WEBVTT 00:00.540 --> 00:08.300 From your perspective, what does CVD mean to you? 00:08.300 --> 00:13.200 And kind of what are your motivations when you're working on an issue and you need to disclose something? 00:14.460 --> 00:20.500 So I think the main point of CVD is, of course, to protect users. 00:23.580 --> 00:27.900 And my main thought is a bit historical. 00:27.900 --> 00:36.260 So I've been around in the 90s where disclosure was you find a mailing list where other hackers hang out and you zero-day everybody. 00:37.200 --> 00:39.160 And nobody really cared. 00:39.940 --> 00:46.520 And that became responsible disclosure, which is the predecessor for coordinated vulnerability disclosure. 00:46.520 --> 00:59.080 The problem with responsible disclosure is that it was really made to shame hackers that didn't follow the desired protocol of industry text. 00:59.080 --> 01:13.800 And the current iteration, coordinated vulnerability disclosure, is instead of trying to be coercive, trying to actually work with people that want to submit issues. 01:14.600 --> 01:18.340 And it is a much, much improved over that. 01:18.380 --> 01:35.320 And it does a much better job of making sure that every party to a vulnerability disclosure, that means vendors, customers, and hackers, have their needs met. 01:35.320 --> 01:41.160 So that's what I think coordinated vulnerability disclosure is for me. 01:41.680 --> 01:42.880 Awesome. 01:42.880 --> 01:45.540 Daniel, another researching perspective. 01:45.540 --> 01:48.980 What do you think about coordinated vulnerability disclosure? 01:49.000 --> 01:53.720 So we are interested in understanding how things work. 01:53.720 --> 02:02.260 And sometimes that involves understanding how things work that are not supposed to happen, which we then call vulnerability. 02:02.420 --> 02:06.820 And of course, then we want to figure out the truth behind it. 02:06.820 --> 02:10.880 And that involves talking to the vendor. 02:11.540 --> 02:17.480 Very often, they tell us that we got something slightly wrong. 02:17.480 --> 02:24.580 And that is an opportunity to correct these mistakes before we submit the paper or publish the paper. 02:24.580 --> 02:35.880 But also, from my perspective, it's the only ethical thing to do to protect the customers, to protect people who are using these products. 02:36.220 --> 02:45.340 And for me, I'm not in this game for finding vulnerabilities as a motivation by itself. 02:45.340 --> 02:54.260 My main motivation is finding the truth, finding a better understanding of how things work. 02:54.900 --> 02:56.720 That's awesome. 02:56.900 --> 03:02.520 Katie, you've had a lot of experience monkeying around with CVD. 03:03.320 --> 03:05.620 What does a CVD mean to you? 03:05.620 --> 03:06.480 Hold on a minute. 03:06.680 --> 03:09.480 All right. 03:09.480 --> 03:19.480 So CVD means to me... So when I think about it, I think of it from a risk-based perspective. 03:19.480 --> 03:25.220 And so what Probe is alluding to here is that my background is government in nature. 03:25.220 --> 03:28.200 So I spent about 15 years in the U.S. 03:28.200 --> 03:30.020 government, 12 years of that in the U.S. 03:30.020 --> 03:30.920 Air Force. 03:31.260 --> 03:40.420 And then several other years at the Department of Homeland Security, where I ran the vulnerability disclosure profiles programs that most people are familiar with. 03:40.420 --> 03:45.340 So like the NIST NVD program and the Carnegie Mellon CERT CC program. 03:45.340 --> 03:48.680 And the MITRE CVD program. 03:48.700 --> 03:50.920 So I was a sponsor for those programs. 03:50.920 --> 03:58.580 So in a single year, 2017, we coordinated and disclosed 14,800 vulnerabilities for public disclosure. 03:58.920 --> 04:04.000 So that's 14,000 IT vulnerabilities and about 800 ICS vulnerabilities. 04:04.500 --> 04:10.360 In the following two years, so 18 and 19, we coordinated and disclosed over 20,000 cybersecurity vulnerabilities. 04:10.620 --> 04:13.960 So I've kind of seen things from lots of different perspectives. 04:14.020 --> 04:20.920 And when I think about CVD, I think about balancing risk, right? 04:20.920 --> 04:23.220 So CVD is really a process. 04:23.400 --> 04:33.100 And every time you, when you're going through this process, understand like every organization is going to treat it differently, because there isn't a standardized, like one size fits all kind of thing here. 04:34.060 --> 04:38.300 There's differences that are going to happen across the coordination stack. 04:38.300 --> 04:47.220 So if you're looking at digital services, it's going to be different from software, which is going to be different from open source, which is going to be different from hardware or ICS, like all the differences are going to come into play there. 04:47.220 --> 04:54.820 But the overarching sort of thing, the big takeaway here is that CVD is balancing risk. 04:54.940 --> 05:06.380 It's all about making sure that there is an opportunity for the product vendor to fix the problem before an adversary has the opportunity to take advantage of that. 05:06.380 --> 05:08.780 So like, it's all about protecting the end user. 05:08.780 --> 05:14.900 And I think everybody that I've ever met in the entire ecosystem is all focused on that. 05:14.900 --> 05:20.960 Like we may be speaking different languages, we may talk past each other, but I think that everyone is trying to protect the end user. 05:20.960 --> 05:23.680 So to me, that's what that's what CVD is about. 05:24.240 --> 05:25.200 That's awesome. 