From your perspective, what does CVD mean to you? And kind of what are your motivations
when you're working on an issue and you need to disclose something?
So I think the main point of CVD is, of course, to protect users.
And my main thought is a bit historical. So I've been around in the 90s where disclosure was
you find a mailing list where other hackers hang out and you zero-day everybody. And nobody
really cared. And that became responsible disclosure, which is the predecessor for
coordinated vulnerability disclosure. The problem with responsible disclosure is that it was really
made to shame hackers that didn't follow the desired protocol of industry text.
And the current iteration, coordinated vulnerability disclosure, is instead of
trying to be coercive, trying to actually work with people that want to submit issues.
And it is a much, much improved over that. And it does a much better job of making sure that
every party to a vulnerability disclosure, that means vendors, customers, and hackers,
have their needs met. So that's what I think coordinated vulnerability disclosure is for me.
Awesome. Daniel, another researching perspective. What do you think about coordinated
vulnerability disclosure? So we are interested in understanding how things work. And sometimes
that involves understanding how things work that are not supposed to happen, which we then call
vulnerability. And of course, then we want to figure out the truth behind it. And that involves
talking to the vendor. Very often, they tell us that we got something slightly wrong. And that
is an opportunity to correct these mistakes before we submit the paper or publish the paper.
But also, from my perspective, it's the only ethical thing to do to protect the customers,
to protect people who are using these products. And for me, I'm not in this game for
finding vulnerabilities as a motivation by itself. My main motivation is finding the truth,
finding a better understanding of how things work. That's awesome. Katie, you've had a lot
of experience monkeying around with CVD. What does a CVD mean to you? Hold on a minute.
All right. So CVD means to me... So when I think about it, I think of it from a risk-based
perspective. And so what Probe is alluding to here is that my background is government in nature. So
I spent about 15 years in the U.S. government, 12 years of that in the U.S. Air Force. And then
several other years at the Department of Homeland Security, where I ran the vulnerability disclosure
profiles programs that most people are familiar with. So like the NIST NVD program and the
Carnegie Mellon CERT CC program. And the MITRE CVD program. So I was a sponsor for those programs. So
in a single year, 2017, we coordinated and disclosed 14,800 vulnerabilities for public
disclosure. So that's 14,000 IT vulnerabilities and about 800 ICS vulnerabilities. In the following
two years, so 18 and 19, we coordinated and disclosed over 20,000 cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
So I've kind of seen things from lots of different perspectives. And when I think about CVD,
I think about balancing risk, right? So CVD is really a process. And every time you,
when you're going through this process, understand like every organization is going to treat it
differently, because there isn't a standardized, like one size fits all kind of thing here.
There's differences that are going to happen across the coordination stack. So if you're
looking at digital services, it's going to be different from software, which is going to be
different from open source, which is going to be different from hardware or ICS, like all the
differences are going to come into play there. But the overarching sort of thing, the big takeaway
here is that CVD is balancing risk. It's all about making sure that there is an opportunity for the
product vendor to fix the problem before an adversary has the opportunity to take advantage
of that. So like, it's all about protecting the end user. And I think everybody that I've ever met
in the entire ecosystem is all focused on that. Like we may be speaking different languages,
we may talk past each other, but I think that everyone is trying to protect the end user.
So to me, that's what that's what CVD is about. That's awesome. And remind you, remind me to
circle back to you later in our talk, talk a little about some of the psychology behind some of this.
I would love to hear my dearest friend Lisa's thoughts on kind of coordinating
vulnerability disclosure, and kind of what some of your motivations that you've seen,
or kind of what's behind your modus operandi? Yeah, so I think where I've seen a sort of an
evolution of what we do now, where I think Heartbleed was sort of the big start of where
we paid attention, realized we all need to come together a little bit. And then Spectre Meltdown
sort of brought us even closer. So my thought is, is that not only do we work with the researchers,
but we work across the industry to, you know, make sure that we're all doing our best to protect our
customers. So like Katie was talking about, it's really our end users that are our focus,
and making sure that we have the right people involved to be able to solve the issue,
and then provide a security update so that our customers could get it and be best protected.
