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0	14740	Hi, my name is Young B. Lim. I am a doctoral candidate at George Mason University and I'm also a Baltimore Underground Science Space Community Lab member and I am super thrilled to be here to give you this talk.
15120	28160	I think that it's fairly apparent when you look at the title what I'm going to talk about. And that's about the dangers of assumptions. So let's get on with this talk about you know what they say when you assume
29160	46160	So as a brief background about who I am, just from a professional vantage point, I'm clearly a guy that's into some style. I love glasses and I love wooden bow ties. I've been involved in national security and looking into it for about the past decade.
46160	57880	Also, I am involved in community labs and community organizations. So I've been very fortunate the past few years to be involved with the Global Biosummit.
57880	72760	Just so you know, Global Biosummit 4.0 is coming up. Biosummit.org. So go check it out and register while you still can. And like I mentioned previously, I am a doctoral candidate at George Mason University looking at DIY bio
73880	82400	So the thing that I also wanted to point out because everybody is a multifaceted individual is I wanted to see what the internet would pull up
82400	95800	When I decided to talk about, you know, things that are personal about me. So interestingly enough, these are the images that came up and the first one to the upper right should be pretty obvious.
95800	103040	It's me hanging out with a friend of mine, Natalie Ma. This is actually at Santoka Ramen in Boston.
103300	118540	So I'm a huge fan of ramen. In the bottom right hand corner, it shows me being involved in a community lab project called Barcoding the Inner Harbor, along with other members such as Syrah and also actually the founder of
119240	122500	Bugs, Tom Burkett, in the photo in the lower right there.
122560	134000	In the lower left hand corner, you can see that I think of myself, I guess, as a flamingo. I just thought this was a really fun picture because this photo was taken when I was traveling in Seoul, South Korea.
134000	147040	I'm a person that really loves to travel. And interestingly enough, this focaccia bread picture popped up in the internet search. And so it seems to show that I have a real appreciation for baking.
147040	155980	And for carbohydrates, which shouldn't be terribly surprising given the Robman photo. So, you know, that's a bit more about me, apparently, according to the internet.
155980	172620	So I really want to now get into the meat of this particular talk, which deals with this idea of assuming. So you know what they say when you assume. And I think that Moira Rose does a fantastic job in this animated GIF of explaining that.
172620	186660	Never assumed here, it makes an ass out of both of us. So what do assumptions have to do with kind of my talk and my life story here? Well, to get to that, we need to start with an origin story.
186700	201760	So I'd like you to picture it, a la Sofia Petrillo. It's at George Mason University in 2015. That's when The Force Awakens came out. I just really liked that animated GIF. So I decided to put that in there.
201760	224540	So when I was a PhD student at George Mason University in 2015, that's where I had my first exposure to these concepts of do-it-yourself biology, community labs, people doing the life sciences outside of conventional traditional areas like academia, industry, and government.
224540	241140	And this was my first exposure to it. So if you look through any of these particular images, you can see that the image presented of do-it-yourself biology, community labs, amateur science is a pretty horrifying one.
241140	263140	There's this idea that amateurs could create mutant viruses. There's this idea that these people are actually creating biosecurity issues. There's an idea that non-state actors could use these technologies that people are using in unconventional ways to exploit synthetic biology for terrorist purposes.
263140	278620	And as more people engage in these types of activities, it's possible that, according to this 2018 New York Times article, that people will get hurt as they continue to do these DIY gene editing experiments.
279420	289400	So my first impression of do-it-yourself biology and community labs is not terribly surprising. I think Archer explains it best here with welcome to the danger zone.
289400	302020	Because it certainly feels like a danger zone type situation. You know, it feels very dangerous. It's about people that I don't understand. And, you know, that's the impression that I initially had.
302020	312140	So clearly, I'm speaking to you here right now from the comfort of my own home during this virtual conference, and I've clearly had a change of heart.
312400	317460	And how did that change of heart happen? Well, I think that there are three precipitating reasons.
317460	332020	The first is, I'm a homebrewer. Starting in 2012, I go visit Korea. I try to visit once, sometimes twice a year. And I really got into homebrewing. They have a rice wine there called makgeolli.
332020	344440	And if you listen to my interview podcast episode with Nina and Bo on white hats and lab coats, I talk a little bit about my homebrewing experience.
344440	360540	But I kind of came to realize, and I use this book, I realized that sake is Japanese, makgeolli is Korean, but I kind of came to realize that homebrewing in itself is a form of, you know, doing biology.
360540	374860	Outside of conventional spaces. And so, you know, that kind of got me open to this idea that maybe biology in unconventional spaces is not only something that's desirable, but it can be something that's delicious.
374860	404100	So the second thing that kind of got me thinking about how biology in unconventional spaces could be a good thing was this idea that I was talking about myself as this kind of emerging tech, biosecurity expert, but the more that I got into the biology of it all, the more that I realized that biology is actually really hard.
404860	420700	I kept having to go back through basic biology textbooks to just get a basic understanding of a lot of these very complex ideas and complex technologies that were coming down the pike that I was supposed to be able to understand.
