[00:00.790 --> 00:06.590]  Okay, welcome to my talk, COVID-1984, propaganda and surveillance during a pandemic.
[00:08.090 --> 00:13.830]  Before we start, I would like to make a brief introduction both to this talk and to myself.
[00:14.550 --> 00:18.390]  My name is Mauro Eldritch, I work as a cyber security architect,
[00:18.870 --> 00:27.210]  I'm the founder of DC5411 Argentina, and I was a speaker for DEF CON Las Vegas,
[00:27.210 --> 00:32.610]  Dragonjar Colombia, POSCON Iran, and Texas Cyber Summit, among other conferences.
[00:32.610 --> 00:38.270]  I'm a returning speaker to this village, I spoke here on DEF CON 26.
[00:40.430 --> 00:46.490]  And this talk is about explaining the political situation of surveillance and propaganda in
[00:46.490 --> 00:53.510]  Argentina, although it is also compatible with the same situation in other countries and regions.
[00:53.510 --> 01:00.410]  This will be explained from a hacker's point of view, using a hacker's toolbox, which in my case
[01:00.410 --> 01:06.550]  includes social engineering and open source intelligence, and there's even some application
[01:06.550 --> 01:15.790]  reverse engineering at the end. This talk will be divided into two chapters. The first propaganda
[01:16.270 --> 01:21.310]  about the Argentine pro-government propaganda apparatus and social networks seen from the
[01:21.310 --> 01:28.410]  inside. We will see the process from the scratch, from the infiltration of a sock puppet account
[01:28.410 --> 01:37.650]  into the apparatus to its internal operation. The second part is surveillance. We will dissect
[01:37.650 --> 01:44.750]  the Cuidar COVID-19 mobile application, which is now mandatory by law in order to circulate.
[01:44.750 --> 01:50.750]  So if you want to leave your home, if you want to step away from your doorstep,
[01:50.750 --> 01:59.030]  you have to have this application installed on your phone. And we will dissect this application
[01:59.710 --> 02:08.250]  uncovering many privacy abuses, bad practices, and lots of material worth of appearing on Reddit,
[02:08.250 --> 02:17.490]  especially on Programming Horror subreddit. Just a brief disclaimer, every item disclosed here is
[02:17.490 --> 02:25.270]  publicly available through OSINT. On my jurisdiction, it is totally legal to reverse
[02:25.270 --> 02:33.870]  engineer any application on any software, and I wasn't involved in any illegal activity directly
[02:33.870 --> 02:41.870]  or indirectly. So that being said, let's start with our first chapter, propaganda.
[02:44.290 --> 02:52.150]  So, what is propaganda, you might ask? Propaganda is a communication that is primarily
[02:52.750 --> 03:00.410]  focused on influencing an audience and furthering an agenda, which might not be objective or might
[03:00.410 --> 03:08.910]  not be real at all, and that may be presenting facts selectively. You might have heard the term
[03:08.910 --> 03:18.590]  alternative facts recently in media. Well, it's probably related to this kind of behavior.
[03:20.390 --> 03:29.090]  Online, agents of propaganda are called trolls. They massively comment on social networks,
[03:29.090 --> 03:35.050]  supporting a certain government, in this case, or a certain movement. It may not always be a
[03:35.050 --> 03:42.970]  government, but a political movement. They try to establish their own debates and trends.
[03:42.970 --> 03:46.650]  For instance, in my country, it's pretty popular to see trendings like
[03:46.650 --> 03:52.140]  thanks, President Fernandez, or we support you, President Fernandez.
[03:53.530 --> 04:01.750]  They are also maybe found diverting the focus from opposition debates. For example, every time
[04:02.610 --> 04:10.730]  an opposition part tries to open a thread or tries to communicate something, you might find
[04:10.730 --> 04:19.990]  the trolls leaving spam comments, fancams, or any other material that, when exposed repeatedly,
[04:19.990 --> 04:26.510]  could turn this thread into something really difficult to follow for legit users or for
[04:26.510 --> 04:34.850]  interested users. So it may turn the conversation into something unbearable.
