WEBVTT 00:01.120 --> 00:03.280 Can you guys hear me now? 00:06.500 --> 00:09.820 Alright, so hello everyone. 00:10.100 --> 00:12.040 I'm 800XL. 00:12.520 --> 00:17.360 As already mentioned, I'm with DEF CON group 619858, San Diego. 00:17.880 --> 00:20.560 And just a few quick fun facts about me. 00:21.640 --> 00:26.660 The first ever hacking movie they ever saw in the mid-80s was WarGames. 00:26.660 --> 00:29.420 If you haven't seen it, you should watch it. 00:29.940 --> 00:38.420 My first computer, and also inspiration for my handle, was Atari 800XL, which I received at the age of 15. 00:38.420 --> 00:44.320 And that was quite a life-changing event for me that shaped my interests and passions going forward. 00:45.260 --> 00:54.300 Just a quick note about Atari 800XL, just to put things into perspective, it was an 8-bit computer with 64K of memory. 00:54.500 --> 00:56.620 And that's how I learned how to program. 00:58.100 --> 01:06.720 My first DEF CON, and it's been quite a while since then, was DEF CON 14, and that was at the Riviera Hotel and Casino. 01:06.720 --> 01:10.160 I believe the casino is no longer around, it's been demolished. 01:10.160 --> 01:12.400 And that was back in 2006. 01:13.780 --> 01:22.800 Now, the thing about DEF CON, the first DEF CON, I clearly remember driving back home with a bit of sadness that the event was over. 01:22.800 --> 01:31.240 And dreading, you know, how many months it will be before I can come back to Las Vegas and attend the next DEF CON conference the following year. 01:31.680 --> 01:36.220 And, you know, as it turned out, DEF CON Groups was a perfect remedy for that. 01:36.380 --> 01:38.720 And we'll get to that in a bit. 01:48.500 --> 01:50.960 So, a little bit about San Diego. 01:52.340 --> 02:00.960 For those of you who don't know much about San Diego, it's located in Southland, California, on the border of Mexico. 02:01.540 --> 02:07.660 And it is the 8th largest city in the United States, with population approaching 1.5 million. 02:08.680 --> 02:12.940 We are known for great microclimates, and it's, you know, beautiful beaches. 02:14.620 --> 02:20.640 But, you know, to be honest, I only go to the beach like 5 times a year, even though it's close. 02:21.700 --> 02:26.400 And, as you know, DEF CON Group names are designated by dialing area codes. 02:26.400 --> 02:35.380 And in San Diego, the original dialing code was 619, and we also have 858 and 760, which is like a North County. 02:36.360 --> 02:49.700 And another fun fact is that we are 534 kilometers from Las Vegas, which means that, you know, when DEF CON conference is on, it takes about 5 hours, you know, drive to get there. 02:49.700 --> 02:52.160 Or you can fly, and that takes like 30 minutes. 02:57.180 --> 02:58.920 Group history. 03:00.440 --> 03:05.920 The DEF CON Group 858 was originally founded by Techlord. 03:05.920 --> 03:15.060 I've actually never met him in person, but I did read about the group on DEF CON forums after I went to DEF CON first time in 2006. 03:15.660 --> 03:23.940 And I was involved in DEF CON Group 619, which was founded by Renan01, Carl. 03:23.940 --> 03:26.300 He founded the group in 2007. 03:26.300 --> 03:30.460 Unfortunately, that group fell apart. 03:31.580 --> 03:43.420 In 2009 and 2012, there was no activity from DEF CON Groups, and I decided in December of 2013 that it was time to revive it from an activity. 03:43.520 --> 03:46.580 And, you know, we've been going very strong since then. 03:46.580 --> 03:49.040 We are approaching our 7-year anniversary. 03:51.800 --> 04:10.780 Our DEF CON Group leadership, you know, the responsibilities include organizing and running the meetings, organizing various events, a DEF CON party that we have annually, solicit people for talks, which is probably the hardest part, manage social media presence, 04:10.780 --> 04:13.120 order pizza for the meetings, etc. 04:14.340 --> 04:20.180 The three key people and other organizers for our group is Mr. 04:20.180 --> 04:21.120 Bill. 04:21.380 --> 04:28.480 He specializes in our social media and Twitter and Twitch, Braxis, and Tokso. 04:28.480 --> 04:30.900 Shout out to you guys. 04:32.120 --> 04:32.960 There was 04:36.960 --> 04:40.940 a pandemic... 04:40.940 --> 04:45.740 which is in the North County of San Diego. 04:45.940 --> 04:52.980 And on average, we had approximately 30 attendees at each meeting, sometimes even approaching as many as 40. 04:53.600 --> 05:02.380 Currently, because of social distancing guidelines, which we follow, we conduct our meetings on Zoom. 05:02.560 --> 05:05.820 We also stream the meetings to Twitch. 05:07.040 --> 05:08.900 Every week, Mr. 05:08.900 --> 05:12.700 Bill also organizes virtual happy hours. 05:13.080 --> 05:16.560 In between meetings, we collaborate on Slack. 05:16.740 --> 05:20.360 Our Slack has approximately 190 members. 05:21.560 --> 05:28.560 Our team at VaporSec competes in various CTFs, and that's pretty much on a weekly basis. 05:28.560 --> 05:30.240 It's a very active group. 05:30.240 --> 05:33.160 We have had occasional workshops. 05:34.620 --> 05:37.400 At least twice a year, we have Lockpicking Village. 05:37.440 --> 05:43.400 We also have done a wireless workshop in the past. 05:43.960 --> 05:50.280 Now, one other fun thing to do for us is, usually around December, we have a crap meet. 05:50.280 --> 05:57.520 This is when members bring books, electronics, any kind of cool unwanted items for exchange or just give away. 05:57.520 --> 06:01.460 Usually, we come with more stuff than members. 