[00:03.310 --> 00:09.670] Welcome to the DEFCON Ethics Village again, and it is our honor to have with us Commissioner [00:09.670 --> 00:13.430] Rohit Chopra of the Federal Trade Commission. Welcome, Commissioner. [00:13.750 --> 00:15.610] Thanks, Andrea, for having me. [00:15.610 --> 00:18.290] No, thank you for taking the time to join us. [00:18.350 --> 00:23.390] So before we get started with nerdy substantive questions, [00:23.390 --> 00:29.370] could you tell us a bit about your own career? Somewhere out there in the wilds of the [00:29.370 --> 00:36.130] internet, there may be a teenager whose dream is to be an FTC commissioner. How does that teenager [00:36.130 --> 00:39.730] fulfill the dream of growing up to be like you? [00:39.990 --> 00:48.350] Well, you know, it's really easy for me to pinpoint what totally changed my thinking on the [00:48.350 --> 00:58.790] world. And that was the subprime mortgage crisis. The absolute failure of not only big Wall Street [00:58.790 --> 01:07.510] institutions, but also the failure of our regulators to actually take action to avoid [01:07.510 --> 01:14.350] massive pain for so many people was a wake-up call to me. I really saw how clearly that [01:14.950 --> 01:23.170] regulators in Washington were willing to be spoon-fed, you know, tall tales about market [01:23.170 --> 01:29.670] efficiency and how everything is self-correcting. But in reality, many of these large, powerful [01:29.670 --> 01:36.930] firms had weapons of destruction and they could cause damage while not really getting hurt much [01:36.930 --> 01:45.070] themselves and even getting bailouts. So that really taught me about the need to jump into [01:45.070 --> 01:51.950] the fray and fix this broken culture. And you know, I'm the first non-lawyer in about a quarter [01:51.950 --> 01:58.570] century at the FTC. I'm one of the first to have a technologist on my team. So we are trying to [01:58.570 --> 02:03.070] do things differently because it's clear the status quo is so fundamentally broken. [02:06.480 --> 02:13.140] So with that, let's start talking about some of the things that are challenging and how the FTC [02:13.140 --> 02:18.200] is working to address them. So the first issue, let's talk a bit about supply chains. [02:18.200 --> 02:23.300] So supply chain integrity is something that is near and dear to the heart of every security [02:23.300 --> 02:29.000] professional. And it's also something that's been in the news a lot, whether it's with Kaspersky [02:29.000 --> 02:35.040] software being viewed as suspect for use in government operations, or the most recent [02:35.040 --> 02:42.960] conversations about whether TikTok should be limited in its access to U.S. consumer markets. [02:43.040 --> 02:49.980] You also recently concurred in a notice of proposed rulemaking around made-in-the-USA [02:49.980 --> 02:56.760] labeling. Could you tell us about that concurrence and talk to us about some of these broader issues [02:56.760 --> 03:02.960] around supply chain management and their impact on integrity and security of software? [03:03.480 --> 03:10.180] Yeah, sure. So just to take a step back, I think everyone is really asking hard questions about [03:10.860 --> 03:18.240] how mergers and how a lot of our policies, including offshoring and our trade agreements, [03:18.240 --> 03:24.140] have actually undermined the resilience of our supply chains and how we produce [03:24.140 --> 03:32.680] goods and services. It's obviously been in full view in the context of PPE and responding [03:33.180 --> 03:40.320] to the COVID crisis. It's obviously top of mind for me when it comes to needed pharmaceuticals, [03:40.320 --> 03:47.080] especially generic drugs. But it's also really come up in the context of our agricultural [03:47.080 --> 03:56.840] supply chain. We saw how epidemics that took place in certain meatpacking facilities were [03:56.840 --> 04:02.920] having ripple effects. And what it really represents is, I think, a tension between [04:03.310 --> 04:12.480] the concept of efficiency and the value of resilience. Resilience, and many of you [04:12.480 --> 04:19.540] watching will know this well, systems are only resilient when they have backstops, [04:19.540 --> 04:24.280] when there's redundancies. And I think a lot of our economic policy in America [04:24.800 --> 04:33.000] has really been in favor of consolidating to one single source. And when that single source [04:33.000 --> 04:41.140] is disrupted, boy, is there chaos and panic. In the telecommunications and semiconductor sector, [04:41.140 --> 04:52.420] we saw many years ago how one natural disaster near Taiwan led to OEMs in the United States being [04:52.420 --> 04:57.460] unable to produce for an extended period of time because there was so much dependence of their [04:57.460 --> 05:04.640] supply chains on that. And I think we're really rethinking a lot of that in the U.S. about what [05:04.640 --> 05:09.920] does our healthcare supply chain look like? And really, what does our technology and telecommunication [05:09.920 --> 05:15.820] supply chain look like? There's obviously been serious geopolitical tensions with respect to [05:15.820 --> 05:22.360] the treatment of Huawei in many communications infrastructure in Europe and around the world. [05:22.580 --> 05:29.180] And I do think there are some serious questions we have to tackle when it comes, one, to this issue [05:29.180 --> 05:37.520] of resilience and redundancies and backstops. And two, whether we're really able to trace [05:38.430 --> 05:43.480] the components of a supply chain, particularly in the digital sector, [05:43.480 --> 05:51.500] we obviously really have some lack of understanding about where those supply chains share data, [05:51.500 --> 05:57.260] the extent to which it could be shared with potentially an authoritarian government. [05:57.260 --> 06:03.060] So there's a lot of live issues. You obviously mentioned the Made in USA question. I've really [06:03.060 --> 06:09.640] been critical of the government's no-money, no-fault settlement approach when it comes to [06:09.640 --> 06:18.480] Made in USA. I think this is totally a slap in the face to many honest businesses in the United [06:18.480 --> 06:23.740] States, or frankly, any honest business that doesn't lie about where their products and [06:23.740 --> 06:31.680] services are made. Because when you can have some lie about it and get a market advantage and then [06:31.680 --> 06:38.240] settle it for no money and no admission of liability and really kind of nothing except [06:38.240 --> 06:44.080] some paperwork and a promise not to do it again, that's not a penalty, that's an incentive. So [06:44.080 --> 06:52.440] we put forth a proposal a year ago to create new penalties for this. I'm really happy to see that [06:52.440 --> 06:58.080] we're pushing forward with it. And I think there's a lot of open questions in software and digital [06:58.080 --> 07:04.320] services about how we think about country of origin claims. But I do know that our law protects [07:04.960 --> 07:10.720] against those who lie about it. And I think we're going to need to develop our thinking around that, [07:10.720 --> 07:15.860] especially as it relates to technology around election security and other things that have [07:15.860 --> 07:20.600] such fundamental and big consequences for our democracy and our economy. [07:20.640 --> 07:26.060] So there's a lot there. Obviously, right now, there's major discussions about TikTok. [07:26.680 --> 07:31.740] You know, previously, the FTC has sanctioned TikTok for violating children's privacy. I thought [07:31.740 --> 07:38.460] the violations were totally unacceptable. And I think there's more discussion that you're hearing, [07:39.100 --> 07:46.280] frankly, across political views around the national security implications of the TikTok [07:46.280 --> 07:52.260] corporate structure, and whether the existing corporate structure should be permitted to [07:52.260 --> 08:01.560] operate as is in the US. You know, to be clear, of course, we want to allow a broad ecosystem [08:02.880 --> 08:09.200] of apps and ways for people to connect. But of course, their corporate structure may need to [08:09.200 --> 08:15.560] be modified if there are serious national security implications around the ownership structure and [08:15.560 --> 08:22.240] how data is being handled, transferred, or potentially abused without user knowledge. [08:24.800 --> 08:30.520] So you recently wrote that algorithmic discrimination is a silent pickpocket, [08:30.820 --> 08:37.280] a lovely turn of phrase, that robs consumers of opportunities and the ability to foresee their [08:37.280 --> 08:44.370] access to various services. What are the sorts of concerns that you're thinking about in the context [08:44.500 --> 08:52.740] of algorithmic transparency and discrimination? And how do we think about creating a more [08:52.740 --> 08:59.600] transparent system of algorithms that preserves information integrity for consumers and gives [08:59.600 --> 09:06.240] them maximum fair access to various consumer markets? Yeah, so I think there's a myth out [09:06.240 --> 09:14.760] there that algorithms take the bias out of things, and that humans are the ones that are biased, [09:14.760 --> 09:20.860] and therefore the algorithms will be unbiased. And I think that is really such a dangerous point [09:20.860 --> 09:28.440] of view. The reality is that these biases are built into these algorithms, often by the data [09:28.440 --> 09:36.140] set that they are trained on. We know that that is how machine