to make that as safe as possible, there were a number of new protocols. Some just
1916720	1922120	limited who could be in the hospital. So a lot of it was keeping it to be just the patient and
1922120	1927080	maybe one support person, which would often be, say, a spouse or a family member. Whereas the
1927080	1931700	intention before COVID would have been to have multiple support people, either multiple family
1931700	1939360	members or a doula or someone like that. So that initially changed. And there were some,
1939360	1946360	unfortunately, kind of rigid policies that did change the birth experience and definitely
1946360	1952660	changed the postpartum experience. As we've gotten better at rapid testing and symptom screening
1952660	1959440	and mask wearing and PPE, those have become a little more lenient. But there still is an
1959440	1964320	emphasis on getting patients in and out of the hospital as quickly as possible. So going home
1964320	1970000	on day one after a vaginal delivery or day two after a c-section would be accelerated in normal
1970000	1975580	situations, but it has kind of become routine right now. And then there's the whole
1975580	1980820	testing element, where if you test positive, there is a whole other kind of precautionary
1980820	1986080	protocol that gets put into place. And it does mean wearing more masks than you're probably used to
1986620	1992960	for the patient. Definitely means more PPE for the providers. So it looks like a much more kind of
1992960	2002440	medicalized version of the delivery, which is the safest thing we have right now.
2003000	2008240	So you talked about social media and the way that it's working into better patient care. Are
2008240	2014100	you familiar that the FDA is working on something like that, that they're bringing in all of that?
2014100	2022260	Can you speak to that a little bit? So yeah, I can speak. I'm not part of that personally.
2022280	2026600	So is that a call to action that you want to express? I may be expressing that for you.
2026600	2034040	Yeah, it's definitely a call to action in that we need these kind of bi-directional flow of
2034040	2040000	information. We need patients who can more directly interact with decision makers and
2040000	2045240	with people who are making the health policies. It's a little bit different, I think, than
2045240	2049560	initially you're talking about, but one of the most effective waivers during this COVID era
2049560	2056400	was the allowance of different devices so that everybody can access virtual health,
2056400	2059520	even if they don't have, say, some of the infrastructure that's not available in all
2059520	2067120	communities. And examples of that would be like Skype, FaceTime. Most communities now,
2067120	2072600	whatever the resource setting is, do have access to cell phones and enough,
2072600	2077700	either Bluetooth or internet, that they could do a FaceTime visit or a Skype visit.
2079060	2087020	So, what kind of interactions have you had with the security researcher community? And
2087020	2090520	are you getting into that realm? Are you in that realm?
2092240	2097200	We're wading in. We're probably about knee-deep right now. So, there's definitely an adult
2097200	2103140	swim deep into this that we have not gone into. But even in the shallow waters, it's been
2103140	2110320	very enlightening. Because what we want to see happen with this telehealth revolution
2111140	2118480	is the best kind of transition from optimizing the benefits without falling prey to the pitfalls.
2118480	2124960	And we know with any new technology that those pitfalls are there, often unintended. So,
2124960	2130220	kind of a classic example would be any scientific discovery that, at an extreme,
2130220	2137580	became very dangerous. Nuclear fission comes to mind. And when it comes to Facebook and social
2137580	2141500	media, I think the extreme of that in the negative is pretty obvious right now, with all of the
2141500	2147380	misinformation and all the ways that social media can negatively influence public perception of
2147380	2154600	pseudoscience or influence elections. And what we want to do is harness the power of these things,
2154600	2159740	because social media has also enabled Black Lives Matter and the Me Too movement. We want to
2159740	2165840	maximize the good and minimize the bad. And we're learning right now what are the, you know,
2165840	2169740	to switch analogies for a second, in vehicle safety, you know, what are the
2170680	2177400	anti-lock brakes and seatbelts and air traffic control of telehealth? And, for example, in the
2177400	2184040	kind of entry-level interaction I've had with the cybersecurity community, we don't have much
2184040	2189660	training on the physician side. So, you know, when a doctor is talking about a device that might be
2189660	2195900	beneficial to a patient, say like a remote blood pressure device, they probably, you know,
2195900	2200940	genuinely just don't have a lot of training or information about the nuts and bolts of how that
2200940	2205860	works and how safe the data is. They know to ask about it, they know to be concerned about it,
2205860	2211700	but they don't have like the deeper level understanding. That's just one example of how,
2211700	2218320	you know, data privacy is totally intimately intertwined with this, and doctors do have
2218320	2223480	questions about it. So, I have two things for you. This year at the Biohacking Village,
2223940	2227900	Andrea Downing is talking about disinformation on social media, and you should also have a
2227900	2232020	conversation with Dr. Christian DeMeth and listen to his panel on Do No Harm. I can send you those
2232020	2238400	links after. And the last thing I want from you is how can we as a community, the hacker community,
2238400	2245020	cybersecurity community, help you in whatever next step it takes to get mid-thigh into that water?
2245020	2250720	Yeah, well, exactly what you just proposed. I think we need a lot of these cross-disciplinary
2251700	2257060	conferences. I think we need to be going to each other's lectures and learning each other's worlds
2257280	2262420	a little bit first, and then finding out all the intersections. I do think ultimately,
2263240	2268580	there's going to be a role for a lot of these conversations to take place outside the patient
2268580	2276140	encounter. It's already such a short time we have to talk to patients about the things that we're
2276140	2282000	trained in extensively, the immediate health of the patient right in front of us. To then dive
2282000	2287840	into really complex topics about cybersecurity and patient-generated data and where that data
2287840	2292880	sits and how protected it is, not only is it maybe beyond the scope of our time limits,
2292880	2298240	it might be on the scope of our expertise. So I think finding a way that we can get patients
2298240	2302360	the answers to those questions and get a well-informed citizenry of doctors to feel
2302360	2307720	comfortable enough that they can confidently recommend the devices without having to get
2307720	2313880	into all the deep weeds or deep end of the pool about exactly how it works. Finding the trusted
2313880	2318660	sources to say, I don't know exactly how it works, but these guys do and we trust them. And so
2319520	2322240	here's your kind of safety measures.
2322240	2327240	Yet another plug. Meg Dewar is working on a cybersecurity informed consent
2327840	2332460	project that would help patients and help you folks get that information to them.
