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Hey, AJ.

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Hello.

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How are you?

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Hi.

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I'm doing good.

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Alright, it looks like our presenters are here.

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It sounds like there is a slight echo somewhere.

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Ah, no worries.

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How about now?

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Let's see.

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Yep, it seems to be gone.

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Let me...

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I like your t-shirt, Jason.

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Yes.

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I like it.

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So, is it backwards for you or forwards?

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It's forwards.

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I'm just going to go straight through.

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It looks like it's mirrored.

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Yeah, on mine, I get the mirror image.

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Nice.

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Alright, let me get your all slides queued up really quick, and we will go from there.

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We are almost at the hour, so let me share my screen.

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Let's share the screen.

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Let us share the slides.

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So, I'm going to introduce you all in a few.

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Let me go from there.

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Alright, can you all see the slides?

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Let's see.

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Yep.

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I can see.

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Okay, that's perfect.

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I'm getting...

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Okay, now I see it.

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Perfect, perfect.

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And we will commence just shortly.

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Give folks a few more minutes to pop on.

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It looks like...

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Sure.

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There's about nine folks on the Twitch chat.

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We have another maybe ten or so on the voice chat, so...

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Alright, let us commence.

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So, hi everybody.

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I'd like to welcome our next set of speakers.

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We have Art Jason Kronk and A.J.

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Gmusel.

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They're going to be talking about the models of privacy norms.

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So, a little bit about Jason.

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Jason is a privacy consultant with the Interprivacy Consulting Group, a boutique privacy consulting firm, where his current focus is on helping companies overcome the socio-technical challenges of privacy.

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He is a certified information privacy professional, a certified information privacy manager, a certified information privacy technologist, and a floor member of the IAPP faculty, a licensed attorney in the United States, an author, blogger, speaker, and is a passionate advocate for understanding privacy.

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He writes regularly for both his own blog and others, and he has been a guest speaker at his alma mater, FSU College of Law, and he frequently speaks at IAPP events and tweets at Privacy Maverick.

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Welcome, Jason.

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And then our next speaker, who is also in the talk, is A.J.

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Gmusel.

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So, A.J.

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is an editor, legal researcher, lecturer, and licensed attorney.

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Her interests are privacy, privacy by design, technology law, contract law, and cybersecurity law.

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She received her LL.M.

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from the University of Illinois College of Law in 2019, where she focused on intellectual property and technology law.

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After her graduation, she started her research for Privacy Wiki at privacy.wiki, and now she's a chief legal editor at the wiki, with Professor Faye Jones and R.

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Jason Gronk of Pender Privacy, one of our other speakers.

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She's been working with Jason for over a year as a legal editor at Privacy Wiki.

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She remains at her work and researches in the wiki at the Interprivacy Consulting Group.

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She's also a visiting researcher at the Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority, and she teaches the course of health and privacy law at a Turkish university.

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Thank you, everybody, for being here as well, our Ethics Village attendees.

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I'd like to say welcome to our speakers, and without further ado, we will go forward.

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Thanks, Steve, for the introduction, and thanks, everyone, for taking time and joining us today.

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Hope everyone is healthy and safe.

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I can hear the Jason's voice, which is weird.

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Can't hear me?

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Yeah, I can hear you right now.

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Okay.

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So, you know, what is privacy?

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I often get this question.

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You may get this question.

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You may have this question.

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Oftentimes, you know, we run into situations where, you know, we talk about privacy, and it seems very ambiguous, ethereal, hard to pinpoint.

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We know it when we feel it, just like the old U.S.

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Supreme Court pornography case.

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I know it when I see it.

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But, you know, it's kind of hard to define, you know, say in a simple sentence or easily state.

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You know, I run into this situation all the time when people, you know, ask me what I do or ask me, you know, to try to help them.

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You know, companies want to build more privacy into their products.

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But what does that mean?

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What do we mean by privacy?

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AJ, I'm assuming, you know, you have the same questions or people have asked you the questions as well.

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Yeah, privacy is a complex social norm that has been tried to define for over decades.

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So as you can mention that privacy is very ambiguous and broad and depends on individuals, their psychology, responsibilities, cultural effects, sociological backgrounds, personal choices or preferences and experience and so on.

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Maybe in a chat screen, someone has a description of privacy.

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If you have like description of privacy by your own, just think about what privacy is for you.

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And do you care about that?

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Do you care about others' privacy?

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Or is it ethical for you to violate someone's privacy?

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That would be great to share your thoughts in a chat screen if you have one.

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What is your own privacy?

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I think that there is no real answers for privacy right now.

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Let me look again.

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Okay, what is privacy for you then, Jason?

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Like how do you describe it?

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Jason will be back in a few.

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It seems his chat has crashed or Discord has gone.

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So he will be back in a second.

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And if anybody has any questions, please feel free to field them to AJ over in the chat.

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If any of you all have any ideas on what privacy means to you, please post it in the chat as we wait for Jason to come back on.

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Okay, while we're waiting for Jason, I just wanted to talk about what we are going to talk in models of privacy norms under this talk.

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Jason and I are going to talk and discuss about models of privacy norms and how to use them in organizations, businesses, or daily lives.

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We're questioning the definition of privacy and diving in solo taxonomy and looking to Nest privacy framework.

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Lastly, we also talk about our privacy wiki.

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Again, thanks for joining us.

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But I think that we will be waiting for Jason.

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Just some technical difficulties, folks.

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Unfortunately, Discord is a little bit glitchy sometimes.

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I think it crashed the thing twice yesterday.

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So while we wait for Jason, if anybody has any idea of what privacy means to them, please post in the chat.

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I think for me, AJ, kind of moving a little bit forward, especially nowadays with social media and how people are constantly taking our data.

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Oh, it looks like Jason is back.

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There we are.

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Thanks for the definition.

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Definitely, definitely.

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Let's see.

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Jason, can you hear us?

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Let's wait a few seconds.

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Let's see while he goes live.

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So to finish my thought on that, you know, especially nowadays with people are being sold as a service.

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So all of your data that is essentially being sold, you know, as a product.

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So, you know, when everything is free, you are the product when it comes to Facebook, Google, when it comes to all the social media applications, Reddit and what have you.

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I think privacy to me means can I have control over that, that data, my information, all my posts.

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For all of you that have used, you know, social networking, online dating apps, online health, body checkers, Fitbits and what have you.

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Where is your data going?

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That's a question.

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And do you even own it?

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Because technically you have sold it to a company by using their application.

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So to me, that is what privacy is, I guess, in the 21st century, you know, in current times, what it means to me, I would say.

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And let's see if we can hear Jason really quick.

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I'll be right back, folks.

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So, I guess while we wait for Jason, let's see if we can double check.

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For those of you, can you all hear us clearly on the Ethics Talks voice channel?

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Just to double check.

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Please give us a shout out in the general text, just to double check and see.

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So, folks, give us one quick second.

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It looks like our speaker's computer probably decided to randomly reset itself when it shouldn't.

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Thanks, Microsoft, wherever you are.

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Billy G and what's-his-face, Palmer.

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Anyhoo, while we wait for our speaker to come back, I will put the slides up temporarily and we will continue forward.

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Again, this talk will continue just in a little while as our speaker, RJ Sincron, comes back from the form-dreaded Microsoft crashing death and doom.

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And thank you all for your patience.

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We will commence just shortly.

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And yeah, hang in there.

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Alright, folks, while we're waiting, does anybody have any ideas or any ideas when it comes to privacy, what it means to them?

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Please post it into the general chat.

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Earlier I was talking with AJ a little bit about how a lot of our, I guess, privacy, a lot of our privacy is kind of being taken nowadays with the idea of social media.

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Ah, here we go.

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So we got something from our very own The Fixer, one of our Ethics Village staff.

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So The Fixer says, for those of you that are on Twitch and other non-discord things, privacy within an application on the internet is the ability to do what I wish to do without attribution when I am not authenticated.

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When I am authenticated, then my activity should only be visible with whom I should choose to make visible without a warrant.

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Or actually, no, I'm sorry, that was from a Twitch comment from Denny Ma.

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So thank you, The Fixer, for relaying that from there.

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Let us double check and see now if our speakers are back.

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Hi, Jason, are you with us?

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Can you hear me?

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Yeah.

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Yeah , I hear you very well.

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A windowed blue screen in like years and years.

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Now I've pulled up Discord.

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It won't give me video, and it says your Discord installation is corrupt.

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But if you can hear me, that's good.

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I don't see the... are you still sharing the screen or no?

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Yes, I am currently sharing the screens.

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I am on the very first slide, Models of Privacy Norms.

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Jason, I was going to say you can also join our Twitch stream if you want to mute it.

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Oh, that was from Walt Williams.

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If you want to join, let me post that really quick.

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It's twitch.tv forward slash Ethics Village.

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You'll be able to see the slides as I go through them.

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Yeah, let me do that.

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And Dr.

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Wardog, you are correct.

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You can use Gen 2 and never update anything, but then you'll be stuck in cyclic dependency hell when you forget to update your box because Gen 2 likes to be bleeding edge.

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Although, yes, use Gen 2.

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If you want to heat up your apartment in the winter.

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Okay, we're back.

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So I see the original first screen.

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Is that correct?

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That is correct.

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Awesome.

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We can start if you'd like.

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I'm going to mute myself.

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And yeah, we'll start again.

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Everybody, welcome our speakers, R.

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Jason Kronk and A.J.

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Gumusel.

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I will stop speaking now and I'll let you all commence.

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So, okay, go ahead and advance to the next slide.

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So we often get the question of, and I'm going to repeat, and hopefully I don't know where everybody left off, but this may be a repeat for some people.

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But, you know, I often get the question, what is privacy?

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You know, it tends to be a very subjective topic.

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You know, everybody has their own opinion of what constitutes privacy.

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Everybody has a hard time defining it.

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And in defining it, it makes it really hard to manage it in a company.

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You know, a lot of people, I gave an example just a moment ago, but I'll say it again.

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Similar to the Supreme Court case around pornography, I know it when I see it.

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When I see a privacy violation or I feel a privacy violation, I know it's a privacy violation, but I have a hard time defining it.

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So, AJ, you were kind of expanding on that.

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Do you want to repeat what you were saying before my technical glitch?

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Well, I was saying that privacy, as you said, is a complex social norm that has been tried to define for over decades.

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However, there's no specific definitions or description for privacy.

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And you told, like, privacy is very ambiguous and broad.

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So, it depends on individual social backgrounds or preferences or personal choices.

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And there are tons of, like, and other, like, definitions from the chat.

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I saw Anna's definitions for privacy.

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Anna says that everybody has different privacy thresholds.

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And that's why, to me, it's important that we default to privacy.

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Any data sharing should only happen as a result of personal choice.

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That was good.

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And SushiPens agrees that.

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And it's sad to see that the norm on a lot of platforms is to opt into privacy instead of opt out.

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The user says, SushiPens says.

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And another comment on Twitch was privacy is the right to own data about yourself and not have others use that data without your express permission.

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Privacy is the right to own data about yourself and not have others use that data without your express permission.

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I don't know.

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It's just more security in privacy.

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Well, certainly, I think a lot of people, you know, especially if they have a technical background or even a security background, you know, they tend to gravitate towards that, you know, concept of confidentiality and, you know, you know, right to control data.

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But, you know, as I hope, you know, as we get into it, we'll expand on that and talk more about, you know, different thoughts around privacy.

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Next slide.

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So I want to give a little anecdotal story.

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I was at an event two years ago, maybe a year and a half ago or so.

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It was a IAPP KnowledgeNet.

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So the IAPP is the International Association of Privacy Professionals.

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And I was at a local chapter meeting.

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And we were doing an exercise, we were being led in an exercise to consider if there was an ethical issue around a specific scenario.

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So we were given a scenario and asked to say, you know, is there an ethical issue with what's going on?

