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0	7820	All right, it looks like we are resetting the stream. One quick second, let me get a
7820	15510	heads up by our recording folks. Let's see. Let me just double-check while we
15510	19810	get this, get this sorted. Yeah, and sometimes I would announce a class like
19810	26210	welcome to Chem 107 or something, just something weird. I like to have fun with my
26210	31890	students, but when I was teaching, it was good. I don't think I was ever bold
31890	37970	enough to try anything like that. Or maybe I just had more pity for my
37970	40130	students. I don't know, one of those two.
42730	50010	Well, I lucked out and taught a, what do you call it, a simple class on...
50610	55550	it was we were building an electric vehicle. Oh, hi everybody. For those of you
55550	59250	that are just tuning in, we're holding out for one quick second while we get
59250	67290	our recording AV equipment going. Mr. The Fixer, let me know when things are
67290	70370	ready to go and we will commence.
73750	79190	Let's see, it looks like... all right, so looks like things are ready. So let us
79190	86650	begin. We're introducing our speakers. So everybody, welcome to the very first talk
86650	93450	of Ethics Village on day two. So today we have Larry Lewis and we have Diane
93450	97010	Bavacek, and they were going to be talking a little bit about killer
97010	103390	robots, so reconsidered. So a little bit about Larry. Larry is the director of the
103390	108030	Center for Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence at CNA. His areas of
108030	112790	expertise include military applications of artificial intelligence and autonomy,
112790	117690	reducing civilian casualties, identifying lessons from current operations, security
117690	123550	systems, and counterterrorism. So Larry spearheaded the first database approach
123550	128990	to protecting civilians in conflict, analyzing military operational data in
128990	133490	conjunction with open source data. He has worked extensively to help reduce, to
133490	137510	help militaries reduce civilian casualties in their operations. Larry has
137510	141130	also served as a senior advisor to the Department of State's Assistant
141130	147050	Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and was on the U.S. delegation to
147050	151770	the United Nations regarding lethal autonomous weapon systems or laws. Larry
151770	156650	currently holds a PhD in physical chemistry from Rice University. And our
156650	162010	other speaker, Diane Bavacek, is an analyst at CNA, where she researches
162010	166850	military operations and policy with a focus on emerging technologies, including
166850	170950	autonomy, artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and the cyberspace
170950	177090	domain. She deployed abroad on the USS Vinson during Operation Iraqi Freedom
177090	182150	and Operation Inherent Resolve. Diane currently has a PhD in mathematics from
182150	188690	the University of Michigan. And without further ado, welcome again, y'all, and
188690	193330	thank you again for doing this talk for Ethics Village 2020. Let me queue up
193330	205110	those slides and I will pass it off to you. So I'm gonna go mute. Great. So before we
205110	208850	get to the slides, just a few introductory comments. So thank you.
208970	215570	Thank you for joining us. Diane and I are really excited to talk to you guys. Just
215710	221290	a few things. If this is your first acquaintance with CNA, we're a
221290	225970	nonprofit research organization and we provide objective and independent
228010	232930	analysis and perspectives to the U.S. government, including the U.S. military,
232930	240070	but also other parts of the government. And several years ago, CNA
240070	245490	established a Center for Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence because those
245490	251170	technologies are so important to the U.S. and national security priorities. So
251170	259910	and a key focus for us at CNA is AI safety. So we're going to be talking about that today.
260110	267470	This presentation incorporates a number of different areas of CNA research. At the same
267470	275600	time, this presentation reflects our opinion and not that of CNA or the U.S. government.
276520	283280	Finally, we really want your participation today. So we want this to be participatory.
283280	291060	So you can send us a question in the Discord general text chat. We're monitoring it. I have
291060	297720	it open right here. So feel free, please, to ask questions. We'd love to answer them.
297720	303000	We're aiming to finish this presentation and the general question and answer in an hour.
303000	308400	But we are also happy to stick around longer if we haven't gotten your questions. So feel
308400	313580	free to stick around if we haven't answered it, and we will gladly get to it. So with that,
313580	316980	we'll go ahead and get started. And Diane is going to start us off.
317820	324300	Thanks, Larry. And let me echo what Larry said. Thanks to the Ethics Village for hosting us.
324880	330400	Steve, you can go ahead to the next slide, please. Thanks. So what are we going to talk
330400	337680	to you about today? So here's kind of a general outline. Militaries are turning to artificial
337680	343020	intelligence. And the U.S. Department of Defense is certainly one of those that sees
343020	350780	moving forward with AI as an imperative. And the DoD is going to need the tech sector,
350780	356020	the help of the tech sector, the help of AI researchers in order to be competitive here.
356860	363920	There are risks associated with incorporating AI into military applications. A lot of risks and
363920	368240	challenges that are really important and crucial getting right. But there are also a lot of
368240	372180	misconceptions that come up in this conversation. And so we're going to talk both about challenges
372180	379920	and the misconceptions. And DoD practices and policies that are in place right now that address
379920	386940	some of these risks. And again, to go back to the role of the tech sector and AI researchers here,
386940	392680	addressing some of the challenges associated with AI in this setting is something that we
392680	398800	think the tech sector can really help DoD to do. In addition to risks, though, there are actually
398800	405840	benefits, opportunities associated with integrating AI into military applications. So there's a real
405840	412340	potential for benefits like fewer civilian casualties or protecting hospitals, different
412340	417440	humanitarian benefits that we'll talk through. And again, to bring back to what is the role
417440	422880	of tech sector here, we've seen through history that outside influences can motivate DoD to try
422880	431680	harder in these areas. So what we have here is a new paradigm with AI coming into applications
431680	437280	in the military and more broadly. And we think that you should see this as an opportunity to
438240	444760	help and influence the way that AI is used in warfighting. So this is our aim. The plan for
444760	449000	this talk is that I'm going to talk through the first few points and then Larry will talk
449000	455180	through the later points. And then we will spend some time going through the questions that we see
455180	465040	in the chat. All right, go to the next slide, please. So what are we talking about here,
465040	471200	first of all? How are we thinking about the definition of AI? So to be consistent with how
471200	476200	the U.S. government uses this term, we're thinking of this broadly. So one definition you can think
476200	481800	of for AI is a set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to approximate
481960	493080	a cognitive task. So one kind of piece that I want to get at, at this point, is to talk about
493080	499700	how people group AI into kind of two broad bins. So people talk about artificial general intelligence.