learning, artificial intelligence, [09:36.140 --> 09:41.320] and algorithmic decision making works, and we know that it can have a disparate impact [09:42.060 --> 09:48.460] on certain groups of individuals. And I'm worried that some algorithmic decision making [09:50.400 --> 09:56.040] reinforces discrimination rather than taking discrimination out of it. [09:56.040 --> 10:02.460] So one of the things that I have been writing about and speaking about to build more support [10:02.460 --> 10:13.800] around is to use the FTC's prohibition on unfair practices, and there's a legal framework for that, [10:13.800 --> 10:19.500] and to use that law to combat discriminatory algorithms. [10:19.940 --> 10:25.880] And discrimination, I believe, is an unfair practice under the FTC Act, and we currently [10:25.880 --> 10:32.920] have some existing laws that we can use to tackle discriminatory algorithms, whether it's [10:32.920 --> 10:38.180] our laws protecting against housing discrimination, employment discrimination, [10:38.180 --> 10:46.860] credit discrimination. And I do believe that the FTC Act could be a place that is a broad [10:46.860 --> 10:54.020] anti-discrimination protection when it comes to algorithms. So I'll say this, in many cases there [10:54.020 --> 11:02.380] will be algorithmic discrimination, but I would like to see more individuals and companies that [11:02.380 --> 11:08.740] deploy those algorithms do what many other responsible entities do and do some basic [11:08.740 --> 11:18.100] due diligence and testing to see what some of the impacts might be. I mean, to deploy some of this [11:18.100 --> 11:26.460] and to not understand how it can cause harm and damage I just think is so blind. So there's a lot [11:26.460 --> 11:33.340] more to do on this, but I do think that this moment that we're living in is such a reminder, [11:33.340 --> 11:40.800] and it's not just facial recognition, it's not just biometric identification, it's all sorts of [11:40.800 --> 11:48.660] automated decision making that I fear can be weaponized or I fear can be used as a tool to [11:48.660 --> 11:56.940] exclude rather than to be a fair form of commercial activity. Particularly as databases get [11:56.940 --> 12:04.620] merged with other databases and repurposed. So along those lines, but shifting gears a little [12:04.620 --> 12:10.260] bit, it's been an exciting week in terms of congressional testimony. So I'm sure that you [12:10.260 --> 12:18.160] heard about or watched the CEO testimony of big tech companies this week, or last week I guess, [12:18.790 --> 12:24.860] in Congress. Would you have any impressions that you'd like to share with us about the kinds of [12:24.860 --> 12:32.540] core FTC concerns that you saw reflected in the testimony and some observations about what was [12:32.540 --> 12:39.580] asked or what was not asked? Yeah, well I want to be mindful about my comments because every single [12:39.580 --> 12:46.980] one of those witnesses represents a company that is under an FTC order for one reason or another. [12:48.160 --> 12:58.480] Obviously, I had major objections to the FTC's settlement with Facebook. I thought that it was [12:58.480 --> 13:07.820] completely not the right way to do things, especially without even deposing or collecting [13:07.820 --> 13:15.840] the documents in the custody of Mark Zuckerberg and then awarding a release of liability for him [13:15.840 --> 13:24.180] and other top executives. But let's just say this, I think that it's important for [13:24.800 --> 13:33.560] top business decision makers, including CEOs, to have to answer questions under oath when there is [13:34.540 --> 13:41.860] scrutiny about whether their business practices are lawful. Too often I see a mentality in [13:41.860 --> 13:49.580] Washington, including at the FTC, that treats small businesses, app developers, [13:49.920 --> 13:57.060] and others who don't have a big corporation standing behind them to defend them. Those [13:57.060 --> 14:02.960] individuals get put on the hot seat, they often get named in law enforcement actions, while too [14:02.960 --> 14:12.500] often the largest firms or the individuals at the top called the shots completely evade any [14:12.500 --> 14:17.380] scrutiny or accountability. And I just think that's fundamentally wrong. It goes back to [14:17.380 --> 14:23.000] something earlier I said about the subprime mortgage crisis a decade ago. We really didn't [14:23.000 --> 14:31.540] see many executives face serious scrutiny or accountability for the conduct of their institutions [14:31.540 --> 14:38.720] while in the savings and loan scandal a generation ago, we saw dozens, if not hundreds, of bank [14:38.720 --> 14:46.420] executives that were from smaller banks, in many cases locked up. So we need to remind ourselves [14:46.420 --> 14:54.520] that the law does not have an exemption for the CEOs of the largest corporations on the planet [14:55.250 --> 15:00.960] and obtaining their sworn testimony, you know, whether it be in a congressional investigation [15:00.960 --> 15:07.360] or a federal law enforcement investigation or a state AG investigation, I think is critical [15:07.980 --> 15:12.560] and they should not be able to lobby their way out of that. [15:13.740 --> 15:19.440] So continuing along those lines, you recently tweeted that until we address big tech's business [15:19.440 --> 15:25.300] models, any effort to combat disinformation is like shoveling snow during a blizzard. [15:25.300 --> 15:33.040] Another vivid image. Which aspects of big tech's business models specifically concern you? [15:33.160 --> 15:42.620] Well, there's a lot there. I mean, I hear so many responses from some of our largest firms [15:43.340 --> 15:50.000] about what they're doing on everything from fake reviews to harmful content, [15:50.000 --> 15:58.240] and often the response is to hire more people, to do more checking. And I think that misses the [15:58.240 --> 16:04.620] point. And we're hearing, having some of these debates and there's a lot of discussion around [16:04.620 --> 16:13.080] the some of the ad boycotts with respect to hateful content. You know, my view is that we're [16:13.080 --> 16:22.240] always going to have content that we disagree with or that is hateful. You know, in some ways, [16:22.240 --> 16:28.100] that is the price of living in an open society. Where the question is, is to what extent are [16:28.100 --> 16:36.280] companies profiting from that? Are they profiting from amplifying it, from making it more prominent, [16:36.280 --> 16:42.460] knowing in their own research or machine learning or artificial intelligence [16:43.100 --> 16:50.480] that it is this type of divisive content that is keeping us more hooked and more engaged, [16:50.480 --> 16:57.040] because that's what makes us click and therefore makes them more money. Until we really look at [16:57.040 --> 17:02.300] some of the business incentives, I don't think we're really going to ever be able to fix some [17:02.300 --> 17:08.340] of it. And they can hire all the people they want, but some of it is just going to be too little, [17:08.340 --> 17:13.920] too late. So I'd really like us to diagnose a lot of the problems we see on the platforms [17:14.520 --> 17:20.120] by looking at their core business incentive of whether they even make money by fixing it. [17:20.140 --> 17:24.140] You know, they make a lot of claims that it's better for them to fix it, but I don't [17:24.140 --> 17:30.660] always see that to be the case. Sometimes I see their own financial interests come ahead, [17:30.660 --> 17:37.080] including even when it comes to bots and disinformation. So take the issue in the [17:37.080 --> 17:42.660] context of elections. You know, we hear a lot about what they're doing, but let's be honest [17:42.660 --> 17:50.960] with ourselves. There are billions of fake accounts. There are so many false accounts that are [17:50.960 --> 17:57.420] propagating and amplifying intrusive disinformation, and often that is connected [17:58.080 --> 18:04.240] to state and non-state actors. So the question is, is how are some of the platforms actually [18:04.240 --> 18:10.720] benefiting from these fake accounts and bots? It may actually be helping them when it comes to [18:10.720 --> 18:19.420] juicing their ad metrics or making it look like more people are clicking so that they can charge [18:19.420 --> 18:25.380] advertisers. So there's really very little transparency in this, and I think we need to [18:25.380 --> 18:30.400] do much more to really understand what those business incentives are, how they are actually [18:30.400 --> 18:38.460] deciding to curate and amplify content. And you know, there's a lot of talk about political bias [18:38.460 --> 18:44.900] and all this. I'm really focused on the business incentives, what makes them money, and why certain [18:44.900 --> 18:53.680] types of content are amplified, and what we need to do in order to fix that, rather than hearing a [18:53.680 --> 18:58.420] bunch of PR stories about what they're doing to clean up their act. [18:59.720 --> 19:05.120] The other half of that question might be the micro-targeting of consumers. Is micro-targeting [19:05.120 --> 19:10.920] of consumers a problem in your mind? I do think it's a problem. I think that we have not fully [19:10.920 --> 19:19.940] appreciated that when you, in normal advertising markets, you advertise to a demographic. [19:19.940 --> 19:25.060] But in today's advertising markets online, you can advertise to a single individual. [19:25.340 --> 19:31.000] And we know that this can be