[00:04.440 --> 00:11.040] All right, welcome to day two of Monero Village at DevCon Safe Mode 2020. I'm Daniel Kin, [00:11.040 --> 00:19.580] and welcome to another day of Monero Village. We have a lineup of interesting talks for you, [00:19.580 --> 00:29.060] and also tutorials and so on. So this talk that I'm going to give is called Sound Money Safe Mode, [00:29.060 --> 00:36.180] and it is a kind of a broad, big-picture introduction to cryptocurrency and Monero. [00:36.400 --> 00:46.180] I will do my best to get this all transmitted in a timely manner. There's a lot of material, [00:46.180 --> 00:52.800] because I'm assuming that the viewer here is a bright person, knows their way around a computer, [00:52.800 --> 00:58.120] but has not necessarily spent a lot of time thinking about Bitcoin or Blockchain or Monero. [00:59.560 --> 01:04.980] A little bit about myself. I studied physics at Harvard. I did a bachelor's, master's, and PhD [01:04.980 --> 01:12.000] there. There I kind of had a habit ingrained in me to always look at data. So there's going to be a [01:12.000 --> 01:17.960] lot of data shown in this talk. Most of my career was spent in the non-profit sector. So my first [01:17.960 --> 01:22.060] job out of grad school was with a symphony orchestra, where I ended up doing about 700 [01:22.060 --> 01:26.640] concerts professionally. First as a violinist, and then later as a keyboardist. And then [01:26.640 --> 01:30.840] concurrently with that, I jumped through the hoops to become board certified in radiation [01:30.840 --> 01:37.520] oncology physics, where then as a medical school professor in medical physics, I helped about a [01:37.520 --> 01:43.160] couple thousand patients with their fights against cancer by helping with the technical aspects of [01:43.160 --> 01:49.720] delivering high intensity radiation to cancer. So it was there that I signed up for the executive [01:49.720 --> 01:54.880] MBA program at Yale, because I thought that I wanted to show an interest in the way that the [01:54.880 --> 02:00.460] world works in a different way than in physics. Of course, in physics, you're, you're studying how [02:00.460 --> 02:05.520] the world works at the smallest levels, which is what I did as a particle physicist. But then to [02:05.520 --> 02:11.760] think broadly about real world human problems from a variety of perspectives, the MBA is good for [02:11.760 --> 02:18.160] that. So I ended up signing up for that. And while doing that, I made a switch to the for profit [02:18.160 --> 02:25.240] sector, I joined a small hedge fund on the hedge fund world, meaning like about a billion dollars [02:25.240 --> 02:29.540] under management management, and I become director of research there. [02:30.220 --> 02:36.980] I was a co author of a paper that won the top research award of the CFA Institute, which is [02:36.980 --> 02:46.060] the basically the premier credentialing Institute for equity analysts. So that paper was about the [02:46.060 --> 02:53.120] effect of liquidity on asset prices. So it was there that kind of in my spare time, I was getting [02:53.120 --> 02:58.020] more and more interested into cryptocurrency, and blockchain. And then I made a decision that [02:58.020 --> 03:02.640] I thought that this was a genuine innovation, of which there are not that many that happened in [03:02.640 --> 03:08.480] one's lifetime. So I jumped to my own small business, which is what I do now as an independent [03:08.480 --> 03:15.240] consultant. So right now I help bridge two very separate worlds as the founder and CEO of [03:15.240 --> 03:20.560] Sweetwater Digital Asset Consulting. As you can see on the bottom, there's the world that Defcon [03:21.280 --> 03:26.440] kind of represents, which is a non-commercial, open source, cypherpunk, grassroots cryptocurrency [03:27.180 --> 03:36.000] culture. And on the right side is the very parallel universe of traditional asset protection, [03:36.000 --> 03:42.180] trusts and family office, portfolio management, estate and tax planning. These two separate worlds [03:42.180 --> 03:46.900] know very little about each other in practice. They often make assumptions about each other that [03:46.900 --> 03:56.780] are kind of, you know, maybe based in fear and not necessarily information. And so as one who [03:56.780 --> 04:01.820] has significant experience on both sides of this divide, I help people who are in one side or the [04:01.820 --> 04:11.540] other to gain the benefits of genuine engagement of the other. So in my non-profit efforts these [04:11.540 --> 04:18.260] days, I am also a community volunteer for the Monero Project. My talking here is on a voluntary [04:18.260 --> 04:25.320] basis. I do not receive any support from the Monero Project. I've never asked for support from [04:25.320 --> 04:31.360] the Monero Project because actually I want to maintain my independence as my primary loyalty [04:31.360 --> 04:40.300] duty is to my consulting clients, to whom I owe the duty of doing the research and examination of [04:40.300 --> 04:44.540] the entire cryptocurrency space and making recommendations on what I think are the [04:44.540 --> 04:50.360] most compelling projects out there. And within cryptocurrency, I also specialize in [04:50.360 --> 04:56.820] tokens that do what I think is the killer app of Nakamoto Consensus, which is store of value. [04:57.140 --> 05:03.300] Basically, cryptocurrencies that act like money, as a private form of money. And within that space, [05:03.300 --> 05:08.800] I think that there are only really two projects worth considering and they are Bitcoin and Monero. [05:08.800 --> 05:15.760] So that's what I do for my non-profit in my non-profit time is that I help out with the [05:15.760 --> 05:26.440] community and that's about me. All right, so this talk is called Sound Money Safe Mode [05:26.440 --> 05:33.360] and it's got four parts. First, I'm going to talk about the pandemic and the economic fallout so far [05:33.360 --> 05:44.400] from the pandemic. Second is that the management of fiat scarcity in the world leads to a strong [05:44.400 --> 05:50.600] suggestion that it might be a good time in history to be looking at independent sources of scarcity. [05:50.600 --> 05:55.900] So that will be the second part of the talk. Third, I'll talk about fungibility, what that means [05:55.900 --> 06:02.330] and why it's important as the world moves increasingly towards a mass surveillance society. [06:02.330 --> 06:08.490] And the fourth part will be how one can get involved with the Monero project. So before [06:08.490 --> 06:13.390] starting, I wanted to say thanks to a few people in the Monero community who I had consulted with [06:13.390 --> 06:19.830] while preparing this talk. So they are Howard H.Y.C. Chu, Dr. Sarang Nether of the Monero [06:19.830 --> 06:30.920] Research Lab and Dr. Francisco Cabanas of the Monero Core Team. All right, so very much has [06:30.920 --> 06:39.140] been said about the pandemic, so I'm not going to go into that too much. But I wanted to show [06:40.400 --> 06:46.840] basically, from a social engineering point of view, how one can see this entire pandemic that [06:46.840 --> 06:53.140] we're in the midst of. Really what this is, is an example of a microbe that did a very good job of [06:53.140 --> 07:00.980] social engineering humanity, basically taking advantage of a weakness in evolved humanity's [07:00.980 --> 07:07.680] ability to diagnose their disease state. So here I'm showing this in the form of a flow chart. [07:07.700 --> 07:14.160] And if you start here in this upper left corner, this is basically what people would go through [07:14.160 --> 07:20.440] as their decision process before the pandemic hit. So they would be sitting at home, [07:20.440 --> 07:24.140] and you ask yourself, well, do I feel like going out? Well, if you don't feel like going out, [07:24.140 --> 07:28.740] you stay at home. But if you do feel like going out, then you diagnose yourself as being healthy, [07:28.740 --> 07:35.020] because of course you're healthy, because you feel like going out. If you weren't healthy, [07:35.020 --> 07:39.400] you wouldn't feel like going out. Therefore, since you feel like going out, you must be healthy. [07:39.600 --> 07:44.780] So there's a self-diagnosis that gets made there. And now that we're in the midst of the pandemic, [07:44.780 --> 07:49.480] we can look back at this pattern of thought and think, wow, that was kind of naive. [07:50.900 --> 07:54.400] There's like this bygone era when you could assume that you were healthy, [07:54.400 --> 07:59.940] just because you felt like you were healthy. All right, so going on, again, in the pre-pandemic [07:59.940 --> 08:04.220] thought process, because you diagnose yourself as being healthy, now you go out. [08:04.280 --> 08:10.100] And so now you're dealing with other people, and their disease state is not known to you. [08:10.120 --> 08:16.460] But you use basically a heuristic. That is, you ask yourself, do you see anybody who's coughing? [08:16.680 --> 08:19.420] Well, if you don't see anyone who's coughing, then you just carry on. [08:20.620 --> 08:25.500] If you do see someone who's coughing, then you diagnose them as being a sick person, [08:25.500 --> 08:31.740] and you want to avoid them. And then you carry on, because you don't make a big deal out of it. [08:31.740 --> 08:36.180] You just make a mental note that, oh, gee, that person might be sick. Maybe I'll keep my distance. [08:37.040 --> 08:41.880] And then do you feel like going home? No, then you stay out in public. And yes, [08:41.880 --> 08:48.880] if you do feel like going home, you go home. And nowhere in this loop does the possibility of [08:48.880 --> 08:54.280] actually getting sick really come up that much. And so now we can look back at this and [08:55.120 --> 09:01.520] see how basically this pattern of thought, which has, I would say, probably evolutionarily [09:02.080 --> 09:08.760] developed in humanity, after all, it's gotten us to survive for this many thousands of years [09:08.760 --> 09:15.200] as it is. And now all of a sudden, we're confronted with this microbe that challenges that. [09:15.200 --> 09:20.640] And of course, it's not fun for anybody to be told, hey, your instincts are totally wrong. [09:20.640 --> 09:27.280] You need to not trust your instincts, and you need to stay at home even if you feel healthy, [09:27.280 --> 09:33.180] or put on a mask even if you feel healthy, and so on. So people generally don't take too well [09:33.180 --> 09:40.520] to being told that their very natural instincts are leading them astray. But nevertheless, [09:40.520 --> 09:45.280] if you look at the objective reality, that is the fact. [09:46.820 --> 09:56.560] All right, so in addition to having our notions challenged of who is sick and who is not sick, [09:56.560 --> 10:00.880] what the current pandemic has also done is challenge our notions of what can you get sick [10:00.880 --> 10:08.160] from. And in the right side of the chart is a published study that was published in The Lancet, [10:08.160 --> 10:13.080] which is the UK's premier medical journal. And what this is showing is an experiment that some [10:13.080 --> 10:23.280] researchers did in which they took SARS-CoV-2 and they put it on money, like cash. They put it on [10:23.280 --> 10:28.900] banknotes. So what this chart is showing is how much of that virus remained on the money over [10:28.900 --> 10:35.820] time. So here at time zero, they put a drop of the virus on. This is how much virus they measured. [10:35.820 --> 10:41.840] And then as time goes on, you can see that the amount of the virus remaining on the money goes [10:41.840 --> 10:48.520] down, but it goes down less quickly than one would hope. So for example, here at the 24-hour mark, [10:48.520 --> 10:55.560] there is still a significant amount of virus detected. And you have to go to three days out [10:55.560 --> 11:04.040] before these researchers found that undetectable amount of virus on the money. So what would happen [11:04.040 --> 11:10.100] in a real-world scenario when something like this gets unleashed? And here I'm showing basically the [11:10.100 --> 11:16.520] macroeconomic effects of what's happened in the pandemic. So there's a lot going on in this chart. [11:16.520 --> 11:22.400] So I'll start with the blue line here. The blue line is showing U6 unemployment. So this is the [11:22.400 --> 11:30.440] fraction of people who are either looking for work, or underemployed, or working part-time when [11:30.440 --> 11:36.000] they want to be working full-time, or are so discouraged with their state of trying to find [11:36.120 --> 11:41.960] a job that they've given up. So all these people are measured, are counted as unemployed in the U6 [11:41.960 --> 11:49.980] measure of the U.S. government's unemployment number. This is contrasting with U3, which is [11:49.980 --> 11:55.300] only counting those people who are actively looking for work and can't find it. So U6 is a broader [11:55.300 --> 12:00.340] measure, and so it's widely considered to be more accurate. And here in this plot, I'm showing a U.S. [12:00.340 --> 12:06.720] government data going back, all the way back to 1980. So we're looking at 40 years of history here, [12:06.720 --> 12:13.880] and you can see here that the unemployment line in the year 2020 spiked up to the highest level [12:13.880 --> 12:22.920] that ever in recorded history, at least of the U6 unemployment rate. It spiked up to about 22-23 percent, [12:22.920 --> 12:30.040] so one-fourth of Americans out of work. And fortunately, that's gone down a bit since then, [12:30.040 --> 12:36.940] but it's still definitely not a pretty number. So what happens when something like this happens, [12:36.940 --> 12:45.280] like the demand for services, like in travel, in dining, entertainment, all fell through the floor. [12:45.380 --> 12:52.000] And so the federal government's reaction to that was to be concerned about deflation. So deflation [12:52.000 --> 12:59.120] happens when people stop spending their money and the economy drops to a halt. So to fight that, [12:59.120 --> 13:04.300] they expanded the money supply. So they basically printed money, which is what you do to try to get [13:04.300 --> 13:09.560] people to spend again, because by printing money, that reduces the interest rate. The interest rate [13:09.560 --> 13:14.320] goes down, then it becomes less attractive to save your money and get a tiny, tiny bit of interest. [13:14.320 --> 13:20.580] It becomes more attractive to spend your money. So here in green, I'm showing the MZM money supply. [13:20.580 --> 13:27.340] MZM stands for money zero maturity. And what that consists of is the M1 money supply, which is [13:27.340 --> 13:34.140] coins, currency, and checking accounts. And it combines that with savings accounts and also [13:34.140 --> 13:38.740] money market accounts, which many people use as sort of an alternate form of a savings account [13:38.740 --> 13:45.540] these days. It differs from M2 money supply in that it does not include certificates of deposit, [13:45.540 --> 13:49.820] which as you know, you go to a bank and you lock in your money for 12 months and they pay you [13:49.820 --> 13:55.500] slightly higher interest for the time that your money is locked up, be it 12 months or six months [13:55.500 --> 14:01.380] or whatever the time term is that you agreed to. But because that money gets locked up for that time, [14:01.380 --> 14:08.980] that is not counted in money zero maturity, the MZM metric. So basically, the green line [14:08.980 --> 14:18.460] is showing all of the liquid money in the US. Now, it's a huge number. It's roughly [14:18.460 --> 14:23.960] $20 trillion. So because that's hard to get your head around, I've normalized that number [14:23.960 --> 14:29.220] to the gross domestic product. That is the value of all goods and services produced in the US [14:29.220 --> 14:36.640] in one year. So you can see that the money supply as a fraction of the productive output of the US [14:36.640 --> 14:42.920] has been going up for the last four years. And you can see here at 2020, the line spikes up from [14:42.920 --> 14:50.760] about 70% to over 100%. So, you know, the word unprecedented gets thrown around a lot for this [14:50.760 --> 14:58.700] crisis. But truly, if you look at long term plots like this, and you see that the size and the slope [14:58.700 --> 15:04.880] of this money printing that's been happening in the last several months is truly breathtaking. [15:06.020 --> 15:12.240] All right, so that's the money supply. So of course, the government can print as much or as [15:12.240 --> 15:20.740] little money as it wants with nothing stopping them from doing whatever they want. This has been [15:20.740 --> 15:30.780] true since Nixon in the 70s abolished the linkage of the US dollar to gold. So before the 1970s, [15:30.780 --> 15:38.780] the US dollar could be traded in for some quantity of gold. And that meant that the US government was [15:38.780 --> 15:42.360] constrained in how much money it could print because if it printed more money, it needed to [15:42.360 --> 15:48.520] have more gold in order to accommodate those people who wanted to trade in their US dollars [15:48.520 --> 15:57.540] for gold. But Nixon in the 70s did away with that kind of inconvenience from the part of the [15:57.540 --> 16:03.840] federal government. And so since then, the US government has been free to create however much [16:03.840 --> 16:08.600] money it wants, just like any other country, all the countries of the world are free to use [16:08.600 --> 16:16.420] their own judgment and discretion in controlling their own money