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Hi, I'm Bryson Bort, and thank you for joining us today with the Election Security Panel with the Feds.

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This is a really momentous occasion, bringing this many federal agencies all together on one hand.

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The timing is perfect.

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There is a huge election coming up here in the United States in 2020.

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There are elections happening around the world.

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And I think that's a key thing for us to understand, is that while this panel is talking about the U.S.

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federal government, how we are responding to our American election, when we look at the broader forces that are aligned against democracy in the world, that all comes down to trust in the system for the democracy to work.

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And those forces are working against places more than the U.S.

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And so while this is going to be the U.S.

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government discussing this, I think citizens all over the world and hackers all over the world will be able to take something away from that.

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Just quick logistics.

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Q&A will be available through the DEF CON Discord.

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So if you put your questions in the Voting Village DEF CON Discord, those will make it their way up here to me on the stage and we will answer them as best as we can.

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Starting off, we have Cynthia Kaiser.

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Hello, I'm Cynthia Kaiser.

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I'm an assistant section chief with the FBI Cyber Division.

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And what that really means is I lead analysis among multiple threat groups for the FBI.

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That includes election threats, mostly in the cyber arena.

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And that's by design.

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I saw what happened in 2016 and I knew that there was nowhere else I wanted to be.

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And then working this threat as we came into 2020.

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And I'm really excited to be here with people that I get to see all the time anyways.

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And so for the FBI in the election space, a good way to think about it is that we're really focused on the threat.

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So we work hand in hand with our DHS counterparts and they're really focused on the risk to the systems, the remuneration on those systems.

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But when it comes to the threat response of incidents or looking at investigations into malign foreign influence or investigations into election crimes like ballot fraud, that's where the FBI really plays in the space.

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David Mordino from the National Security Agency.

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It's great to be with you here today.

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I'm an NSA election security lead.

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Most of you are familiar with NSA's mission, really divided up into two components.

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Our foreign signals intelligence mission, which is all about figuring out what the adversaries are up to.

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And then we have the cybersecurity component, which is all about preventing and eradicating threats to national security systems and figuring out how we can protect DOD networks and the like.

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Really a lot of power from NSA comes with combining those missions.

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Knowing what the threat is and combining that with a technical analysis and mitigations in order for us to be able to deploy those into unclassified space.

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From an election security standpoint, I oversee all the activities and partnerships that NSA has on election security.

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I also co-lead something called the Election Security Group, along with Brigadier General Hartman here, which we'll get into, I'm sure, on the panel.

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And that's a joint NSA Cyber Command Task Force for protecting the elections.

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A little bit about me.

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I grew up in Chicago.

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That's what I'm representing here in the Comiskey Park shirt, no white socks.

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And I'm also into craft cocktails.

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I supplied, in the typical DEF CON tradition, a cocktail of Black Manhattan for everybody.

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And I'd like to give a shout out to Johnny and Carl for hosting me at Cocktail Con this Tuesday.

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Really great event and a community in terms of getting the InfoSec community together to talk about cocktails, talk about security.

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So I appreciate it.

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I appreciate DEF CON folks for having us here today.

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Hey, I'm Joe Hartman.

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I command the Cyber National Mission Force, so part of U.S.

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Cyber Command.

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As Dave said, I co-lead the Election Security Group with him.

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And, you know, the Election Security Group is really partnered with all the agencies you see represented here and others in defense of the 2020 election.

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We're the part of the U.S.

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government that focuses on the away game.

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So we are looking at foreign adversaries, Russia, China, Iran, any other foreign adversary who's attempting to interfere with our elections.

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We're looking for them in foreign space, and we're partnering with DHS and FBI in order to ensure that we share information that we find abroad that makes us safer here in the United States.

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I'm really glad to be here today and looking forward to your questions.

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My name is Maurice Turner.

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I'm Senior Advisor for the Executive Director at the U.S.

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Election Assistance Commission.

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We're a relatively small agency compared to the ones you've heard from earlier today, but our mission is focused.

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We help make sure that Americans all across the country and all across the world have the ability to participate in elections, whether they're going to be in any one of the 50 states, six territories, or stationed overseas.

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So our focus is really, how do we make sure that those voters have access to the polls and that they can vote safely, securely, and make sure that their vote counts?

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And I'm Matt Masterson.

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I'm the designated survivor that was held back from the federal panel.

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So if anything happens, we can maintain federal continuity of operations on election security.

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I'm in a secret skiff out in the Midwest somewhere.

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I appreciate the voting village for inviting me and the feds to participate.

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So thankful to Bryson for organizing.

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And I know we're going to address the question of what's the greatest area of progress since 2016, where have we improved?

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I mean, the fact that you have a unified federal effort working to help support state and local election officials on this mission space, I think, speaks volumes.

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I work for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA.

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I'm the election security lead there.

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Prior to that, I was a commissioner at the EAC, where Maurice now sits.

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And before that, I was an election official in the state of Ohio.

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So come from an election administration background, have had to learn the intricacies of both CISA and the IC.

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And I'm so thankful to everyone sitting up on that stage for their patience with me and working with me and CISA to make sure we're supporting the almost 8,800 state and local election officials across this country, let alone the private sector that we work very closely with and members of academia and nonpartisan organization.

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Our focus at CISA is to get information, support, services, everything from penetration testing to routine cyber hygiene scans to incident response out to the state and local election officials to help support them and engaging with their voters.

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The reality is American elections are run at the state and local level.

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And we want to do everything we can so that those state and local officials can talk to their voters about why the process is secure and why they should have confidence that their vote was counted as cast.