499900	505920	And the idea there is kind of thinking of the Terminator, sort of, right? Is artificial
505920	511700	intelligence that can do what a human can do? That can understand or learn any cognitive task
511700	517920	that a human can do. So artificial general intelligence is not the state of technology today,
517920	526520	and it's not expected to come to fruition in the foreseeable future at this point. So this is not
526520	529900	going to be the focus of our talk today. What we're going to focus on is the other category,
529900	537860	which is narrow artificial intelligence. So narrow AI is AI that's focused on a specific task,
537860	542440	something like image classification, right? So it carries out a specific task within a specific
542440	552180	context. Why is AI relevant to warfighting? Well, one reason is that AI helps you make better
552180	559200	decisions. So if you might want the best possible decision-making tools to be used in areas of your
559200	563840	life that you care a lot about, right? Maybe the person managing your investments or a doctor
563840	569580	giving you diagnosis, if you want them to have access to the best technologies to help them with
569580	575580	decision-making, right? It's the same idea. This is why military commanders, this is why U.S.
575580	585740	government leadership wants to draw from this technology. Also in warfighting, AI can be useful
585740	592260	if your military is facing a threat that is vast or numerous or very dynamic. So think about
592260	598720	something like a drone swarm attacking a naval ship, right? So that's the kind of setting that
598720	603280	DoD cares very much about, being able to combat that threat. And so this is another place where
603280	610280	AI can be really critical. So for all of these reasons, DoD and other militaries around the world
610280	616360	are moving forward with exploring and investing in artificial intelligence.
617460	622960	What type of military applications are we talking about here? So a few examples, right? And I've
622960	629540	listed a few bins here in the slide. So AI can help with by providing decision aids on the
629540	634880	battlefield. So things like detecting anomalies in behavior, the behavior of say people on the
634880	642880	ground or shipping traffic. Sensor data fusion is another application. Human machine teaming
643280	652240	is also a key area of AI applications. So think about maybe an unmanned ground system that is
652240	657220	assisting a soldier by carrying a lot of heavy gear or by providing surveillance where the
657220	663020	soldier is patrolling. And business applications are also something that are going to be important
663020	671940	to DoD going forward. AI uses in say preventative maintenance, network defense, or even to figure
671940	681600	out how to target recruiting efforts. But an AI is going to, you know, there are important
681600	686000	challenges of artificial intelligence that comes into those type of applications, but that's not
686000	693100	the most contentious type of applications that we're talking about here. So DoD and other
693100	699940	militaries are also considering how you might integrate AI into autonomous systems or weapon
699940	706260	systems, right? So autonomous systems being systems that operate in some sense on their own,
706260	712260	right? And you can combine that with a lethality component too. And so here's a case where you
712260	718820	really see that it's critical that we make sure to get it right moving forward with this technology.
720180	729920	Next slide. Okay, so DoD and the U.S. government more broadly are thinking about how to use
729920	736320	AI in national security. So they're already moving ahead with creating strategies and guidance,
736320	742040	making some organizational changes, and investing in research and development. And so I've listed
743120	750480	some examples of these types of developments in the slide. The one that I'll anchor on here
750480	758000	is this first sub-bullet, which is the recently established DoD AI strategy.
758740	763920	And this is a document that... this and most of the other documents that I reference here
764500	768640	are things that are available open source. So you can just Google and find at least an
768640	775160	unclassified summary of the strategy. So a couple of things that I'll just list off here,
775160	780420	just to anchor on this piece, a couple of things that they say in the strategy, right? So they
780420	786920	emphasize that the women and men in the U.S. armed forces are the real source of strength.
786920	793260	And the intent is for AI to empower but not replace those who serve.
794240	799120	Another thing that the strategy says is that AI is poised to change the character
799120	805020	of the future battlefield and the pace of the threats that we must face.
805880	812260	And so I just want to point out that you can see from that line that the DoD is... the context that
812260	818460	DoD is thinking about this in is one in which they expect that adversaries will also be using
818460	826300	this technology. So that's kind of the landscape that we're thinking of here. Go ahead to the next
826300	836200	slide. Thanks. So AI really represents a paradigm in terms of the relationship between DoD and the
836200	842820	private sector. That's a new and interesting dynamic, which is that in the past, we're used
842820	848840	to thinking of DoD as having unique needs with research and development and that they very much
848840	856420	bankroll the research in order to develop platforms they need, like military aircraft
856420	863820	or develop weapon systems technologies. Even early versions of the internet were something that DoD
864540	868960	bankrolled because it was something that they needed and the developments weren't available
868960	876600	elsewhere. So that's the dynamic that DoD is used to having. But bringing AI into the picture
877240	882860	is a big change because obviously AI is something that has many uses outside of
882860	887600	just military applications. And because of that, tech sector is already moving forward
888400	896120	rapidly with research and development. So the graph here is one where we kind of try to get
896120	905120	at this snapshot of the difference between U.S. government and tech sector spending here,
905120	917360	which is that you can see the lower bars in the graph are the budget that U.S. government overall,
917360	924840	information technology research and development, including AI. And the taller light purple bars
924840	932680	are we just took just five top tech companies and it is their summed research and development
932680	938780	investments. And so you can see that just looking at that snapshot, DoD and the U.S. government
938780	943120	overall are going to be dwarfed by this type of research and development spending. And so
943120	948740	this just illustrates that DoD has a real dependency on what's happening in the private
948740	957420	sector, what's happening with external research and development in AI. All right, next slide, please.
959380	966980	Okay, so now let's talk about risks. Actually, let's try, hopefully this will work, to see if
966980	971460	you guys can, this is one of the areas where we really want to try to have as much of a dialogue
971460	978180	as we can with you, the listeners. So I'm going to talk through sort of the landscape of risks.
978180	984280	As I'm doing that, we would love it if you would type into the Discord chat, what are your biggest
984280	989660	concerns here with regard to military applications of AI, right? Or what are questions or thoughts
989660	996300	that you have on this? And after I talk through some of these risks, we'll see if Larry can read
996300	1004940	off some of what you all wrote in. Okay, so AI, also thinking of AI potential use in lethal
1004940	1013500	autonomy, these are really controversial ideas in the public sphere. I don't know if
1013500	1019220	how many of you were at DEFCON and came to Ethics Village sessions last year, you may have seen
1019780	1025380	a talk given by a group that's a proponent of preemptively banning lethal autonomous
1025380	1034420	weapon systems. So there's a real kind of an active debate and dialogue about some of
1034420	1041200	these questions. And so what are the concerns that people are voicing here? All right, well,
1041200	1046160	one concern is that AI will destroy the world. So that's one that we've seen, for example, Elon Musk
1047420	1052320	say quite publicly, even as I'll mention, even as, of course, Elon Musk has simultaneously
1052320	1061060	been investing in AI research. But AI and lethal autonomy are inherently unlawful or unethical.
1061060	1067420	This is an assumption that is made by the proponents of banning these types of technologies.
1068160	1074920	There are questions about accountability, concerns about discrimination, which means the ability of
1075600	1084140	a weapon system to tell a combatant from a civilian. Of course, biases are also
1084880	1092740	an important challenge and concern when it comes to AI. Let's go to the next slide.