420700	442870	So I wasn't sure at one point if it was that biology is hard or that I'm just a horrible student, but I eventually realized that having community lab spaces as a place where people could learn biology at their own pace would actually be helpful to me from a professional and educational standpoint.
442870	462170	And finally, the third thing that changed was I was very fortunate to get a research assistantship in California at Lawrence Livermore National Lab. And I met this gentleman in the upper right hand corner, Patrick Dessalier.
462170	480350	He is a founder of one of the first few community labs in the United States, Counterculture Labs in Oakland, California. And he learned it through the grapevine at Lawrence Livermore National Lab that I was interested in do-it-yourself biology.
480350	493710	And he at one point came up to me and he asked me, hey, so I hear that you're interested in community labs. And I said, yes. And then he asked me, have you ever been to a community lab? And I said, no.
493970	509390	And so he offered me literally a life changing opportunity with an invitation very akin to Arnold Schwarzenegger in the lower right hand corner. Come with me if you want to live, or at least come with me if you want to learn more about community labs.
509390	534470	So actually getting that initial introduction, actually getting that invitation to come and participate and observe was a really eye opening experience for me in 2016. And over the past five years, I think that it's really developed a number of changes in the way that I think about community labs and DIY bio that are very much with me to this day.
534470	545810	So I know some of the people in the audience at this point are saying, you know, origin stories are great. But if you could get to the point, that would be great. So here's the point.
546390	562190	This is often the situation, you know, there's a major problem when we assume things. So as much as we like to think that we know everything under the sun, that is not a true fact. That is fiction.
562190	587670	There are the known knowns that we know of, but if we're not willing to push ourselves beyond the known knowns into the other areas, particularly in my case, in regards to DIY bio, the known unknown. So, you know, we know that there are like particular issues that may be existent, but we don't necessarily understand what this phenomenon is that we're observing in the first place.
587670	602430	Unless we're willing to push ourselves to expand our idea of the known knowns, we often work off of assumptions. And once again, TLDR, remember what Moira says, it makes an ass out of both of us.
602430	616890	So I just, you know, as the start to this whole entire talk, I wanted to get people to think about this idea of assumptions and understanding that assumptions aren't facts. Assumptions aren't truth.
616890	639250	What we need to do as responsible citizens and responsible scientists is to, when we run into a particular situation that we don't know very much about, have the willingness to be curious and open minded and go into that new area, this kind of like, you know, this strange new world.
640090	653050	With, you know, an open mind and be willing to kind of process information as we go along and allow that information to help inform us as we, you know, expand our knowledge.
653550	658850	And arrive at particular conclusions and policy recommendations.
659870	672490	So we are finally here now. My talk is on understanding the do-it-yourself biology and community labs scene, and it is a bit unusual, I think,
672490	687270	in the biohacking village context, because a lot of you people are like incredibly technical people, and I would not be able to do half the things, actually even a quarter of the things that the people do in this audience on a regular basis.
687270	699010	So, you know, testing vulnerabilities and various types of software, imagining, you know, all of these kind of like red teaming, like cybersecurity type events.
700610	713030	That's amazing. It is amazing that you can do it. I really hope that you find this to be an interesting talk because social science, I think, is often referred to as a soft science and sometimes kind of
713030	728530	pushed to the side, but I think there's real insights here that could be helpful, not only from a policy standpoint, but from a community standpoint. So I'm going to go forward with that kind of perspective in mind. So here we are finally at the main event.
729930	739070	No crazy animated gif here. I just wanted to go over a few basic facts about the do-it-yourself biology community from my research.
739070	750630	So there aren't very many reports about the do-it-yourself biology community. One of the main ones was from 2013 authored by Dan Grushkin, Todd Cookin, and
751270	765650	Piers Millett. So in terms of its history, it appeared to emerge somewhere in the United States from about 2005 to 2008. It's now a global phenomenon with community labs popping up all around the world.
765650	773550	A lot of people associated with the do-it-yourself biology movement in the early days include Rob Carlson, who built his own
774390	783170	biolab in 2005 and he talked about, in a Wired article, how people could maybe start doing their own
783750	788910	community lab work and learning community lab skills from the comfort of their own home.
788910	803370	And then Jason Bobb and Matt Cowell in 2008, they were based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and they had this idea of making biology more accessible and easier to do, particularly from the angle of synthetic biology.
803550	817090	So having people, you know, providing people with the knowledge and the tools to be able to engage in biology and do some really fun and cool things, you know, from the comfort of their own home or from community lab settings.
817690	828210	So the 2013 report discusses how this community started as a small online forum. It was an online Google group called DIY Bio.
828210	844290	Current estimates estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 individuals associated with the movement. It's highly decentralized, consisting of actors ranging from individuals to regional communities. The individuals from that 2013 report,
845150	860750	they noted that people tended to be more educated and younger than the general population. And these community labs and these kind of garage labs tend to be centered in highly developed urban locations with higher education academic institutions.