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So really thankful for this panel and super excited to have this discussion today.

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Matt, that's a great segue.

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Trust is key to the infrastructure, right?

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The process for collecting the votes to determine our democracy starts with that trust and that begins with transparency and accountability, which is why I thought it was so critical to have this panel here for the government to talk about, okay, what's happened and what have we done?

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So 2016 is when I think this really grew into the consciousness as a significant issue that everybody understood.

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What exactly happened in 2016 and 2018?

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Well, on the cyber side, in 2016, Russia compromised multiple different election networks.

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That included the state network, that included two counties.

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And as a part of that, we've assessed that they really sought to at least conduct reconnaissance against all 50 states.

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To try to figure out where it was most vulnerable and where they could get in.

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Now, we don't think that had any effect on election.

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We have no information that that did.

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And really, where they were focused on, really couldn't have.

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But within that, it's obviously troubling because that's an attack on our election systems.

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It's attacking critical infrastructure.

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And it's something that now, looking at that and moving forward, that's why we partnered with everybody here to focus on, how do we, A, harden the networks so that can't happen?

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And how do we work to counter adversaries so they don't want to do it?

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And how do we ensure that we can be as transparent as possible?

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And that's included some various measures like both FBI and CISA will now tell a chief state election official if anything happens on a local election network.

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That's a change from 2016, and it's a necessary change for the transparency that you noted.

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Yeah, I mean, I think Cynthia covered the cyber side pretty well.

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From an influence side, I think most folks are tracking the infamous Internet Research Agency, Troll Farm.

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So in terms of the social media operations that they were conducting in 2016 and 2018, also hack and leak operations could be very damaging.

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When we look at it in terms of evolution between 2016, 2018, and 2020, it was mostly focused on Russia in 2016, but we know that the threat is broader than that.

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For 2020, we're looking at the spectrum of all of our adversaries.

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Russia, China, Iran, ransomware actors.

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There's more people in the game.

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They're learning from each other.

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Influence is a cheap game to get into now with social media.

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It doesn't cost a lot of money.

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You can try to launder your narratives online through different media outlets.

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So that's something we're laser focused on.

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For us, in 2016, election security really wasn't a priority mission for the Department of Defense.

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It just wasn't something that we had previously focused on, heavily involved in other operations.

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And so while we were focused on other operations, the Russians obviously focused on our elections.

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We learned from that in 2018, between Cybercom and NSA, we formed what was called the Russia Small Group, really laser focused on Russian interference in the 2018 election.

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For us, that never stopped.

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I got back to the command about a year ago in 2019, and we didn't start up this thing called the Election Security Group that was already working.

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And it never stopped working from 2018, and we think we're in a much better position now, certainly, than we were in 2016 or 2018.

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The big change from 2016 to 2018 and now into 2020 really started with the critical infrastructure designation that allowed all these federal partners to come together in a way that we'd be able to better protect our election infrastructure.

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And I think that that really is the key to all of this, which is information sharing, making sure that information is shared amongst agencies, but also to the state and local partners as well.

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The folks are actually running their own networks, their own infrastructure.

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And so that's where EAC comes in.

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We have relationships, we're building those relationships with the state and locals to make sure that they understand the information that's coming to them from their federal partners, and that they realize that they're part of the solution too.

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It's how this all works.

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It's not just keeping those information notices in a silo and keeping them at the local level.

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It's a sharing up and down the stack to make sure that the infrastructure is protected, because it may not just be an attack that happens on a single state or a single county.

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That might be happening other places.

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And if we're not sharing information, then the partners don't know that that coordination is going on.

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Yeah, just to build off on what some of the other panelists have said.

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For me, the biggest change has really been that level of coordination and support with state and local election officials.

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As many people know, when the critical infrastructure designation was made in 2017, there was a lot of resistance, understandably, from state and local election officials and skepticism.

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And we sat there in 2018 and had relationships with all 50 states, had information flowing, we're deploying Albert sensors.

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We sit here now on the brink of 2020.

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We not only have Albert sensors, so intrusion detection sensors deployed across networks in all 50 states.

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We have an ISAC, an information sharing analysis center with close to 3,000 state and local partners receiving information, pushing information back to us.

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We're now deploying endpoint protection in many of the states and across localities to have additional insight.

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But really, that ability to coordinate across the federal government and push information back down to the state and locals has improved so much.

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The federal government, I think, is working in a way around election threat information that I don't know that it did around other issues.

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We are able now to take information, and state and locals are sharing all kinds of reporting with us, and push it across the interagency, the folks that you see sitting up on the stage here, and then push out alerts and warnings through the ISAC broadly to the community.

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And that's just a function that wasn't there certainly in 2016 and is really being honed and improved upon from 2018 to 2020, and that broad reach.

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And so that ability to really work with the election officials to understand risk, our risk understanding is much deeper than it was 2016 or 2018, to the point where as COVID has developed and kind of changed operations within elections offices, we've been able to be responsive and understand where the risk is shifting,

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and try to help gear our support, our information sharing, to understand that risk shift, so that they can take appropriate steps to mitigate that risk and really ensure the integrity of the election, and then turn around and message it to voters.

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And I think that's a theme you're going to hear throughout this conversation, really reach in that last step of talking to voters about their options, about how they can vote, about the process and security is really critical in an environment when we know adversaries are trying to undermine confidence in the process.

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So part of what we've learned, which stems from the problem, and a lot of what the solution has been, has been the designation of this as critical infrastructure, the federal collaboration, where this isn't the first time you're all meeting each other.

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You all know each other pretty well, right?