So Omar, you've been doing this for a while, and you work for a very large company,
so I'm sure you get the opportunity to see a lot of different vulnerabilities. So what does
the whole process mean, and what are some of the motivations you've seen? Yeah, I think that
pretty much everybody has summarized it very well, is protecting the end consumer at the end of the day.
But I see it as a very, very complex ecosystem, right, that we're trying to actually solve.
And Katie, you know, mentioned in one side hardware, another side software, then if you
decompose that, then you have open source, which we're going to probably talk about a lot in here.
And you have things that, you know, perhaps you cannot even control. I have had, I guess,
the pleasure or not the pleasure, in some cases, where we're looking at vulnerabilities and even
in some cases, whenever we try to actually solve the issues, the companies don't even exist anymore.
That's another predicament, you know, that in some cases, we actually have to take into
consideration. And it's a fairly complex ecosystem. And at the end of the day, what we have to
actually put our heads together is how can we modernize our practice into the way that not only,
yes, we deal with a single vulnerability, we reproduce it, we actually fix it, we find the
patch, but how can we accelerate that process, that one, everybody's talking somewhat the
correct vocabulary, or at least they can understand each other. And then we also understand the
overall risk, right? And how to prioritize things and so on. So it's fairly complex, so we can
actually talk about it for quite some time. And that's what we're here for. But those are some of
the initial perspectives that I want to share. Thank you, I appreciate that. I want to talk
about something we touched on in one of our prep calls. We have Anders and Daniel that come at
this research angle from slightly different angles. So maybe you two gentlemen can figure
out who wants to start first. But thinking about the perspective of academia versus a professional
bug hunter, security researcher, maybe you can describe some of the particulars in
either area. And maybe what are some of the differences you might see between those two
different types of research? So from the industry, or rather the bug hunter, be professional or not,
there is very often an element of good old-fashioned fun. I started out hacking
things not because I wanted to achieve anything with it, just because it was great fun.
When you become pro with it, there is different motivations. So if you work for a company and you
work on their products, obviously your motivation is to make those products secure. And sometimes
my past job, I did some research and that was sponsored by that company, but essentially me
doing what I like to do. Their end of it was attention to that company's competences. And
my end, of course, was having a bit of fun with it. So that is probably pretty typical of what
hackers get out of hacking. Yeah, from the more academic side, it's more of advancing the field,
the knowledge in the field, and there you try to figure out how things work and what the
implications there are, what the security implications of certain understandings are.
For instance, understanding when you can execute a certain piece of code and that does something
that is not intended, what are the implications? And this is interesting from a security perspective
than if it enables someone to do something that they shouldn't be allowed to do.
Yes, often this involves disclosing a vulnerability to a vendor. But I would say that,
for instance, bug bounties that might be very relevant for people from the industry.
I think this plays a smaller role in academia, because you have to participate in CVD anyway,
if you wouldn't, then you would get a lot of problems in the academic community. There's
a lot of peer pressure that you participate in this, because that's the only ethical approach
to handling vulnerabilities. At the same time, if you keep them secret for too long,
then there's also the question on why did you keep them secret for so long?
Maybe also some perspective that I can share. In academia, you see more and more often the
effect that academic publications are easier to publish if you have a CVE.
I don't think that's a good thing, because I think that a CVE does not necessarily
describe that a research result really brings you new insights. A CVE is an identifier for
a vulnerability, not an identifier that says this is something with a new insight.
And also, if you participated in CVD, and you mentioned this in the paper,
this also gives you bonus points, at least that's my impression, to get the paper published.
Of course, it's good if you participate in CVD, but my feeling is also that this is going a bit
too strong. And yes, now overemphasized in our community a bit.
What about, you know, having an icon or a fun name?