1095940	1107040	So embedded in these concerns are some real and critical challenges that are actually going to be
1107040	1111260	they appear they're going to be surmountable, but they're important challenges to think about.
1111260	1116720	But also embedded in these are some real misconceptions. Okay, so just to talk through
1116720	1125160	some of this, AI will destroy the world. Okay, so that concern is really rooted in
1125760	1130720	worries about artificial general intelligence. And that's not what we're talking about here.
1131340	1140120	But what about questions of lawfulness, ethics, and accountability? So those next two points.
1141080	1153060	So these concerns are rooted in a misunderstanding of how DoD operates. So DoD follows many domestic
1153060	1159820	and international laws, follows many ethical principles. And these laws and principles
1160880	1167300	don't depend on the type of technology that you're using. So the laws of war apply no matter
1167300	1174360	what weapon you're using. So similarly, accountability. Accountability is also
1174360	1182140	baked into how DoD operates. From acquisition, test and evaluation standards, to the chain of
1182140	1188620	command. And also, this doesn't depend on the type of technology that you're talking about.
1190180	1197440	Although certainly things like test and evaluation specific processes will have to be updated
1198440	1203320	for new technologies as they come through, including for artificial intelligence.
1204460	1211340	So that said, there definitely, not to discount, there will absolutely be challenges
1211340	1219300	in developing military applications of AI. So in particular, you want to make sure that it really
1219300	1227280	works. So integrated into that is making sure that systems can be discriminant, that systems
1227280	1232420	will, or use of systems will address bias. Basically, you want to make sure that systems
1232420	1241040	will operate as intended in any other ways. And so just a couple quick comments here.
1241040	1247380	We say that these concerns are surmountable. So some of the way to think about that here
1247380	1256500	is that the goal is not necessarily to, say, develop some kind of AI-enabled weapon system
1256500	1262840	that is able to discriminate civilians from combatants in all possible situations.
1263260	1270180	So the point is that you would only approve a system for use in settings in which you knew
1270180	1275040	it was going to be able to function properly. So that's kind of the aim and the goal here.
1275040	1280280	This isn't going to be something that works in all settings. Of course, that's true of
1280920	1287180	legacy non-AI-enabled systems and weapons as well.
1288480	1295740	Also, we're not necessarily aiming for, say, systems that are learning in real time,
1295740	1300540	especially weapon systems. So it's more likely to be thinking about at this stage,
1300540	1306560	right, maybe systems that will be collecting data in real time, but that maybe it would not
1306560	1312540	go ahead and update how it's making decisions until those updates can be validated.
1313000	1316960	So keep some of those important caveats in mind here.
1318720	1324060	Larry, did anybody write anything good in the chat about concerns and risks?
1326360	1336360	Yes, definitely. So a few things here are... there's a link to a report that is a really
1336360	1345340	good report from early 2019. And it talks about different risks of AI. And I think it's actually
1346620	1353560	good to kind of frame this. So we are talking specifically about military applications of AI.
1353560	1362140	So the report that we do recommend you look at talks about broader risks of AI. And it
1362140	1367760	talks about three different kinds of risks. One is digital security. So digital security,
1367760	1374020	physical security, political security. So digital security goes to cyber attacks and the kinds of
1374020	1381040	infiltration I can do. Physical security, they give the example of the potential for using an
1381040	1389420	autonomous self-driving car as a weapon. So like a terrorist attack that you can use that.
1389420	1396700	And then third, they talk about political security. And that includes misuse of surveillance,
1396700	1404660	propaganda, misinformation. And these are all really great points. So the fact that we don't
1404660	1410480	have those on there is because we're kind of talking about the more narrow military applications
1410480	1415320	of AI. But it's important to acknowledge that there are broader risks as well.
1415320	1420120	Larry, what is that? What report is it that you're referring to? Or who made it?
1420140	1430460	Yeah, there's a link. And see, actually, who did it? I've looked at the link at this before.
1430460	1438480	There are many authors from different organizations. So University of Oxford,
1438480	1447520	Future of Humanity Institute, CNAS was also a contributor, OpenAI. So it's a multi-author,
1447520	1454580	multi-organization report. But the link is in the general text channel. So definitely,
1454580	1465260	it's good to check out. Yeah. So another comment is about bias and how bias seems like a really
1465260	1472680	big deal, which is it absolutely is. And I guess one comment to make about that is that
1472680	1480880	humans are biased, right? Humans have lots of cognitive biases. And so AI applications that
1480880	1487400	are built by humans that leverage data that are developed by humans should also be expected to
1487400	1492800	be biased. So that is absolutely true. The one thing to me that's a key difference is that
1492800	1500620	with AI applications, you can explicitly examine those biases and try to correct for them. So
1500620	1508520	that's actually a valuable thing that we can do. However, too often, we don't do that. So we need
1508520	1516460	to be very deliberate about trying to characterize and correct those biases. Let's see. Another
1516460	1522180	comment is majority of DoD spending on AI goes to warfighting and lethality,
1522180	1528940	not logistics, humanitarian assistance, predictive maintenance, logistics. Thank you for that
1528940	1534720	comment. We're actually going to... that is a big topic of our talk. So please keep on
1535620	1543800	listening and participating. Do AI weapon systems fall under the Geneva Convention?
1543800	1548760	Um, so if it's used for armed conflict, then it should.
1549020	1553060	And I think you're going to you're going to continue to talk about this,
1553640	1561180	kind of the legal aspect of this. bleed over from DoD and the intelligence community.
1562060	1569920	And that's, that's also it. That is a tricky issue today, because because of the
1570280	1580980	um, like, we have some some US activities that do kind of combine the DoD and intelligence
1580980	1586720	community. So that is something that kind of needs to be watched. And then how do we ethically
1586720	1595240	import bias into AI? And again, I think, going back to the earlier comment about bias, bias is
1595240	1601980	really a significant issue we need to be careful about. And I think, you know, yes, the Microsoft
1601980	1610260	chatbot is a great example. And how, again, we can't just do something and then put it out in
1610260	1615940	the world and then assume it's going to work well, we need to monitor it, we need to be explicitly
1616920	1625240	monitoring for bias and intervening as well. So that kind of gets it what I said a minute ago
1625240	1629020	about making sure to validate as as you're learning, right, we're gonna we're gonna have
1629020	1638270	to validate that learning. So great comments. Okay, great. Well, thank you guys all and keep
1638270	1645150	them coming. Um, we will we will come back to looking at the at the comments in a little bit.
