WEBVTT 00:00.000 --> 00:05.580 This talk is about my search for a good UPnP hacking tool. 00:06.340 --> 00:11.340 So what we're going to go over today is just some introductions to tell you who I am. 00:12.020 --> 00:16.320 First I'll start talking about what is UPnP and why should you care about UPnP? 00:16.560 --> 00:20.120 Why was I looking for a tool to hack UPnP in the first place? 00:20.620 --> 00:29.680 I'll talk about some of the tools that are out there right now and what I found to be their shortcomings and why I thought that they weren't quite sufficient. 00:29.980 --> 00:39.360 I will show you a new, an updated tool that I put a lot of updates into and I'll talk about the features of that. 00:39.360 --> 00:44.000 And throughout we'll do some demos of that functionality and about UPnP in general. 00:44.580 --> 00:51.600 Q&A was going to be in the Discord chat, but I know Discord is down at the moment or there's some issues with it. 00:51.600 --> 00:58.760 So if that still happens, we'll probably just keep the Q&A here in the Twitch channel. 00:59.880 --> 01:01.360 All right, so who am I? 01:01.360 --> 01:03.620 Real name is Trevor Stavato. 01:03.620 --> 01:06.880 I've been in offensive security for over 10 years. 01:07.580 --> 01:13.160 Different positions, mostly in web app and network pen testing. 01:13.480 --> 01:17.880 A couple of years ago, I founded this cool little company called LabMath Security. 01:19.400 --> 01:28.340 Before I was in hacking, I was a software developer and I did that for a number of years and then realized all the mistakes I was making once I became a hacker. 01:29.220 --> 01:32.740 I try to be an active member of the security community. 01:32.780 --> 01:37.140 As Sam said, I help do some IoT village stuff in Canada. 01:37.140 --> 01:38.380 I help sometimes in the U.S. 01:38.380 --> 01:39.200 as well. 01:40.200 --> 01:42.680 I like to dabble a little bit in RFID. 01:42.680 --> 01:45.280 So we do an RFID village here in Canada. 01:45.280 --> 01:53.320 And I do some red teaming for the pros versus Joe CTF, which unfortunately didn't happen this year because of all this COVID stuff. 01:54.360 --> 02:01.400 Maybe one of my proudest achievements so far is the DEF CON 26 black badge win at the IoT CTF. 02:02.640 --> 02:06.220 All right, so let's talk about what UPnP is. 02:06.220 --> 02:09.320 So UPnP is Universal Plug and Play. 02:09.320 --> 02:22.100 And it's a protocol defined, I think back in 2008 was the original publication of this protocol, allowing for devices on network to discover and interact with each other. 02:22.100 --> 02:25.820 It's based around a principle called zero configuration networking. 02:26.260 --> 02:44.140 Really what they wanted to be able to do was to have a device that just plugged into a network, found other devices and was able to talk to and communicate with the other devices and have them configure themselves according to their needs without anybody having any actual input and hands-on keyboard configuration. 02:44.700 --> 02:47.140 Sounds like a great idea to me. 02:48.200 --> 02:55.740 So UPnP is a protocol that uses pretty standard services like HTTP, XML, and SOAP. 02:55.740 --> 03:01.760 And it defines a way for services to describe their functionality and interact with other devices. 03:02.220 --> 03:06.100 A lot of the common uses for this are for network services. 03:06.100 --> 03:12.840 So small office, home office routers will use this for configuring port forwarding. 03:13.480 --> 03:25.660 There's data sharing services for network storage, media streaming, for example, Chromecast, or some of the original versions of Chromecast use UPnP to initiate the streams. 03:25.680 --> 03:31.000 And it's also used commonly in smart home control, which will be one of the demos that we're doing later on today. 03:33.200 --> 03:43.080 So in the spec, UPnP talks about kind of six capabilities or six things that are required for proper UPnP functioning. 03:43.300 --> 03:45.140 The first one is addressing. 03:45.620 --> 03:53.340 It's not as important for the tool because we can't really talk to it unless it has a device, but the device needs a way to get an IP address. 03:53.340 --> 03:55.820 And this is typically done through DHCP. 03:57.160 --> 04:01.080 The second one, more interesting to us, is a discovery protocol. 04:01.080 --> 04:10.700 The devices need to be able to advertise their presence on the network, or other devices need to be able to search for other UPnP devices on the network. 