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And should we, you know, what should we do about it?

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And I was really struck.

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I, you know, we were each kind of cordoned off into tables.

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And I had about three or four or four or five other people at my table.

236
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And at first, I just kind of sat back and listened.

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I was really struck by the number of people who were like, oh, there's no ethical issue.

238
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Or, yeah, I see an ethical issue.

239
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They didn't really have a frame of reference.

240
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They were just kind of talking in a vacuum of seeing an ethical issue or not seeing an ethical issue.

241
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And it was really problematic from my perspective because it makes it much more difficult to deal with if you're not working from a common frame of reference in terms of what is ethical and what is unethical.

242
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Because when I prodded, when I asked the person who said there's no ethical issue, I was like, well, what are you measuring this against?

243
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What do you consider ethical and unethical?

244
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And he sat there and he thought for a minute.

245
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I'm like, what is the measuring tool by which you're deciding this is unethical or not?

246
00:24:18,310 --> 00:24:20,250
And he sat and thought for a minute.

247
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And he's an attorney, and I'll be forthcoming and say I'm an attorney as well.

248
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So I don't want to disparage all attorneys, just some of them.

249
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So he was like, well, yeah, I'm an attorney and they don't have a duty of confidentiality here like an attorney would.

250
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So there's no ethical issue.

251
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So that's the only measuring stick by which you determine there's an ethical issue is whether or not there's a duty of confidentiality and they breach that duty.

252
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So he sat and thought about it and he's like, well, maybe there's a fiduciary duty.

253
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You have a duty to, you know, clients to protect data.

254
00:25:05,710 --> 00:25:16,510
Again, he was very narrow minded in his thought pattern about what, you know, what is privacy or what was what was ethical in this situation.

255
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So I want to introduce you to two concepts in the law.

256
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So Latin terms, malum in se and malum prohibitum.

257
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Malum in se means evil, wrong in itself.

258
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We typically think of the stereotypical example here is murder.

259
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You know, we as a society almost universally view murder as as wrong.

260
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It's an evil unto itself.

261
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You don't need a law to tell you that murder is wrong.

262
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So then there's a concept of malum prohibitum, and this is wrong because a statute law or regulation says so.

263
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So if the law says that going over 55 miles an hour on this road is a violation of the law, it's only wrong because that statute set that speed limit on that road.

264
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Going 55 miles per hour is not wrong in and of itself.

265
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It's not it's not an evil unto itself.

266
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It's only wrong because a law says so in particular.

267
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So I would position that privacy is more in the in the realm of or violations of privacy are more in the realms of malum in se.

268
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In other words, you know, violating somebody's privacy is evil or wrong into itself.

269
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But but how do we again, how do we determine murder?

270
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Pretty obvious.

271
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OK, killing somebody, you know, taking out their life.

272
00:26:52,370 --> 00:26:58,290
But when I when I say privacy is is wrong in or violations of privacy is wrong in itself.

273
00:26:58,530 --> 00:27:08,430
And we're back to that question of what is privacy and is there an is there or can there be agreement around that?

274
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I think in this concept, I think complying a rule without considering and evaluating is also a concern for privacy.

275
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Sorry, you said compliance.

276
00:27:21,150 --> 00:27:22,170
Say that again?

277
00:27:22,210 --> 00:27:28,710
Complying a rule without considering and evaluating is also a concern for privacy.

278
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Sure, sure.

279
00:27:31,050 --> 00:27:31,970
Agreed.

280
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So, you know, so how do so what are the social norms to which I'm referring, you know, and how do we define them?

281
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And they may be different.

282
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You know, we talked about privacy being subjective, but it may be different based on different cultures, certainly different contexts and situations.

283
00:27:50,810 --> 00:27:56,770
Sorry, AJ, I know I went on a little bit of a rant there on the compliance issue.

284
00:27:56,770 --> 00:28:00,370
Do you have anything else you wanted to add here?

285
00:28:00,670 --> 00:28:12,290
Well, I just wanted to add like you're thinking you're we're talking about it depends on privacy depends upon individuals to individuals, but it's considering as a human rights as well.

286
00:28:12,290 --> 00:28:13,650
I just want to edit it.

287
00:28:13,650 --> 00:28:20,030
And while we're talking about privacy as social norm, I just wanted to remind it.

288
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I remember the event in 2016, you know, Mark Zuckerberg is just like leading Facebook.

289
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And he in 2016, he considered privacy is not a social norm in 21st century.

290
00:28:34,590 --> 00:28:43,070
But here is we're talking about privacy as a social norm, as professionals.

291
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And I think that it's just valuable for all humanity.

292
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So like we're not only thinking that privacy as a social norm, but also we should consider about a human right.

293
00:28:57,870 --> 00:29:13,850
Yeah, I would say, you know, going back to that Mark Zuckerberg quote, you know, I think, again, this is what is is makes privacy confusing is, you know, he was using a certain concept or definition of privacy.

294
00:29:13,850 --> 00:29:26,590
You know, if you started probing and asking him questions about that, he might feel that there are other things that fall within the privacy rubric that, you know, certainly are social norms.

295
00:29:26,650 --> 00:29:32,570
Clearly, he was using that for, you know, defensive purposes of Facebook's actions.

296
00:29:32,650 --> 00:29:38,550
But, you know, but again, it depends on what you mean.

297
00:29:38,550 --> 00:29:49,930
And oftentimes when somebody says privacy, they're usually talking about one aspect and not the entire spectrum of what what people might consider privacy.

298
00:29:49,930 --> 00:29:50,610
Of course.

299
00:29:50,610 --> 00:29:53,710
OK, let's go on to the next slide.

300
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So let's talk about models of privacy norms.

301
00:29:58,670 --> 00:30:03,830
You know, there are several models of privacy norms and we respect them.

302
00:30:03,830 --> 00:30:07,370
However, we selected the most popular and well-known models.

303
00:30:07,370 --> 00:30:17,760
They're Hartzog's Privacy Pillars, Weston's States of Privacy, Presser's Privacy Torts, Callot's Harm, Solow's Taxonomy.

304
00:30:17,950 --> 00:30:24,970
And we're going to talk about also Nissenbaum's Obfuscation, which Hartzog also discussed in his articles.

305
00:30:25,090 --> 00:30:30,550
When Hartzog and Weston defined privacy, they considered privacy values.

306
00:30:30,550 --> 00:30:33,670
Therefore, it is in white color in the left side.

307
00:30:33,670 --> 00:30:43,130
On the other hand, Presser, Callot, and Solow categorized privacy with its harms, which is why it is colored in black.

308
00:30:43,810 --> 00:30:50,530
Let's first talk about Weston and Hartzog, who defined privacy based on its values.

309
00:30:50,530 --> 00:30:53,510
Then Jason will speak about Presser, Callot, and Solow.

310
00:30:53,510 --> 00:31:03,890
And he will give an example about Solow's Taxonomy in order to illustrate what it is, what they are describing as privacy.

311
00:31:04,130 --> 00:31:05,090
L.L.

312
00:31:05,090 --> 00:31:10,850
Weston was a well-known privacy law professor and a legend in privacy.

313
00:31:11,130 --> 00:31:13,470
He shaped privacy law.

314
00:31:13,470 --> 00:31:21,250
He wrote his doctoral dissertation in the 1960s, which later got funding to turn into a book called Privacy and Freedom.

315
00:31:21,250 --> 00:31:27,690
I can quick quote his definition of privacy.

316
00:31:27,690 --> 00:31:39,410
It's like the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions determined to themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.

317
00:31:39,930 --> 00:31:45,090
He pointed out privacy, either physical and psychological.

318
00:31:45,090 --> 00:31:56,030
He outlined these four states of privacy as solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve, respectively.

319
00:31:56,550 --> 00:32:03,830
In its states of privacy, solitude means to be alone and free from observation by others.

320
00:32:03,830 --> 00:32:06,610
Weston was involved in the threat of freedom.

321
00:32:06,610 --> 00:32:15,910
For him, intimacy refers to being alone with a small group to the exclusion of others, such as family, and concerns close relationships.

322
00:32:16,390 --> 00:32:22,970
We can say that solitude and intimacy both involve freedom from observation of others.

323
00:32:22,970 --> 00:32:32,070
Everyone may be familiar with anonymity because everyone is just popping up the information security definitions in a chat.

324
00:32:32,070 --> 00:32:39,790
His anonymity is involving freedom from being identified by others.

325
00:32:39,790 --> 00:32:44,030
It depends on the choices available in one's environment.

326
00:32:44,030 --> 00:32:50,410
In other words, it refers to being unrecognized in a public place to be bland in the crowd.

327
00:32:50,690 --> 00:32:55,350
The last one is reserve.

328
00:32:55,470 --> 00:33:00,490
It's about freedom from disclosing information about yourself to others.

329
00:33:00,490 --> 00:33:08,290
It's not keeping information secret, but limiting communication of self to others in different ways.

330
00:33:08,290 --> 00:33:12,150
It is based on a desire to limit disclosure to others.

331
00:33:12,150 --> 00:33:24,990
So before talking about Herzog, I would also like to quote here Professor Elisa Austin's perspective to Weston's state of privacy to clarify.

332
00:33:24,990 --> 00:33:50,610
She states that in her re-reading article, like this, we choose a state of privacy when we choose to not share information about ourselves, either through shielding ourselves from observation, which refers solitude and intimacy, shielding ourselves from identification,

333
00:33:50,610 --> 00:34:05,010
which refers anonymity in Weston's state of privacy, or shielding ourselves from disclosure, which refers to reserve in states of privacy.

334
00:34:05,030 --> 00:34:12,230
So let's talk about Rudra Herzog values privacy with his pillars of privacy.

335
00:34:12,230 --> 00:34:17,090
He defined privacy in three pillars, obscurity, autonomy, and trust.

336
00:34:17,090 --> 00:34:24,010
We may familiar with it, but let's dive in his pillars of privacy.

337
00:34:24,010 --> 00:34:29,890
Obscurity is when information and people are hard or unlikely to be found or understood.

338
00:34:29,890 --> 00:34:36,070
People are relatively safe and rely on that risk calculus.

339
00:34:36,070 --> 00:34:47,150
It is continual presence of some facts, such as search visibility, unprotected access, identification, clarity.

340
00:34:47,310 --> 00:34:50,390
These are diminishes obscurity.

341
00:34:50,390 --> 00:35:00,430
His autonomy is defined as freedom to develop reliable and sustainable relationships of trust and create and maintain those zones of obscurity.

342
00:35:00,430 --> 00:35:06,430
It is like freedom from external interference or something leads us what we want or not.

343
00:35:06,430 --> 00:35:14,590
It's kind of a value, and it's kind of slows decisional interference, which Jason will talk about later on.

344
00:35:14,590 --> 00:35:16,910
But just remind it.

345
00:35:17,890 --> 00:35:23,430
And think about social media users, YouTubers, Instagrammers, or influencers.

346
00:35:23,430 --> 00:35:29,750
Maybe we don't like them, but they disclose every detail about their lives because of their followers.

347
00:35:29,930 --> 00:35:33,050
And also they're making money for that.

348
00:35:33,250 --> 00:35:41,910
We therefore say that privacy leads us solutions that helps us choose and hour us in control of our own unique lives.

349
00:35:44,130 --> 00:35:47,650
So think about this for a second.

350
00:35:47,650 --> 00:35:51,950
Privacy is right to what we want to do or not.

351
00:35:51,950 --> 00:35:57,190
So he's just literally considering privacy as a value.

352
00:35:57,250 --> 00:36:03,930
And when we think about privacy as a right to what we want to do or not, it's just a value.

353
00:36:03,930 --> 00:36:09,170
And it's just a robust value that we ever had.

354
00:36:10,170 --> 00:36:14,610
So he described autonomy as one of the values of privacy.