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I was talking to Bryson earlier that I've been on panels before with people from the government who are all working the same issue, and then you're meeting the person right before the panel starts.

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So when Bryson reached out and said, we're going to have a panel on election security.

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And I asked, OK, who's going to be on it?

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And he started to tick it off names.

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And I'm like, OK, I talk to these people multiple times per week or sometimes every single day or multiple times a day.

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So it really just shows how deep the collaboration is.

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I spent a lot of time in counterterrorism.

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You think that's a mission that, you know, and it is a mission that the government rallies around.

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But election security, I don't get it out of the water in terms of how much we all talk to each other.

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Right.

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I mean, there's no better example than that.

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This panel is a representation of what's already happening.

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This panel is not the thing that is driving it.

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Right.

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We are capturing a moment in time of what's been accomplished.

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If we had tried to do this in 2016, we would have been spending the last 30 minutes all shaking each other.

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So what do you do?

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What do you do?

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What exactly is that?

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Tell us about the Midwest, Matt.

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Like, we've never heard of these things.

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Sorry, that's a Chicago thing.

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OK.

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And how information sharing isn't just sharing information.

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Right.

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But it's the fact that the information is being shared so that missions are being executed.

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Things are happening with it.

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Right.

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Those risks are being assessed.

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Those actions are being taken.

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And I really like the way you phrased it, Joe.

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Right.

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We're playing the away game.

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I'll translate that for everybody.

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Actually, why don't you translate what the away game is?

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Yeah.

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So.

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So let me translate the away game at the end.

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I mean, if I could just talk about the collaboration, the relationships.

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You know, a good example is like the rehearsal that we did on Super Tuesday.

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And so, look, I'm in the Army.

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I've been in the Army a long time, just like Dave.

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You know, I spent a lot of time in the CT fight and, you know, a lot of times in panel rooms and places like Afghanistan.

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And, you know, we operate out of these joint operations centers.

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Right.

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And in the joint operations centers, we're sitting in there, as you can imagine, we love flat screen TVs, a lot of flat screen TVs on the wall.

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And, you know, unmanned aerial vehicles are flying around and other collection assets.

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All that data is being pumped into the room where you're immediately able to make sense of it and then make decisions.

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You know, allocating resources, sending forces, doing what.

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And, you know, Super Tuesday, if you walked into the to the room that we were using as a mission center, you know, you would have seen cybercom personnel.

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You would have seen NSA personnel and you would have looked in a chat room.

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And almost every organization that you could imagine involved in the federal government is in a chat room.

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OK, and they are talking about in almost real time.

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If something goes on on state election infrastructure in North Carolina, you know, there is an unclassified chat going up to DHS drops it in a classified chat room.

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You've got analysts from NSA and cybercom and other government agencies immediately combing their databases and then almost instantaneously providing information back that says, hey, this is something you should be concerned about.

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Or this is just normal traffic that we see on any day on the Internet.

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It looks anomalous because we're paying a lot more attention to it right now because there's this thing called Super Tuesday going on.

202
00:18:32,480 --> 00:18:39,940
You know, at the same time, I've got defensive cyber elements that are sitting in things we call war rooms and they are waiting on a call.

203
00:18:39,960 --> 00:18:45,340
You know, if there is something that happens that DHS needs help with, you know, they are trained.

204
00:18:45,520 --> 00:18:49,500
They have collaborated in the past and we're ready to kick a team out.

205
00:18:49,500 --> 00:18:53,400
Additionally, we have elements that are that are sitting over in other off centers.

206
00:18:53,500 --> 00:18:59,260
Okay, and they are prepared if we see an adversary that's attempting to do something to interfere with that election.

207
00:18:59,260 --> 00:19:02,000
You know, we have the ability to play the away game.

208
00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:05,820
And so we have the ability to go out in foreign space and look at what you're doing.

209
00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:08,500
And we have the ability to make you stop doing that.

210
00:19:08,500 --> 00:19:20,280
And that's really the focus of what I think the federal government looks like from the local and state level all the way up through the national level to the Department of Defense.

211
00:19:20,280 --> 00:19:24,840
And, you know, for me as American, honestly, that was a pretty impressive experience.

212
00:19:25,380 --> 00:19:33,300
If I could take a slight turn from that, I think it is important to call out the collaboration that we have in the government.

213
00:19:33,300 --> 00:19:39,740
But I think the other evolution that's occurred is the engagement with industry here, right?

214
00:19:39,920 --> 00:19:44,720
I'm sure we have a lot of people who are, you know, working for the federal government all that year.

215
00:19:44,720 --> 00:19:50,820
And I think that's been a major component of the shift in posture we have for election security.

216
00:19:51,020 --> 00:19:55,060
I mean, it's awesome when you're reading about, you know, disinformation networks being pulled out.

217
00:19:55,820 --> 00:20:03,880
Obviously, the cybersecurity companies really focused on election threats and trying to hunt down, you know, adversaries and what they're up to.

218
00:20:03,880 --> 00:20:16,200
You know, we can't do this mission without them and without industry help from state and local election officials, but also the cybersecurity companies and how we can feed off each other.

219
00:20:16,200 --> 00:20:22,620
We learn from what industry is putting out and what we're providing value at and what we're putting out.

220
00:20:22,880 --> 00:20:27,220
So people can leverage that in the systems and insights they have, right?

221
00:20:27,280 --> 00:20:30,840
Industry has a lot better insights than the government does in a lot of these cases.

222
00:20:30,840 --> 00:20:34,180
So they're a critical partner in this partnership.