1645750	1652170	I'll go go ahead for the next slide, please. Okay, I'm gonna say a few words now. Okay, right. So,
1652170	1660090	so there are misconceptions out there, but also a lot of very real challenges and risks. And DOD
1660090	1668310	is doing some things now that address some of these risks. And so any, any, any discussion of
1668310	1674410	this topic, right needs to have have this information as part of the context. So to run
1674410	1678630	through some of that, right, some some of the things that DOD does that address these risks
1678630	1683570	are just general DOD practices, and some of them are things specifically being developed for
1683570	1689570	AI in a related context. So, so first, I'll talk about the general practices. Okay, so,
1689570	1696790	so legal considerations, right. So, so, to kind of reiterate something I mentioned before,
1696790	1703670	DOD incorporates legal considerations into, you know, pretty much everything it does development
1703670	1711490	certification, use of any systems. So, so, and these laws, you know, laws of war, they apply no
1711490	1716810	matter what type of technology you're using, right, things like proportionality, that, that,
1716810	1720510	that's a principle that does not depend on the weapon that you're using. And so,
1720510	1728170	so these things generally apply independent of the technology. Practices also help to
1728810	1733850	mitigate some of these risks, right. So test and evaluation processes need to make sure that
1733850	1739230	systems function as intended. Whenever you have a new system, also training will be established
1739230	1745510	for that and operating procedures for using any kind of system, especially weapon systems.
1746650	1753970	Policy is also a really important part of how DOD operates. So one example I'll give here
1754470	1761270	is a 2016 executive order that's focused on minimizing civilian casualty.
1761690	1767710	So this executive order says a lot of really great things. And I want to just highlight one,
1767710	1772750	one piece of it, which I think is especially interesting in this context. So, so the, the EO
1772750	1779510	says that the U.S. is going to develop, acquire, and field weapon systems and other technological
1779510	1786270	capabilities that further enable the discriminant use of force in different operational contexts.
1786670	1791770	So what are we saying there, right? We're saying that if there's technology that comes along that
1791770	1795810	will allow us to be more discriminant in war fighting, you know, we're going to look at using
1795810	1801210	that. And so, so keep that in mind because what Larry's going to talk about in a, in a minute or
1801210	1807190	two here is, is the, you know, the very real possibility that AI can, can help us be more
1807190	1815970	discriminant in war fighting. See, please go to the next slide. So now I'll talk just briefly
1815970	1823970	about some AI specific steps that the DoD is taking. I mentioned the AI strategy earlier. DoD
1823970	1831570	also very recently adopted some ethics, AI ethics principles. These came from the work of the
1831570	1838790	Defense Innovation Board, right? And so these are, these are principles that, that include,
1838790	1844270	you know, appropriate levels of human judgment, the intent that that will allow it if they exhibit
1844270	1850210	unintended escalatory behavior. So this is, this is really the intent of DoD moving forward.
1850910	1858250	So another, another related policy dimension, right, is a DoD has a directive on lethal
1858250	1861860	autonomous weapon systems, which was actually from all the way back in 2012,
1862930	1867830	which again says that appropriate levels of human judgment will always be used when it comes to
1867830	1875370	lethal autonomy. And, and it also puts out that in many cases, a lethal autonomous weapon system
1875370	1880210	would have to undergo a senior level review before it would ever be used by DoD forces.
1880570	1885890	Test and evaluation requirements are being looked at, right? So all of these steps are good and they
1885890	1891890	do start to get at a lot of the risks that we talked about. But as, as Larry alluded to,
1891890	1897870	with talking about bias a minute ago, right, we, we would put out there that more is needed here.
1897870	1904350	And in particular, what we don't see right now and really, really is necessary is a comprehensive
1904350	1911550	approach to identifying and systematically addressing risks. So I've, I've talked here
1911550	1918190	about how AI represents a new dynamic between DoD and the tech sector, and how there are a lot
1918190	1923190	of challenges out there. And we're already working to address some of those challenges.
1923610	1928010	I want to turn things over now to Larry, and we'll hear a little bit about the opportunities.
1931910	1934250	Great. So if you can go to the next slide, please.
1935650	1940230	Okay. So we've heard about that there are risks of military use of AI,
1940230	1946750	how those risks can be different than those that are sometimes commonly discussed, and that we need
1946750	1951950	to be more deliberate in addressing them. At the same time, we'll highlight that there are
1951950	1959530	opportunities. I'll talk about three things. One is there is potential for good with the use of
1959530	1966370	technology. AI and autonomous systems can be used deliberately for humanitarian benefits.
1966370	1973090	Second of all, history shows that outside influence can help, can help the U.S. military
1973090	1982590	work harder on focusing on humanitarian issues. And finally, times, things are, times are changing,
1982590	1988230	and there are new opportunities where the tech sector can have an influence on national security
1988230	1995130	policy that it has not had in the past. So if you can go to the next slide, please.
1997830	2007110	Okay. So, so an argument is often made how advanced technology has humanitarian benefits.
2007110	2011870	So an example that I hear a lot is, well, we have precision-guided munitions,
2011870	2018170	they're much better for civilians on the battlefield than dumb bombs. Okay. And that is,
2018170	2024810	that is generally true. At the same time, that what that really is, is a humanitarian side benefit
2024810	2032810	of a military aim, right? So precision-guided munitions were not created to help innocent
2032810	2037550	civilians. They were created to help the military to hit targets more effectively,
2038090	2044710	and they happen to have a humanitarian side benefit. But technology can also be used
2044710	2051150	deliberately to help address pressing humanitarian challenges and war. And some of those
2051150	2058130	opportunities include reducing civilian casualties, you know, avoiding tragic attacks
2058130	2065410	on hospitals and other protected sites, and also deconfliction of humanitarian aid on the battlefield
2065410	2073630	so that those, you know, so that World Food Program trucks aren't targeted in military attacks.
2073630	2084830	Next slide. So here's an example. So protecting hospitals in conflict. Medical care in conflict
2084830	2092310	was the very first issue taking up as a measure of international humanitarian law. We talked about
2092310	2099210	the Geneva Conventions, and there are other legal agreements that governments have agreed to over
2099210	2105290	the years. Medical care in conflict was the very first issue taken up. And of course, the origin of
2105290	2112410	ICRC was centered around providing medical care in conflict, making sure it was not interrupted
2113210	2122230	by a war. So it was the first thing, and yet attacks on hospitals continue 150 years later
2122230	2129490	after ICRC was created, after the first international law was created to help
2130310	2138510	conflict be more humane. The picture here is an MSF hospital in Yemen that was destroyed by an
2138510	2146650	airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition in August 2016. This kind of thing, this kind of attack,
2146650	2152370	happens too many times. And you see the international community trying to do things.
2152370	2157310	I think of the United Nations, they had a Security Council Resolution 2286
2158250	2165870	that calls the international community to action. We need to do more. And yet nothing
2165870	2171190	practical has been done. So we have a really pressing problem with protecting hospitals.