355
00:36:14,710 --> 00:36:18,290
And the Herzog's one of the players is also trust.

356
00:36:18,290 --> 00:36:23,150
Trust is also familiar with us.

357
00:36:23,150 --> 00:36:27,430
Trust is always a valuable thing in our lives and relationships.

358
00:36:27,430 --> 00:36:35,630
Even when you're talking with your relatives, your friends, trust is always leading your relationship with being them.

359
00:36:35,630 --> 00:36:41,950
According to Herzog, trust is willingness to become vulnerable to the actions of another.

360
00:36:43,250 --> 00:36:50,210
Think about you're okay with something, what other people behave to you in every circumstance.

361
00:36:50,210 --> 00:36:53,170
It happens in every second of our lives.

362
00:36:53,170 --> 00:37:01,010
Even when you opt in for a company's privacy policy or notice or something maybe pop out in their website.

363
00:37:01,010 --> 00:37:07,650
You're just like opting in and then you're just literally trusting that company while you're opting in.

364
00:37:07,650 --> 00:37:16,430
So Herzog is just defining privacy with his pillars of privacy.

365
00:37:16,430 --> 00:37:17,750
So Jason?

366
00:37:18,610 --> 00:37:28,590
Yeah, so AJ just went over kind of those are all things to aspire to.

367
00:37:28,590 --> 00:37:31,450
You want to give people obscurity.

368
00:37:31,450 --> 00:37:32,890
You want to give people autonomy.

369
00:37:32,890 --> 00:37:34,710
You want to give people trust.

370
00:37:35,630 --> 00:37:42,490
Where it's a privacy torts and cable harms are things that as a society we want to avoid.

371
00:37:42,490 --> 00:37:55,870
So Prosser was a famed law professor who wrote the primary text on torts in the United States.

372
00:37:55,870 --> 00:38:00,590
And a tort is just a wrongful act.

373
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And this under common law in the United States, you can sue people for violation, for impedance onto you.

374
00:38:12,210 --> 00:38:21,090
So there are four privacy related torts that Prosser defined in his seminal text.

375
00:38:21,090 --> 00:38:29,770
And these are still found in common law, though most states have adopted statutory interpretations of them.

376
00:38:29,930 --> 00:38:32,450
So false light is the first one.

377
00:38:32,450 --> 00:38:37,070
And that is publicity which puts somebody in a false light.

378
00:38:37,210 --> 00:38:49,870
So when you think of the National Enquirer, you know, describing somebody's alien baby or something, that would be an example of putting somebody in a false light.

379
00:38:51,330 --> 00:39:07,150
Intrusion upon seclusion or intrusion upon somebody's private affairs or solitude, that is essentially like prying into somebody's, you know, private life.

380
00:39:07,150 --> 00:39:14,250
You know, digging up information or finding information that really is none of your business.

381
00:39:14,790 --> 00:39:18,910
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.

382
00:39:18,910 --> 00:39:23,330
So it's not just disclosure of private facts.

383
00:39:23,330 --> 00:39:34,250
One of the things that makes this a little bit narrow and hard to use in a lot of times as far as like a lawsuit, because it has to be embarrassing private facts.

384
00:39:34,910 --> 00:39:45,230
And then appropriation is what we think of when we think somebody takes a celebrity's image and uses it for financial gain.

385
00:39:45,230 --> 00:39:50,490
And we'll talk a little bit about that in a little bit more detail in a minute.

386
00:39:51,030 --> 00:39:59,570
So Ryan Calo has come up with his objective and subjective harms.

387
00:39:59,790 --> 00:40:12,530
These are fairly broad categories, but they still kind of run the gamut of a lot of different type of activity we would consider privacy.

388
00:40:12,530 --> 00:40:21,730
So his objective harm is unanticipated or coerced use of information.

389
00:40:22,150 --> 00:40:36,130
So if I have information about you and I use it in a way you weren't expecting, that is an objective harm or if I coerce the use of information from you.

390
00:40:36,130 --> 00:40:38,550
AJ, were you saying something?

391
00:40:39,710 --> 00:40:41,610
Okay.

392
00:40:41,610 --> 00:40:42,610
Okay.

393
00:40:42,610 --> 00:40:48,950
And then subjective is the perception of unwanted observation.

394
00:40:48,950 --> 00:41:03,470
Now, notice the word perception there, because what Calo was suggesting is that subjective harm doesn't need to come from actually having unwanted observation.

395
00:41:03,470 --> 00:41:21,470
If I think the NSA is surveilling me, I may do things like not talk on the phone or I may change my behavior or be anxious or have anxiety about it.

396
00:41:21,470 --> 00:41:31,530
So even if I have the perception of unwanted observation, even if I just have that perception, that is in itself a harm.

397
00:41:31,530 --> 00:41:36,990
And you can see this in thinking about surveillance.

398
00:41:36,990 --> 00:41:46,310
If somebody wants to just get me convinced that I'm being surveilled, hey, by the way, I put a camera in your house.

399
00:41:46,310 --> 00:41:46,690
What?

400
00:41:46,690 --> 00:41:47,230
Where is it?

401
00:41:47,230 --> 00:41:47,870
What?

402
00:41:47,870 --> 00:41:50,710
I may not actually be surveilled.

403
00:41:50,710 --> 00:41:52,850
I may not actually have a camera in my house.

404
00:41:52,850 --> 00:41:58,050
But if I have that perception, it's still going to affect me.

405
00:41:58,050 --> 00:42:01,910
And that's what Calo was trying to get across with his subjective harms.

406
00:42:02,350 --> 00:42:23,030
Now, you know, one of the things I want to, going back to my anecdote a little bit ago about the conversation around ethics I had at the IAPP KnowledgeNet, you know, by picking, and this is not all of the privacy norms we're going to discuss, but by picking a model of privacy norms,

407
00:42:23,030 --> 00:42:29,030
now the discussion isn't what is ethical and what is unethical.

408
00:42:29,030 --> 00:42:36,970
The question is whether your scenario fits within one of these models, and then what do you do about it?

409
00:42:36,970 --> 00:42:49,230
So, for instance, if you were to pick Harzog's privacy pillars, now it's not just this kind of ambiguous discussion of is this ethical, is this unethical?

410
00:42:49,290 --> 00:42:56,250
Now you just have to relate, well, you know, are we subscribing to obscurity?

411
00:42:56,250 --> 00:42:58,970
Are we giving people obscurity or not?

412
00:42:58,970 --> 00:43:02,010
Are we giving people autonomy or not?

413
00:43:02,010 --> 00:43:06,790
Are we giving people, you know, are we instilling trust or not?

414
00:43:06,790 --> 00:43:14,010
And then it just becomes a line-drawing exercise of where are you within or without the model?

415
00:43:14,010 --> 00:43:24,010
Not a question of is it ethical or not, and kind of that, you know, almost unanswerable question.

416
00:43:24,010 --> 00:43:27,190
I just want to add something.

417
00:43:27,610 --> 00:43:34,250
It shouldn't be expected that organizations use it for checklists in developing privacy values.

418
00:43:34,250 --> 00:43:57,730
While you're just saying that, if we're thinking in any circumstances and considering those privacy norms, whether it is ethical or not, organizations or businesses or any individual should use it for a checklist.

419
00:43:57,730 --> 00:44:10,970
It's a guidance on how to think about privacy values and how to distinguish them from privacy principles and privacy outcomes in the consumer environment or organizations, businesses, that I would say.

420
00:44:11,230 --> 00:44:13,930
And I just want to ask something.

421
00:44:14,270 --> 00:44:17,210
That will be great for the audience as well.

422
00:44:18,750 --> 00:44:26,210
So it can appear in, like, different privacy harms or values may occur at the same time, right?

423
00:44:32,330 --> 00:44:35,950
I'm sorry, was that a question to me or to the audience?

424
00:44:36,670 --> 00:44:38,190
Like, both.

425
00:44:38,190 --> 00:44:48,070
Like, it may occur, like, all the privacy norms may occur at the same time in any circumstance, right?

426
00:44:48,070 --> 00:44:49,630
I was just, like, asking.

427
00:44:50,790 --> 00:44:57,750
I mean, from my perspective, certainly an activity can fall under many of these models.

428
00:44:57,750 --> 00:45:01,790
I'm not sure I quite follow if that's the question.

429
00:45:01,790 --> 00:45:03,790
Yeah, I would agree.

430
00:45:04,770 --> 00:45:08,190
For instance, hard dogs obscurity.

431
00:45:08,610 --> 00:45:28,150
If you're, you could potentially, you know, being losing obscurity, you know, and also violating Prosser's privacy tort of public disclosure because something happened in private and by you exposing it to a larger audience, you know, disclosing it to the public.

432
00:45:28,150 --> 00:45:43,350
You've essentially ruined that person's, you know, obscurity in what they were doing because they were reliant on that, that they were doing it, you know, and nobody was paying attention.

433
00:45:44,350 --> 00:45:45,270
Yes.

434
00:45:46,230 --> 00:45:49,670
Okay, let's dive into solo taxonomy then, right?

435
00:45:49,670 --> 00:45:55,950
Well, let me, yeah, so before we do that, hit next real quick, Steve.

436
00:46:00,950 --> 00:46:10,190
Yeah, so I just want to point out one additional one that it's not, it's not a model of privacy norm in the traditional sense.

437
00:46:10,390 --> 00:46:18,430
Nissenbaum, Helen Nissenbaum is a philosophy professor who has come up with the concept of contextual integrity.

438
00:46:18,430 --> 00:46:45,830
And this is related to information privacy harms and it's not a norm as we've described to others where there are certain buckets of activities that we say are normative or non-normative behaviors, but rather it's a way of examining an activity to determine if it meets or does not meet a social norm.

439
00:46:45,830 --> 00:46:54,430
And that is looking at five different aspects around an information activity.

440
00:46:54,430 --> 00:47:05,210
You have a sender who is transmitting information, have some transmission principle, and then a recipient of that information.

441
00:47:05,210 --> 00:47:14,690
And then the black silhouette is meant to represent the data subject about who the information refers.

442
00:47:15,010 --> 00:47:18,410
And then I is the actual type of information.

443
00:47:18,410 --> 00:47:19,910
Are we talking about health information?

444
00:47:19,910 --> 00:47:27,430
Are we talking about, you know, identifying information, contact information?

445
00:47:27,430 --> 00:47:48,990
And by looking at these five different factors, then we can essentially, you know, describe this and look, you know, in a given culture or society, does this type of activity exceed or undermine, you know, social norms?

446
00:47:48,990 --> 00:48:09,390
So just by way of example, you know, sticking with, say, healthcare information about a particular person, if the sender is a doctor and it's being sent to an insurance company, you know, probably for the most part, you know, they need that information to,

447
00:48:09,390 --> 00:48:13,950
you know, to pay the doctor or something like that.

448
00:48:13,950 --> 00:48:17,530
So generally, that probably wouldn't violate social norms.

449
00:48:17,530 --> 00:48:30,450
If, however, they were posting that information on Facebook and their recipients were their Facebook friends, that could be viewed as a violation of social norms around health data.

450
00:48:30,590 --> 00:48:32,290
So that's how that would work.

451
00:48:32,450 --> 00:48:34,210
But yeah, next slide.

452
00:48:42,200 --> 00:48:56,880
So another model of privacy norm to which I am particularly fond of is Professor Dan Solov's taxonomy of privacy.

453
00:48:56,880 --> 00:49:22,100
Now, Dan Solov is a professor of law at George Washington University, and in 2008, he developed this taxonomy of privacy by looking at case law and laws and trying to, from the bottom up, trying to discern what are the different categories or buckets in which we can kind of place things that,

454
00:49:22,100 --> 00:49:28,180
you know, people would consider violations of privacy or privacy harms.