223
00:20:34,980 --> 00:20:51,800
And I think that taking that a step further, even the individual level collaboration, you know, not just a big corporate or a company collaboration with the federal government, but people who call in suspicious information because they're worried about it.

224
00:20:51,920 --> 00:20:56,320
And they call DHS, they call FBI, they call any of us.

225
00:20:56,320 --> 00:21:01,920
And they are calling because they're worried and they want to do the right thing.

226
00:21:01,920 --> 00:21:11,920
And because those people call, the majority of the information that really we're able to get to state and locals since 2016, it's been because people called us.

227
00:21:11,920 --> 00:21:15,880
They said they were concerned about something, we looked at it, and we said, you're right, and we got it out to everybody.

228
00:21:15,880 --> 00:21:21,400
So there's this element of that corporate industry responsibility and collaboration.

229
00:21:21,400 --> 00:21:28,580
There's a federal government collaboration, but there's that individual collaboration too with all of us that it really is working well together.

230
00:21:29,560 --> 00:21:33,180
Yeah, Bryson, if I can just really quick on that.

231
00:21:33,300 --> 00:21:36,700
I think Cynthia raises a really good point and it's appropriate here.

232
00:21:36,700 --> 00:21:42,820
Just the fact that there's now a guide for coordinated vulnerability disclosure for state and local election officials.

233
00:21:42,820 --> 00:21:51,540
In 2016, as a member of the election community, I can tell you that was not a known commodity or something that they were even considering.

234
00:21:51,540 --> 00:22:07,180
And now we're progressed where folks like Jack Cable, who I know was on before, have built relationships with election officials, to help them understand the value of vulnerability disclosure and working with independent researchers and security experts in that way.

235
00:22:07,180 --> 00:22:18,060
The fact that private industry within the elections community is rolling out vulnerability disclosure policies and engaging in that conversation, not something that was going on in 2016.

236
00:22:18,060 --> 00:22:23,820
And so the multiple avenues of information, the multiple avenues of collaboration are really encouraging.

237
00:22:23,820 --> 00:22:25,680
I think we have a ways to go.

238
00:22:25,680 --> 00:22:29,920
I think there's lots of room for improvement, certainly on the federal side to help coordinate on that.

239
00:22:29,920 --> 00:22:36,460
At the state and local level, increasing capacity, the ability to intake and resolve and mitigate those vulnerabilities.

240
00:22:36,620 --> 00:22:56,400
But it's a drastic improvement from where we were even four years ago, and really speaks to the professionalism of state and local election officials in particular, who care deeply about the security of this process in their systems and want to find ways to improve and talk to their voters about the steps they've taken to secure it.

241
00:22:57,540 --> 00:23:02,560
This industry and this community has really matured very quickly compared to some others.

242
00:23:02,560 --> 00:23:16,560
And I think it's part due to events like this, like DEF CON, where researchers are coming together, talking about what's going on, where are their vulnerabilities, what are some ways we can fix it, taking a look at other industries like telecoms, aviation,

243
00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:21,220
things like that, and getting those best practices out of the way kind of quickly.

244
00:23:21,620 --> 00:23:25,000
And as Matt was saying, it's because individuals care.

245
00:23:25,000 --> 00:23:31,480
And I think that's probably the biggest part of this that I want people to take away from this is that elections happen in communities.

246
00:23:31,480 --> 00:23:37,760
And I think that's really what it comes down to is everyone gets a sense of how important it is at the very local level.

247
00:23:37,760 --> 00:23:43,580
And all that builds up to build a sense of national urgency and importance about the issue.

248
00:23:43,660 --> 00:24:04,480
And to see the election officials really get on board with this idea that they are part of the defense network to make sure that we don't have interference playing in our elections and to see them, you know, get educated on the issues and really try to convey their own sense of confidence in their systems,

249
00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:07,440
because they know what goes into running an election.

250
00:24:07,560 --> 00:24:09,340
It's not all just about cybersecurity.

251
00:24:09,340 --> 00:24:11,680
There are administrative tasks they need to do.

252
00:24:11,680 --> 00:24:15,620
There are other tasks that some of them are even responsible for.

253
00:24:15,620 --> 00:24:17,580
And so, you know, they care deeply about elections.

254
00:24:17,580 --> 00:24:26,880
They want to make sure that everyone who votes has a level of confidence that they can feel when they go into the polling place or when they mail in their ballot.

255
00:24:27,160 --> 00:24:30,720
So a follow-up question to Maurice and to Matt.

256
00:24:30,760 --> 00:24:34,620
This follows from a question from Neil McKernan.

257
00:24:34,920 --> 00:24:39,640
And it is, we're talking to a very unique audience today, right?

258
00:24:39,800 --> 00:24:41,440
They are citizens of the world.

259
00:24:41,440 --> 00:24:44,240
They're American citizens, but they're hackers, right?

260
00:24:44,240 --> 00:24:49,960
This is the new system of the Internet that's there to figure out what works best.

261
00:24:49,960 --> 00:24:50,940
And here's the thing.

262
00:24:51,340 --> 00:24:54,040
They're doing it today in the voting village.

263
00:24:54,040 --> 00:24:55,780
They're doing it on the technology.

264
00:24:55,780 --> 00:24:57,320
We talked about industry involvement.

265
00:24:57,320 --> 00:25:08,880
We have individuals willing to take their time to actually dig into the technology itself to understand what works and what doesn't, because that gives us better trust in that technical implementation of the system.