2171790	2174190	So to go to the next slide.
2176070	2185490	There are things we can do. So we're a research organization. And in my grad school,
2185490	2193890	I have a PhD in physical chemistry. So I had a laboratory with a laser and with
2194550	2199610	liquid nitrogen kind of fuming to make things really cold and a vacuum chamber, and it smelled
2199610	2207810	horrible. And that was kind of the environment that I worked in. Now at CNA, the world is our
2207810	2217410	laboratory. So we go out and we go to places like Yemen and Afghanistan and Iraq and Syria,
2217410	2223370	and we try to get the data to help us to better understand these kinds of problems.
2223960	2230230	So one of the things I did is look at attacks on hospitals and looking at the data and say,
2230230	2235590	okay, why do these things happen? What goes wrong when they're attacked? And our analysis shows that
2235590	2241790	there are two kinds of failures that both have to happen simultaneously for a hospital to be
2241790	2249790	attacked. One is a failure in deconfliction. And that is, if you look at modern militaries,
2249790	2255330	they try to maintain a list of locations that are supposed to be protected and not attacked,
2255330	2262630	and they call this a no-strike list. So they're supposed to be looking at lists when they are
2262630	2269570	about to attack someone. And an attack on a medical facility means that this deconfliction step
2269570	2275390	has failed. But that's not the only thing they have to do. They're also supposed to try to
2275770	2281790	and avoid attacks on medical facilities. And one way is that, again, through the Geneva
2281790	2289690	Conventions, identification of hospitals can be facilitated by the hospitals displaying a
2289690	2296870	Red Cross or a Red Crescent. So an attack means that that identification process has also failed.
2296870	2303310	So if you can fix either of these problems, you can stop the attack. And it'd be nice to work on
2303310	2307650	both, but if you can make one of these things successful instead of a failure,
2307650	2313980	you prevented a tragic attack on a hospital. So if you go to the next slide...
2316670	2324870	technology can help reduce attacks on hospitals in various ways. So one example is Australia.
2324870	2330290	They're using machine learning right now. They're exploring machine learning applications to help
2330290	2335650	automatic recognition of protected symbols, like the Red Cross and the Red Crescent.
2336090	2342490	So it doesn't automate the attack. Basically, it's a safety net. So if you're looking to make
2342490	2347870	an attack and the machine learning algorithm senses that there's a Red Cross or a Red Crescent
2347870	2360190	in the target area, it says, hey, stop. You need to stop. There are also opportunities
2360190	2366410	to use technology to strengthen the deconfliction process. For example, White Flag is being
2366410	2371710	developed. It's a protocol developed by the Netherlands. And that is an encrypted technology
2371710	2376790	to strengthen this deconfliction process. And that's really important because what we see
2377630	2384010	as we look at the data on this is that often the information that would stop an attack is
2384010	2389130	known somewhere, but there is an information flow problem and it's not reaching the person
2389130	2393370	that is making the decision whether to attack or not. So if we can improve that,
2393370	2399750	then we can also help reduce attacks on hospitals. And the protection of hospitals
2399750	2404850	is just one area. It's an important area, but just one area where technology can be used
2404850	2411410	specifically for humanitarian benefit. We've also looked at how to reduce civilian casualties,
2411410	2416050	how to detect civilian casualties, which is also an issue. Oftentimes you'll hear
2417230	2422350	you'll hear militaries say, you know, they did a strike. There are accusations about civilian
2422350	2428650	casualties and they say, nope, we didn't do it. And what the data says is oftentimes they did,
2428650	2435570	but they're just not very good at detecting civilian casualties. So, and if you can't detect
2435570	2440530	them, then you don't know you have a problem to solve. So this is also a really important issue
2440530	2446050	that can be helped by technology. There's also anticipating and avoiding reverberating
2446050	2451350	long-term effects of attacks. So essential services, that's something that militaries
2451350	2456230	around the world really do poorly. And that could also be helped. And then there's also
2456230	2463210	traceability and accountability for violations. The New York Times had a really powerful article
2463210	2470600	on how Russia and the Syrian regime were specifically targeting hospitals in Syria.
2470930	2478370	And we can potentially use technology to not only, not only avoid things, but also provide
2478370	2483730	more accountability, provide basically the proof that says, Hey, this is the smoking gun.
2483730	2491190	You guys did this and you can't just argue, you know, fog of war. So these are just some
2491190	2496870	examples of how technology can be used for, for good and for humanitarian benefits.
2497270	2498730	So the next slide, please.
2499130	2504770	Hey, Larry, can I jump in with a good point that somebody made in one of the chats about what
2504770	2508350	you're talking about here, which is that, you know, if you have these, these algorithms that
2508350	2515530	are designed to detect red crosses and then not shoot at that thing, right? The question is,
2515530	2519590	well, doesn't that mean that all of the bad guys are just going to start putting red crosses on,
2519590	2521530	on their, on their stuff?
2523790	2531930	Sure. And I mean, yeah. So, so there, there, there are states and actors that try to follow
2531930	2537110	the law, the law of war, internationally humanitarian law, like the genomic conventions.
2537110	2541290	And then there are some that don't. That's actually why I included that last piece there,
2541290	2548230	traceability and accountability. Because with, with, you know, with technology,
2548230	2555690	you can also better document how actors, and that may be a state like Russia, or it may be
2555890	2562190	a non-state armed group, but if they are intentionally flouting requirements of the law,
2562190	2569670	you now have documented this and you can put more pressure on them to, to behave differently.
2571910	2577090	And try to use different ways to, to, to positively influence them.
2577090	2580610	Yeah. And, and one of the things I think you're getting at when you're talking about flouting the
2580610	2587750	law is that it is, goes against international humanitarian law to put those red cross symbols,
2587750	2591710	red crescent symbols on something that is not actually a protected site. So,
2591710	2597290	so some bad actors, right, would be doing that even, even without AI technology.
2597290	2603410	Right. Right. Yeah, certainly, certainly they can, they can do that now. And sometimes they do.
2603950	2612950	That is, that is not, that is not an excuse to, to just be reckless. Right. So, so we need,
2612950	2617870	still need to, to have, to strengthen our protection. But at the same time,
2617870	2623510	this is also an opportunity to avoid the bad behavior that we see today.
2626410	2633950	Okay. So finally, I mean, so the military cares about humanitarian issues. But at the same time,
2633950	2638630	there's, there's not a lot of, of strong leadership on this issue. And that's,
2638630	2643950	that's really because of a combination of formal responsibilities. If you look
2643950	2649410	organizationally at DOD, you know, they have, they have people in charge of lots of different
2649410	2654810	things, you know, developing weapons systems, developing, you know, lethal capabilities.