455
00:49:28,180 --> 00:49:35,260
And what I like about it is the items are fairly discrete and small.

456
00:49:35,260 --> 00:49:43,800
It breaks privacy up into 16 different categories or different discrete harms.

457
00:49:44,220 --> 00:49:51,940
And so it's much easier than, say, Ryan Calo's objective-subjective harms, which are still kind of broad.

458
00:49:51,940 --> 00:50:00,700
So instead of saying a violation of privacy, you might say a violation of objective harms or subjective harms, although they're still very broad categories.

459
00:50:01,040 --> 00:50:10,740
Solov's taxonomy is very narrow and easily, you know, easily digestible and discussable.

460
00:50:10,740 --> 00:50:14,320
And it's also very comprehensive.

461
00:50:14,320 --> 00:50:30,420
I have yet to find, and not to say that there isn't, but I have yet to find something that somebody would say, yeah, that's a violation of privacy that doesn't fall under one of these privacy harms in the Solov taxonomy.

462
00:50:30,420 --> 00:50:35,380
Now Solov breaks up privacy into four broad categories.

463
00:50:35,380 --> 00:50:50,840
That is information processing, information dissemination, which are both forms of information privacy violation, collection, and then a kind of generic invasions.

464
00:50:50,840 --> 00:51:03,240
So we certainly don't have time today to go over each of the 16 individual privacy harms, but I want to touch upon one from each category.

465
00:51:04,400 --> 00:51:06,060
Next slide.

466
00:51:16,710 --> 00:51:17,670
Okay.

467
00:51:17,670 --> 00:51:25,390
So the first one is under information processing and it's identification, linking of information to a particular individual.

468
00:51:25,390 --> 00:51:27,830
And I'm going to use an example here.

469
00:51:27,830 --> 00:51:38,770
So about two decades ago, about 20 years ago, the state of Massachusetts released medical records from state employees.

470
00:51:38,770 --> 00:51:46,270
And it was done so that they could do analysis of, you know, what diseases are happening where, et cetera.

471
00:51:46,270 --> 00:51:57,450
Well, a researcher from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology re-identified the then governor of William Weld on that information.

472
00:51:57,450 --> 00:52:10,830
And it's because the information, though it was de-identified, they had taken off names and social security numbers, you know, addresses, they still had some information that was particularly identifying.

473
00:52:10,830 --> 00:52:17,110
That was the person's gender, their date of birth, their postal code.

474
00:52:17,110 --> 00:52:29,390
And the researcher from MIT was able to re-identify the governor based on that information because he was the only one with that date of birth and that gender in that postal code.

475
00:52:29,390 --> 00:52:34,170
And she matched it up against, I think, voter rolls or something like that.

476
00:52:34,170 --> 00:52:54,490
So it turns out that this sort of information, this gender, date of birth, and postal code, will actually uniquely identify or uniquely identified about 95% of that state employee database release.

477
00:52:54,490 --> 00:53:03,670
So there was only a very small minority of people who, you know, had the same date of birth, same gender, and lived in the same postal code.

478
00:53:03,670 --> 00:53:06,110
So it was fairly uniquely identifying.

479
00:53:06,310 --> 00:53:07,450
Click Next.

480
00:53:08,430 --> 00:53:22,330
So the point here isn't to be able to, like, re-identify the governor or even re-identify somebody by name and pinpoint them.

481
00:53:22,330 --> 00:53:29,850
The point is to be able to single out a person within your data.

482
00:53:29,850 --> 00:53:36,470
And I think this is very apparent or obvious when you start talking about facial recognition.

483
00:53:36,530 --> 00:53:39,510
So, I mean, let's say we had a database of photos.

484
00:53:39,510 --> 00:53:44,890
Yes, we might be able to re-identify William Weld in those photos.

485
00:53:44,890 --> 00:53:57,330
But even being able to say, look, here's person 2, if we can re-identify that person in other photos as that person 2, that's about identification.

486
00:53:57,330 --> 00:54:03,750
It doesn't matter that we've necessarily, you know, named them, you know, found out what their legal name is.

487
00:54:03,750 --> 00:54:05,010
I mean, it could be John Smith.

488
00:54:05,010 --> 00:54:07,210
There could be hundreds of John Smith.

489
00:54:07,230 --> 00:54:20,110
But the fact that we can re-identify the same person across multiple photos, that's what, you know, linking of information to a particular person is, to this person number 2.

490
00:54:20,110 --> 00:54:25,270
That's what identification, the privacy harm of identification under the Solov taxonomy is.

491
00:54:28,070 --> 00:54:29,290
I'm checking.

492
00:54:29,290 --> 00:54:36,190
You know, if anybody sees any, has any questions or comments, please feel free to post them.

493
00:54:36,390 --> 00:54:39,450
I don't want to feel like this is a one-way street.

494
00:54:40,230 --> 00:54:43,350
But go ahead.

495
00:54:43,350 --> 00:54:44,690
I heard a beep.

496
00:54:44,690 --> 00:54:45,110
No, it's not.

497
00:54:45,110 --> 00:54:45,770
Okay.

498
00:54:45,770 --> 00:54:48,490
So,

499
00:54:52,260 --> 00:54:54,480
maybe I'm not right.

500
00:54:55,980 --> 00:54:57,100
Okay.

501
00:54:57,100 --> 00:54:59,420
Go ahead and next slide, Steve.

502
00:55:08,020 --> 00:55:20,340
So, Solov's category of information dissemination, one of the harms is appropriation, that is using an individual's identity to serve the aims and interests of another.

503
00:55:20,340 --> 00:55:28,500
So, this was also a privacy tort under Prosser's list of four privacy torts.

504
00:55:28,500 --> 00:55:32,020
So, we typically think about this in terms of celebrities.

505
00:55:32,020 --> 00:55:36,580
So, Elon Musk here is not hawking smart pills.

506
00:55:36,720 --> 00:55:51,400
But in fact, he is, you know, his image had been appropriated by the seller of these smart pills to try to, you know, promote the sale of these pills.

507
00:55:51,400 --> 00:55:53,460
But he didn't endorse them.

508
00:55:53,460 --> 00:55:55,120
He wasn't paid for them.

509
00:55:55,120 --> 00:55:58,060
So, this is a form of appropriation.

510
00:55:58,060 --> 00:56:04,400
Now, while we typically think about this happening to celebrities, it's not just celebrities.

511
00:56:04,400 --> 00:56:06,460
Go ahead and click next.

512
00:56:13,120 --> 00:56:15,520
This happens to you and me.

513
00:56:15,520 --> 00:56:32,520
So, this is my image I found using a Google reverse image search that was on a few years back that was on an Asian dating site that had been appropriated by that dating site to promote their site.

514
00:56:33,560 --> 00:56:37,160
And I had never joined or had no intention of joining the site.

515
00:56:37,160 --> 00:56:46,980
So, the site was actually, I did the translation, it was promoting Western millionaires, which isn't exactly accurate.

516
00:56:46,980 --> 00:56:49,900
Although I'd like to be a millionaire, I'm not quite.

517
00:56:50,540 --> 00:56:54,640
So, it's, you know, interesting appropriation.

518
00:56:54,640 --> 00:56:58,220
But it's not just, you know, me either.

519
00:56:58,220 --> 00:57:02,840
I would say that many people have been appropriated.

520
00:57:02,840 --> 00:57:23,640
For instance, when you think about social media, if you click like on something on a product or a website, you know, many social media sites will then promote your name and likeness saying, hey, Jay, you know, like this product to her friends and family.

521
00:57:23,680 --> 00:57:32,380
So, it's not a huge privacy invasion, but it is a form of appropriation because she wasn't compensated.

522
00:57:32,380 --> 00:57:46,060
Now, one could make the argument, as I'm sure the social media sites do, that the free use of the service is compensation for that appropriation of her image and name.

523
00:57:47,060 --> 00:57:54,240
But if you think about it, it's a social media site that you're getting a free use of.

524
00:57:54,240 --> 00:58:11,360
It's not the product or service that is essentially getting the advantage, the sellability of her name and likeness that is, you know, they're not taking it or they're not compensating her in any way.

525
00:58:11,360 --> 00:58:12,980
Okay.

526
00:58:13,260 --> 00:58:14,660
Next slide.

527
00:58:22,420 --> 00:58:32,500
So, now we move outside of the information privacy harms under the Solov taxonomy.

528
00:58:32,500 --> 00:58:34,240
We move to collection.

529
00:58:34,240 --> 00:58:40,200
And interrogation is one of the harms, that is, the questioning or probing for personal information.

530
00:58:40,200 --> 00:58:48,360
We typically think of this in terms of like a police interrogation or a suspect or a terrorist being interrogated.

531
00:58:48,360 --> 00:58:50,390
But go ahead and click next.

532
00:58:51,570 --> 00:58:54,810
This is not necessarily the case.

533
00:58:54,810 --> 00:59:04,350
It can be really any questioning or probing for information that's out of context for the situation.

534
00:59:04,350 --> 00:59:09,590
So, think about a job interview and a candidate being interviewed for a job.

535
00:59:09,590 --> 00:59:11,490
There may be completely appropriate questions.

536
00:59:11,490 --> 00:59:13,230
You know, what are your qualifications?

537
00:59:13,350 --> 00:59:17,830
Do you have any, you know, background or history in this kind of work?

538
00:59:17,830 --> 00:59:20,090
But there may be completely inappropriate.

539
00:59:20,090 --> 00:59:29,050
You can imagine a hiring manager asking, and especially in a female candidate, if she was pregnant or planning on becoming pregnant.

540
00:59:29,370 --> 00:59:41,270
And, you know, an inappropriate question, a privacy norm violating question, an interrogation that's inappropriate for the interview.

541
00:59:41,270 --> 00:59:49,130
So, is it ethical to ask the candidate's ethnicity while you're applying a job?

542
00:59:51,830 --> 00:59:53,090
Ethnicity?

543
00:59:53,270 --> 00:59:54,330
Yeah.

544
00:59:54,330 --> 01:00:05,330
Like, while you're applying a job, the company is always, like, companies always ask the candidate what ethnicity they involve.

545
01:00:05,330 --> 01:00:05,850
Okay.

546
01:00:05,850 --> 01:00:23,270
So, let me caveat that, say, by, you know, if you're asking if it's ethical, you know, I would, again, refer to the privacy norm of, you know, interrogation.

547
01:00:23,270 --> 01:00:33,030
It's a questioning or probing for information that's out of context and irrelevant to the purpose of hiring.

548
01:00:33,030 --> 01:00:47,730
Now, in the United States, you'll often see the EEOC questions about gender, ethnicity, veteran status.

549
01:00:48,910 --> 01:00:51,470
It seems like there's one other question.

550
01:00:52,130 --> 01:00:58,290
And so, you know, those are not supposed to be used for hiring.

551
01:00:58,290 --> 01:01:07,730
They're supposed to be kept separate and just reported to the EEOC to try to limit discrimination in hiring.

552
01:01:08,190 --> 01:01:11,370
So, there may be a purpose there.

553
01:01:11,370 --> 01:01:14,770
So, that questioning is separate.

554
01:01:15,150 --> 01:01:19,710
So, you have to really kind of dive into the context of what's going on.

555
01:01:19,710 --> 01:01:32,050
Similarly, with the pregnancy question, generally, we would say that it's completely inappropriate for a hiring manager to ask a candidate whether she was pregnant or planning on becoming pregnant.

556
01:01:32,390 --> 01:01:42,590
Now, if the job were working with hazardous chemicals that could put a pregnancy at risk, it might be appropriate.

557
01:01:42,590 --> 01:01:56,790
Although, I would probably suggest that maybe a better way of handling it is giving information to the candidate that says, this, you know, this job will put a pregnancy at risk.

558
01:01:57,110 --> 01:02:05,810
If you're pregnant, you should seriously consider not applying or, you know, waiting until your pregnancy is determined or something to that effect.

