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1550	5270	Hello, everyone, and welcome to Trust but Verify,
5270	8930	Maintaining Democracy in Spite of Information Countermeasures.
9910	16190	My name is Allie Mellon. I'm a security strategist in the office of the CISO at Cyber Reason.
16190	20330	A little bit about me, I'm a computer engineer at heart.
20350	25290	I've been in various engineering and development roles for the past 10 years.
25690	30810	Previous security researcher and now security strategist at Cyber Reason.
30830	36610	I am a frequent presenter on different topics, including election security.
37210	42170	And before we jump into the voting aspects of this talk,
42170	47850	what I really want to talk about is something very important and related,
47850	52750	which is what is truly critical to our daily life?
52790	58810	And the way that I immediately think about this is through Maslow's hierarchy of needs.
59450	64570	At the base of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, you have the physiological needs,
64570	69130	things like air, water, and food. It's critical to daily life.
69210	73650	At the next level, you have things like personal security, employment,
73650	78910	resources, these things that are a complete requirement if you're going to continue to survive.
80030	85470	And then you get into the more psychological side of things with things like belonging.
85470	93630	The majority of first world countries, we have safety and the physiological needs relatively
93630	99570	covered. But once you get to this level of belonging and that psychological element,
99570	105130	you start to get into something that I think a lot of people are under constant development with.
105130	108890	And it's not a given that you're going to have these things just because you're in a
108890	116290	first world country. Similarly, esteem, things like respect, self-esteem, status. These are
116290	122950	things that you need on this path towards what is ultimately self-actualization and the desire
122950	129410	to become the most one can be. And you can be taking steps at each of these levels. But the
129410	135550	idea is that in order to reach the top of the pyramid, you need to have all of these different
135550	142950	levels met. So the reason that I talk about this is because I think that it plays an important role
142950	149550	in voting and in election security as well. And it raises the question of where does voting fit
149550	160110	into this? Now, a little bit of background. The original, the start of this idea came from
160330	165470	a series of exercises we did at Cyber Reason called Operation Blackout Protect the Vote,
165470	172010	where we worked with local and federal law enforcement officers to host tabletop exercises,
172010	176910	where we had one red team of hackers and cybersecurity experts and a blue team of
176910	183370	local and federal law enforcement from DHS, FBI, and the Secret Service. And then we also had a
183370	189030	white team set up for adjudication. And it was basically a turn-based tabletop exercise
189030	198610	so that we could ultimately identify gaps in law enforcement's ability to protect Election Day
198610	206650	with a fictional country known as Adversaria. And we actually held these exercises in Washington,
206650	214450	D.C., in Boston, in San Francisco, in London, in Tel Aviv, and Paris. And what we learned from them
214450	220330	is that even when you're not actually hacking, even when this is just a thought experiment,
220330	224510	you can see a lot of potential for different ways to attack an election
224510	229350	that isn't just limited to those voting machines. And so that's what I'm going to be talking about
229350	234450	today. We're going to start with the defender perspective and really getting into the daily
234450	240110	life of a voter before jumping into the attacker perspective. And then we're going to start
240110	245110	brainstorming what you could do to stop an election in order to understand better how we
245110	250470	can actually defend it. And so throughout this talk, I want you guys to be brainstorming and
250470	256830	thinking about the different things that you would do to stop an election or to cause chaos
256830	263050	during an election day. So let's jump into the defender perspective.
264830	271410	According to the DHS, election infrastructure includes things like voter registration databases,
271410	277450	IT infrastructure, voting systems, storage facilities, and polling places. Okay, this is
277450	282150	very classical definition, totally understandable. These are all the things that have to do with
282150	288930	actually submitting your vote. But I don't think that that's all that we need to consider.
288990	293030	I think that there's a lot more that we need to consider before the voter is actually able
293030	299130	to go to the polling place and put in their ballot. And the way that I like to talk about
299130	305020	this is through the voter hierarchy of needs. These are, much like Maslow's hierarchy,
305630	312690	a set of different things that voters need before they're actually comfortable going out to vote.