2332460	2337100	So this is the last question. What is your shameless plug for this conversation?
2337460	2344200	My shameless plug is to have a post-COVID world that looks a lot like the current
2344960	2351060	waivers and adaptations. So it doesn't mean that we have to continue all visits via Skype or
2351060	2357400	FaceTime, for example. Even among the adopters, most have moved away from that already. They use
2357400	2362020	things that are HIPAA compliant. It's a nice backup to have. But that's not the waiver that
2362020	2366980	we're looking for. But we do need a lot of these other waivers to continue. We need doctors to
2366980	2371340	see patients without, for example, a prior existing patient-doctor relationship. We can
2371340	2377180	establish that for the first time virtually. We really need the cross-state lines flexibility.
2377740	2383720	In fact, a totally shameless plug would be to have something akin to a national medical license,
2383720	2386900	where if you're licensed in one state, you can practice anywhere, the same way that you can
2386900	2390920	prescribe anywhere in the United States with a DEA number, or you can drive anywhere in
2390920	2396040	the United States with a driver's license. We need payers to continue to fund this.
2396040	2401820	They've been doing an admirable job adapting to the current climate. We need that to continue.
2401820	2413760	And we need the people using it right now to be open to still some reining in of all the
2413760	2418720	new technology. In other words, we know that things like virtual visits and online care
2418720	2425240	are still prone to overuse and fraud and all the things that in-person care is prone to.
2425240	2431380	So while I'm calling for many of the waivers to stay in place and not be reenacted, we will need
2431380	2436200	some new things that come in and we need to be open to those so we can continue to use it safely.
2436440	2437800	Thank you so much.
2438160	2439740	Thank you.
2439740	2440800	Hey girl, hey.
2440800	2443880	Hey girl, hey, hey, hey.
2443980	2450300	This is Najla Lindsay. She is on the board with us. She helps us do the things and accomplish
2450300	2455220	all the things that you're about to experience. I have a question.
2455880	2459700	I may have some answers, Nina. I may have some answers for you.
2459880	2461040	Are you ready?
2461380	2462620	I'm gonna get into it.
2462620	2466520	So what's your origin story? Two, three sentences.
2467780	2479080	Forensic scientist lover, wine lover, and I am here to share forensic science and information
2479080	2484760	security is hand in hand. That's just, that's the bottom line. They are lifetime lovers and
2484760	2490760	part-time friends right now and I need them to be full-time friends as well as the lifetime lovers.
2490760	2493040	So that's it in a nutshell.
2493120	2497000	I was going to ask about your shameless plug, but you clearly already got this because that
2497000	2501500	was the title of your talk for last year. So hashtag go to YouTube.
2501680	2502840	It's all in there.
2506380	2511520	You're up and coming as a researcher. You're doing all the things. What do you need from
2511520	2516240	our community to help you get to that next level? Because if anybody follows you on the Twitters,
2516240	2522220	you just, it's all the time every day doing the things. How can we help you?
2522740	2529540	How can we help? How can you help me? You know, share, you know, the resources that I share,
2529540	2536700	share things that I'm doing with the community and reach out to me. I'm always open to have
2536800	2541800	a discussion. I'm always open to learn something new. I don't know everything and I think that
2541800	2548640	the community is full of experts and people that know so much that there needs to be a bridge
2549320	2556060	to, you know, career transitioners like myself and, you know, recent graduates and, you know,
2556060	2561460	the people that have been in the industry for years. So I'm always willing to have a conversation,
2561460	2570720	talk to you, share my resources, and, you know, just be genuine and in your reach as well.
2571140	2576400	Because it's no sense in being fake with me. I'm not fake with anybody. Just be genuine in your
2576400	2582880	reach and reach out to me, talk to me, and teach me something new. Learn something new every day.
2584520	2592100	You talked about your forensic science work. How do you see the overlap of DFIR,
2592100	2602640	science, security, technology, healthcare? It's all intertwined. And I like to tell people that,
2602640	2607840	you know, a lot of people that are currently studying digital forensics, they don't know that
2607840	2615980	that's actually a branch and a discipline in forensic science. And once people learn and
2615980	2624640	actually take into their work that this is from a scientific discipline, what you do in digital
2625460	2630700	forensics can go to court. Like, you can testify based on what evidence you have processed, what
2630700	2635780	evidence you have found, what story you're telling. And that could be a make or break for someone. You
2635780	2640060	can wind up putting someone in jail or you can wind up freeing someone and exonerating them from
2640180	2645980	a crime that they've probably been in jail for for years. And so I always like to remind people that
2647420	2652180	they are together, whether you like it or not. And I think that people forget that you have to
2652180	2658220	take the scientific approach to a lot of things. That scientific method, we didn't learn that just
2658220	2663940	to learn it. We learned it because it actually applies. You have a hypothesis and you have to
2663940	2670140	test it out, not just once, not twice, various times and with various people. Because what I get
2670140	2676300	when I do it will be a different result and can be a different result from what you get. And it
2676300	2681900	doesn't hurt to share the information. You're not going to lose anything by sharing what you learn.
2682080	2689560	And I think that it will forever be intertwined as digital forensics gets more popular
2689560	2695800	because that's also taking the turn and being the talk of the town of cybersecurity,
2696340	2702700	information security. I think it's important that people remember or know, just even learn that
2702700	2709240	this is a part of forensic science. This is a science discipline. And the more you think
2709240	2714380	methodically about it, the better you will be as a practitioner in the field. And that's either as
2714460	2722600	a researcher or if you're working full-time as well. So not a lot of people consider digital
2722600	2727880	forensics in healthcare because there are no laws surrounding it. If something goes wrong,
2727880	2734240	you re-image it, you keep moving, you keep going. How do you see the transition happening? Is it
2734240	2741280	happening? Is it going to happen? What do you see the future? So with healthcare, I find that
2741280	2747960	they're always at least five to 10 years behind on making the transition to updated technology,
2747960	2752500	just in general. Just switching to have Windows 10 on all of their computer systems in the hospital
2752500	2759480	can sometimes take much longer than private organizations or government organizations.