supply. All right, so that has [16:16.420 --> 16:23.340] nothing to do with, for example, the ins and outs, the income and the expenses of the government, [16:23.340 --> 16:30.040] which would be taxes and government spending. So looking at the bottom line here, the bottom line, [16:30.040 --> 16:35.300] which is, you know, wiggling all over the place, what this is showing is on a monthly basis, [16:35.300 --> 16:40.620] how much money is the US government taking in, minus how much money is the US government [16:40.620 --> 16:45.920] spending. So it's basically taxes minus spending on a monthly basis going back to 1980. [16:46.020 --> 16:51.360] You can see that the line goes up and down quite a bit. It basically spikes four times a year [16:51.360 --> 16:57.940] because that's when estimated taxes are due. And so there's that seasonal structure to it. [16:57.940 --> 17:05.420] Also, if you integrate this over time, then you get the black line that's on top, [17:05.420 --> 17:12.580] which is the total federal debt and normalized to GDP again. So basically you can see, for example, [17:12.580 --> 17:20.180] in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the government was spending quite a bit [17:20.180 --> 17:25.940] more money than it was collecting. That's this area here. And as a result, when you time integrate [17:25.940 --> 17:32.660] that, you get the black line up here in which the rate of increase of the federal debt to GDP [17:33.300 --> 17:40.800] went much faster in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis. Unfortunately, in the years [17:40.800 --> 17:46.040] that followed the last financial crisis in 2008-2009, which could have been an opportunity [17:46.040 --> 17:53.100] to reduce our federal debt, much as what happened in the late 1990s over here, you can see the [17:53.660 --> 18:01.600] went down a little bit with the government surplus. No such thing happened in the 2010s. [18:01.620 --> 18:07.600] And so the federal debt kept creeping up. And now we're at this point here, in which at the [18:07.600 --> 18:14.820] beginning of the year, the debt to GDP ratio was about 110%. And that is before the pandemic. And [18:14.820 --> 18:21.020] so this federal debt to GDP number is actually lagged about four months. You know, all these [18:21.020 --> 18:24.580] numbers come from the government. So there's like a significant bureaucracy behind it. So [18:24.580 --> 18:32.260] it's far from the situation in a digital form of money like Monero, where you can see everything [18:32.260 --> 18:40.080] instantly. So there's a four-month lag. And so the debt to GDP number is only showing the first [18:40.080 --> 18:50.020] quarter of this year. But it's rather troubling to see all this. Oh, yeah, back down here. [18:50.020 --> 18:56.620] So this line here with the monthly taxes minus government spending, as you can see, it really [18:56.620 --> 19:03.420] tanked in especially quarter two of 2020. Now, some of this might bounce back, it might not [19:03.420 --> 19:07.980] be as alarming as it looks. Because if you're in the US, you probably know that [19:09.400 --> 19:14.700] April 15, which is the normal deadline for taxes to be due got pushed back to July 15 due to the [19:14.700 --> 19:21.530] pandemic. And so basically, the government was collecting zero tax between April through July. [19:22.320 --> 19:29.960] And so that's why you'll see this precipitous drop here is that there was no tax revenue coming in, [19:29.960 --> 19:34.480] yet the government was continuing to spend money as it was before. The spending didn't stop, [19:34.480 --> 19:42.300] just the income stopped. And so this might reverse itself now that July 15 has come and gone, [19:42.300 --> 19:50.020] with a correspondingly high spike in taxes that is assuming that this July 15 was a kind of a [19:50.020 --> 19:53.760] bonanza from from the point of view of the IRS with a whole lot of tax money coming in, we'll [19:53.760 --> 20:04.510] see if that was actually the case. Zooming into other countries as well. So in the G20, there are [20:04.510 --> 20:09.830] eight countries that have been reporting statistics on the amount of money that's in circulation in [20:09.830 --> 20:15.910] their particular currency. And that's going back to 2018 here. So of these eight countries, [20:15.910 --> 20:21.350] you can see there's basically this hockey stick shape to this curve of how much money of each of [20:21.350 --> 20:26.430] these countries is circulating. Here, I've normalized the amount of money in every country [20:26.430 --> 20:33.590] to be equal to one on January of 2020. So you can see prior to the pandemic, the money creation was [20:33.590 --> 20:40.890] at this rate, and post pandemic, it's happening at this much more fast rate. In the United States, [20:40.890 --> 20:49.830] which is the biggest line here, as you can see, post 2020, the M1 expansion has been to the tune [20:49.830 --> 20:56.930] of about $1.33 trillion, which amounts to increase in the money supply of about $300 million per hour. [20:57.590 --> 21:02.310] Now, if you compare this to, for example, the market cap of Monero, the value of all the [21:02.310 --> 21:07.790] Monero in existence, it's something on the order of like about $1.5 billion. So this is saying that [21:07.790 --> 21:15.470] the money supply of the U.S. expanded by the size of Monero's market cap roughly five times every [21:15.470 --> 21:23.670] day for the last six months. And if you look at MZM money, so this metric is M1 money supply, [21:23.670 --> 21:28.590] which is only coins, currency, and checking accounts. If you add to that the other forms [21:28.590 --> 21:35.410] of liquidity that are included to MZM, then this figure jumps up, it's to more like half a billion [21:35.410 --> 21:42.790] dollars per hour. All right, let's broaden our focus to not just the eight countries in the G20 [21:42.790 --> 21:48.550] that have reported results recently, but let's look at all the G20 fiat currencies. And let's [21:48.550 --> 21:55.250] also expand the time frame in which we're looking to back to 2009. 2009 is the date that I chose [21:55.250 --> 22:00.490] here for the left hand scale here. That is because that is the year in which the Bitcoin white paper [22:00.490 --> 22:06.850] came out and introduced a way to introduce digital scarcity without needing a central authority to [22:06.850 --> 22:13.330] maintain that scarcity. But since 2009, and I again, I've normalized this so that every country's [22:13.330 --> 22:20.030] money is equal to one at the beginning of 2009, you can see that there's been steady growth [22:20.030 --> 22:26.790] in all of the currencies. There is not one of the G20 currencies that has been flat or has actually [22:26.790 --> 22:32.490] decreased their money supply over time, it's all increased. And you can see that the average, [22:32.490 --> 22:38.530] if you pick the middle line of this distribution, it looks like it took about seven or eight years, [22:38.530 --> 22:46.370] eight years for the average G20 cryptocurrency, average G20 currency to double. So as a former [22:46.370 --> 22:54.610] med school professor who worked in oncology, the exponential math of uncontrolled growth, [22:54.610 --> 22:59.070] which is something we see in cancerous tumors, is something that I think about when I see a plot [22:59.070 --> 23:03.470] like this. So here we're looking at a doubling time of eight years. It took eight years for the [23:03.470 --> 23:09.570] money supplied to double. So it's kind of like a certain cancer tumor that takes eight months [23:09.570 --> 23:14.990] time to double in size. There's similar metrics that get used in the oncology literature. [23:14.990 --> 23:20.810] So, but if you look at the money supply here, it's, and this is a pre-pandemic, pre-pandemic, [23:20.810 --> 23:26.750] we're looking at a doubling time of about eight years per doubling. So if you think about how [23:26.750 --> 23:34.610] long does, you know, average human survive, let's say 80 years, that is 10 doubling times. So eight [23:34.610 --> 23:40.870] times 10, that's 10 doubling times, which means at this rate, the amount of money expansion in a [23:40.870 --> 23:45.810] average human's lifetime is going to go through 10 doublings, which is two to the 10th power, [23:45.810 --> 23:52.470] which is 1,024. It's about a thousand times increase in the money supply. And that is before [23:53.350 --> 23:57.970] the pandemic. And so now after the pandemic, we're looking at a doubling time that's closer [23:57.970 --> 24:06.270] to like two years. There's an interesting scholarly book called Monetary Regimes and Inflation, [24:06.270 --> 24:14.550] which did a study of 29 historical cases of hyperinflation. So this is, for example, [24:14.550 --> 24:20.010] what happened in the Weimar Republic of Germany in the 1910s, and other countries throughout [24:20.010 --> 24:25.350] history in which, you know, the people are taking wheelbarrows of money out to buy a, you know, [24:25.350 --> 24:30.830] one loaf of bread, that kind of thing. That's because the money supply grows at such a large [24:30.830 --> 24:36.710] rate that the prices go up too. And so people basically find that their savings are destroyed. [24:36.850 --> 24:42.870] So if you have, you know, $100 in savings, and then in a month from now, you find that the $100 [24:43.470 --> 24:49.650] used to buy you, you know, say a week's worth of groceries, but now the $100 buys you a candy bar. [24:49.650 --> 24:56.190] That's what hyperinflation looks like. And I would say, you know, at least for Americans, [24:56.190 --> 25:01.630] none of us have ever had to, you know, live through that. But all accounts of what it is [25:01.630 --> 25:06.570] like to survive through something like that, it's no fun at all. It wipes out people's savings. [25:06.570 --> 25:12.950] It promotes, you know, social unrest, social violence. It's just not pretty. [25:13.690 --> 25:18.430] But this book that studied the underlying economic causes of hyperinflation came to [25:18.430 --> 25:24.070] the conclusion that in 25 out of 29 of these historical cases of hyperinflation, [25:24.070 --> 25:30.470] the trigger was that there was money creation that financed government deficit. So these charts [25:30.470 --> 25:36.750] from the G20 money supply, this should be convincing evidence that the money creation, [25:36.750 --> 25:41.390] which is half of this equation, is indeed happening. The second half is the government [25:41.390 --> 25:47.890] deficits. So unless governments are able to make extremely difficult decisions and are able to [25:47.890 --> 25:54.410] their budgets, now we're going to have two out of two of these criteria met for conditions to be [25:54.930 --> 26:00.370] favorable for the development of hyperinflation. And this is not really like a, this is sort of [26:00.470 --> 26:06.670] a phase transition kind of thing in which it's hard to predict when, because the conclusion [26:06.670 --> 26:14.350] of people that the money is no longer trustable and must be spent immediately, otherwise it lose [26:14.350 --> 26:19.910] value, that that decision, which needs to take place among an entire population in order for [26:19.910 --> 26:26.550] hyperinflation to take place, that's, it's a social thing, right? So it's like, it's the herd [26:26.550 --> 26:31.230] that decides, you know, that they don't have confidence in the money anymore. It's hard to [26:31.230 --> 26:38.970] predict. So it's not an, it's not a 100% foregone conclusion that money creation plus government [26:38.970 --> 26:46.030] deficits means hyperinflation or increased inflation, even, but it certainly doesn't help [26:46.030 --> 26:54.910] the prospects. And so in this backdrop, I think the takeaway for anyone with assets to save [26:54.910 --> 27:02.910] is that, you know, it might be wise to consider the possibility that the future might hold higher [27:02.910 --> 27:07.910] inflation than what you are used to and what indeed, what you might be comfortable with. [27:10.250 --> 27:15.550] All right. So moving on to the second part of the talk. So what does this mean in terms of [27:15.550 --> 27:26.250] independent scarcity? So if the unit of account that is being used in your society is, is going [27:26.630 --> 27:31.910] under hyperinflation, what people often do is they look for a different sort of unit of account that [27:31.910 --> 27:37.050] is not subject to hyperinflation. It's a rather natural thing to want to do is to preserve the [27:37.050 --> 27:43.010] value of your savings. And so historically, at least in a hyperinflation sort of scenario, [27:43.010 --> 27:48.310] there have been independent sources of scarcity that have been looked at to store wealth. So that [27:48.310 --> 27:52.910] would be physical commodities, for example, gold and silver. These are the classic ones. [27:53.270 --> 27:59.550] And since 2009, there is a new option for humanity that is in the form of digital commodities, [27:59.550 --> 28:07.150] which became possible to consider after the development of the Satoshi Nakamoto Bitcoin [28:07.150 --> 28:15.930] white paper. And as one who studies this stuff, thinks about it a lot, I've come to the conclusion [28:15.930 --> 28:21.030] that there are really only two projects out of the many that are worth considering. It's Bitcoin [28:21.030 --> 28:30.380] Monero. Let's think about digital scarcity networks for a bit. So let's contrast digital [28:30.380 --> 28:37.520] fiat versus decentralized digital scarcity like Bitcoin and Monero. After all, our US dollars, [28:37.520 --> 28:45.260] our euros or yen, or all of our fiat central bank monies are in fact digital these days. [28:45.980 --> 28:53.380] There is such a thing as online banking, your banks are using computers. So the fiat money [28:53.380 --> 28:58.980] is a source of digital scarcity. It's just that that scarcity is controlled by a centralized [28:58.980 --> 29:09.040] entity. So the access to the database of who owns what is protected. There's a moat of firewalls [29:09.040 --> 29:13.280] around that. And there's really just one authoritative version of the ledger. There [29:13.280 --> 29:17.880] might be backups and stuff, but really there's basically you have a moat. And then inside the [29:17.880 --> 29:26.360] moat, you have the copy of who owns what, the ledger that says who owns what. And once you [29:26.360 --> 29:32.380] have access to that, you have quite a bit of ability to change things. At the lower level, [29:32.380 --> 29:36.880] like at a bank teller level, of course, you can't just create money out of thin air. But you have [29:36.880 --> 29:41.720] the power to manipulate money between accounts. For example, you can transfer money from one [29:41.720 --> 29:48.020] customer's account to another. As you go up in the system, the amount of power that you have over [29:48.020 --> 29:52.740] that database becomes higher. So that now that you get to the level of the Federal Reserve Bank, [29:53.300 --> 30:03.740] when this committee of men sitting around a table, I guess there's some women on the FOMC [30:03.740 --> 30:09.180] now, I'm not totally sure. But traditionally, it's been just a group of men making this decision that [30:09.860 --> 30:14.180] okay, it's time to print more money. And then when that decision gets made, [30:14.180 --> 30:22.720] some employee in the federal government goes to their computer and they click a button, [30:22.720 --> 30:28.020] and they get a $1 billion money supply by another billion dollars. Yeah, I guess that's probably a [30:28.020 --> 30:32.740] very hardworking federal employee right now, whose job it is to click create money. They're [30:32.740 --> 30:39.160] kind of sitting there working overtime, clicking this button over and over. But at the highest [30:39.160 --> 30:48.400] levels of government, it becomes literally just arbitrary right access to this ledger. And of [30:48.400 --> 30:52.360] course, the software that controls this is closed source. It's closed source, because why would they [30:52.360 --> 30:58.680] open source it? Because then that would facilitate bad actors learning how the system works. [30:59.360 --> 31:04.660] And there are downsides to this. Mismanagement is probably the chief one. So all these plots that I [31:04.660 --> 31:09.480] was showing of the money supply could be interpreted as signs of mismanagement. [31:10.260 --> 31:15.440] That the Federal Reserve is supposed to be imposing discipline, it's supposed to be [31:15.440 --> 31:21.400] independent of the political process. The Federal Reserve is supposed to be the entity that says, [31:21.400 --> 31:28.200] no, I'm sorry, we're not going to print tons and tons of money. Government, you're just going to [31:28.200 --> 31:34.300] have to learn to come up with a budget that you can balance. And please don't look to us to be [31:34.300 --> 31:38.850] just manufacturing money out of thin air, because that's not sustainable. That's what the [31:38.850 --> 31:45.790] Federal Reserve is supposed to do. Arguably, and these charts before are evidence showing that [31:45.790 --> 31:52.470] it's not really doing that. There's also insider abuse that is a problem with these sort of [31:52.470 --> 31:58.010] centralized security models. And that is, there are plenty of examples of large banks that do [31:58.010 --> 32:03.090] egregious things to abuse the trust of their customers and get away with it with just a slap [32:03.090 --> 32:11.050] on the wrist. For example, there is a case where Bank of America took its customers' personal data [32:11.570 --> 32:16.950] and created fake checking and savings accounts under the names of the, you