04:10.700 --> 04:18.280 So there's a protocol called Simple Service Discovery Protocol, SSDP, that is used to do this advertisement. 04:18.280 --> 04:21.920 And I'll show one of those requests later and show how that works. 04:23.240 --> 04:28.820 Once you know what devices are on the networks, you need to know what those devices can do. 04:28.820 --> 04:34.400 And then there's a device description XML file that gives this detail. 04:34.400 --> 04:44.420 And when the devices broadcast their presence or another device searches for them, the URL to that XML file is part of the response that comes back. 04:47.030 --> 04:49.270 The next part is control. 04:49.270 --> 04:53.430 So once you know what it can do, you need to know how to control that device. 04:53.430 --> 05:01.370 You need to know what endpoint to send the request to, what parameters you need to include in the request. 05:01.370 --> 05:06.630 Once you have this information, now that's enough information to start interacting with that device. 05:07.270 --> 05:11.690 There are still a couple of other parts to UPnP. 05:11.690 --> 05:13.870 The fifth one is event notification. 05:13.870 --> 05:18.930 So you can subscribe to specific state variables on a device. 05:18.930 --> 05:22.690 And if that state variable changes, it'll send a notification to you. 05:23.030 --> 05:27.110 And then the last part of UPnP protocol is a presentation. 05:27.810 --> 05:36.730 For the topic of this talk, that's not as important, because that just gets into sort of regular web app hacking, less UPnP hacking. 05:36.730 --> 05:41.330 So we're going to focus on two to five with this talk. 05:41.990 --> 05:53.370 So I'm going to show you just a brief view of a device description and what that kind of looks like. 05:53.370 --> 05:58.170 So over here, I'm going to run a search. 05:58.370 --> 06:00.210 And you'll see the discovery message. 06:00.210 --> 06:03.370 And I'll make this bigger, because this might not be easy for people to see. 06:07.200 --> 06:12.680 So there's a discovery message that uses a custom HTTP verb called msearch. 06:12.820 --> 06:17.080 It posts to a broadcast address. 06:17.080 --> 06:20.600 And this is just a fixed... this is the same on every network. 06:21.340 --> 06:34.080 It's got a message saying, try SSDP discover, and the service type in this case is SSDP all, which basically says, all devices respond to me. 06:34.320 --> 06:44.960 And you can see the responses come back here from all the different devices, showing you here is the location of my device description. 06:45.000 --> 06:50.700 And it'll also give you some information about what kind of device it is. 06:51.040 --> 06:55.660 So you can see on my network, there are a couple devices that have a lot of different services. 06:55.660 --> 07:01.260 Because we said SSDP all, all the services are responding separately. 07:02.420 --> 07:06.660 So now I'm going to... we're going to take a look at one of these. 07:06.720 --> 07:11.500 And we'll show you what a device description looks like. 07:12.460 --> 07:17.130 And make this bigger. 07:19.070 --> 07:23.430 So this here, you can see my setup here on the other screen. 07:23.430 --> 07:30.050 I have an Asus router, I have a WeMo switch, and that is, there's a little lamp plugged into that WeMo switch. 07:30.450 --> 07:34.450 So the device description we're seeing here is for the Asus router. 07:34.910 --> 07:41.230 It shows you the model number, the version numbers, serial number, a lot of information about it. 07:41.250 --> 07:49.270 When we get down into this section, the service list, this is where we see the different services, the UPnP services that it supports. 07:49.310 --> 07:56.510 So it'll show you the URL that you need to send control requests to, the URL to send event requests to. 07:57.350 --> 08:12.910 And it'll also have, not in this one, but in some of them, it'll have the, oh yeah, no, here it is, the SCDP, so the service controlled description, so the service description. 08:12.910 --> 08:22.970 So if we copy this, and we put this on here, we'll now put a double X bar, there we go. 08:23.230 --> 08:31.350 Now we'll see all the actions that this service supports, action name, and all the arguments. 08:31.350 --> 08:36.890 So we can collapse all this, and you can see there's gonna be a bunch of actions for this service. 08:36.890 --> 08:41.230 And then we get into this server state table that talks about all the state variables. 