2759480	2767140	And so I think that the healthcare industry is still catching up. Healthcare, a lot of people
2767140	2772300	didn't think about, oh, I have to worry about securing this device and making sure someone
2772300	2777040	don't try and trip it and increase, you know, let's say you take insulin, you have an insulin pump,
2777040	2782340	and increase my insulin pump or, you know, mess with the anesthesiologist who is very important
2782340	2789100	during surgery because one wrong dose can kill somebody. So your hospital go down and your
2789980	2795000	anesthesiology equipment is on a network and somebody decides to play with it,
2796240	2803180	you're just completely out of luck. So I think that as more people are aware of, you know,
2803180	2807780	the biohacking village, as more people are aware of, you know, healthcare and medical device security
2807780	2815060	and how important that it is to think about security at the beginning and not the after effect,
2815060	2820200	I think that people will start to realize, oh crap, we actually have to take care of this.
2820200	2824420	And I think if manufacturers, there's a couple manufacturers that I know that they started
2825780	2831420	implementing on their websites where you can learn about stuff that has issues. And so they
2831420	2836600	want to make sure that the community is aware so that, you know, they're doing, they have their
2836600	2841380	methods to build in and make sure that everything works better. I think the more that people
2841380	2849320	actually have conversations because as much as big and as much as cybersecurity is, they don't
2849320	2853480	talk to each other. Like people within the industry and the organizations don't talk to each
2853480	2858580	other. It's like a hush hush thing. And I just feel like this is actually the same thing in
2858580	2863660	forensic science too. But I think that the more that you talk, the better we can come together
2863660	2868620	and the better we can build these, you know, these instruments and these medical devices,
2868620	2874460	because that's the only way we're going to make healthcare better for everyone. It's not about,
2874460	2880700	oh, you get access to healthcare and you don't. You have to think security at the forefront and
2880700	2884640	not at the, at the, at the end of it, because it actually costs you more when you think about it
2884640	2891080	at the end versus with it in mind as you're doing it. So it's all intertwined, all of it.
2891820	2898500	So in recent history, you were part of, share the mic, in cybersecurity.
2898760	2899980	Oh yeah.
2901600	2906700	So what was, what was that like? What were the outcomes?
2907860	2916240	Um, that was like one of the best things that I've ever been a part of. Um, and, you know,
2916240	2922940	I, when I got paired with Rachel Toback of WISP, you know, I had known of Rachel. I hadn't really
2922940	2928100	talked to her as much, but I had known of Rachel because I wind up being able to receive a WISP
2928100	2932760	scholarship last year for DEFCON. So that was very helpful in me attending DEFCON.
2932760	2940500	And on top of that, we just clicked instantly. I learned so much about her. Um, and we put a plan
2940500	2945400	together. We put a plan because, because you're, you're on Twitter. You're not necessarily doing
2945400	2949740	videos. It's a tweet and you put together some tweets. We put together some tweets. We put
2949740	2953220	together an action plan and just talked about, you know, what it is that I'm trying to do,
2953220	2957980	what it is that you're looking for. Um, you know, certifications that you're doing
2957980	2963980	and all of the like. And so we put it together Thursday night, everything was set.
2964300	2970480	And then Friday, everything, I was at work. I still work in my forensic science industry. So
2970480	2974240	I was at work when all of this was going on, but I knew what the tweets were because we talked
2974240	2981520	through them and we worked through them. And I wanted, you know, funding for my certifications.
2981800	2986080	And I wanted to attend the SANS class. And we know, you know, SANS has been,
2986680	2993380	um, looked at as like one of the main industry certifications to achieve and attend that class.
2993380	2999060	And so I was fortunate to be able to receive a full scholarship to attend one of their classes.
2999060	3006160	I was able to get all of my certification, um, certification costs covered. And then
3006160	3012520	they wind up covering all of the black cybersecurity professionals, um,
3012520	3020880	certifications and trainings. And to, to still, you know, make that, you know,
3020880	3026200	hey, I'm going to still get all of these people, um, make that the forefront and say, hey, I'm,
3026200	3032740	I want these people to progress. I want these people to win. Um, I think that that was amazing.
3032740	3041340	It felt amazing. And I was elated, um, all day at work. I was on my, I was just so elated at work.
3041340	3045520	They couldn't even tell me, they was like, are you okay? I'm like, I'm not sure, but I'm here
3045520	3050980	and I'm going to get my work done. But it was so amazing. Um, and then later on in the day,
3050980	3056240	Rachel and I actually went live on Periscope and we had a discussion about, you know, you know,
3056240	3062980	being black in the industry, um, and what it is that people can do to help black cybersecurity
3062980	3070460	professionals. And so, um, that whole day was just full of adrenaline and full of, you know,
3070460	3075700	happiness and gratitude, um, and people using their platform to promote other people's voices
3075700	3080980	that don't typically have a voice. So I loved it. Um, and Rachel and I are still building our
3080980	3084660	relationship in the background and learning about each other and things like that. And I think
3084660	3089960	all of the participants are also doing that. So it was, it was amazing. I hope that it continues
3089960	3097160	to grow into something much larger, um, going forward. How can the biohacking village participate
3097160	3103080	or do better with it? Um, you, as a biohacking village, I think that
3104520	3109640	you have to make a conscious effort. And then to some people, it may look like you're being biased
3109640	3114580	because you may focus on underrepresented minorities or things like that. And I think
3114720	3118520	a good way, because normally the biohacking village just does an event during DEF CON,
3118520	3124280	right? Um, I think that, you know, during the year, you know, after, you know, a couple of
3124280	3131920	months later down the line, do, do... Are you secret dropping? You got to cut this out.
3132340	3138660	No, I'm just telling you what I think. I'm just telling you things that I think that would be
3138660	3143800	helpful. You know, maybe start a partnership or a mentor program with, um, you know, some people,
3143800	3150340	get people involved in, in it and promote it, you know, consistently. Um, you know,
3150340	3154680	especially during, uh, Cybersecurity Awareness Month, everybody participates in it, right?
