[00:00.000 --> 00:01.960]  Hi, I'm Cecilia.
[00:01.960 --> 00:02.880]  And I'm Denise.
[00:02.880 --> 00:05.320]  And today we are going to talk about sex toys.
[00:05.320 --> 00:06.540]  Smart sex toys.
[00:06.540 --> 00:08.780]  Well, insecure smart sex toys.
[00:08.780 --> 00:09.280]  Yeah.
[00:09.280 --> 00:11.660]  There have been previous researches on this subject,
[00:11.660 --> 00:13.420]  and you can find them online,
[00:13.420 --> 00:16.040]  but many devices that are still on the market
[00:16.040 --> 00:18.920]  have a lot of vulnerability and privacy issues.
[00:18.920 --> 00:21.900]  So, in our research we tried to find these problems
[00:21.900 --> 00:24.900]  and today we are going to share with you our results.
[00:25.100 --> 00:25.800]  Exactly.
[00:25.800 --> 00:27.800]  But first, let's do a quick recap
[00:27.800 --> 00:30.040]  on the history of these devices.
[00:30.520 --> 00:34.020]  They have actually been with us for a very long time.
[00:34.020 --> 00:36.000]  Actually, more than a century.
[00:36.000 --> 00:39.120]  The first sex toys were used as medical appliances
[00:39.120 --> 00:41.580]  back in the 1900s.
[00:41.580 --> 00:45.180]  They were used to cure different types of pathologies,
[00:45.180 --> 00:47.740]  including some psychological ones.
[00:47.780 --> 00:52.140]  Then, throughout the 1920s, 30s, 40s, 50s,
[00:52.140 --> 00:55.040]  even to the late 60s,
[00:55.040 --> 00:57.840]  new devices, new models, new shapes
[00:57.840 --> 00:59.980]  started to appear in the market.
[01:00.220 --> 01:04.780]  And they were, this time, advertised towards the home users
[01:04.780 --> 01:07.420]  that could buy these products, take them home,
[01:07.420 --> 01:09.320]  and use them whenever they wanted.
[01:09.660 --> 01:14.640]  Imagine powering one of these via the electric power grid, right?
[01:14.640 --> 01:17.460]  Well, let's talk about physical security back in the 20s
[01:17.460 --> 01:18.740]  with one of those.
[01:19.200 --> 01:24.440]  Then, by the 70s, the emergence of new feminist movements
[01:24.440 --> 01:27.740]  alongside the boom of the porn industry
[01:27.740 --> 01:30.900]  propelled those devices,
[01:30.900 --> 01:34.800]  and new forms, shapes, and materials started to be used.
[01:34.800 --> 01:40.300]  But by the 2000s, this thing starts to get interesting for us,
[01:40.300 --> 01:44.200]  because new devices that could be controlled remotely
[01:44.200 --> 01:47.660]  via infrared connectivity started to appear,
[01:47.660 --> 01:50.660]  and by the 2010s,
[01:50.660 --> 01:54.420]  there were several devices that could be controlled locally
[01:54.420 --> 01:58.540]  via Bluetooth with an application on your own smartphone.
[01:58.540 --> 02:01.900]  Yeah, with the arrival of IoT and new technologies,
[02:01.900 --> 02:05.380]  many manufacturers decided to integrate these toys
[02:05.380 --> 02:08.020]  with mobile apps and internet connections.
[02:08.020 --> 02:11.320]  So, nowadays, in 2020,
[02:11.320 --> 02:14.380]  we have toys that have a lot of characteristics
[02:14.380 --> 02:17.560]  and that can be used remotely,
[02:17.560 --> 02:21.580]  like control the toy remotely through the mobile app
[02:21.580 --> 02:23.600]  or even a web browser,
[02:23.600 --> 02:25.600]  and change the vibrating patterns,
[02:25.600 --> 02:30.420]  or even synchronize the device with a video call,
[02:30.420 --> 02:32.700]  an audio book, a playlist,
[02:32.700 --> 02:37.140]  or even have Alexa support or other assistance support
[02:37.140 --> 02:39.660]  to control them on voice commands.
[02:39.660 --> 02:42.940]  So, all of these functionalities are very interesting
[02:42.940 --> 02:46.520]  and also open the door to many vulnerabilities.
[02:46.520 --> 02:50.380]  Exactly, and they open the door to new models
[02:50.380 --> 02:53.280]  that can connect between each other.
[02:53.760 --> 02:57.160]  And also, we are now starting to see a trend
[02:57.160 --> 03:00.000]  towards smart 6 robots
[03:00.000 --> 03:02.640]  that have a lot of different capabilities
[03:03.060 --> 03:05.820]  that can be connected to the internet.
[03:05.880 --> 03:10.020]  They have certain artificial intelligence apps
[03:10.020 --> 03:13.080]  that can be installed on the device,
[03:13.080 --> 03:16.000]  and these apps, of course, have a lot of vulnerabilities
[03:16.000 --> 03:20.880]  that we can somehow assess to try to bypass.
[03:21.040 --> 03:24.440]  So, we actually contacted a few of these vendors
[03:24.440 --> 03:29.080]  to ask them about the characteristics of these smart 6 robots,
[03:29.080 --> 03:34.200]  and we found out that they are following several bad practices
[03:34.200 --> 03:36.260]  when it comes to security.
[03:36.280 --> 03:40.100]  So, the way these smart 6 robots work
[03:40.100 --> 03:42.620]  is that they actually have a smartphone
[03:42.620 --> 03:45.980]  that functions on their head, basically.
[03:45.980 --> 03:47.360]  Like a brain.
[03:47.540 --> 03:51.300]  And that connects to the rest of the sensors of the body.
[03:51.660 --> 03:55.840]  So, that phone can be actually very vulnerable,
[03:55.840 --> 04:01.380]  and the updates are actually delivered through e-mails.
[04:01.380 --> 04:04.680]  So, the user has to install the APKs themselves.
[04:04.680 --> 04:09.040]  Talk about security when it comes to these types of devices.
[04:09.400 --> 04:12.240]  Well, apart from the devices,
[04:12.240 --> 04:14.240]  if we think about the sex industry
[04:14.240 --> 04:16.680]  and the adult entertainment industry,
[04:16.680 --> 04:21.020]  these industries have already been the target of several cyber attacks.
[04:21.120 --> 04:23.640]  And the first attack that comes to my mind
[04:23.640 --> 04:26.520]  is the Ashley Madison social network,
[04:26.520 --> 04:30.200]  which a couple of years before was the target of an attack,
[04:30.200 --> 04:34.600]  and the details, the information of more than 30 million users
[04:34.600 --> 04:36.500]  was exposed online.
[04:36.500 --> 04:38.820]  So, a lot of cheaters were revealed,
[04:38.820 --> 04:42.400]  and many people had a lot of problems in their relationships.
[04:42.400 --> 04:45.340]  And we can also think about Tinder,
[04:45.340 --> 04:49.840]  this dating app that has already been found in many vulnerabilities.
[04:50.280 --> 04:53.860]  And also, we have to think about the many scams
[04:53.860 --> 04:56.740]  that are based on fake apps,
[04:56.740 --> 04:59.460]  or fake lab promises,
[04:59.460 --> 05:03.480]  or even sextortion based on stolen information.
[05:03.660 --> 05:06.980]  So, if to these attacks to the sex industry,
[05:06.980 --> 05:09.520]  we add the fact that IoT devices
[05:09.520 --> 05:12.200]  are being compromised by attackers
[05:12.200 --> 05:15.080]  to perform different types of attacks,
[05:15.080 --> 05:16.640]  well, that's a problem.