05:25.200 --> 05:31.580 And remind you, remind me to circle back to you later in our talk, talk a little about some of the psychology behind some of this. 05:31.580 --> 05:47.860 I would love to hear my dearest friend Lisa's thoughts on kind of coordinating vulnerability disclosure, and kind of what some of your motivations that you've seen, or kind of what's behind your modus operandi? 05:48.420 --> 06:05.420 Yeah, so I think where I've seen a sort of an evolution of what we do now, where I think Heartbleed was sort of the big start of where we paid attention, realized we all need to come together a little bit. 06:05.420 --> 06:08.880 And then Spectre Meltdown sort of brought us even closer. 06:09.120 --> 06:21.880 So my thought is, is that not only do we work with the researchers, but we work across the industry to, you know, make sure that we're all doing our best to protect our customers. 06:21.940 --> 06:36.060 So like Katie was talking about, it's really our end users that are our focus, and making sure that we have the right people involved to be able to solve the issue, and then provide a security update so that our customers could get it and be best protected. 06:45.180 --> 06:55.560 So Omar, you've been doing this for a while, and you work for a very large company, so I'm sure you get the opportunity to see a lot of different vulnerabilities. 06:55.560 --> 06:59.880 So what does the whole process mean, and what are some of the motivations you've seen? 07:00.300 --> 07:06.720 Yeah, I think that pretty much everybody has summarized it very well, is protecting the end consumer at the end of the day. 07:06.940 --> 07:12.800 But I see it as a very, very complex ecosystem, right, that we're trying to actually solve. 07:13.220 --> 07:24.540 And Katie, you know, mentioned in one side hardware, another side software, then if you decompose that, then you have open source, which we're going to probably talk about a lot in here. 07:24.820 --> 07:28.160 And you have things that, you know, perhaps you cannot even control. 07:28.160 --> 07:41.560 I have had, I guess, the pleasure or not the pleasure, in some cases, where we're looking at vulnerabilities and even in some cases, whenever we try to actually solve the issues, the companies don't even exist anymore. 07:42.380 --> 07:47.700 That's another predicament, you know, that in some cases, we actually have to take into consideration. 07:47.700 --> 07:50.280 And it's a fairly complex ecosystem. 07:50.860 --> 08:07.980 And at the end of the day, what we have to actually put our heads together is how can we modernize our practice into the way that not only, yes, we deal with a single vulnerability, we reproduce it, we actually fix it, we find the patch, but how can we accelerate that process, 08:07.980 --> 08:15.380 that one, everybody's talking somewhat the correct vocabulary, or at least they can understand each other. 08:15.600 --> 08:19.000 And then we also understand the overall risk, right? 08:19.680 --> 08:22.700 And how to prioritize things and so on. 08:22.700 --> 08:26.120 So it's fairly complex, so we can actually talk about it for quite some time. 08:26.120 --> 08:27.400 And that's what we're here for. 08:27.800 --> 08:31.040 But those are some of the initial perspectives that I want to share. 08:31.780 --> 08:33.860 Thank you, I appreciate that. 08:34.520 --> 08:38.700 I want to talk about something we touched on in one of our prep calls. 08:38.740 --> 08:46.380 We have Anders and Daniel that come at this research angle from slightly different angles. 08:46.880 --> 08:51.520 So maybe you two gentlemen can figure out who wants to start first. 08:51.520 --> 09:06.480 But thinking about the perspective of academia versus a professional bug hunter, security researcher, maybe you can describe some of the particulars in either area. 09:06.480 --> 09:11.220 And maybe what are some of the differences you might see between those two different types of research? 09:13.440 --> 09:27.620 So from the industry, or rather the bug hunter, be professional or not, there is very often an element of good old-fashioned fun. 09:28.460 --> 09:36.480 I started out hacking things not because I wanted to achieve anything with it, just because it was great fun. 09:37.800 --> 09:42.660 When you become pro with it, there is different motivations. 09:42.780 --> 09:51.280 So if you work for a company and you work on their products, obviously your motivation is to make those products secure. 09:51.900 --> 10:03.640 And sometimes my past job, I did some research and that was sponsored by that company, but essentially me doing what I like to do. 10:03.920 --> 10:10.700 Their end of it was attention to that company's competences. 10:10.740 --> 10:13.620 And my end, of course, was having a bit of fun with it. 10:14.520 --> 10:20.780 So that is probably pretty typical of what hackers get out of hacking. 10:21.580 --> 10:40.220 Yeah, from the more academic side, it's more of advancing the field, the knowledge in the field, and there you try to figure out how things work and what the implications there are, what the security implications of certain understandings are. 10:40.220 --> 10:50.920 For instance, understanding when you can execute a certain piece of code and that does something that is not intended, what are the implications? 10:51.000 --> 10:58.820 And this is interesting from a security perspective than if it enables someone to do something that they shouldn't be allowed to do. 10:59.700 --> 11:04.880 Yes, often this involves disclosing a vulnerability to a vendor. 11:04.880 --> 11:15.060 But I would say that, for instance, bug bounties that might be very relevant for people from the industry. 