266
00:25:08,880 --> 00:25:28,480
And so the full question here is, when would we start potentially having a prerequisite for entrance to the VVSG certification process that election system vendors adopt good vulnerability disclosure policies, as called out today, to make them widely available for penetration testing?

267
00:25:29,160 --> 00:25:35,580
I'll take that since EAC is in charge of the development and the approval of the VVSG.

268
00:25:35,580 --> 00:25:47,820
So those are guidelines that are used by states, and it directs the manufacturers to meet certain requirements so that they build their systems in a way that is accessible and secure and usable.

269
00:25:48,100 --> 00:25:57,140
And so I think the idea of a vulnerability disclosure policy being part of that would really just be the codification of industry best practices.

270
00:25:57,140 --> 00:26:07,520
Now, the manufacturers know that they are in competition to help bring a better level of security to these systems that are in use.

271
00:26:07,520 --> 00:26:09,260
And so I think that that's already happening.

272
00:26:09,260 --> 00:26:11,720
We've seen the fruits of that labor already.

273
00:26:11,720 --> 00:26:17,740
It didn't need to come from a federal agency to help the process along.

274
00:26:18,340 --> 00:26:22,060
So to answer Neil's question, it's already happening.

275
00:26:22,060 --> 00:26:28,580
And so as the industry continues to mature, I think that we'll see more and more vulnerability disclosure policies.

276
00:26:28,580 --> 00:26:33,640
And I'm hoping that you folks out there get interested in this sector and actually use them.

277
00:26:33,640 --> 00:26:40,520
Find that legal way of doing the research and then reporting it responsibly to make sure that the problems actually get fixed.

278
00:26:40,520 --> 00:26:44,040
This isn't about a big bug bounty that you're going after.

279
00:26:44,040 --> 00:26:46,520
This isn't about trying to embarrass anyone.

280
00:26:46,520 --> 00:26:50,820
This is about strengthening our democracy, literally through strengthening our systems.

281
00:26:52,000 --> 00:26:57,080
Yeah, Bryson, just to just add a little bit, Maurice really tackled the meat of the issue.

282
00:26:57,080 --> 00:26:58,700
But I agree.

283
00:26:58,700 --> 00:27:10,600
I mean, we have had several vendors, election system vendors, come through our penetration testing process, what we call our critical product evaluation process up in Idaho.

284
00:27:10,700 --> 00:27:13,360
We have seen the private sector embrace that.

285
00:27:13,360 --> 00:27:20,920
And now we're starting to see, I think, the fruits of the work of not just the voting village, but the private sector companies to understand the value.

286
00:27:20,920 --> 00:27:31,400
And frankly, the marketplace dictating that improves security steps towards coordinated vulnerability disclosure processes are going to be good for business.

287
00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:35,220
And that's why you see a reflection in progress being made.

288
00:27:35,220 --> 00:27:44,520
The private sector is hearing from customers, is responding, and I think we'll continue to see progress made on that level.

289
00:27:44,520 --> 00:28:00,840
I think one step we need to take, and I know the EAC takes this very seriously and states need to be thinking about it too, but to the extent it involves equipment, whether e-poll books or voting systems that they certify, you have to be ready to respond and adjust certification quickly,

290
00:28:00,840 --> 00:28:03,260
adapt to those type of processes.

291
00:28:03,260 --> 00:28:24,260
So I think we have a maturing to do sort of in the bureaucratic lane to make sure that we can support the private sector as they're changing and evolving and accepting this approach, that we support them in our certification processes and the way that systems need to be fielded.

292
00:28:27,370 --> 00:28:30,350
So that all ties back to that, what is the threat?

293
00:28:30,350 --> 00:28:33,290
China, Iran, Russia have been mentioned.

294
00:28:33,690 --> 00:28:35,050
How are they a threat?

295
00:28:35,050 --> 00:28:36,190
What are they doing?

296
00:28:36,190 --> 00:28:38,950
And are they the only threat that we need to be worried about?

297
00:28:40,970 --> 00:28:42,850
So I'll start with that one.

298
00:28:42,850 --> 00:28:45,730
I would say those are the main threats we're facing.

299
00:28:45,730 --> 00:28:56,050
Again, I think ransomware is like one of those wild cards out there that could be fielded by anyone, in theory, criminal actors, etc.

300
00:28:56,050 --> 00:28:59,210
So they could probably say more to that.

301
00:28:59,710 --> 00:29:09,950
So for Russia, I think in terms of an evolution, what we've seen, we talked about the Internet Research Agency, what they did in kind of social media accounts and the troll farms.

302
00:29:10,290 --> 00:29:15,250
In terms of 2020, we've seen a shift more towards the use of proxies.

303
00:29:15,250 --> 00:29:21,350
I guess I should maybe say intermediaries when we're in a technology crowd instead of saying proxies.

304
00:29:22,210 --> 00:29:31,190
So using, again, I mentioned before, laundering information through other individuals into the media space.

305
00:29:31,190 --> 00:29:35,090
The IRA, you've seen that shift tactics.

306
00:29:35,170 --> 00:29:53,110
They had set up something in Africa, in Ghana, in terms of trying to have people there, trying to put stuff online, posting things about socially divisive issues, using covert influence websites to be able to get their narrative out.

307
00:29:53,410 --> 00:29:56,910
So that's kind of a shift of tactic we've seen from the Russia side.

308
00:29:56,910 --> 00:30:07,410
China, I think scale is something that is a bit unmatched in terms of them as a threat, both from a cyber standpoint and from an influence standpoint.

309
00:30:07,410 --> 00:30:13,650
Certainly on influence, they've been very active in that region, Taiwan, Hong Kong.