08:41.290 --> 08:46.610 And some of these won't send events, so the send events is no, but some of these do. 08:46.890 --> 08:48.830 And those are the ones that we can subscribe to. 08:48.830 --> 08:57.030 So physical link status is a variable that we can subscribe to and get notifications when that status changes. 08:57.190 --> 09:05.950 So you can see how this can be used by devices to monitor what's happening in the network and be able to control it. 09:06.330 --> 09:14.210 So that's the overview of how the service descriptions and device descriptions work and what they look like. 09:17.720 --> 09:23.000 So one thing that's missing from this spec is that there's no authentication. 09:23.120 --> 09:28.000 Even on the control endpoints, when you're sending a control message, they are unauthenticated. 09:28.260 --> 09:34.280 It's a very old protocol, as I said, 2008, so they probably didn't think about that part of it. 09:34.440 --> 09:43.540 There have been some updates, some other optional pieces that you can tack on to add some authentication and some security to it. 09:43.540 --> 09:47.880 But those really, from my experience, I haven't seen any devices that use those. 09:47.880 --> 09:51.600 So most of this is just fully done unauthenticated. 09:53.600 --> 09:56.060 So why does this relate to IoT? 09:56.060 --> 09:57.620 Why is it in IoT Village? 09:57.620 --> 10:01.880 A lot of IoT devices are using UPnP. 10:01.880 --> 10:05.000 It makes them very simple for setup and control. 10:05.140 --> 10:08.280 A lot of consumer devices, they just want to make it simple. 10:08.280 --> 10:10.760 You take it home, you plug it in, and it works. 10:10.860 --> 10:13.660 So that's why UPnP is helpful for that. 10:14.460 --> 10:18.360 But as a hacker, we can look at what can we do with that. 10:18.360 --> 10:21.980 So we can do things like turning smart home devices on and off. 10:21.980 --> 10:25.960 And I'll do a demo later of the Wemo switch turning that on and off. 10:27.020 --> 10:44.820 One of the other things that UPnP has gotten the news a lot for is the ability to update the router's configuration and open ports on the router so that you can forward from the WAN side, the internet side, into the internal network. 10:45.040 --> 10:47.860 And then, as I said, you can also control media devices. 10:47.860 --> 10:52.500 So I thought IoT has already so many vulnerabilities. 10:52.660 --> 10:55.540 There's got to be some UPnP vulnerabilities, right? 10:55.540 --> 11:01.020 So that's why I wanted to look at UPnP as sort of an attack path. 11:02.220 --> 11:07.000 As I said, there's been a couple of notable exploits in the news. 11:07.000 --> 11:14.320 Back in 2017, Akamai released a paper talking about UPnProxy, UPnProxy. 11:15.000 --> 11:25.180 Basically, a lot of devices were configured to expose the UPnP interface on their WAN, on the WAN side. 11:25.180 --> 11:32.660 So you could send control events, things like port forwarding from the WAN side. 11:32.660 --> 11:40.080 So somebody on the internet could control your router and could set port forwarding to get internal access to your network. 11:40.080 --> 11:46.060 And even some of the rules, the way that they were doing the port forwarding, they're not validating the field. 11:46.060 --> 11:54.380 So you could port forward a port on the WAN side and forward it to a completely different URL somewhere else on the internet. 11:54.380 --> 12:03.600 So people were using this as a proxy, as their UPnProxy, to hide where they're coming from and sort of disguise their attacks. 12:04.260 --> 12:23.220 Back in 2019, there was a pretty famous attack from HackerGiraffe, where they used basically that same functionality, routers that were allowing configuration on their WAN side, to port forward to the Chromecast device. 12:23.440 --> 12:29.980 And then from there, they could control the Chromecast device, because it used UPnP as a way to stream a video to it. 12:29.980 --> 12:34.780 So they could control the Chromecast device and put a video of their choosing on. 12:34.780 --> 12:39.840 And they decided to put up an advertisement to subscribe to PewDiePie. 12:40.100 --> 12:42.060 So that got a lot of news headlines. 12:42.760 --> 12:48.480 One of the more recent ones that I've come across is this vulnerability called Call Stranger. 12:49.020 --> 12:51.420 And it's a 2020 vulnerability. 12:51.420 --> 13:01.520 It's really interesting when you look at this, because basically what he did is he looked at the UPnP spec and just noticed that there's some bad design in the spec. 13:02.060 --> 13:07.000 So I talked about the event subscription part of this. 13:07.360 --> 13:10.100 There's a callback of the event subscription. 