3154680	3160540	Like last year I did that. I was dropping random tips of the day, like, and doing that. I think
3160540	3166220	that the more that people learn that the biohacking village is out there, the more that people will
3166220	3172000	want to participate and know about, you know, healthcare and medical device security. I think
3172000	3179740	that is, you know, keep, you know, tweeting and sharing, you know, information and reaching out
3179740	3185960	and being personable. I think that's all going to do a world of good as we continue to grow,
3185960	3189000	because I'm not going anywhere. Nina, you're stuck with me, just so you know.
3189000	3190460	I was never letting you go.
3190520	3192080	Okay, just so we're clear here.
3192080	3193560	I was never an option.
3197700	3200160	So what's your controversial opinion?
3200880	3219270	Whew, um, wow, you tripped me up here. Good one, actually. Um, my controversial opinion is that
3220950	3224590	I, I see,
3226290	3232490	I see people being performative on making sure that Black people get heard in the
3232490	3238710	industry. But it means nothing, because you're not actually doing anything. And I can see right
3238710	3245250	through you pretending to do anything. And I think that, you know, even with share the mic and cyber,
3247370	3251930	it's, I feel like it'll be a moment in time for some people, and for a lot of people,
3251930	3259570	because you have the same type of people at the top of the industry. And they have a lot of say.
3259570	3265990	And it, and the industry follows a lot of what those top people say. So I think sometimes,
3265990	3274450	you know, doing all of this and making sure that, you know, people get heard.
3276590	3283270	Let's check back around wintertime and see what's been happening. Because I know, or I feel,
3283270	3285910	that stuff's not going to look the same.
3287290	3291150	So, controversial opinion. What's your call to arms?
3291890	3301030	My call to arms is don't talk about it, be about it. Go make for the next, listen, we're in Rona.
3303050	3311210	It's Rona. You're like, it's coronavirus. Most states, most countries are locked down.
3312250	3318930	Reach out to somebody in the industry, not a white person.
3320910	3325730	Not, no, no, no, not a white person, not a white male, not a white female.
3326230	3331410	Somebody that does not look like you, that you've never actually talked to either, because you can
3331410	3335830	tend to have a bias against the people that you've already known. And you just choose that because
3335830	3339950	that's your comfort zone. No, no, no, no, no, we want you out of your comfort zone. We want you
3339950	3347590	to be held accountable for your thoughts, your feelings, and your words, and your actions.
3347790	3356610	Reach out to somebody, a black person, a Latino person, an Asian person, somebody not related
3357180	3362150	to you in any way, fashion form that you've never talked to, and get to know them genuinely.
3362150	3371510	Don't expect anything in return, nothing. I mean, not an ounce of nothing.
3372790	3380650	See what happens to yourself as you choose to develop a relationship with someone with no
3380650	3388750	transactional expectations. See what happens to yourself, not for them, for you. Because
3388750	3394190	I can guarantee you, when you start to do stuff without expecting anything in return,
3394190	3402210	you feel good. And you realize that the stuff, and the values, and the beliefs that you have now,
3402210	3407890	they can change. They don't have to be there for the rest of your life. And your life's not going
3407890	3413110	to end because you've changed a value or belief. It's not going to end. It's only going to get
3413110	3420090	better. And if it don't get better, I'm sorry, you're not growing. And you're going to be stuck.
3420650	3426870	So choose somebody you've never talked to. Go on LinkedIn. LinkedIn is the place of people
3426870	3433650	just, I feel like they just Google and just reach out to people. Go on LinkedIn. Check Twitter.
3434290	3441510	Check hashtags. Go on there. Go talk to someone. Build a genuine relationship. Find out about them.
3441510	3448450	Reach out and take it from here. Commit to it for the next six months. I'll make it easy. I won't even
3448450	3452810	say a year. For the next six months. Into the new year. Actually, it's five. Let's make it into
3453270	3459530	January 2020. And see what happens. And reach out to me on Twitter and tell me what happened
3459530	3465730	when you did this. Because I would like to know. I love that. That's it. I love the passion you
3465730	3476130	bring to pretty much every single conversation. Let's do it. Thank you. You are very welcome.
3476150	3482550	So fun fact about this quarantine is Canibal and I started cooking together on the weekends.
3483330	3490090	Three hour time difference. He's Mexican. I'm Puerto Rican. We started making dishes from each
3490090	3495290	other's cultures. It opened up our eyes. We're like super homies now. It's amazing. It is
3495730	3502130	probably one of the best friendships I have ever cultivated. And thank you for being on here.
3505770	3515070	So quick, just to get to know you, question. Two lines, one minute. What's your origin story?
3516210	3520570	All right. Origin story. It's going to be a little bit more than two lines.
3520570	3528010	But I started out in the medical industry. This was 12-ish years ago for a medical device
3528010	3534670	manufacturer. And it's kind of how I got into medical and how I got into security where
3535230	3542070	I was brought in actually more of a support role. And I noticed that, hey, these devices
3542070	3547430	aren't being patched. Nobody's really taking the lead on this. So I just started doing it
3547430	3555910	on top of my other stuff. And that was kind of it. At one point, it started rolling up into,
3555910	3561850	oh, hey, hospitals are starting to get hit with ransomware. This is kind of a big deal.
3561850	3565870	I'm like, yeah, I've been doing this for years because you guys didn't care about it.
3565870	3572170	Right. Perfect segue. So you've been around the industry for a super long time. So you've seen
3572170	3579270	it go from health care instantiation with technology and security to where we are now.
3579270	3583370	What are the biggest differences you see and how much do we still have to go?
3584330	3593090	There is still so much work that needs to be done. So, so much work. I think people are more aware.
3593790	3597490	I'm talking about a populist standpoint, not so much the medical industry, but people are more
3597490	3603730	aware of their data, the sensitivity of things, and that security is important, especially on
3603730	3609890	devices that are connected to people or those people are relying on those devices for their
3609890	3621390	safety and their well-being. Things were a mess. They're still a mess, but not as much of a mess.
3622190	3628470	I think a lot of it has to do with, one of the things is the regulations, HIPAA.
3629070	3635510	There's not enough there. Their heart's in the right place, but they have no way of enforcing
3635510	3641290	it. The claws have no teeth. Claws have no teeth. That's kind of funny because it sounds like it's
3641450	3650210	a cat. A healthcare cat? Right. So, I'm going to bend you on that. Okay. So, what would give
3651850	3658370	healthcare policy makers, regulators more teeth? How do they, and just an extension of that,
3658370	3664810	so then how do they engage more with the sec community hackers to make this better?