know, using the names [32:16.950 --> 32:21.130] and social security numbers of their customers, they made fake accounts, and then they proceeded [32:21.130 --> 32:26.970] to charge fees on those accounts, which the customers didn't even know existed. And, you know, [32:26.970 --> 32:32.350] this caused some scandal, and then they got a fine, which was, you know, maybe, you know, a day's worth [32:32.350 --> 32:39.570] of profits. And, and that was that. So, you know, the potential for insider abuse is, unfortunately, [32:39.570 --> 32:45.790] there for a centralized network where, basically, you have middlemen between the people and the [32:45.790 --> 32:51.150] database, you have the these middlemen who are in a position of power, and so they unfortunately [32:51.150 --> 32:57.770] abuse that. Another feature, or, you know, I would say benefit from the point of view of the middleman [32:57.770 --> 33:02.990] of being a middleman is that there's little incentive to improve. So if there's a database [33:02.990 --> 33:10.360] that holds your bank account balance, right, and, and, for example, you want to do a wire transfer, [33:11.530 --> 33:16.550] you need to wait for the middleman to be good and ready to process your wire transfer before [33:16.550 --> 33:22.330] you can get it done. So the very fact that we have bank hours, Monday to Friday, nine to five, [33:22.330 --> 33:28.410] in an era in which everyone has been used to shopping at 2.30 in the morning from their bed, [33:28.410 --> 33:32.850] on their phone, you know, shopping on Amazon to get whatever they want, yet we're still in a, [33:32.850 --> 33:38.170] in a situation where fiat money oftentimes requires the services of another human [33:38.170 --> 33:45.330] to, to help you do what you need to do. So the decentralized security model of Bitcoin and also [33:45.330 --> 33:50.950] Monero is totally different. So in, in these decentralized networks, anyone can join the [33:50.950 --> 33:56.530] peer-to-peer network. Anyone can download the Monero code, run it on their computer, and then [33:56.530 --> 34:03.310] basically become part of this network, which does the functions of what a bank does. It processes [34:03.310 --> 34:10.410] transactions, it keeps track of who owns what, it, it, it keeps track of all this. Each node maintains [34:10.410 --> 34:16.390] its own version of the ledger. So in contrast to the centralized security model, where you have a, [34:16.390 --> 34:20.770] you know, a master database sitting in the middle with all sorts of firewalls and protections [34:20.770 --> 34:28.010] around it to try and defend it from misuse, here each node has its own copy of the ledger. Every [34:28.010 --> 34:33.710] node in the Bitcoin network, every node in the Monero network has a database file that contains [34:33.910 --> 34:40.970] a record of who sent what to who. In the decentralized security model, it's open source. [34:40.970 --> 34:45.730] It would have to be. If, you know, if anyone is able to join the peer-to-peer network, you'd better [34:45.730 --> 34:50.510] make your code open source, because otherwise how do you know what you're running? How do you, how do [34:50.510 --> 34:56.030] you get people to, you know, put their trust basically into this network unless you publish the code [34:56.030 --> 35:01.930] as open source? And so like the Cathedral and the Bazaar, the, the classic open source software [35:01.930 --> 35:06.910] development book that contrasts the building of a cathedral, which is a centralized sort of [35:06.910 --> 35:13.750] process a la Microsoft, versus the Bazaar, which is just a, you know, farmer's market where everyone [35:13.750 --> 35:19.910] is free to come show up and just build something, which would be like the Linux model. This is [35:19.910 --> 35:27.110] basically the version, the Linux of money. So really these two situations, fiat versus decentralized [35:27.110 --> 35:33.170] money, it's really like Microsoft versus Linux. So the fiat monies would be like Microsoft of money [35:33.170 --> 35:39.990] and the decentralized solutions like Bitcoin and Monero are like the Linux of money. [35:41.070 --> 35:46.150] Of course, there are downsides to this, just like there are downsides of Linux over Windows, and [35:46.150 --> 35:52.050] that's new, but fewer people have heard of it. It's relatively inefficient, at least not the [35:52.050 --> 35:58.570] operating system now, but the, the use of FOSS in money is going to be inefficient because you have [35:58.570 --> 36:03.890] this decentralized network keeping track of who owns what. So if there's no boss computer, if [36:03.890 --> 36:09.210] there's no, you know, like super privileges computer within this peer-to-peer network, [36:09.210 --> 36:15.250] then how are you going to decide what the true version is of the database that keeps [36:15.250 --> 36:26.990] track of who owns what? So to explain that, currently cryptocurrencies are able to be [36:26.990 --> 36:33.310] traded for US dollars and all sorts of fiat currencies, but this used to not be the case. [36:33.390 --> 36:38.990] So back in 2009, when the Bitcoin white paper first came out, Bitcoin had zero dollar value. [36:38.990 --> 36:46.370] It was just a geek project. It was this, you know, kind of interesting curiosity of a system that [36:46.370 --> 36:53.130] purported to make a new form of scarcity that kind of acted like money. But back in 2009, [36:53.130 --> 36:58.530] nobody knew that that was actually the case. Nobody knew if this thing would actually work [36:58.530 --> 37:03.910] like it said it would work. And so I think it's a good idea if you're new to cryptocurrency to, [37:03.910 --> 37:10.990] before you get caught up in the hoopla of, you know, the prices of everything and, you know, [37:10.990 --> 37:17.430] God forbid, you start searching cryptocurrency on YouTube and are confronted with, you know, [37:17.550 --> 37:23.650] a hundred different channels of people making sensational, you know, hay out of like the latest [37:23.650 --> 37:28.590] price movement of this and that currency, and you get caught up in the horse race aspect of all that. [37:28.690 --> 37:33.390] Before you get into all that, I would suggest pretending that all of cryptocurrency has zero [37:33.390 --> 37:40.130] value, because it'll end up being good for you in the long run, because you'll have a more solid [37:40.130 --> 37:44.290] understanding of what's actually going on with this stuff that you're buying and selling. [37:46.790 --> 37:51.390] One, Halloween of the year 2008, that is when the Nakamoto white paper was just [37:51.390 --> 37:59.190] dropped into existence on a bulletin board, like a discussion board. 2009, January 9, [37:59.190 --> 38:05.150] is when the Genesis block, which is the very first block, which is the very first record of [38:05.150 --> 38:10.470] who sent what to who in the Bitcoin network, that is when that happened, was in 2009. And since then [38:10.470 --> 38:16.990] the network's been going, it's been running 24 hours, 7, 365 ever since. So in the calendar year [38:16.990 --> 38:25.150] 2009, Bitcoin was operational, but Bitcoin itself, like each Bitcoin unit itself had zero monetary [38:25.150 --> 38:31.810] value, because again, it was just a geek project. So I'd like to kind of turn the clock back and [38:32.370 --> 38:38.430] summarize how Bitcoin works from that standpoint. Now there are three aspects that you need to [38:38.430 --> 38:46.770] get working to create a private form of money. First, you have to have some sense of what is the [38:46.770 --> 38:53.490] analogy of a bank account. Second, is you need to have some analogy to what it is to write a check. [38:53.490 --> 38:57.630] And third, you need to have some sort of process for that written check, [38:57.630 --> 39:00.970] once it's shown to be legitimate, to be processed through the system. [39:02.910 --> 39:08.290] So Bitcoin is based on the Secp256k1 elliptic curve, and that's written out here. It's public [39:08.290 --> 39:12.610] knowledge what this elliptic curve is, there's nothing secret about it, it's a public standard. [39:13.170 --> 39:20.630] It's y squared is congruent to x cubed plus 7 mod this very large prime number. And x and y, [39:20.630 --> 39:25.150] usually you think of as being real numbers, like if you think of like high school algebra, [39:25.150 --> 39:30.550] and you want to plot this curve, you will make a nice kind of curvy shape out of this if you [39:31.030 --> 39:37.050] let n y be real numbers. But in this case, we're restricting x and y to be integers, [39:37.050 --> 39:42.130] right? And furthermore, these integers are modulus this prime number, which is basically [39:42.130 --> 39:48.110] clock arithmetic. This is saying that 1 o'clock, 13 o'clock, 25 o'clock are all the same, [39:48.110 --> 39:53.950] because the number on the clock dial is pointing to the one. So basically, every 12, [39:53.950 --> 39:59.990] your counting goes back to zero. So that's the case here, except instead of 12 numbers, [39:59.990 --> 40:08.090] you have like this 70 some digit prime number that so you have a clock with just an unfathomable [40:08.090 --> 40:14.430] number of numbers on its dial. Alright, so the way to think of this, this x and y is basically [40:14.430 --> 40:24.010] you have this, you know, universe sized sheet of grid paper, and on grid paper, you can have x y [40:24.010 --> 40:31.310] coordinates that are each integers. And some of the points on this huge, gigantic sheet of grid [40:31.310 --> 40:38.650] paper are solutions to this particular elliptic curve. And if one was to try to guess just random [40:38.650 --> 40:45.970] combinations of x and y to, to come up with a solution to this, your chances of coming up with [40:46.330 --> 40:53.070] a solution to this elliptic curve would be one in that prime numbers probability. So one in 10 to [40:53.070 --> 40:58.910] the 70th, I forget the exact number, it's like 10 to the 70th, something on that order. So basically [40:58.910 --> 41:05.310] you to come up with a solution on your own is it's basically impossible. But so fortunately, [41:05.310 --> 41:09.750] part of the elliptic curve definition is to provide you with a solution called the base [41:09.750 --> 41:16.370] point. The base point is a solution x sub b, y sub b, which is known to solve this equation. [41:16.510 --> 41:21.430] And furthermore, because of the mathematics of elliptic curves, it's possible if somebody gives [41:21.430 --> 41:28.110] you an integer n, it's possible to come up with another point, another solution. So basically, [41:28.110 --> 41:33.690] if somebody gives you this base point solution, it's possible to compute another solution to this, [41:33.690 --> 41:38.070] which would be another point on this grid paper. And this other point on the grid paper would be [41:38.070 --> 41:44.770] n times the base point. And that would be p sub n, which is equal to x sub n, y sub n. Now it's [41:44.770 --> 41:49.330] much more complicated. It's not just that you take the base point and you multiply both the x and y [41:49.330 --> 41:53.890] coordinates by the number n. It's much, it's more sophisticated than that. But the idea is that [41:53.890 --> 42:00.410] if somebody tells you n, you can compute the nth point that is a solution to the elliptic curve. [42:00.410 --> 42:04.910] The thing is that it's a one-way function. So if someone tells you n, you can get p sub n. [42:04.910 --> 42:09.810] But if someone tells you p sub n, you can't get n. You have to brute force that. And again, [42:09.810 --> 42:15.250] to brute force this is a 10 to the 70th chance of getting it right, which means, you know, [42:15.250 --> 42:23.670] might as well just not try. And so that's the key to this, is that the public key, which is the [42:23.670 --> 42:31.330] location of that base point, is itself the Bitcoin address. Now it's not a number like I'm kind of [42:31.330 --> 42:37.470] implying it is here. The number gets translated to a string of letters and numbers in Bitcoin, [42:38.230 --> 42:43.730] which is a Bitcoin address. But at the heart of it, that Bitcoin address is representing an x, [42:43.730 --> 42:53.210] y coordinate on the secp256k1 elliptic curve. The private key is n. n is the which solution [42:53.210 --> 43:02.150] to this elliptic curve is your point. And again, it's a one-way function. So if you give your [43:02.150 --> 43:11.690] Bitcoin software the number n, which is basically the seed to generate a public address, then you [43:11.690 --> 43:18.050] can get the public address from your private key, but you can't go backwards. So the private key is [43:18.050 --> 43:23.270] like basically it functions as an authorized signature to spend. So getting a new Bitcoin [43:23.270 --> 43:30.610] account is tantamount to picking a number. What can you do with this elliptic curve point? So [43:30.610 --> 43:35.870] big deal, like why make such a big deal out of having a, you know, an x, y point that satisfies [43:35.870 --> 43:40.930] this equation? You can do something very useful with it, which is secure message signing. So if [43:40.930 --> 43:47.130] you are in possession of a public-private key pair, and you have a message that you want to [43:47.130 --> 43:51.430] send to the world, and you want to make sure that everyone in the world knows that that message [43:51.430 --> 43:56.610] came from you and only you, this is the way you would do this using elliptic curve cryptography. [43:56.610 --> 44:01.770] You would take your message and you would combine it with your private key. So you would have to [44:01.770 --> 44:08.210] manipulate those in a routine. So the combination of the message and your private key scrambled up [44:08.210 --> 44:13.590] together will produce a signature, which is just a block of bytes that is unique to the combination [44:13.590 --> 44:18.650] of the message and the private key. Then as the sender, you would send your message in plain text [44:19.190 --> 44:23.630] and you would include with your plain text message the signature, which is this byte block that you [44:23.630 --> 44:29.970] generated by processing your message along with the private key. As a recipient now, you get this [44:29.970 --> 44:34.970] message and you got the signature from the sender, but now you're not sure if this actually came from [44:34.970 --> 44:39.610] the sender or not. So what you do is you take this stuff that you came from the purported sender, [44:39.610 --> 44:43.610] and you combine this with a public key, which you know to be from the sender. [44:44.110 --> 44:47.950] When you combine all three of those, you get a binary verification result that says, yes, [44:47.950 --> 44:54.610] this was a legitimate message from the sender or no, it was not. This type of cryptography gets [44:54.610 --> 45:01.010] used all over the internet. For example, it gets used in the HTTPS protocol. In Bitcoin, [45:02.970 --> 45:08.930] this was used in a novel way. That is, the sender's public key was used in a further [45:09.890 --> 45:16.770] interpretation to be an analogy to a bank account address. So the public key then becomes [45:16.770 --> 45:22.210] your Bitcoin address, and the private key becomes the signature that's needed to spend the money [45:22.210 --> 45:27.630] that's associated with the public key. So sending Bitcoin means sending a signed message to the [45:27.630 --> 45:33.210] Bitcoin network. And it's analogous to a check, as I'm showing here. So knowledge of the private [45:33.210 --> 45:40.670] key is tantamount to speech, which is tantamount to money. So finally, once a valid check gets [45:40.670 --> 45:44.650] written and signed and sent to the Bitcoin network, how does it get processed? Well, [45:44.650 --> 45:50.190] in Bitcoin, the network is controlled by a group of gossipy accountants. So these are computers, [45:50.190 --> 45:54.070] again, anyone can join the Bitcoin network simply by downloading the software and putting your [45:54.070 --> 45:59.230] computer on this. When you do that, your computer is going to start to download the entire transaction [45:59.230 --> 46:03.750] history of everything that's happened in Bitcoin since 2009. It's going to get that from being [46:03.750 --> 46:08.830] gossipy with the other Bitcoin computers that it's connected to on the network. And those other [46:08.830 --> 46:14.730] computers will willfully share little pieces of the database. And there's redundancy because you [46:14.730 --> 46:19.170] want to make sure that a database that you're getting in from your neighbors is correct. So [46:19.170 --> 46:25.450] there's checks and balances for that, namely the hash value of the blocks. So that is what is used [46:25.450 --> 46:32.090] to guarantee kind of authenticity of the database through the system. So again, miners are peer to [46:32.090 --> 46:37.550] peer Bitcoin accountants. What they do is they process blocks. Blocks are lists of valid signed [46:37.550 --> 46:43.010] spend messages. It's basically the list, the current list of pending checks to be processed. [46:43.390 --> 46:48.990] They get packaged into a collection called the block, and then the block gets added to the [46:48.990 --> 46:57.090] chain. And therefore, it's basically one page worth of transactions showing who sent what to [46:57.090 --> 47:02.310] who. That's what a block is. Part of what the block has is a nonce. And the nonce is just a [47:02.310 --> 47:07.170] little data field within the block, which is free for the miner to choose whatever they want it to [47:07.170 --> 47:13.710] be. So the miner can just guess a number and put that in the nonce. Why do they have to do that? [47:13.710 --> 