So, there are, of course, there are.
I'm really a big fan of logos and names and anything that is fun.
But of course, there are multiple layers here. For instance, we had this paper,
Hello from the Other Side, which had this name not just by coincidence.
And it was about a covert channel in the cloud where we send data through the cache from one
virtual machine to the other. And we really went crazy on that. So, we built an entire TCP
stack on top of that and tunneled an SSH session through the cache covert channel
for whatever reason. And we then sent a music video through this cache covert channel.
And of course, we couldn't just take any music video. So, we had to make our own parody of
Hello from the Other Side. And this is just fun. I mean, we are just a bunch of people and we like
to have fun. And basically, once you finish your project, it's really nice to close this up with
something nice and funny. And logos on the other side also help about...
So, they help you communicating about the issue. I realized that every time I create slides,
my favorite slides are the slides that don't have any words on them, just pictures, logos,
and icons. Because then I can follow the speaker. I don't have to read because I'm very bad at
reading. I can't read and listen at the same time. And I bet many people can't do that. So,
there's only icons and symbols and logos. I can follow what the person is saying and look at the
images at the same time. And I'm always annoyed if I have to speak about the vulnerability and I
don't have a logo for it because then I have to put text on the slide.
So, since Daniel brought it up, let me ask the other panelists. How do you all feel about
branded vulnerabilities? Do you like logos? Do you find that helpful to you and your constituents?
Oh, I'm sorry, Daniel. No. When there's a logo or PR or everything, it grabs the media's attention
so quickly. And sometimes the issue is not that severe or very hard to be able to
breach. And it gives a little bit of extra fear to our customers and also encourages us to
maybe reprioritize other issues first, which are more severe to our customers. So, although I
think I get the point, it's easy to talk about it. They grab the media's attention really quickly.
But if you put a caveat about the real severity of the issue in there,
maybe that would help a little bit. Yeah. So, in our team, we often have this
discussion. Should we have a logo? Should we have a website or shouldn't we? And we have...
So, for most of our papers and most of the vulnerabilities that we discovered, we don't
because we just say they are not significant enough. And I think that's also the responsibility
of the researcher to first assess, is this something that significant that I need this
additional PR or is it not? Right. Well, then you're doing it the right way. So, yay. Cheers.
Maybe. But it's also... I mean, I will have a different view on what is really important than
you have, right? Everyone will have a different view on that. So, something that I think is
really, really important, you might say, well, it's not really exploitable in our use case.
Right. We don't ever want to downplay a researcher's work. I mean, it's important,
whatever they do. And we appreciate especially doing CBD with them and not being zero-day.
But yeah, it's a more matter of, especially in a bigger industry when you're trying to
protect your customers best, how do you approach it?
There is a fight for customer attention. And for customers to make the right security decisions,
they need to be attentive about the right things. And logos and hype in the press
wants that. And we have bad security outcomes for our customers due to that.
Of course, there's also the thing that even fixed vulnerabilities sometimes cause suffering
for system administrators running around the basement and patching systems and all the like.
And to some extent, I sometimes find overhyped bugs disrespectful to those people.
Yeah. So, in my case, I don't have an issue with logos or anything,
even though in a previous call and a couple of exchanges, Daniel, I alluded into that.
Whether it's a logo, as a matter of fact, even for Cisco, we had the first vulnerability with
emojis. So, we have emojis, logos, and everything else. So, at the end of the day, if it helps
to do an alias for a vulnerability and bring some awareness, I'm perfectly okay with that.
The only challenge that I'm seeing or opportunity, right, is that in some cases,
whenever we write information, and even vendors, in my case, we have a research
institution at Cisco called Talos, and we find vulnerabilities in other people's products, right?