314110	319350	We can see the parallels with Maslow's hierarchy of needs with things like
319350	325290	the physiological needs. Life and death, very important. Property, having a place to live,
325290	331890	having a place to do your daily activities. Those things are automatically going to come before
331890	337050	voting. If you are afraid for your life, you're probably not going to take the time to vote.
337050	342090	For those who do, it's going to be much less than it would if they weren't afraid for their lives.
343150	349470	And that also plays into the safety concept, but it can be extended to things like family health
349470	357950	or job safety, financial security. People, when they don't feel financially secure,
357950	362930	are they going to want to spend the extra money to get to the polling place? Some will not.
364050	369330	And then also that belonging aspect. If you don't feel like you're a part of a country,
369410	374310	a part of a culture, you're not going to want to contribute to it by giving back your vote.
375910	381370	And then esteem, feeling like your vote matters, feeling like you matter in the grand scheme of
381370	385930	things, feeling like it's worth it to vote because you think that you're making something a better
385930	395170	place. And then, of course, being all that you can be and really being able to feel good about that
395850	400870	as you move forward and also feel good about your voting and that contributing to your country being
400870	407450	the best that it can be. So this is how I like to talk about the voter hierarchy of needs and
407450	412670	all of the levels that we have to consider as different places that can be attacked.
412950	418410	And that's why I question if election infrastructure is really just limited to the
418410	423670	ways that you submit your ballots. And I think it's important to say that I'm not suggesting that
424310	430090	election commissions need to control all of these levels, but they need to be considered
430090	435100	as we look to secure our elections and protect our democracy.
436910	441550	Because these systems that we've identified that we need to protect
441550	449590	are also systems that can become a target. And you might think that this would be a small
449590	455950	impact on an election, but take the United States, where 40% of eligible U.S. citizens
455950	462090	do not vote at all, and any kind of voter suppression will have an impact on the election.
464210	469170	So when we're thinking about election security and election infrastructure,
469170	475050	we need to think about things that relate to voter suppression and faith in the government.
475530	482590	There are ways to influence an election outside of attacking the actual polling places.
484330	488850	So let's jump into the attacker perspective and talk about a more historical approach
488850	493170	and modern day what we're seeing, as well as motivations and things like that.
493890	501270	So on the motivation side, these nation-state attackers, they're looking to either gain power,
501510	506210	a particular ideology, or maintain global recognition and support. And for any of you
506210	511410	who were able to attend some of the Black Hat keynotes, we saw this as a common thread.
511870	518850	These countries are looking to make sure that their particular belief system is spread across
518850	524730	the world, that they maintain their status as a superpower, whatever the case may be,
524730	527190	or that they get to the point of a superpower.
528970	533030	And when I'm thinking about the different types of attacks, the different types of cyber attacks
533030	540850	that we can see, I like to use a way of describing it that our CISO Sam Curry talks about, which is
540850	545850	three different layers. The infrastructure layer, the information layer, and the ethos layer.
545850	556950	The infrastructure layer, that's that physical objects like the electric grid, things like that,
556950	562750	misinformation or disinformation. And the ethos layer, that's all about the core belief system of
562750	569010	the country. So we're going to start with that belief system and delve into some historical
569010	574030	examples, and then get to some modern day examples that incorporate a lot more of the
574030	580030	cybersecurity aspect. The historical examples don't as much, however, they give us a really
580030	585450	good baseline to understand that this is not a new problem, and that the way that we're seeing
585450	593070	people do it digitally is just a new approach to that problem. So let's take the Italian elections
593070	600210	of 1948. At the time, it was right after World War II, the U.S. government was intent on
600210	605530	psychological warfare. They were obsessed with spreading democracy, and they were putting
605530	611390	millions of dollars towards Christian, Democratic, and right-wing socialist parties. In effect,
611390	616520	they were spreading a massive propaganda campaign against communist socialist coalitions.