3665370	3667950	How would you like to be engaged by these people?
3667950	3675410	Yes. So, that's kind of a, there's no quick, easy answer to it, unfortunately, but
3675910	3680910	this isn't a new issue. We've known about this for a really long time. It's one of those things
3680910	3688750	where if we, if something were just started now, in five, six years from now, we could look back
3688750	3692630	and say, oh, yeah, we still don't have a great plan, but there's something, there's at least
3692630	3701290	this momentum that we can build off of. Getting some sort of enforcement policy in place, and
3701290	3707110	that usually comes with auditors or someone that would like basically go to each hospital.
3707970	3713390	Some sort of government funding would be helpful because a lot of the hospitals,
3713610	3716550	a lot of people think that hospitals are making money hand over fist because of how much they
3716550	3721870	cost, but they're just, they're trying to break even. A lot of hospitals are running in the red.
3723790	3727450	And they really don't have the money. A lot of them don't even have IT staff.
3727650	3732090	A lot of them outsource their IT, and it's one of those things where the doctor will call up and
3732090	3737150	say, hey, I want to be able to check my x-rays or whatever from home, punch this hole through
3737150	3742730	the firewall so I can get access to my machines. Having some sort of standardized
3743810	3749510	IT policy for hospitals that the government can say, hey, here's a framework, you can either use
3749510	3754830	this or use your own, but you got to use something. That would be a huge step forward,
3754830	3759770	just having some sort of basic guideline so that the hospitals aren't fumbling around in the dark
3759770	3765070	trying to figure this out. Newer hospitals tend to be better, but there's so many old hospitals
3765070	3769990	that are just kind of like cobbling things on as they go. Most hospitals...
3771290	3771790	What's that?
3771790	3776810	Working with those legacy devices that they have to continue to integrate and continue to protect
3776810	3778930	with the other things that are coming in.
3778930	3782910	A lot of hospitals, especially on the East Coast, have been around since before computers were even
3783050	3790590	a thing. Yeah, right, it's crazy. Technology. A lot of them are like, how do I use this fax machine?
3790590	3793710	I almost took that personal. I was like, what do you mean? Are you talking about New York
3793710	3794770	specifically?
3795050	3797030	Yeah, especially New York.
3797370	3802870	No, it's actually true, right? So you're not in healthcare anymore, right?
3802870	3806970	No, I am no longer in healthcare. I've been out for maybe three or four years.
3806970	3810490	So I don't know if you want to talk about the industry you're in, but how does that industry,
3810490	3814190	how can that industry that you're currently in influence what healthcare is doing?
3814850	3824830	So I'm a Threat Hunter Red Team for local government. And just having... so my issue
3824830	3834170	with that type of work is the hospitals just need the basics. It's great that these devices
3834170	3840430	on the user side have two or MFA, usually three forms of authentication in order to be able to
3840430	3846610	pull meds or change access to a patient's record. But on the admin side of things, a lot of those
3846610	3851370	don't have multi-factor authentication. It's single auth. So it's great that the users have
3851370	3857570	to do this, but the admins don't. The technical side of things is just like, it's just oftentimes
3857810	3864990	a reused password across the vendor. And I mean, pick your vendor a lot. Pretty much all of them
3864990	3872350	have it. So what's your call to action for healthcare or the hacker community, whoever?
3874750	3879690	So many things. There's so many things. One of them is just education.
3881330	3888230	Get educated on what hospital you're going to. What standards do they have? What equipment do
3888230	3893210	they use? Ask them, how is my information going to be used? I mean, as a patient, this is what you're
3893210	3898930	talking about. As a patient. As a patient. As a hospital, it'd be one of those things of like,
3898930	3903090	yeah, holding your vendor a little bit more accountable as to what equipment they're putting
3903090	3908710	on your network. So many of them basically say, hey, we're on your network. It's up to you to
3908710	3914410	protect this equipment, not we're going to harden this stuff because, you know, we don't know what's
3914410	3924010	there. And every hospital is different. There's no standardized network for hospitals. I keep
3924010	3929850	kind of going back to the whole standardized policy thing of this is a basic framework.
3930090	3936510	You're welcome to modify this as much as you want. But these are the basics. You need to,
3936510	3943350	be able to segment off some of this equipment or have a standardized 2FA or MFA policy for
3943350	3948750	your internal staff and admins. And if you're not going to have your on-site IT, these are
3948750	3952610	the rules they have to play by. So what if it's a baseline where people just have to meet this
3952610	3958890	very small criteria to meet? And then from there they can build up, but they cannot go below?
3958890	3965190	Right. Who would be the organizing body to lead that or who would be involved in that?
3965190	3972390	That would seem like it'd be kind of fall onto the FDA. And there's, they have some stuff,
3972390	3979010	but it doesn't really call out a basic framework or some sort of structure that hospitals can,
3979010	3983450	can fall back on if they have these questions that are going unanswered.
3984850	3989850	So we're almost out of time. Okay. So what's your shameless plug?
3990490	3996350	I don't have one. Just, just get angry, get, get informed and like realize how like,
3996350	4003030	how poorly everything has been. They're like, this is this, none of this is new. We've,
4003030	4008250	we've been talking about this for 10 years and very little has been done. One,
4008250	4015150	one thing I will plug is if you look up the HHS breach report, whenever there's a breach,
4015150	4020810	it has to be notified. It has to be reported and you can go and you can read these reports
4021530	4027450	and you can see is like, Oh, look, 10,000 records just got breached or this other,
4027450	4032330	you know, CVS got breached. There was one recently, I think within the last week for CVS
4033170	4036030	in one specific area. And it's one of those things where it's like,
4036030	4038370	I feel like nobody's really looking at this.
4038370	4042410	Think about how CVS is networked, right? You can go to any CVS and pick up your meds.
4042410	4047270	So it's not just a singular, a singular one area that got hit.