559
01:02:05,810 --> 01:02:13,550
So, giving the candidate control rather than the probing or asking questions there.

560
01:02:13,550 --> 01:02:24,130
Now, notice, I want to pinpoint something that's important on this and why this is not under the information privacy harms under SOLOV's kind of categorization.

561
01:02:24,130 --> 01:02:28,130
And notice, it isn't the actual information.

562
01:02:28,130 --> 01:02:39,730
It's not, you know, what the candidate responds, whether she's pregnant or not, or even the information of knowing, you know, of a response or a non-response.

563
01:02:39,730 --> 01:02:55,650
The actual privacy violation here, the harm, is the asking, the questioning, because she may feel uncomfortable, you know, that she's going to feel violated by having that question posed to her.

564
01:02:55,650 --> 01:03:05,010
Not in answering, not in deciding whether or not to answer, but just in the asking of the question, you know, makes her uncomfortable.

565
01:03:05,010 --> 01:03:12,150
And certainly, you know, this is an interesting question or interesting thing related to this specific thing.

566
01:03:12,150 --> 01:03:19,370
If she was overweight, it may make her embarrassed by the question being asked, because it's like, no, I'm not pregnant.

567
01:03:19,370 --> 01:03:20,830
I'm just overweight.

568
01:03:20,830 --> 01:03:23,250
I had something happen.

569
01:03:23,250 --> 01:03:29,050
I was with a friend at a bar, and we were told the waitress was pregnant.

570
01:03:29,050 --> 01:03:32,390
And my friend asked the waitress, when are you due?

571
01:03:32,590 --> 01:03:34,490
The waitress was like, what are you talking about?

572
01:03:34,490 --> 01:03:36,990
Because our waitress was overweight.

573
01:03:36,990 --> 01:03:39,490
It was another waitress that was pregnant.

574
01:03:39,490 --> 01:03:44,230
So again, just the questioning or probing for personal information is not the answer.

575
01:03:44,230 --> 01:03:46,070
It's not about the information.

576
01:03:46,230 --> 01:03:50,090
It's about that act of questioning or probing.

577
01:03:50,850 --> 01:03:51,530
Okay.

578
01:03:51,530 --> 01:03:52,750
Next slide.

579
01:03:59,610 --> 01:04:03,890
This is the last one I will go over.

580
01:04:04,090 --> 01:04:07,150
Again, this is the category of invasion.

581
01:04:07,150 --> 01:04:11,150
And the harm here is intrusion.

582
01:04:11,150 --> 01:04:16,010
That is disturbing an individual's tranquility or solitude.

583
01:04:16,010 --> 01:04:22,230
So when Polkman Go came out a number of years ago, certainly there were a lot of questions about the privacy of the app.

584
01:04:22,230 --> 01:04:24,850
What is it doing with people's data?

585
01:04:24,850 --> 01:04:30,170
Is it tracking people 24-7, especially if children are playing the game?

586
01:04:30,170 --> 01:04:33,240
There was another privacy issue at play.

587
01:04:33,670 --> 01:04:43,610
So Polkman Go used churches and a number of other places as gyms where people could train their characters and earn points and stuff.

588
01:04:43,610 --> 01:04:48,530
And we'll go ahead and click next.

589
01:04:48,530 --> 01:04:56,010
But a number of people had transformed those churches into their private residences.

590
01:04:56,010 --> 01:05:16,650
So you think about people and they're trying to enjoy their home and all of a sudden they've got Polkman Go players trotting through their yard trying to catch their Polkman Go or Polkmans.

591
01:05:16,650 --> 01:05:24,430
So this is about disturbing an individual's tranquility or solitude while they're trying to enjoy their house.

592
01:05:24,430 --> 01:05:35,410
Now, it's not just Polkman Go players, it's vacuum cleaner salespeople, it's religious pamphleteers, you know, showing up while you're trying to eat dinner and they're knocking on your door.

593
01:05:35,830 --> 01:05:40,050
These are all intrusions into your personal space.

594
01:05:40,110 --> 01:05:44,290
Not just about the home, but think about the spam you get.

595
01:05:44,290 --> 01:05:52,470
Or back in the old days before browsers kind of put a stop to it, you would go to a website and all of a sudden you get a bunch of pop-up ads.

596
01:05:52,470 --> 01:06:02,950
You're trying to view the website, but you're being intruded upon, you know, and interrupted while trying to do that.

597
01:06:03,130 --> 01:06:10,650
So that concludes our examples of these four privacy harms under the Solove taxonomy.

598
01:06:10,650 --> 01:06:17,630
Like I said, there are a lot more, but what I like about them is they're very discreet and very easy to work with.

599
01:06:17,630 --> 01:06:26,450
And again, you can imagine a company, you know, you're setting, here are the privacy norms to which we subscribe.

600
01:06:26,510 --> 01:06:30,210
We don't want to intrude upon people's tranquility and solitude.

601
01:06:30,210 --> 01:06:34,770
You know, we don't want to interrogate people out of context.

602
01:06:34,770 --> 01:06:46,030
And it just becomes a question of matching, you know, does the scenario that you're considering, are you violating people's privacy, you know, match with the privacy norm?

603
01:06:46,030 --> 01:06:54,850
Not this kind of generic, you know, are we being ethical or not?

604
01:06:55,710 --> 01:06:57,970
Okay, next slide.

605
01:07:00,700 --> 01:07:05,820
AJ, sorry, I know I tend to kind of go off there.

606
01:07:05,820 --> 01:07:09,280
Did you have any comments on the Solove taxonomy?

607
01:07:12,250 --> 01:07:22,510
Well, I do think that a Solove taxonomy is the most granular and comprehensive categorization of privacy.

608
01:07:22,510 --> 01:07:27,450
Therefore, it involves all the scenarios under his taxonomy.

609
01:07:27,450 --> 01:07:33,330
I was just like, I liked your slides of Solove taxonomy.

610
01:07:34,450 --> 01:07:47,310
Like, but I would like to, I would like to, I would like to hear more about using these norms in business side and organizations.

611
01:07:47,310 --> 01:07:48,590
Yeah, sure.

612
01:07:48,590 --> 01:07:53,690
So, so, you know, I mentioned kind of a broad way of using them.

613
01:07:53,690 --> 01:07:59,530
It's just kind of looking at a situation and seeing if you're violating a social norm.

614
01:07:59,750 --> 01:08:12,610
But let's, let's, let's look at a more concrete method of kind of using the norms to drive your privacy, you know, privacy aspects of your business.

615
01:08:12,610 --> 01:08:14,330
Go ahead and click Next.

616
01:08:18,890 --> 01:08:19,450
So...

617
01:08:20,270 --> 01:08:22,030
Oh, go ahead.

618
01:08:22,030 --> 01:08:22,530
So here is...

619
01:08:22,530 --> 01:08:22,870
Oh, right.

620
01:08:22,870 --> 01:08:23,830
We were going to compare.

621
01:08:23,830 --> 01:08:24,290
Sorry.

622
01:08:24,290 --> 01:08:25,350
Yeah, we, right.

623
01:08:25,350 --> 01:08:25,910
Okay .

624
01:08:26,410 --> 01:08:30,350
Herzog and Weston are colored with purple in this slide.

625
01:08:30,390 --> 01:08:35,810
And we're going to talk with Jason more about a Solove taxonomy in this table as well.

626
01:08:35,810 --> 01:08:39,710
But purple side is harm-based privacy definitions.

627
01:08:39,710 --> 01:08:45,890
As we stated at the beginning, an orange color refers to their harm-based privacy definitions.

628
01:08:46,770 --> 01:08:58,990
Like we can see the autonomy of the Herzog's pillars of privacy refers to decisional interference, exclusion, blackmail, and distortion in Solove's taxonomy.

629
01:08:58,990 --> 01:09:03,670
And it includes the objective harms in Callow.

630
01:09:03,670 --> 01:09:19,270
And we don't see any reference, reference between the connection between Prosser's false light with Herzog's pillars of privacy, Weston's status privacy, and Callow's subjective and objective.

631
01:09:19,710 --> 01:09:22,190
But we can see the Solove's distortion.

632
01:09:22,630 --> 01:09:27,770
We , I mean, Jason didn't get involved in the whole Solove taxonomy.

633
01:09:27,770 --> 01:09:37,950
But we would like to hear about decision interference definition because it's also in Asian and it's more broad.

634
01:09:37,950 --> 01:09:47,590
It has more broad definition in decision interference, which also refers in Herzog's pillars of privacy.

635
01:09:47,590 --> 01:09:57,730
We can see the definition of decision interference as intruding into an individual's decision-making regarding their private affairs.

636
01:09:57,730 --> 01:10:04,230
There is another side of, another perspective in decision interference as manipulation.

637
01:10:04,810 --> 01:10:08,850
So do you want to talk about this, Jason?

638
01:10:09,090 --> 01:10:22,070
So what I just want to say, so first off, just to clarify and what this chart, and I think we've got a couple more, illustrate is that you can map the different models together.

639
01:10:22,070 --> 01:10:31,850
So as AJ pointed out, autonomy under Herzog can be mapped to Solove's decisional interference, exclusion, and blackmail.

640
01:10:31,850 --> 01:10:42,150
So the prototypical case for decisional interference was a case at the Supreme Court level.

641
01:10:42,370 --> 01:10:43,730
It was Griswold v.

642
01:10:43,730 --> 01:10:47,710
Connecticut that decided under the U.S.

643
01:10:47,710 --> 01:11:08,710
Constitution, since there's not a direct right to privacy, but it found a right to privacy in the penumbra of rights, as the Supreme Court called it, that there was a question, the state of Connecticut was not allowing married couples to purchase contraceptives.

644
01:11:08,710 --> 01:11:10,430
They made contraceptives illegal.

645
01:11:10,430 --> 01:11:13,350
This was back in the 50s and 60s.

646
01:11:13,610 --> 01:11:30,810
And it went up to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said that that was not the purview of the state, that that was a violation of essentially the right of privacy under the Constitution, even though there is no constitutional amendment that says right of privacy.

647
01:11:30,810 --> 01:11:47,450
It was found in a penumbra of other rights, and this was an interference into the decision-making into the private affairs of that couple, and that the state did not have a right to make that decision.

648
01:11:47,450 --> 01:11:50,630
This goes similar to Lawrence v.

649
01:11:50,630 --> 01:12:15,350
Texas, which says the state doesn't have a right to preclude homosexual couples or homosexuals from engaging in sexual activity in the privacy of their own bedroom, because it's a decision that they alone have the right to make, and that the state should not interfere with that decision-making.

650
01:12:15,350 --> 01:12:29,370
And again, you can see how this relates to autonomy and that individuals have a decision, a freedom to act as their own decision-makers.

651
01:12:29,710 --> 01:12:33,290
Similarly, if you just go down to blackmail, I want to compare that.

652
01:12:35,630 --> 01:12:46,370
Blackmail also, it's about decisions about the use of information and saying, hey, unless you pay me $100, I'm going to release this photo.

653
01:12:46,370 --> 01:12:59,490
I'm essentially interfering with your decision and your right to make a decision of how to release or when or if to release information about you, again, interfering with your autonomy.

654
01:12:59,490 --> 01:13:08,090
And if you look at Kalo's objective harms, which as you see maps up here, that is about the coerced use of information.

655
01:13:08,330 --> 01:13:20,370
I'm using information, you know, a photo of you, and I'm doing it in a coercive manner that says either you pay me $100 or I'm going to release this information.

656
01:13:20,470 --> 01:13:25,950
So you can see how that, you know, those things map together.

657
01:13:28,070 --> 01:13:28,770
Next slide.

658
01:13:28,770 --> 01:13:32,710
I know we've got a couple to get through, so I want to go to the next slide.