310
00:30:13,870 --> 00:30:16,670
Then becoming potentially more aggressive in the U.S.

311
00:30:16,670 --> 00:30:20,950
space is something that we need to monitor and be prepared for.

312
00:30:20,950 --> 00:30:29,230
But in cyber, for the China cyber threat, they're a little bit different in terms of the scale and breadth of the targets they go after.

313
00:30:29,230 --> 00:30:30,450
It's like every U.S.

314
00:30:30,450 --> 00:30:37,470
citizen is a target of China, just because of the big data, PII that they're interested in collecting.

315
00:30:37,650 --> 00:30:43,270
Obviously, everyone's familiar with IP threat, besides just the standard intelligence-type targets.

316
00:30:43,450 --> 00:30:46,410
So I think that sets them uniquely apart.

317
00:30:46,410 --> 00:30:56,210
And Iran, just getting into the game, too, in terms of them trying to do social media influence and learning from what the other adversaries are doing.

318
00:30:58,450 --> 00:31:06,250
Yeah, so Russia, I would offer everyone you should read the report that came out from the State Department a couple of days ago.

319
00:31:06,290 --> 00:31:13,370
77 pages called the Pillars of Disinformation about the various sites operated by Russia.

320
00:31:13,370 --> 00:31:28,470
Just ask yourself, why in Russia, a country where few people read or write English, do they continue to put out a tremendous amount of English language news on these French news outlets?

321
00:31:28,470 --> 00:31:32,450
That really involved divisive issues that are U.S.-based.

322
00:31:32,450 --> 00:31:39,190
And so, again, a tremendous amount of platforms that the Russians invest in.

323
00:31:39,190 --> 00:31:48,950
CNN ran a great news exposé in April of 2020 about an organization that Dave referenced.

324
00:31:48,950 --> 00:32:01,230
So 18 Trolls in Ghana, led by a guy named Seth Wierdo, who grew up in Ghana, educated in Russia, and appears to have been on the payroll of the Purgosian network.

325
00:32:01,230 --> 00:32:04,830
So, again, it's about a seven-minute watch.

326
00:32:05,510 --> 00:32:10,790
And that can just provide you some insight into what the Russians are doing there.

327
00:32:10,790 --> 00:32:29,250
And then, you know, when we talk about private industry, you know, whether it's Facebook, Google, Microsoft, you know, there are dozens of articles about how these technology companies have identified this malicious behavior on their platforms that they're able to link back to the nation-state adversaries,

328
00:32:29,250 --> 00:32:30,310
Russia, China, and Iran.

329
00:32:30,310 --> 00:32:34,970
So, you know, I would tell everybody that there's a ton of stuff out there.

330
00:32:34,970 --> 00:32:40,410
You know, I know when we talk to CyberComm and NSA, we want to focus on that classified cyber box.

331
00:32:40,410 --> 00:32:47,450
But I'll tell you, there is a tremendous amount of great information already out there on the Internet that can provide you a lot of insight.

332
00:32:48,150 --> 00:32:52,230
You know, as Cynthia talked about, you know, we, you know, the U.S.

333
00:32:52,230 --> 00:32:59,750
government, you know, for you experts that are out there, you know, if you see suspicious activity, tell DHS.

334
00:32:59,750 --> 00:33:01,090
Tell the FBI.

335
00:33:01,090 --> 00:33:03,750
You know, we, the government, will do something about it.

336
00:33:03,830 --> 00:33:07,350
You know, if it's a domestic threat, those organizations will address it.

337
00:33:07,350 --> 00:33:09,370
If it's a foreign threat, they'll tell us.

338
00:33:09,370 --> 00:33:11,890
And I don't mean they'll tell us like six months from now.

339
00:33:11,890 --> 00:33:13,490
They'll tell us that day.

340
00:33:13,490 --> 00:33:15,710
They'll tell us early the next morning.

341
00:33:16,010 --> 00:33:21,070
You know, we had an incident the other night that, you know, occurred at 1.42 in the morning.

342
00:33:21,230 --> 00:33:24,950
And, you know, about 6 o'clock in the morning, we had cyber teams looking at the activity.

343
00:33:24,950 --> 00:33:33,850
So, again, for you experts out there, you know, you know better than anybody else if something weird is going on on the Internet.

344
00:33:33,910 --> 00:33:38,050
And I would just ask you to share that and we, the government, will take action.

345
00:33:38,150 --> 00:33:49,450
And I'd say, too, just from a cyber aspect, because I know we're talking to a lot of the hacker community, you know, leveraging trust relationships, you know, it's a common technique.

346
00:33:49,450 --> 00:33:49,750
Right.

347
00:33:49,750 --> 00:33:55,750
So, you know, some of these networks that they might be interested in are very well defended, just like the DoD.

348
00:33:55,750 --> 00:33:55,970
Right.

349
00:33:55,970 --> 00:33:59,570
But, you know, companies sometimes outsource their marketing departments.

350
00:33:59,570 --> 00:34:06,350
There's other other soft targets out there, think tanks, that could be lucrative even from an Intel perspective.

351
00:34:06,350 --> 00:34:10,190
You know, think tanks do policy work for politicians.

352
00:34:10,190 --> 00:34:12,090
They have contacts with elected officials.

353
00:34:12,110 --> 00:34:14,810
So, you know, sometimes going outside the bullseye.

354
00:34:15,370 --> 00:34:24,170
And again, a lot of this is common techniques, exploiting publicly known CVEs, you know, password spraying, spear phishing, you name it.