weaponized for the purposes of disinformation and manipulation. [19:31.140 --> 19:37.700] In fact, there's been reports by NATO, by even reports for the Department of Homeland Security [19:37.700 --> 19:45.800] in Australia and in Europe, about how these tools can be used to be weaponized to influence certain [19:45.800 --> 19:52.900] individuals. And when you can essentially provide a list of individuals and send a message that [19:52.900 --> 19:58.120] follows them across the digital world, you know, that is a recipe for manipulation. And look, we [19:58.120 --> 20:04.460] saw this in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and that scandal, I think, was just a small-scale [20:04.460 --> 20:11.960] reflection of Facebook's overall business model. And I'm not so sure that the behavioral advertising [20:11.960 --> 20:17.900] model or the surveillance-based advertising model that is tied to an individual person, [20:17.900 --> 20:25.940] I'm not really sure that is completely in coexistence with our views on an open internet [20:26.700 --> 20:33.400] and a fair digital marketplace. So we'll need to look at everything from the legal immunities they [20:33.400 --> 20:38.540] enjoy, and maybe they shouldn't have some of those legal immunities if they have certain business [20:38.540 --> 20:43.660] models, as well as how we correct the core business incentive that drives some of the [20:43.660 --> 20:50.600] massive intrusions in privacy and security. You previously hinted at this issue, but could you [20:50.600 --> 20:56.680] talk with us a bit more about how you see disinformation and misinformation management [20:56.680 --> 21:04.220] happening on social networks and other platforms, and whether you feel that it's [21:04.220 --> 21:12.780] meeting expectations or whether more needs to be done? I don't. I think the idea that there is [21:12.780 --> 21:21.140] just going to be more content moderation, I have to tell you, one, I don't think it's going to work. [21:21.140 --> 21:31.080] I have serious concerns that this is being adjudicated by the tech platforms themselves. [21:31.080 --> 21:36.960] It's an enormous amount of power they hold, and I think some of those issues needed [21:36.960 --> 21:45.760] to be decided through democratic governance, rather than a few people who control [21:45.760 --> 21:53.380] the massive platforms for whatever decisions that they choose. And I think, ultimately, they will [21:55.240 --> 21:59.420] make certain decisions that are in their shareholders' best interest and [21:59.420 --> 22:06.520] their best interest, not necessarily in society's best interest. I think we have to change our [22:06.520 --> 22:12.940] mindset completely when it comes to abuse and misuse of data. And I know that many of [22:12.940 --> 22:22.980] you who think about ethics and the role of technology in society, you know that data [22:22.980 --> 22:30.900] can be weaponized. I mean, just take a look at some of the massive intrusions. Equifax, Anthem, [22:30.900 --> 22:39.460] Marriott, these were not done in order to open up credit cards in consumers' names. [22:39.460 --> 22:46.460] We believe, according to what we're hearing from government enforcement, that these were connected [22:46.460 --> 22:52.860] to state and non-state actors, and almost all of them, or the majority of them, are related to [22:52.860 --> 23:00.320] essentially Chinese actors that are related to their own state's objectives. So we have [23:00.320 --> 23:06.920] to start thinking about this as a national security issue, rather than as a narrow identity [23:06.920 --> 23:14.820] theft issue. The remedy is not really credit monitoring for individuals. The remedy is much [23:14.820 --> 23:22.760] different, and we have to quickly accept the harms that are not just to our pocketbooks, but are to [23:22.760 --> 23:32.160] our safety and security as well. Following up on that, but switching gears a bit, let's talk about [23:32.160 --> 23:39.660] anti-competitive conduct. Do you have concerns about the level of competition that's currently [23:39.660 --> 23:49.320] occurring, or rather not occurring, in some technology spaces? I do. I really think that [23:49.320 --> 24:02.000] the existing way that many platform businesses gain scale is often through a model of domination [24:02.000 --> 24:09.640] where, if they have deep pockets, to lose a lot of money in order to create network effects. So [24:09.640 --> 24:17.040] think rideshare, you know, think food delivery. There's so many examples. You worry that that [24:17.040 --> 24:24.180] actually is a model that ultimately monetizes itself, not through a set of open protocols [24:24.180 --> 24:31.360] where there's dynamic competition, but through essentially imposing more rents and regulations [24:31.360 --> 