617010	623210	And the goal was to change the perception in that election specifically to a conversation about
623210	630870	democracy versus totalitarianism, Christianity versus atheism, America versus the Soviet Union,
630870	637870	and of course, abundance versus starvation, trying to draw that contrast. And they ended up
637870	644170	successfully swaying the votes in the election. And so they repeated that process in places like
644170	653830	Guatemala, in South Vietnam, in Afghanistan, and Indonesia, as well as many, many more.
654150	658730	And this was without having the digital component at all, without having to do any hacking.
659150	664170	But it was the start of something that we're seeing take shape even more now.
665050	673310	Another example. Moscow founded the communist international group Comintern in 1919, and they
673310	680350	urged the American Communist Party to pursue revolutionary regime change. This was very
680350	686610	similar to democracy promotion, which was, again, later pursued by Washington, all with the purpose
686610	697470	of spreading their point of view within America. And of course, the 1996 Chinese influence on the
697470	704850	U.S. election, where a Chinese general sent $300,000 to influence a U.S. presidential election
704850	712950	by funneling money to the Clinton campaign. So let's look at the cyber equivalent of these
712950	719870	things that's happening right now, and has been happening for some time. A good example of this
719870	727930	is social media attacks. So on the left, you can see this ad, which is meant to persuade voters to
727930	735610	vote ahead by voting from home, and saying that you can text Hillary to a certain number to vote,
735610	741110	which is obviously not true. But especially right now, it might be something that people would
741910	748390	find really appealing, not having to worry about any mail-in voting, just having to text a name to
748510	756760	a certain number. But of course, it doesn't work. So that's kind of a double-edged attack, because
756760	763380	it's not just targeting that belief system, and that belief in your government, and their ability
763380	768120	to actually protect you from these types of things, but it's also targeting that information
768120	772840	layer, and making it so that your vote doesn't actually count, even though you think that it did.
772860	778820	And then on the right-hand side, you can see an advertisement, also not from someone in the U.S.,
779760	787260	but aimed at highlighting divisions within the U.S., and also creating them, depending on the case.
789320	797680	And an important part of this talk is recognizing that there are other organizations than the
797680	806160	government that have a role in election security, even if they choose not to. And
806700	811820	that through actions that certain social media organizations have taken,
812460	821580	they have set up governments to spread this type of attack more easily. And that's not to say that
821580	826880	these organizations should be controlled, or anything like that, but to some extent,
826880	833560	they do have a responsibility as American citizens, as people in the United States,
833560	840820	to consider this, and to consider the implications of these types of attacks, and to try to build a
842180	848780	stronger foundation for democracy within their own organizations. So now let's look at the
848780	855620	information plane. And remember, this is all of the communication. This is where we get into the
855620	862060	real misinformation and disinformation. And I want to start with a really baffling example
862780	870000	that highlights that, you know, this is not a new thing. And as much as we are recognizing
870000	875840	disinformation and misinformation right now in American culture, America was really founded on
875840	881240	this. It was founded on the premise of a conspiracy theory where the British were trying
881240	887540	to enslave us. Sam Adams argued that Britain's taxations before the Revolutionary War were part
887540	894800	of an elaborate conspiracy to eventually enslave American colonists. He actually spread that and
894800	901180	other early disinformation through pamphlets and speeches that he would hand out that contained
901180	908620	information that he knew was not true. And he used the Boston Massacre as a tool in order to
908620	915280	continue to spread that disinformation and to continue to cause chaos within America leading
915280	923500	to the American Revolution. So we have this foundation in the U.S., for those of you who
923500	930120	are from the U.S., of disinformation and of misinformation from our very earliest days.
932120	939180	And then, of course, you can consider things like the CIA and the infamous propaganda asset inventory.
939180	948700	During the Cold War era in the 1950s and 60s, the CIA had a huge number of radio stations
948700	956840	and newspapers and magazines across the globe that they were using to push the United States
956840	965480	agenda. In one very interesting instance, they had control of a program called Radio Free Asia,
966290	974580	but they realized that the average Taiwanese person, individual, would not actually have a radio.