4047270	4053810	If you go to Google and you just search for the HHS breach report, that's a hotel, hotel,
4053810	4060710	Sierra breach report. It'll take you to a page and you scroll down and you look for
4061210	4067390	breaches greater than 500 or less than 500. I don't know if there's a way to display them both
4067390	4070910	for what I mean, it's a .gov site. So at least you're getting something.
4071950	4080030	This, so the one I was just talking about is the CVS pharmacy and that's 21,000 records or not
4080030	4085610	even records, but individuals. The next one down is 25,000. The one below that for university of
4085610	4093770	Utah is 10,000, you know, 78,000 for the NCP healthcare management company. These are all
4093770	4100750	within the last, you know, seven to 10 days. This is a lot. And, and it just, it just scrolls
4100750	4104710	every, every day or every few days, there's just another one and another one and another one.
4105090	4112250	And I feel like not enough people are looking at the breach report. And if you get enough people,
4112250	4118030	you get enough eyes on this report, it kind of paints a picture of this is a really big issue.
4118030	4124630	And if, if we just followed some basic practices, it could really prevent this. If, and it also
4124630	4128330	shows you the, the location and the type of breach, you know, hacking IT incident,
4128330	4135070	hacking IT incident, unauthorized access or disclosure. Those are the ones that you see
4135070	4140790	the most. The, the one at the very top for Walgreens is theft, but, and, and the one below
4140790	4145190	it is loss as well. But I mean, those are, those are all preventable things. These are,
4145190	4153690	these are easy things that, that can be mitigated. Basic framework, just a very basic
4153690	4160570	framework of how to handle passwords. 2FA has to be required for not just the medical staff,
4160570	4165670	like the, the RNs getting the meds out of the machine, but the techs servicing the machines
4165670	4171330	and, and the vendor companies that are putting this equipment in the hospital should have some
4171330	4179250	degree of accountability for what they're introducing to the network. So we're going to
4179250	4185910	see each other later because it's Friday for us and it's a cooking day. So here for later.
4188030	4198590	Thanks. Later. So Sri, hi, how are you? Good. Thank you. How are you? I'm good. So
4199390	4203150	tell us about yourself. Where do you work and a little bit about your origin story?
4203710	4210130	Sure. Yes. I've been working on controlling pandemics since the Ebola epidemic. I got
4210130	4215830	pulled into that by a complete, by almost by accident. I was at a conference, Ted Med that
4216510	4220670	looked at, looking at all kinds of medical topics, but just a few days before that,
4220670	4227870	the Ebola crisis was, was escalating. And the CDC director had a press conference saying this is the,
4227870	4233370	at that time it was Tom Frieden saying this is the worst epidemic of his career since the AIDS
4233370	4238730	epidemic. And then, so it was like, oh wow, if the CDC doesn't have things under control,
4238730	4244330	then things must be pretty bad. So although we were, you know, we're having drinks at the city
4244330	4249690	hall in San Francisco for the, at the conference, it was very hard to relax because we were thinking
4249690	4253470	about, well, what was happening with Ebola as the whole rest of the world was worried about. So
4253470	4259870	I happened to meet my, a gentleman who became my coauthor. He was a Harvard public health school
4259870	4266070	professor. And it turns out I just was, I just happened to randomly meet him there and started,
4266070	4272590	he told me he had a lot of experience with Ebola in, sorry, with health, public health in West
4272590	4277350	Africa and East Africa and India and a whole bunch of places. So I said, wow, so you must know all
4277350	4282590	about what's going on there. And so I just asked him questions and we just kept talking and kept
4282590	4287730	in touch. And then realizing that there may be some ways to solve this problem in a, you know,
4287730	4292470	kind of a cool headed way, as opposed to all the panic that was being, if you look at the
4292470	4297170	literature at the time, there were people who were openly panicking and it was kind of a strange
4297170	4302230	time. And so, so we said, we wrote some things down on paper, just started emailing a bunch of
4302230	4306670	people and saying, Hey, could you try this and do that? And, you know, and ultimately about a
4306670	4314570	month later, that paper, that, that, that got written into a sort of article format and we
4314570	4320270	submitted it and it got published in the Lancet. And then the president of Guinea saw that and
4320270	4326690	invited my coauthor to, to come advise him on how to, how to control Ebola in his country. And
4326690	4332250	he was supposed to be there for two weeks. He ended up there for, for six months unexpectedly.
4332250	4336290	And I was there on the phone with him almost every day, just we're working through the details of how
4336290	4342750	you create a national Ebola response. So that's how I got plunged into this pandemics field just
4342750	4352350	by completely a bunch of random events. So now we're in COVID. Yeah. And you have the experience
4352350	4360750	with Ebola. So how is that medical data being, being taken in? How is it being allocated?
4361470	4369190	Okay. So that's great. So the data is, is not, it's still not where it needs to be. And I think
4369190	4373950	there's a lot of, as we know, there's, there's these big problems with the CDC and the federal
4373950	4379130	government trying to gather the data from all over the country. And our testing is far behind what it
4379130	4384430	needs to be. But we're probably seeing a very small percentage of the cases that are actually
4384830	4390010	people are having. This is, this is a disease that has asymptomatic infection as well as
4390010	4397210	pre-symptomatic spread. So we're basically only seeing a fraction of the, of the picture.
4397690	4404670	And this, this is a reflected way. We know this is that if you so in other words, I think the
4404670	4409510	data that we have is only a small fraction of what really is out there. And I think that's
4409510	4415050	the point I'm trying to make is that we, whatever data we have is, is a tiny, tiny, you know
4415770	4420650	reflection of the, of the ocean. So how is the data that we have
4420650	4427270	going to influence COVID care? And then beyond that, once we get past COVID,
4427270	4431430	how is this data going to influence change within healthcare as a whole?
4432510	4437050	This data is already influencing, I think, in a very big way. I think, for example, you know,
4437050	4441510	the like take the state of California there, the there's a, there's a metric called a positivity
4441510	4446210	rate, which is the percentage of tests that get returned that are tested positive. So if you do
4446290	4452130	a hundred tests, how many come back positive? On average, it's 7% in the state of California,
4452130	4460470	but in parts of the state, it's actually 12 or 20% close to 10, 14, 17, 20%. Like that's in
4460470	4465710	central California right now. Whereas in the, in the San Francisco Bay area, it's closer to two to
4465710	4470570	4%. So the average is not really reflecting the whole state. It's, it's really highly variable.