11:15.620 --> 11:33.560 I think this plays a smaller role in academia, because you have to participate in CVD anyway, if you wouldn't, then you would get a lot of problems in the academic community. 11:33.560 --> 11:42.660 There's a lot of peer pressure that you participate in this, because that's the only ethical approach to handling vulnerabilities. 11:42.740 --> 11:52.080 At the same time, if you keep them secret for too long, then there's also the question on why did you keep them secret for so long? 11:52.610 --> 11:55.880 Maybe also some perspective that I can share. 11:56.400 --> 12:06.690 In academia, you see more and more often the effect that academic publications are easier to publish if you have a CVE. 12:07.360 --> 12:22.700 I don't think that's a good thing, because I think that a CVE does not necessarily describe that a research result really brings you new insights. 12:22.700 --> 12:34.060 A CVE is an identifier for a vulnerability, not an identifier that says this is something with a new insight. 12:34.450 --> 12:48.460 And also, if you participated in CVD, and you mentioned this in the paper, this also gives you bonus points, at least that's my impression, to get the paper published. 12:50.180 --> 12:59.740 Of course, it's good if you participate in CVD, but my feeling is also that this is going a bit too strong. 13:00.860 --> 13:05.640 And yes, now overemphasized in our community a bit. 13:05.640 --> 13:09.160 What about, you know, having an icon or a fun name? 13:11.580 --> 13:14.680 So, there are, of course, there are. 13:16.740 --> 13:22.980 I'm really a big fan of logos and names and anything that is fun. 13:23.620 --> 13:26.480 But of course, there are multiple layers here. 13:26.660 --> 13:34.040 For instance, we had this paper, Hello from the Other Side, which had this name not just by coincidence. 13:34.740 --> 13:43.060 And it was about a covert channel in the cloud where we send data through the cache from one virtual machine to the other. 13:43.060 --> 13:46.840 And we really went crazy on that. 13:46.840 --> 13:56.340 So, we built an entire TCP stack on top of that and tunneled an SSH session through the cache covert channel for whatever reason. 13:56.340 --> 14:01.600 And we then sent a music video through this cache covert channel. 14:01.600 --> 14:04.300 And of course, we couldn't just take any music video. 14:04.300 --> 14:07.860 So, we had to make our own parody of Hello from the Other Side. 14:07.860 --> 14:09.180 And this is just fun. 14:09.180 --> 14:12.520 I mean, we are just a bunch of people and we like to have fun. 14:12.740 --> 14:22.820 And basically, once you finish your project, it's really nice to close this up with something nice and funny. 14:23.340 --> 14:27.920 And logos on the other side also help about... 14:28.700 --> 14:31.860 So, they help you communicating about the issue. 14:32.660 --> 14:44.200 I realized that every time I create slides, my favorite slides are the slides that don't have any words on them, just pictures, logos, and icons. 14:44.200 --> 14:47.360 Because then I can follow the speaker. 14:47.500 --> 14:50.820 I don't have to read because I'm very bad at reading. 14:50.820 --> 14:53.000 I can't read and listen at the same time. 14:53.000 --> 14:55.040 And I bet many people can't do that. 14:55.040 --> 14:59.180 So, there's only icons and symbols and logos. 14:59.180 --> 15:04.880 I can follow what the person is saying and look at the images at the same time. 15:05.040 --> 15:12.740 And I'm always annoyed if I have to speak about the vulnerability and I don't have a logo for it because then I have to put text on the slide. 15:13.740 --> 15:18.040 So, since Daniel brought it up, let me ask the other panelists. 15:18.420 --> 15:22.220 How do you all feel about branded vulnerabilities? 15:22.220 --> 15:23.700 Do you like logos? 15:23.700 --> 15:26.700 Do you find that helpful to you and your constituents? 15:26.980 --> 15:28.980 Oh, I'm sorry, Daniel. 15:28.980 --> 15:29.940 No. 15:32.200 --> 15:38.460 When there's a logo or PR or everything, it grabs the media's attention so quickly. 15:38.600 --> 15:47.660 And sometimes the issue is not that severe or very hard to be able to breach. 15:47.680 --> 16:03.540 And it gives a little bit of extra fear to our customers and also encourages us to maybe reprioritize other issues first, which are more severe to our customers. 16:03.640 --> 16:08.020 So, although I think I get the point, it's easy to talk about it. 16:08.020 --> 16:11.080 They grab the media's attention really quickly. 16:12.160 --> 16:23.480 But if you put a caveat about the real severity of the issue in there, maybe that would help a little bit. 16:23.840 --> 16:24.620 Yeah. 16:24.620 --> 16:27.920 So, in our team, we often have this discussion. 16:27.920 --> 16:29.200 Should we have a logo? 16:29.200 --> 16:31.640 Should we have a website or shouldn't we? 16:32.140 --> 16:33.520 And we have... 16:33.520 --> 16:43.000 So, for most of our papers and most of the vulnerabilities that we discovered, we don't because we just say they are not significant enough. 16:43.000 --> 16:54.940 And I think that's also the responsibility of the researcher to first assess, is this something that significant that I need this additional PR or is it not? 16:55.120 --> 16:55.520 Right. 16:55.520 --> 16:57.400 Well, then you're doing it the right way. 16:57.400 --> 16:57.900 So, yay. 16:57.900 --> 16:58.600 Cheers. 16:58.880 --> 16:59.660 Maybe. 16:59.660 --> 17:07.040 But it's also... I mean, I will have a different view on what is really important than you have, right? 17:07.040 --> 17:08.980 Everyone will have a different view on that. 17:08.980 --> 17:16.320 So, something that I think is really, really important, you might say, well, it's not really exploitable in our use case. 17:16.320 --> 17:16.580 Right. 