2655070	2660550	There's really not that same kind of leadership on, hey, how can we, how can we get better at
2660550	2668270	humanitarian issues? At the same time, there, there, there has been, there have been leaders
2668270	2672850	who have really focused on this issue, but then they rotate out. And so it does,
2672850	2681970	long lasting focus. So, so what, what can we do? History shows that non-governmental influences can
2681970	2688170	strongly encourage progress in this area. And typically that has been through media,
2688170	2692710	you know, media accounts. And I think of the uncounted article, for example, in 2017,
2693170	2699850	by Asma Khan was one great example of this, how one powerful, well-researched article
2699850	2707230	basically influenced DOD to, to be more introspective and to do kind of internal
2707230	2714330	reviews that actually make real changes. And civil society, you know, NGOs, academia can
2714330	2721470	have a role. And then of course the UN and ICRC. So they have all, at different times,
2721470	2728430	had important contributions to help the military to do better. And I listed,
2729330	2735090	listed three specific examples. You know, there are, these are actually examples, real examples
2735090	2743950	where outside influences encourage the military to try harder, both in Afghanistan and that really,
2743950	2747770	they really turned things around and did things differently. And the civilian casualty numbers
2747770	2754490	went down. Drone strikes and counter-terrorism, you know, leading to the presidential policy
2754490	2760390	directive, the presidential policy guidance issued by President Obama for counter-terrorism
2760390	2765590	operations. And then the campaign in Iraq and Syria, again, there were things like,
2765590	2772530	you know, counted article and also air wars that contributed to greater scrutiny and led to
2772530	2777590	differences in how the U.S. military has done things. If you go to the next slide.
2778830	2786550	So, so bottom line, there, there's a, there's an opportunity here. So if you combine kind of
2786550	2792790	the things we've been talking about, the community needs the tech sector as they have not before.
2792790	2797770	So, you know, looking at that graph we had earlier, you know, the, just the top five
2799050	2805910	tech companies in the U.S., their research and development, you know, now 15 times larger than
2805910	2812550	the entire tech development budget of the United States government. And that ratio is increasing
2812550	2822290	over time. So the U.S. government sees it needs the tech sector to be competitive. And you see
2822290	2826450	this in DoD wanting to work with the tech sector and they have a number of initiatives. There's
2826450	2831330	the defense innovation board. And of course they developed the AI principles that DoD then
2831890	2836830	accepted. You have the defense innovation unit, defense digital service, and then there are other
2836830	2844350	initiatives that DoD is trying to engage more with the tech sector. So we just wanted to highlight
2844350	2850070	this is an opportunity for the tech sector, right? So this is an opportunity to engage and have
2850070	2857790	influence. So as DoD says, Hey, we want to talk, we want to work together. There are opportunities
2857790	2863950	for tech companies and people working in the tech sector to influence the areas for engagement and
2863950	2872830	for cooperation. And also voice concerns about how these issues can be addressed. And then,
2872830	2878590	you know, I mentioned, you know, right now there's academia, there's a civil society,
2878590	2885850	there's a UN that are engaging now with DoD on discussions and humanitarian issues. I was in
2885850	2891550	such a discussion yesterday, right? There was nobody in the tech sector in that discussion,
2891550	2899670	but there could be, right? As a stakeholder and as a potential solution. So this is an opportunity.
2899670	2904330	And then I also just wanted to highlight, this is not just for the US, right? So I mentioned
2904330	2912890	Australia doing work. Also the Netherlands are working on this protocol, white flag,
2912890	2919810	white flag is an open source solution. So it's also, it doesn't have to be a proprietary solution
2919810	2924930	for the US or it could be other open source solutions that help address humanitarian
2924930	2934490	issues that basically could be offered to all parties to conflict. So I think that's,
2934490	2940810	if you go to the next slide. So now we'd love to have a discussion and we also have
2940810	2952110	contact information here. So we'd love to continue to answer questions or things you'd
2952110	2957390	like to raise, but also in the future, we'd love to hear from you and we can continue those
2957390	2964550	discussions. So open to any questions you may have. Yeah, absolutely. I'll certainly echo what Larry
2964550	2970290	has said there. And so I've been reading through the comments that people have been posting.
2970290	2976570	So I'm just going to go ahead and kind of read off the things that I've seen there.
2977050	2982650	So one of the things that kind of the main thing that a couple of different folks have raised
2982650	2990330	are concerns around proliferation, right? So one person raised a worry, and this is very timely,
2990530	2995990	a worry about the trickle down of military technology being used in domestic law enforcement,
2995990	3003310	right? Or being used abroad to stifle dissent. There was also some concerns brought up about,
3003310	3009870	well, if other, say, bad actor nations get these technologies, that's something that's going to
3009870	3015790	serve as a force multiplier for those bad bad actors, dictators or whatever. And so
3017730	3024170	a mention of, let's see, so the person wrote in that the best way to keep control of technology
3024670	3029970	is to not develop it. And there's another mention of mutually assured destruction.
3030970	3038270	So there's kind of a lot baked up in those proliferation concerns. I might start to
3038270	3044430	address those by saying that certainly thinking about this technology and how we want to move
3044430	3052350	forward with thinking about exporting or sharing it is absolutely something that DOD and the U.S.
3052350	3056970	government is taking very seriously and really thinking about right now.
3058090	3062190	Another thing I'll... and so, again, it's going to be one of these contexts where
3062830	3068990	there's some hard challenges, you know, wrapped up in there. But at the same time, right,
3068990	3074770	keep in mind that, you know, as we talked about with that earlier slide with the graph on it,
3074770	3081570	most of the R&D that's going on in this space is not happening by state actors. It's not happening
3081570	3089590	by the U.S. government or DOD. So that's a reality to keep in mind, thinking about proliferation
3089590	3097110	also. And one other thing I'll mention, just thinking about the domestic law enforcement
3097650	3104290	context, is just be aware that a lot of the rules and laws that DOD has to follow
3105350	3113270	and what it makes are... so domestic law enforcement is not subject to those laws.
3113270	3117790	So, again, I think there are things to worry about here, but I'm not sure if
3117790	3123650	DOD's development of these technologies... that may not be the biggest concern in some
3123650	3128970	of these cases. Larry, would you add anything on any of those topics?