And yes, it is. So, in that case, yes, we also have logos, and we put them up there,
and we put up blog posts and so on, right? But what we need to do collectively is to make sure
that the media is not either downplaying it or over-proportioned. So, we have to have a balance,
right? And we all say the media, the media, the media, right? But it's our responsibility, right,
on how we create our security advisories. And it's both ways. Even though we're vendors here
and everything, but we have to point fingers to us. How clear is our advisories? Can we
have some collateral that the end consumer actually knows about, you know, what the
implications are? And we work with the researcher to make sure that we all understand, you know,
what the problem is. And in a previous conversation, I also mentioned that
the biggest nerd fights in history is whenever it comes to CVSS scoring, right? And, you know,
whenever it comes to risk. And at the end of the day, you know, whether it's CVSS, whenever we
come up with some new ways and everything, we have to have some type of way of saying,
yeah, you have to jump right now and fix this vulnerability versus the other 100 criticals
that we're also, you know, dependent on. And especially nowadays, since it's not so much
of a vulnerability coming from like a Cisco or an Intel or Red Hat or anything else, it's
open source, right? By the time that actually I'm boring you to death in here, probably three more
CVEs that are super important has been disclosed and we don't know about, right? So that's the type
of balance and the type of, I guess, for a corny way of saying orchestration that needs to take
place, right, in this CBD. I want to add another point here
regarding the overhyping. Having a logo, having a website for something, for a vulnerability,
for a research result does not necessarily mean that you overhype it. We had experiences where we
just put papers on archive without any website, without any logo and anything, and media picked
it up and media reported about it and not necessarily correct in all cases. And we had this,
on AMD CPUs, and their media picked it up. We intentionally didn't make any website
or logo, but media picked it up and the reporting, it was not entirely wrong,
but it was definitely, I would say, definitely overhyped. And we discussed this also in our team
and the conclusion that we had was that in some cases we should have a website, even if it's not
a vulnerability that we want to hype, because it's not that significant, but just to have a very
clear message which says how relevant is it. And I think that's the important part that we also
always had on our websites, a short three-sentence summary like what is it, who has to care about this
and what can an attacker do. Yeah, I think that's great. That's great you do that. And it's good
advice. I think that I would love to see it be more adopted in the researcher world,
for sure. I think it would help out. So before I move on to my next question, I'm just going to say
when I retire, all of you in vendor world are doomed, because I'm going to offer my services
to LREG for free writing up crazy headlines. But to touch on a point that Daniel made, he
invoked the Katie Masuris clause. Let's talk about bug bounties and CVD.
Oh, Katie, maybe you should take that one. Because our friend Katie Noble Trimble here
actually has a lot to do with that in her organization. Could you maybe talk about how
coordinated disclosure interacts both good and bad with bug bounty?
Yeah, so I love Katie Mo. I think that first off, let me just say that it is an honor to
be confused with Katie Mo. My hair color is like, you know, getting close to hers too now. I don't
know. I think I have been accepted to conferences because they thought that I was she. When I showed
up, I don't think they were nearly as excited to see me instead of her. So, yeah, bug bounties.
So, bug bounties are a tool. I'm trying to be serious here about bug bounties.
So, bug bounties are a tool, right? So, they're a tool in a toolkit. And they are there to
incentivize. But they're a part of a well-structured product security portfolio. They're
not the whole thing. And there are different motivations that will help people from different
perspectives. So, in the academic world, for instance, bug bounties may not weigh as much
because a lot of academic institutions don't allow an individual to accept that cold hard cash,
right? If you are a professional bug hunter, that might be how you pay your mortgage.
And so, there's a lot more tied to that. But the problem becomes that bug bounties are
a wonderful tool. And they're great. But you have to have a good program in place already
to accept that information, to be able to execute on that information, and figure out, like, how do
you actually... there are so many questions about it. How do you award? How do you manage it? Like,
are we gonna tie the payments to CVSS scores? Are we gonna tie the payments to a well thought
out proof of concept? There's so many pieces that go into it. And so, I would say, like,
bug bounty is not a one size fits all. It's gonna vary from organization to organization.