17:16.580 --> 17:18.960 We don't ever want to downplay a researcher's work. 17:18.960 --> 17:21.320 I mean, it's important, whatever they do. 17:21.320 --> 17:26.360 And we appreciate especially doing CBD with them and not being zero-day. 17:27.860 --> 17:37.900 But yeah, it's a more matter of, especially in a bigger industry when you're trying to protect your customers best, how do you approach it? 17:38.220 --> 17:41.680 There is a fight for customer attention. 17:42.240 --> 17:49.580 And for customers to make the right security decisions, they need to be attentive about the right things. 17:49.580 --> 17:55.960 And logos and hype in the press wants that. 17:56.360 --> 18:01.920 And we have bad security outcomes for our customers due to that. 18:01.920 --> 18:12.620 Of course, there's also the thing that even fixed vulnerabilities sometimes cause suffering for system administrators running around the basement and patching systems and all the like. 18:14.180 --> 18:23.140 And to some extent, I sometimes find overhyped bugs disrespectful to those people. 18:25.980 --> 18:26.300 Yeah. 18:26.300 --> 18:37.840 So, in my case, I don't have an issue with logos or anything, even though in a previous call and a couple of exchanges, Daniel, I alluded into that. 18:37.980 --> 18:44.360 Whether it's a logo, as a matter of fact, even for Cisco, we had the first vulnerability with emojis. 18:44.360 --> 18:46.840 So, we have emojis, logos, and everything else. 18:46.840 --> 18:57.360 So, at the end of the day, if it helps to do an alias for a vulnerability and bring some awareness, I'm perfectly okay with that. 18:57.360 --> 19:12.580 The only challenge that I'm seeing or opportunity, right, is that in some cases, whenever we write information, and even vendors, in my case, we have a research institution at Cisco called Talos, and we find vulnerabilities in other people's products, 19:12.580 --> 19:13.140 right? 19:13.360 --> 19:14.880 And yes, it is. 19:14.880 --> 19:22.500 So, in that case, yes, we also have logos, and we put them up there, and we put up blog posts and so on, right? 19:22.720 --> 19:32.400 But what we need to do collectively is to make sure that the media is not either downplaying it or over-proportioned. 19:32.400 --> 19:34.080 So, we have to have a balance, right? 19:34.680 --> 19:37.140 And we all say the media, the media, the media, right? 19:37.140 --> 19:42.880 But it's our responsibility, right, on how we create our security advisories. 19:43.140 --> 19:44.600 And it's both ways. 19:44.600 --> 19:49.580 Even though we're vendors here and everything, but we have to point fingers to us. 19:49.580 --> 19:51.300 How clear is our advisories? 19:51.300 --> 19:58.360 Can we have some collateral that the end consumer actually knows about, you know, what the implications are? 19:58.360 --> 20:04.260 And we work with the researcher to make sure that we all understand, you know, what the problem is. 20:04.260 --> 20:15.460 And in a previous conversation, I also mentioned that the biggest nerd fights in history is whenever it comes to CVSS scoring, right? 20:15.560 --> 20:18.020 And, you know, whenever it comes to risk. 20:18.020 --> 20:32.840 And at the end of the day, you know, whether it's CVSS, whenever we come up with some new ways and everything, we have to have some type of way of saying, yeah, you have to jump right now and fix this vulnerability versus the other 100 criticals that we're also, 20:32.840 --> 20:34.500 you know, dependent on. 20:34.500 --> 20:42.460 And especially nowadays, since it's not so much of a vulnerability coming from like a Cisco or an Intel or Red Hat or anything else, it's open source, right? 20:42.460 --> 20:51.400 By the time that actually I'm boring you to death in here, probably three more CVEs that are super important has been disclosed and we don't know about, right? 20:51.400 --> 21:01.520 So that's the type of balance and the type of, I guess, for a corny way of saying orchestration that needs to take place, right, in this CBD. 21:03.640 --> 21:09.320 I want to add another point here regarding the overhyping. 21:09.560 --> 21:20.880 Having a logo, having a website for something, for a vulnerability, for a research result does not necessarily mean that you overhype it. 21:20.880 --> 21:37.640 We had experiences where we just put papers on archive without any website, without any logo and anything, and media picked it up and media reported about it and not necessarily correct in all cases. 21:37.640 --> 21:50.620 And we had this, on AMD CPUs, and their media picked it up. 21:50.620 --> 22:06.120 We intentionally didn't make any website or logo, but media picked it up and the reporting, it was not entirely wrong, but it was definitely, I would say, definitely overhyped. 22:07.280 --> 22:28.300 And we discussed this also in our team and the conclusion that we had was that in some cases we should have a website, even if it's not a vulnerability that we want to hype, because it's not that significant, but just to have a very clear message which says how relevant is it. 22:28.540 --> 22:42.760 And I think that's the important part that we also always had on our websites, a short three-sentence summary like what is it, who has to care about this and what can an attacker do. 22:42.760 --> 22:44.140 Yeah, I think that's great. 22:44.140 --> 22:45.280 That's great you do that. 22:45.280 --> 22:46.520 And it's good advice. 