[05:16.640 --> 05:19.920]  And we can think, for example, about the Mirai network,
[05:19.920 --> 05:23.740]  or about a case where attackers got control
[05:23.740 --> 05:27.080]  of a thermometer in a casino's fish tank,
[05:27.080 --> 05:30.820]  and then from there could jump to the casino's network.
[05:30.820 --> 05:35.420]  So, if we sum up the industry of sex
[05:35.420 --> 05:37.780]  that has been the target of cyber attacks,
[05:37.780 --> 05:40.860]  with the many IoT devices that we have today in the market
[05:40.860 --> 05:43.460]  that are already being used by attackers,
[05:43.460 --> 05:46.200]  well, the combination is a little bit scary.
[05:46.380 --> 05:48.880]  So, what can go wrong with these toys?
[05:48.980 --> 05:52.880]  Well, first of all, an attacker can put a backdoor or malware
[05:52.880 --> 05:54.960]  inside of one of these toys.
[05:54.960 --> 05:59.180]  But also, these devices are permanently advertising themselves.
[05:59.180 --> 06:01.080]  So, they are permanently sending information
[06:01.080 --> 06:02.620]  of their presence there.
[06:02.620 --> 06:05.840]  So, it's pretty easy to find if a toy is present
[06:05.840 --> 06:10.760]  on a hotel room, or if someone is carrying one with him.
[06:10.760 --> 06:13.600]  So, this can lead to several issues,
[06:13.600 --> 06:16.980]  like information disclosure, information very sensitive,
[06:16.980 --> 06:19.220]  for example, as sexual orientation,
[06:19.220 --> 06:21.880]  sexual partners, or sexual practices.
[06:22.020 --> 06:27.880]  And this can be some problem in many countries
[06:27.880 --> 06:32.140]  that have laws against some sexual practices.
[06:32.140 --> 06:34.680]  But also, we can think about an attacker
[06:34.680 --> 06:37.340]  that gets control of one of these devices
[06:37.340 --> 06:39.640]  while a user is playing with it.
[06:39.640 --> 06:42.400]  So, imagine a person has a toy, it's playing at home,
[06:42.400 --> 06:44.640]  but then an attacker gets control of that toy
[06:44.640 --> 06:47.900]  and is the one that is really sending the commands to the toy.
[06:47.900 --> 06:50.760]  Would that be sexual assault? What happens there?
[06:51.000 --> 06:52.940]  These are things that we have to start considering
[06:52.940 --> 06:54.760]  with smart sex toys.
[06:55.340 --> 06:57.600]  So, at the start of our research,
[06:57.600 --> 07:01.420]  we had to choose the devices that we were going to use
[07:01.940 --> 07:03.380]  for our research.
[07:03.380 --> 07:06.620]  Basically, the models that we were going to buy.
[07:07.080 --> 07:11.160]  And, voila, there were so many different vendors,
[07:11.160 --> 07:12.620]  so many different models,
[07:12.620 --> 07:14.140]  and it was really hard to choose
[07:14.140 --> 07:16.200]  with so many different characteristics,
[07:16.200 --> 07:17.640]  each and every one of them.
[07:17.860 --> 07:21.920]  So, we did what anybody would do in this situation, right?
[07:21.920 --> 07:23.500]  We went to the Museum of Sex.
[07:24.060 --> 07:25.360]  Yes, in New York.
[07:25.360 --> 07:27.480]  We were in New York and we visited the museum.
[07:27.480 --> 07:31.600]  Exactly, and we started actually testing different devices
[07:31.600 --> 07:35.600]  that you could test in the site.
[07:35.800 --> 07:38.760]  And we didn't bring our laptops with us.
[07:38.760 --> 07:39.740]  We should have.
[07:39.740 --> 07:40.160]  Yeah.
[07:40.620 --> 07:44.560]  But we ended up choosing two vendors
[07:44.560 --> 07:47.140]  that we think were one of the biggest,
[07:47.140 --> 07:48.780]  or two of the biggest.
[07:49.300 --> 07:49.880]  So...
[07:49.880 --> 07:51.640]  Are you referring to the size?
[07:51.640 --> 07:51.680]  No.
[07:51.680 --> 07:52.900]  Or actually the vendors?
[07:52.900 --> 07:54.000]  Oh, come on.
[07:54.000 --> 07:55.980]  Don't do this to me.
[07:56.420 --> 07:57.860]  Just thinking, just thinking.
[07:57.860 --> 08:00.140]  Okay, the first one is Lovenz.
[08:00.140 --> 08:03.260]  I'm sure many of you know this brand
[08:03.260 --> 08:04.880]  if you're interested in sex toys
[08:04.880 --> 08:06.480]  and security of sex toys,
[08:06.480 --> 08:11.440]  because there have been research on this particular vendor.
[08:12.140 --> 08:17.480]  This brand has a lot of smart sex toys.
[08:17.480 --> 08:21.140]  You can connect them over a Bluetooth network
[08:21.140 --> 08:25.300]  or even over the internet.
[08:26.040 --> 08:28.880]  And there are so many different shapes and sizes.
[08:28.880 --> 08:31.840]  And we have also WeVibe that we choose
[08:31.840 --> 08:34.320]  because they also have a lot of smart sex toys
[08:34.760 --> 08:37.800]  and they are very important in the market.
[08:37.800 --> 08:39.080]  And I'm sure you're aware
[08:39.080 --> 08:41.760]  that there were several researches
[08:41.760 --> 08:44.740]  regarding this vendor in the past.
[08:44.740 --> 08:48.160]  So we wanted to know how much they have changed.
[08:48.260 --> 08:50.120]  So the first we did was
[08:50.120 --> 08:53.640]  we visited the websites of these two vendors
[08:53.640 --> 08:56.980]  and tried to look at the characteristics
[08:57.980 --> 09:00.640]  of their different models.
[09:00.640 --> 09:03.040]  So the first thing that you can see
[09:03.040 --> 09:05.420]  is that there is a lot of information
[09:05.420 --> 09:07.900]  about colors, materials,
[09:07.900 --> 09:10.880]  how much the battery lasts,
[09:10.880 --> 09:13.160]  how much does it take to charge them.
[09:13.160 --> 09:15.380]  But there were no mentions,
[09:15.380 --> 09:16.880]  at least on the websites,
[09:16.880 --> 09:19.360]  about protocols, encryption,
[09:19.360 --> 09:21.980]  and the security that was being applied
[09:21.980 --> 09:25.240]  to these apps and this firmware
[09:25.240 --> 09:27.020]  to make it secure.
[09:27.120 --> 09:31.060]  So this is something that happens a lot
[09:31.060 --> 09:33.460]  with this type of IoT devices,
[09:33.460 --> 09:35.760]  in particular sex toys.
[09:35.760 --> 09:38.220]  So the first step was to understand
[09:38.220 --> 09:39.260]  the architecture.
[09:39.260 --> 09:41.800]  How are these toys connected?
[09:41.980 --> 09:45.880]  So the toy connects to the user's smartphone
[09:45.880 --> 09:49.540]  using a personal area network like Bluetooth
[09:49.540 --> 09:52.360]  or, in most cases, Bluetooth Low Energy.
[09:52.380 --> 09:54.260]  Then, from the smartphone,
[09:54.260 --> 09:56.800]  the user connects to an API from the vendor,
[09:56.800 --> 09:58.560]  usually on a vendor server,
[09:58.560 --> 10:00.080]  and then the remote partner,
[10:00.080 --> 10:02.200]  that can be anywhere in the world,
[10:02.200 --> 10:03.400]  connects to that API
[10:03.400 --> 10:06.800]  and from there gets control of the remote toy.