[04:35.900 --> 04:42.670]  They also work by establishing negative trends against the opposition, and they are usually
[04:42.670 --> 04:49.700]  grouped into troll farms, where they work together in an organized manner, surprisingly.
[04:51.700 --> 05:00.860]  How do you recognize a troll? Okay, first, it's pretty simple, because lots of default
[05:02.160 --> 05:08.480]  configurations on their profile are present. For example, they don't have a picture,
[05:08.480 --> 05:15.620]  a profile picture. They use a fake one or a stock one. There are lots of numbers in their
[05:15.620 --> 05:21.660]  handlers. For instance, Mauro and a bunch of numbers. That's pretty common, pretty normal
[05:21.660 --> 05:27.520]  on Twitter, actually, because that's the default username that Twitter gives you
[05:27.520 --> 05:36.080]  and allows you to change later. They share common terms and phrases. They have their own languages,
[05:36.080 --> 05:41.800]  surprisingly. They agree on a common version to answer debates. For example,
[05:41.800 --> 05:45.620]  the president's offshore accounts are a media operation.
[05:46.200 --> 05:53.780]  So they are basically saying that everyone else is lying, and they are not. And they obviously
[05:53.780 --> 06:01.100]  work in swarm behavior. They never come alone. They act like a swarm.
[06:02.060 --> 06:08.800]  Many governments are credited with having online propaganda apparatus and agents. For example,
[06:08.800 --> 06:17.460]  Russia, with the collapse of the Trolls of Olgino. China and the 57th party. North Korea,
[06:17.460 --> 06:22.960]  with the United Front Department. Venezuela, with the Armada Bolivariana de Trolls,
[06:22.960 --> 06:31.740]  which barely translated to English is Bolivarian Army of Trolls. And also Argentina, with the
[06:31.740 --> 06:40.000]  Ciber-Cas, or Tropa-Ca, which translated from Spanish is K-Troop or Cyber-K,
[06:40.000 --> 06:45.720]  which is not actually a K-pop supporting fandom. It's valid, the clarification.
[06:47.620 --> 06:53.680]  This global advance on propaganda apparatus around the world is such that there are social
[06:53.680 --> 07:01.380]  networks with firm positions towards them. For example, Counter-Social is against it,
[07:01.380 --> 07:06.840]  and countries with the highest propaganda incidents are absolutely banned,
[07:06.840 --> 07:11.630]  blocked entirely by their IP block. Some of them are listed here.
[07:13.580 --> 07:20.780]  And there are other social media sites, for example, this one in my country, that supports
[07:20.780 --> 07:27.700]  the propaganda behavior. Facebookular.net was an Argentine social network against
[07:27.700 --> 07:34.980]  establishment and imperialism, and it's a firm supporter of the Peronist party.
[07:35.380 --> 07:41.200]  It was a place where only its militants participated, and it was backed, supported,
[07:41.460 --> 07:49.680]  by the Ministry of Culture. At a first sight, you might obviously see that this is a bad rip-off of
[07:49.680 --> 07:58.680]  Facebook, and it even allows you to register with Facebook. This project is now defunct,
[07:58.680 --> 08:06.380]  and it's no longer active, but it was heavily used by users from Argentina and Venezuela
[08:07.380 --> 08:09.700]  some years ago.
[08:12.220 --> 08:17.660]  Trolls and censorship. The goal of a troll is not only to spread messages,
[08:17.660 --> 08:24.020]  but to prevent the opposition from doing so. Lots of groups participate in massively reporting
[08:24.020 --> 08:31.840]  legit posts or accounts from the opposition in order to take them down. They are actively abusing
[08:32.730 --> 08:40.240]  an automatic mechanism for reporting, so if a lot of users report someone, it must be true.
[08:40.400 --> 08:47.640]  And this automatic behavior takes down the post or the account without any real intervention.
[08:49.480 --> 08:55.020]  Argentina, it's an ideal terrain for this surveillance experiments, since many times
[08:55.560 --> 09:00.180]  the government have tried to control social networks to no avail.