And some organizations are gonna have different timelines, different pieces. It's... yeah,
it's complex. So, bug bounty is not the end of the world. Bug bounty is a tool. It's a tool in
your toolkit. So, it's a great tool. I love the tool because I'm the director of it at Intel.
But it's not... it's not everything. So, vulnerability disclosure is more than bug
bounty alone. Yeah, I think when you think about it, too, like, there's a lot of smaller
companies that probably, you know, don't have that or don't have the funding for it. But that
doesn't mean that they're not wanting to work with researchers. They just can't get the budget to do
it. You know, so... so, you know, do your best to try to figure out how to reach out to those
companies. Hopefully, they have a web page or email address, you know, secure at p-cert at
security at. I know we struggle a little bit. But, you know, there's plenty of us around that
can help find the right contacts. Because we're, you know, sort of come together from all over the
place. And we're sort of an expanding group here. I like it. Bug bounties are one of the wonderful
signs of how the industry has changed. Back in the 90s, researchers were often rewarded with...
their disclosure was rewarded with lawsuits. And now people in the industry are working with
the people and have started actually paying the researchers for their efforts. So I'm
very much thumbs up on bug bounties, especially because it shows how the industry has changed
on how they view hackers. Hackers are nowadays helpers and not the enemy. Yeah, I thought you
were going to say t-shirts for a minute there in the early days. I like it. It just won the t-shirt.
Oh, earlier than that, it was lawsuits. Then it became t-shirts and then maybe stickers.
And then, yeah, and now financial rewards. Awesome stickers.
So let's... we've touched on it a little bit. Let's see if we can spend some time now that we're
past the top of the hour here. Let's talk about coordinated vulnerability disclosure
inside an open source context. So I'll go last, but let our esteemed panel here,
whether it's our researchers or our vendor friends, kind of describe
what works out really well and what are some challenges for you within the open source world,
which makes up about 90% of all software now. Hey, Jerry, open source won.
I guess I start. So basically, that's top of mind for me. And it sounds corny whenever people say,
hey, what keeps you up at night and everything else? It's actually open source right now.
And it's not so much of the predicament of using open source. We have to use and embrace and
contribute to open source. I mean, I'm a super big fan of that. The challenge when it comes to
open source is that it can be anything, right? It's like IoT can be anything, right? And it's
critical infrastructure for a lot of things. So to give you somewhat of a real life, I guess,
realization that we had a while back, probably about four or five years ago, whenever Heartbleed
came, we were looking in the industry, right? Not only Cisco, but a whole bunch of other companies,
right? So what to prioritize, as far as actually giving funding, probably doing research,
and so on. So we said, okay, so open SSL, and things like that, which are actually
super important for us. There's a lot of people looking at it right now. So can we look at things
that perhaps are actually critical infrastructure, that nobody actually has probably taken a look at
it, right? We're going down the list. And as a matter of fact, that number two is perfectly
fine. Because there are two guys that work on open SSL that get paid to do it. Yes, indeed.
And the example that I was going to go is NTP, the Network Time Protocol, so NTPD specifically.
And there's also two guys that don't get paid, which is bad, right? They're not even the
full-time job, right? Well, I guess now, you fast-forward this year, it's a little bit better
now, right? So it's a lot better. And it's not that the problem is the poor guys that actually
are contributing to the code. It's a matter of scalability. It's a matter of actually even
running static analysis into the thing that didn't even exist five years ago for these
components. Now, of course, we're modernizing our ways. Even if you submit things on GitHub,
a lot of things are actually happening. We're getting better, for sure. It's just that it's
getting way more complicated, right? And more people actually are not only, of course,
contributing, but using it more than contributing, which is the other predicament. And in some cases,
we were talking about bug bounties. In some cases, actually, amazing. I'm a big fan of
bug bounties, right? The challenge is that in some cases, we also don't think about,
does this affect other vendors? Am I actually finding some type of vulnerabilities that perhaps,
yes, it's a SQL injection, cross-site scripting, which is actually pretty common, but I'm doing
some fuzzing and I crash an application. What is the underlying issue, right? And in some cases,
it's actually kind of a commodity, even though it goes back and forth and it hasn't been shared.