[10:07.140 --> 10:09.600]  So in this architecture, in this model,
[10:09.600 --> 10:11.200]  there are a lot of attack vectors
[10:11.200 --> 10:13.020]  that an attacker could use,
[10:13.020 --> 10:18.040]  like go for the personal area network connection
[10:18.040 --> 10:19.980]  or go for the Bluetooth connection,
[10:19.980 --> 10:23.540]  maybe something on the smartphone, on the app,
[10:23.540 --> 10:27.180]  or even the remote connection through the internet API.
[10:27.260 --> 10:29.240]  So that's what we analyzed.
[10:29.340 --> 10:32.460]  Exactly. But first, a quick disclaimer,
[10:32.460 --> 10:34.880]  because all of the vulnerabilities
[10:34.880 --> 10:37.260]  that we are going to see throughout the talk
[10:37.260 --> 10:38.580]  that we are going to discuss
[10:38.580 --> 10:39.940]  have been already fixed
[10:39.940 --> 10:43.680]  and we have permission to perform
[10:43.680 --> 10:46.620]  and distribute the content that you are going to see.
[10:46.620 --> 10:49.920]  So just to be clear on where we are standing.
[10:49.920 --> 10:52.340]  So the first toy we are going to show you
[10:52.340 --> 10:55.460]  is this naughty one right here.
[10:55.680 --> 10:57.240]  He can't stand still.
[10:57.240 --> 11:00.740]  So this is the Jive from WeVibe.
[11:00.740 --> 11:02.280]  This toy is pretty interesting
[11:02.280 --> 11:03.760]  because it's a wearable.
[11:03.760 --> 11:06.540]  It means that the person wears this toy
[11:06.540 --> 11:09.440]  and can go around playing with this toy.
[11:09.440 --> 11:11.460]  So usually a couple use these toys
[11:11.460 --> 11:14.760]  in bars, restaurants, or even discos,
[11:14.760 --> 11:17.700]  not only in hotel rooms or inside a house.
[11:17.700 --> 11:19.840]  So that was pretty interesting for our analysis
[11:19.840 --> 11:23.400]  because it's a toy that you can find anywhere.
[11:23.640 --> 11:25.720]  And it's, as we said before,
[11:25.720 --> 11:27.760]  it's permanently advertising its presence
[11:27.760 --> 11:31.320]  and an attacker can easily find one of these
[11:31.320 --> 11:35.800]  like 30 feet around.
[11:35.800 --> 11:39.800]  Yeah, it is designed to be used in insecure networks
[11:39.800 --> 11:42.060]  or it should be designed for that.
[11:42.060 --> 11:43.560]  WeVibe had some trouble
[11:43.560 --> 11:46.240]  when it comes to information security in the past.
[11:46.240 --> 11:49.420]  It was at DEF CON a few years ago
[11:49.420 --> 11:51.440]  that a research was presented
[11:51.440 --> 11:55.780]  where it was proven that they had collected
[11:55.780 --> 11:57.980]  too much information from their users
[11:57.980 --> 11:59.980]  without their consent.
[11:59.980 --> 12:01.480]  And so they were sued
[12:01.480 --> 12:04.640]  and they had to pay $3.7 million,
[12:04.640 --> 12:06.580]  which is a lot.
[12:06.580 --> 12:08.980]  So we wanted to see if they had learned
[12:08.980 --> 12:10.420]  from this experience
[12:10.420 --> 12:12.960]  and they had changed their applications
[12:12.960 --> 12:15.460]  to make them more secure.
[12:15.720 --> 12:17.540]  The first thing that we checked
[12:17.540 --> 12:20.300]  was the remote control via the URL.
[12:20.520 --> 12:22.520]  This application has the possibility
[12:22.520 --> 12:26.420]  to create a 12 characters string
[12:26.420 --> 12:28.440]  that it's been used as a token
[12:28.440 --> 12:30.660]  and you can share with your partner
[12:30.660 --> 12:34.040]  and so they can connect via the application
[12:34.040 --> 12:38.360]  to control your own sex toy.
[12:38.380 --> 12:42.840]  So this token used to have some problems in the past
[12:42.840 --> 12:44.660]  it didn't expire as it should
[12:44.660 --> 12:46.980]  but now they actually fixed it.
[12:46.980 --> 12:49.160]  At least we couldn't find any problem
[12:49.160 --> 12:50.740]  with this right now.
[12:50.740 --> 12:52.280]  The first things that we checked
[12:52.280 --> 12:54.120]  were some privacy issues
[12:54.120 --> 12:56.560]  that could have critical consequences
[12:56.560 --> 12:57.460]  for their users
[12:57.460 --> 13:00.200]  leading to information disclosure.
[13:00.620 --> 13:02.880]  There are so many good things
[13:02.880 --> 13:04.680]  that WeBypass changed.
[13:04.680 --> 13:07.840]  For example, now they block all screenshot attempts,
[13:07.840 --> 13:08.460]  which is great
[13:08.460 --> 13:10.820]  and it's quite common in these applications
[13:10.820 --> 13:14.200]  that tend to handle such sensitive data.
[13:14.200 --> 13:16.220]  They applied end-to-end encryption
[13:16.220 --> 13:18.560]  to encrypt all the pictures that you are sending
[13:18.560 --> 13:23.480]  and their files actually are deleted
[13:23.480 --> 13:25.980]  from the chat once the chat ends
[13:25.980 --> 13:26.880]  which is great
[13:26.880 --> 13:28.300]  so you know that your pictures
[13:28.300 --> 13:31.620]  do not linger on the phone of your partners.
[13:31.620 --> 13:34.160]  But still there were some issues
[13:34.160 --> 13:38.220]  that we found with this transferring of images.
[13:38.220 --> 13:40.880]  Yes, well, the pictures sent on the chat
[13:40.880 --> 13:45.320]  are saved to the storage inside the app
[13:45.320 --> 13:47.360]  sorry, to the app storage inside the phone
[13:47.360 --> 13:50.380]  so that no other app can access that picture
[13:50.380 --> 13:51.860]  or you cannot access that picture
[13:51.860 --> 13:54.240]  from outside the application.
[13:54.300 --> 13:57.080]  But if the attacker has a rooted phone,
[13:57.080 --> 13:59.360]  well, they can access the app storage.
[13:59.360 --> 14:01.100]  In that case, that's what we did.
[14:01.100 --> 14:02.540]  We found out that the picture
[14:03.090 --> 14:05.180]  that is stored inside the application
[14:05.180 --> 14:08.260]  still has all the metadata in it.
[14:08.260 --> 14:09.780]  So when you send a picture,
[14:09.780 --> 14:12.980]  the metadata is not deleted before it's sent.
[14:12.980 --> 14:15.580]  So that picture can be uploaded to a site
[14:15.580 --> 14:17.040]  like, for example, Metapix
[14:17.040 --> 14:19.200]  and an attacker can find out
[14:19.200 --> 14:21.820]  where the person that sent the picture
[14:21.820 --> 14:24.180]  is actually located,
[14:24.180 --> 14:29.560]  the exact location by the GPS details, information.
[14:29.920 --> 14:31.560]  The attacker can also know
[14:31.560 --> 14:33.720]  the model of the phone that's being used,
[14:33.720 --> 14:35.620]  the camera, the time and date
[14:35.620 --> 14:37.860]  the photo was actually taken,
[14:37.860 --> 14:40.300]  and if it has been edited or not.
[14:40.300 --> 14:42.520]  This information at first could sound
[14:42.520 --> 14:45.320]  like something that no one could use.