[09:01.460 --> 09:06.540]  For example, Peronist legislators proposing that users who comment on websites identify
[09:06.540 --> 09:12.360]  themselves with their national identification number, which is like the social security number
[09:12.360 --> 09:21.080]  for US residents. Or a senator from the same party proposing a public and democratic
[09:21.080 --> 09:29.760]  regulation of social networks. Or the cyber patrol protocol imposed this year,
[09:29.760 --> 09:37.340]  which basically ended up with a lot of people being detained for tweeting or for expressing
[09:37.340 --> 09:46.100]  themselves on social media. You know, there are a lot of projects and already installed measures
[09:46.820 --> 09:52.780]  to control social networks, but what about the trolls? The trolls continue working together
[09:52.780 --> 10:00.500]  and growing. So this is where we start after this introduction. Tracking trolls.
[10:02.200 --> 10:06.940]  The Argentine apparatus has the particularity of being made up of real users
[10:07.340 --> 10:12.880]  as well as trolls and bots, as you can see when exploring their hashtags.
[10:14.260 --> 10:19.820]  Rumors indicated that many users received invitations to join this apparatus.
[10:20.380 --> 10:27.180]  My goal was to get that invitation. You know, it's like a golden ticket to the chocolate factory.
[10:27.820 --> 10:32.460]  So after a month of silent observation, I created a sock puppet account
[10:32.460 --> 10:36.000]  mimicking the behavior of these users.
[10:37.480 --> 10:43.980]  And it was configured using these settings. Profile photo, President Fernández and Vice
[10:43.980 --> 10:51.560]  President Fernández together. The cover photo was Vice President Fernández giving a speech at Vélez
[10:51.560 --> 11:00.940]  Stadium. And who was I following? The president and some ministers, along with a few real
[11:01.350 --> 11:07.640]  pro-government accounts. What about the description and tweets?
[11:08.160 --> 11:15.780]  Both I made them imitating the specific languages and symbolism used by these users.
[11:15.860 --> 11:23.480]  How? Well, using Twitter API to monitor their hashtags and extracts the most repeated words.
[11:23.480 --> 11:31.680]  You may find them here as a word cloud. Most of these are pejorative terms to refer to opponents
[11:31.680 --> 11:35.700]  like Bolsonaro, the former president of Brazil, Bolsonaro.
[11:36.280 --> 11:41.100]  And Piranha instead of Sebastián Piñera, the Chilean president.
[11:42.240 --> 11:46.840]  So after learning how they speak, now that we speak the same languages,
[11:46.840 --> 11:49.760]  it was a matter of time before getting the invitation.
[11:52.400 --> 11:59.920]  This sub-puppet raised a hundred or so followers in a few hours. I have my original Twitter account
[11:59.920 --> 12:10.520]  since 2015 and I think I have less than 300 users, just for comparing. Most of these were trolls,
[12:10.520 --> 12:17.300]  but a few real users too. So I started retweeting official accounts and these real users and tweeting
[12:17.300 --> 12:23.680]  with their same hashtags. For instance, Macri should be in jail, our ex-president from the
[12:23.680 --> 12:31.060]  opposition. And after only three days, I received my invitation, this golden ticket from a user
[12:31.060 --> 12:41.200]  we'll call DC. On the left, you can see the original conversation in Spanish and I translated
[12:41.200 --> 12:47.280]  it the best I could to English. Hey buddy, we are making Twitter groups to install hashtags.
[12:47.300 --> 12:54.040]  Wanna join? Hey buddy, sure. What I'm supposed to do? Well, basically you have to tweet the hashtags
[12:54.040 --> 13:00.960]  that we send to the group. After agreeing this, I was added to the group number 300 and some
[13:01.760 --> 13:06.340]  of soldiers of the national project containing 50 people.