861770	872750	So in terms of DIY Bio, in terms of its values and goals, it's very much about democratizing technology. And when we talk about democratizing technology,
873310	883690	I see it as four separate but interrelated concepts. So there's increasing access to technology, increasing access to knowledge,
883690	892370	so the internet, but also increasing access between people to have conversations, to talk about science,
892370	902550	distributing scientific practices to a broader community, and distributing capability for a broader community. So broader in terms of the number of individuals and broader in terms of
902750	917750	ways of usage. So I think that it's very much the idea of DIY Bio that people see the democratization of science as good news, as Professor Farnsworth clearly acknowledges.
917750	934020	And, you know, this idea that not only do academics and, you know, industrialists and government have science, but we as citizens have science and should have access to science and should be able to do science.
935250	947470	So in terms of my research, what I found in terms of DIY Bio activities were they encompass four general categories. So the first is exploration.
948350	963910	People in the DIY Bio community like to explore, you know, everything from within themselves to their local and regional environments. So that's, you know, a vehicle that DIY Bio uses to enable people to explore their surroundings.
964750	973570	He-Man, clearly with the, I have the power, indicates that DIY Bio also really believes in empowering individuals
974210	984310	to be able to engage in biology and to be able to leverage biology for their own particular sets of purposes. In terms of another activity that DIY Bio does,
984310	993510	there's a lot of education that happens in do-it-yourself biology contexts. So there are lectures, there are hands-on lab skills classes,
993510	1003510	there are casual conversations where people just talk about various topics. And before you know it, they've talked about this entire area of science that they're really excited about
1003510	1016090	and really excited to collaborate on. And finally, there's an entrepreneurial element. So there are a number of community labs that function as early stage incubators for
1016090	1033950	small groups and individuals to come in and maybe develop a proof of concept or get some data that hopefully they can then use to develop a product and very much in the style of Fry there, have people tell them to shut up and take their money.
1036610	1044210	So question here is, how do national security professionals and practitioners typically feel about what I described?
1044790	1048470	If you remember back maybe about 15 minutes ago,
1049630	1065850	surprise, we're back to the danger zone again. There's this real concern that as people have access to these technologies that they can do all sorts of things with them and they're not necessarily benign things that, you know, people can do.
1066350	1073210	So scouring through the WMD literature, especially as it relates to non-state actors,
1073750	1083670	but, you know, the WMD context, I noticed three general trends or three general considerations that
1083670	1096410	national security experts seem to be focused on when they think about the change in risk associated with the development of WMD and the use of WMD in the modern day.
1096410	1110350	So in terms of capability, as capabilities increase, as people can do more things with the technology, that means that people are then able to leverage that technology to do lots of things.
1110710	1123190	So if people are able to do lots of things, that increases the playing field of not only could they use the increased capabilities for good, but also for nefarious purposes.
1123890	1140190	The second major trend that I noticed in terms of assessing WMD risk is increases in convergence. So there are lots of different players that are getting involved in science nowadays. And it's not just
1140750	1152870	you know citizen scientists, but disciplines are also converging. So synthetic biology is actually a convergence between biology, you know, the traditional life sciences
1153190	1162450	and the application of engineering principles to biology, trying to make it easier to design, easier to test, easier to build,
1163040	1171670	making it easier to produce products with. So as these different groups and different communities engage with each other,
1171670	1192790	there's less certainty about what the outcomes will be. And it's harder to predict what outcomes will come from what interactions. And so the lack of certainty also contributes to the sense of concern that, you know, as as more communities work together with each other or different disciplines work with each other,
1193610	1201650	you're going to end up with this, you know, you're not, you're not sure where, you know, what's going to come out of those interactions.
1202270	1213610	And finally, in terms of increased accessibility, technologies, you know, people talk often about how gene sequencing and gene synthesis prices are consistently falling
1214150	1221530	rapidly. So that makes them financially more accessible to a broader audience.
1221530	1226990	Technologies also are becoming more available secondhand, on secondhand markets,
1227830	1235490	because there are a fair number of biotech companies that, you know, there's a high rate of failure in biotech. So when a company goes out of business,
1235490	1243310	they often set things up so that they either donate their equipment to other people that, you know, are interested in them, they sell them on eBay.
1243790	1255510	So as these technologies become more accessible to a broader audience, there's also this perception that there's a loss of control of the equipment, of the reagents, of all of these things,
1256170	1265490	which then contributes to this idea that the risk of weapons of mass destruction, development, research, and use are increasing.
1266850	1269110	And these are just some examples
1270510	1280190	from the state actor perspective. So in the upper left hand corner, you have a 3D printer. The, you know, one of the concerns with 3D printing is
1280190	1290830	as it becomes more capable, as we're able to do more granular things with it, maybe states or potentially non-state actors could use that granularity, that specificity,
1291310	1304610	to develop nuclear weapons parts or parts for a nuclear centrifuge. In the upper right hand corner, we have, you know, a graphical image of CRISPR. So this idea of gene editing.