4470570	4475410	So that people are using that data, that percentage to allocate resources. So the governor
4475410	4482510	allocated $52 million of extra effort, you know, to do contact tracing and a whole bunch of things
4482510	4488590	for central California based on that data, based on that positivity rate. So that's one way in which
4488590	4494750	the data is really important. It gives us insight into where the problems are. So
4497310	4502770	actually, I want to do current state versus future state. So current state with COVID,
4502770	4511090	how is that data influencing changes in healthcare? And for future state of healthcare,
4511090	4517170	what are we learning that we need to start changing in how hospitals operate, how patient
4517170	4524730	care is done? Learning a lot. I think there's a probably a number of different topics that
4524730	4530890	we could talk about in that area. So I could just pick one maybe. And, you know, I think one is,
4531410	4537290	the other thing about this is that it's so fast. I mean, this is happening like at light speed,
4537690	4543150	faster than anybody can even keep up with. So that's the other part about this. The data,
4543150	4547190	there's obviously a lot of clinical data in terms of treatment of patients that people are learning
4547190	4553190	about treatments on real time, which works, which doesn't. And there's a really, I think one of the
4553190	4558450	examples that people point to is there's by the UK National Health Service, where they conducted a
4558450	4565870	whole bunch of, they constructed a clinical trial for a large number of drugs, and they came up with
4566670	4575370	dextromethazone as one that has effectiveness for treating COVID patients. And so that's an example
4575370	4579730	how by properly constructing the trial, they can draw accurate conclusions and come up with
4579730	4590010	solutions. So from all the information, I think you've been involved in the data couriership
4590570	4596470	of COVID since it started, is that correct? The data what? The data couriership and gathering
4596470	4601330	since the beginning of this, since the beginning of COVID? Yeah, that's so much the data and more
4601330	4609910	the epidemic modeling. Yeah, modeling of how you can control the epidemic. Oh, perfect. Perfect
4609910	4614290	segue, because that was the next question. So what is the data showing you on how to control this?
4614770	4620290	What should the American society understand about how the data should influence how we're going to
4620290	4627310	control this? Okay, great question. I think one of the things that we can do, so the testing is
4627310	4632310	something that we have tried to do, and we are doing and continuing to improve at some rate,
4632310	4637310	and it's now in full swing, and people are trying to increase testing all over the country and
4637310	4643950	make it better, cheaper, faster, which is all good. It's certainly not been enough. And so
4643950	4647910	that doesn't mean that, you know, we want to stop testing, we want to keep going.
4648130	4652850	And that will help us find cases and reduce the burden, but we need something else
4652850	4657990	to control the spread and combination. And I think we talked about this on our
4659330	4666750	podcast about how combining it with masks or social protections of some kind will,
4666750	4671590	and that could include social distancing or anything, would be able to bring the transition
4671590	4681050	rate below one, the R0 below one, in order to stop the spread of the epidemic. And since we
4681050	4687830	talked at a time, one thing that's become clear is that people are finding that the virus
4687830	4695230	transmits not only through droplets, which are greater than five microns in size, but also in
4695230	4701090	aerosols, which are smaller, less than five microns, even less than one micron. And the
4701090	4707270	properties of these droplets are that they pass right through the cloth or cotton masks that
4707270	4712750	people are wearing. So although the cotton masks will filter a certain percentage of the
4713790	4720530	virus that's exhaled by the breath or incoming in the environment, these aerosols linger for
4720530	4725230	many hours and they can pass right through this cloth. And so we're only getting partial
4725230	4730190	protection. And so one of the things we can do, we discovered, I think this has all happened
4730190	4738110	the last 30, 40 days, is that using... it's kind of like these cloth masks are like socks,
4738110	4742990	and we need shoes. We need something that's going to be much better if we want to keep
4742990	4748690	walking in the streets. And so the one example of that is, of course, in healthcare settings,
4748690	4755630	people use N95 masks. And these N95 masks are designed to stop the aerosols, to give the shoes
4755630	4761430	of the industry, except that they've been reserved for healthcare workers because they need them.
4761450	4766950	But the problem is that the more the virus spreads in the community, the more cases they're going to
4766950	4772750	be showing up at the hospital. So you're actually not really solving any problem by more and more
4772750	4775790	people getting infected, more and more people showing up at the hospital, and even more people
4775790	4780870	dying. So there are actually industrial masks that are not used by the hospital system. This
4780870	4788390	is an example. This is one example. It's a NIOSH-approved N95 mask, and it could be used
4788390	4793410	by essential workers or healthcare workers... I'm sorry, non-healthcare workers to protect
4793410	4798270	themselves. And because these people who are exposed on a daily basis to the public and to
4798270	4803490	other workers that are keeping the economy running, they are actually... they're finding
4803490	4807970	that those are the people ending up in the hospital. And so, you know, people staying at
4807970	4814410	home who can isolate, they're much less likely to get the virus than the people who are obviously
4814410	4820830	exposed. And that obviously makes logical sense. So these types of masks. Another mask is this
4820830	4834790	mask here. It's from Canada. It has an N95 filter in it. And it has... let me get the other one that
4834790	4843390	I have here. This is a little bit more very industrial looking, but it's a Lastomeric mask.
4843390	4848950	You put it on like this and strap it around. And these are N95 filters. But the point... the thing
4848950	4854550	is, these are just like a seat belt. They're dummy-proof. They're very easy to use. They
4854550	4859490	don't require this big, you know, careful fitting and healthcare training and all that.
4859510	4864410	They're stretchy. And the word Lastomeric means stretchy. So that's what we can do is by wearing
4864410	4870670	these kinds of off-the-shelf pre-approved masks and putting them in the hands of essential
4870670	4878970	workers, I think we can make a big difference. So last question. What's your call to arms
4878970	4885390	from the security research community, from healthcare, from the American population?
4886370	4892490	I call to arms. I think right now... I think I already sort of discussed a little bit more.
4892490	4897050	I think essential workers need these masks, these N95-capable masks. Without that...