[13:08.320 --> 13:15.600]  One of the messages shared there was this. Guys, Ariel Garbarz is asking us to use
[13:16.440 --> 13:21.940]  LARRETAISRESPONSIBLE. LARRETA is the mayor of Buenos Aires city and a member of the opposition.
[13:22.520 --> 13:28.500]  Now you may ask, who is Ariel Garbarz, by the way? No clue so far.
[13:29.680 --> 13:37.320]  But in fact, both of these hashtags that made the top five in my country,
[13:37.980 --> 13:43.580]  one of them being PESCADOPODRIDOEME and LARRETAISRESPONSIBLE are fabricated trends
[13:43.580 --> 13:51.140]  proposed on propaganda groups. You may find the source on getthytrends.com. Just for confirmation,
[13:51.660 --> 13:58.980]  I went to trending earlier and I found that this information was right. And these
[13:59.660 --> 14:04.680]  trendings lasted for at least 12 hours, which gives us a lead on how toxic
[14:05.640 --> 14:08.020]  are these propaganda interventions.
[14:10.540 --> 14:17.560]  Another message on this group is, hey guys, with Ariel Garbarz, we formed a group where he's the
[14:17.560 --> 14:24.240]  administrator and tells us what to publish and at what time, so we can get our trend to always be
[14:24.240 --> 14:31.560]  in first place. Another user replies, it's like you say, we used to do the same long ago with the K
[14:31.560 --> 14:37.700]  youth, a new group. You have to set a day and a time, it's the best.
[14:38.020 --> 14:40.520]  Again, who is Ariel Garbarz?
[14:42.360 --> 14:49.960]  Okay, remember DC, the original member who invited me here? Well, 10 days later, another account from
[14:49.960 --> 14:56.900]  him tried to recruit me again. So he has probably forgot about my account. Hey buddy, we're making
[14:56.900 --> 15:04.060]  Twitter groups to install hashtags. Wanna join? And I say, hey buddy, sure, go ahead. I was added once
[15:04.060 --> 15:13.060]  again to another Soldiers of the National Project 300 and something. Now by accident, I was a member
[15:13.060 --> 15:21.540]  of two propaganda groups. There was a six digit difference between each group ID, for example,
[15:21.540 --> 15:32.040]  301 and 307. Each group can have up to 50 users, 49 if you do not take into account administrator.
[15:34.060 --> 15:44.440]  So 49 users multiplied by six new groups are almost 300 new users in 10 days.
[15:44.440 --> 15:52.480]  This is how fast can this apparatus grow without almost no any effort.
[15:54.260 --> 16:02.200]  Currently, according to the last group ID I managed to find, there are at least about 350
[16:02.920 --> 16:12.320]  propaganda groups on Twitter alone. This gives us a total of 17,150 users.
[16:13.500 --> 16:17.480]  I imagine all these people, try to picture all these people tweeting
[16:18.040 --> 16:23.080]  five or six times a day. They can make any trend they want.
[16:24.960 --> 16:33.120]  Well, also, this doesn't end here. A WhatsApp group is shared with both groups I belong to.
[16:33.120 --> 16:36.160]  And of course, hashtags are shared there too.
[16:37.360 --> 16:46.220]  This group is city seven. There are seven groups of around 256 users.
[16:46.940 --> 16:56.360]  If we take into account 255 users, we are not taking into account administration,
[16:56.360 --> 17:02.820]  multiplied by these seven groups, there are almost 2,000 new users here that may be repeated.
[17:04.820 --> 17:11.960]  And adding them all together, we have almost 20,000 users. Again, there may be repeated users.
[17:12.920 --> 17:18.140]  This doesn't end here. This group had members from the USA,
[17:18.540 --> 17:26.660]  Spain, the United Arab Emirates, and even Germany. So, upon joining, the administrator started
[17:26.660 --> 17:33.620]  sending hashtags. In this case, at half past seven, we come out with $Witness.
[17:33.960 --> 17:38.900]  That administrator, as you may see in the message, or the leading message,
[17:38.900 --> 17:44.400]  is Ariel Garbaros. And that name now definitely rings a bell for you, right?