1304990	1320270	And as, you know, gene editing becomes more prevalent, as gene editing becomes more accessible to a broader audience, it becomes not only harder to control the technology, but it also is just really hard for people to
1321150	1329030	arrive at what would be approved and unapproved uses of gene editing technologies. Because as you broaden the pool,
1329810	1343310	you know, you have an expansion of opinions. Opinions are like assholes. Everybody has one. And so, you know, it becomes harder to arrive at a consensus when it comes to technologies that become increasingly, you know, increasingly accessible.
1344230	1360730	And then, you know, within the non-state actor context, here's that concern again about the use of weapons of mass destruction or the facilitation of uses of weapons of mass destruction. So as drone technology becomes more prevalent, it may be possible to
1361350	1369750	use drone technologies themselves as a weapon of mass destruction in terms of, you know, if you have a concentrated number that's swarming,
1369750	1384050	attacking a particular position that could, you know, result in massive, massive casualties and massive damage. We're looking at the fact that drones with swarming technologies may aggregate and be able to be used by non-state actors to
1384050	1399150	do significant damage to infrastructure, to individuals, things along those lines. To the upper right hand, that image in terms of the non-state actor space, that was a sarin factory in Japan
1400210	1405250	that was being run by a group called Amashinrikyo. The bottom image
1406150	1412810	is in reference to Amerithrax, a domestic event that happened in 2001,
1413790	1418250	largely believed to have been done by a single individual
1419530	1423350	through the distribution of anthrax to the postal system.
1426090	1437270	So with this, you know, with these three kind of considerations in mind, you know, these three relationships of what is driving risk, WMD risk,
1437270	1448760	related to the life sciences, where does do-it-yourself biology fit? And I would argue that if you look through the lens of a national security person looking through this framework,
1449260	1457400	that you could argue that do-it-yourself biology appears to mean a greater perceived WMD threat
1458300	1465660	to the national security space. So, you know, you have people getting access to
1465660	1474980	you know, use lab equipment that contributes to a diminished sense of control over being able to control the supply of
1475580	1485160	equipment, reagents, things along those lines. You also have an increased convergence. So you have not only traditional people doing the life sciences,
1485160	1495180	but you also have regular citizen scientists contributing towards, you know, various kind of life sciences projects, which means you're not necessarily sure how
1495180	1504520	you know, what the outcome will be of the types of work that these people are doing. And, you know, technology is only getting not only cheaper, but
1505260	1514620	more efficient, more capable. So as technologies become smaller, as technologies become faster, as technologies can do more things
1515400	1522820	like gene sequencing devices that are, you know, tabletop gene sequencing devices or potentially even
1522820	1541340	gene synthesis devices that are tabletop, we're talking about the potential to do more things as technology advances. So, unfortunately, it seems like do-it-yourself biology from a national security angle is
1542420	1551620	a thing that deserves some concern and, you know, increases the potential for WMD threats from that perspective.
1552300	1560340	And that is, you know, this typical perspective that you see in national security circles. So here are a few quotes.
1560980	1567140	You can read through them, but mostly they're about how technology is becoming more accessible, specifically gene editing.
1567660	1576400	People may be able to do all sorts of things with these technologies as they become more available. And, you know, these are communities that
1576400	1590080	have traditionally not necessarily been involved in the life sciences. So there may be security and safety implications that go along with that kind of naivete, that amateur element.
1591240	1605160	So, um, I saw this issue and I was trying to balance it with my perceptions and my experience being involved with the community for five years at this point.
1605740	1619180	It was very frustrating, to be honest, to sit in and listen to people talking about do-it-yourself biology as this threat when I, from my personal observations and interactions,
1619860	1623460	thought there was a more complex picture at play. So,
1624400	1632660	you know, with the support of my committee, with the support of the do-it-yourself biology community, I developed a dissertation project
1632660	1637960	looking to understand do-it-yourself biology community labs from a social science aspect,
1638660	1646360	following very much in line with what Dr. Farnsworth recommends in terms of how to proceed with the scientific method.
1646620	1653420	So I developed a one-year study. It looked at 10 community labs across the United States, as well as
1654020	1666260	major spaces that are associated with community labs. So, for example, MIT Media Lab is a place that is not necessarily a community lab. It is a major convening space for community labs.
1666640	1676720	In terms of the activities that I engaged in, I did in-depth interviews. I also actively participated in projects, classes, labs
1677300	1689700	throughout that year. And I also did observations. So I gathered field notes and I highlighted observations over the course of a year to develop a very deep understanding
1690480	1699060	of the community labs that I was able to associate with. So this study really focuses on four things.
1699060	1706440	How people find out about community labs, what motivates people to participate in community labs, how they are organized,
1706440	1709080	and how people learn and teach in these spaces.
1709840	1714620	So getting to how people find community labs.
1715860	1723540	Interestingly, actually not interestingly, because it's, you know, it's, I think it's a pretty obvious phenomenon nowadays.
1723540	1733720	The most prevalent method that people find community labs is through the internet. As Homer Simpson points out, they now have the internet on computers.