659
01:13:33,710 --> 01:13:44,410
And you can do this for all of the different, you know, all of the different categories under all of these models.

660
01:13:44,630 --> 01:13:45,190
AJ?

661
01:13:46,160 --> 01:14:01,830
I don't want to get involved in all of the things, but you can see that, like, in Solo's taxonomy, it just, it refers to all the privacy norms in this chart.

662
01:14:01,830 --> 01:14:16,020
So we can see that in Hard Sock's pillars of privacy, obscurity refers to disclosure, exposure, appropriation, surveillance, interrogation, intrusion, identification, aggregation, increased accessibility.

663
01:14:16,020 --> 01:14:26,740
However, we're not seeing in, like, Prosser's kind of law of privacy towards, and we're not seeing this in Weston.

664
01:14:26,740 --> 01:14:36,480
They're so, they're so just involving, they're just so not, they're just broad, and they're not referring to all things.

665
01:14:36,480 --> 01:14:40,280
And I think that there's some issues in the table.

666
01:14:40,280 --> 01:14:49,120
If Jason, if Steve shows the next slide, I was, I was concerning something in this.

667
01:14:50,080 --> 01:14:55,500
This model of privacy norms is just a model.

668
01:14:55,500 --> 01:14:58,460
So it shouldn't be, it shouldn't be correct.

669
01:14:58,460 --> 01:15:01,580
And it depends upon the persons of persons.

670
01:15:01,580 --> 01:15:05,040
We, I have to, I have to just add it.

671
01:15:05,040 --> 01:15:11,840
For example, the trust means a willingness to become vulnerable to the actions of another.

672
01:15:11,840 --> 01:15:14,840
So it depends on the individuals to individuals.

673
01:15:14,840 --> 01:15:24,940
And we're just, we just stated that in Solow's taxonomy, breach of confidentiality, secondary use, and insecurity in here.

674
01:15:24,940 --> 01:15:33,340
So I was questioning, and I was concerning whether we could add the privacy harm of exclusion to this table.

675
01:15:35,420 --> 01:15:39,100
It's more relevant with the Hartzog's trust definition too.

676
01:15:39,100 --> 01:15:40,760
What do you think, Jason?

677
01:15:43,460 --> 01:15:44,760
It's possible.

678
01:15:44,760 --> 01:15:46,940
I, you know, maybe we should take that offline.

679
01:15:47,580 --> 01:15:50,940
Just because we haven't really explained to people what exclusion is.

680
01:15:50,940 --> 01:15:54,180
I'm sure they don't want us going down the weeds too far.

681
01:15:54,580 --> 01:16:00,660
But certainly, you know, this isn't, this, this, this chart isn't meant to be.

682
01:16:00,660 --> 01:16:12,620
In the chart I published, there is actually a disclaimer that there may be mappings that are uncovered by the chart.

683
01:16:12,620 --> 01:16:28,800
But the point I want to use, go into here with this last one is we can use this, a business can use this to create its own privacy values specific to its business.

684
01:16:28,800 --> 01:16:31,240
So go ahead and click the next slide.

685
01:16:37,530 --> 01:16:48,950
So let's say we wanted to use Hartzog's trust, Weston's intimacy, Kalo's objective harm, and then Solov's breach of confidentiality, secondary use, and insecurity.

686
01:16:48,950 --> 01:16:55,050
And we don't want to use any of those in particular, but we wanted to create something specific for our organization.

687
01:16:55,310 --> 01:16:56,770
Go ahead and click next.

688
01:16:58,870 --> 01:17:05,670
Let's say we were running a service called Texacleric.

689
01:17:05,670 --> 01:17:18,130
And the purpose of this service is to allow parishioners to send a message to a religious leader and get back advice or, or just hold a confessional.

690
01:17:18,130 --> 01:17:34,530
So we could develop a privacy value for this service, and we're going to call it seal of confession, and say Texacleric will protect and not use or reveal any information divulged.

691
01:17:34,670 --> 01:17:45,750
So in that simple declarative statement, we've kind of combined all of these normative values into a privacy value for the organization.

692
01:17:45,750 --> 01:17:58,010
So we've imbued trust, because we want our parishioners to trust that we're going to protect their information, not use it, or not reveal it.

693
01:17:58,870 --> 01:18:13,390
Intimacy, we've created this intimate environment where individuals can feel that they're in an intimate, closed environment with their religious leader that they're talking to.

694
01:18:14,370 --> 01:18:19,270
We are not using, you know, we're not violating Kalo's objective harms.

695
01:18:19,270 --> 01:18:23,910
We're not using it in an information in an unanticipated or coerced way.

696
01:18:24,050 --> 01:18:27,330
We're also not breaching confidentiality.

697
01:18:27,330 --> 01:18:31,290
You know, again, we're not going to use or we're not going to reveal this information.

698
01:18:31,390 --> 01:18:39,890
And we typically think of, you know, the clergy as having a duty of confidentiality when things are said in a confessional.

699
01:18:39,890 --> 01:18:42,710
We're not violating secondary use.

700
01:18:42,710 --> 01:18:50,670
Again, we're not using this information for other than religious, you know, providing religious salvation.

701
01:18:50,710 --> 01:18:57,110
And insecurity, we are not, you know, handling the information in an insecure manner.

702
01:18:57,130 --> 01:19:05,830
So this is how we would develop a very simple privacy value that then we can manage, you know, the organization against.

703
01:19:05,830 --> 01:19:15,670
Now, how would you use this in a proactive way in developing your organization's activities?

704
01:19:15,670 --> 01:19:18,310
So go ahead and click Next.

705
01:19:25,230 --> 01:19:32,890
So NIST earlier in the year published their Privacy Framework.

706
01:19:32,890 --> 01:19:47,250
And what the Privacy Framework does is it provides a lot of functions and activities that an organization can do to have a functioning privacy program.

707
01:19:47,250 --> 01:19:54,050
So it divides these into five functional areas.

708
01:19:54,050 --> 01:20:01,610
That is identify, govern, control, communicate, and protect.

709
01:20:01,610 --> 01:20:08,550
And they actually have 100 different subcategories of activities that organization can do.

710
01:20:08,550 --> 01:20:13,710
And you can think of these activities in the NIST Privacy Framework as muffin pans.

711
01:20:13,730 --> 01:20:16,610
So they're like muffin pans.

712
01:20:16,610 --> 01:20:25,110
And then your job as an organization is to figure out which muffin pans to fill in and what kind of muffins you're going to actually bake in them.

713
01:20:25,110 --> 01:20:28,030
Are you baking cornbread muffins, blueberry muffins?

714
01:20:28,030 --> 01:20:29,890
Are you making cupcakes?

715
01:20:29,890 --> 01:20:36,010
And what are the ingredients that you're going to use to bake all of these different muffins?

716
01:20:36,010 --> 01:20:38,430
Go ahead and click Next.

717
01:20:42,110 --> 01:20:54,990
So by having this privacy value, this can help us identify what are the ingredients that are going to go into these muffin pans into this framework.

718
01:20:54,990 --> 01:21:07,410
And so, for instance, related to identity, one of the identity subcategories, one of the muffin holes, is data actions of the system, product, service, or inventory.

719
01:21:08,510 --> 01:21:30,190
So here, in order to meet this privacy value of seal of confession that we've defined, we may say all touch points for confessional message data are kept in system architecture diagrams so that we can identify, you know, where we need to protect this data,

720
01:21:30,190 --> 01:21:42,730
where we need to make sure we're not using it for other purposes, and where we're, you know, make sure it's not being revealed or disclosed to people outside of our system.

721
01:21:42,730 --> 01:21:54,390
So if our architecture diagram shows a, you know, a line going off to a marketing company, hey, whoa, we're breaking our seal of confessional, our privacy value.

722
01:21:54,550 --> 01:21:56,910
So that would help us along.

723
01:21:56,910 --> 01:21:58,910
And I'm not going to read all of these.

724
01:21:58,930 --> 01:22:02,530
But, you know, I might go down to the bottom one of protect.

725
01:22:02,530 --> 01:22:05,570
Data in transit are protected.

726
01:22:05,570 --> 01:22:20,470
Well, in order to meet our seal of confessional value, you know, our particular ingredient, our particular activity, is that data between the parishioners app in which they are sending these messages, and our system are encrypted.

727
01:22:20,470 --> 01:22:32,070
That might be one of many ingredients that goes into saying data in transit are protected, and also meeting our privacy value of seal of confession.

728
01:22:33,650 --> 01:22:36,090
Jay, did you have any comments on this?

729
01:22:36,370 --> 01:22:39,990
We can also combine it with solo taxonomy as well.

730
01:22:39,990 --> 01:22:45,930
In the first column, foredraw, it says data are destroyed according to policy.

731
01:22:45,930 --> 01:22:50,310
I would say it's the privacy harm of insecurity in solo taxonomy.

732
01:22:50,310 --> 01:22:53,230
So we can combine with solo taxonomy, right?

733
01:22:54,290 --> 01:23:02,230
Yeah, so certainly you'll see a lot of overlap in terms of... so she's looking at the second line from the top.

734
01:23:02,230 --> 01:23:07,610
And one of the subcategories is data are destroyed according to policy.

735
01:23:08,330 --> 01:23:13,930
And so defining that policy is going to help with insecurity.

736
01:23:13,930 --> 01:23:22,090
But remember, insecurity get into creating our seal of confession privacy value.

737
01:23:22,090 --> 01:23:36,590
So whether you want to go directly against the solo taxonomy, or against our synthetic derived privacy value specific to our organization, you can go about it either way.

738
01:23:36,590 --> 01:23:44,930
You don't have to derive your own privacy values, you can go directly against any of the models that we've suggested or others.

739
01:23:44,930 --> 01:23:50,130
Harzog, Weston, Prosser, Kalo, Solove, Nissenbaum.

740
01:23:50,250 --> 01:24:01,370
Again, there are many others or you can create what I'm suggesting is it might be easy to create sort of these hybrid privacy values specific to your organization.

741
01:24:03,110 --> 01:24:04,530
Thank you.

742
01:24:04,530 --> 01:24:06,390
Okay, next.

743
01:24:08,950 --> 01:24:12,850
Okay, now we're going to talk about a privacy wiki.

744
01:24:12,850 --> 01:24:22,790
We created privacy wiki in order to see what the United States laws protect individuals from the privacy harms on a solo taxonomy and those social norms.

745
01:24:22,790 --> 01:24:29,010
I would like to thank for Professor Fay Jones with her support and into privacy.

746
01:24:29,070 --> 01:24:38,110
We also thought it could be better to demonstrate latest privacy articles and privacy related cases combined with taxonomy as well.

747
01:24:38,110 --> 01:24:43,070
In this wiki, it now includes over 100 privacy related articles.

748
01:24:43,070 --> 01:24:46,070
So you may go check them out as well.

749
01:24:46,070 --> 01:24:47,730
So next slide.

750
01:24:48,990 --> 01:24:56,190
So privacy wiki is basically a wiki dedicated to privacy laws, events and articles.

751
01:24:56,190 --> 01:25:01,630
It is organized around solo taxonomy and its 16 privacy harms.

752
01:25:01,630 --> 01:25:10,030
It currently has 78 US federal laws and over 300 state laws that were met with solo taxonomy.

753
01:25:10,030 --> 01:25:25,400
Furthermore, when we're editing articles, which are also like, as I said, over 100, we also use some other aspects of privacy by design like in Huffman strategies and tactics.

754
01:25:27,050 --> 01:25:29,400
So next slide.

755
01:25:31,500 --> 01:25:48,560
Before starting this research or wiki, the issue was whether the United States privacy related laws generally protect or preserve citizens or individuals from privacy violations or harms on our solo taxonomy.

756
01:25:48,560 --> 01:26:03,520
We had at this table at the beginning, which you can see, we had only had some federal laws, and we did not even establish the harms of appropriation, decisional interference, interrogation or even item scattering.