355
00:34:24,310 --> 00:34:28,690
You know, they're using Shodan, they're using Burp Suite, they're using those tools.

356
00:34:28,690 --> 00:34:37,770
They can get access to a network that maybe isn't inside the bullseye, leverage that, leverage an account, leverage a network connection to get into the target they're going after.

357
00:34:37,770 --> 00:34:39,550
And that's an important point.

358
00:34:39,550 --> 00:34:45,710
And that type of targeting hasn't really stopped from 2016 on.

359
00:34:45,730 --> 00:34:53,890
So spear phishing or looking for those networks that might be connected to the targets that they more desire.

360
00:34:54,210 --> 00:34:55,970
That's been continuing the pace.

361
00:34:55,970 --> 00:34:59,050
And I mean, we're tracking a lot of incidents even right now.

362
00:34:59,330 --> 00:35:06,030
And the good news with all those incidents is we haven't really seen any widespread impacts from those.

363
00:35:06,030 --> 00:35:13,330
But it's interesting because tracking a lot of incidents can feel scary.

364
00:35:13,330 --> 00:35:21,890
But it also gives me a lot of... it makes me feel better almost because I know that we're detecting every tremor.

365
00:35:22,070 --> 00:35:27,870
And that means we have a lot of false positives that we follow up on.

366
00:35:28,170 --> 00:35:31,710
I'd much rather that than not knowing things are out there.

367
00:35:31,710 --> 00:35:34,290
But it also means we have a fuller picture.

368
00:35:34,290 --> 00:35:41,470
And part of that fuller picture, as Dave mentioned, is on cyber criminals and not just ransomware.

369
00:35:42,270 --> 00:35:48,010
Other types of incidents as well and actors as well.

370
00:35:48,010 --> 00:35:59,170
And we really have to be on guard, not just if it's coming from Russia or China or Iran or a host of other groups, but a threat to an election network or a campaign network is a threat.

371
00:35:59,170 --> 00:36:04,310
And we need to be able to be really flexible in addressing that.

372
00:36:04,310 --> 00:36:17,450
And getting in front of that head on so that we can't make sure that come election day we're not dealing with a lot of pop-up threats and we're spending a lot of time trying to figure out really what happened.

373
00:36:17,490 --> 00:36:23,510
Yeah, I think that the nexus of cyber and the cyber threats and influence threats is a dangerous space.

374
00:36:23,510 --> 00:36:32,150
We know about Hackenleak and how that could impact potentially the voter populace and their opinions.

375
00:36:32,590 --> 00:36:44,570
But we were just talking before this panel, I think, in terms of using influence to make people distrust either the electoral outcomes.

376
00:36:44,570 --> 00:36:51,610
So you could have a ransomware incident in a local network that actually doesn't even impact.

377
00:36:51,610 --> 00:36:56,050
The elections counting or any of that.

378
00:36:56,050 --> 00:37:04,810
But someone could then spin an influence campaign when that gets reported to make people think it has had an impact and then not trust the results.

379
00:37:04,810 --> 00:37:05,030
Right.

380
00:37:05,030 --> 00:37:08,370
So that's one of those things that I think is worrisome.

381
00:37:08,370 --> 00:37:16,630
Even if a cyber attack doesn't actually have a measurable impact in terms of the conduct of the election or voting tallies.

382
00:37:17,570 --> 00:37:23,650
But, you know, if someone's able to take that and then try to spin off an information operations campaign from it.

383
00:37:26,010 --> 00:37:33,930
That point, I'd just like to drive home is that it's not just about, you know, what actually happened, where votes actually change.

384
00:37:33,930 --> 00:37:37,570
That's incredibly difficult to do at scale in a way that's undetectable.

385
00:37:38,310 --> 00:37:45,690
But if you can put that message out there that causes people to question and their local election official picks up that phone call and they don't have a good response for it.

386
00:37:45,690 --> 00:37:47,410
That can be just as damaging.

387
00:37:47,450 --> 00:37:54,650
So that's why at EAC we feel so strongly about making sure that local election officials have the tools, have the training that they need.

388
00:37:54,650 --> 00:38:02,390
So we partner with the Center for Tech and Civic Life to actually provide that basic intermediate level of cybersecurity training.

389
00:38:02,390 --> 00:38:05,810
So that they understand, you know, why is it important to have two-factor authentication?

390
00:38:05,810 --> 00:38:10,430
You know, what does it mean to actually have a password manager so you're not reusing your passwords?

391
00:38:10,430 --> 00:38:17,210
These are all basics that most folks that are watching us right now are thinking, how can anybody not know how to do that?

392
00:38:17,210 --> 00:38:23,710
But if you've never been taught that or if you don't have an understanding of the impact of that, then it might be too much work.

393
00:38:23,770 --> 00:38:29,290
But once you understand how much bad stuff that can actually prevent you recognize, it's actually not that difficult.

394
00:38:29,290 --> 00:38:32,750
It's actually pretty easy to use it if you are familiar with the tools.

395
00:38:32,970 --> 00:38:36,170
And then it gives you the confidence to stand up and say, you know what?

396
00:38:36,190 --> 00:38:39,010
Yeah, we heard about the ransomware or maybe we got hit with some ransomware.

397
00:38:39,370 --> 00:38:42,670
You know, the town down the street, but we're ready.

398
00:38:42,670 --> 00:38:44,090
These are the things that we're doing.

399
00:38:44,090 --> 00:38:45,550
We're also doing some other things we're not going to talk about.

400
00:38:45,550 --> 00:38:52,090
But here are some of the big things, the high-level things that we're doing to be prepared so that if we do get a phishing email, we know how to spot it.