And then two or three months down the road, you say, oh, but this CVE was not shared with
these vendors that they're also affected. So we go back and in some cases, you actually see
people trying to find the same or found the same CVEs and they reported a different way, but
there were no coordination. So those are the things that are crucial for us to be successful.
And not only among vendors, but actually downstreams and upstreams as well, right? So
especially whenever it comes to IoT is number one. Yeah. So Omar, you brought up a few points.
One is who do you bring in, right? Ahead of time. And I think that we're seeing that even if you're
the competition, we still want to work together in the background here. Our whole goal is to
protect our customers and we often have the same customers, even if we're competitors.
So we like to make sure that we're all working together and ideas is when do you bring someone
in and it's not only the researchers. Okay, Crowe, you got your hand raised. Go ahead.
Can I tell you a secret? Yes. Open source has worked with our competitors for 25 plus years.
Yeah, yeah. Well, I would have to say with some of those other vendors in the industry,
it wasn't always so nice. We're getting better. But I think not only the researchers should be
thinking who else is affected, but when we are the receiving end, we should be thinking who else is
affected and bring them in. I recently worked on an issue, a very recent one, where we are in
and the researchers were in right with the industry people who were fixing the issue.
And there was great coordination amongst the group there. It was pretty awesome to see
of how much we've evolved. How do you do that, though, with like open source, though, when
everything's shown? It's super easy.
Well, and I guess I'll chime in before we let other folks.
I found it very interesting how some vulnerabilities have been patched wide in the open
under the cover of some other patch. I don't know what you're talking about at all.
So, in general,
open source, there is no single definition of what open source is. You could have two young
ladies in Bangladesh that have an amazing idea and they're just trying to get this creativity
out there to share with the world. You could have large corporations like a lot of the folks
represented here. You could have academics. So, open source is a lot of different things. And
there's really no one definition or moniker that fits, that works with every community. But if
you're thinking about the types of open source that might make up a product or some kind of
cloud offering, you're going to have the high end of the spectrum are things like the kernel group,
which is very mature and organized, Kubernetes. And then you start moving down to Apache
Foundation, these other large communities. And then you get down to something where it's
a single person, a couple people that are just playing around. And it's hard to put any kind of
structure or process to all these different models because a lot of people that code for
open source are doing it for free, for no remuneration from large companies that make a
lot of money off of it. But they do it for free because they love kind of adding value and
expressing their creativity. And as Daniel mentioned, open source is very creative. And
some of the larger projects, we do have ways to privately take in data. So we take in a private
bug report that's well established within the community for a long time. And when you're
looking at a less mature community or package or library, they might not have that capability. And
that's where larger kind of big brothers and big sisters, like a Red Hat or a SUSE or Canonical,
kind of step in and try to help mentor these smaller projects to help them get these good
practices set up so they can take in a private note. Because sometimes a lot of, you know,
my team, we track between 3,000 and 5,000 vulnerabilities a year out of 450,000 packages.
That's a lot. Not all of them really kind of bubble up to the level of they need the
attention of like a Spectre meltdown or a Heartbleed or a, you know, Blueborn, all these
kind of the other big name nonsense things. But, you know, they still need to get fixed. And what
open source is really good at is you identify a problem, the team attacks it collaboratively,
they develop a solution and release that update very quickly. And they don't like to spend a lot
of time making a big deal out of it because they've already moved on to the next feature,
the next big thing. But, yeah, it can be challenging. But there are definitely ways to
do it. There are methods to do it. There are groups that allow this. I hear a lot of bleeping
in the background. What's going on, folks? I was wondering when you were going to change
your hat again. Sorry. There we go.