47:19.810] Well, one requirement for a block to be considered valid is that the hash of the block, [47:19.810 --> 47:23.710] and of course, being DEF CON, I don't have to explain too much. Hash is just a one-way [47:23.710 --> 47:30.290] cryptographic hash function with fixed output length. So you take as input a file of any size, [47:30.290 --> 47:36.390] and you get as output a block of bytes that is basically a signature that is extremely [47:36.390 --> 47:42.550] sensitive to even bit level changes in the input. All right, so the thing is that a block has to be [47:42.550 --> 47:47.410] have a hash value that is lower than a difficulty number. The difficulty number is dynamically [47:47.410 --> 47:54.890] adjusted so that the number of valid blocks that happened in a 10-minute interval is one on [47:54.890 --> 48:00.590] average. So there's a maximum acceptable value for the block hash, which the accountants in this [48:00.590 --> 48:07.790] network are busy trying to satisfy for a given block. The computer in the network that does that [48:07.790 --> 48:12.670] gets what's called the block reward. That is a Bitcoin payout to the non-solver. And it's [48:12.670 --> 48:18.550] important to know that in Bitcoin, and also this is true in Monero, and it's actually quite rare [48:18.550 --> 48:24.670] for cryptocurrencies to have this property, is that all of the accounting money, all of the money in [48:24.670 --> 48:30.350] existence, came into existence as a payout to a random computer in the network that was helping [48:30.350 --> 48:35.930] to secure the accounting and the bookkeeping for that network. None of the block reward in Bitcoin [48:35.930 --> 48:43.470] was shunted off and a cut went to a group of people, or to a foundation, or you didn't have [48:44.370 --> 48:50.290] a portion of that money got set aside and then used to do marketing or whatever. All of the [48:50.290 --> 48:54.410] money went directly to the computers that were actually doing the accounting work [48:55.050 --> 49:00.290] for that network. And this is relevant from a regulatory point of view because FinCEN, [49:00.290 --> 49:07.490] which is one of the financial regulators in the US, defines a decentralized cryptocurrency as a [49:07.490 --> 49:11.690] currency in which the block rewards all go directly to the decentralized network that's [49:11.690 --> 49:16.790] doing the accounting. That's important because if you have a chunk of money that's going to a group [49:16.790 --> 49:21.490] of people, then that group of people could be considered as being basically the masterminds of [49:21.490 --> 49:28.590] the operation. And so they have to be subject to increased regulation in terms of compliance with [49:29.350 --> 49:37.210] AML KYC rules. So it's important that the block reward, both from sort of a philosophical and a [49:37.210 --> 49:42.690] fairness point of view and also a regulatory point of view, that all of the unit of [49:42.690 --> 49:50.210] currency in existence went as a reward to the decentralized network of miners. Conflict [49:50.210 --> 49:54.850] resolution. So again, there's no one boss computer that is in charge of having, you know, the [49:54.850 --> 50:01.350] correct version of the ledger. So how do we know if you have a conflict in the network, who wins? [50:01.350 --> 50:06.010] Well, the answer is that the chain with the more hash power is going to be the one that is deemed [50:06.010 --> 50:11.590] to be the authoritative version of the blockchain. So this basically functions as a self-healing [50:11.590 --> 50:16.830] mechanism. If there's a discrepancy in the state of the network in two geographically [50:16.830 --> 50:23.250] distant parts of the network, basically the tie break will be resolved at the next block that [50:23.250 --> 50:31.350] comes, because then that will have, that chain will have more hash power. So at least relative [50:31.350 --> 50:37.630] to the state of the blockchain at the time when the chain fork happened. [50:37.630 --> 50:43.190] All right, anyway, I'm getting a bit too technical here. So back to the blockchain, it's a, the [50:43.190 --> 50:48.170] definition is it's a distributed append-only linked list of blocks with low value hash. [50:50.070 --> 50:56.310] And sorry if I've gone too fast here, but there's lots of big concepts here to understand. [50:56.310 --> 51:01.890] And if this is all new to you, I would suggest taking the time to, you know, think about it until [51:01.890 --> 51:07.970] it makes sense. Because especially before, you know, getting into this circus, which is kind of [51:07.970 --> 51:15.190] the cryptocurrency, you know, world of today. So to summarize the Bitcoin white paper, Nakamoto [51:15.190 --> 51:19.870] consensus synthesizes digital scarcity. There's a few different kinds of scarcity that we're [51:19.870 --> 51:23.950] talking about. One is account level scarcity, that is property rights, the establishment of [51:23.950 --> 51:29.630] property rights. How do you know that who owns what in this system of accounting? So that is [51:29.630 --> 51:35.350] enforced in Bitcoin by the users, the individual's selection and subsequent protection of an elliptic [51:35.350 --> 51:40.870] curve private key. How do we know in aggregate how many Bitcoin there are? How do we know that [51:40.870 --> 51:45.710] we're not going to have a situation like we have in fiat banking, where we have a money supply whose [51:45.710 --> 51:52.530] quantity is unpredictable over time and is subject to the hopefully wise, but in [51:52.530 --> 51:59.450] practice, not always 100% wise decisions of a central group with arbitrary control of that [51:59.450 --> 52:04.870] money supply? Well, that is enforced by an open network of peer-to-peer accountants in Bitcoin [52:05.430 --> 52:09.590] who are rewarded for behaving consistently with the consensus rule set. [52:10.150 --> 52:16.810] What that means is that the majority of nodes in Bitcoin have decided in advance, it's been [52:16.810 --> 52:23.850] coded in advance, that the Bitcoins that are given to a miner as a reward is going to decrease over [52:23.850 --> 52:29.470] time. And therefore, the total number of Bitcoins that are going to be rewarded to miners in the [52:29.470 --> 52:37.810] network is going to be a total sum of 21 million Bitcoin forever. So any new computer that comes [52:37.810 --> 52:43.610] onto the network and has a different idea of what the money supply should be, let's say there's a [52:43.610 --> 52:50.630] computer that Joe Noob Hacker comes up with their own version of the Bitcoin client [52:50.630 --> 52:55.310] in which they program that the block reward is going to go to their personal Bitcoin address, [52:55.310 --> 52:59.950] and then they put that on the network. What's going to happen is that it's just going to get ignored [52:59.950 --> 53:06.910] because you need majority decisions on this network to be considered correct. That's how [53:06.910 --> 53:11.510] you get around the fact that there's no boss computer. Basically, the majority rules becomes [53:11.510 --> 53:16.970] the boss, right? And so a rogue computer that's introduced to the network is going to have zero [53:16.970 --> 53:23.530] effect on it unless it can manage to get 51% of the hash power, which is expensive and difficult to do. [53:25.310 --> 53:32.250] Finally, you have database modification scarcity, which is record permanence. The number [53:32.250 --> 53:39.390] of opportunities that the Bitcoin network has to modify what's in the Bitcoin database is severely [53:39.390 --> 53:44.330] limited. And it's severely limited by this proof of work mechanism, like the nonce stuff that I was [53:44.330 --> 53:49.990] talking about. Basically, when a Bitcoin computer comes up with a nonce that satisfies difficulty, [53:49.990 --> 53:56.150] it's coming up with a block of data, that block, which is extremely rare, because its hash value [53:56.150 --> 54:01.570] is arbitrarily low. It's got a whole bunch of zeros in front of it, and then numbers after that, [54:01.570 --> 54:06.730] which does not really happen if you just have randomly generated blocks. If you have randomly [54:06.730 --> 54:11.530] generated blocks, then you would have random numbers for the hash function. But every single [54:11.530 --> 54:18.550] block in the Bitcoin blockchain, and also this is true in Monero, has a low hash rate, has a low [54:18.550 --> 54:23.930] hash number associated with each block. And so that makes each little piece of data that gets [54:23.930 --> 54:29.410] added to the blockchain a rare piece of data. It took a lot of trial and error effort. In other [54:29.410 --> 54:34.610] words, it took a lot of proof of work to get that piece of data added to the blockchain. And so, [54:34.610 --> 54:40.210] as a result, it's extraordinarily difficult to make modifications to that database, especially [54:40.210 --> 54:45.730] as time goes on, and more proof of work gets piled on top of the older transactions. It becomes near [54:45.730 --> 54:55.370] impossible to modify older transactions. Okay, so how is Monero's features of scarcity? How do [54:55.370 --> 55:03.410] they differ from Bitcoin's? Probably the most important, I would say, from a assessment point [55:03.410 --> 55:08.770] of view when assessing, you know, is Monero something worth considering, given that Bitcoin [55:08.770 --> 55:15.250] was there first, and it has the largest network. Currently, it has the largest, you know, market [55:15.250 --> 55:23.230] share, the largest mind share, the largest network value. But if you look at Monero, it is not [55:24.310 --> 55:30.790] a code fork of Bitcoin. So most all of the cryptocurrencies in existence today simply did [55:30.910 --> 55:35.970] a copy-paste of Bitcoin's code, and then changed a few little things. And that, you know, they [55:35.970 --> 55:40.790] said, oh, I like this about Bitcoin, I don't like that about Bitcoin, made a few oftentimes [55:40.790 --> 55:45.550] trivial changes to the code, and then published that and call it your own cryptocurrency. [55:46.190 --> 55:56.030] And because we're in a time in which the, I would say, the, I guess, the sophistication level [55:56.030 --> 56:02.570] on a dollar-weighted basis in the crypto market is rat low. It's basically like the [56:03.130 --> 56:07.910] early days of the dot-com bubble, in which the internet was new. And because the internet was [56:07.910 --> 56:13.090] new, it was like, you know, there's all sorts of technological utopia talk going on about how the [56:13.090 --> 56:19.290] internet was going to revolutionize everything. And as a result, because you had basically, [56:19.290 --> 56:24.310] you know, a bunch of geeks who understood how the internet worked, and a bunch of normies who had [56:24.310 --> 56:29.550] really no idea what even email was. So you had the situation where you had, you know, stupid idea [56:29.550 --> 56:36.390] plus internet equals sexy company. So you'd have things like pets.com, which, in which the business [56:36.390 --> 56:43.210] model was to, you know, FedEx 50-pound bags of dog food to people. But they were using the internet [56:43.210 --> 56:49.050] to get the orders in for these dog food orders. And so therefore, this was just like a hot [56:49.050 --> 56:53.430] company back in the early days of the internet. It's funny for us to look back at that and kind [56:53.430 --> 56:58.130] of laugh at that. But we are in exactly the same situation now with cryptocurrencies, in which [56:58.130 --> 57:05.590] stupid idea plus a little bit of blockchain buzzwords equals hot new cryptocurrency. And [57:06.650 --> 57:13.650] that's enough to get a bunch of people who have basically profits in mind above any sort of [57:13.650 --> 57:21.150] technological benefit to get in on a bandwagon. So anyway, one criteria that one can use to [57:21.150 --> 57:27.570] whittle down the subset of cryptocurrencies that are worth considering are this. Is it simply [57:27.770 --> 57:32.710] a Bitcoin fork? How much original intellectual effort went into the creation of this other [57:32.710 --> 57:38.470] cryptocurrency? In Monero, it was started from scratch. It has its own separate code base. In [57:38.470 --> 57:43.890] fact, it uses a completely different elliptic curve than Bitcoin. So Monero uses ED25519. [57:43.890 --> 57:50.970] That is the very XY points on this gigantic sheet of grid paper, which is fundamental to how the [57:50.970 --> 57:56.570] cryptocurrency works. That very equation is different in Monero than it is in Bitcoin. [57:56.650 --> 58:02.330] So this is a form of technical hedging to the extent that the elliptic curve used in Bitcoin [58:02.330 --> 58:07.170] may or may not have weaknesses associated with it. This is a form of technical hedging in which [58:07.170 --> 58:12.390] Monero has chosen deliberately a different elliptic curve. In Monero, there are two forms of [58:12.390 --> 58:17.350] private keys. There's a spend key and a view key. The spend key works like the Bitcoin private key. [58:17.450 --> 58:21.790] So if you know the spend key, you are in complete control of your account and you can see everything [58:21.790 --> 58:27.010] that goes on with it. In contrast to Bitcoin, there's also a view key in Monero. In Monero, [58:27.010 --> 58:35.010] the view key is used to basically see details of your account. So by default in Monero, [58:35.010 --> 58:41.190] lots of the details of transactions are encrypted because by default, the details of transactions [58:41.190 --> 58:45.410] are nobody's business except for the people who were involved in the transaction. It's their [58:45.410 --> 58:53.890] business. So in Monero, there is a public blockchain, which everyone in the Monero ecosystem [58:53.890 --> 58:59.990] gets if they run the Monero software, but many details of this blockchain are encrypted. [59:00.410 --> 59:06.110] Because by default, a random person downloading the Monero blockchain, it's not their business [59:06.800 --> 59:12.690] who sent what to who, like all the details. They can know very high level details about what's [59:12.690 --> 59:17.810] going on, but why is it their business to know exactly who sent what to whom and how much they [59:17.810 --> 59:25.110] spent? So in Monero, this necessitates the use of two different keys. There's a spend key and a [59:25.110 --> 59:29.910] view key. Those are both private keys. All right, in Monero, the address space is larger. So we're [59:29.910 --> 59:36.730] talking about 10 to the 76 different addresses to choose from in Monero versus 10 to the 60th [59:36.730 --> 59:43.070] in Bitcoin. This means that there is more security in terms of the birthday problem. So [59:43.070 --> 59:48.250] when one is choosing a cryptocurrency account, one is simply picking a point on this grid paper [59:48.250 --> 59:53.310] and calling it your own. When you do that, you have to consider what is the risk that somebody [59:53.310 --> 59:57.450] else in the world is going through this same process and picking a random point on this grid [59:57.450 --> 01:00:02.730] paper. And what's the chance that they pick the point that I picked? If they pick the point that [01:00:02.730 --> 01:00:07.690] I picked, then they will know the private and public keys for that elliptic curve point. Therefore, [01:00:07.690 --> 01:00:11.750] I'm going to be basically sharing my money with a stranger somewhere else in the world. [01:00:12.550 --> 01:00:18.430] That is a possibility. So in that sense, there is security by obscurity in cryptocurrencies, [01:00:18.430 --> 01:00:23.690] but that is mitigated by the fact by the vast number of addresses that are possible. [01:00:23.710 --> 01:00:28.430] And there is an even more vast number of addresses in Monero than there are in Bitcoin by [01:00:28.430 --> 01:00:36.970] 10 to the 16th, that many times more addresses in Monero. The drawback of this is that you have a [01:00:36.970 --> 01:00:43.130] less user-friendly experience because the address lengths in Monero are long. They're [01:00:43.130 --> 01:00:49.710] very long strings of numbers and letters. The emission schedule is different in Monero [01:00:49.710 --> 01:00:55.090] relative to Bitcoin. So in Monero, it's continually decreasing. There's not a four-year halvening. [01:00:55.510 --> 01:01:02.190] So in Bitcoin, every 210,000 blocks, the miner reward that goes out to each miner who [01:01:02.190 --> 01:01:07.630] successfully adds a block to the network gets cut in half. That means every four years, [01:01:07.630 --> 01:01:11.970] if you're a Bitcoin miner, there is a date circled in red that's coming up sometime in [01:01:11.970 --> 01:01:17.930] the next four years in which your income from helping contribute to the Bitcoin ecosystem gets [01:01:17.930 --> 01:01:21.830] cut in half. And so from a business point of view, if you're doing mining for a business, [01:01:21.830 --> 01:01:29.470] it's a rather disruptive thing. And this is something in which Monero has basically looked [01:01:29.470 --> 01:01:35.610] at the granddaddy cryptocurrency and kind of thought about what they're doing and maybe trying [01:01:35.610 --> 01:01:41.030] something a little different that might help matters a bit. And so in Monero, the emission [01:01:41.030 --> 01:01:49.350] is continually decreasing. So we are spared from this drama in Bitcoin of having every four year, [01:01:49.730 --> 01:01:58.210] a large disruption thrown into the mining ecosystem. There's another form of unwanted [01:01:58.210 --> 01:02:05.290] scarcity, and that is future miner rewards. So as I mentioned before, all the computers in the [01:02:05.290 --> 01:02:11.690] Bitcoin network and also in the