22:46.520 --> 22:54.680 I think that I would love to see it be more adopted in the researcher world, for sure. 22:54.680 --> 22:56.240 I think it would help out. 22:57.380 --> 23:11.020 So before I move on to my next question, I'm just going to say when I retire, all of you in vendor world are doomed, because I'm going to offer my services to LREG for free writing up crazy headlines. 23:11.420 --> 23:17.680 But to touch on a point that Daniel made, he invoked the Katie Masuris clause. 23:17.920 --> 23:21.180 Let's talk about bug bounties and CVD. 23:22.400 --> 23:24.700 Oh, Katie, maybe you should take that one. 23:25.560 --> 23:31.680 Because our friend Katie Noble Trimble here actually has a lot to do with that in her organization. 23:31.680 --> 23:38.660 Could you maybe talk about how coordinated disclosure interacts both good and bad with bug bounty? 23:39.620 --> 23:42.460 Yeah, so I love Katie Mo. 23:42.600 --> 23:48.480 I think that first off, let me just say that it is an honor to be confused with Katie Mo. 23:49.880 --> 23:53.300 My hair color is like, you know, getting close to hers too now. 23:53.300 --> 23:54.260 I don't know. 23:54.340 --> 23:58.600 I think I have been accepted to conferences because they thought that I was she. 23:58.760 --> 24:03.360 When I showed up, I don't think they were nearly as excited to see me instead of her. 24:03.380 --> 24:06.520 So, yeah, bug bounties. 24:06.840 --> 24:10.660 So, bug bounties are a tool. 24:10.660 --> 24:13.340 I'm trying to be serious here about bug bounties. 24:13.980 --> 24:15.680 So, bug bounties are a tool, right? 24:15.680 --> 24:17.680 So, they're a tool in a toolkit. 24:17.680 --> 24:20.760 And they are there to incentivize. 24:20.760 --> 24:28.000 But they're a part of a well-structured product security portfolio. 24:28.140 --> 24:30.040 They're not the whole thing. 24:30.040 --> 24:35.160 And there are different motivations that will help people from different perspectives. 24:35.580 --> 24:46.700 So, in the academic world, for instance, bug bounties may not weigh as much because a lot of academic institutions don't allow an individual to accept that cold hard cash, right? 24:46.860 --> 24:51.000 If you are a professional bug hunter, that might be how you pay your mortgage. 24:51.000 --> 24:53.520 And so, there's a lot more tied to that. 24:54.100 --> 24:58.000 But the problem becomes that bug bounties are a wonderful tool. 24:58.060 --> 24:59.580 And they're great. 24:59.580 --> 25:12.440 But you have to have a good program in place already to accept that information, to be able to execute on that information, and figure out, like, how do you actually... there are so many questions about it. 25:12.440 --> 25:13.620 How do you award? 25:13.720 --> 25:15.100 How do you manage it? 25:15.100 --> 25:18.860 Like, are we gonna tie the payments to CVSS scores? 25:18.860 --> 25:22.280 Are we gonna tie the payments to a well thought out proof of concept? 25:22.280 --> 25:24.260 There's so many pieces that go into it. 25:24.260 --> 25:27.760 And so, I would say, like, bug bounty is not a one size fits all. 25:27.760 --> 25:31.280 It's gonna vary from organization to organization. 25:31.420 --> 25:35.420 And some organizations are gonna have different timelines, different pieces. 25:36.380 --> 25:38.220 It's... yeah, it's complex. 25:38.420 --> 25:40.460 So, bug bounty is not the end of the world. 25:40.460 --> 25:41.760 Bug bounty is a tool. 25:41.820 --> 25:43.440 It's a tool in your toolkit. 25:43.600 --> 25:44.940 So, it's a great tool. 25:44.940 --> 25:48.000 I love the tool because I'm the director of it at Intel. 25:48.000 --> 25:52.160 But it's not... it's not everything. 25:52.320 --> 25:56.220 So, vulnerability disclosure is more than bug bounty alone. 25:56.580 --> 26:05.760 Yeah, I think when you think about it, too, like, there's a lot of smaller companies that probably, you know, don't have that or don't have the funding for it. 26:05.860 --> 26:09.580 But that doesn't mean that they're not wanting to work with researchers. 26:09.580 --> 26:12.560 They just can't get the budget to do it. 26:12.920 --> 26:18.820 You know, so... so, you know, do your best to try to figure out how to reach out to those companies. 26:18.980 --> 26:25.280 Hopefully, they have a web page or email address, you know, secure at p-cert at security at. 26:25.300 --> 26:27.040 I know we struggle a little bit. 26:27.040 --> 26:34.720 But, you know, there's plenty of us around that can help find the right contacts. 26:35.600 --> 26:40.020 Because we're, you know, sort of come together from all over the place. 26:40.020 --> 26:43.440 And we're sort of an expanding group here. 26:43.440 --> 26:44.640 I like it. 26:45.040 --> 26:50.000 Bug bounties are one of the wonderful signs of how the industry has changed. 26:50.000 --> 26:54.100 Back in the 90s, researchers were often rewarded with... 26:55.380 --> 26:58.120 their disclosure was rewarded with lawsuits. 26:58.420 --> 27:06.860 And now people in the industry are working with the people and have started actually paying the researchers for their efforts. 27:07.540 --> 27:17.460 So I'm very much thumbs up on bug bounties, especially because it shows how the industry has changed on how they view hackers. 27:17.680 --> 27:20.840 Hackers are nowadays helpers and not the enemy. 27:21.080 --> 27:25.520 Yeah, I thought you were going to say t-shirts for a minute there in the early days. 27:25.520 --> 27:26.400 I like it. 27:26.840 --> 27:28.440 It just won the t-shirt. 27:31.400 --> 27:35.500 Oh, earlier than that, it was lawsuits. 27:35.500 --> 27:39.260 Then it became t-shirts and then maybe stickers. 27:39.280 --> 27:44.880 And then, yeah, and now financial rewards. 27:44.880 --> 27:45.620 Awesome stickers. 