[14:45.320 --> 14:47.780]  But the thing is that many people
[14:47.780 --> 14:49.920]  usually use these applications
[14:49.920 --> 14:52.120]  to talk to strangers.
[14:52.120 --> 14:55.020]  And also many people share online
[14:55.020 --> 14:58.340]  their tokens or their remote controls.
[14:58.340 --> 15:01.500]  So if that person is trying to hide
[15:01.500 --> 15:03.500]  his or her true personality
[15:03.500 --> 15:06.860]  or is trying to hide where he or she is,
[15:06.860 --> 15:08.420]  well, the metadata and the pictures
[15:08.420 --> 15:10.100]  does not help.
[15:10.500 --> 15:11.500]  Exactly.
[15:11.500 --> 15:14.540]  And sometimes this is not a personal choice,
[15:14.540 --> 15:15.860]  but this is also
[15:16.760 --> 15:18.760]  can be part of the service
[15:18.760 --> 15:22.080]  as a cam girl or a cam boy service.
[15:22.080 --> 15:24.140]  So we need to protect these people
[15:24.140 --> 15:25.440]  that are using these devices
[15:25.440 --> 15:27.700]  basically to work.
[15:27.760 --> 15:28.680]  What else?
[15:28.680 --> 15:31.220]  Well, this application actually includes
[15:31.720 --> 15:34.080]  a four-digit PIN that they can use
[15:34.080 --> 15:36.140]  in order to lock the application
[15:36.140 --> 15:39.000]  so no one else can access the application
[15:39.000 --> 15:42.280]  unless it has a four-digit PIN.
[15:42.280 --> 15:45.320]  This functionality might be in place
[15:45.320 --> 15:46.980]  to protect the app from
[15:46.980 --> 15:50.080]  your kids or something like that,
[15:50.080 --> 15:51.020]  your nieces,
[15:51.020 --> 15:53.740]  or maybe also a jealous lover.
[15:53.740 --> 15:56.260]  So the consequences can also be
[15:56.260 --> 15:57.940]  kind of critical
[15:57.940 --> 16:01.460]  if you're talking about a toxic relationship
[16:01.460 --> 16:04.180]  because this application only allows
[16:04.180 --> 16:06.260]  one partner at a time.
[16:06.260 --> 16:08.720]  So polyamory has not arrived
[16:08.720 --> 16:10.940]  to this application.
[16:11.440 --> 16:13.620]  So this PIN can actually,
[16:13.620 --> 16:16.180]  since it's just a four-digit PIN,
[16:16.180 --> 16:19.440]  can be brute-forced by using a bad USB
[16:19.440 --> 16:21.540]  with a very simple script
[16:21.540 --> 16:24.840]  because it takes the keyboard input
[16:24.840 --> 16:27.420]  and not like a grid of buttons
[16:27.420 --> 16:29.720]  or other type of components.
[16:29.720 --> 16:33.420]  So it's quite trivial to access this token
[16:33.420 --> 16:37.560]  and therefore access the control panel
[16:37.560 --> 16:38.460]  of the application
[16:38.460 --> 16:41.620]  and the usage of the application itself.
[16:41.840 --> 16:43.600]  And like we've seen in the video,
[16:43.600 --> 16:45.060]  just unblock the app.
[16:45.060 --> 16:46.080]  Exactly.
[16:46.080 --> 16:49.540]  So what else regarding these toys?
[16:49.540 --> 16:52.880]  Well, as we spoke before,
[16:52.880 --> 16:55.980]  these toys use Bluetooth Low Energy.
[16:55.980 --> 16:59.760]  And this protocol has a particular characteristic
[16:59.760 --> 17:02.980]  that is that there are two types of devices,
[17:02.980 --> 17:05.400]  peripheral and central devices.
[17:05.400 --> 17:07.560]  Peripheral devices that are usually the toys
[17:07.560 --> 17:11.300]  have to be constantly advertising their presence
[17:11.300 --> 17:14.140]  to wait for a connection from the central device.
[17:14.140 --> 17:18.120]  That means that while a toy is not connected
[17:18.120 --> 17:19.520]  to a smartphone,
[17:19.520 --> 17:22.860]  it's permanently advertising,
[17:22.860 --> 17:24.460]  that they are waiting for the connection.
[17:24.460 --> 17:25.900]  This means that...
[17:25.900 --> 17:26.640]  Like that.
[17:26.640 --> 17:27.420]  See?
[17:27.600 --> 17:29.000]  You're doing that.
[17:29.000 --> 17:30.640]  I'm not doing that.
[17:30.680 --> 17:31.340]  It's crazy.
[17:31.340 --> 17:32.300]  We are already being hacked.
[17:32.300 --> 17:33.360]  Who is doing that?
[17:33.360 --> 17:33.960]  I'm not sure.
[17:33.960 --> 17:34.900]  There's nobody here.
[17:34.900 --> 17:36.040]  It's just us.
[17:36.260 --> 17:37.660]  Okay, so...
[17:37.660 --> 17:39.020]  Is somebody here?
[17:39.760 --> 17:41.240]  A ghost.
[17:41.300 --> 17:44.580]  So the attacker can download an application
[17:44.580 --> 17:46.600]  like this Bluetooth scanner
[17:46.600 --> 17:49.140]  and just try to find out
[17:49.140 --> 17:51.640]  if there are any devices around.
[17:51.640 --> 17:54.060]  In the example that you can see on the screen,
[17:54.060 --> 17:56.920]  we are finding the Jive that's here
[17:56.920 --> 17:59.860]  and the Max that we are going to talk later about.
[18:00.480 --> 18:02.580]  So it's pretty easy for the attacker
[18:02.580 --> 18:04.340]  to just find these devices,
[18:04.340 --> 18:06.640]  find a lot of information from these devices
[18:06.640 --> 18:10.000]  and start using this scanner as a compass.
[18:10.000 --> 18:12.600]  A compass to get closer to the device
[18:12.600 --> 18:16.860]  just using the signal strength of each device.
[18:16.860 --> 18:18.840]  So the attacker can easily move around
[18:18.840 --> 18:21.120]  looking for the best signal strength
[18:21.120 --> 18:23.660]  and that would give the attacker an idea
[18:23.660 --> 18:26.080]  of where is the toy present,
[18:26.080 --> 18:28.780]  who is wearing or using that toy.
[18:28.820 --> 18:31.300]  That's pretty much a lot of information.
[18:31.300 --> 18:33.700]  Yes, and then they can connect to the toy
[18:33.700 --> 18:36.700]  and they don't even need the app to do that
[18:36.700 --> 18:39.120]  because there are several websites
[18:40.060 --> 18:41.580]  that you can use
[18:41.580 --> 18:44.980]  by using the web Bluetooth APA
[18:44.980 --> 18:47.960]  to connect to the sex toy
[18:47.960 --> 18:51.100]  and send comments to the sex toys.
[18:51.100 --> 18:52.500]  And they are still functioning
[18:52.960 --> 18:54.820]  because there is no authentication
[18:54.820 --> 18:57.720]  when it comes to this Bluetooth connection.
[18:57.720 --> 19:02.020]  And so it's quite vulnerable to this type of hijackings.
[19:02.020 --> 19:05.960]  So not only an attacker can get control of this toy
[19:05.960 --> 19:08.280]  whenever the toy is available,
[19:08.280 --> 19:11.580]  but also, could an attacker get into a middle of a conversation,
[19:11.580 --> 19:13.020]  into a middle of a connection?
[19:13.020 --> 19:14.900]  Well, that's actually what we tried.