Monero network are programmed with a understanding of how big [01:02:11.690 --> 01:02:18.670] is the reward going to be to each computer over time. So now and into the future, how big is that [01:02:18.670 --> 01:02:25.390] reward going to be? In Bitcoin, this reward is predefined to get cut in half every four years, [01:02:25.390 --> 01:02:34.050] as I just explained. What that means is that in, say, 40 years from now, the Bitcoin reward is going [01:02:34.050 --> 01:02:39.730] to be, it's going to have halved four times. So one half to the 10th power, that's about a factor [01:02:39.730 --> 01:02:45.330] of a thousand. So the Bitcoin reward to miners in 40 years time is going to be one one thousandth [01:02:45.330 --> 01:02:52.190] of what it is now. So this brings up a concern, like are miners in the Bitcoin network in that [01:02:52.190 --> 01:02:55.870] length of time from now, are they going to be able, are they going to find that to be enough [01:02:55.870 --> 01:03:00.670] incentive to keep working for the network? There's some academic research that shows that [01:03:00.670 --> 01:03:06.010] the solution that Bitcoin has come up with, which is to institute a fee market in which the people [01:03:06.010 --> 01:03:13.650] who transact end up chipping in and basically engaging in a auction-like process to bid up [01:03:13.650 --> 01:03:20.670] the fee that they offer with the transaction in an effort to get their transaction into the next block. [01:03:20.670 --> 01:03:26.730] But that idea may not be enough to incentivize miners in the future. So in Monero, what we have [01:03:26.730 --> 01:03:31.490] is what we call the tail emission. That is that the block reward in Monero is never going to be [01:03:31.490 --> 01:03:37.610] less than 0.3 Monero per minute. And what this means is that over time, the number of Monero [01:03:37.610 --> 01:03:44.650] in existence is going to linearly increase forever. And so this gets kind of portrayed as [01:03:44.650 --> 01:03:54.330] quote-unquote infinite emission by people who are not thinking about it very, I would say, fairly. [01:03:54.450 --> 01:04:01.850] But the reason is that the absolute value of emission is not relevant in any macroeconomic [01:04:01.850 --> 01:04:06.990] theory. Any macroeconomic theory that takes into account what the money supply is and the effects [01:04:06.990 --> 01:04:13.130] of changes in that money supply in the macroeconomy will look at the percentage increase of that money [01:04:13.130 --> 01:04:18.090] supply. So it's not the absolute value of U.S. dollars increasing that's relevant, it's the [01:04:18.090 --> 01:04:24.790] percentage increase in U.S. dollars that's relevant. And if you have a money supply like Monero that is [01:04:24.790 --> 01:04:31.450] increasing linearly over time, what that means is that if you look at the percentage increase of the [01:04:31.450 --> 01:04:38.070] money supply, every year it's going to get smaller and smaller. Because every year the money supply [01:04:38.070 --> 01:04:43.430] is going to expand by a fixed constant amount, which is what linear expansion just means. Every [01:04:43.430 --> 01:04:49.010] year is a constant amount of Monero is going to be added, but that's going to be added to a [01:04:49.010 --> 01:04:55.250] pre-existing base of Monero that is going to be growing. Therefore the inflation rate on percentage [01:04:55.250 --> 01:05:00.870] terms is going to be decreasing and asymptotically going to zero. Which means that that is the [01:05:00.870 --> 01:05:06.770] relevant input to any macroeconomic theory that uses the expansion of the money supply. An asymptotically [01:05:06.770 --> 01:05:14.110] zero inflation rate. And so to claim that identically zero inflation rate is significantly [01:05:14.110 --> 01:05:20.370] different. It's a totally different situation that an asymptotically zero inflation rate is is silly. [01:05:21.310 --> 01:05:27.310] It's just not factual. It is easy for normies to understand that 21 million bitcoiners [01:05:27.310 --> 01:05:32.350] is the only amount that's ever going to be created, but it leads to a bit of a laziness of thinking in [01:05:32.350 --> 01:05:39.430] which one comes to this false conclusion that one must have a identically zero inflation rate [01:05:39.430 --> 01:05:46.090] in order to be macroeconomically negligible. What do we gain in Monero for having this [01:05:46.090 --> 01:05:51.410] tail emission? We know in Monero that minor incentives are going to be there in perpetuity. [01:05:51.410 --> 01:05:59.130] In Monero we do not have a civil war over who is going to be paying for minor rewards in the future. [01:05:59.130 --> 01:06:03.210] Now this sounds like it might be kind of a trivial and academic thing but this actually happened in [01:06:03.210 --> 01:06:08.630] bitcoin. There is a civil war that was partly caused by a disagreement over who is going to [01:06:08.630 --> 01:06:16.830] pay for the network's operation in the future. So this whole position in bitcoin that we are [01:06:16.830 --> 01:06:23.010] going to get the users of bitcoin, the transactors of bitcoin, to engage in this competition in a fee [01:06:23.010 --> 01:06:28.770] market to get the transactions processed in the next block. The viability of that was debated [01:06:28.770 --> 01:06:35.270] within bitcoin and was one of the factors leading to the divorce of bitcoin versus bitcoin cash. [01:06:36.410 --> 01:06:42.510] Now if you think about it, who wants to go to ebay to try and get a financial [01:06:42.510 --> 01:06:47.910] transaction going? Who wants to engage in a bidding process to try and just [01:06:48.910 --> 01:06:55.690] send ten dollars to your buddy for lunch? But anyway, we avoid all that again in Monero by [01:06:55.690 --> 01:07:01.330] having this tail emission. So here's some charts that show what I'm talking about. This is actually [01:07:01.330 --> 01:07:08.030] empirical data on the left. So to the left of the present, and I'm looking at a timescale of 2009 [01:07:08.030 --> 01:07:12.370] which is when the bitcoin white paper started, and I'm going out 15 years into the future to the year [01:07:12.370 --> 01:07:20.050] 2035. This is the amount of the number of coins that will be in circulation. So in bitcoin there [01:07:20.050 --> 01:07:24.670] have been about roughly 18 million bitcoin created and there are going to be three million more [01:07:24.670 --> 01:07:31.150] created for the rest of time. So you can see to the left this is what the money supply has looked [01:07:31.150 --> 01:07:36.930] like in bitcoin, and to the right of this in gray we can reliably predict in the future what the [01:07:36.930 --> 01:07:42.370] future money supply is going to be, because again the miners in the network are kind of programmed [01:07:42.370 --> 01:07:49.870] with that information in advance. The same is in Monero. So in Monero we also have a predefined [01:07:49.870 --> 01:07:55.930] schedule for what the coin emission is going to be over time. And so on to the left of August 2020 [01:07:55.930 --> 01:08:01.970] you see what has actually happened in Monero. And this curve here, it looks so smooth and perfect it [01:08:01.970 --> 01:08:05.830] looks like it's a theoretical line, but this is actually empirical data that I'm showing on the [01:08:05.830 --> 01:08:11.670] left. This is what actually happened in terms of emission in the Monero blockchain up to now. And [01:08:11.670 --> 01:08:17.450] then in the future you can see the tail emission in Monero shows up as this very slight [01:08:18.010 --> 01:08:23.530] curve, a straight line that's that's slightly tilted up to the right. That's the tail emission [01:08:23.530 --> 01:08:29.350] which there's a going to be a fixed number of Monero dedicated to be given out to miners every [01:08:29.350 --> 01:08:35.590] year in perpetuity. This differs from bitcoin in which the 21 million limit is a hard limit. [01:08:35.610 --> 01:08:40.270] Once the number of bitcoins emitted gets close to the 21 million that's going to go to zero. [01:08:40.270 --> 01:08:44.590] And again they have a problem to deal with, which is how do they guarantee that the miners in the [01:08:44.590 --> 01:08:49.130] far future are going to be incentivized to keep using their electricity and their [01:08:49.130 --> 01:08:56.430] silicon to keep supporting their network. If we take the time derivative of this last chart, [01:08:56.430 --> 01:09:01.610] you get year-over-year supplied inflation. So what I'm doing is I'm taking what is the supply [01:09:01.610 --> 01:09:07.850] of a currency today versus what is the supply of that currency one year ago on the same day. [01:09:07.850 --> 01:09:13.550] And I'm showing what you get for Monero, bitcoin, and also gold. So the World Gold Council keeps [01:09:13.550 --> 01:09:19.970] track of its estimate of how much above ground gold there is in the world every year. And you [01:09:19.970 --> 01:09:25.650] can see here that the amount of gold in above ground that's known to exist and has been processed [01:09:25.650 --> 01:09:34.550] and refined into bullion in jewelry, that has been increasing at a pretty constant rate of about 1.8% [01:09:34.550 --> 01:09:42.250] per year. So if you think of sound money as being something that is gold-like in that there is no [01:09:42.250 --> 01:09:47.490] entity that can artificially create gold out of nothing, like you have to do the work of mining [01:09:47.490 --> 01:09:53.770] it yourself, then even gold inflates at a rate of 1.8% per year. So if you use that as kind of [01:09:53.770 --> 01:09:58.810] your litmus test for defining something called sound money. So sound money, a working definition [01:09:58.810 --> 01:10:07.270] of sound money would be something, a source of scarcity that inflates by a level of about 1.8% [01:10:07.270 --> 01:10:11.970] per year or less. So that would be kind of a working definition of what sound money is. [01:10:12.250 --> 01:10:18.350] So as you can see, Bitcoin and Monero both are coming up on a new area of scarcity. Starting [01:10:18.350 --> 01:10:24.230] now, here in 2020, going into the future, the inflation rates of both Bitcoin and Monero are [01:10:24.230 --> 01:10:30.690] going to be lower than gold. And so these will satisfy that definition of sound money. It's [01:10:30.690 --> 01:10:37.590] like a digital form of sound money. In contrast to this, we have a kind of scary situation with [01:10:37.590 --> 01:10:43.710] the money supply of the U.S. dollar, for example. This is again, money zero maturity, which is the [01:10:43.710 --> 01:10:49.890] broadest measure of liquid money in the U.S. And this is looking at year-over-year supply inflation, [01:10:49.890 --> 01:10:55.750] how much U.S. dollars have there been versus how much U.S. dollars have there been a year ago at [01:10:55.750 --> 01:11:02.470] the same date. You can see as a result of the pandemic, this has spiked up recently to about 30%. [01:11:07.880 --> 01:11:13.280] Now, I showed a version of this chart just six months ago at a keynote talk that I gave at [01:11:13.880 --> 01:11:19.360] the Critical Decentralization Cluster at 36C3 in Leipzig, Germany. You might have seen the [01:11:19.360 --> 01:11:26.820] Monero Means Money documentary film that was made out of that. And relative to that, which [01:11:26.820 --> 01:11:33.200] was just six months ago, and just before the pandemic hit, I had to adjust the vertical [01:11:33.200 --> 01:11:38.560] axis here. It used to go to 20% now because I had to adjust it to 30% to fit fiat. [01:11:41.020 --> 01:11:45.400] Again, it's a scary situation. Hopefully it works out for the best, because if it doesn't, [01:11:45.400 --> 01:11:52.660] there's going to be a lot of suffering by humanity. But the situation is what it is. [01:11:52.900 --> 01:12:00.440] And for those people looking for a source of scarcity that is gold or gold-like, this is what [01:12:00.440 --> 01:12:04.640] you're looking at. You have gold and you have new digital alternatives in the form of Bitcoin [01:12:04.640 --> 01:12:09.940] and Monero. There's another form of unwanted scarcity I want to talk about, and that's [01:12:09.940 --> 01:12:15.280] mining hardware. So in the Bitcoin white paper, Satoshi used the phrase one CPU, one vote. What [01:12:15.280 --> 01:12:20.520] that means is that this is the idea that the miner reward should scale with miner expense. [01:12:20.540 --> 01:12:26.240] So you want the probability that a miner computer gets the Bitcoin reward. You want that to be [01:12:26.240 --> 01:12:31.300] proportional to basically how much money and effort that they spent into buying the computer [01:12:31.300 --> 01:12:36.260] and paying for the electricity to run the computer and so on. You don't want a situation in which [01:12:36.260 --> 01:12:41.360] somebody with a whole bunch of wealth can come up with a way to do mining much more efficiently [01:12:41.360 --> 01:12:46.300] than a little guy who doesn't have much wealth. And yet that's exactly the situation that has [01:12:46.300 --> 01:12:53.120] come to pass in Bitcoin, and that is because of the economics of silicon manufacture. Silicon [01:12:53.120 --> 01:12:57.660] economies of scale destroy the linearity between miner expense and miner reward, [01:12:57.660 --> 01:13:03.200] and that is because you have different pieces of silicon with different capabilities and [01:13:03.200 --> 01:13:08.840] different specializations. CPUs, like the things that run your computer or your cell phone, those [01:13:08.840 --> 01:13:15.140] are general purpose computing devices and they're made to be pretty fast at doing everything. [01:13:15.140 --> 01:13:20.940] Whereas ASICs are custom pieces of silicon that are custom designed to do one thing and do that [01:13:20.940 --> 01:13:26.860] one thing extremely efficiently. So it turned out that in Bitcoin, the proof of work algorithm [01:13:26.860 --> 01:13:32.580] that's used is simple enough to encode on a piece of silicon and have a dedicated piece of silicon [01:13:32.580 --> 01:13:37.460] that does nothing but the proof of work in Bitcoin. So basically, if you have $50 million, [01:13:37.460 --> 01:13:42.500] you can make a silicon fabrication lab and you hire a bunch of PhD electrical engineers to [01:13:42.500 --> 01:13:49.940] make this thing happen. And then you can basically print out chips that do nothing but the Bitcoin [01:13:49.940 --> 01:13:56.000] algorithm and do that more efficiently than anybody else in the world. And so currently, [01:13:56.000 --> 01:14:02.340] that capability exists really on an economically competitive basis, really only in China. [01:14:02.520 --> 01:14:08.460] And so at the current date, Bitcoin mining is a Chinese-dominated oligopoly. If you're in Shenzhen [01:14:08.460 --> 01:14:20.940] and you've got about $50 million, you mine Bitcoin the fastest. Otherwise, you're out of the game. [01:14:20.940 --> 01:14:25.900] If you are just a regular guy with a CPU, just a gaming computer at home, and you want to [01:14:25.900 --> 01:14:31.260] join that to the Bitcoin network and try to see if you can maybe hit a block, maybe you can get [01:14:31.360 --> 01:14:37.560] a reward, you have a higher chance of winning the lotto than getting a Bitcoin block reward. [01:14:37.560 --> 01:14:44.080] It's just not worth your time. It's not worth your time. It's not worth the extra electricity [01:14:44.080 --> 01:14:48.520] that your computer is going to eat while it's trying to come up with blocks to satisfy the [01:14:48.520 --> 01:14:57.300] Bitcoin network. This has the unfortunate effect of centralization. So now, Bitcoin mining is [01:14:57.300 --> 01:15:03.200] effectively a Chinese oligopoly. You need to be one of these chip fab makers, or you need to be [01:15:03.200 --> 01:15:09.460] buddies with one of the chip fab manufacturers to get a realistic shot of amassing enough Bitcoin [01:15:09.460 --> 01:15:14.000] hash power to make a difference, to have a realistic shot of getting a block. So in Monero, [01:15:14.000 --> 01:15:18.760] again, we've looked at the situation in Bitcoin and asked what can we do, what is going [01:15:18.760 --> 01:15:25.320] maybe not so great over there, and try to come up with solutions to mitigate that. So in Monero, [01:15:25.320 --> 01:15:31.240] what we've done is we have evolved the proof-of-work algorithm to keep small independent miners viable. [01:15:31.640 --> 01:15:36.020] So this is quite remarkable for any cryptocurrency, but if you look at Monero's proof-of-work since [01:15:36.020 --> 01:15:41.460] 2018, it has changed four times. And each of these four times has required a hard fork. [01:15:41.460 --> 01:15:48.260] So there's been an enormous level of effort that's gone into this. First, you need to come [01:15:48.260 --> 01:15:52.100] up with these algorithms, you need to notice that they're ASICs, you have to have a community [01:15:52.100 --> 01:15:57.560] consensus that this is a problem, you have to have a community that's willing to all upgrade their [01:15:57.560 --> 01:16:03.220] Monero clients to keep up with the latest changes, because these changes were all hard forks. [01:16:03.220 --> 01:16:10.240] That is, they were not backwards compatible. So it's a testament to kind of the persistence [01:16:10.240 --> 01:16:15.820] and really the unanimity of the Monero community in having this goal of keeping [01:16:18.480 --> 01:16:24.600] a situation of decentralization really viable in the real world, not just a theoretical thing, [01:16:24.600 --> 01:16:29.360] but something that's actually decentralized in practice, with small independent miners [01:16:29.360 --> 01:16:35.460] having a shot at getting a block reward in