06:03.800 --> 06:07.900 It's a fun event, I recommend for other groups to also have it. 06:08.940 --> 06:16.020 Once a year, we organize a party at DEF CON for group members and friends. 06:17.200 --> 06:23.480 Hopefully, next year, when we have an in-person DEF CON, ping me, I'll get an invite. 06:26.880 --> 06:38.480 Speaking of things that we do, I should mention that two years ago, we had our DC858 electronic badge. 06:39.460 --> 06:42.760 The project was led by Elwood and Ager. 06:43.100 --> 06:49.720 Thanks to the badge sale process, it was possible to fund the pizza for our monthly group meetings for the entire year. 06:49.720 --> 07:01.940 I should also mention that Elwood and Ager made a significant donation on behalf of DC858 to the Women in Security and Privacy organization, which is very cool. 07:05.580 --> 07:09.860 I should mention some of the cool talks that we've had in the last 12 months. 07:12.760 --> 07:16.900 As you can see, talks cover a variety of topics. 07:16.900 --> 07:23.300 We are lucky to have many active contributors in subject matters as members. 07:23.300 --> 07:33.920 I should also point out that when we had the meetings in person, we had two to three talks at the same meeting, which is quite busy. 07:39.120 --> 07:42.280 Thanks for starting and growing your DEF CON group. 07:42.520 --> 07:46.120 I think we are very successful and very active. 07:46.120 --> 07:50.400 I recommend advertising on DEF CON forums, which is a good way. 07:52.080 --> 07:58.060 However, the activity on DEF CON forums is cyclical. 07:58.060 --> 08:02.720 Usually, it's more active, more people visited right before DEF CON and not so much afterwards. 08:02.780 --> 08:04.980 But it's a good place to start. 08:05.580 --> 08:13.080 And obviously, utilizing social media and Twitter and hoping for DEF CON groups' retweets is a great way to get members to attend your meetings. 08:13.640 --> 08:21.020 I also recommend to be very specific and have a topic for the meeting rather than just meet and greet or have beers. 08:21.020 --> 08:23.660 I recommend to have a topic of some sort. 08:23.780 --> 08:26.660 Don't be afraid to host introductory one-on-one talks. 08:26.660 --> 08:28.580 Your talks don't have to be advanced. 08:28.720 --> 08:31.460 It's also okay to have a short lightning talk. 08:31.460 --> 08:38.320 Maybe bring an idea or a topic to your group or a project that you want to work on. 08:39.240 --> 08:40.560 Invite guest speakers. 08:40.560 --> 08:55.100 I think now that we have all the groups engaged, it is possible for somebody from a different group to jump in on your Zoom and give a talk as a guest speaker. 08:55.100 --> 08:56.760 So you should reach out. 08:57.980 --> 09:07.080 You can get an invite to the unofficial DEF CON groups' Discord that we have and ask for guest speakers there. 09:09.580 --> 09:21.120 I've already mentioned that having workshops such as lockpicking is a good way to get people interested in your meeting. 09:21.500 --> 09:25.380 And also having a craft meet or something like a war driving contest. 09:25.380 --> 09:29.300 Simple things that get people interested. 09:30.680 --> 09:32.360 Where to meet? 09:32.360 --> 09:43.780 We've chosen a local pizzeria which has a private room and a couple TVs where we can project presentations, which is very convenient and also gives us a little bit of privacy. 09:44.040 --> 09:52.220 Because we have our own room and I think that particular Wednesday of the month would probably be the biggest revenue for that pizza place. 09:52.220 --> 09:57.780 Obviously, that's not possible now since we are following social distancing guidelines and we are doing virtual talks. 09:57.780 --> 10:01.260 But when things get back to normal, most likely we'll go back there. 10:02.460 --> 10:03.980 Frequency of your meetings. 10:04.000 --> 10:06.360 I guess it depends on how much content you have. 10:06.360 --> 10:13.080 If you are in a really large group with a lot of talks and a lot of volunteers to give talks, you may want to do it twice a month. 10:13.080 --> 10:19.500 But if you have fewer people, maybe quarterly, doing those meetings quarterly is more appropriate. 10:21.620 --> 10:31.940 It's very important to keep the momentum going, so definitely set up a chat, Discord or Slack, so your team members can communicate and collaborate in between meetings. 10:33.300 --> 10:36.540 Also, don't go at it alone. 10:36.560 --> 10:38.720 That will most likely lead to a burnout. 10:38.720 --> 10:40.440 Build your leadership team. 10:40.620 --> 10:42.000 Distribute responsibilities. 10:42.000 --> 10:44.660 Delegate tasks as much as you can. 10:44.740 --> 10:47.500 Sometimes real life will take over. 10:47.500 --> 10:50.740 You may not be able to participate and you want to keep your group going. 10:50.740 --> 10:53.860 It's important that you have other people to fall back on. 10:54.800 --> 11:04.840 If you'd like to connect with DEF CON San Diego, you can reach out to us on Twitter, Facebook, watch our Twitch streams, or email us. 11:07.580 --> 11:12.280 And that covers the introduction to DEF CON San Diego. 11:12.840 --> 11:21.720 Up next, we have a DC-858 member, Smoochie, who will give his talk, so let's welcome him. 11:21.720 --> 11:22.480 Hey, Dr. 11:22.480 --> 11:23.180 Axelsen. 