1734200	1743320	So that seems to be the most popular method. People are interested in finding lab spaces, and so they look online. People are interested in finding
1743320	1751240	science spaces, so they look online. So that's a typical method. That was the most prevalent method from what I saw in the study.
1751240	1757140	But other methods include interpersonal connections. So friends telling other friends about community labs.
1757140	1763200	Professional connections as well. So individuals that are interested in, say, bio art.
1763200	1774560	And they're like instructors of art at various institutions. They hear about community labs as these kinds of innovative spaces for bio artists.
1774560	1785160	And then that's how they then go to these community labs. There's also direct community lab outreach. So community labs often have web pages.
1785160	1791800	They have meetup sites, you know, things like that. And then sometimes it's just a roll of the dice. It's serendipity. So,
1791800	1801520	you know, there were a number of people that I talked with throughout the process that said, hey, I was going to this one place because a friend told me about a poetry slam
1802180	1813160	that was happening in this building. And then I looked around the corner and I found out that there was this lab that was in this building as well. So serendipity also does play a role.
1813580	1821300	It's not exactly empirical, but I think it's just a really interesting little factoid to toss in there. Sometimes it's a little random.
1822460	1839620	So what motivates people to participate in community labs? The main one is a passion for science. These individuals are very passionate about science. They want to learn about science. Maybe they want to engage in science, but there's this fundamental desire
1841320	1850780	to engage in science. And that's what motivates people to not only start going to community labs, but continue participating in them.
1850780	1855960	And then, you know, there are a number of other elements, too. You know, these are some just some of the top ones.
1856000	1868200	Social interaction. So, you know, community labs, the word community is in there. Community members come together and they talk. So social interaction is considered a very positive motivation for why people go.
1868200	1876180	People also believe in the mission of community labs and democratizing science. So there's an alignment of values with the organization.
1876520	1887420	People also like to engage in community spaces because there's community engagement. You get to engage in community projects and work with community people to build things for the community.
1887800	1895760	And another major one is just this idea that outside of a traditional institution like academia, industry, and government,
1896580	1910600	you have access to an actual BSL-1 lab. So you can actually have hands on experience, rather than just read from a book. You can actually, you know, get your hands a little dirty and do a lot, you know, learn and do some science.
1911780	1923100	So how are community labs organized? This is a blatant steal from Alex Perlman's Twitter. Alex Perlman is an amazing bioethicist
1923840	1937360	who works closely with the DIY bio community. This was from Global Bio Summit. I believe 3.0. It may have been 2.0. Alex can correct me. I'm sure she's involved in Biohacking Village this year.
1937800	1951480	But in this picture, David Kong at MIT Media Lab is presenting how he sees community labs being organized, which is as an armada of pirate ships. So this, you know,
1951480	1965800	these pirates, they loosely associate with each other as a group, but they also kind of go their own path and their own direction, depending on their own particular whims and their own particular desires.
1967020	1976640	The idea here, of course, is also that there is a loose organization, but it's not exactly hierarchical and entrenched in stone.
1977120	1990380	So, you know, community labs are often organized this way, you know, not only from a community lab to community lab basis, like an organizational basis, but also just like within a community lab itself.
1990380	2000080	So what are some of the advantages and disadvantages of having this loose organization style? Well, I see some of the advantages as being autonomy.
2000700	2007100	People can do what they want. Individuals can do what they want. Community labs can engage in projects that they want.
2007380	2016520	Also, many of these community labs are volunteer based, so they actually have a really incredible ability to operate with exceptionally low budgets.
2017060	2024080	What often comes up in conversations with community lab leads and individuals is they run on shoestring budgets.
2025180	2036820	And finally, with the autonomy element connected with it, community labs can engage in activities that are reflective of the unique local and regional communities that they're a part of.
2036820	2047160	So in the case of bugs, for example, based in Baltimore, Maryland, they're really interested in barcoding or understanding what lives on a genetic level
2047940	2054400	in the Inner Harbor, which is a body of water that is very significant to the Baltimore ecosystem.
2054920	2062140	So some of the disadvantages, though, is because each group is autonomous and they're so distant,
2062580	2070840	sometimes there are coordination difficulties. You can have issues with coordination across even the United States because there are time zone differences.
2071350	2080150	You also have coordination difficulties within organizations in terms of this because of the fact that they're volunteer based.
2080940	2089140	So the thing with volunteer based is while you have a lot of people that are willing to do work for no money,
2090060	2094480	when there are situations that take precedence over your hobby
2095260	2103980	of engaging in the community, that means that DIY bio activities won't always be a top priority. So things can fall through the cracks.
2104420	2115100	And just as I mentioned that they're able to operate on shoestring budgets, there are severe resource limitations and it's not just financial. So a lot of community labs depend very heavily
2115600	2127500	on the lab leadership to do a lot of the heavy lifting and that's usually one to two to three people that are essentially in charge of making sure that a shoestring budget organization
2128740	2142260	continues onward. And that's a really large burden. There's a significant concern in the community for burnout. People that eventually get burned out because they've taken on too much for a long period of time and there's no respite.