13:10.100 --> 13:12.800 So you tell it where to call back when something changes. 13:12.800 --> 13:16.660 But there's no validation at this point done on that callback. 13:16.660 --> 13:21.540 So you can have that be some other address on the internet. 13:21.540 --> 13:25.460 You can use it to... you can add query strings on it. 13:25.460 --> 13:29.940 So you could use it for data exfiltration, if you wanted to get stuff out of a network kind of sneakily. 13:30.520 --> 13:43.040 There's also some amplifications type ramifications to this, because you send a very small request, and the request that comes back or gets forwarded to that notification server is much larger in size. 13:43.040 --> 13:48.120 So you can potentially do some sort of denial of service using that amplification. 13:48.740 --> 13:51.900 So we'll look at that and show you how that's done. 13:54.690 --> 14:01.530 So when I went looking for the UPnP tool, there's basic things that I would want a UPnP tool to do. 14:01.530 --> 14:04.450 First, I want it to discover all the devices on my network. 14:05.270 --> 14:06.970 I don't want to have to go out there and look for it. 14:06.970 --> 14:08.810 I want this tool to be able to find them. 14:08.990 --> 14:14.170 Once it finds them, it should be able to parse the description, find the services and actions and events. 14:14.290 --> 14:16.930 You know, XML is pretty straightforward and easy to parse. 14:16.930 --> 14:18.590 So that should be straightforward. 14:18.730 --> 14:31.990 And then to be able to build and manipulate the UPnP requests, that needs to be something simple that I can easily do, and potentially, ideally, fuzz that interface. 14:34.270 --> 14:39.110 So let's look at some of the tools that are out there and how I found that they worked. 14:39.110 --> 14:42.970 Now, this isn't an exhaustive presentation of what's out there. 14:42.970 --> 14:45.490 These are just the more common ones that I've come across. 14:46.150 --> 14:48.190 The first one is Miranda. 14:48.190 --> 14:50.730 And it's available in Kali out of the box. 14:50.950 --> 14:54.590 Has a nice command line syntax, if you like that kind of thing. 14:54.850 --> 14:58.930 But on the con side of things, I found it doesn't always work. 14:59.830 --> 15:03.610 In the case, I just ran it yesterday on my home network. 15:03.830 --> 15:10.130 It can find the devices by doing an msearch, but it seems to have trouble parsing some of the service description files. 15:10.130 --> 15:16.770 So it comes back with an empty list of services, and it can't do any sort of control of the actions. 15:17.010 --> 15:23.130 Also, command line syntax, in my opinion, isn't as nice for interacting with these requests. 15:23.130 --> 15:27.130 And I just don't find it as nice to use. 15:28.850 --> 15:34.790 The next tool that I looked at, and I was actually really excited about this tool, was the Burp UPnP B-Hunter. 15:34.830 --> 15:37.150 It's available in the Burp app store. 15:37.750 --> 15:44.430 Because UPnP is HTTP based, XML soap, all that kind of stuff works really well in Burp. 15:44.450 --> 15:47.910 And it works really well in Burp's other tools, like Intruder and Repeater. 15:47.990 --> 15:51.630 So I thought this was a great place to have that kind of functionality. 15:52.110 --> 15:58.150 But when I started using it, there were some major problems that I had where it wouldn't detect all the devices on the network. 15:58.150 --> 16:02.370 Some of the devices that I knew were there, it wasn't picking them up. 16:03.250 --> 16:05.450 And sometimes the parsing wasn't working. 16:05.450 --> 16:14.030 It wasn't able to parse the service descriptions and get access to all the different control points. 16:14.550 --> 16:17.190 Lastly, I found the interface just wasn't so easy. 16:17.770 --> 16:21.570 My home network, I do have a lot of IoT devices plugged in. 16:21.930 --> 16:26.150 And when I do a UPnP scan, I get back five or six devices. 16:26.150 --> 16:32.950 Each of them have many service descriptions and lots of control endpoints. 16:33.090 --> 16:42.190 And the version that's in the app store right now basically has very little fine-grained control over what requests you send to Intruder or Repeater. 16:42.250 --> 16:45.430 And sometimes even you don't have control over where you send it to. 16:45.430 --> 16:46.710 It's either one or the other. 