[17:45.320 --> 17:50.460]  So, okay, let's try to answer who is Ariel Garbaros.
[17:52.260 --> 17:59.120]  He's the CEO of Protección Digital, which is digital protection, a company which was
[17:59.120 --> 18:03.760]  favored with many contracts by the federal justice and various Argentine governments.
[18:03.760 --> 18:09.820]  He was benefited to direct several state infrastructure projects.
[18:10.080 --> 18:15.290]  He was appointed computer attorney general for the 17 and 19 elections.
[18:15.520 --> 18:20.980]  And he's the leader of the propaganda apparatus on social networks, the lord of the trolls,
[18:20.980 --> 18:28.830]  we might say. The source of this is the newspaper Perfil, where he answered an interview.
[18:32.600 --> 18:40.020]  Here is a video of Ariel Garbaros instructing the trolls live, but it is in Spanish. And for
[18:40.020 --> 18:47.360]  time reasons, I'm not going to show it here, but it will be shared on the GitHub repository along
[18:47.360 --> 18:55.020]  with the slides. Obviously, since in Argentina, we speak Spanish, the video is in Spanish.
[18:56.260 --> 18:59.340]  This was leaked on Twitter by a user.
[19:00.880 --> 19:08.760]  So, the final diagram of the trolls, or a simplified one, is here.
[19:08.900 --> 19:16.300]  Ariel Garbaros acts as a leader, sends the trending topics to be installed to its coordinators,
[19:16.300 --> 19:24.520]  the coordinators of each group, which then share this objective to both Twitter groups and WhatsApp
[19:24.520 --> 19:36.560]  groups, which then are executed by the trolls. So, is this illegal? In Twitter platform, it is
[19:36.560 --> 19:42.220]  against the terms of service. The Twitter safety team actively tracks and takes down state-linked
[19:42.220 --> 19:50.120]  propaganda groups. In our country, well, it is not. In fact, it looks suspiciously endorsed,
[19:50.840 --> 19:56.180]  like the Facebook ripoff social media I showed you some slides ago.
[19:57.780 --> 20:05.580]  What tools did you use for this chapter? Well, Trendinalia, Trends24in, Votometer, GetDayTrends,
[20:05.580 --> 20:10.840]  the Twitter API, the Twitter RubyGem, and my own tool, which is also in the repository,
[20:10.840 --> 20:16.080]  venator.lua, for recognizing bot or troll-like behavior.
[20:17.400 --> 20:23.660]  So, what is the propaganda apparatus up to right now? Generating hashtags supporting the use of
[20:23.660 --> 20:28.580]  the government application to monitor the coronavirus outbreak, you know, the Cuidar
[20:28.580 --> 20:37.900]  COVID-19 application, which leads us to the next part. Surveillance, or dissecting the
[20:37.900 --> 20:45.480]  ARGO coronavirus application. So, this is the tracking application proposed by the Argentine
[20:45.480 --> 20:52.260]  Ministry of Modernization. It is mandatory by law to circulate, so if you want to leave your home,
[20:52.260 --> 20:58.560]  you want to step outside your front door, you need to have this application installed.
[20:59.320 --> 21:07.520]  The current version is 3.3.1, but here we analyzed 1.0.2, 3.0.7, and 3.3,
[21:07.520 --> 21:13.420]  using the most common tools available for Android, the compiling and reverse engineering.
[21:14.400 --> 21:21.420]  At first glance, I noticed a lot of broken functions, and reviewing the code, I found many
[21:21.420 --> 21:29.480]  dyslexic errors, like for example, disabilidad instead of disabilidad, which in English means
[21:29.480 --> 21:38.620]  disabled. Bonotus instead of botones, buttons. And this problem is repeated regardless of the
[21:38.620 --> 21:48.180]  compiler user. Numeor instead of numero, number. Masculio instead of masculino, male.
[21:50.240 --> 21:55.200]  Autoevaluacoin instead of autoevaluación, which is a critical feature of this application,
[21:55.200 --> 22:02.320]  the auto-evaluation module. And after digging a little bit further, I found a new rolegride-only
[22:02.320 --> 22:06.980]  token discloser, which is not a vulnerability per se, but will become handy later.