2143940	2154000	So in terms of, finally, how do people learn and teach in these spaces, um, I kind of divided out the activities as structured so versus unstructured.
2154060	2166420	So in terms of how people learn in these spaces, there are the structured styles that actually reflect a lot of traditional academic teaching styles. So there are pure lectures,
2166420	2171000	there are hybrid lecture and lab courses and there's project participation.
2171620	2182940	Unstructured styles include, you know, just casual conversations, impromptu conversations, impromptu demonstrations, where people just engage with each other and then just kind of
2183320	2190020	take things as they come and, you know, just explore things with each other in an unstructured fashion.
2190440	2201940	And in terms of the style of teaching in these spaces, once again, it's very reflective of a traditional academic style. And the thing I want to emphasize here is the traditional academic style is not
2203200	2213780	is not random. A lot of these community labs are run or founded by individuals that have advanced degrees from academia.
2214500	2226520	So when you look at a board or a leadership of a community lab, more often than not, you will see individuals with PhDs in molecular biology, electrical engineering,
2227140	2238860	bioinformatics, just, you know, these are highly educated individuals. And so it's not surprising that that traditional academic style bleeds into how they then structure
2239780	2249100	the learning and teaching environments in, you know, in community labs. So, you know, in terms of like groups,
2249100	2257920	they use traditional academic approaches like lecturing, small group demonstration and practice. And then you also have these mentorship
2258720	2267260	one-on-one interactions. So when people are learning like a significant number of lab skills, they're really trying to beef themselves up.
2267260	2282300	Learning from a PhD in, you know, in traditional science, then you get into more of these like hardcore mentorship relationships where they interact one-on-one. The person that is learning shadows their mentor.
2282300	2295460	The person that's learning practices consistently and the mentor is there often in the beginning to monitor the progress of the individual. So I talked a lot about, you know,
2296100	2298580	how people learn about these spaces, motivation,
2299520	2304460	how people learn in these spaces, and how these places are organized. So is there an implication
2305220	2322380	to these kind of like social elements? And I would argue, yeah, there is. Let's revisit that framework of perceiving WMD threat as it relates to, you know, from the do-it-yourself biology community. So
2323030	2331310	does increased potential capability lead to a greater efficacy for do-it-yourself biology? Can you do more things as capabilities increase?
2332280	2341360	And you know what, on the one hand, yes. So people can construct, you know, self-made Arduino board guided
2342580	2351300	incubators for plants. So DIY constructs. People can engage in their own sample preparation and analysis and
2351300	2360860	and people can even, you know, in high school through programs like iGEM engage in synthetic biology projects in a DIY biocontext.
2362340	2369400	However, I would also argue that from some of the observations and some of the data that I acquired,
2370560	2380980	it's not necessarily just because there's an increased potential capability does not necessarily lead to greater efficacy in the DIY biocontext.
2380980	2394160	So in the DIY biocontext, like I mentioned, there's a lot of secondhand, third-hand equipment, self-made equipment. There's a lot of equipment breakages, which interferes directly with the ability to do science.
2394880	2405760	Also, because DIY bioplaces are places of learning and of education, there are lots of errors that happen along the way. It's not just professionals doing
2406180	2416580	the sampling and the analysis. It's people that are being taught as well by these professionals, by these, you know, knowledgeable people.
2416580	2427380	And guess what? Those students learning, they make lots of mistakes. I can tell you for a fact that I made a ton of mistakes as I was learning how to just even basically pipette things.
2428260	2434220	Also, community labs suffer from environmental contamination issues. We're talking about
2434780	2447200	places where biology is being done in unconventional spaces, you know, whether it's in a warehouse or it's in, you know, a building or whether it's
2448440	2460010	a place that doesn't have a separate room for your PCR machine that's being kept sterile so that you can get lots of environmental contamination that way.
2460320	2464840	And then, you know, you just have issues with supplies and logistics. So there's this,
2465690	2474140	from my understanding from the research, there's a very negative conceptualization of the term biohacking.
2474140	2494140	So any place that refers to themselves as a biohacking place. So whether it has biohacking in the name or things like that, companies that produce reagents are very wary about sending reagents to such spaces. So, you know, that could be a limiting factor as well.
2495580	2509080	So does also, you know, in terms of that second risk issue, does greater convergence lead to less certainty of outcomes in the DIY bio context? So on the one hand, yes.
2509500	2519380	People engage in lots of really cool independent projects that you don't necessarily see in academia. So there's this really interesting, it's almost like
2520560	2535600	it almost looks like a photo that they took on a leaf of a particular logo. I don't quite remember how they did it, but it looks like magic to me, but that's not something that I would expect coming out of an academic lab.
2536140	2545720	Once again, there's that barcoding the Inner Harbor project. The open insulin project also is a really interesting example of
2546340	2557980	having citizens get engaged in science. So not only is open insulin about finding ways to develop and distribute insulin,
2557980	2567160	given the insulin crisis in the United States and across the globe nowadays, but it also sends a political message of saying that
2567160	2575570	you know, big pharma is literally holding the lives of diabetics in its hands and trying to find a way to disrupt that.