All right. Let me get this panel back under order. When you're thinking about doing a CVD,
what are some things you might want to prepare for? What can you do to help make that
coordination very successful? And let me start off with... we'll start off with Lisa because
she has a lot of ideas. So, from your perspective, what will make you successful when you're getting
ready to do this multiparty coordination? So, I guess it depends on how familiar you
are with it or not. Like, if I was a researcher and I wasn't too familiar, I would potentially
utilize CERT or something like that if I felt like it was going to cross over more than one
company in the industry just to have them help. Because I think it could be overbearing of
figuring out how if one, you know, if industry, you know, company A wants this date to get it
fixed and company B wants another date and company C wants another date. So, I think that's one way
that a researcher could use. But I think the idea is to figure out when you start is what are your
rules? What's your embargo date? How many days do you actually want to, you know, give the company
or vendor to fix the issue? Typically, it's 90 days. I would prefer that as a company. I think
it's respectful to do that, especially when things get more difficult. So, think about your rules and
what you want to do and how you want to approach it. But I'll pause there because I know we're
running out of time to get other people in. Anders, what are your thoughts about how you
could make CVD successful? Three things. Use it. It's a tool not only for vendors but also for
hackers. Listen to what vendors are saying or what hackers are saying
and try to make the best out of it and be aware that there's
often a lot of complexities involved with it. Right. Be patient, right? Yeah.
Omar, what are your thoughts on how you can make CVD successful?
I think that I'm going to capitalize on something that Daniel mentioned in a previous
call. And it's in some cases, even if you provide some data to even a vendor or whoever,
whenever you're coordinating, you have to make it first easy to understand. But at the same time,
in some cases, getting the right people at the right place at the right time to make sure that
you understand the technical implications of a given vulnerability instead of running around.
Even if you have the 90 days or 60 days or 100 days, getting that streamlined and modernizing
the way that we actually exchange information among all the affected parties, that is number
one. And Art Mannion, which is actually a good friend of mine, he leads... We all love Art.
He's the person that will tell you we cannot scale, right? This is a big ecosystem.
And just having a Rolodex of all the vendors that actually use a component is foolish, right? We
will never, ever, ever be able to actually have a complete thing. But what we have to think about
is what Lisa mentioned is that in some cases, we are working with competitors, right? Even more
than our companies. For example, you know, I work with Lisa a lot. I work with Juniper even more,
in some cases more than I worked with Cisco, whenever it comes to fixing a vulnerability,
saying BGP, OSPF, or whatever the case might be. So that type of thing of, oh, I'm going to talk
to this competitor, is there a problem and everything else is not, you know, that's 20
years ago, a fallacy. And then the last one is that at the end of the day, I have the reality
and I tell my guys at Cisco is that whenever I push a button, I publish a CV out there,
the number ones that actually are reading that CV are the bad guys, right? And probably
at the same time that you're committing an open source code, you know, probably that's going to be
the case too, right? So what we have to do is think about how can we exchange information to
the consumer, to downstream and upstream providers in a more modern way. I know that sounds corny,
but you know, can we actually make it more and we're trying to do that machine readable, right?
So if in the case that we actually have that Rolodex of people and everything else, you know,
get some tool and that's what Art and, you know, the guys in CERT are also doing, you know,
we're creating tools that allow us to do that. And even if you have, I don't know, even two years ago
that didn't exist and it wasn't even a thought, right? So we have to move faster. That's the number
one thing that I want to say. So as I close, I'll say Art Mannion has the best facial hair
in the industry. But I want to thank our panel here. This was a great hour together. I really
appreciate your time and expertise. We're going to be hanging out for a little bit on this awesome
Discord channel that my kids made fun of me all week about because I've had it up. Thank you
everybody for coming and your attention here, panelists, and thank you to the audience for
having us here at the IoT Village. Enjoy your day and enjoy the rest of the con.
We've got some great stuff lined up the rest of the weekend.
We're out.