974580	980470	So they strapped small radios to balloons and sent them flying to try and get them to Taiwan.
981040	985520	Needless to say, the wind took them in the wrong direction, but the idea was very interesting
985520	995320	nonetheless. In another interesting little tidbit, they had control of a magazine, but
996080	1000820	the magazine became so popular that it was actually also began being distributed to the
1000820	1005000	United States. And so they had to be very careful to only put the propaganda in the
1005000	1014880	ones that were not going to the U.S. Similarly, in the 50s, 60s, and 70s, left-wing newspapers
1014880	1020680	in Europe were pretty much all financed directly from Moscow, pushing Moscow's agenda.
1021880	1028840	And then the U.S. radio, also in Moscow, which would play rock music like Elton John and the
1028840	1034880	Beatles that they couldn't get anywhere else, but it was always followed by short segments of what
1034880	1039940	they called editorial content, which Soviet authorities considered disinformation, which
1039940	1048180	was giving that American perspective. One that's more focused on the cyber realm is the
1048180	1056900	2014 Ukraine elections. On May 21st of 2014, attackers compromised the CEC network and
1056900	1062820	actually disabled the vote counting. Now, this would automatically attack that ethos layer,
1062820	1066720	and you start to lose faith in your government to actually be able to accurately count your
1066720	1072040	votes and the validity of the election. But then they managed to get it back up after,
1072040	1077020	I think, like 12 hours. And four days later was the actual election day.
1077740	1088260	At the time, the same CEC website was under constant DDoS attack. And 12 minutes before
1088260	1093160	the polls closed, attackers actually posted a picture of a former leader to the right sector
1093160	1098960	on the CEC website claiming he won the election. What's really interesting about this is it was
1098960	1106880	immediately shared by Russian media. Almost as if it was coordinated. Almost.
1108740	1116220	And let's also look at the communication plane. This is very interesting, and it really makes it
1116220	1123140	so that people are confused about what to do, where to go. It's a direct line to the voters.
1124140	1129480	And here are two examples of that. On the left, you have an example of a text that is supposedly
1129480	1134720	from President Trump shaming someone into voting, saying your ballot hasn't been submitted,
1134720	1139960	what are you still doing? In reality, this is not from the campaign, this is not from Trump.
1140400	1146240	And they would not be able to track this type of information. But they even got an interesting URL,
1146240	1152760	vote.gop. And then on the right-hand side, you can see an example that's supposed to be a very
1152760	1160160	helpful message from the government telling you your polling location and what the hours are and
1160160	1165660	where to go. In reality, that's not a real polling location. That's someone sending a message that
1165660	1172240	purports to be from the government as a helpful reminder to go vote, when in reality, there's
1172240	1178340	nothing there and the voter will go, get there, and not be able to vote. And at that point,
1178340	1184780	you're either one, late for work if you go into work, or two, you're frustrated and less likely
1184780	1193010	to vote. Now let's look at the infrastructure plane. And this one is really interesting
1193010	1197870	because it's that physical layer, which I think that a lot of times, especially more broadly,
1197870	1204150	we don't think about or more broadly, I mean, the world instead of just the cybersecurity community
1204150	1209030	doesn't think of cyber attacks in this infrastructure plane as much. And we're
1209030	1215010	going to go back to those historical examples that don't incorporate a cybersecurity component,
1215010	1220210	but lay the groundwork for where this can go in the future. Starting with the assassination of
1220210	1230210	Lumumba. In 1960, the Democratic Republic of Congo gained its independence. And Lumumba was the
1230210	1237410	prime minister of the DRC. He was also elected that year. And then he was subsequently assassinated
1237410	1245430	one year later in 1961. Now, this was immediately politically fracturing for this very, very new
1245430	1252690	independent nation. And it turns out that the groups behind it were American and Belgian.