[19:14.900 --> 19:16.560]  A Bluetooth man-in-the-middle attack,
[19:16.560 --> 19:19.980]  where the attacker tries to get in the middle of a communication
[19:19.980 --> 19:21.940]  and control the toy.
[19:21.940 --> 19:23.980]  So in a common scenario,
[19:24.040 --> 19:26.980]  a toy would be connected to the user's phone.
[19:26.980 --> 19:29.140]  But in this case,
[19:29.140 --> 19:30.620]  what the attacker will try to do
[19:30.620 --> 19:33.180]  is get in the middle of that connection,
[19:33.180 --> 19:36.820]  create a fake toy in his or her computer,
[19:36.820 --> 19:39.740]  and then make the user connect to the fake toy
[19:39.740 --> 19:41.520]  instead of the real toy.
[19:41.520 --> 19:43.420]  And the attacker will be the one
[19:43.420 --> 19:46.520]  who will forward the commands to the toy
[19:46.520 --> 19:49.160]  or maybe change them in the middle.
[19:49.740 --> 19:51.700]  So, in the next video,
[19:51.700 --> 19:54.820]  we are going to see a proof-of-concept of this.
[19:54.860 --> 19:56.160]  So what we did is
[19:56.160 --> 19:59.360]  use the tool BTLJuice
[19:59.360 --> 20:02.420]  to create a man-in-the-middle attack.
[20:02.420 --> 20:05.060]  This tool uses two Bluetooth dongles
[20:05.060 --> 20:07.960]  and the attacker will need two computers,
[20:07.960 --> 20:10.120]  or in this case, two virtual machines.
[20:10.120 --> 20:11.260]  In the first one,
[20:11.260 --> 20:15.080]  what the attacker would do is create a Bluetooth proxy.
[20:15.080 --> 20:17.700]  This Bluetooth proxy will be in charge of
[20:18.720 --> 20:21.080]  getting all the Bluetooth communications,
[20:21.080 --> 20:23.200]  capturing all the Bluetooth traffic.
[20:23.380 --> 20:25.520]  Then once the proxy is up,
[20:25.520 --> 20:27.180]  the attacker can go to the other computer
[20:27.180 --> 20:28.540]  or the other virtual machine
[20:29.080 --> 20:33.220]  and will connect to the Bluetooth proxy,
[20:33.220 --> 20:35.340]  to the BTLJuice proxy.
[20:35.660 --> 20:37.220]  And then, once connected,
[20:37.220 --> 20:40.240]  you will see that this tool has a web interface
[20:40.240 --> 20:42.620]  that's very useful and easy to use.
[20:42.620 --> 20:46.400]  So, in that interface,
[20:46.400 --> 20:50.080]  the attacker can see all the Bluetooth devices on range.
[20:50.320 --> 20:53.560]  And there you will find the child, our toy.
[20:54.000 --> 20:56.140]  So then, once the attacker finds the toy,
[20:56.140 --> 20:58.320]  can connect to that toy,
[20:58.320 --> 21:01.120]  and as you see in the console,
[21:01.120 --> 21:03.360]  the tool BTLJuice will create
[21:03.360 --> 21:05.660]  what is called a dummy.
[21:05.660 --> 21:08.700]  It's like a fake toy, a fake device,
[21:08.700 --> 21:11.520]  where the user, the victim, will connect
[21:11.520 --> 21:14.040]  but will still think that it's the real toy
[21:14.040 --> 21:17.200]  because this dummy will copy all the characteristics
[21:17.200 --> 21:19.360]  of the real device.
[21:19.500 --> 21:22.120]  So, then the victim connects to that dummy,
[21:22.120 --> 21:23.480]  to the fake toy,
[21:23.480 --> 21:26.680]  and when sends a command, the toy actually moves.
[21:26.680 --> 21:28.240]  As you see on the screen,
[21:28.240 --> 21:31.420]  the attacker is capturing all these packages,
[21:31.420 --> 21:32.720]  all these commands.
[21:32.720 --> 21:35.880]  So the attacker can start knowing some commands
[21:35.880 --> 21:37.800]  and getting some traffic.
[21:38.720 --> 21:42.700]  So, there can you see the user is changing
[21:42.700 --> 21:44.840]  some vibration patterns,
[21:44.840 --> 21:46.440]  and the attacker is there capturing
[21:46.440 --> 21:48.400]  all of these packages.
[21:48.480 --> 21:51.500]  So then, the attacker can get some commands.
[21:51.740 --> 21:53.200]  But what the attacker can do next
[21:53.200 --> 21:56.620]  is take any of these packages and just reply it.
[21:56.620 --> 21:58.760]  That means send it back to the toy.
[21:59.120 --> 22:02.140]  So now, the attacker is sending a command,
[22:02.140 --> 22:04.160]  and while the victim is not doing anything,
[22:04.160 --> 22:05.300]  the toy is moving.
[22:05.300 --> 22:06.760]  So the toy is vibrating.
[22:06.760 --> 22:09.300]  So the attacker is the one that is actually controlling
[22:09.300 --> 22:11.280]  the toy at this point.
[22:11.520 --> 22:14.960]  You can see it's sending different type of commands,
[22:14.960 --> 22:16.820]  and the toy is responding.
[22:19.850 --> 22:21.630]  Also, what the attacker can do
[22:21.630 --> 22:23.990]  when the device is stopping,
[22:23.990 --> 22:26.010]  is change these packages.
[22:26.010 --> 22:27.690]  Just add new commands.
[22:27.690 --> 22:30.690]  These commands can either be taken from
[22:30.690 --> 22:32.370]  the source code of the application
[22:32.370 --> 22:35.390]  or by capturing a lot of traffic.
[22:35.390 --> 22:38.630]  So there, for example, you have the max intensity.
[22:38.670 --> 22:41.110]  So the attacker can send a command to the toy
[22:41.110 --> 22:44.850]  to vibrate at its maximum intensity.
[22:45.190 --> 22:48.610]  And there you will see how the toy is now vibrating.
[22:48.730 --> 22:53.450]  So the attacker can not only intercept the actual commands,
[22:53.450 --> 22:57.310]  but also change them or send new commands to the toy.
[22:57.310 --> 22:59.370]  So in this case, I don't know,
[22:59.370 --> 23:01.750]  maybe it could be a sexual assault.
[23:01.750 --> 23:03.730]  Something to talk about or to think about.
[23:05.870 --> 23:08.830]  So we have proved that these devices
[23:08.830 --> 23:11.730]  are still vulnerable to this type of attack
[23:11.730 --> 23:14.390]  and no authentication has been included
[23:14.390 --> 23:18.030]  in these toys in the past years,
[23:18.030 --> 23:21.350]  which was the goal of this research.
[23:21.350 --> 23:24.450]  So now we are going to analyze our Lovance device,
[23:24.450 --> 23:26.350]  which is the max device that you are
[23:26.350 --> 23:29.110]  watching right now on screen.
[23:29.110 --> 23:31.650]  This device can be synchronized
[23:31.650 --> 23:33.770]  with its counterpart.
[23:33.770 --> 23:37.890]  It can be another max device or a Nora device.
[23:37.890 --> 23:41.270]  These models are interesting from a hacking perspective
[23:41.270 --> 23:47.930]  because if a hacker has control over one of these devices,
[23:47.930 --> 23:50.750]  then immediately compromises the other one
[23:50.750 --> 23:54.010]  that replicates the movements of the first.
[23:54.010 --> 23:57.890]  So you can have two devices under your control
[23:57.890 --> 23:59.710]  by the price of one.