[22:09.060 --> 22:14.640]  Insecure JSON structure creation, vulnerable to injection or manipulation, instead of using
[22:15.420 --> 22:24.660]  the Java-provided functions to build JSON. A reference to a long-dead product, Google Plus.
[22:25.880 --> 22:30.520]  Lots of insecure and unsanitized execute calls,
[22:30.520 --> 22:35.740]  really, a lot of them, and some even could lead to SQL injection.
[22:36.740 --> 22:40.520]  The application communicates with foreign servers,
[22:40.520 --> 22:45.560]  which is by national law or local law, it's not allowed.
[22:47.060 --> 22:53.380]  These servers are not pretty much safe for storing medical data or, well, anything.
[22:54.520 --> 23:03.720]  This is the map of the application. All of these assets inherit the qualification of C,
[23:03.720 --> 23:10.540]  so it's not secure at all. A lot of missing security features.
[23:12.180 --> 23:24.020]  And privacy is also at risk. Of a total score of 100, this application received a 61 score.
[23:24.840 --> 23:30.900]  There are many write operations that record PII about the device,
[23:31.780 --> 23:39.300]  which are in Base64. Whenever you decode them, you get that this application is trying to keep
[23:39.300 --> 23:47.000]  track of the device ID, the build of the own application, and the device manufacturer.
[23:47.660 --> 23:53.620]  Obviously, since this is an emulated device, the application was not able to extract any
[23:53.620 --> 24:01.240]  valid information at all. From the very first version, the possibility of permanently tracking
[24:01.240 --> 24:08.060]  the user was considered. As you may see, permiso de ubicación means access location permission,
[24:08.560 --> 24:14.500]  and todo el tiempo means all the time. The application has far set of data that try to
[24:14.500 --> 24:22.000]  run a startup. For example, show far set of date dialogue and device startup or on boot.
[24:23.680 --> 24:29.120]  Also, this location tracker attempts to listen for boot events.
[24:31.160 --> 24:37.680]  The app tracks and asks for medical history. For example, cancer, diabetes, pregnancy,
[24:37.680 --> 24:43.620]  cardiac hepatic, renal, respiratory diseases, and all this data is stored abroad.
[24:45.100 --> 24:50.920]  Auto-evaluations are not stored client-side, but rather sent to the server.
[24:53.340 --> 24:59.700]  The user's location, along with his or her DNI, the national document ID number,
[24:59.700 --> 25:07.360]  are sent to a remote server. Again, this identification number is like the social
[25:07.360 --> 25:17.800]  security number of U.S. residents. If the user's evaluation returns that he or she is infected,
[25:17.800 --> 25:27.230]  tracking service is activated in the background. Also, by default,
[25:27.230 --> 25:33.090]  the app allows backup mode, which may send private medical information to Google.
[25:35.250 --> 25:42.970]  Now, it's unreliable for an application to diagnose a disease, but it's less reliable
[25:42.970 --> 25:49.950]  for an app to say, okay, you're not contagious, bro. We are during a pandemic, but hey,
[25:49.950 --> 25:55.370]  you're not contagious. You are safe to go. No sos contagioso means in English you're not
[25:55.370 --> 26:02.330]  contagious. So, the app has an option or feature for that. Now, remember the last time you Googled
[26:02.330 --> 26:12.070]  your symptoms of some sort, anything you had. I had a slight fever, my ankle hurts, I have a
[26:12.070 --> 26:23.590]  headache. What is the first result that Google answered you? You know, it's probably not something
[26:23.590 --> 26:34.190]  good at all or not accurate at all. Again, for example, in this snippet of code,
[26:34.190 --> 26:41.030]  it tries to determine if a user is not infected or not contagious. Again, you might have to see
[26:41.170 --> 26:50.330]  a professional, not an application. And this is not the first time we do something like this on
[26:50.330 --> 26:55.810]  the Argentine government. We were featured a lot of times on Programming Horror on Reddit
[26:56.610 --> 27:02.010]  for this kind of things. For example, this was the application that the Argentine government
[27:02.010 --> 27:08.110]  forces people to download when they land in Argentina to control coronavirus infections.