27:48.160 --> 27:50.960 So let's... we've touched on it a little bit. 27:50.960 --> 27:54.700 Let's see if we can spend some time now that we're past the top of the hour here. 27:54.700 --> 28:00.660 Let's talk about coordinated vulnerability disclosure inside an open source context. 28:00.940 --> 28:22.400 So I'll go last, but let our esteemed panel here, whether it's our researchers or our vendor friends, kind of describe what works out really well and what are some challenges for you within the open source world, which makes up about 90% of all software now. 28:23.700 --> 28:25.380 Hey, Jerry, open source won. 28:37.400 --> 28:39.280 I guess I start. 28:39.900 --> 28:45.060 So basically, that's top of mind for me. 28:45.060 --> 28:49.480 And it sounds corny whenever people say, hey, what keeps you up at night and everything else? 28:49.480 --> 28:51.000 It's actually open source right now. 28:51.200 --> 28:56.080 And it's not so much of the predicament of using open source. 28:56.080 --> 28:59.380 We have to use and embrace and contribute to open source. 28:59.380 --> 29:01.360 I mean, I'm a super big fan of that. 29:02.220 --> 29:06.860 The challenge when it comes to open source is that it can be anything, right? 29:06.860 --> 29:08.580 It's like IoT can be anything, right? 29:09.260 --> 29:12.740 And it's critical infrastructure for a lot of things. 29:12.740 --> 29:28.180 So to give you somewhat of a real life, I guess, realization that we had a while back, probably about four or five years ago, whenever Heartbleed came, we were looking in the industry, right? 29:28.180 --> 29:30.620 Not only Cisco, but a whole bunch of other companies, right? 29:30.620 --> 29:38.880 So what to prioritize, as far as actually giving funding, probably doing research, and so on. 29:38.880 --> 29:45.960 So we said, okay, so open SSL, and things like that, which are actually super important for us. 29:46.760 --> 29:48.700 There's a lot of people looking at it right now. 29:48.700 --> 29:55.640 So can we look at things that perhaps are actually critical infrastructure, that nobody actually has probably taken a look at it, right? 29:55.840 --> 29:57.620 We're going down the list. 29:57.760 --> 30:01.700 And as a matter of fact, that number two is perfectly fine. 30:01.700 --> 30:05.280 Because there are two guys that work on open SSL that get paid to do it. 30:05.280 --> 30:06.380 Yes, indeed. 30:06.560 --> 30:13.920 And the example that I was going to go is NTP, the Network Time Protocol, so NTPD specifically. 30:14.120 --> 30:18.260 And there's also two guys that don't get paid, which is bad, right? 30:18.360 --> 30:21.400 They're not even the full-time job, right? 30:21.400 --> 30:25.020 Well, I guess now, you fast-forward this year, it's a little bit better now, right? 30:25.020 --> 30:26.120 So it's a lot better. 30:26.500 --> 30:32.660 And it's not that the problem is the poor guys that actually are contributing to the code. 30:32.660 --> 30:34.000 It's a matter of scalability. 30:34.000 --> 30:41.800 It's a matter of actually even running static analysis into the thing that didn't even exist five years ago for these components. 30:41.920 --> 30:44.000 Now, of course, we're modernizing our ways. 30:44.000 --> 30:47.340 Even if you submit things on GitHub, a lot of things are actually happening. 30:47.500 --> 30:50.120 We're getting better, for sure. 30:50.420 --> 30:53.120 It's just that it's getting way more complicated, right? 30:53.120 --> 31:01.640 And more people actually are not only, of course, contributing, but using it more than contributing, which is the other predicament. 31:01.900 --> 31:05.120 And in some cases, we were talking about bug bounties. 31:07.040 --> 31:09.760 In some cases, actually, amazing. 31:09.760 --> 31:11.700 I'm a big fan of bug bounties, right? 31:11.700 --> 31:18.460 The challenge is that in some cases, we also don't think about, does this affect other vendors? 31:18.900 --> 31:30.300 Am I actually finding some type of vulnerabilities that perhaps, yes, it's a SQL injection, cross-site scripting, which is actually pretty common, but I'm doing some fuzzing and I crash an application. 31:30.480 --> 31:32.080 What is the underlying issue, right? 31:32.080 --> 31:37.400 And in some cases, it's actually kind of a commodity, even though it goes back and forth and it hasn't been shared. 31:37.460 --> 31:46.420 And then two or three months down the road, you say, oh, but this CVE was not shared with these vendors that they're also affected. 31:46.480 --> 31:55.880 So we go back and in some cases, you actually see people trying to find the same or found the same CVEs and they reported a different way, but there were no coordination. 31:55.880 --> 32:00.340 So those are the things that are crucial for us to be successful. 32:00.340 --> 32:05.040 And not only among vendors, but actually downstreams and upstreams as well, right? 32:05.040 --> 32:08.820 So especially whenever it comes to IoT is number one. 32:08.980 --> 32:09.300 Yeah. 32:09.300 --> 32:11.860 So Omar, you brought up a few points. 32:11.860 --> 32:14.320 One is who do you bring in, right? 32:14.320 --> 32:15.700 Ahead of time. 32:15.780 --> 32:26.840 And I think that we're seeing that even if you're the competition, we still want to work together in the background here. 32:27.280 --> 32:34.580 Our whole goal is to protect our customers and we often have the same customers, even if we're competitors. 32:34.580 --> 32:43.060 So we like to make sure that we're all working together and ideas is when do you bring someone in and it's not only the researchers. 32:43.540 --> 32:45.440 Okay, Crowe, you got your hand raised. 