Monero. This chart is showing data to support that [01:16:35.460 --> 01:16:41.620] narrative. So here I'm looking at 2014 to the present, and this is a chart of the Monero [01:16:41.620 --> 01:16:47.600] network difficulty. So again, previously I talked about how Bitcoin works, there's a number called [01:16:47.600 --> 01:16:53.600] the difficulty, which is a number under which blocks have to have a hash that's under in order [01:16:53.600 --> 01:17:03.060] to be considered a viable block. So as more computers get onto the network, you can see that [01:17:03.060 --> 01:17:12.840] difficulty will increase. So through version 0.11 of Monero, the proof of work was Kryptonite. [01:17:12.920 --> 01:17:18.860] And so you can see that the difficulty was proceeding along for several years, and then [01:17:18.860 --> 01:17:24.120] now there's a spike upwards in the difficulty. And this is basically interpreted as ASICs coming [01:17:24.120 --> 01:17:31.840] onto the system. So basically, there were chip manufacturers who looked at the Monero proof of [01:17:31.840 --> 01:17:37.040] work, figured out how to program the Monero proof of work into a custom piece of silicon, make that [01:17:37.040 --> 01:17:41.760] piece of silicon, plug it into the network, and then start getting a disproportionate share of [01:17:41.760 --> 01:17:46.800] block rewards from Monero. So once that happened, there was some alarm in the Monero community. [01:17:47.720 --> 01:17:52.680] There were signs that, you know, ASICs were going to dominate the network and have a situation in [01:17:52.680 --> 01:17:56.460] which you have to have connections with a bunch of buddies in Shenzhen in order to be able to [01:17:56.460 --> 01:18:02.800] have a realistic shot at mining. And so work commenced on a variant of the Kryptonite proof of [01:18:02.800 --> 01:18:10.080] work. So Kryptonite v2 was developed and tested and then deployed on the network in early 2018. [01:18:10.240 --> 01:18:15.620] When that happened, you can see the difficulty took a nosedive. And that is because all these [01:18:15.620 --> 01:18:21.080] ASICs that were previously viable in collecting a lot of the block reward were now shut out [01:18:21.080 --> 01:18:26.940] because the proof of work changed on them. So that proceeded for several months. And that's [01:18:26.940 --> 01:18:30.780] the lead time in silicon design, is that you need, there's like a several month lead time [01:18:30.780 --> 01:18:35.660] from the time that you design an ASICs to the time that you actually fabricate it in enough [01:18:35.660 --> 01:18:40.440] quantity to make a big dent on the network. So several months later, there was another upward [01:18:40.440 --> 01:18:46.080] spike in the difficulty. So that was ASICs coming back online. So Kryptonite was patched again, [01:18:46.080 --> 01:18:51.600] to again, preserve the network viability of getting block rewards for the little guy. [01:18:51.620 --> 01:18:55.860] So again, there was another hard fork in late 2018 to change to Kryptonite v3. [01:18:55.940 --> 01:19:00.900] That worked for another few months. Then the difficulty spiked up again. And then finally, [01:19:00.900 --> 01:19:04.960] there was Kryptonite R, well, not finally, almost finally, there was Kryptonite R introduced in early [01:19:04.960 --> 01:19:12.020] 29. Then kind of mercifully, there was this, there's this silence from the ASICs manufacturer, [01:19:12.020 --> 01:19:17.520] which was a nice sign to see in the Monero community. And then finally, there was a [01:19:17.520 --> 01:19:22.900] kind of a revolutionary change in the proof of work algorithm to RandomX, which uses [01:19:22.900 --> 01:19:29.820] a randomly generated computer algorithm that must be executed in order to do the proof of work. [01:19:29.820 --> 01:19:34.020] It uses not only integer operations, but even floating point operations. And so it's a very [01:19:34.020 --> 01:19:44.020] interesting example of a proof of work algorithm, for which the customized piece of silicon that [01:19:44.020 --> 01:19:50.000] will do RandomX the best happens to be, for example, an AMD Ryzen Threadripper, which is [01:19:50.000 --> 01:19:55.800] something that you can buy on Amazon. So it's basically commodity hardware is the most efficient [01:19:55.800 --> 01:20:01.740] at doing the Monero proof of work. It's not something that you have to, you know, go on [01:20:01.740 --> 01:20:07.600] Alibaba to try and get for yourself, and then suffer through like the very many shenanigans [01:20:07.600 --> 01:20:12.640] that are associated with having a centralized mining operator. So for example, these ASIC [01:20:12.640 --> 01:20:18.160] manufacturers do not have the most honest reputation, shall we say, of immediately shipping [01:20:18.160 --> 01:20:23.600] their product out once a customer buys an ASIC. There tends to be a several month lag due to, [01:20:23.600 --> 01:20:31.160] you know, testing and other very unexplainable reasons that their shipped product gets delayed. [01:20:31.160 --> 01:20:35.760] And why would a ASIC manufacturer want to delay shipment of product that's been paid for? [01:20:35.760 --> 01:20:42.900] Well, they want to test the thing by running, by basically collecting Bitcoin block rewards with [01:20:42.900 --> 01:20:47.580] their customer's hardware before they send it out, right? So that's basically the shenanigans that [01:20:47.580 --> 01:20:53.580] one has to deal with when one does not have a commodity piece of computer hardware to do proof [01:20:53.580 --> 01:21:00.840] of work with. And so since RandomX has gone into effect, CPUs have once again been dominating the [01:21:00.840 --> 01:21:07.000] network. Arguably, that was also the case with Kryptonite R, but we see that there is basically [01:21:07.220 --> 01:21:14.240] a regime change in the proof of work. The metric of difficulty became apples and oranges once [01:21:14.240 --> 01:21:21.080] RandomX came in. So this increase in difficulty is not to be interpreted as meaningful. It's just [01:21:21.080 --> 01:21:29.840] what is meant by a hash now is different in RandomX versus Kryptonite. So there's a one-time [01:21:29.840 --> 01:21:35.180] jump in the difficulty, which is meaningless. But since RandomX went in, it's been all signs [01:21:35.180 --> 01:21:41.420] have been that there have been only CPUs on the network. Another form of unwanted scarcity is [01:21:41.420 --> 01:21:47.520] access to layer one. So Bitcoin's one megabyte block limit caused a project fork. So there is a [01:21:47.520 --> 01:21:53.620] controversy as to whether this hard-coded line of code, which Satoshi had put into the Bitcoin [01:21:53.620 --> 01:21:59.620] client, saying that blocks have to be no larger than one megabyte in size, which is something that [01:21:59.620 --> 01:22:06.420] Satoshi did as a kludgy way of preventing the network from getting spammed. That has remained [01:22:06.420 --> 01:22:15.840] in there. The decision has been made, at least in the dominant implementation of Bitcoin, [01:22:17.640 --> 01:22:22.940] post-divorce of Bitcoin, the most dominant one has preserved this one megabyte block limit, [01:22:22.940 --> 01:22:30.020] subject to very marginal level changes like Segwit, which actually made it like 1.3, [01:22:30.020 --> 01:22:35.700] whatever. The idea that there's going to be a hard block limit that doesn't change has [01:22:35.700 --> 01:22:41.620] survived in Bitcoin. And so you can see the transactions per day here. And I'm showing [01:22:41.620 --> 01:22:46.220] an exponential scale. So this is 10 transactions a day on the bottom to a million transactions a [01:22:46.220 --> 01:22:53.760] day on the top. In Bitcoin, you can see that just like the mining reward asymptotically hits a [01:22:53.760 --> 01:22:58.660] ceiling, the transactions per day in Bitcoin have also asymptotically hit a ceiling. And that is due [01:22:58.660 --> 01:23:03.900] to this one megabyte block limit. Again, in Monero, we look at what's happening in the dominant [01:23:04.780 --> 01:23:09.660] granddaddy cryptocurrency and give it all due respect as being the pioneer and the first to [01:23:09.660 --> 01:23:17.520] exist. But we're on a case-by-case basis looking at what could be done as an alternative solution [01:23:17.520 --> 01:23:23.340] to some of these issues. And so in Monero, we use what is called an adaptive block weight. [01:23:23.400 --> 01:23:27.620] It used to be called the adaptive block size, but now there were modifications to the algorithm. So [01:23:27.620 --> 01:23:33.220] now it's called the adaptive block weight. But the basic idea is that there is no hard-coded [01:23:33.220 --> 01:23:38.280] limit on the size of the Monero block. It dynamically adjusts along with the network [01:23:38.280 --> 01:23:45.260] so that it can dynamically expand if there is organic growth in the demand for Monero transactions, [01:23:45.260 --> 01:23:50.860] which as you can see from this past history of transactions per day, you can make a pretty good [01:23:50.860 --> 01:23:56.060] argument that the trend line of this transaction per day is on the way up. It's unlikely to be [01:23:56.060 --> 01:24:03.560] spam related. It's unlikely to be like spammers are just kind of carefully spamming the network [01:24:03.560 --> 01:24:08.380] by just a little bit and then increasing the amount of spam that they send over time. [01:24:08.420 --> 01:24:14.100] You know, this by all indications seems to be organic growth in the demand for Monero transactions. [01:24:15.100 --> 01:24:22.400] It looks... so from here to here, from like this time in 2016 to this time today, that's a 10x [01:24:23.120 --> 01:24:29.580] increase in the transactions per day. So 10x in four years is what we're looking at in terms of [01:24:29.580 --> 01:24:34.120] transaction per day growth. It doesn't look like much on this chart, but if you think about it, [01:24:34.120 --> 01:24:38.360] that is quite significant. In four years from now at this pace, we're going to be looking at [01:24:38.360 --> 01:24:44.020] 100,000 transactions per day. And then in the year 2028, maybe in DEF CON we'll be showing a [01:24:44.020 --> 01:24:50.620] million transactions a day, who knows. But in the adaptive block size, there is a minor disincentive [01:24:50.620 --> 01:24:55.280] that kicks in when blocks get too big. So that disincentivizes miners from including a whole [01:24:55.280 --> 01:25:01.840] bunch of transactions into a block. And if that happens, there are user fees that also increase [01:25:01.840 --> 01:25:08.560] if the blocks get too big. So miners will continue to be... they won't be so disincentivized that they [01:25:08.560 --> 01:25:13.880] stop making blocks, because their reward is not going to go down to zero, because user fees are [01:25:13.880 --> 01:25:22.660] going to kick in. Yet there's a disincentive for miners to just blindly process like spam. [01:25:25.280 --> 01:25:30.620] All right, so moving on to the third part of the talk, which... so up to now there have been kind of, [01:25:31.100 --> 01:25:37.500] I would say, technical under the hood differences between Monero and Bitcoin. At this point of the [01:25:37.500 --> 01:25:41.860] talk, I want to talk about fungibility and transparency. And this is where the two kind of [01:25:41.860 --> 01:25:47.200] mission statements of these two cryptocurrency projects start to diverge quite strongly. [01:25:47.200 --> 01:25:53.420] Bitcoin is transparent. Etched forever, for everyone to see forever, is for every transaction [01:25:53.420 --> 01:25:57.620] you can see the sender, the receiver, and the amount. For every address, you can see a complete [01:25:57.620 --> 01:26:04.980] live balance history. And so this is contrary to what you might have heard from the popular press, [01:26:04.980 --> 01:26:10.780] if you're kind of new to getting into the real details of cryptocurrency, because the news [01:26:10.780 --> 01:26:15.780] reports always make Bitcoin out to be this anonymous currency that nobody knows anything [01:26:15.780 --> 01:26:19.740] about. Nothing could be further from the truth. It's actually completely transparent. It shows [01:26:19.740 --> 01:26:25.640] every single detail. So for example, for the high net worth clients that I work with [01:26:25.640 --> 01:26:30.560] in my consulting practice, this tends to be a showstopper once they know about it. Once they [01:26:30.560 --> 01:26:36.120] become aware of this fact that, hey, did you know that if you put, say, a million dollars into [01:26:36.120 --> 01:26:41.300] Bitcoin and you have a Bitcoin address that has a million worth of Bitcoin in it, everyone can [01:26:41.300 --> 01:26:46.860] see that. As soon as they know your Bitcoin address, anyone in the world can go to their [01:26:46.860 --> 01:26:51.740] blockchain explorer, type in that address and see, oh, hey, there's like 100 Bitcoin in there [01:26:51.740 --> 01:26:58.440] that's worth a lot of money. This is a showstopper for really anyone with wealth. No one with wealth [01:26:58.440 --> 01:27:07.740] wants to broadcast that to the world. It's indiscreet and it's unsafe to do that. [01:27:08.400 --> 01:27:14.220] So the fact that there's this transparency in Bitcoin, it puts innocent people and businesses [01:27:14.220 --> 01:27:19.980] at risk and also businesses, because businesses have as part of their secret sauce as to how they [01:27:19.980 --> 01:27:26.760] are able to serve humanity, make a profit at the same time, is that they have [01:27:26.760 --> 01:27:32.680] suppliers and customers. They have a certain pattern of suppliers they get their inputs from. [01:27:32.740 --> 01:27:37.420] They have certain vendors that they deal with and they buy products from their vendors at a [01:27:37.420 --> 01:27:42.120] certain time. Then they sell their products to their customers. So oftentimes the prices of those [01:27:42.120 --> 01:27:46.440] products might not be public knowledge if it's a business-to-business sort of transaction. [01:27:46.900 --> 01:27:52.220] And so there are lots of trade secrets that businesses have and there's no shame in that, [01:27:52.220 --> 01:27:58.660] whereas for some reason, for some people, any sort of desire for privacy gets portrayed as [01:27:58.660 --> 01:28:05.280] being something nefarious. For businesses, they routinely need privacy in order to survive as [01:28:05.280 --> 01:28:10.020] businesses, in order for their intellectual property, their trade secrets, to not be [01:28:10.020 --> 01:28:17.920] copied by competitors. Another problem in Bitcoin that goes beyond privacy is fungibility. [01:28:17.920 --> 01:28:23.680] That is that reputation transfers in the Bitcoin network as well as value. So for every coin in the [01:28:23.680 --> 01:28:28.600] Bitcoin network, it's traceable back to the miner. So it's as if you have a $10 bill and on the back [01:28:28.600 --> 01:28:33.860] of the $10 bill, there's a neat chart that shows for the entire history of the existence of that [01:28:33.860 --> 01:28:41.360] $10 bill, basically your address, your bank address. It might not be your name in picture, but [01:28:41.360 --> 01:28:47.320] it's your bank address, let's say, your bank account numbers. And then the account numbers [01:28:47.320 --> 01:28:52.900] of everyone before you who had that $10 bill going all the way back to the US Mint [01:28:52.900 --> 01:28:59.820] that fabricated the $10 bill. And you have a nice neat chart for all to see. It's even worse [01:28:59.820 --> 01:29:05.760] than that, because it's not that the $10 bill has that transparent list on it, because if it were [01:29:05.760 --> 01:29:10.000] actually on a physical piece of paper, then the holder of the piece of paper would be the only [01:29:10.000 --> 01:29:15.400] one who could see it. In Bitcoin, everyone in the world can see that nice transaction list [01:29:15.400 --> 01:29:21.380] for every piece of currency that's in the entire system. Every coin is traceable. Who owned it [01:29:21.380 --> 01:29:26.500] is traceable all the way back to the miner who first mined it. And what that does, first [01:29:26.500 --> 01:29:33.940] it invites voyeurism. So if you know a Bitcoin address, it's just natural to go to a Bitcoin [01:29:33.940 --> 01:29:37.900] explorer and type in the address and see how much money is there and see how many transactions they [01:29:37.900 --> 01:29:43.940] do. It's a part of the culture of Bitcoin to basically... it's normalized being nosy. [01:29:44.960 --> 01:29:50.900] I think it's a pernicious social effect of this feature of the protocol. There's also guilt [01:29:50.900 --> 01:29:56.020] by association. And this is far more serious. There are now many companies in existence [01:29:56.020 --> 01:30:00.940] whose job it is to try and associate names and faces with every account in Bitcoin, [01:30:00.940 --> 01:30:06.100] every address in Bitcoin. They're trying to dox everyone on the Bitcoin network. And what do they [01:30:06.100 --> 01:30:10.960] do with that information? They basically come up with the equivalent of a social credit score. [01:30:11.240 --> 01:30:18.880] Because every Bitcoin in existence can be traced as to who owned it, they can make a graph showing [01:30:20.300 --> 01:30:24.640] people transacting money with each other. And if any of these people happen to be a, quote, [01:30:24.640 --> 01:30:31.740] bad person, then those people who happen to have exchanged money with that bad person are now [01:30:31.740 --> 01:30:38.440] flagged as potentially being bad themselves. Now, the problem with this is that it's based on [01:30:38.440 --> 01:30:44.160] imperfect information that is often easy to misinterpret. So, for example, let's say [01:30:44.720 --> 01:30:52.820] somebody buys a car, right? Somebody buys a car and they pay for their purchase with Bitcoin. Or [01:30:52.820 --> 01:30:58.620] let's say the opposite, for example. You're selling your used car and you want to get Bitcoin for it. [01:30:58.620 --> 01:31:03.740] And so the person who you sell your car to gives you Bitcoin. And now, unbeknownst to you, the [01:31:03.740 --> 01:31:09.980] person who sold your Bitcoin... the person who bought your car and gave you Bitcoin for it, [01:31:09.980 --> 01:31:15.160] the way that they got their Bitcoin was that they were, for example, selling drugs on the dark web, [01:31:15.160 --> 01:31:18.940] right? And that's how they came up with that Bitcoin, which now you own because you sold [01:31:18.940 --> 01:31:26.120] your car to this person. And you also failed to do, like everyone else who sells their car [01:31:26.120 --> 01:31:31.280] to a stranger by posting an ad on Craigslist, you didn't do a thorough background check on this [01:31:31.280 --> 01:31:35.620] person who bought your car, you know, because they just had some Bitcoin. They had Bitcoin, you had a [01:31:35.620 --> 01:31:40.520] car, you did an exchange, you went on your way. Unbeknownst to you that they were a quote-unquote [01:31:40.520 --> 01:31:45.360] bad person. And now, because they were a bad person and the companies that are doing blockchain [01:31:45.360 --> 01:31:52.760] analysis know that, now they are looking at you and thinking, oh, this person just got, you know, [01:31:52.760 --> 01:32:00.980] $10,000 worth of Bitcoin from a known drug dealer. Maybe this person is supplying, you know, drug [01:32:00.980 --> 01:32:07.040] paraphernalia to that dealer. So now you are under suspicion for that. And it had nothing to do with [01:32:07.040 --> 01:32:11.900] you, right? But it had to do with the fact that this money is completely transparent and has this [01:32:11.900 --> 01:32:19.960] history behind it. What this means is that there is a social level of censorship, because now when [01:32:19.960 --> 01:32:24.860] this person who sells their, who sold their car and got this tainted Bitcoin, now this person [01:32:24.860 --> 01:32:31.360] tries to put their tainted Bitcoin into a crypto exchange to get USD out of it. Once they send [01:32:31.360 --> 01:32:36.720] their tainted Bitcoin to their exchange, it gets frozen, because now it's under suspicion. And now [01:32:36.720 --> 01:32:41.560] the customer who's done this has to go through all sorts of extra hoops to kind of prove their [01:32:41.560 --> 01:32:46.780] innocence. And to do that, they're trying to prove their innocence to somebody who really doesn't care [01:32:47.560 --> 01:32:52.320] to know the truth. They're just, they just want to cover liability on their side. They just [01:32:52.320 --> 01:32:57.620] want to make sure that they don't get in trouble. So, you know, probably the most, the easiest thing [01:32:57.620 --> 01:33:02.840] to do is just to, you know, quarantine that money, not give it back to the customer and wait for [01:33:02.840 --> 01:33:07.940] the authorities to give them permission to give it back, something like that. And none of this was, [01:33:07.940 --> 01:33:14.700] anything to do with the innocent person involved. So this is why the transparency of Bitcoin is a [01:33:14.700 --> 01:33:20.400] problem, even for innocent, squeaky people who have nothing to hide, is that because the system [01:33:20.400 --> 01:33:28.420] is transparent, false accusations can be made against them due to false assertions, incomplete [01:33:28.420 --> 01:33:32.820] misunderstandings that other third parties are making based on that transaction data. [01:33:33.600 --> 01:33:39.900] In contrast, Monero is fungible, which means that every Monero is indistinguishable from every other [01:33:39.900 --> 01:33:45.200] Monero. There are three technologies that promote this indistinguishability. One is ring signatures. [01:33:45.200 --> 01:33:50.920] So those keep transacting senders private. Stealth addresses keep transacting receivers private. And [01:33:50.920 --> 01:33:56.920] ring CT keeps transaction amount sent private. So all three of these are present on the Monero [01:33:56.920 --> 01:34:03.120] blockchain. But when a person joins the Monero network with, by downloading the Monero software [01:34:03.120 --> 01:34:08.040] at getmonero.org, and running that on their computer and downloading a copy of the blockchain [01:34:08.040 --> 01:34:15.340] from the, from their peer miners, then they are getting a complete history of who sent what to [01:34:15.340 --> 01:34:20.560] who in Monero. The difference is in Monero, it's all encrypted, because by default, it's none of [01:34:20.560 --> 01:34:25.120] your business, like what the details of those. You can, you will know that transactions happened. [01:34:25.120 --> 01:34:30.160] You will know when they happened. And you will know that they happened, but you won't see the [01:34:30.160 --> 01:34:35.000] details of what happened. You won't see the details of who's, who was the sender, who is the receiver [01:34:35.000 --> 01:34:41.860] and or what the amount was. Two of these three technologies were included in the original white [01:34:41.860 --> 01:34:45.780] paper that defined Monero, which is the crypto note white paper, ring signatures and stealth [01:34:45.780 --> 01:34:51.720] addresses, but ring CT was not. Ring CT was a innovation. And the history of how this got into [01:34:51.720 --> 01:34:56.880] the network is an example of the dedication of this group of people to put it in. Ring CT [01:34:56.880 --> 01:35:02.520] required several ingredients to come to fruition. It first required original cryptographic research. [01:35:02.520 --> 01:35:09.700] We're talking postdoc PhD mathematician level cryptographic research that goes through audit [01:35:09.700 --> 01:35:19.140] and peer review. Second, you need development of code to implement this new math. And, you know, [01:35:19.140 --> 01:35:24.100] on the sharp end of the bell curve to be doing this because like the math is not trivial and [01:35:24.100 --> 01:35:29.580] then to write code that faithfully implements that new math is also not trivial. To write [01:35:29.580 --> 01:35:36.880] clean code that does not screw up somehow in implementing that is even harder. And so that [01:35:36.880 --> 01:35:42.360] was another ingredient in getting ring CT implemented. Also, just in case there were [01:35:42.360 --> 01:35:47.220] problems in the code that got written, it got subject to external audit. So basically the [01:35:47.220 --> 01:35:54.380] community was solicited for donations to pay for external auditors to examine the code of ring CT [01:35:54.380 --> 01:36:01.560] and make sure that there were no subtle errors of memory overwrites or stuff, you know, or such. [01:36:02.100 --> 01:36:08.180] So and that got approved. Then finally, it doesn't matter if code gets written if nobody actually [01:36:08.180 --> 01:36:15.660] runs it. So the community of Monero node owners needed to get on board and download this and agree [01:36:15.660 --> 01:36:21.760] and update their computers once the new code came out. And because this was a hard fork that that [01:36:21.760 --> 01:36:27.700] ring CT was again, a hard fork being that it's not backwards compatible, which means if if a [01:36:27.700 --> 01:36:31.660] node owner fails to update their computer, they're going to be left out, they're going to be kicked [01:36:31.660 --> 01:36:40.490] off the coin. So all these ingredients had to happen for ring CT to go in. Here are some charts [01:36:40.490 --> 01:36:46.590] that show the evolution of how this went down. On the top, I'm showing daily average bytes per [01:36:46.590 --> 01:36:52.630] transaction. This is how many bytes, like how much disk space is taken up by a transaction on [01:36:52.630 --> 01:36:57.450] both the Bitcoin network and the Monero network. Bitcoin is the chart you see in black. And it's [01:36:57.450 --> 01:37:03.170] been pretty constant over time. So that's one of their, I guess, that's part of their community [01:37:03.170 --> 01:37:07.550] ethos over at Bitcoin is that they want a stable protocol, they don't want to rock the boat, [01:37:07.550 --> 01:37:11.470] they don't want to make too many changes, because they feel that they have an enormous amount of [01:37:11.470 --> 01:37:18.050] money in custody, under their control, they don't want to do anything that might jeopardize [01:37:18.670 --> 01:37:25.590] safety in their view. Of course, if you take a broader view, the amount of money in Bitcoin is [01:37:25.590 --> 01:37:32.230] just like a trivial amount in terms of global finance. So it's arguable as to whether that [01:37:32.230 --> 01:37:41.490] sort of high horse view of the importance of the intrinsic goodness of what's already been done [01:37:41.490 --> 01:37:46.090] is maybe subject to question. That's something that's different in Monero. In Monero, [01:37:46.090 --> 01:37:51.710] we are used to acknowledging that this is all experimental, acknowledging that they're going [01:37:51.710 --> 01:37:57.970] to be new research, new innovations that make fungibility even better. And we go through the [01:37:58.510 --> 01:38:04.270] time and the trouble and the effort to actually make that happen. So in Monero, you can see that [01:38:04.270 --> 01:38:10.670] the bytes per transaction started out as being pretty high, they're much bigger than in Bitcoin. [01:38:10.670 --> 01:38:14.510] And this was in the early days of denominated outputs. So in the early days of Monero, [01:38:14.510 --> 01:38:20.130] you had, for example, little nuggets of Monero, you can think of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Monero, [01:38:20.130 --> 01:38:27.210] like little dollar bills, but they're like Monero bills. So doing a Monero transaction in the old [01:38:27.210 --> 01:38:32.030] days meant that if you were going to send 123 Monero to somebody, you would need to scrounge [01:38:32.030 --> 01:38:37.110] around and find a 100 Monero chunk, a 20 Monero chunk, and a three Monero chunk, and then you [01:38:37.110 --> 01:38:42.130] would send those out. And then those like little dollar bills would have to get broken up and then [01:38:42.130 --> 01:38:47.650] sent to whoever you were sending your money to. And so as a result, there were a large number of [01:38:47.650 --> 01:38:52.390] inputs, large number of outputs on every transaction. And there were the transactions [01:38:52.390 --> 01:38:59.210] rather large. But this had the drawback of if you can see the denominations that are being sent [01:38:59.210 --> 01:39:09.190] around, that's harmful to fungibility. Because you can see that this, you know, certain accounts [01:39:09.190 --> 01:39:16.290] on the Monero network seem to have been identified with certain denominations of Monero chunks. [01:39:16.290 --> 01:39:21.350] And so you can make some assertions about that break fungibility in that case. [01:39:21.350 --> 01:39:25.630] There were some papers that were published that made the case that fungibility in Monero was [01:39:26.590 --> 01:39:32.690] potentially breakable under certain circumstances. But these papers were written before 2017. And yet [01:39:32.690 --> 01:39:39.070] they continue to be kind of parroted about to this day as and shown as examples of weaknesses in [01:39:39.070 --> 01:39:45.450] Monero, whereas this got fixed in 2017, kind of an eternity ago in cryptocurrency standards. [01:39:46.010 --> 01:39:52.290] So RingCT was enabled in 2017, at which point the bytes per transaction went up by quite a bit. [01:39:52.290 --> 01:39:57.310] Then RingCT became mandatory. And now you can see that transactions were about, you know, [01:39:57.310 --> 01:40:02.870] 1000 times larger than Bitcoin transactions in throughout 2017, 2018. This was until bullet [01:40:02.870 --> 01:40:07.630] proofs came around. So this was another independent research effort, in which it was found that the [01:40:08.290 --> 01:40:15.030] higher level math that RingCT used in order to ensure that the value of outputs was the same as [01:40:15.030 --> 01:40:20.010] the value of the inputs, i.e. ensure that no money was being created out of thin air, [01:40:20.010 --> 01:40:24.810] that cryptographic proof could be done in much smaller byte space than could have been done [01:40:24.810 --> 01:40:30.070] earlier. And so as you can see, overnight, basically, the transaction size dropped back down [01:40:30.070 --> 01:40:37.070] with RingCT and bullet proofs. Now, recently, there's been CLSAGs. This is a new research [01:40:37.070 --> 01:40:42.270] initiative that was developed by the Monero Research Lab, and it's gone through audit, [01:40:42.270 --> 01:40:48.210] and the audit came back good. And so in October, we are projecting to go with another hard fork to [01:40:48.210 --> 01:40:53.810] implement CLSAGs, and that is going to decrease the transaction sizes in Monero by about 20%, [01:40:53.810 --> 01:40:58.930] which this dotted line is kind of showing you the magnitude of that. So basically, there is [01:40:58.930 --> 01:41:05.730] ongoing active research in Monero to improve the way the engine works under the hood. [01:41:06.090 --> 01:41:10.290] This is the kind of thing that is actually rare to see in other cryptocurrencies. Other [01:41:10.290 --> 01:41:17.590] cryptocurrencies tend to make big announcements, use lots of buzzwords, and not actually improve [01:41:17.590 --> 01:41:23.570] anything. And it's actually the opposite in Monero. There's not a lot of big splashy [01:41:23.570 --> 01:41:29.630] announcements. People work generally quietly without fanfare, and from time to time introduce [01:41:29.630 --> 01:41:35.010] something that improves the actual product. All right, and the bottom here, you can see the daily [01:41:35.010 --> 01:41:41.010] average transaction fee. And so over history, and the scale here is, again, quite large. So it's one [01:41:41.010 --> 01:41:46.310] penny to $100 per transaction. So at times of peak demand, like for example, in the last bull market [01:41:46.310 --> 01:41:52.010] in the end of 2017, you can see that transaction fees were, in both Bitcoin and Monero, were quite [01:41:52.010 --> 01:41:59.410] high. They were in like the $50 range. But then now, since then, bulletproofs have gone in. [01:41:59.450 --> 01:42:04.430] When bulletproofs went in, not only did the transaction size drop, but also the fee to send a [01:42:04.430 --> 01:42:10.110] transaction dropped by that order of magnitude sort of level. So that now, transaction fees in [01:42:10.110 --> 01:42:15.790] Monero are on the order of a penny. Whereas in Bitcoin, now that there's what is potentially a [01:42:15.790 --> 01:42:23.390] new bull run starting, you see transactions in Bitcoin creeping up again to now the $5-$10 [01:42:23.390 --> 01:42:31.110] range. And if there's another burst of interest in cryptocurrencies that is driven by the price, [01:42:31.110 --> 01:42:36.650] expect to see, again, another spike in the transaction cost for sending Bitcoin. [01:42:37.190 --> 01:42:42.630] It might spike again in Monero too, who knows, but we're already at a sub-penny level already. So [01:42:44.090 --> 01:42:50.210] we're looking good on the fee front. So Monero benefits people with nothing to hide. And [01:42:50.210 --> 01:42:55.710] primarily it does that by eliminating the risk of receiving coins that are tainted due to no [01:42:55.950 --> 01:43:01.050] fault of the receiver. It's even worse than that. So for example, let's say you're an owner of [01:43:01.050 --> 01:43:07.550] Bitcoin and you get hacked. Somebody steals your Bitcoin, right? And let's say that the person who [01:43:07.550 --> 01:43:13.750] stole your Bitcoin now goes on the dark web and spends it. Whereas let's say you are a squeaky [01:43:13.750 --> 01:43:20.390] clean person. You don't even know what the dark web is, or you do absolutely nothing that could [01:43:20.390 --> 01:43:25.370] get you in trouble. You're totally 100% squeaky clean, but you have Bitcoin and this Bitcoin is [01:43:25.370 --> 01:43:29.450] on a transparent ledger, which is completely traceable. So now you get hacked, you've lost [01:43:29.450 --> 01:43:34.170] your money. So in addition to suffering the loss of your money, now it turns out that the person who [01:43:34.170 --> 01:43:41.150] stole your money is now using it to buy drugs, right? So now your address, your identity is [01:43:41.150 --> 01:43:45.810] associated with drug buying, right? Let's say something really bad happens. The person who [01:43:45.810 --> 01:43:51.630] stole your money does something extremely bad with it. Now your identity is caught up with that. [01:43:51.650 --> 01:43:56.710] And so now you might be even investigated for crimes that were committed [01:43:56.710 --> 01:44:02.970] with your formerly your Bitcoin that got stolen. And so now, not only are you suffering the loss [01:44:02.970 --> 01:44:09.110] of your money, you're having to now explain to people that, no, no, no, it's not the case that I [01:44:09.550 --> 01:44:14.130] paid this guy to buy drugs for me. I actually had my money stolen from me. [01:44:14.130 --> 01:44:17.790] You know, you have to... all sorts of headache can happen. [01:44:19.970 --> 01:44:24.290] All right. One way to look at this is in the Akerlof framework. So this was a Nobel prize [01:44:24.290 --> 01:44:29.270] winning paper in economics. It has to do with used cars. And so I relate this. So first I'll [01:44:29.270 --> 01:44:34.630] explain the paper and then I'll apply it because that has applicants to both safe mode Defcon, [01:44:34.630 --> 