11:23.180 --> 11:35.840 I'm from the San Diego DEF CON group and I'll be giving a presentation on Microsoft, how to save yourself from their Active Directory and Identity and Access Management design. 11:36.840 --> 11:52.060 So, with most of my talks, I always like to remind everybody that we are definitely in a privileged group that may get a little numb to the phishing campaigns and the jokes out there. 11:52.060 --> 11:57.760 For example, the Nigerian Prince and the IRS calling you. 11:57.760 --> 12:04.000 Those are stuff that we make fun of, but people fall victim to it. 12:04.000 --> 12:07.220 I personally had to deal with that with my in-laws. 12:07.220 --> 12:14.520 Microsoft called them directly and wanted to fix a problem of theirs, and that ultimately caused an issue that I had to help resolve. 12:15.920 --> 12:20.200 These things that we're aware of, just speak out about obvious things. 12:20.200 --> 12:27.720 Make sure your in-laws, your family that are non-technical, that this isn't something that happens in the real world. 12:27.720 --> 12:31.480 Microsoft is not going to reach out to you because you're a valued member. 12:32.260 --> 12:37.700 And the IRS is not going to call you and tell you that they're going to sue you if you don't send $100 this very instant. 12:37.900 --> 12:45.080 And of course, no main business does any type of commerce in Apple gift cards, so that should be a dead giveaway. 12:53.090 --> 13:14.750 In broad strokes, what we're going to talk about is what's wrong with Microsoft, good or bad, and how you can design a system, secure your system, protect your system against these by default settings and design decisions by Microsoft. 13:14.750 --> 13:21.770 One of the biggest ones that you need to take into account as you design any system is to always assume a breach. 13:21.830 --> 13:25.370 There are no safe zones anymore. 13:25.790 --> 13:32.890 With the rapid change of software and hardware that's out there, there are going to be bugs. 13:32.890 --> 13:42.930 There are going to be unintended backdoors, there are going to be unintended consequences that no person is going to be able to keep track of. 13:42.930 --> 13:49.850 So as you design any system or as you upgrade any system or as you review any system, always assume compromise. 13:49.850 --> 13:55.510 Assume that at some point, the thing that you're touching is going to have somebody on it that you don't want to have on it. 13:55.510 --> 14:09.190 So how can you help mitigate that concern when it does happen and limit the impact and success that that attacker or anybody who's just making mistakes could have on your environment? 14:09.190 --> 14:15.030 And again, it's not an if but a when of when you're going to have some issues. 14:15.490 --> 14:19.650 You know, the old adage that script kitties are just out there poking around having fun. 14:19.650 --> 14:21.090 That's still the case, right? 14:21.290 --> 14:26.610 It doesn't take much to go find tools that are out there. 14:26.810 --> 14:29.670 Cali Linux is well advertised. 14:30.010 --> 14:38.610 You do a couple of keyword searches into Google and you can find yourself going down a rabbit hole and identifying tools that will just do this for you, right? 14:39.190 --> 14:46.130 People are out there unaware of the ethical challenges of banging on the front door of someone's network, right? 14:46.130 --> 14:51.090 You can look at the Twitter compromise that just happened. 14:51.090 --> 14:52.850 This 17-year-old kid, right? 14:52.850 --> 15:02.170 How many years before that was he just playing around before he actually got deep into the SE and the actual phishing aspect? 15:02.170 --> 15:04.710 And then separation of duties. 15:04.710 --> 15:10.750 So, I know it's very easy to just say, hey, I'm your admin. 15:10.750 --> 15:13.050 I need full God rights on everything. 15:13.150 --> 15:17.070 Well, that's not how things should be operating, right? 15:17.070 --> 15:19.590 You should have very specific controls. 15:19.590 --> 15:23.410 You should have separation of those responsibilities. 15:23.410 --> 15:31.210 You know, for example, your exchange or email administrator probably shouldn't be the same person as your domain administrator, right? 15:31.210 --> 15:35.530 Because the impact that person could have is significant. 15:35.530 --> 15:42.510 Now, in smaller shops that you're unable to do this, you can start to separate those duties with accounts. 15:42.510 --> 15:57.750 So, you can have an exchange administrator account, your domain administrator account, and your user account just to make sure that any one account or any one person can be audited and does not have that wide blast radius if something does go bad. 15:58.750 --> 16:07.230 And when installing anything on your network at home or at work, take into account the install permissions. 16:07.230 --> 16:14.130 It's far too easy to say, hey, I need root rights or hey, I need domain admin rights and the installs just go great. 16:14.130 --> 16:26.190 But there are unintended consequences with service accounts being created or permissions on files being set up in that process that may cause harm in the future. 16:29.980 --> 16:42.840 So, on average, it takes about 24 to 48 hours from the first hour being compromised before someone's able to escalate their privilege to domain administrator or root rights. 16:43.140 --> 16:51.060 Now, once that person has domain administrator rights on your network, your network is essentially theirs. 