16:46.870 --> 16:56.250 But I was ending up with, you know, a hundred Repeater tabs of requests and trying to dig through a hundred tabs to find the one request that I wanted to fuzz or test. 16:56.390 --> 16:59.630 It's just not very user-friendly, in my opinion. 17:01.010 --> 17:05.650 So, you know, what's a wannabe UPnP hacker guy like me going to do? 17:05.710 --> 17:07.330 As I said, there's other tools. 17:07.330 --> 17:10.610 There are things like uFuzz that's based on Miranda. 17:10.610 --> 17:13.350 So it's going to have the same sort of shortcomings that Miranda has. 17:13.630 --> 17:18.150 There's some .NET tools, but I don't really work on a Windows laptop very much. 17:18.150 --> 17:21.530 So .NET is not that conducive for me. 17:22.590 --> 17:26.050 So, you know, I was kind of looking at a few different options. 17:26.050 --> 17:28.790 I keep looking, see if there's other tools out there. 17:28.870 --> 17:34.170 I build a new tool from scratch or I modify an existing tool that's already out there. 17:34.310 --> 17:39.850 So being Canadian, I turned to my good friend and my neighbor, Drake, and I said, what should I do? 17:39.870 --> 17:42.210 He told me, don't build a new tool from scratch. 17:42.210 --> 17:45.190 You got to modify something that's already existing out there. 17:46.630 --> 17:51.630 So that brings me to my version of Burp's UPnP Hunter. 17:51.630 --> 18:02.950 I thought that it had the best sort of, you know, potential for a tool because of its integration into Burp and some of the other tools that you can use with Burp. 18:03.150 --> 18:07.150 But first we had to get through some of the bugs that it was facing right now. 18:07.150 --> 18:17.190 So the first one, the fact that it didn't detect all the UPnP devices on the network, I found that this comes down to some devices just don't follow the spec very well. 18:18.230 --> 18:25.930 It was sending the msearch using an ssdp-all, which I showed earlier, and all devices are supposed to respond to that. 18:25.930 --> 18:27.790 But some devices, they just don't. 18:27.790 --> 18:30.450 So I added a different msearch. 18:30.450 --> 18:36.550 So it does two msearches, one using ssdp-all and one using another tag called root device. 18:36.670 --> 18:40.530 And only the root device is supposed to respond to that, not all the different services. 18:41.170 --> 18:47.510 That seemed, pardon me, that seemed to work a little bit better for some of the devices that were on my network. 18:47.510 --> 18:51.510 So I was able to find all the devices on my network at that point. 18:52.210 --> 18:56.210 I still had some issues though with parsing in this tool. 18:56.490 --> 19:00.050 There was an interesting unsigned integer conversion error. 19:00.050 --> 19:07.330 So Burp is written in Java and Java byte arrays go from negative 127 to positive 127. 19:07.510 --> 19:14.430 But Python, which this tool is written in, has byte arrays go from 0 to 256. 19:14.770 --> 19:21.110 So in most characters, that doesn't really matter because you're still in the 0 to 127 range. 19:21.190 --> 19:29.530 But when you get into special characters and you get an assigned byte array from Java going into Python, things don't work so well. 19:29.530 --> 19:36.810 So I had to do some tricks to convert that back to an unsigned byte array. 19:38.110 --> 19:46.730 So that, you know, no matter what we got in the service description, special characters or not, it wasn't going to work on me. 19:47.290 --> 19:59.930 I also found that the control URLs, the way that it was parsing the control URLs from the device description, it didn't account for the fact that some devices add query strings to the control URLs. 19:59.930 --> 20:09.090 So they have a generic control URL, they have a query parameter that it uses to determine what service you're trying to talk to. 20:09.190 --> 20:11.970 Without that, it just gave me back a bad request. 20:11.970 --> 20:18.090 So I had to modify the tool to actually use the query string that was part of the control URL. 20:20.010 --> 20:23.910 Lastly, there were still other issues with the parsing. 20:23.910 --> 20:27.270 It wasn't actually doing XML parsing in the first version. 20:27.270 --> 20:34.210 It was using a regex to try to search through the XML document to pull out the pieces that it needed. 20:34.330 --> 20:40.430 And if you had an XML document that wasn't structured the way it's expected, then it wouldn't work. 20:40.430 --> 20:45.670 So I switched it to use actual XML parsing because that just makes sense. 