757
01:26:03,520 --> 01:26:10,500
So you may see it in the right upper corner, appropriation.

758
01:26:10,500 --> 01:26:21,900
So we're not seeing any harms under all the federal laws in this listed table.

759
01:26:21,900 --> 01:26:32,720
However, we just involved it and mapped the 40 over 100 or over 400 state over 400 United States laws.

760
01:26:32,720 --> 01:26:39,900
So we just dive in and found a lot of protection privacy harms under those laws.

761
01:26:39,900 --> 01:26:52,100
However, we always say that the United States privacy related laws do not protect all citizens from the privacy violations or harms on the solo taxonomy.

762
01:26:52,100 --> 01:26:53,860
So next slide.

763
01:26:56,580 --> 01:27:07,610
In taxonomy page of the wiki, we are stating as this, the United States law has been failed by not addressing privacy harms and violations.

764
01:27:07,610 --> 01:27:21,750
However, under the fourth amendment, over 300 state privacy laws, specific privacy related federal laws and precedents identify and protect some privacy violations and harms that has been addressed by sole law.

765
01:27:21,750 --> 01:27:36,270
Moreover, although some state laws do not cover all the privacy violations, the other state all industry violations such as California, he argues that privacy and society are indivisible integrity.

766
01:27:36,270 --> 01:27:46,190
Therefore, it is categorized to identify and understand socially recognized privacy violations with basic groups of harmful activities.

767
01:27:46,550 --> 01:27:48,770
It mainly covers what we did.

768
01:27:48,770 --> 01:28:01,070
If you scroll down the page in the wiki, you can see all the column links that indicates all 16 privacy harms and laws that are related with the harms.

769
01:28:01,070 --> 01:28:14,090
If you would like to discover it or are interested in taking a look at it, you can see the harms of blackmail, appropriation, distortion and intrusion have less protected than the harms in the United States.

770
01:28:14,090 --> 01:28:18,510
If Steve may click it, you can see all the laws.

771
01:28:21,630 --> 01:28:29,310
Yeah, here are the interrogation, aggregation, security identification, secondary use.

772
01:28:35,580 --> 01:28:41,740
See, there are more laws than the beginning of this research.

773
01:28:42,000 --> 01:28:51,760
So if you're interested in how to look at it, that will be great for covering all the presentations and slides.

774
01:28:51,760 --> 01:28:54,660
So next slide.

775
01:29:00,980 --> 01:29:03,000
It takes time.

776
01:29:18,740 --> 01:29:20,860
Can you click the next slide?

777
01:29:20,920 --> 01:29:21,940
Okay.

778
01:29:22,460 --> 01:29:24,100
Okay.

779
01:29:26,420 --> 01:29:31,820
We have in this wiki, we have sample forms for federal laws.

780
01:29:31,820 --> 01:29:40,620
And this list includes short title for understanding which law refers it.

781
01:29:40,620 --> 01:29:54,520
In this example, in the sample forms, we stated FERPA, DPPA and HIPAA, which are literally more broad and most popular privacy-related federal laws.

782
01:29:54,520 --> 01:30:11,180
And we just added the official text in this form in order to provide an official text and in order to provide a current text via link.

783
01:30:11,180 --> 01:30:17,380
And we included the country because we're going to involve in the EU laws as well in the future.

784
01:30:17,380 --> 01:30:27,980
Therefore, we included the country and we just cannot understand which, I mean, where the law is enacted, was enacted.

785
01:30:27,980 --> 01:30:31,960
And we added the state or province for the state laws.

786
01:30:31,960 --> 01:30:33,620
Therefore, it's in here.

787
01:30:33,620 --> 01:30:37,420
But we may change it for federal laws in the future.

788
01:30:37,420 --> 01:30:41,700
We stated regulatory bodies in this form.

789
01:30:42,500 --> 01:30:48,340
However, because they're sample forms, they're just wrong.

790
01:30:48,340 --> 01:30:53,520
Regulatory bodies shouldn't be stated as United States Congress.

791
01:30:53,520 --> 01:31:06,400
We added the dates enacted, time for showing the time and scope of the law in the list and personal information.

792
01:31:06,400 --> 01:31:09,100
And we stated the taxonomy.

793
01:31:09,100 --> 01:31:14,300
And we're going to add the strategies and tactics under the Hoopman strategy in the future.

794
01:31:14,300 --> 01:31:21,280
But we generally mapped over 400 United States privacy-related laws with the taxonomy.

795
01:31:21,280 --> 01:31:27,360
So you may see these forms in the wiki.

796
01:31:27,360 --> 01:31:29,080
So next slide.

797
01:31:31,060 --> 01:31:34,520
State laws also include the same form.

798
01:31:34,840 --> 01:31:47,940
So it still includes a short title, official tax, country, jurisdiction, state or province, regulatory bodies, date enacted, scope of the law, personal information, taxonomy, strategies and tactics.

799
01:31:47,940 --> 01:31:53,640
So we show the Illinois BIPA in here and California's CCPA.

800
01:31:54,800 --> 01:31:59,260
We also add those laws in this wiki.

801
01:31:59,700 --> 01:32:01,140
So next slide.

802
01:32:03,840 --> 01:32:12,700
Maybe everyone's just like concerning, okay, you just mapped those laws on soil taxonomy.

803
01:32:12,700 --> 01:32:16,960
And you're stating those things in your form.

804
01:32:16,960 --> 01:32:24,880
However, like, how can we see those taxonomy forms in a specific law?

805
01:32:24,880 --> 01:32:28,900
So here's an Illinois BIPA example.

806
01:32:29,360 --> 01:32:33,240
In the right side, we're just seeing the form.

807
01:32:33,240 --> 01:32:45,140
In the left side, on the whole page, we are seeing the whole laws and provisions and sections in this site.

808
01:32:45,140 --> 01:33:13,540
And if you would like to see a taxonomy harm that is protected under the law, you can see after the provision or after the section, a little font, the name of the privacy harm that is stated on a soil taxonomy.

809
01:33:13,540 --> 01:33:36,900
And if you're interested in learning those privacy harms, and if you would like to see the related laws that protect surveillance or any other harm on a soil taxonomy, you can access with those little links.

810
01:33:37,900 --> 01:33:39,240
So next slide.

811
01:33:39,240 --> 01:33:41,240
Hold on, just to clarify.

812
01:33:41,880 --> 01:33:47,020
And sorry, if you covered this, I distracted momentarily.

813
01:33:47,020 --> 01:33:48,080
Yeah, of course.

814
01:33:48,080 --> 01:34:12,740
So it's hard to see in this slide, because I know it's kind of small, but in the kind of insert that's popped up, the actual law is written, but there is a text that says surveillance, and it pinpoints the part of the law that covers surveillance.

815
01:34:12,740 --> 01:34:22,200
For instance, in BIPA, it says no private party may collect, and then it's about a person's biometric identifier.

816
01:34:22,200 --> 01:34:25,960
So remember that collection, surveillance was part of collection.

817
01:34:25,960 --> 01:34:29,620
So that is recording, watching, listening to, monitoring.

818
01:34:30,240 --> 01:34:38,300
So that collection process is what BIPA is trying to stop or one of the things that BIPA is trying to stop.

819
01:34:38,300 --> 01:34:43,560
And so that's why it's related to the SOLA surveillance harm.

820
01:34:43,600 --> 01:34:45,120
So that's why we tag it.

821
01:34:45,120 --> 01:34:52,640
So it's tagged specifically in the law, exactly where in the text of the law it aims to prevent surveillance.

822
01:34:52,980 --> 01:34:54,280
Thanks for adding.

823
01:34:55,840 --> 01:34:56,560
Okay.

824
01:35:02,860 --> 01:35:07,700
Would you like to talk about a simple form for articles and privacy news?

825
01:35:07,700 --> 01:35:08,240
Oh , sure.

826
01:35:08,240 --> 01:35:18,440
So in addition to over 300 laws in the wiki right now, there's at least 100, maybe over 200 articles.

827
01:35:18,480 --> 01:35:24,820
And by the way, Steve, I just looked to see if there was anything about Hobby Lobby in there yet.

828
01:35:24,820 --> 01:35:37,420
The only thing related to Hobby Lobby was something about some guy following women around with a camera and happened to be following people in a Hobby Lobby, but not the particular...

829
01:35:37,420 --> 01:35:39,000
I know the incident you're talking about.

830
01:35:39,000 --> 01:35:43,680
Unfortunately, we don't have that article in yet, but we can hopefully issue it.

831
01:35:44,260 --> 01:35:45,240
By the way, somebody...

832
01:35:45,240 --> 01:35:46,240
I expect that from Hobby Lobby.

833
01:35:46,440 --> 01:35:47,240
Sorry.

834
01:35:47,340 --> 01:35:47,920
Pardon?

835
01:35:51,560 --> 01:35:52,360
Again?

836
01:35:54,020 --> 01:35:54,880
Oh, no, sorry.

837
01:35:54,880 --> 01:35:58,480
I was saying I'd expect that from somebody at Hobby Lobby with a camera being followed.

838
01:35:59,680 --> 01:36:02,180
So somebody was... Oh, okay.

839
01:36:02,180 --> 01:36:02,860
So we've got it.

840
01:36:02,860 --> 01:36:03,120
Okay.

841
01:36:03,120 --> 01:36:09,420
Anyway, so like I was saying, there's a couple hundred articles, certainly room for more.

842
01:36:10,320 --> 01:36:16,500
You know, we have one person right now that is putting in articles, Maria, who is not on the call.

843
01:36:17,200 --> 01:36:22,140
But, you know, I mean, there's certainly opportunity for hundreds of more articles.

844
01:36:22,140 --> 01:36:32,800
What I love about this is it provides an opportunity to people see examples and kind of categorize and it's like, oh, yeah, this is an example of surveillance.

845
01:36:32,800 --> 01:36:35,500
This is an example of interrogation.

846
01:36:35,520 --> 01:36:44,200
And it really kind of makes these concepts much more concrete by having very real life examples of this.

847
01:36:45,540 --> 01:36:48,720
So within this, you know, we have a short title.

848
01:36:48,720 --> 01:36:50,820
We have, you know, where did this happen?

849
01:36:50,820 --> 01:36:58,020
The location, the date that it happened, you know, if it's a specific date or maybe just a year.

850
01:36:58,340 --> 01:37:02,760
And what privacy harms under the taxonomy were relevant?

851
01:37:03,040 --> 01:37:08,360
What information, types of information were appropriated?

852
01:37:08,360 --> 01:37:14,000
So this one, which was about the Twitter account hack, you know, we talk about insecurity.

853
01:37:14,000 --> 01:37:16,200
So Twitter was being insecure.

854
01:37:16,640 --> 01:37:23,480
Appropriation, the hacker used the names and likeness of those people's accounts.

855
01:37:23,480 --> 01:37:27,000
He appropriated those accounts for his own purpose.

856
01:37:27,320 --> 01:37:34,300
Interrogation, I forget what the interrogation was, but maybe they were asking some type of questions of people.

857
01:37:34,300 --> 01:37:40,520
So the information here was authentication information, was at play.

858
01:37:40,520 --> 01:37:42,380
Identifying information.

859
01:37:42,380 --> 01:37:44,620
Social network, again, Twitter.

860
01:37:45,000 --> 01:37:50,960
And communication information that was being communicated from one party to another.

861
01:37:50,960 --> 01:37:52,680
Go ahead and click.

862
01:37:54,980 --> 01:37:58,740
And so that's kind of like the high profile panel.

863
01:37:58,740 --> 01:38:10,620
But then, of course, we have a much more detailed description and discussion of what actually happened and why these particular privacy harms were at play.

864
01:38:10,740 --> 01:38:16,980
And all of our articles, we don't write articles, you know, nothing is new to us.