16:51.830 --> 16:58.120 For those that are not used to Microsoft and Active Directory, that's full God rights. 16:58.120 --> 17:07.580 That's modifying accounts, that's changing passwords, that's removing computers from the domain, that's modifying files, that's anything and everything that they would want to do within the kingdom. 17:08.320 --> 17:14.140 And the persistence of a user once they have those... 17:19.730 --> 17:33.150 notified or able to identify them normally with tools that are out there in network land today. 17:33.450 --> 17:38.350 So, a lot of these things have to have outside help to come identify those. 17:38.350 --> 17:48.770 FBI has been reaching out when they've identified traffic from the nation state actors, Russia, Iran, all of those guys. 17:49.010 --> 17:52.150 So, a lot of these companies don't even know that they're there. 17:52.150 --> 17:56.710 And it's these third parties that come in and say, hey, we've seen this traffic, can you validate that this is valid for your company? 17:56.710 --> 18:00.650 Or they confirm that they have actually been compromised. 18:01.750 --> 18:05.230 And once those credentials are compromised, 18:13.320 --> 18:18.520 they're exfilling data, they're modifying data. 18:18.520 --> 18:24.460 So, it's very important that we get a tight rein on those elevated permissions. 18:26.320 --> 18:33.040 So, the way that Microsoft does password hashing is not unique to every domain. 18:33.040 --> 18:38.720 So, you have a user, the username is user, their password is password1. 18:38.740 --> 18:47.200 Well, Microsoft will take that combination of username and password, create a hash based on their algorithm. 18:47.400 --> 18:55.480 Either for Landman, which is the old way of authenticating, or NTLM, which is the new land manager. 18:55.480 --> 18:57.020 And you get a hash. 18:57.140 --> 19:05.280 Now, the great thing is that no matter what domain you're on, that combination will always have the same hash. 19:05.280 --> 19:19.600 So, if you're at alt space domain and you put in user1, password1, that hash that you get in NTLM will be the exact same when you go to Microsoft and put in user and password1. 19:20.030 --> 19:31.160 Which is an issue in itself, right, because you can start to build this domain knowledge of standard usernames and start to create those passwords. 19:31.160 --> 19:41.320 And because Microsoft doesn't solve the passwords, does not create that blank data in it, again, it's not unique across people's domains. 19:43.020 --> 19:50.220 So, what can be done and what is available is you can start to calculate these hashes, right? 19:50.220 --> 19:56.480 So, for username administrator, password1, that creates a unique hash, password2, password3, password4. 19:56.480 --> 20:04.240 And then you can also pull hashes and start to look up within that database or the rainbow table and know what the password is. 20:04.260 --> 20:06.860 So, it's not a lot of effort. 20:06.860 --> 20:09.640 And again, there are tools out there that do this for you. 20:09.860 --> 20:17.700 And basic process for a lot of people, you know, they use the administrator account with the administrator name. 20:17.700 --> 20:19.900 They don't change the name itself, right? 20:19.900 --> 20:21.560 There's still the guest account. 20:21.560 --> 20:26.460 There's still a lot of built-in stuff that they don't change that are pretty consistent across the board. 20:26.480 --> 20:31.960 And we're actually going to get into that with one specific account and why that's important. 20:37.430 --> 20:42.170 So, taking the passwords and the hashes. 20:42.170 --> 20:45.290 So, where can you find outside of having those hashes? 20:45.290 --> 20:57.050 So , within group policy objects, people hard code in username and passwords for ease of use, for installation of capabilities, or just out of pure laziness. 20:57.050 --> 21:01.910 So, map network drives within those group policy objects. 21:03.670 --> 21:06.670 Creating local users, right? 21:06.670 --> 21:11.990 Create a local service account on the box that's running a specific application. 21:11.990 --> 21:17.250 Well, that password is in clear text most of the time for those accounts. 21:17.250 --> 21:22.610 Data sources, printer configurations, update services, schedule tasks. 21:22.610 --> 21:28.490 All those require authentication and that password and username have to be stored somewhere. 21:28.590 --> 21:33.290 And nine times out of ten, it's going to be stored in clear text within group policy objects. 21:33.870 --> 21:35.170 SysVol for batch files. 21:35.170 --> 21:46.470 So, if you're able to create a custom batch file to delete a file on logon or to create a folder structure on logoff, that's going to take some credentials. 21:46.670 --> 21:51.470 Those passwords are probably within that batch file itself to run. 21:51.470 --> 22:01.090 On the domain controller, so you can use volume shadow copy and create a copy of the actual domain database itself, the ntds.dip. 22:01.210 --> 22:10.190 And on that same domain controller that you pull that dip file off, the decrypt key is actually in the registry. 22:10.310 --> 22:16.450 Now, the good thing is that the decrypt key is tied to the actual machine itself. 22:16.450 --> 22:21.870 So, it's not one universal decrypt key for every domain. 22:21.930 --> 22:30.390 It's for domain controller one has one decrypt key, domain controller two has a separate one, and they are unique in that regard. 