32:45.440 --> 32:46.460 Go ahead. 32:46.500 --> 32:48.000 Can I tell you a secret? 32:48.180 --> 32:49.220 Yes. 32:49.720 --> 32:55.160 Open source has worked with our competitors for 25 plus years. 32:56.200 --> 32:57.140 Yeah, yeah. 32:57.140 --> 33:06.400 Well, I would have to say with some of those other vendors in the industry, it wasn't always so nice. 33:08.420 --> 33:10.260 We're getting better. 33:11.200 --> 33:23.280 But I think not only the researchers should be thinking who else is affected, but when we are the receiving end, we should be thinking who else is affected and bring them in. 33:23.280 --> 33:35.520 I recently worked on an issue, a very recent one, where we are in and the researchers were in right with the industry people who were fixing the issue. 33:35.520 --> 33:41.580 And there was great coordination amongst the group there. 33:41.580 --> 33:45.400 It was pretty awesome to see of how much we've evolved. 33:46.240 --> 33:51.780 How do you do that, though, with like open source, though, when everything's shown? 33:51.780 --> 33:53.240 It's super easy. 33:54.680 --> 33:59.380 Well, and I guess I'll chime in before we let other folks. 33:59.380 --> 34:11.440 I found it very interesting how some vulnerabilities have been patched wide in the open under the cover of some other patch. 34:11.520 --> 34:15.020 I don't know what you're talking about at all. 34:17.980 --> 34:27.640 So, in general, open source, there is no single definition of what open source is. 34:27.640 --> 34:36.700 You could have two young ladies in Bangladesh that have an amazing idea and they're just trying to get this creativity out there to share with the world. 34:36.740 --> 34:40.340 You could have large corporations like a lot of the folks represented here. 34:40.340 --> 34:41.740 You could have academics. 34:42.120 --> 34:44.000 So, open source is a lot of different things. 34:44.000 --> 34:49.540 And there's really no one definition or moniker that fits, that works with every community. 34:49.540 --> 35:07.660 But if you're thinking about the types of open source that might make up a product or some kind of cloud offering, you're going to have the high end of the spectrum are things like the kernel group, which is very mature and organized, Kubernetes. 35:07.660 --> 35:14.080 And then you start moving down to Apache Foundation, these other large communities. 35:14.080 --> 35:19.300 And then you get down to something where it's a single person, a couple people that are just playing around. 35:19.300 --> 35:34.600 And it's hard to put any kind of structure or process to all these different models because a lot of people that code for open source are doing it for free, for no remuneration from large companies that make a lot of money off of it. 35:34.920 --> 35:40.740 But they do it for free because they love kind of adding value and expressing their creativity. 35:41.160 --> 35:45.580 And as Daniel mentioned, open source is very creative. 35:45.580 --> 35:50.940 And some of the larger projects, we do have ways to privately take in data. 35:50.940 --> 35:56.980 So we take in a private bug report that's well established within the community for a long time. 35:57.140 --> 36:05.120 And when you're looking at a less mature community or package or library, they might not have that capability. 36:05.120 --> 36:18.680 And that's where larger kind of big brothers and big sisters, like a Red Hat or a SUSE or Canonical, kind of step in and try to help mentor these smaller projects to help them get these good practices set up so they can take in a private note. 36:18.680 --> 36:30.020 Because sometimes a lot of, you know, my team, we track between 3,000 and 5,000 vulnerabilities a year out of 450,000 packages. 36:30.020 --> 36:30.920 That's a lot. 36:30.920 --> 36:44.580 Not all of them really kind of bubble up to the level of they need the attention of like a Spectre meltdown or a Heartbleed or a, you know, Blueborn, all these kind of the other big name nonsense things. 36:44.620 --> 36:46.480 But, you know, they still need to get fixed. 36:46.480 --> 36:56.280 And what open source is really good at is you identify a problem, the team attacks it collaboratively, they develop a solution and release that update very quickly. 36:56.280 --> 37:05.120 And they don't like to spend a lot of time making a big deal out of it because they've already moved on to the next feature, the next big thing. 37:06.420 --> 37:09.040 But, yeah, it can be challenging. 37:09.040 --> 37:10.680 But there are definitely ways to do it. 37:10.680 --> 37:11.720 There are methods to do it. 37:11.720 --> 37:14.180 There are groups that allow this. 37:14.180 --> 37:15.960 I hear a lot of bleeping in the background. 37:15.960 --> 37:17.440 What's going on, folks? 37:17.440 --> 37:19.780 I was wondering when you were going to change your hat again. 37:19.780 --> 37:20.600 Sorry. 37:23.680 --> 37:25.600 There we go. 37:28.420 --> 37:29.500 All right. 37:29.500 --> 37:31.500 Let me get this panel back under order. 37:33.420 --> 37:44.110 When you're thinking about doing a CVD, what are some things you might want to prepare for? 37:44.110 --> 37:47.890 What can you do to help make that coordination very successful? 37:48.150 --> 37:54.450 And let me start off with... we'll start off with Lisa because she has a lot of ideas. 37:54.490 --> 38:00.570 So, from your perspective, what will make you successful when you're getting ready to do this multiparty coordination? 