[24:00.630 --> 24:03.630]  So we started analyzing the application
[24:03.630 --> 24:05.930]  that is used to control this device,
[24:06.490 --> 24:09.810]  that is the Lovance Remote application,
[24:09.810 --> 24:13.730]  and we started analyzing the privacy features
[24:13.730 --> 24:16.730]  related to this application.
[24:16.730 --> 24:20.010]  Well, we could see that it uses a 4-digit PIN
[24:20.010 --> 24:23.570]  to lock the application, same as the other one,
[24:23.570 --> 24:27.950]  but there were some concerns, right?
[24:27.950 --> 24:31.710]  Yes, well, some questionable design choices from Lovance.
[24:31.710 --> 24:35.430]  To start, the screenshots are allowed.
[24:35.430 --> 24:37.630]  So for a sexting application,
[24:37.630 --> 24:40.990]  that's pretty much something to think about.
[24:40.990 --> 24:44.350]  But also, well, the metadata was deleted
[24:44.350 --> 24:46.530]  from the pictures before they are sent.
[24:46.530 --> 24:47.550]  That's great.
[24:47.550 --> 24:51.270]  But the pictures that a person sent on a chat,
[24:51.270 --> 24:53.590]  well, are very difficult to delete
[24:53.590 --> 24:55.330]  from the remote smartphone.
[24:55.330 --> 24:57.430]  They practically stay there.
[24:57.430 --> 24:59.630]  What do we mean by this?
[24:59.630 --> 25:01.930]  Well, let's imagine you're using the application
[25:01.930 --> 25:05.270]  and you send your partner your own picture.
[25:05.470 --> 25:10.130]  Let's say that you now open the options menu on this picture.
[25:10.130 --> 25:11.710]  Well, you see different options.
[25:11.710 --> 25:16.030]  First of all, you can see that you can delete the picture.
[25:16.030 --> 25:19.430]  But this deletion only works locally.
[25:19.430 --> 25:23.110]  It doesn't remove the picture from the server
[25:23.110 --> 25:26.930]  nor the phone of your lover.
[25:26.930 --> 25:29.130]  So basically, once you send the picture,
[25:29.130 --> 25:30.570]  you lose control.
[25:31.350 --> 25:35.210]  Also, the remote partner can also forward
[25:35.210 --> 25:38.590]  or download your picture whenever they want.
[25:39.010 --> 25:42.910]  And since this picture stays on the server,
[25:42.910 --> 25:44.730]  then they can also query the server
[25:44.730 --> 25:46.910]  to get the image if they know the URL
[25:46.910 --> 25:49.330]  of this particular resource.
[25:50.010 --> 25:53.010]  The lover's privacy policy says
[25:53.010 --> 25:56.350]  that these pictures stay in their servers
[25:56.350 --> 25:59.290]  unencrypted, by the way, for seven days.
[25:59.290 --> 26:02.870]  But we've actually found that they can stay longer.
[26:03.390 --> 26:06.350]  There's actually a hidden option
[26:06.350 --> 26:07.870]  that's called Recall.
[26:07.870 --> 26:09.890]  And that's the one you want to use
[26:09.890 --> 26:11.810]  when you want to delete a picture
[26:11.810 --> 26:14.570]  from the two devices.
[26:14.570 --> 26:16.830]  But this option is only available
[26:16.830 --> 26:19.330]  for two minutes after sending the picture
[26:19.330 --> 26:22.190]  and then completely disappears.
[26:22.190 --> 26:25.090]  So if you never tried to delete the pictures
[26:25.090 --> 26:27.390]  right after you send it,
[26:27.390 --> 26:29.550]  then you don't even know that this function
[26:29.550 --> 26:30.930]  even exists.
[26:30.930 --> 26:32.810]  So that's something to have in mind
[26:32.810 --> 26:35.450]  if you or one of your relatives
[26:35.450 --> 26:37.750]  or someone of your friends
[26:37.750 --> 26:40.490]  is actually using this application.
[26:41.210 --> 26:44.770]  Also, when we start analyzing the traffic,
[26:44.770 --> 26:47.870]  you can see that there are several queries,
[26:47.870 --> 26:50.270]  HTTP GET queries,
[26:50.270 --> 26:53.070]  that are broadcasting information
[26:53.070 --> 26:56.190]  such as the user ID.
[26:56.190 --> 26:58.390]  In this case, it's the same one
[26:58.390 --> 27:01.190]  as the email addresses.
[27:01.190 --> 27:03.130]  When you register into the application,
[27:03.130 --> 27:05.330]  you can set a fantasy username
[27:05.330 --> 27:08.190]  and you need to provide your email.
[27:08.190 --> 27:09.370]  Well, guess what?
[27:09.370 --> 27:11.310]  That email is actually shared
[27:11.310 --> 27:14.070]  with whomever you're chatting with.
[27:14.070 --> 27:16.310]  Let's say you open up a chat
[27:16.310 --> 27:17.410]  with one of your friends.
[27:17.410 --> 27:20.350]  Well, the application uses your email
[27:20.350 --> 27:22.050]  as your user ID
[27:22.050 --> 27:24.430]  to identify your phone.
[27:24.430 --> 27:26.910]  So they are sharing your email
[27:26.910 --> 27:29.830]  with the person that you're chatting.
[27:30.130 --> 27:33.030]  And they can look up your email
[27:33.030 --> 27:36.330]  in the internal files of the phone
[27:36.330 --> 27:38.630]  because they are not encrypted.
[27:38.630 --> 27:39.910]  And even if they were,
[27:39.910 --> 27:42.490]  you can still somehow
[27:43.110 --> 27:45.670]  manage to get through this information
[27:45.670 --> 27:49.070]  by injecting the application at runtime.
[27:49.530 --> 27:51.310]  And there are other ways,
[27:51.310 --> 27:53.190]  other issues related to
[27:53.190 --> 27:54.910]  the way this application
[27:54.910 --> 27:58.130]  manipulates the email addresses.
[27:58.130 --> 28:01.070]  For example, you can query the server
[28:01.070 --> 28:04.610]  to see if a given email address
[28:04.610 --> 28:07.250]  is registered on the system.
[28:07.250 --> 28:09.550]  So you can know based on the response
[28:09.550 --> 28:12.170]  if the email exists.
[28:12.170 --> 28:16.370]  You could use a leaked database
[28:16.370 --> 28:19.890]  of emails from previous attacks,
[28:19.890 --> 28:21.230]  let's say the Ashley Madison
[28:21.870 --> 28:23.510]  social network attack,
[28:23.510 --> 28:25.190]  and then query these emails
[28:25.190 --> 28:26.450]  against the server
[28:26.450 --> 28:28.570]  because there are no protections
[28:28.570 --> 28:30.530]  against brute forcing.
[28:30.530 --> 28:33.490]  So you could query all that you want.
[28:33.950 --> 28:37.050]  And it works the other way around.
[28:37.050 --> 28:38.430]  You can also query for usernames
[28:38.850 --> 28:40.910]  and get their emails.
[28:40.910 --> 28:42.950]  So let's say you
[28:42.950 --> 28:44.670]  start browsing the application
[28:44.670 --> 28:47.330]  and you find the patterns library
[28:47.730 --> 28:50.930]  where users can share their patterns of use
[28:50.930 --> 28:53.830]  publicly with other users.
[28:53.830 --> 28:56.710]  So you could find usernames
[28:56.710 --> 28:58.530]  listed in this library
[28:58.530 --> 29:00.070]  and then query the server
[29:00.070 --> 29:01.130]  to get their emails
[29:01.130 --> 29:02.870]  and start different attacks
[29:02.870 --> 29:04.230]  as social engineering
[29:04.230 --> 29:06.590]  or sextortion attacks
[29:06.590 --> 29:09.550]  or even use these emails
[29:09.550 --> 29:12.190]  to launch other types of attacks
[29:12.190 --> 29:14.770]  since these are also the user IDs.