22:30.550 --> 22:33.170 And then you can run tools out there. 22:33.170 --> 22:35.870 So, hopefully you all are aware of these ones. 22:35.870 --> 22:39.310 So, Mimikatz is one of the holy grail tools out there. 22:39.310 --> 22:40.390 It kind of does everything. 22:40.390 --> 22:42.790 It's a Swiss Army knife for how to take over a domain. 22:42.990 --> 22:46.430 That's created and deployed by a general way. 22:47.490 --> 22:51.850 There's Cryptman, a powerful script that's pulled by Microsoft. 22:54.770 --> 23:02.270 And DCSync, which is a capability for you to basically synchronize data from a domain. 23:11.610 --> 23:16.530 So, authentication within Active Directory is pretty straightforward. 23:16.710 --> 23:18.750 Kerberos has been around for quite some time. 23:18.890 --> 23:24.250 But in broad strokes, you have a view here that says, hey, I need access to something. 23:24.390 --> 23:26.270 Here is who I am. 23:26.270 --> 23:29.750 The domain controller validates that and says, yep, here's a ticket. 23:29.750 --> 23:31.290 You are who you say you are. 23:31.430 --> 23:39.270 Workstation says, cool, I want to go do this, get access to this server, go check out this website, whatever is Kerberos enabled. 23:39.270 --> 23:44.050 Server says, cool, yep, you are authorized to do that based off your groups and your rights. 23:44.050 --> 23:51.650 Send this over to the server, your application server, and you just have that back and forth like TCP packets. 23:53.170 --> 23:54.250 Sounds good, right? 23:54.250 --> 23:57.150 You have separation of duties within the authentication. 23:57.150 --> 24:00.170 You don't have one machine saying who they are or who they say they are. 24:00.170 --> 24:01.530 Everybody validates who they are. 24:01.530 --> 24:02.510 It's a circle of trust. 24:02.510 --> 24:03.590 Everything is great. 24:03.590 --> 24:12.090 But those tickets that are created by the domain controller are assigned by a specific account. 24:12.350 --> 24:18.970 And that account is the Kerberos ticket granting ticket account. 24:18.970 --> 24:31.330 And the hash that it uses for encryption is the hash of that username and password just like Microsoft does for every single account that I talked about before. 24:31.330 --> 24:46.110 So, using tools like Mimikatz, you are able to impersonate whoever you want to impersonate once you have that hash of the Kerberos ticket granting ticket. 24:46.110 --> 24:54.770 So essentially, you use Mimikatz, you read the domain, which is read-only to every single account on the domain. 24:54.770 --> 24:58.050 So as long as you are on the domain, you can read that information. 24:58.050 --> 24:59.210 You use Mimikatz. 24:59.210 --> 25:03.390 It's a very simple command to pull that hash. 25:03.390 --> 25:07.370 Once you have that hash, you use Mimikatz to create that golden ticket. 25:07.370 --> 25:11.750 At that point, you are able to sign and create any ticket that you want. 25:11.910 --> 25:18.670 So the ticket that would normally go from user station to domain controller saying, hey, I'm an admin. 25:18.670 --> 25:20.090 Here's my hash. 25:20.090 --> 25:22.350 Give me a ticket that says I can do what I want. 25:22.470 --> 25:24.190 That's essentially gone. 25:24.190 --> 25:29.390 As the user, you're passing that ticket that says, I'm already authenticated as an administrator. 25:29.390 --> 25:31.650 Let me do what I want to do. 25:33.710 --> 25:38.790 So, how would this kind of all work in the grand scheme of things? 25:38.790 --> 25:43.190 So, starting on the left as patient zero, we'll go through the black. 25:43.810 --> 25:45.890 Patient zero is infected. 25:45.970 --> 25:48.370 You've clicked on a bad link. 25:48.370 --> 25:50.590 You've installed some malware. 25:50.590 --> 25:55.630 You're subject to a phishing campaign, whatever the case may be. 25:56.090 --> 25:58.590 What are 26:01.680 --> 26:04.520 the ramifications of that happening? 26:04.520 --> 26:09.280 So, starting in black on the left, they have access to that machine. 26:09.420 --> 26:12.160 Well, any good attacker is going to set up a C2. 26:12.160 --> 26:19.680 So, they're going to beacon back using some type of remote console, most likely Netcat. 26:19.680 --> 26:27.040 But essentially, the traffic is going to initiate from that host out to your command and control center. 26:27.540 --> 26:35.460 Once they have that foothold within the machine, on the machine itself, again, it can read all of Active Directory because it's read-only by default. 26:35.900 --> 26:41.060 They can start to install keyloggers and look what data is on that local machine. 26:41.520 --> 26:49.060 They can also grab the credentials with the LSAT service, which is the service that stores the hashes on every machine. 26:52.220 --> 26:58.780 So, what I was saying was, as I talked about in the beginning slides, we're going to design for compromise. 26:58.780 --> 27:14.140 We're going to understand that the endpoint is going to be compromised at some point because of zero days, because of phishing, because of all of the multitude of vulnerabilities that are out there that could be used to take over that host. 27:16.480 --> 27:21.700 At the very least, somebody shares their username and password, or they put it underneath their keyboard. 