4898490	4903090	until this... I think that's really the number one thing we need to get done right now,
4903090	4909050	is put them... protect the essential workers so that they don't spread the disease and get sick
4909050	4915930	and bring it home to their families. And I think that would be the number one thing that would...
4915930	4922070	Thank you, Sri, from patientknowhow.com. So go check that out for more information on everything
4922070	4927890	that he's just talked about. Thank you so much. Thank you. So for everyone that doesn't know,
4928830	4936250	this is Josh, our recording producer for this year's virtual conference,
4936250	4942570	and he literally just got told that he is the next interview for this keynote. So let's all
4942570	4953130	welcome Josh. And just to be clear, he does not work in the cybers, but the reason I wanted you
4953130	4962130	here is literally that reason. You've recorded... I think there's one more talk left. You've recorded
4962130	4971070	95% of the talks that we've had so far. How's your brain? It is really full because I did not
4971070	4977570	have any understanding of this field before, and I just watched like 20, I think 28 lectures or
4977570	4982210	seminars or whatever we call them. And I'm just the type of personality that if I'm watching
4982210	4986690	something, I'm really paying attention to it and trying to figure it out. So it's kind of bursting
4986690	4995850	at the moment. So from all the talks you've heard, where in life are your concerns for healthcare?
4996470	5004650	Well, the massive lack of any type of cybersecurity at many HDOs is pretty bad. Personally, I'm going
5004650	5009910	to be working at a small mental health clinic in a few weeks, and I'm sure that I'll be asking them
5009990	5015010	a lot of questions about what their cybersecurity is, especially since we're delivering all of our
5015010	5022710	services over telehealth. So what are the concerns for that? But I also really enjoyed Yusuf's talk
5022710	5028710	about representation in medical studies, and I think that's super important in research,
5028710	5033630	coming from, again, studying social work. So coming from that background,
5033630	5036470	that's also really important now, especially now when we see such
5039490	5042730	dramatic demographic distribution of COVID cases.
5045850	5051670	What are your takeaways? What should we be working on as a security community?
5052290	5056850	What's your greatest concern that you think we should get to straight away?
5056850	5063170	Well, I thought Sri's takeaway on getting masks to essential workers seems like the most urgent
5063170	5069450	takeaway from any of the talks now, just because that specifically saves lives. But I don't think
5069450	5072090	that's really cybersecurity, so I don't know if that really answers it.
5072170	5079690	It's part of the maker space, part of it. So then if we're going to go back into the security side,
5079690	5086750	being that you've heard 28 intense talks, and I'm not sorry for that,
5087510	5095290	and you're going to go into social work, and you have an understanding, you very likely have a
5095290	5101990	better understanding of how healthcare works now and the security around it, more so than
5101990	5106810	a lot of other patients out there. As a patient, as someone going into the hospital,
5107710	5115550	what's your takeaway? What's your greatest need now as a patient walking in?
5115550	5119970	Well, I've never liked to go to the hospital, and I sure don't now. But if I did,
5119970	5126430	I think I would just make sure that either myself or a companion who was with me double-checked
5126430	5133090	that whoever was treating me or administering medication or other treatments has my correct
5133090	5137350	record and that the information is correct, that my blood type is correct, things like that. I
5137350	5142290	would just double-check things, which I always cross-examine a doctor when I talk to them anyway.
5142310	5147050	And I think that being an informed patient is really important. So I think that the potential
5147610	5152010	for accidental mishaps is probably the thing that would concern me the most.
5154590	5161590	How do you think our community can engage more? You know what? Not even our community. How can
5161590	5167710	your community engage more? What's my community? What is your community? My community right now is
5167710	5174830	my son, my wife, and my dog and me. Okay, so how can your community engage more in the healthcare
5175870	5182970	security side of the house? Wow, I'm not sure I have an answer to that. Okay. I mean, I'll be
5182970	5187130	talking to people at the clinic and so forth and people that I, you know, study with in Social Work
5187130	5193570	school and professors for all my classes moving forward now for the next couple years because I
5193570	5199330	have attended this conference as the video producer. So I think it would probably be in the
5199330	5204730	form of conversations with people, you know, in the Social Work field from my perspective.
5206350	5213390	What questions do you have for the security folks, the biohackers? I think I did have a question.
5220250	5225530	Societal change. I mean, changing social policy. One thing I do know from studies and from just a
5225530	5230530	career in journalism is that changing social policy in the United States, even when we're at a
5230530	5238590	World War II level event like we're having right now with the coronavirus, is still tremendously slow.
5238590	5243270	I think that, and this kind of goes back to the other question about outreach, I think that maybe
5243270	5247690	people in the community need to be doing more outreach through people that they know, whether
5247690	5254450	it's on, you know, probably on social media, just to sort of raise questions and try to stimulate
5254450	5260430	some dialogue about what people should be, what regular people should be prioritizing in this
5260430	5264070	situation. And, you know, I mean, it's going to come down to who people vote for in November,
5264070	5267790	but it's also, it also comes down to like, how are you going to spend your time online on social
5267790	5274470	media? You know, whether it's, are you going to be sharing memes or maybe having a substantial
5274470	5279350	conversation with somebody in the community who might actually have some suggestions for how to
5279350	5285930	improve the situation. I know a few people, just by virtue of living where I do, it's a very IT
5285930	5291490	heavy, you know, neighborhood. And we have people who've been building respirators in their, or
5291490	5295870	ventilators in their rooms, or designing software for it, or, you know, building masks and things
5295870	5300170	like that. So I think that kind of community outreach is really important. I think that,
5300170	5304450	you know, that is maybe the type of thing we should be using social media more for these
5304450	5310430	days than spreading bad information. So I wanted to make sure people knew who you were,
5310430	5314670	because thank you so much for being part of The Village this year. There's so many people
5314670	5320550	that are involved that don't get the accolades that they need. So thank you everyone that I
5320550	5326130	interviewed. Thank you for trusting me enough to come in cold. I want to thank the organizers
5326770	5336850	for this year. It was, it was a work of love. And thank you to Beau, Sidney, Andrea, Bill,
5336850	5342030	Najla, the volunteers, the sponsors, the device folks that are working with us.
5342030	5346850	We appreciate you attendees so much. Watch this space. Enjoy the show.