865
01:38:16,980 --> 01:38:23,540
These are related to articles, you know, that pop up in major news sources.

866
01:38:23,540 --> 01:38:34,540
So, you know, once in a while we get something that maybe, I've seen a couple of incidences on Twitter that, you know, people, you know, more personal incidents.

867
01:38:34,540 --> 01:38:35,860
Oh, this happened to me.

868
01:38:36,000 --> 01:38:43,040
There was one I wanted to put in, but didn't get permission of the, again, we asked for permission if it's something like that.

869
01:38:43,040 --> 01:38:53,060
I didn't get permission of the account poster, but they were, you know, they had ordered a pizza and then the pizza delivery guy had solicited a date with her afterwards.

870
01:38:53,060 --> 01:38:56,500
Using her phone number to contact her later that evening.

871
01:38:56,500 --> 01:38:58,020
Hey, I delivered your pizza.

872
01:38:58,020 --> 01:39:00,340
Are you available to date?

873
01:39:00,340 --> 01:39:08,620
So, but generally we try to put in major news stories, which there are certainly no shortage of.

874
01:39:08,620 --> 01:39:16,220
And, you know, another issue, one of the reasons I wanted to work on this is because I was always having trouble doing Google searches.

875
01:39:16,220 --> 01:39:20,780
I was like, oh, wasn't there some issue about Hobby Lobby, for instance?

876
01:39:20,780 --> 01:39:27,820
And I would put in Hobby Lobby privacy into, you know, Google or another search engine and what would come up?

877
01:39:27,820 --> 01:39:33,580
Well, Hobby Lobby's privacy policy or a news story about Hobby Lobby.

878
01:39:33,580 --> 01:39:39,660
But then, you know, the only thing privacy was that, you know, CNN's privacy link.

879
01:39:39,660 --> 01:39:41,980
It wasn't about Hobby Lobby and privacy.

880
01:39:41,980 --> 01:39:51,180
So I wanted a centralized place that I could research articles and stories about privacy related to all these issues.

881
01:39:51,960 --> 01:39:53,400
Click next.

882
01:39:54,760 --> 01:39:59,040
I can't remember, is that, or is that our last, that's not our last slide, is it?

883
01:39:59,600 --> 01:40:00,580
It was.

884
01:40:00,580 --> 01:40:02,820
Okay, so discussion.

885
01:40:02,880 --> 01:40:09,600
Now that we've used up almost our entire two hours, and I don't know how we did that, except lots of talking.

886
01:40:09,600 --> 01:40:16,100
And I appreciate everyone for sticking around so long and not running away.

887
01:40:17,240 --> 01:40:23,840
But certainly if there's, you know, any questions, comments, thoughts about this.

888
01:40:24,840 --> 01:40:27,840
Walt wants the new law from Brazil.

889
01:40:27,880 --> 01:40:28,920
That would be great.

890
01:40:28,920 --> 01:40:31,540
So what we are doing...

891
01:40:31,540 --> 01:40:36,740
Oh, yeah, AJ says it includes the Turkish data protection law.

892
01:40:37,720 --> 01:40:41,780
Because AJ is in Turkey and knows a lot about that, knows a lot about that.

893
01:40:41,780 --> 01:40:45,420
So we are adding international laws.

894
01:40:45,420 --> 01:40:49,840
We have somebody in the UK who is adding UK laws.

895
01:40:49,900 --> 01:40:50,420
Australia .

896
01:40:51,200 --> 01:40:52,520
What now, Australia?

897
01:40:52,520 --> 01:40:53,460
Oh, we do?

898
01:40:53,460 --> 01:40:54,460
Okay, good.

899
01:40:55,100 --> 01:41:03,580
And, you know, so we're kind of reliant on volunteers for all the international ones.

900
01:41:04,420 --> 01:41:06,620
You know, just because it's so overwhelming.

901
01:41:06,620 --> 01:41:09,240
I mean, we had enough work putting in the U.S.

902
01:41:09,240 --> 01:41:10,100
state laws.

903
01:41:10,100 --> 01:41:13,520
And we're actually looking for volunteers to keep the states updated.

904
01:41:13,520 --> 01:41:16,820
I think we have slightly less than 10 volunteers.

905
01:41:16,820 --> 01:41:19,520
And we asked for a volunteer per state.

906
01:41:19,520 --> 01:41:25,540
Just as new states, like I'm in Florida, and we just enacted a new law recently.

907
01:41:26,500 --> 01:41:30,840
And , you know, so all laws get updated or changed.

908
01:41:30,980 --> 01:41:35,320
So having to keep track of that is a monumental undertaking.

909
01:41:35,680 --> 01:41:42,580
Not to mention adding all the stories that are coming at a breakneck pace every day.

910
01:41:42,580 --> 01:41:46,700
And even trying to catch up with privacy-related stories.

911
01:41:46,900 --> 01:41:48,280
But, yeah.

912
01:41:53,060 --> 01:41:55,700
Yeah, feel free to ask questions.

913
01:41:57,140 --> 01:42:04,460
And we will certainly stick around until the top of the hour and the next speaker.

914
01:42:05,020 --> 01:42:05,660
Yeah.

915
01:42:05,660 --> 01:42:08,160
And, of course, we're going to share the slides.

916
01:42:09,460 --> 01:42:13,260
Yeah, and Steve, do you want us to send that to you?

917
01:42:13,600 --> 01:42:17,020
Or you already have it, I guess, so we don't need to send it to you.

918
01:42:17,020 --> 01:42:18,140
You have it.

919
01:42:18,420 --> 01:42:19,360
Yeah, definitely.

920
01:42:20,080 --> 01:42:23,340
I'm more than happy to share them a little bit later on.

921
01:42:23,340 --> 01:42:29,620
So I'll make sure to post those somewhere and see if you all can flip them a little bit, moving down the line.

922
01:42:29,820 --> 01:42:34,980
I want to thank Jason and AJ again for doing this really awesome talk.

923
01:42:35,560 --> 01:42:37,240
This is something that we really need.

924
01:42:37,240 --> 01:42:41,140
We need to really define a lot of these different privacy laws moving forward.

925
01:42:41,140 --> 01:42:47,160
Because, I mean, honestly, it's going to be the future with all these services, especially.

926
01:42:47,160 --> 01:42:52,920
So everybody, I guess, do a round of applause, I guess, wherever you're at, for our speakers.

927
01:42:52,920 --> 01:42:56,920
And it looks like they'll be sticking around if anybody has any questions.

928
01:42:57,280 --> 01:43:01,600
They have the voice channel for another at least 20 minutes.

929
01:43:01,600 --> 01:43:04,620
So thank you again, y'all, and yeah.

930
01:43:07,530 --> 01:43:10,570
I'm looking for... so I'm new to Discord.

931
01:43:10,570 --> 01:43:12,190
How do I do an applause?

932
01:43:12,190 --> 01:43:21,210
Is there a... I'm looking for... I guess, maybe, is there a GIF I can do with applause?

933
01:43:24,130 --> 01:43:25,490
I think you'll...

934
01:43:26,490 --> 01:43:28,150
Yeah, there we go.

935
01:43:30,910 --> 01:43:34,950
And that's applause for the people who stuck around to listen.

936
01:44:20,450 --> 01:44:23,930
AJ, what is it, about 2 o'clock in the morning there?

937
01:44:33,400 --> 01:44:37,800
She must have dropped off because it is about 2 o'clock in the morning there.

938
01:44:37,800 --> 01:44:39,220
She must have fallen asleep.

939
01:44:39,220 --> 01:44:40,920
It's pretty late.

940
01:44:42,740 --> 01:44:44,640
Hopefully, she was able to stay up.

941
01:44:44,640 --> 01:44:46,540
And luckily, it was on a Friday night.

942
01:44:46,540 --> 01:44:49,840
So hopefully, she's got nothing going on tomorrow.

943
01:45:00,610 --> 01:45:06,490
I guess we didn't get any trolls or anybody trying to hack the channel, huh?

944
01:45:06,490 --> 01:45:18,250
I was a little bit happy for that, because we had, I think, yesterday, and even on Thursday, we had Discord completely crash, slash, shut down, slash, I don't know what happened.

945
01:45:18,330 --> 01:45:22,890
So I'm really glad that it didn't go down, because, yeah, that was interesting.

946
01:45:22,890 --> 01:45:27,430
We were doing some live training, and everything just pretty much died.

947
01:45:27,430 --> 01:45:31,330
And in the true fashion of DEF CON, if we haven't crashed Discord, it's not really a DEF CON.

948
01:45:31,330 --> 01:45:35,050
Or done anything unintentionally malicious.

949
01:45:35,050 --> 01:45:40,690
So you've done Ethics Village.

950
01:45:40,790 --> 01:45:42,670
I've never been to actual DEF CON.

951
01:45:42,670 --> 01:45:45,970
I go to a lot of conferences, but that's not one I've touched upon.

952
01:45:45,970 --> 01:45:56,590
Although I do have a DEF CON deck of playing cards from 2015 that I won in a poker game.

953
01:45:57,030 --> 01:46:00,030
So that's about as close as I've gotten.

954
01:46:00,030 --> 01:46:01,630
It's actually pretty cool.

955
01:46:01,630 --> 01:46:03,710
I meant to bring them out, because they're...

956
01:46:03,710 --> 01:46:06,810
Although my screen shut down.

957
01:46:07,770 --> 01:46:12,070
The jokers are hackers, and it's got a pretty good...

958
01:46:12,070 --> 01:46:14,810
The graphic design is pretty interesting.

959
01:46:15,290 --> 01:46:20,190
So you've done Ethics Village before, at the actual event?

960
01:46:20,370 --> 01:46:21,170
Yeah, definitely.

961
01:46:21,170 --> 01:46:23,610
So this is, I think, I believe...

962
01:46:23,610 --> 01:46:33,610
And if the Fixer, or at Irish Bug, or anyone who's listening, and I believe this is the third year we're doing it, or maybe possibly the fourth year.

963
01:46:33,610 --> 01:46:40,590
So essentially, Ethics Village originally started, believe it or not, as a university project.

964
01:46:41,010 --> 01:46:42,730
Irish Bug and Dr.

965
01:46:42,730 --> 01:46:46,530
Wardog were both... third year, there you go, third year.

966
01:46:46,530 --> 01:46:50,170
They're both faculty slash staff at the University of Illinois.

967
01:46:50,710 --> 01:46:54,230
Also the same university where AJ was mentioning.

968
01:46:54,750 --> 01:47:02,490
And they essentially created a... there's a privacy and ethics class, and Ethics Village was born out of that.

969
01:47:02,570 --> 01:47:14,490
So what ended up happening was one day, the class assignment was, hey, let's do a DEF CON Ethics Village, and Irish Bug can attest a little more to that.

970
01:47:14,490 --> 01:47:17,810
He's actually the... him and Dr.

971
01:47:17,810 --> 01:47:19,670
Wardog are the original creators.

972
01:47:19,670 --> 01:47:25,510
So I just kind of tagged along since I've worked with them on some security stuff as well.

973
01:47:25,510 --> 01:47:28,110
So yeah, we're in our third year.

974
01:47:28,110 --> 01:47:31,530
And unfortunately, you know, this is a... we can't do it live.

975
01:47:31,530 --> 01:47:34,850
We usually have fun, and we even have cool t-shirts.

976
01:47:35,110 --> 01:47:37,050
You'll see my shirt.

977
01:47:37,530 --> 01:47:47,790
So hopefully next year we all get to see folks again, you know, personally, because it tends to be pretty fun, just in general, and seeing people's faces.

978
01:47:48,630 --> 01:47:57,910
Yeah, I'll definitely have to check it out, because I do go to a lot of conferences normally, in a normal world.

979
01:47:57,910 --> 01:48:00,870
In fact, so the last two years...