27:21.700 --> 27:24.600 Whatever the case may be, there's a patient zero. 27:24.940 --> 27:35.460 Now, that patient zero machine on your network, that person, any attacker, is going to try and set up a command and control setup. 27:35.460 --> 27:37.720 And it's going to be a remote console. 27:37.720 --> 27:46.640 So, the communication is going to initiate from that host out to the command and control system, out into the internet. 27:46.640 --> 27:55.700 So, most firewalls out there are ports and protocol firewalls, and it's saying, hey, anything initiating from the internet, do not come into my network. 27:55.700 --> 27:58.980 Anybody that's saying, hey, I'm 443, 28:05.730 --> 28:12.850 going out on 443, 9 times out of 10, that's already permitted. 28:12.850 --> 28:24.670 And you're not going to know the difference between them going to Google HTTPS or some other server HTTPS, because there's no break-and-inspect. 28:24.670 --> 28:29.090 We're not looking at the traffic, any encryption that happens between the host and server. 28:29.490 --> 28:37.250 Once we have that foothold within that host, you're able to pull all of the Active Directory credentials. 28:37.510 --> 28:42.530 Sorry, you're able to pull all of the Active Directory information, because Active Directory is read-only. 28:42.850 --> 28:57.970 So, you can pull those GPOs, you can pull the usernames, you can understand structures, you can pull your organizational units, your OU structure, and start to build that greater recon on that domain that you're on. 28:58.210 --> 29:04.670 And then, of course, actually on the hosts themselves, you can put on key loggers, you can look at the data that's stored on there, and you can pull those credentials. 29:04.670 --> 29:18.890 Now, using any type of privilege escalation path, so a vulnerability or an exploit, or that user's already logged in as an administrator, you're able to get admin rights on that box. 29:19.570 --> 29:30.730 And so, from there, you're able to pull hashes, you're able to look at active credentials, you can change passwords on the host, you can do anything you want to do on that single host. 29:30.730 --> 29:40.810 Now, the money's where you're able to reach out and gain access as a privileged user within the domain. 29:40.810 --> 29:47.630 And so, everything that's within the yellow at this point is assumed local user or non-privileged user. 29:47.930 --> 29:58.650 When you pass the hash on the host out to another server or system, again, that hash is your username and your password in a single string. 29:58.650 --> 30:03.610 And so, the other servers can adjust that and say, yep, give me that hash, great. 30:03.870 --> 30:10.770 Pass the hash attacks are well documented out there, and you're able to get access as impersonating that user. 30:11.070 --> 30:18.490 Now, the trick for escalation is really nuts and bolts in the separation of duties, right? 30:18.490 --> 30:27.850 So, we don't want people logging into their daily driver machines, the machines that they check their email with, the machines that they go to the internet on as a domain admin. 30:28.810 --> 30:37.610 Sad to say, that's still very much happening, and I understand why, good or bad, as a domain admin, you can do whatever you want. 30:37.610 --> 30:38.730 There's nothing restricting you. 30:38.730 --> 30:42.270 You don't have to act for access. 30:42.530 --> 30:44.250 Everything's presented to you. 30:44.990 --> 30:55.510 From there, you can use tools like Mimikatz to grab credentials, to grab the hashes, and then you can start to create your golden ticket. 30:55.510 --> 31:01.210 And at that point, you can impersonate anybody that you want, and your persistence is pretty much guaranteed. 31:02.630 --> 31:04.290 So, what do you do about this, right? 31:04.290 --> 31:06.910 This is built-in Microsoft capability. 31:06.910 --> 31:09.770 They're all about collaboration and integration. 31:09.770 --> 31:21.510 So, these are the trade-offs that they've made as a solution to say, we want this to move fast, and we want things to work together quickly, over security. 31:21.510 --> 31:48.970 So, as an individual, you can implement break-and-select to get the ability that, say, when you go to https.google.com, you're swapping certificates with that server that says, I am google.com, here's my public key, send me data, we will encrypt this communication. 31:49.230 --> 31:59.210 When you pass that through any of your next-generation firewalls, they can't see anything but encrypted HTTPS. 32:00.590 --> 32:15.820 This allows for that communication from a host that uses an F5 device to essentially terminate the encryption, so your F5 device essentially impersonates Google. 32:16.060 --> 32:25.820 You can see that HTTPS traffic and then move on to encrypting that with the end server that you're communicating with. 32:25.820 --> 32:28.040 And that way, you can look at the payload. 32:28.880 --> 32:31.660 Now, this is different. 32:32.100 --> 32:46.000 Break-and-inspect and TLS offload is different from your normal load balancing, where your load balancing, your host comes in and makes a connection with the F5 device, and then traffic isn't cleared back to your server. 32:46.000 --> 32:48.720 So, it's really about what you're looking to protect. 32:48.720 --> 32:57.740 Are you protecting your data, users connecting to your stuff, or are you trying to connect your users connecting out to other servers? 