[29:15.310 --> 29:16.750]  So these emails could be used
[29:16.750 --> 29:18.830]  to identify a person, right?
[29:18.830 --> 29:19.510]  Yes, exactly.
[29:19.510 --> 29:20.950]  Well, apart from the library,
[29:20.950 --> 29:21.930]  we need to think that
[29:21.930 --> 29:23.890]  many people just share
[29:23.890 --> 29:25.430]  their username, their nicknames
[29:25.430 --> 29:27.890]  online for remote session
[29:27.890 --> 29:29.890]  with someone around the world.
[29:29.890 --> 29:31.530]  But most of the time,
[29:31.530 --> 29:32.950]  these are fantasy names
[29:32.950 --> 29:34.910]  like sexyscot26.
[29:34.910 --> 29:36.270]  Well, in this case,
[29:36.270 --> 29:37.630]  an attacker could find out
[29:37.630 --> 29:40.090]  what's the email for sexyscot26
[29:40.390 --> 29:41.990]  and find the real person
[29:41.990 --> 29:43.810]  behind that nickname.
[29:44.230 --> 29:45.450]  Be sure not to register
[29:45.450 --> 29:47.050]  with a corporate account, right?
[29:47.050 --> 29:48.690]  Yeah, for sure.
[29:49.530 --> 29:51.650]  Well, apart from this,
[29:52.210 --> 29:53.730]  Loven's remote control
[29:53.730 --> 29:56.670]  also works with an URL.
[29:56.670 --> 29:59.770]  So the person that has this toy
[29:59.770 --> 30:03.070]  can create a remote control URL
[30:03.070 --> 30:04.830]  for his or her partner
[30:04.830 --> 30:06.870]  to control the toy remotely.
[30:06.870 --> 30:09.790]  So this URL works directly
[30:09.790 --> 30:10.850]  through the internet.
[30:10.850 --> 30:13.230]  It does not need for the remote partner
[30:13.230 --> 30:14.570]  to have the app installed
[30:14.570 --> 30:17.100]  as in the case of Webuy.
[30:17.530 --> 30:18.650]  So in this case,
[30:18.650 --> 30:21.190]  this URL is made by,
[30:21.190 --> 30:23.050]  at first, an alphanumeric token
[30:23.050 --> 30:25.290]  with only four characters.
[30:25.290 --> 30:26.630]  So we started analyzing
[30:26.990 --> 30:29.530]  a little bit about this token.
[30:29.530 --> 30:32.030]  So apparently, Loven says
[30:32.030 --> 30:33.690]  it's a one-time use token
[30:33.690 --> 30:36.130]  and it lasts only 30 minutes.
[30:36.130 --> 30:40.090]  But we were going to test this
[30:40.090 --> 30:41.990]  and see if this is true.
[30:41.990 --> 30:44.570]  Spoiler alert, it's not.
[30:44.790 --> 30:47.250]  So this is the remote panel
[30:47.250 --> 30:48.970]  where the remote lover
[30:48.970 --> 30:51.210]  can connect to control this toy.
[30:51.210 --> 30:52.810]  In this case, what you're seeing
[30:52.810 --> 30:55.130]  is the panel for our own toy.
[30:55.130 --> 30:56.130]  In the case of Max,
[30:56.130 --> 30:57.250]  you have two controls
[30:57.250 --> 31:02.290]  for vibration and for air control.
[31:02.410 --> 31:05.310]  So anyone that connects to this URL
[31:05.310 --> 31:06.770]  without authentication
[31:07.130 --> 31:10.090]  just gets control of this toy.
[31:10.090 --> 31:11.870]  So the idea here was to find
[31:11.870 --> 31:13.910]  if it was able to just
[31:13.910 --> 31:15.250]  guess different tokens
[31:15.250 --> 31:17.130]  and get access to panels
[31:17.130 --> 31:18.670]  that are online
[31:18.670 --> 31:21.150]  and maybe get a panel
[31:21.150 --> 31:23.330]  for another person's toy.
[31:23.530 --> 31:26.150]  Yeah, so we created different tokens,
[31:26.150 --> 31:27.770]  some of them expired,
[31:27.770 --> 31:29.050]  some of them active,
[31:29.050 --> 31:32.210]  and we used our own Loven app
[31:32.210 --> 31:35.490]  installed on our own smartphone.
[31:35.850 --> 31:38.850]  And then we tried to analyze
[31:38.850 --> 31:41.950]  how this access to this token worked.
[31:41.950 --> 31:44.410]  So basically, if the token
[31:44.410 --> 31:46.810]  never actually existed,
[31:46.810 --> 31:49.390]  then it's the server redirects
[31:49.390 --> 31:52.470]  to a JSON with page not found.
[31:52.810 --> 31:54.470]  But in the case the token
[31:54.470 --> 31:56.810]  existed at some point in time,
[31:56.810 --> 31:59.830]  then it's redirected to another resource
[31:59.830 --> 32:03.430]  with a path that you can see now on screen.
[32:03.550 --> 32:05.790]  You can see there's an SID
[32:05.790 --> 32:08.930]  or a session ID that links the token,
[32:08.930 --> 32:10.410]  the user ID,
[32:10.410 --> 32:13.290]  and also the ID of the particular device,
[32:13.290 --> 32:15.630]  since a user can have multiple devices
[32:15.630 --> 32:18.310]  connected to this application.
[32:18.490 --> 32:20.710]  And then there was a second redirection
[32:21.790 --> 32:23.510]  within this process,
[32:23.510 --> 32:25.250]  where you can see that the only thing
[32:25.250 --> 32:27.130]  that changes is the two
[32:27.130 --> 32:28.750]  in the middle of the path.
[32:28.750 --> 32:31.870]  At the end, the session only expires,
[32:31.870 --> 32:33.710]  or the token expires,
[32:33.710 --> 32:37.130]  if the user reaches the final URL.
[32:37.130 --> 32:39.390]  But in the meantime, you can interrupt the process
[32:40.090 --> 32:43.030]  and try to somehow see
[32:43.030 --> 32:45.890]  if the response from the server
[32:45.890 --> 32:48.390]  tells you if a token is valid,
[32:48.390 --> 32:51.490]  meaning it has existed at some point in time,
[32:51.490 --> 32:53.710]  if it's active, meaning there's someone
[32:53.710 --> 32:56.770]  actually waiting for you to connect to this token,
[32:56.770 --> 32:59.050]  or if it has expired.
[32:59.130 --> 33:01.670]  So, is there a way to weaponize this?
[33:01.670 --> 33:04.370]  Could an attacker just try to write a script
[33:04.370 --> 33:06.930]  to find random active tokens
[33:06.930 --> 33:10.130]  and try to join these remote sessions?
[33:10.210 --> 33:12.930]  Well, we created different tokens,
[33:12.930 --> 33:15.710]  some of them expired, some of them active,
[33:15.710 --> 33:19.770]  and we actually tested some non-existent tokens,
[33:20.310 --> 33:21.690]  and we created a script
[33:21.690 --> 33:25.490]  to see if we could do this programmatically.
[33:25.490 --> 33:29.630]  And, in fact, this worked. It's a success.
[33:29.630 --> 33:32.310]  You can actually tell with a script
[33:32.310 --> 33:34.910]  if a token is active or not.