3130350	3137470	So, yeah, so great questions. One thing I wanted to mention, especially for the
3137470	3144810	export and proliferation piece, because I've spent a couple years at state
3144810	3151090	where this was a really key concern. And one thing that became very apparent to me,
3151090	3158690	in the case of Yemen, so, you know, the U.S. has provided a lot of arms, you know,
3158690	3163250	weapons systems, intelligence to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. And,
3164530	3170210	you know, there were lots of discussions about, is it legal to do that? And I think
3170210	3178190	I saw one report kind of summarized it as lawful, but awful. So the laws and policies
3178190	3186630	that the U.S. applies to security assistance, providing stuff to other countries,
3186630	3192350	it considers some things. It considers things like diversion, which is, are you going to give,
3192350	3196830	we want to safeguard that if we give this, if the U.S. gives this to another country,
3196830	3201990	they won't give it to somebody else. And there's also something called Leahy law that guards
3201990	3206430	against gross violations of human rights. So if they're doing like war crimes, really horrible
3206430	3213290	things, then that can stop transfers. But the more general civilian protection considerations
3213290	3218570	that we're talking about really are not well incorporated in security assistance. And so
3219290	3225090	that is something that the state department is really trying to think about doing. We're talking
3225090	3233410	to them about, you know, new policies and new ways to think about this. But one thing that can help
3233410	3242810	is if you can provide equipment, including weapons, that have some of these safeguards,
3242810	3249010	right? So right now, the Saudi-led coalition, how many hospitals have they struck? I've lost
3249010	3256310	count. It's so many, so many, right? And I mean, you can certainly say, well, we're not going to
3256310	3262150	give them anything, right? But they've also shown that they'll just buy from the Russians.
3262150	3272930	So it'd be great to stop them, okay? I'm in favor of that. But if war is going to continue,
3272930	3281790	are there things that can be done to make war more humane and safer for the civilians that are in the
3281790	3291370	conflict areas? And so the answer is yes, and that technology can help. And that can certainly be the
3291370	3300010	case for exports as well. And as I'm reading the chats coming in, I'll just say that folks are
3300010	3306430	kind of doubling down on concerns about domestic law enforcement again, right? And so predator
3306430	3315370	drones at protests, you know, an interest in, you know, can we have voting where we select that
3315370	3322030	we're gonna not fund these types of technologies? Maybe that's in a military or in a law enforcement
3322030	3331070	context. So let's see, and a note that killer robots are perfect for war crimes. So back to
3331070	3336110	the armed conflict case. So I'll say again, with respect to the domestic law enforcement front,
3336110	3343150	right, we're just seeing that, you know, some of this is not, maybe not necessarily an issue
3343150	3350930	limited to AI developments, right? We're seeing it now. It's a real problem in domestic law
3350930	3356630	enforcement. And so, you know, it's important that we fix the laws and fix the practices that are in
3356630	3363230	place now, even before we have sort of new classes of weapons that the military is using.
3363930	3373130	Um, let's see one, another comment that somebody wrote into the chat was, was concerned about AI
3373130	3379430	vulnerabilities, right, being especially problematic in this context, they mentioned
3379430	3387310	adversarial attacks, data poisoning, right. So these are, so these are getting technical
3387310	3392630	challenges, right, that are going to be hard challenges to to solve, right. So this goes back
3392630	3397270	to, there are a lot of challenges and just getting getting the technology right to actually
3397270	3405510	make these applications work. And so I guess one thing I would say here is is that, that,
3405510	3411250	you know, yeah, these are hard problems. I think we, you know, we, DoD will need the tech sector,
3411250	3416130	private industries help to get good solutions here. And in cases where we can't be confident
3416130	3424290	in these technologies, especially in in lethal, or weapons contexts, those are cases where we need
3424290	3429230	to not not deploy systems, right, unless we can, unless we can be confident with how they're going
3429230	3439790	to operate. Can I make one comment about the, you know, I do hear this a lot about, you know,
3439790	3446110	killer robots are perfect for war crimes, right. And so I think it's useful kind of just to build
3446230	3452690	a framework here. So there are two kinds of parties that are involved in conflict. Some can
3452690	3461310	be states, or it can be armed groups. One is parties that want to follow the law. Okay. And
3461310	3468110	then there are some that don't, they show impunity. And so I think technology applies differently to
3468110	3476810	the two of them. So those that that wants to apply the law, then this kind of technology can
3476810	3485030	be useful for, for helping, helping them to better comply with the law and their legal obligations.
3485030	3490710	But even beyond the law, because in the US, we talked about there are legal things we're required
3490710	3497710	to do. But then we also want to try even harder than what we're required to do, right. The law
3497710	3504510	is just the basic requirements. Diane mentioned the, the US civilian casualty executive order in
3504510	3510830	2016. That goes beyond what is required by the law. It says, you know, there are things we're
3510830	3517870	required to do, but we're going to do more because it's important. So, so for the group of states or
3517870	3523690	parties that want to comply with the law, you can help comply with the law. And then you can even
3523690	3529510	go further. And we talked about some ways to do that. Then there's others that don't comply with
3529510	3533730	the law, right. And there's the Russians and the Syrians. And, you know, there are different,
3533730	3539190	different, you know, different terrorist groups out there. They just don't care. They exploit the
3539190	3547310	law for their own benefits. And in those cases, technology can also be used for accountability
3548110	3554590	and to traceability and to try to highlight some of the things that they do. Honestly,
3554590	3558230	you know, there were, there were things I remember in the counter ISIS
3560430	3569650	conflict in, in Iraq and Syria, ISIS did horrible, horrible things, and most people have no idea.
3569650	3578870	Right. And so, and just better, better showing those things can help in themselves to influence
3578870	3583750	those groups, just like the New York Times article, talking about the Russians and
3584370	3591610	delivery striking hospitals. Okay. They, they did that quietly. When the New York Times came out,
3591610	3596510	Russia started to squirm, right? Because they don't want to be known for that. They want to do
3596510	3602950	it for various interests. But when you start putting the spotlight on them, that can help,
3603530	3610050	that can help influence them in themselves. We should also be thinking about how can we better
3610050	3616050	use that information to really deter them from doing those terrible things. So just wanted to
3616050	3621770	kind of give that overall framework for war crimes. So Larry, another comment that somebody
3621770	3627970	wrote in that I think is a really interesting one is a question of whether, right, so DOD has
3627970	3634190	these AI policies. Should, should those be codified in law? Because it's, it's really
3634190	3649220	easy to change norms and guidelines. What would you say to that? So, so I remember actually having
3649400	3657700	a conversation with Eric Schmidt about, he's part of the, the National Security Commission for AI.
3657700	3664160	And so there was this discussion about, you know, law versus policy. And, you know, the tricky thing
3664160	3670700	is that it is so early that oftentimes we don't even really know what we're talking about, you
3670700	3677320	know, and, and these kinds of conversations are so valuable because we're, we're, we're trying to
3677320	3681460	figure out what is really important. And that, that's one reason why we've been asking these
3681460	3685620	questions too, right? You know, what do you think is important? Because we want to hear from, from all
3685620	3694760	of you. And, but, but trying to make a law too soon has risks, right? Because then you've sort of
3694760	3702360	codified your limited understanding. And it's really, it's harder to change law than it is
3702360	3711160	to change policy. So, so in these early stages and really, you know, DoD has not done much.