32:58.040 --> 33:00.200 It's a trade-off that you're going to have to make. 33:00.200 --> 33:08.250 There's obviously implications on speed and throughput, and devices like F5 are notoriously expensive. 33:09.410 --> 33:15.550 The other thing that can be implemented if you are Windows 8 or above is Credential Guard. 33:15.550 --> 33:23.830 And Credential Guard is taking that LSAS capability that stores those hashes and virtualizing it. 33:23.830 --> 33:30.970 So, if they take over that host, they're unable to pull any hashes that have been used on that machine. 33:30.970 --> 33:41.150 And that's very, very important because if a domain administrator has logged into that machine, that may not be the user that's currently logged in. 33:41.150 --> 33:43.930 The hash is still stored in LSAS. 33:44.690 --> 33:54.710 And that's very important because a lot of times domain admins or people with escalated privilege log into machines to fix a problem or to install software. 33:54.710 --> 34:03.430 Using Credential Guard allows you to virtualize that and keep that isolated from somebody who has compromised that local machine. 34:04.930 --> 34:08.710 And this fundamentally breaks Mimikatz. 34:08.710 --> 34:14.430 And like I said before, Mimikatz is the bread and butter for taking over Active Directory. 34:15.270 --> 34:18.110 You can also do AD segmentation. 34:18.130 --> 34:24.130 So, partitioning out where that information is going to live. 34:24.130 --> 34:32.910 Having domain controllers live within a completely separate domain, this completely separate force from where the data lives. 34:32.930 --> 34:41.990 So that way, when a user is ultimately compromised, what they're able to access and what they're able to view and what they're able to pull is extremely limited. 34:42.190 --> 34:53.750 Because again, designed for compromise, with all the threats that are out there and the change in the software, it's very hard, if not impossible, to keep up on everything and have everything patched. 34:54.130 --> 34:59.370 To a level that accounts for all of the new stuff that's out there. 35:00.850 --> 35:15.230 And so, what you effectively do is that you take your privileged accounts, your enterprise admins, your domain admins, and they live in a completely separate domain. 35:15.230 --> 35:21.990 Meaning that isolated domain controllers, isolated servers, isolated virtual environments. 35:21.990 --> 35:34.970 Because you can backdoor into Windows domain through, if you're using VMware, you can use VMware capability to get escalated rights within your domain control if it's virtualized and then take over the domain itself. 35:34.970 --> 35:45.210 So, you're really trying to draw a clear line between what your users can access and what can be accessed in a nefarious manner. 35:48.190 --> 36:00.010 And then, using Microsoft's suggested terminology, so they have their tiers where Tier 0 is your highest level, your forest domains, your enterprise domains. 36:00.010 --> 36:05.730 And those live separate and they can communicate within, but you don't talk down, right? 36:05.730 --> 36:10.650 So, you don't log in as a forest domain into a resource within a Tier 0. 36:10.650 --> 36:14.870 You can always escalate up, you never escalate down. 36:15.110 --> 36:22.890 And that's to keep those credentials isolated from any of those hosts that ultimately may become compromised, right? 36:23.330 --> 36:34.270 So, again, that idea that an enterprise domain or domain controller wouldn't log into an endpoint because that's going to be the first line of attack. 36:36.640 --> 36:46.040 And what are some of the standard stuff that ultimately lead to compromise is your access control list. 36:46.040 --> 36:53.680 So, users out there, your group membership, your help desk persons, never going to need to take over accounts, right? 36:53.680 --> 36:56.580 They may need to reset the password. 36:57.380 --> 37:00.020 Best practice would be to put something in between that, right? 37:00.020 --> 37:06.640 A service account that you would have heavily monitored that whenever it's used, it needs to be tied to a help desk ticket. 37:06.640 --> 37:14.720 Something that you can start to draw those parallels in your logging so you can understand anomalies that are happening. 37:14.720 --> 37:24.020 This one happens a lot where you have good isolation, you have a domain admin account, you have your exchange account, you have your user account. 37:24.180 --> 37:31.700 And there may be joe.admin, joe.exchange, joe.user, but the password's all password1. 37:32.140 --> 37:35.100 So, that one's going to get you. 37:35.100 --> 37:38.620 And again, it's all about not salting, so it's the same hash. 37:38.620 --> 37:48.220 So, if they have an administrator account with password1, it's going to be easily found because every other domain that has the same username and same password has the same exact hash. 37:48.380 --> 37:49.940 Service accounts. 37:50.140 --> 37:59.040 So, service accounts are meant to be targeted quote-unquote user accounts that you would create that execute a specific purpose. 37:59.040 --> 38:02.520 And that specific purpose needs to be locked down. 38:10.070 --> 38:15.730 Service accounts are created for a specific capability and it's just set it, forget it. 38:15.730 --> 38:26.770 And sometimes those passwords are shared among other service accounts, sometimes those passwords are written down, sometimes those passwords are default from the vendor. 