24:36.220] on every side of the market, whether it's riders and passengers, whether it's restaurants [24:36.880 --> 24:47.500] and their customers. We have to really think hard about the way that venture capital and [24:47.500 --> 24:54.000] Wall Street incentives work. I'm also really concerned about, you know, the app economy, [24:54.000 --> 25:02.880] the extent to which app developers face major gatekeepers and who can impose their own [25:02.880 --> 25:11.460] regulations and commissions. And ultimately, sometimes maybe they're even able to use their [25:11.460 --> 25:19.700] data in order to determine what new apps they might offer as a competitor, or what new products [25:19.700 --> 25:26.680] or services they might offer. You know, the original conception of an open internet was [25:26.680 --> 25:33.260] really low barriers to entry without gatekeepers. And I'm concerned that venture capital investment [25:33.260 --> 25:42.500] doesn't go to startups that could just be squashed out by a major incumbent. Ultimately, I think that [25:42.500 --> 25:52.620] reduces overall innovation, it slows us down, and it's not good for our digital progress. And [25:52.620 --> 26:01.000] so I am worried about a slowdown in innovation because of the rent seeking and gatekeeper [26:01.000 --> 26:09.080] activities and choke points that many people raise concerns about in today's digital marketplaces. [26:09.740 --> 26:14.400] Following up on that question, one of the key dynamics that happens from the venture capital [26:14.400 --> 26:22.660] standpoint is a reliance on consumer information databases as a way to monetize businesses that [26:22.660 --> 26:30.000] may be otherwise losing money. How do you analyze the dynamics around the mergers of consumer [26:30.000 --> 26:37.980] databases, particularly in vertical integration contexts? And how does that connect with the [26:37.980 --> 26:44.640] short term return on investment pressure that so many VC firms face and pass on to the startups [26:44.640 --> 26:52.960] that they work with? It's a great question. I do think that before I took office on the commission, [26:52.960 --> 27:04.560] the FTC closed an investigation into Amazon and Whole Foods. And while I was not on the commission, [27:04.560 --> 27:12.860] before I came on, I had the observation that a lot of deals like this are for the purposes [27:12.860 --> 27:22.720] of acquiring more consumer data in order to price discriminate, in order to essentially create more [27:22.720 --> 27:30.300] and more reliance on a particular platform. There's obviously been a lot of discussion [27:30.820 --> 27:39.080] around the world about Google's proposed acquisition of Fitbit. There's lots and lots [27:39.080 --> 27:46.800] of data acquisitions that I think ultimately could reduce competition in both directions. [27:46.800 --> 27:55.420] In some ways, the target could have grown into a bigger challenger. And on the other side, [27:55.420 --> 28:03.300] the buyer, it may lead them to shut down their own internal investments in building arrival. [28:03.680 --> 28:10.720] And we need to really analyze that in multiple directions. I really supported an effort by the [28:10.720 --> 28:20.640] commission to issue orders to Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, to report to us about [28:20.640 --> 28:26.700] all of their acquisitions that did not meet the merger reporting requirements [28:27.220 --> 28:34.740] so that we can understand whether we are even monitoring mergers and acquisitions appropriately. [28:34.740 --> 28:43.300] And I really believe that in the private equity space and in many acquisition strategies, [28:43.300 --> 28:50.620] we are seeing the roll-up of many small companies that may not meet merger reporting thresholds [28:50.640 --> 28:56.840] but that can be used ultimately to reduce competition and innovation and exclude potential [28:56.840 --> 29:03.780] rivals. And it's a real concern that we all need to be thinking about. And ultimately, with the [29:03.780 --> 29:12.260] goal of making sure that our U.S. markets are the friendliest when it comes to new market entrants, [29:12.260 --> 29:20.540] because ultimately that is what is going to drive the progress, not coddling a few [29:20.540 --> 29:28.000] politically connected behemoths. So the last question, which is a bit open-ended, [29:28.000 --> 29:34.420] is sort of a hopes and dreams question. How do you see the FTC and how do you hope the FTC [29:34.420 --> 29:41.120] will use its authority going forward in the next five years to further its mission of consumer [29:41.120 --> 29:47.960] protection and encouraging market competition? Yeah, I could go on about that forever, [29:47.960 --> 29:55.660] but just a couple things. One, I think our enforcement remedies when