2576020	2586650	So yeah, you know, there are, you know, there is a certain type of less certainty that comes from an increased convergence, but on the other hand, no.
2586650	2597290	One of the things that I found as I was doing my research was there are definite limiting factors. It's almost like a path dependence model for community labs.
2597290	2604670	Where community labs are shaped by the environments that they exist in and the organizational factors that
2605370	2615890	you know, that they have. So in terms of leadership expertise, the individual that runs the lab, depending on their expertise,
2615890	2624130	may be more inclined or less inclined to do certain projects because they might not necessarily be comfortable with doing things that fall outside of their expertise.
2624750	2634270	There's also the expertise of the community. If you don't have a particular type of expertise that you need to run a particular type of project, you're probably not going to pursue that project.
2634270	2642790	There's also community interest and resources. So is there an interest in the community to actually do a particular type of project or not?
2642790	2649550	And, you know, in the case of bugs, for example, like I said, they're really focused on that inner harbor.
2649950	2659390	And so they're interested in doing projects that reflect the community, but they might be less interested in doing another type of project that does not reflect the community.
2659390	2671390	And finally, there are a number of community labs that actually have higher education affiliations and being connected with these higher education affiliation, you know, these higher education affiliates,
2672530	2679990	inherently because higher education, you know, affiliates tend to be a bit risk averse when it comes to interactions
2680610	2690090	with outside entities. It, you know, inherently acts as a limiting factor to make sure that community labs don't just do whatever they want.
2690650	2697450	If they want to participate and get kind of like the validation from higher education, they need to play by certain rules.
2699670	2709150	And finally, does the increased accessibility of technology and knowledge lead to less control in the DIY biocontext? So yes, right.
2709150	2718210	People can do independent research. People can learn how to do lab skills and techniques, potentially on their own, at least basic ones like pipetting,
2718210	2731070	particularly through online resources. And, you know, there's readily equipment and tools available online for people that want to engage in do-it-yourself biology projects.
2731870	2740580	However, I would also argue that the increased accessibility of technology, so technology and knowledge alone,
2741650	2751220	they don't necessarily lead to less control because there are other factors to take into account than just these capabilities of like knowledge and capabilities of technology.
2751570	2759530	So once again, community labs are limited by several factors. There needs to be a sufficient amount of scientific expertise in the community
2760070	2766190	to be able to engage as a community lab. So, you know, a lot of this, as I discussed before,
2767270	2776730	is addressed by the fact that a lot of these community labs are founded by people that are experts in science. So PhDs in molecular biology,
2776730	2786590	things along those lines. But there also needs to be a desire or a need for a community lab space. So you're not going to find community lab space popping up literally everywhere.
2786590	2793470	It's a little bit of an easier sell for a community lab space in Silicon Valley, for example, where BioCurious is based,
2793830	2798670	or in Boston, where Boss Lab is based, or Baltimore, where there's a biotech hub in
2799210	2810370	the Rockville area. But you're not going to, you're not going to, you're going to have a lot of difficulty finding a community lab space in, say, Cairo, Illinois,
2810900	2818770	which is predominantly farmland, and there's not that much of a, you know, that much of a resource and interest in science.
2819290	2830280	You know, and then there are a couple of other issues, availability of resources, and then there's networking communications issues, which I previously discussed. So what are we left with?
2831530	2840350	So it's not like I'm saying that there aren't changes that happen with the introduction of do-it-yourself biology to the national security landscape.
2840370	2852070	You know, the implications exist. There are potential risks on biosafety, biosecurity, cybersecurity elements, which I'd be more than happy to talk about during the Q&A.
2853610	2860930	And, you know, the thing is, national security experts have a lot of things to deal with, with very little time.
2861530	2872790	And so having a framework to be able to assess risk is very helpful. These frameworks are like heuristics. They're fast, they work as a mental shortcut,
2872790	2886410	they can be correct, and they're based on the information available. That said, they may lead experts and policymakers astray. The focus may be diverted from more pressing issues and we may be missing opportunities
2887890	2893950	by, you know, throwing DIY bio out with the bathwater.
2894270	2896290	So don't pull a Ron.
2896590	2903130	Don't get frustrated and throw your computer away just because you don't understand how your computer works.
2904890	2908310	In terms of the opportunities that I think that we're missing
2909210	2918090	by not fully leveraging DIY bio, one of them is grassroots education, community building, and science communication.
2918270	2926510	I think that, particularly in an age of misinformation and disinformation, having a community based science resource could be very helpful
2927070	2935490	in terms of dealing with misinformation and disinformation campaigns. Community labs can function as trusted sources of science information
2935970	2938690	and hopefully communicate proper information
2940490	2956930	that may be helpful in addressing those kind of misinformation and disinformation campaigns. I also see it as a supplemental education resource. So it's not a resource that is taking away from traditional education mechanisms, rather
2957930	2967150	it is supplementing the things that people are learning in school. And in particular, the way that I see it being helpful is it offers hands on experience to individuals.