01:44:39.790] like our virtual meeting that we're doing, and also a surveillance state with transparent coins. [01:44:40.010 --> 01:44:42.990] So there are two used cars types. There are lemons and there are peaches. [01:44:43.210 --> 01:44:48.130] Lemons are the cars that are going to break right away. And peaches are the well-maintained used [01:44:48.130 --> 01:44:53.770] cars. So sellers know which type of car they have. If you own a lemon, you know it because [01:44:53.770 --> 01:44:58.290] you were there in the hurricane that the, you know, when the, when your car was under, you know, [01:44:58.290 --> 01:45:02.950] five feet of water and flooded your car, it was yours. And you know that that happened. [01:45:03.070 --> 01:45:06.990] And now you're trying to sell your car because it's damaged. That's a lemon. A peach is a car [01:45:06.990 --> 01:45:11.430] that, you know, this is the type of owner who goes and changes the oil and does all the maintenance [01:45:11.430 --> 01:45:15.790] that you have to do on a car to keep it in good condition. So the sellers know what kind of car [01:45:15.790 --> 01:45:20.050] they have, but the buyers don't because both lemon sellers and peach sellers make sure that [01:45:20.050 --> 01:45:26.130] the paint job on their car is extra shiny. So as on a superficial level, both lemons and peaches [01:45:26.130 --> 01:45:30.390] look identical to buyers. So the buyers can't tell lemons apart from peaches, but they know [01:45:30.390 --> 01:45:34.550] that they are ignorant in this situation. They know that they could end up with a lemon. [01:45:34.610 --> 01:45:39.770] So the Akerlof paper brilliantly explains this race to the bottom that happens in this [01:45:39.770 --> 01:45:45.210] asymmetric information market in which buyers are armed with less information than the sellers are. [01:45:45.910 --> 01:45:50.670] If you look at what is the offer price that a buyer is going to offer for a car, [01:45:50.670 --> 01:45:55.970] the offer price is going to be equal to the lemon price because that's the minimum possible price [01:45:55.970 --> 01:46:00.750] that a car could be, right? Lemons are worth less than peaches, so at the minimum you're going to be [01:46:00.750 --> 01:46:05.410] offering the lemon price. And then you're going to offer more than the lemon price, but that's [01:46:05.410 --> 01:46:09.570] going to be contingent on what you think the probability is that you're going to get a peach [01:46:09.570 --> 01:46:13.750] versus a lemon. So if you think there's a zero percent chance you're going to get a peach, well [01:46:13.750 --> 01:46:17.330] you're just going to offer the lemon price. If you think there's a hundred percent chance that [01:46:17.330 --> 01:46:22.830] you're going to get a peach, then you're going to offer the lemon price plus the difference between [01:46:22.830 --> 01:46:26.650] the peach and the lemon price. In other words, you'll offer the peach price. If you think the [01:46:26.650 --> 01:46:30.370] probability is somewhere in between, then you're going to adjust your offer price to be somewhere [01:46:30.370 --> 01:46:35.630] in between. So that's the offer price that a rational buyer is going to offer for a car in [01:46:35.630 --> 01:46:39.670] this market in which they are ignorant, but they know that they're ignorant and they can price [01:46:39.670 --> 01:46:45.890] their uncertainty. They can adjust their offer price to account for this uncertainty. [01:46:46.390 --> 01:46:51.750] So what do the lemon sellers do when they see this price? Well, they see a great offer because [01:46:51.750 --> 01:46:58.270] they're selling a lemon and the sucker here, the sucker, the buyer, is offering quite a bit higher [01:46:58.270 --> 01:47:02.990] price than the lemon price. So the lemon seller is delighted. They're going to say, okay, I thought [01:47:02.990 --> 01:47:09.490] about it and yeah, I guess I'll accept your offer, right? So that's what the lemon seller says. The [01:47:09.490 --> 01:47:15.710] they know that the value of their car is worth what a peach is, but the buyers are ignorant. [01:47:15.710 --> 01:47:20.330] Like you can tell them all day that you've done a great job of maintaining your car, but the buyers [01:47:20.330 --> 01:47:23.390] at the end of the day, they're going to be skeptical. They don't know if you're really [01:47:23.390 --> 01:47:26.050] telling them the truth. They don't know if you're telling them the partial truth. [01:47:26.350 --> 01:47:30.910] So the price that the buyer is going to offer is less than that of the peach price. [01:47:30.990 --> 01:47:35.190] And so what's going to happen then? The peach sellers are going to become discouraged. They're [01:47:35.190 --> 01:47:40.690] going to be basically kind of disappointed by the fact that the market is not taking to account [01:47:40.690 --> 01:47:45.570] their goodness, their moral goodness, and taking care of their car is not going to be reflected in [01:47:45.670 --> 01:47:51.130] a high marketplace price. So they will leave the market. They will delete their Craigslist ad. [01:47:51.130 --> 01:47:55.810] They will stop selling their car. They will just keep their car until it runs into the ground. [01:47:55.830 --> 01:48:01.550] What happens then? Because the peach sellers leave, like a few of them leave, [01:48:01.550 --> 01:48:06.550] now the proportion of cars in the market that are lemons have gone up. [01:48:06.690 --> 01:48:12.490] A greater fraction of the cars that are available for sale are now lemons. And eventually, [01:48:12.490 --> 01:48:16.770] buyers are going to get wise to that fact. When they get wise to that fact, they're going to lower [01:48:16.770 --> 01:48:22.670] further their offer price. And thus the negative feedback loop is born because the offer price [01:48:22.670 --> 01:48:28.450] keeps going down. Every time the offer price goes down, lemon sellers still accept it because [01:48:28.890 --> 01:48:33.110] they're getting an offer that is still higher than the lemon price. They're making a profit. [01:48:33.110 --> 01:48:36.450] And more peach sellers are going to get more and more discouraged and leave the market. [01:48:36.450 --> 01:48:42.610] You have a situation at the end where only lemons exist in this car market. So this was the Ekeloft [01:48:42.610 --> 01:48:50.270] paper that got the Nobel Prize. Let's think about this in terms of the pandemic. So in health terms, [01:48:50.270 --> 01:48:56.550] peaches are people who are healthy, right? So healthy people are the peaches and they are now [01:48:57.190 --> 01:49:03.730] faced with the decision of do I engage in this super thing called DEF CON, in which a whole [01:49:03.730 --> 01:49:09.730] bunch of smart people get together and talk about cool, geeky stuff. And you make new geeky friends [01:49:09.730 --> 01:49:17.590] and you're out in Vegas and have fun. So that decision is basically, are you going to engage [01:49:17.590 --> 01:49:23.870] in this social marketplace in which you are dealing with other people? So you could be [01:49:23.870 --> 01:49:30.750] with all peaches when you get to the live in person DEF CON. That is, everyone could be healthy. [01:49:31.490 --> 01:49:35.590] But you are aware that that's not the case. There are going to be some lemons. There are [01:49:35.590 --> 01:49:39.790] going to be some people who are sick and don't know it because of the nature of the virus. [01:49:40.110 --> 01:49:45.790] So basically, you have to gauge your overall social utility of going to the conference [01:49:45.790 --> 01:49:50.090] by the probability that you're going to end up with a lemon, i.e. get sick. [01:49:50.090 --> 01:49:55.970] And so the rational decision, if the penalty function of getting a lemon is large enough [01:49:55.970 --> 01:50:00.990] and the probability of it is getting large enough, then the rational thing to do is to withdraw from [01:50:00.990 --> 01:50:05.930] that marketplace and decide to do DEF CON in safe mode. And that's exactly what we've done this year. [01:50:06.970 --> 01:50:11.010] Let's apply this to the marketplace for transparent coins. In transparent coins, [01:50:11.010 --> 01:50:16.290] or surveillance coins as I like to call them, the complete history of every coin is traceable [01:50:16.290 --> 01:50:23.510] going back. That means if you're a squeaky clean person, the analogy is that you are a [01:50:23.510 --> 01:50:28.850] healthy person. You are a peach seller. You are a squeaky clean person with a good reputation. [01:50:28.850 --> 01:50:36.570] And so your social status is healthy. The thing is, if you deal with Bitcoin with other people, [01:50:36.570 --> 01:50:41.150] are you going to unknowingly be dealing, are you going to by mistake do a transaction with somebody [01:50:41.150 --> 01:50:47.830] who is not healthy in terms of a legal status? You don't know that. [01:50:48.830 --> 01:50:53.890] Just like the lemon buyer and just like the person who's thinking about going to a con, [01:50:54.630 --> 01:50:59.890] you could suffer a lemon consequence just by dealing with other people in this network [01:50:59.890 --> 01:51:05.010] because this network has this undesirable feature that the coins are not fungible. [01:51:05.310 --> 01:51:09.730] So what is a squeaky clean person going to do? They're going to tend to want to [01:51:09.730 --> 01:51:16.430] go to a coin that rewards them and does not put them in jeopardy due to the actions that they [01:51:16.430 --> 01:51:20.730] can't control of other people on the network. So you're going to see the squeaky clean people [01:51:20.730 --> 01:51:26.470] going to something like Monero, which is counterintuitive, certainly according to the [01:51:27.070 --> 01:51:32.910] biased and misleading portrayal that often gets put on Monero. It's the squeaky clean people who [01:51:32.910 --> 01:51:39.150] need Monero the most. So Monero is what Bitcoin noobs think they bought. It's sound money in [01:51:39.150 --> 01:51:49.460] safe mode. All right. I have limited time, so I'm going to just go to talking about how to get [01:51:49.460 --> 01:51:56.020] involved. One way you could get involved is to purchase some Monero. Because again, I started [01:51:56.020 --> 01:52:02.760] this talk talking about the kind of out of control extension of the fiat money supply around the [01:52:02.760 --> 01:52:07.860] world that is currently happening as a result of the pandemic. And that led to the idea that one [01:52:07.860 --> 01:52:12.220] should maybe spend some time looking into alternate forms of scarcity that are not [01:52:12.220 --> 01:52:16.520] controlled by governments. That would be precious metals. And also, now that there's Nakamoto [01:52:16.520 --> 01:52:23.420] consensus, Bitcoin and Monero. How does one kind of process the relative expensiveness or cheapness [01:52:23.420 --> 01:52:30.600] of these assets? So here is, I think, probably the only price chart that should be looked at by [01:52:30.600 --> 01:52:36.200] anyone who's looking to think of cryptocurrency as an investment. And that is, I'm doing a long [01:52:36.200 --> 01:52:40.660] term timescale. So this is from 2009 to the present. 2009 being, of course, when the Bitcoin [01:52:40.660 --> 01:52:45.160] white paper came into being. And what I'm doing here is I'm showing the value of all the world's [01:52:45.160 --> 01:52:50.660] Bitcoin. And I'm dividing that by the value of all the world's gold. All the world's above ground [01:52:50.660 --> 01:52:55.220] gold. So there are several variables that go into this chart. First, there's the number of Bitcoin [01:52:55.220 --> 01:52:59.840] in existence at any given time. There's the price of the Bitcoin. There's the amount of gold in [01:52:59.840 --> 01:53:04.380] existence at any given time and the price of gold. You need all four of those ingredients to come up [01:53:04.380 --> 01:53:08.700] with this ratio chart, which I'm showing a log scale again. And then I've done that again for [01:53:08.700 --> 01:53:13.220] Monero. This is the value of all the world's Monero divided by the value of all the world's gold. [01:53:13.320 --> 01:53:18.220] And what you see here is that currently, all the world's Bitcoin is worth something like 2% [01:53:18.220 --> 01:53:23.580] that of all the world's gold. And all the Monero in the world is worth about one one hundredth of [01:53:23.580 --> 01:53:28.260] one percent of all the world's gold. You might be aware that there's been a recent kind of [01:53:28.260 --> 01:53:33.600] spike of interest in cryptocurrency prices. Bitcoin is back over $10,000 for the first time [01:53:33.600 --> 01:53:38.960] in a few years. So there's been a lot of hype, but you don't see that here because there's also [01:53:38.960 --> 01:53:45.440] been a spike in the price of gold. So basically, the relative valuation of crypto to gold has [01:53:45.440 --> 01:53:52.780] been flat in the post-pandemic time period. Now, given that gold is a physical good, [01:53:52.780 --> 01:53:57.740] which is subject to all of the surface contamination issues that any [01:53:58.460 --> 01:54:03.340] physical object has the disadvantage of suffering in the COVID era, [01:54:03.340 --> 01:54:09.820] is this rational that that crypto to gold cap ratios have been flat during the pandemic? I'll [01:54:09.820 --> 01:54:15.280] leave that to you to decide. Second, of these two cryptocurrencies, there is one that actually acts [01:54:15.280 --> 01:54:21.380] like gold because it's fungible. Gold does not have on the back of every gold bar a list of [01:54:21.380 --> 01:54:28.340] everyone who owned that gold bar before you did. And so it's actually a more apt comparison to [01:54:28.340 --> 01:54:34.440] compare the value of Monero versus gold. So is it rational that the amount, the valuation of Monero [01:54:34.440 --> 01:54:39.820] is one ten thousandth of that of gold, whereas the valuation of Bitcoin is one, basically, [01:54:39.820 --> 01:54:45.760] one fiftieth that of gold? So that's another question to think about. One thing I also wanted [01:54:45.760 --> 01:54:53.200] to show was a chart that I think counters this still and very stale narrative that there's [01:54:53.200 --> 01:54:59.960] infinite inflation in Monero. So what I've done is I've, I'm answering this question. Let's say you [01:54:59.960 --> 01:55:07.420] have an investor who today decides that they want to buy one millionth, so one out of every one [01:55:07.420 --> 01:55:14.500] million of one of these alternative forms of scarcity. And to protect themselves against [01:55:14.500 --> 01:55:20.000] inflation, they are not going to buy one millionth of today's supply. They are going to buy one [01:55:20.000 --> 01:55:26.420] millionth of the supply in 100 years time. So they're going to look at what is the supply of [01:55:26.420 --> 01:55:33.540] this scarce asset going to be in the year 2120. And I would like to buy one millionth of that today. [01:55:33.540 --> 01:55:37.860] So that's the question I'm answering. First, let's look at gold. So currently there are about [01:55:37.860 --> 01:55:44.880] 200,000 metric tons of above ground gold, and gold has been expanding at about 1.8% per year. [01:55:44.920 --> 01:55:49.820] When you compound that over 100 years, that ends up being pretty significant. So in 2120, at that [01:55:49.820 --> 01:55:54.500] rate, there's going to be over a million metric tons of gold, which means to buy one one millionth [01:55:54.500 --> 01:55:59.320] of all the gold in the world, you're going to have to end up buying more than a metric ton of it, [01:55:59.320 --> 01:56:04.680] which at the current price is going to be $76 million worth of gold. That buys you one one [01:56:04.680 --> 01:56:10.020] millionth of the projected gold supply in the year 2120. So let's do that with Bitcoin. So with [01:56:10.020 --> 01:56:14.880] Bitcoin, they're going to, you know, be very proud that 100 years from today, there's going to be [01:56:14.880 --> 01:56:20.040] only 21 million Bitcoin in existence. And that's an easy number for even normies to remember and [01:56:20.040 --> 01:56:25.540] understand. So today, there are about 18 million Bitcoin. In the future, there'll be 21 million. [01:56:25.540 --> 01:56:32.440] How much does it cost? $244,000. How about in Monero? Well, here's today's emission. Now we [01:56:32.440 --> 01:56:36.700] have the tail emission, right? So that commonly gets thrown about as being infinite inflation. [01:56:36.700 --> 01:56:41.260] Well, actually, we know what it's going to be. And in 100 years from now, it's not that bad. [01:56:41.280 --> 01:56:46.480] The coin supply in 100 years from now in Monero will be less than double what it is today. [01:56:46.480 --> 01:56:52.100] That's not too bad for a century. So to buy one one millionth of all the Monero that will be in [01:56:52.100 --> 01:56:59.900] the world in the year 2120 will cost you a total of $3,000. So some more framework for [01:57:00.460 --> 01:57:04.980] people's consideration when assessing the relative valuation of these assets. [01:57:06.540 --> 01:57:12.700] Okay. Thank you for listening. If you want to learn more about Monero, there's [01:57:12.700 --> 01:57:19.700] monerovillage.org for the rest of the festivities happening this week. Also, the official website [01:57:19.700 --> 01:57:25.740] is getmonero.org. That's important to know. It's getmonero.org, not .com, not other variants. [01:57:25.740 --> 01:57:30.220] If you want to get in touch with me here at DEF CON on the discourse, I'm intj440. [01:57:30.320 --> 01:57:33.880] Or if you want to get in touch with me over email, it's Daniel at Sweetwater Consulting. [01:57:33.980 --> 01:57:34.900] Thanks for your attention.