it comes to law [29:55.660 --> 30:05.720] breaking and when it comes to mergers need to be more surgical. And it can't just be, [30:05.720 --> 30:15.160] don't do it again, in egregious illegal conduct. And it also has to think about market structure. [30:15.160 --> 30:23.300] I mean, if we're going to challenge consummated mergers that reduce competition in violation of [30:23.300 --> 30:30.780] the law, unscrambling that egg is going to require real thinking, particularly in tech [30:30.780 --> 30:37.080] and digital markets. And we're going to need to think with engineers and developers and experts [30:37.080 --> 30:43.700] about what is the right remedy. Is it going to require cloning? Is it going to require [30:43.700 --> 30:52.220] open licensing? Is it going to require spinoffs? Is it going to require elimination of certain [30:52.220 --> 30:57.740] conflicts of interest within a business model? And the list goes on and on. But we're going to [30:57.740 --> 31:04.180] need to be data-driven, not press-driven. We're going to need to be analytical and not act on [31:04.180 --> 31:10.120] hunch. And I think ultimately that's going to require diversifying a lot of the skill sets [31:10.120 --> 31:17.660] at the FTC and other regulators. And it's also going to require us to be unearthing more information [31:17.660 --> 31:23.940] about existing business practices. We're going to need to use our authorities to conduct more [31:23.940 --> 31:30.260] industry-wide investigations. We're going to need to set real targets to make sure that we [31:30.260 --> 31:37.440] are making sure that barriers to entry are low and that there is not a lot of harm from [31:37.440 --> 31:43.840] exclusionary tactics, whether it be by digital gatekeepers or others in the economy. And that's [31:43.840 --> 31:53.960] just when it comes to other key sectors, whether it be the pharmaceutical industry, [31:53.960 --> 32:02.040] whether it be retail. But we have to bring that lens of data-driven analysis and a broad thinking [32:02.040 --> 32:09.480] about remedies where we include broad participation from the public. That's just really imperative to [32:09.480 --> 32:15.280] me. And I think there's going to be a new bipartisan consensus that is built around this [32:15.280 --> 32:23.060] and that ultimately really wants to hold bad actors accountable, that wants to clean up market [32:23.060 --> 32:30.100] structures so that anyone with a great idea can get in the game. And I hope that over the long [32:30.100 --> 32:35.340] term that we will be able to move the FTC and a lot of our agencies in that direction. [32:37.570 --> 32:43.190] As a bonus question, is there anything that I should have asked you about that I failed to ask you about? [32:43.550 --> 32:51.690] Well, I think it's really important for all of us to think about our individual role when it [32:51.690 --> 33:02.330] comes to thinking about the response and the recovery from COVID-19 and the resulting economic [33:02.330 --> 33:11.170] crisis. We are all going to need to have an all-hands-on-deck mentality about what can [33:11.170 --> 33:19.490] every government agency be doing better, what can every community be doing to really respond to this [33:19.490 --> 33:27.730] and recover. And I'm so worried that our economy is going to look so different in a way that might [33:27.730 --> 33:35.930] wipe out a lot of local businesses, that might make it even harder to break into markets, [33:35.930 --> 33:45.490] and ultimately an economy and society that has disproportionate negative effects of some of these [33:46.750 --> 33:55.230] cataclysmic events on the least fortunate among us, and can also have effects that overwhelmingly [33:55.230 --> 34:03.130] or disproportionately affect people of color and others who may face discrimination. So, [34:03.130 --> 34:10.790] I know that there's a lot we're doing in the digital world and in the tech community to think [34:10.790 --> 34:18.270] more about civil rights and to think about fair markets, but this economic crisis and this [34:18.270 --> 34:26.370] pandemic, I think, put it all in full view that we all need to step up, [34:26.370 --> 34:33.270] and every single sector of the economy and society needs to be thinking differently about it. [34:35.110 --> 34:39.570] Thank you so much, Commissioner Chopra, for taking the time to talk with us. [34:39.570 --> 34:43.810] And I realized I failed to introduce myself at the beginning. I was too excited to interview you. [34:43.810 --> 34:49.350] So, I'm Andrea Matwishan from Penn State, and we've been fortunate enough to talk with Commissioner [34:49.350 --> 34:55.170] Rohit Chopra, and please stay tuned for a live question and answer session with the Commissioner. [34:55.170 --> 34:57.790] Thanks. Thanks, Andrea.