2967930	2978670	Traditionally, when in academic institutions, they learn a lot of theory. And finally, I see it as an accelerative education resource. So community labs
2978670	2986390	can function very well as places that can expose people that are younger to STEM and critical thinking.
2987590	2997590	Providing individuals with opportunities to see if science is their passion when they're five or six, rather than having to wait, you know, until they're more in their teens.
2998770	3008570	And the other thing that I think that we're missing when we don't highlight and lift up DIY Bio is its potential contributions to the bioeconomy.
3008570	3027990	So there was a NASEM 2020 press release that said that the bioeconomy comprises 5% of US GDP, which when you crank the numbers out comes out to be nearly $1 trillion. It was $950 billion, but I think nearly $1 trillion just sounds that much more impressive.
3028910	3036670	So, you know, given the large amount of money at stake, I think it's interesting that we aren't talking more about
3037230	3049650	leveraging community labs as incubators for future biotech innovation. So we already have some proofs of concepts of this from several community labs, including the OpenTRONS project from GenSpace,
3049650	3058810	which is automating lab technologies, as well as over 30 companies that were incubated at BioCurious, which is based in Sunnyvale, California.
3060590	3065190	So in the context of the talk, what do I think we need to think about?
3065330	3079390	And there are two main lanes that I think we need to think about. The first thing is addressing DIY Bio community obstacles. So we talked about how there is burnout and heavy leadership reliance issues, so bandwidth issues.
3079390	3087350	DIY Bio, particularly being volunteer run, means that individuals have very little bandwidth to work with
3088090	3093350	when they're, you know, in this context. So we need to be very cognizant and find out solutions
3094070	3103770	to deal with those bandwidth issues. Also, just the resource issues, like I talked about, financial issues, access to good equipment, access to reagents,
3103770	3112970	things along those lines. And something that I particularly want to emphasize is balancing the economic needs of the community. So understanding that
3113730	3129770	economy is a very important element of making sure that community labs are available and are open and can operate, but also making sure that we don't lose track of its spirit, of
3130710	3143850	its desire to not necessarily be all about capitalism and efficiency, but for it to be a place where people can explore and build communities, because I think there's value in both.
3144510	3149030	And then finally, I think the other thing that we really need to look into is
3149750	3159090	part of the issue with the DIY Bio image in the national security arena and other areas is I don't feel like it's had proper exposure.
3159770	3165090	There's been a lot of hearsay and a lot of like media articles, rather than direct connections
3165590	3179450	between the DIY Bio community and other life sciences stakeholders. So building those bridges, building that collaboration, I think it's incredibly important with members of industry, governance institutions, and public health.
3180730	3190270	So if you survived this long, I first want to congratulate you. That was a lot. I hope that it was a lot of good food for thought.
3190270	3199830	So I want to first, you know, take a moment to acknowledge the DIY Biology community members and organizations that really helped me out
3200610	3204370	in understanding the community lab scene.
3205110	3211970	I really see this as a community based project. I really see this as
3213430	3218910	my contribution to DIY Bio by engaging in a community based project with community buy in.
3218910	3228190	So I really want to make sure that I thank the community labs and DIY Bio members at BioCurious, Biodesign Challenge, Biologic, Biotech Without Borders,
3228190	3242590	Boss Lab, Bugs, Counterculture Labs, GenSpace, Indie Lab, MIT Media Lab, and OpenBioLabs. I really do thank you from the bottom of my heart, and I used that RuPaul animated gif to show that.
3243310	3250550	And then finally, you know, there's this other side too. Like I said, I'm a NatSec, a national security person as well, and my
3250930	3264330	my thinking about the community and my drive to be able to engage with the community to fill what I feel is a very serious gap in the national security
3265950	3276850	perspective would not have been possible without all of the people that are here as well on the security and safety side. So I really want to thank Nina, Bo, Nalja, Sidney,
3276850	3288030	Josh, and everyone at Biohacking Village. I really do appreciate you giving me this platform to, you know, have these conversations, build connections, and see what comes out of it.
3288030	3300330	I also really wanted to thank Gregory Copeland, Sonia Ben-Wahgum-Gormley, Trevor Thrall at George Mason University, Natasha Bajima at Nuclear Spin Cycle, Todd Quicken at NCSU,
3300330	3306310	Seth Karras, Diane D'Ulis, Gerald Epstein at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
3306310	3312510	Gigi Quick-Rumble at Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, as well as Matt Watson and Crystal Watson and Michael Montague.
3312550	3323390	And then a special shout out, a little shout out to my Friday LB night crew, Nicholas Evans, Emily Kelly, Mary Lancaster, Amanda Moody, Sasia Popescu, and Emily Ricotta.
3323990	3334830	And with that, I'm sure that everybody has questions, comments. If you want to also even engage in a bit of old-fashioned trolling, I'm available for Q&A.
3334850	3343210	You could have, you have my email right there, and you also have my Twitter. And with that, we are done.
3344270	3347870	And I want to thank everyone for hanging in there with me.