38:01.390 --> 38:06.370 So, I guess it depends on how familiar you are with it or not. 38:06.370 --> 38:22.670 Like, if I was a researcher and I wasn't too familiar, I would potentially utilize CERT or something like that if I felt like it was going to cross over more than one company in the industry just to have them help. 38:23.190 --> 38:37.950 Because I think it could be overbearing of figuring out how if one, you know, if industry, you know, company A wants this date to get it fixed and company B wants another date and company C wants another date. 38:37.950 --> 38:43.330 So, I think that's one way that a researcher could use. 38:43.330 --> 38:49.710 But I think the idea is to figure out when you start is what are your rules? 38:49.710 --> 38:51.190 What's your embargo date? 38:51.190 --> 38:58.470 How many days do you actually want to, you know, give the company or vendor to fix the issue? 38:58.530 --> 39:00.510 Typically, it's 90 days. 39:00.510 --> 39:03.810 I would prefer that as a company. 39:03.810 --> 39:08.230 I think it's respectful to do that, especially when things get more difficult. 39:08.230 --> 39:13.510 So, think about your rules and what you want to do and how you want to approach it. 39:13.510 --> 39:17.970 But I'll pause there because I know we're running out of time to get other people in. 39:18.530 --> 39:22.270 Anders, what are your thoughts about how you could make CVD successful? 39:22.970 --> 39:24.130 Three things. 39:24.610 --> 39:25.330 Use it. 39:25.330 --> 39:31.350 It's a tool not only for vendors but also for hackers. 39:34.010 --> 39:50.530 Listen to what vendors are saying or what hackers are saying and try to make the best out of it and be aware that there's often a lot of complexities involved with it. 39:50.530 --> 39:50.830 Right. 39:50.830 --> 39:52.550 Be patient, right? 39:52.550 --> 39:53.230 Yeah. 39:55.030 --> 39:59.030 Omar, what are your thoughts on how you can make CVD successful? 39:59.330 --> 40:05.830 I think that I'm going to capitalize on something that Daniel mentioned in a previous call. 40:06.410 --> 40:17.290 And it's in some cases, even if you provide some data to even a vendor or whoever, whenever you're coordinating, you have to make it first easy to understand. 40:17.290 --> 40:28.630 But at the same time, in some cases, getting the right people at the right place at the right time to make sure that you understand the technical implications of a given vulnerability instead of running around. 40:28.630 --> 40:41.310 Even if you have the 90 days or 60 days or 100 days, getting that streamlined and modernizing the way that we actually exchange information among all the affected parties, that is number one. 40:42.510 --> 40:46.870 And Art Mannion, which is actually a good friend of mine, he leads... We all love Art. 40:47.850 --> 40:51.690 He's the person that will tell you we cannot scale, right? 40:51.690 --> 40:54.350 This is a big ecosystem. 40:54.350 --> 41:00.910 And just having a Rolodex of all the vendors that actually use a component is foolish, right? 41:00.910 --> 41:04.430 We will never, ever, ever be able to actually have a complete thing. 41:04.530 --> 41:11.510 But what we have to think about is what Lisa mentioned is that in some cases, we are working with competitors, right? 41:11.930 --> 41:13.650 Even more than our companies. 41:13.650 --> 41:16.070 For example, you know, I work with Lisa a lot. 41:16.070 --> 41:26.130 I work with Juniper even more, in some cases more than I worked with Cisco, whenever it comes to fixing a vulnerability, saying BGP, OSPF, or whatever the case might be. 41:26.130 --> 41:35.310 So that type of thing of, oh, I'm going to talk to this competitor, is there a problem and everything else is not, you know, that's 20 years ago, a fallacy. 41:35.590 --> 41:51.390 And then the last one is that at the end of the day, I have the reality and I tell my guys at Cisco is that whenever I push a button, I publish a CV out there, the number ones that actually are reading that CV are the bad guys, right? 41:51.610 --> 41:58.890 And probably at the same time that you're committing an open source code, you know, probably that's going to be the case too, right? 41:58.950 --> 42:10.830 So what we have to do is think about how can we exchange information to the consumer, to downstream and upstream providers in a more modern way. 42:10.830 --> 42:17.890 I know that sounds corny, but you know, can we actually make it more and we're trying to do that machine readable, right? 42:17.890 --> 42:30.930 So if in the case that we actually have that Rolodex of people and everything else, you know, get some tool and that's what Art and, you know, the guys in CERT are also doing, you know, we're creating tools that allow us to do that. 42:31.070 --> 42:36.150 And even if you have, I don't know, even two years ago that didn't exist and it wasn't even a thought, right? 42:36.230 --> 42:37.590 So we have to move faster. 42:37.590 --> 42:39.670 That's the number one thing that I want to say. 42:40.790 --> 42:47.330 So as I close, I'll say Art Mannion has the best facial hair in the industry. 42:50.710 --> 42:52.970 But I want to thank our panel here. 42:52.970 --> 42:54.930 This was a great hour together. 42:54.930 --> 42:57.170 I really appreciate your time and expertise. 42:57.550 --> 43:04.290 We're going to be hanging out for a little bit on this awesome Discord channel that my kids made fun of me all week about because I've had it up. 43:04.910 --> 43:12.910 Thank you everybody for coming and your attention here, panelists, and thank you to the audience for having us here at the IoT Village. 43:13.070 --> 43:16.010 Enjoy your day and enjoy the rest of the con. 43:16.010 --> 43:18.330 We've got some great stuff lined up the rest of the weekend. 43:25.450 --> 43:26.490 We're out.