38:27.030 --> 38:29.330 And elevated permissions on the workstation. 38:29.330 --> 38:36.310 So, again, that user logging into the machine with the elevated permissions, that goes to the internet, that checks their email. 38:36.310 --> 38:45.050 If they go to a nefariously crafted link or they download a bad file, that file is being ran under that user's permission. 38:45.050 --> 38:55.450 So, you really want to isolate that account to just what it should be doing, meaning that if it's a user, it's user rights. 38:55.450 --> 39:03.570 They have enough rights to log into the machine, to boot up whatever applications they need to boot up and nothing more. 39:03.570 --> 39:13.790 Anything that they need to do on top of that, say developers or whatnot, they should be elevating to another account to do that specific capability. 39:14.210 --> 39:16.050 And then application-wide listing. 39:16.050 --> 39:22.010 So, most of the time, your secretary's machine, never going to need to run PowerShell. 39:22.010 --> 39:26.230 You see PowerShell running on that box, it's a dead giveaway that something's wrong. 39:26.230 --> 39:30.770 Maybe on your developers, you have a little bit of leeway because they're doing other things. 39:30.770 --> 39:40.430 But you really need to understand who's out there, what are they doing on their machines, and only allowing the specific applications that you want them to allow. 39:40.430 --> 39:50.310 And in that instance, if they do download an application, let's just say they think they're downloading Spotify or Zoom and it's not what it's supposed to be. 39:50.310 --> 39:59.010 They execute that, it's not authorized to run, that binary never kicks off. 39:59.450 --> 40:01.070 And LAN hash. 40:01.070 --> 40:10.510 So, like I spoke to earlier in the presentation, LAN manager is an old way of hashing username and passwords. 40:10.510 --> 40:11.830 And it's very, very easy to crack. 40:11.830 --> 40:14.310 It takes really no processing time at all. 40:15.050 --> 40:19.630 It's only in place today for legacy applications. 40:19.630 --> 40:25.310 So, if you do have a legacy application out on your network, that thing probably has some issues as well. 40:25.310 --> 40:29.530 So, you really should identify why you need that enabled. 40:29.670 --> 40:36.550 If you do, identify why that thing still needs to be on the network, why that application still needs to be on the network. 40:36.550 --> 40:46.270 And probably look at some type of deployment plan to getting that on to a newer operating system or a different capability. 40:46.270 --> 40:54.410 Or maybe even a software as a service solution, so that way you really start to lower your risk to your network. 40:54.790 --> 40:59.130 And enumeration is understanding what's out there. 40:59.750 --> 41:10.770 If somebody who stood up that network put every single user in the domain admin rights group because that was the easiest thing to do, your risk is off the charts. 41:10.770 --> 41:18.290 So, you need to look at your groups, you need to look at your users on a pretty regular basis to make sure that nothing's changing. 41:18.330 --> 41:36.730 If you're in a position to be able to deploy new solutions or maybe even procure stuff, there's a lot of products out there that you could download open source or buy that can heavily monitor group membership and notify you of any changes. 41:36.730 --> 41:39.750 In some instances, they can even block it based on business rules. 41:40.770 --> 41:43.610 Volume shadow copy on domain controllers. 41:44.050 --> 41:47.090 You know, domain controllers themselves replicate within themselves. 41:47.090 --> 41:54.950 You don't need to do volume shadow copies of a file structure on your domain controller to another server. 41:55.110 --> 41:57.010 You just need to disable that. 41:57.010 --> 42:02.470 And if you do have a scenario which you need volume shadow copy, please reach out to me. 42:02.470 --> 42:05.930 I would love to understand that problem. 42:05.930 --> 42:15.750 What you're supposed to do with this whole file is essentially a shared member product that has your path files on it, that has some of your computer files on it. 42:15.890 --> 42:20.930 Understand who's reading that, who's pulling the information, and who has access. 42:20.930 --> 42:28.650 And monitor that with any type of logging capability and send you alerts as soon as something's out of the norm is done on that. 42:30.070 --> 42:34.130 If you can block peer-to-peer communication. 42:34.130 --> 42:37.870 End-user machine to end-user machine, you should. 42:38.370 --> 42:44.990 I understand that there's a lot of solutions out there that would require peer-to-peer capability. 42:45.270 --> 42:57.170 But if you can block the adversary from leapfrogging to other hosts, your peers that are generally less secure, you should do that. 42:57.210 --> 43:01.290 And then, of course, log, whitelist, and block if you can PowerShell. 43:01.290 --> 43:03.810 PowerShell is extremely powerful. 43:04.130 --> 43:05.810 You can do a lot of things with that. 43:06.090 --> 43:10.210 And again, I don't think the secretary would ever need to run a PowerShell script. 43:10.570 --> 43:20.030 And any of your developers that might, you would look to see what access they truly need and give them an account to do that in a very specific scenario. 43:21.530 --> 43:24.010 Alright, with that, that is my presentation. 43:24.050 --> 43:25.190 Thank you very much.