1252690	1257890	And they were actually from the US government and the Belgian government. And they had worked
1257890	1262930	together to plan this assassination. And this is the type of thing that can really
1263850	1271290	be destructive to such a new nation. It would be the equivalent in the US is George Washington
1271290	1277690	being assassinated a year after American independence, which would have, who would have,
1277690	1286530	who knows what would have happened in that instance. And then there's also the 1965
1287110	1293570	Indonesian elections and subsequent massacre. The Communist Party finished fourth in an
1293570	1299670	Indonesian elections, and they were offered a proportional representation in the government.
1300510	1308530	Now, this was not aligned to US interests, needless to say. And for fear of how this would
1308530	1315910	impact US interests in the region, the US secretly supported the purge of suspected communists,
1315910	1321050	causing thousands to millions, they're not entirely sure how many, to die over the course
1321050	1328370	of months. And the military took over as the most powerful institution. So this is not only direct
1328370	1336670	impact, because they have supported and pushed for the death and the massacre of these many,
1336670	1343530	many people. But it's also something that I deeply believe would terrify the public,
1343530	1348870	who is going to be voting and speaking about their beliefs freely after this type of thing
1348870	1357680	happens in their country. And now this one isn't an example of election day, but it's a good
1357680	1363500	representation, again, and it does involve that cyber component. So the Bronze Night in Estonia
1363500	1370480	in 2007, this was really a combination of an infrastructure attack and an information attack.
1371080	1378660	In 2007, Estonians made the decision to move a Red Army soldier statue to a Soviet cemetery,
1378660	1383380	because needless to say, they did not want a Red Army soldier in the middle of their country.
1384180	1391540	Not exactly a fan favorite there. So the night that it was being moved, fake news started to
1391540	1399000	spread with Russian news reports claiming that the statue and the Soviet war graves were being
1399000	1405400	destroyed. And this resulted in two nights straight of riots and looting. 156 people were
1405400	1412380	injured, one person was left dead, and a thousand were detained. But at the exact same time,
1412380	1417640	there were a ton of denial of service attacks going on inside Estonia across banks, media
1417640	1423800	outlets, governments, cash machines, things like online banking was out of service, government
1423800	1429320	employees couldn't communicate over email, and newspapers and broadcasters couldn't deliver
1429320	1435900	the news. So all they were left with was the Russian news reports that were spreading this
1435900	1445640	fake news. And this quote, I really like this quote, because it talks a little bit about this
1445640	1455720	with, in all of these historical examples, these campaigns were done covertly. And cyber aggression
1455720	1464100	really gives us the ability to have these type of campaigns very covertly. And it leaves us
1464100	1471440	really vulnerable to these types of attacks, and to really sowing chaos internally in the country,
1471440	1476420	with people believing conspiracy theories about the situation, with people not knowing what's true
1476420	1482180	and what isn't. And that's why I think it's so scary, the potential, not just on the misinformation
1482180	1488080	and disinformation side, but also on that belief system layer, and even that infrastructure layer.
1490900	1499120	So some examples of things that we talked about during these tabletop exercises that I think
1499640	1506540	could have a huge impact on election day come to things like the electric grid. So in 2003,
1506680	1511740	a four-day power outage left at least 100 people in the United States and Canada dead.
1512460	1520220	Now imagine there's a power outage on election day, and you have yet to leave your house. Are
1520220	1524560	you going to be worried about voting? Or are you going to be worried about making sure that whatever's
1525180	1531000	in your fridge doesn't go bad? Are you going to be worried about your family? Maybe you know
1531000	1539760	someone who needs the type of care that requires electricity to be available? There are a lot of
1539760	1544820	factors here that will immediately, just like with those voter hierarchy of needs, that will
1544820	1550040	immediately come before you're actually willing to vote when something sporadic happens, like losing
1550040	1561720	power. And we're also going to talk about transit. So in 2016, San Francisco's transit system was
1561720	1569680	infected with ransomware. Now imagine a scenario, a lot of people go to vote after work. So you
1569680	1577220	go to work, you spend your day on Twitter, probably seeing some disinformation. You get
1577220	1582460	to the end of the day, you've taken the train into work, and you go to take the train to the polling
1582460	1588580	station and then back home, and it's down. And you can't access it. Are you going to be thinking about
1588580	1592580	voting now? Or are you going to be thinking about how you're going to get home and potentially being
1592700	1602340	a little annoyed that the train is down? So we can see that these attacks go across layers,
1602340	1608880	but also across all the layers of the pyramid. And they're just a few examples. There are way
1608880	1616340	more that we can look at through our own tabletop exercises. So let's jump back into the defender
1616340	1622280	perspective before we really get to that brainstorming part. Where does this leave us?