[27:08.670 --> 27:18.930]  As you can see, it is really long if it might give you a little sample of how we work here.
[27:21.070 --> 27:27.970]  Now, on the first version, the 1.0.2 that I have reversed, I found this string all across the code
[27:27.970 --> 27:35.870]  base, all across. So, who is Sergio C? We won't disclose its full name. Who is Sergio? A possible
[27:35.870 --> 27:44.870]  author, a project lead. After some Google foo, after some Google queries, I landed on his personal
[27:44.870 --> 27:52.070]  site. He has worked on a lot of government apps before, including transport, local government,
[27:52.070 --> 27:57.990]  national government, healthcare, and even now on the government's main application,
[27:58.330 --> 28:08.520]  which is MyArgentina. So, following the email he provided on his site,
[28:08.520 --> 28:13.000]  I found out that he was leaked a good couple of times.
[28:13.000 --> 28:18.220]  So, this might even rise the attacks on face for this kind of application.
[28:19.680 --> 28:26.060]  Now, what is everybody else doing? What are all our neighbors doing?
[28:26.780 --> 28:33.060]  All of them are dropping centralized solutions or centralized contact tracing.
[28:33.620 --> 28:40.160]  But we insist on keeping this model and pushing forward this model.
[28:41.400 --> 28:47.720]  And so, to close this chapter, this application was launched without publishing an audit,
[28:47.720 --> 28:54.300]  report, or penetration test. And it isn't even HIPAA compliant, not at all.
[28:54.300 --> 29:00.460]  This is especially serious knowing that it handles medical information and sends it to
[29:00.460 --> 29:07.040]  servers abroad. Now, ask yourself, please, what will happen if you develop an application
[29:07.040 --> 29:17.030]  of this poor quality for your employer? Let's jump to the conclusions and questions and answers.
[29:18.130 --> 29:25.030]  Although it may seem obvious for us, who are techies, geeks, hackers, or whatever,
[29:26.050 --> 29:32.390]  always inform yourself through professional, neutral, and verified sources. They are not easy
[29:32.390 --> 29:39.070]  to get, and again, it may seem obvious to us, but not to the rest of the world out there.
[29:39.130 --> 29:45.870]  Just because a term or a phrase is trending does not mean that it is real or automatically
[29:45.870 --> 29:53.290]  represents the thinking of the majority, right? Every day, somewhere, and at all times,
[29:53.290 --> 29:59.250]  there are groups of people and machines designed to install biased thoughts and debates in society.
[29:59.810 --> 30:06.930]  Surveillance and monitoring of citizens is not the answer, particularly in the hands of governments
[30:06.930 --> 30:13.010]  that have constantly committed systematic abuses against freedom of expression, especially in
[30:13.010 --> 30:19.110]  digital media, and obviously, especially in Argentina. You have seen some examples in this talk.
[30:20.030 --> 30:24.450]  Investing thousands in technology and applications after neglecting the health
[30:24.450 --> 30:31.810]  infrastructure is not the solution. An expensive app does not replace a doctor at all.
[30:33.210 --> 30:38.890]  You can get in touch with me via Telegram or GitHub, where these slides will be shared,
[30:38.890 --> 30:46.450]  and the video that I didn't have the time to play. And feel free to follow me on Twitter
[30:46.450 --> 30:53.330]  at Mauro Eldritch. As you may see, I have a few followers since I'm not into trolls, actually.
[30:54.070 --> 30:59.970]  I really hope you enjoyed this talk, and if you have any questions, I'm glad to help you and to
[30:59.970 --> 31:07.710]  answer. So please feel free to drop in and ask whatever you like. Thanks for watching this,
[31:07.710 --> 31:10.210]  and I hope to see you again next year.