20:47.330 --> 20:50.190 I also changed the UI for the tool. 20:51.210 --> 20:59.910 Because I didn't want to have to dig through 100 tabs in repeater, I added some combo boxes where you can now select the IP, the service, and the action. 20:59.910 --> 21:04.250 So you can drill in on the specific request that you want to look at and play with. 21:04.450 --> 21:07.450 I added a full request viewer and editor. 21:07.490 --> 21:12.810 So you can look at that and maybe change things before you send it to intruder or repeater. 21:12.850 --> 21:15.310 And you have the option to send it to either. 21:15.310 --> 21:18.770 You're not sort of tied into one or the other like you were in the first version. 21:20.270 --> 21:23.990 And lastly, I added a couple new features to the tool. 21:23.990 --> 21:28.950 So I added the ability to subscribe to event notification. 21:28.950 --> 21:43.250 So it parses that service description, looks for state variables that have events turned on, and then it will build a request for you that you can generate a subscribe request to subscribe to those state variables. 21:43.650 --> 21:48.630 I also added an option to specify the single device description. 21:48.630 --> 21:54.230 So instead of searching your network, you can specify a remote service description. 21:54.290 --> 22:00.150 Searching only works on your local network because you're broadcasting to an address within your local network. 22:00.150 --> 22:03.070 So only devices within that local network are going to work. 22:03.250 --> 22:08.850 But if you go on Shodan, there's a lot of UPnP devices on Shodan that are exposed to the internet. 22:08.850 --> 22:16.910 If you want to play with those, now you can because you can paste that service description into there directly and load that and get all the actions. 22:17.430 --> 22:25.330 I also added some little buttons so you can view, pull up the service description and SCDP files directly from the tool. 22:25.370 --> 22:31.170 That was kind of more of a convenience for me as I was debugging and trying to figure out why things weren't working. 22:31.190 --> 22:37.510 To easily get to the device description and those files made it a little bit easier to see what I'm looking at. 22:39.070 --> 22:41.110 And now it's demo time. 22:41.110 --> 22:44.950 So we'll go through that tool and show you what it actually does. 22:47.050 --> 22:49.750 So UPnP Hunter 2.0. 22:49.750 --> 22:52.730 Right now it is not available in the Burp App Store. 22:52.730 --> 22:56.810 I do plan to push it to the Burp App Store at some point later. 22:56.810 --> 23:07.270 I first wanted to wait and give the original author a chance to pull in some of the changes that I pushed and maybe update the tool from there. 23:07.590 --> 23:10.010 He doesn't seem to have the interest to do that. 23:10.010 --> 23:13.230 So I will push this as a separate standalone version. 23:14.350 --> 23:15.510 So this is the tool. 23:15.510 --> 23:18.150 This is what it looks like in the Burp tab. 23:18.330 --> 23:21.470 And I'm just going to go ahead and start a discovery on my network. 23:22.370 --> 23:23.750 And this will take a few minutes. 23:23.750 --> 23:31.330 Because as I said, it's running the mSearch, reading back all the responses and then parsing out. 23:31.330 --> 23:35.430 So on this network, I have two devices that are running UPnP. 23:35.430 --> 23:38.050 This is the ACES router as we saw before. 23:38.050 --> 23:41.170 This one is the Belkin WeMo device. 23:41.170 --> 23:47.730 And this is the list of all the service endpoints that it understands. 23:48.110 --> 23:52.850 And if you look at the different actions, these are all the actions within that service endpoint. 23:52.850 --> 23:55.350 So I'll just pull up the SCDP here for a second. 23:55.930 --> 23:59.950 And so you can see, you know, action, get device information. 24:00.030 --> 24:01.470 That should be in here somewhere. 24:01.470 --> 24:03.050 Yeah, get device information. 24:03.170 --> 24:09.290 And then once you select it, it pulls up the request, builds out the request in this field here. 24:09.290 --> 24:14.850 So you can view it, see what different parameters it takes. 24:14.850 --> 24:18.850 And then you can send that straight to Repeater or to Intruder. 24:18.850 --> 24:21.310 And you'll see that Repeater picked it up. 24:21.350 --> 24:22.170 And now it's here. 24:22.170 --> 24:27.150 And I can send this request and get device information from that device. 24:28.950 --> 24:32.510 So that's, you know, very basically, that's how it works. 