[33:35.510 --> 33:39.610]  So, we tested this set of tokens,
[33:39.610 --> 33:41.550]  and then we wondered,
[33:41.550 --> 33:43.830]  could an attacker wait for how long
[33:44.310 --> 33:45.990]  to find an active token?
[33:45.990 --> 33:48.990]  I mean, is it really worth it?
[33:48.990 --> 33:52.150]  Or would he have to wait so long
[33:52.150 --> 33:55.350]  that it's not even worth the effort?
[33:55.350 --> 33:58.090]  Well, let's do some math. Let's check this.
[33:58.090 --> 34:02.610]  So, it's a four-digit token with letters and numbers,
[34:02.610 --> 34:06.290]  and that would be around 36 characters,
[34:06.290 --> 34:07.670]  different characters,
[34:07.670 --> 34:11.770]  and that would be like 1.6 million possibilities
[34:11.770 --> 34:13.630]  of tokens to try.
[34:13.670 --> 34:18.470]  So, if we think about one second per token to find them,
[34:18.470 --> 34:20.810]  it would take maybe 20 days for an attacker
[34:20.810 --> 34:22.890]  to find a token valid.
[34:22.970 --> 34:26.930]  And, also, the attacker needs to access this URL,
[34:26.930 --> 34:30.350]  this token, before their remote partner does,
[34:30.350 --> 34:32.030]  so it doesn't expire.
[34:32.030 --> 34:34.610]  So, it's pretty much complicated.
[34:34.610 --> 34:35.950]  It's a lot of time.
[34:35.950 --> 34:38.170]  So, maybe if we speed up a little bit,
[34:38.170 --> 34:40.330]  if we make some automation here...
[34:40.330 --> 34:42.530]  Automation to the rescue, right?
[34:42.530 --> 34:44.890]  So, here's a proof of concept
[34:44.890 --> 34:48.810]  that we ran on top of our own tokens,
[34:48.810 --> 34:51.430]  and you can see on the bottom right screen
[34:51.430 --> 34:55.110]  there's a console that's running our script
[34:55.110 --> 34:57.530]  that's checking for different tokens,
[34:57.530 --> 35:01.350]  and some of them are non-existent.
[35:01.350 --> 35:02.950]  Some others are valid.
[35:02.950 --> 35:06.290]  If the token is valid, then it opens up a new tab
[35:06.290 --> 35:08.710]  on the web browser to your left,
[35:08.710 --> 35:12.350]  and if the session is actually active,
[35:12.350 --> 35:17.030]  then it sends a message via a Telegram bot
[35:17.030 --> 35:18.710]  to the attacker.
[35:19.130 --> 35:21.510]  So, that way, the attacker can know
[35:21.510 --> 35:24.790]  that a new active token has been found.
[35:24.790 --> 35:28.230]  And this is done by adding a malicious extension
[35:28.230 --> 35:29.870]  to this web browser
[35:29.870 --> 35:34.350]  that allows or adds more processing capabilities
[35:34.910 --> 35:37.870]  to the Python script that it's running
[35:37.870 --> 35:39.670]  on the bottom right.
[35:40.190 --> 35:41.630]  So, this is a simulation
[35:41.630 --> 35:46.770]  of 10 minutes of running the script,
[35:46.770 --> 35:48.410]  and you can see that in the end
[35:48.410 --> 35:51.530]  it doesn't take long to find new tokens.
[35:51.530 --> 35:53.690]  This is the average that took us
[35:53.690 --> 35:55.530]  to find active tokens.
[35:56.090 --> 35:57.910]  And in this case, you can see that the attacker
[35:57.910 --> 36:01.450]  has access to the control panel of this device,
[36:01.450 --> 36:02.750]  the Max device,
[36:02.750 --> 36:05.570]  and he receives a new message
[36:05.570 --> 36:08.330]  via Telegram in his phone,
[36:08.330 --> 36:10.170]  letting him know that there's a new session
[36:10.170 --> 36:13.330]  active in the web browser.
[36:13.470 --> 36:15.010]  So, how can we protect ourselves
[36:15.010 --> 36:18.550]  given that these devices still have vulnerabilities?
[36:18.830 --> 36:20.270]  Well, first of all, keep in mind
[36:20.270 --> 36:23.070]  that this is a sexting phenomenon.
[36:23.070 --> 36:25.210]  So, if you're talking about sexting,
[36:25.210 --> 36:27.710]  don't share any pictures or videos
[36:27.710 --> 36:30.150]  where other people can see your face
[36:30.150 --> 36:33.690]  or some particular markings that you have.
[36:33.690 --> 36:36.290]  Try to avoid being recognizable
[36:36.290 --> 36:38.630]  through these pictures and videos.
[36:38.630 --> 36:42.290]  Also, make sure that you're not sharing
[36:42.290 --> 36:44.890]  these remote tokens online or publicly
[36:44.890 --> 36:46.810]  and that you're always sharing them
[36:46.810 --> 36:49.730]  via some secure mechanism
[36:49.730 --> 36:52.530]  with the intended person.
[36:52.530 --> 36:55.010]  Make sure also that you're registering
[36:55.010 --> 36:58.410]  to these applications with a fantasy email.
[36:58.410 --> 37:00.690]  Don't use your personal email.
[37:00.690 --> 37:02.490]  Create a new one specifically
[37:02.490 --> 37:04.810]  for these applications.
[37:04.810 --> 37:07.630]  And also make sure to install the latest updates
[37:07.630 --> 37:10.490]  to install the patches
[37:10.490 --> 37:12.850]  to all of these vulnerabilities.
[37:13.570 --> 37:14.950]  Well, and of course, make sure
[37:14.950 --> 37:16.550]  you're using a secure network
[37:16.550 --> 37:19.370]  while you play with these toys.
[37:19.370 --> 37:21.750]  And even if it's possible,
[37:21.750 --> 37:23.930]  make sure nobody is around.
[37:24.250 --> 37:27.350]  And also, you can always google
[37:27.350 --> 37:29.410]  some reviews about the toy
[37:29.410 --> 37:31.530]  and see if there are already
[37:31.530 --> 37:33.350]  some security issues published
[37:33.350 --> 37:36.570]  or there is any security review published.
[37:36.570 --> 37:39.530]  And once you decide to buy a toy
[37:39.530 --> 37:42.110]  or once you have chosen a toy,
[37:42.110 --> 37:44.110]  please read terms and conditions
[37:44.110 --> 37:45.670]  before using it.
[37:45.670 --> 37:47.310]  And it's also a good practice
[37:47.310 --> 37:48.810]  to download the application
[37:48.810 --> 37:50.070]  before buying the toy
[37:50.070 --> 37:52.330]  so you can check the application,
[37:52.330 --> 37:54.150]  see which functionalities it has
[37:54.150 --> 37:55.390]  and how it works,
[37:55.390 --> 37:58.470]  and maybe guess or research a little bit
[37:58.470 --> 38:00.990]  about which information is asking you
[38:00.990 --> 38:03.350]  and how it will treat or protect
[38:03.350 --> 38:05.070]  that information.
[38:05.070 --> 38:07.190]  So, well, that's all.
[38:07.190 --> 38:09.970]  But what happens if you already have a toy?
[38:09.970 --> 38:11.290]  What about all these people
[38:11.290 --> 38:12.790]  that already bought a toy
[38:12.790 --> 38:15.750]  and now are too scared to use it?
[38:15.770 --> 38:16.970]  Well, remember,
[38:16.970 --> 38:20.270]  it's also a great toy for your dog.
[38:21.750 --> 38:23.310]  Thank you very much
[38:23.310 --> 38:25.350]  for listening to our talk.