3711160	3717160	They've done a lot of talking. There really has not been a lot. Diane mentioned the, the DoD
3717160	3724060	directive on, on autonomous weapons that was created in 2012. And it calls for the senior
3724060	3730280	level review for additional scrutiny for systems that would meet certain requirements. They
3730280	3737140	haven't done a single one because they're just not there yet. So I think... And just,
3737140	3741520	they haven't done a single one because, because nobody's made it, nobody's tried, nobody's asked,
3741520	3750320	right? Just to, just to clarify that. Yeah. Yeah. So I think, you know, it's, it's kind of easy to
3750320	3758060	say, you know, yeah, there's so much that can be done, but in reality, militaries move slowly.
3758060	3765220	They're built to move slowly. They're these huge bureaucratic structures that are designed to
3765220	3771840	reduce risk. And so they move really slowly. And so I think at this point, we, we don't
3771840	3776800	necessarily need a law. We need to actually figure out what the important things are.
3777200	3782560	And we're not, we're not even there yet. So, so that's why we really appreciate this discussion
3782560	3787260	today to try to help figure out what are the things we really need to be worried about.
3788060	3792080	Yeah, thanks. And, and I'm tracking, just looking through the chat here, I think there's,
3792580	3796460	there's, there's one more comment that I'm seeing that I don't think we've, we've addressed yet that
3796460	3803460	I'll read off here, which is just that I think the person who recommended this, this report that you
3803460	3810600	talked about earlier, so this, so they, they raised a few issues from that report. This was the
3810600	3817160	vulnerabilities, AI vulnerabilities issue. They also raised the point that there's a dynamic where
3817160	3826500	offense is easier than defense in some of the space. And so I think that, that one thing I would,
3826500	3831100	you know, I would say two things there, right, which is that, you know, one is that I don't,
3831100	3836680	I don't think that's special of the AI. And I would also say that, you know, we did some
3836680	3844120	research a little while back looking at lethal autonomy, you know, potential dynamics or uses
3844120	3850220	within, hypothetical uses within the military. And, you know, back to this, a drone swarm
3850220	3855200	attacking a ship example, I would say just don't discount that, that, you know, certainly it's
3855200	3858760	right that in a lot of contexts, the offense is easier than defense, but there are still
3860340	3866740	really important defensive contexts where technologies like this can be really helpful.
3866740	3870400	And, and those are cases where we're talking about, you know, protecting the lives of our
3870400	3875660	own soldiers. So they're ones that we, you know, I think as a country and certainly our military
3876460	3879140	regards very highly and is very important.
3880280	3886520	If I can just kind of add to that, the, the context thing is really important. So, you know,
3886520	3891780	I was, I was part of the US delegation to the UN and in some of these talks on lethal autonomous
3891780	3900260	systems. And one thing that was often lost is that the context really is important. So, so you have
3900400	3905340	some, some people would talk about, well, how will you use a lethal autonomous weapons system
3905340	3911160	in an urban environment against, you know, against groups that aren't wearing uniforms
3911160	3915840	and they're, you know, hiding within the population. And then, you know, basically the
3915840	3923280	answer of, you know, the US and Australia and the UK was like, we won't. And what, what we really,
3923280	3931160	what they kind of want this stuff for is, is for missile defense in, in a maritime setting,
3931160	3936480	right? So there's no civilians anywhere around but they have hypersonic missiles coming in
3936480	3941820	and they want, they want to have capability that helps them to, to better defend against
3941820	3948900	those kinds of things. So, so just, just recognizing that there are some contexts
3948900	3954980	where you can use some of this technology with a much lower risk to civilians than others.
3955300	3961720	And just having a more nuanced conversation where we recognize that. And, and, you know,
3961720	3966020	militaries need to recognize that too, right? They do internal reviews where they try to
3966020	3970100	recognize risk and the context is really important for those,
3970100	3974300	those decisions on whether they think it's okay or not to use them.
3974900	3981020	Yeah, thanks. And so one more person wrote in a good comment that, that I'll read off here,
3981020	3987440	right? Which is the concerns about, right? AI needs big data a lot of times to, to work.
3987440	3994260	And so what about data security there? So do you have any, any comments on that, Larry?
3994340	4000380	So I think this is, this is, I mean, we talked about, there are some risks that,
4000380	4005120	that, you know, DoD is like, is really handling well. And then there are some that
4005740	4013600	I think they're behind. And I think this is one of them. And it's, you know, we talked about AI
4013600	4021200	and applications. I think this is one reason why, you know, DoD is not as, as making as much
4021200	4027260	progress as people may think. Because there are all these enablers that they need to have
4027980	4034000	enabled to use AI effectively. And the data situation with DoD is really problematic.
4034560	4040620	They, they, they have lots of different networks. You know, they're not necessarily secure.
4040620	4044980	They don't necessarily talk to each other. Well, they're, they're not always formatted
4044980	4050380	in a consistent way or quality control. And so that makes it really difficult
4050380	4059320	to actually use that data in a, in a constructive way. So, so DoD is going to have to get a handle
4059320	4065960	on that. And part of, part of that is going to be trying to make data more secure. I will say
4065960	4074480	in the few serious AI applications that, that I'm aware of, there has been kind of this recognition,
4074480	4080380	both of they need to be careful about data poisoning. And, and that has implications
4080380	4087300	both on storage, but also on who you get to do your, your data processing, right? You can't
4087300	4094520	just necessarily outsource this to some commercial organization that may, may or may not be the most
4094520	4099700	trustworthy. And then the storage. So it's a great question. I think.
4101860	4109300	Yeah. Okay. Well, thank you guys so much. We really appreciate hearing your, your thoughts
4109300	4113800	and comments. I'll reiterate what Larry said a minute ago, which is the, please feel free to
4113800	4118340	reach out to us. You can either do it through discord or through our email addresses that we
4118340	4122900	put up a few minutes ago. We would love to hear, you know, if there's, if there's more that you
4122900	4127180	want to talk about that we didn't get to, again, we would, you know, we, we don't have all the
4127180	4132720	answers, but we are really interested in hearing your thoughts and concerns, even if they're not
4132720	4140860	things that are, can be perfectly answered today. So, so thank you again, Ethics Village for hosting
4140860	4146280	us. And I really appreciate everybody's, everybody's participation here.
4148520	4154800	Awesome. We'd like to, again, thank you to our speakers, Dan and Larry for our very first talk
4154800	4160840	of day two. For those of you that are here for the rest of the few hours, stay tuned for our
4160840	4162980	next few talks. Our next talk will be from our guest speaker, Dan. So, Dan, thank you so much for