24:32.510 --> 24:36.990 So let's show you why this is cool and, you know, what we can do with this. 24:36.990 --> 24:46.290 So one of the things that's very easy to do with the Belkin WeMo device is controlling its on and off state. 24:46.290 --> 24:49.150 So it's called binary state. 24:49.930 --> 24:54.330 So we are going to find the request set binary state. 24:54.470 --> 24:57.690 And we can see there's a few different parameters here. 24:57.690 --> 25:03.510 And the parameter values are just filled with fuzz here to tell you where you can actually put input. 25:04.050 --> 25:05.550 And we'll send that to Repeater. 25:06.030 --> 25:09.090 We'll take all this fuzz here stuff out. 25:12.280 --> 25:18.880 And the only one that really is needed for most basic operation is the binary state. 25:18.880 --> 25:22.700 So I'm going to set the binary state to one, which should be on. 25:23.280 --> 25:32.260 And as you see over here, the light flips on and I get a response that now the binary state is on and some other information. 25:32.260 --> 25:36.720 And now I can set the binary state back to zero and the light goes off. 25:36.720 --> 25:41.320 So very simple, easy control of the device state through UPnP. 25:43.640 --> 25:49.980 Let's talk a little bit about event subscription. 25:50.380 --> 25:55.500 So in here, you will see a subscribe request. 25:55.900 --> 26:00.580 And it again uses a custom HTTP verb, subscribe. 26:01.280 --> 26:04.820 This is the path pulled out of the device subscription. 26:05.040 --> 26:07.840 And then again, there's a bunch of places where you can fuzz. 26:08.640 --> 26:15.340 Here in this section is where you put the parameters that where you want the callback to come to. 26:15.340 --> 26:21.060 You can set a timeout for how long you want to get notified of those event changes. 26:21.060 --> 26:29.800 And then this is a comma separated list of all the different parameters that this device will give event notifications for. 26:29.980 --> 26:33.320 So I already have one of these queued up over here. 26:33.940 --> 26:34.980 Let's see. 26:35.460 --> 26:47.480 So if everything is still working the way it should, I will get a device subscription, or sorry, event notification here saying the... 26:52.400 --> 26:54.360 that is not what I expected. 26:54.360 --> 26:55.340 Hang on a sec. 26:56.420 --> 26:58.100 Property change. 26:59.560 --> 27:01.440 Property state is zero. 27:01.440 --> 27:01.760 Okay. 27:01.760 --> 27:02.100 Sorry. 27:02.100 --> 27:03.340 That is what I expected. 27:03.860 --> 27:17.980 Now if I go back to the basic event request and I change the state back to one, now I get another notification coming in on that callback with the binary state is one. 27:17.980 --> 27:20.840 So we see the notifications and how they come back. 27:21.580 --> 27:32.580 What's interesting about the notifications and what this call stranger vulnerability sort of talks about is you can specify multiple endpoints that this calls back to. 27:33.120 --> 27:48.980 One of the neat sort of features of this is that if the first request doesn't... if the first URL doesn't... it can't reach it, it doesn't get a response from it, then it will try the next request, the next IP. 27:49.120 --> 27:56.000 So you can actually make use of this to do some internal port scanning of things on the network. 27:56.000 --> 28:06.220 If you can access this on the WAN side, for example, you can use this feature, specify a host and a port, and then specify a host and a port that you know it can reach. 28:06.340 --> 28:16.680 And if you get the callback coming to your IP address, you know that it wasn't able to connect to the previous one. 28:17.240 --> 28:22.460 So that's kind of a fun little thing you can do with the subscribe feature. 28:22.780 --> 28:27.840 But really, that's, I guess, sort of the end of my demonstration of this tool. 28:28.160 --> 28:35.400 I think it can be really powerful, especially being able to send stuff to intruder and do some fuzzing with this. 28:36.600 --> 28:47.280 And I can also show you here that if we just take this device description, paste it in here, then we get just that device descriptions services. 28:47.280 --> 28:48.160 We don't get all the other. 28:48.160 --> 28:52.760 So you can use that as well to sort of narrow down or look at remote ones, like I said. 28:54.540 --> 28:56.660 And I think that is it. 28:56.660 --> 28:59.460 So the repository for this is in our GitLab. 28:59.560 --> 29:00.780 The link is here. 29:01.580 --> 29:09.000 As I said, I do plan on pushing this to the Verp app store at some point in the future, but it's just not there right now.