1622800	1630340	We have this small view of election security, just with voter registration, just with databases,
1630340	1637140	IT infrastructure, things like that. And we end up with quotes like these from
1638180	1643440	leaders in different countries. We cannot exclude such activities in Germany either.
1643440	1648200	In the election campaign, we'll also have to confront distortions and fake stories.
1648200	1653000	Now, it's great that they're being honest about it, but where does this leave a citizen
1653000	1659560	when knowing what's fake, what's real? When knowing how to actually combat this?
1660480	1666740	Similarly, we have representatives saying that people are trying to steal another election,
1666740	1670840	that it's all rigged, that it's a scam, pushing this same narrative
1671520	1676140	that these countries want other countries to believe in.
1677520	1682460	And then, of course, just from a couple of weeks ago, congressional Democrats talking about
1682460	1686380	how they were gravely concerned about foreign interference in an election.
1686900	1691660	Now, I think the recognition, again, the recognition is good. It's just a matter of
1691660	1697720	giving us the tools to combat what they're seeing that we're missing here. We're missing
1697720	1706640	the leadership part. So where should we really be going in order to create a different reality
1706640	1711120	for ourselves, where we have a more well-rounded view of election security, where we understand
1711120	1717340	the problem and where we, not just the government, but also the citizens and the private sector,
1717340	1725660	can affect change? And this is what it should look like, where we have all of those different
1725660	1731940	aspects that are front and center, and that we're thinking about, and that we're making clear
1731940	1735040	these are the things that are going to be under attack. These are the things that you need to
1735040	1740840	look out for. Having that communication, because in reality, as I've mentioned before, a lot of
1740840	1748360	these channels are not government-owned entities. A lot of them are privately held, which means that
1748360	1754840	election security cannot just be the government's problem. It has to be something considered by the
1754840	1762720	private sector. It has to be something that we work together as a community, as a society, to help stop.
1765600	1773040	So I want you guys... the goal of this was, if we were in person, to do a small tabletop
1773040	1780220	exercise together. But since we can't really do that, I want you guys to imagine how this
1780220	1786360	scenario would go, what you would do from either perspective. And just start by thinking about,
1787020	1793100	do you vote before work? Do you mail in your ballot? How do modern events, like the pandemic
1793100	1798220	that we're going through right now, change all of that? Are you on Twitter? Do you fact check?
1798400	1805780	I typically do, or would, vote before work, if we were still going into the office. I am doing a
1805780	1809800	mail-in ballot. I think that mail-in ballots are critical right now, given the current situation,
1809800	1814540	and because it really takes away those time-based attacks that we're seeing.
1815620	1821040	If the day of the election you lose power, but you already voted three weeks ago,
1821040	1829120	then you're not actually going to be part of the voter suppression problem, and it's already
1829120	1833660	taken care of. And that's a huge positive, that's a huge benefit. Not to say that mail-in voting
1833660	1840100	doesn't have its own issues, but that's at least a start to removing some of those time-based
1840100	1846820	barriers. How do modern events change this? Are you considering things like mail-in voting?
