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11930	17810	Welcome back to Space Security Challenge 2020, or Mathesat, as one of our competitors fondly
17810	23830	called it. At least, we hope it was fondly. Anyway, I'm your host, Jordan Wines. It's
23830	28490	been a quiet few hours since our last update, with, I think, no changes on the scoreboard.
28490	33410	However, the teams have surprised us in the past, scoring in the middle of updates. So
33410	38490	let's actually take a quick look at the scoreboard now to confirm that. If we look at the octagon,
38490	44270	it does indeed look like our teams are scoring the same. Our last two solves with SolarWine
44270	49670	and FluxRepeatRocket in Challenge 3. So we're still looking at Challenge 4 and 5 for the
49670	54870	rest of the day. While the score hasn't changed, we have had one important game milestone pass
54870	59970	us by. We timed out unavailable points for Challenge 3. That means those two teams, SolarWine
59970	64270	and FluxRepeatRocket, they've obtained points for that challenge, and all other teams were
64270	68570	given a solution script so they can focus on the next challenge. But before we move
68570	72570	on to our explainer video for Challenge 3, we actually missed getting you the full explanation
72570	76150	for Challenge 2 during our last update, so let's start with that.
77350	84410	Challenge 2. The satellite is spinning out of control because the Attitude Determination
84410	91390	and Control System, ADCS, has been manipulated. We suspect sabotage. The challenge? Teams
91390	96330	must repair the ADCS system as quickly as possible to stop the dangerous spinning.
96410	100890	Here's how they do it. Teams may first search the provided documentation for the appropriate
100890	107030	command to reset the ADCS. They find it and execute it. But the reset does not work. The
107030	112630	ADCS system begins communicating again, but it is not functioning properly. Teams discover
112630	117850	that the ADCS configuration tables have been altered and must be restored. They have to
117850	122650	the nominal parameters for the configuration tables from the provided user documentation.
122730	127730	The teams then have to upload a new table to the vehicle and command the ADCS to load the table.
127830	134130	This is how they will restore nominal operation of the ADCS. Good news! With the ADCS configuration
134130	139790	table updated, they receive nominal status from the ADCS, but the majority of the ADCS
139790	145010	commands still don't work. Teams realize that they can point the satellite by uploading various
145010	150490	ADCS configuration tables, each with different pointing modes and configuration parameters,
150490	155470	and loading them at different points in the orbit of the satellite. This allows the teams to stop
155470	160070	the spin of the vehicle and point the solar arrays at the sun to charge the batteries.
164350	168210	All right, now that we're caught up, here's a little bit more about the intended solution to
168210	177030	Challenge 3. Challenge 3. Here's what we know. With the update to the ADCS, the teams have
177030	181350	regained control of the satellite, but we still can't communicate with the payload module or
181350	186110	operate the imager. In addition, the majority of useful commands are not being accepted by
186110	190910	the flight software. We have to ask ourselves, what else did they damage on this satellite?
191090	195790	The challenge? Teams must restore communication with the payload module so we can get it working
195790	200970	again. Here's how they do it. The teams find that their initial commands to communicate with the
200970	205490	payload module are not being accepted by the flight software. It's clear that the command
205490	211830	and data handling C and DH system is not working appropriately. In fact, payload commands and the
211830	217690	majority of the other commands have been disabled in the C and DH system. It turns out the attacker
217690	222910	has modified the C and DH flight software and are now running their own code on board the space
222910	227670	vehicle. The attacker code is rejecting the majority of commands to the satellite, including
227670	234510	firmware updates, firmware restore, and ADCS commands. As a result, it is not possible to
234510	240210	restore the failsafe image as the restore command has been disabled. Lucky for the teams, the attacker
240210	245390	was sloppy and inadvertently introduced a vulnerability in the new firmware image. Teams
245390	251210	exploit this vulnerability and use it to repair the system and restore the C and DH software back
251210	256250	to normal operation. Once that is complete, they are able to communicate with the payload module
256250	265860	once again. Challenge 3 happens to be my personal favorite as it, along with challenge 0, are probably
265860	271020	the most similar to regular CTF challenges. I always love a good pwnable. Since we have some
271020	276080	time in this update, I want to introduce a new graphic to you that we call the Race to Space.
276400	281820	This will be a visualization we'll be using later on today to measure the team's on-orbit submissions.
281920	286460	The closer to the center of the bullseye, the more accurate the solution. And of course, the minimum
286460	291600	acceptance bar will let us see the solutions that were not accurate enough to be accepted. Each team
291600	296660	gets their own little slice of the pie, and we'll be able to see how many tries it took to become
296660	303840	accepted and or how accurate teams got. You may remember that we have four teams that all
303840	309300	submitted accepted solutions before the 4 p.m pacific cutoff yesterday. They were Poland Cannon
309300	315620	to Space ahead of the pack, and then ADD Vulcan, Flux Repeat Rocket, and finally Samurai. Speaking
315620	319920	of ADD Vulcan, we haven't yet had a chance to show off their biography, so let's let's check
319920	326360	them out now in recognition of them being the second accepted solution to the on-orbit challenge.
354360	358000	Apparently, the real reason ADD Vulcan is participating in HackASAT
358000	362920	was just as an excuse to make pink Starfleet uniforms. Go check out their Twitter Team Twitter
362920	368160	account for more info on that. Also, one of the main team members, AmyDD, was on the recent TV
368160	373180	show Lego Masters and also hosts an awesome STEM for Girls scholarship. That's it for this
373180	378800	competition update. I'll see you back here in one hour at 11 50 a.m pacific, 2 50 p.m eastern.