1846820	1852980	Are you on Twitter? I know a lot of us are. InfoSec Twitter is great and terrible, but it
1852980	1857580	raises the question of, do you fact check? Are you checking the things that you see? Are you sharing
1857580	1862900	articles without actually reading them? These are important, and they tend to get lost in the
1862900	1872260	even though people talk about them. And then take a look at how would you attack your life of a
1872260	1878120	voter, your typical day? What would you do that would make you stop and think, I'm going to take
1878120	1885080	care of this problem and I'm not going to go vote today? That's what's critical. And some of the
1885080	1891540	things that we saw in these tabletop exercises to affect an election were things like attackers
1892720	1899400	creating deepfakes of certain candidates. And the thing is, if you release a deepfake of a candidate
1899940	1905560	on the day of the election on that morning, there really isn't enough time for the candidate to
1905560	1910840	react. And maybe they'll issue a statement, but the damage will have been done. And it's not
1910840	1918060	something you can fix over the course of eight hours. So these are the types of questions like,
1918060	1923120	how does that time-based element affect things? If you took out the electric grid exclusively in
1923120	1929320	regions that are known to be very conservative, how would that look to people? What would they
1929320	1934300	take away from that? Would they take away that it was just a random power outage or would they
1934300	1942800	suspect that there was foul play from the other side? And then take those ideas and think about
1942800	1949700	what you can do for your country instead. Because at the end of the day, as we know with red teaming,
1949700	1954560	all of this is working towards stronger security. And that's what's important, is that we come out
1954560	1959580	of this considering how to make security stronger, how to make election security stronger,
1960020	1965760	the whole thing. So how do you defend? Are you involved in any of these sectors? Are you in the
1965760	1970640	transit sector or communication sector? Do you work at a social media company? How can you affect
1970640	1976020	change within these organizations? Because at the end of the day, we all have to do our part
1976740	1987220	in order to protect our system. So this kind of left me with a lot of questions because it feels
1987220	1993620	like an insurmountable problem. It's this huge, huge problem. But at the end of the day, what I
1993620	1998220	think is the most important and what we can take away from this is the first thing is to, whether
1998220	2005040	you work at a private company or a government entity, work to improve your security, your
2005040	2011040	personal security, your enterprise security, whatever the case may be, we need it. Because
2011040	2016120	all of these different elements can be used in a way that they're not supposed to be used. And
2016120	2023720	you just don't know what creative method an attacker is going to use in order to affect
2024440	2031680	the belief system of the country. So really focus on, of course, having good security measures.
2031680	2037600	The second is to work with the government. I know, like, build partnerships with the
2037600	2044060	government. I'm a part of InfraGard. It's the government group for infrastructure security.
2044060	2048940	I think that that's great. It's a great way to share and give back, not just to the community,
2048940	2054300	but also to the government. So I highly recommend just finding different avenues and different
2054300	2060000	partnerships that you can have to make security stronger in the government space, even if you
2060000	2066460	don't work there directly. And also to spread awareness. And then the last one is to work to
2066460	2072320	fight misinformation. Because I think that's a continuous struggle that we all have to consider.
2072320	2079420	And the more that we work at it, the better off we will be inevitably. I mean, it's a lot of work,
2079420	2088060	but that's how it is. I also wrote a white paper on this. Feel free to download. You don't need to
2088060	2092860	put it in email or anything like that. It's totally free if you go to this link. And it
2092860	2098120	elaborates on a lot of what I've talked about here. So feel free to download that. And also
2098120	2104660	message me if you have any questions. I'm happy to help. Thank you so much for attending. I hope
2104660	2109280	you guys have a great rest of DEF CON Red Team Village. And if you have any questions, feel free
2109280	2115360	to reach out. I will respond to all the comments in Discord. And feel free to ask me any questions.
2115360	2121700	HackerBella on Discord. So thank you so much. Awesome. Thank you. Amazing presentation. Thank
2121700	2128540	you so much for supporting us, supporting DEF CON Red Team Village. And again, as we said before,
2128540	2132380	please look at all the talks and activities that are happening right now in the bottom of the
2132380	2139320	screen. You should have a link to our website. We're streaming on Twitch and YouTube and so on.
2139320	2144800	And please, as Ali mentioned, please join the conversation on Discord. We're going to take a
2145700	2147960	small break and the next presenter will be here in about a minute.