401
00:38:52,090 --> 00:38:52,990
We know how to stop it.

402
00:38:52,990 --> 00:38:57,510
We can recover, you know, from those backups if we actually do get hit with it.

403
00:38:57,590 --> 00:39:07,170
And so I think that's why it's so important that the local election officials have a level of confidence that they can then reflect back on to their voters when it comes to elections.

404
00:39:07,950 --> 00:39:10,050
Yeah, just real quick on that.

405
00:39:10,050 --> 00:39:12,370
Maurice raises some really good points.

406
00:39:12,370 --> 00:39:31,930
And it's why we spent a lot of time at CISA on something we call the Last Mile Project, which is literally a poster project offering both risk assessment and then mitigation advice to the local level, almost 6,000 local jurisdictions specific to their state and their jurisdiction so that they can not only take the steps,

407
00:39:31,930 --> 00:39:42,970
whether it's multi-factor authentication or penetration testing or phishing campaign resilience or creating incident response plans, which we really focused on, but then can go and talk to their voters.

408
00:39:42,970 --> 00:39:45,530
And we've seen some cool approaches to this.

409
00:39:45,530 --> 00:39:53,530
We saw one state, the state of Iowa, take their posters out to the state fair so that they could talk to their voters directly about steps that they were taking.

410
00:39:53,530 --> 00:40:01,910
We saw the state of Rhode Island work with their libraries to put it up in the library system so that they could talk to voters through the libraries about this.

411
00:40:01,910 --> 00:40:11,130
And in the end, and I think Dave raises a really important point, there's resilience to cyber intrusion, resilience, and the ability to recover from incidents.

412
00:40:11,130 --> 00:40:16,510
But then there's the resilience that we need to install in talking to the American voter.

413
00:40:16,510 --> 00:40:21,270
We need voters that are prepared, that understand their registry.

414
00:40:21,270 --> 00:40:22,170
Am I registered?

415
00:40:22,170 --> 00:40:23,090
What's on my ballot?

416
00:40:23,090 --> 00:40:29,230
What are my voting options, particularly amongst COVID, so that they can have confidence on how they're going to engage the process?

417
00:40:29,230 --> 00:40:43,850
We need a voter that is patient, that understands that perhaps election night results won't be as complete as what we're used to in a given jurisdiction, and that the accuracy of the vote count is the most important thing, regardless of the time it takes.

418
00:40:43,890 --> 00:40:47,070
And then we need a voter that participates, that engages.

419
00:40:47,070 --> 00:41:01,770
We need, you know, 250,000 or more poll workers across this country in preparation for November in the midst of COVID when we have poll workers that, you know, are going to be unwilling to work, either because their age or high-risk nature.

420
00:41:02,130 --> 00:41:10,790
And so having people engaged and participating, the reality for those folks that are listening, no one told me anyone would be listening to this, so now I'm a little worried.

421
00:41:10,790 --> 00:41:15,970
But anyone that is listening, go sign up to be a poll worker if you want to understand the process.

422
00:41:15,970 --> 00:41:19,070
Matt Blaze hits this every time, and he's exactly right.

423
00:41:19,070 --> 00:41:25,970
If you have questions, if you have concerns, if you want to help secure the process, start off by being an election worker.

424
00:41:25,970 --> 00:41:27,530
You're not going to get turned down.

425
00:41:27,530 --> 00:41:28,650
We need you.

426
00:41:28,810 --> 00:41:35,770
And it's the best way to learn where the resiliency exists in the process, where improvements can be made in order to get involved.

427
00:41:35,770 --> 00:41:41,830
If you can't be a poll worker, if you can't take on that risk, there are opportunities to watch pre-election testing of systems.

428
00:41:41,830 --> 00:41:47,150
We run elections at the local level so you can participate directly with those who run the process.

429
00:41:47,150 --> 00:41:49,030
So go get your questions answered.

430
00:41:49,050 --> 00:41:54,170
Go engage with them and see what kind of support they're in need of, in particular serving as an election worker.

431
00:41:54,170 --> 00:41:59,010
It really is the best path to doing this and the best way to learn the process.

432
00:41:59,010 --> 00:42:03,950
But if we can have voters, voters are our last line of resilience, as Director Krebs says.

433
00:42:03,950 --> 00:42:11,690
They're the ones that can really ensure a responsive, resilient process when attempts to undermine confidence are there.

434
00:42:12,770 --> 00:42:16,070
There is no such thing as a secure system, right?

435
00:42:16,070 --> 00:42:18,870
We never hit the plateau where it's like, oh, we're good.

436
00:42:18,870 --> 00:42:22,110
We can all pack up, go home and take the next year off.

437
00:42:22,110 --> 00:42:29,330
So quick question from a lot of interested citizens who want to get involved.

438
00:42:29,330 --> 00:42:34,050
Ties to the fact around, OK, so you talk about detection being a key part of that secure system.

439
00:42:34,430 --> 00:42:37,590
Where exactly are they supposed to go to figure out where to say something?

440
00:42:39,010 --> 00:42:41,810
Well, you can go to your local FBI field office.

441
00:42:42,590 --> 00:42:52,230
You can go on to FBI.gov and find out contacts or contact our FBI CyWatch directly.

442
00:42:52,570 --> 00:43:00,070
And you can go to multiple other agencies as well, because what we've really said is a call to one is a call to all.

443
00:43:00,070 --> 00:43:08,110
And that's how we are ensuring that there's that kind of information sharing across the board here.

444
00:43:11,450 --> 00:43:15,070
I was just going to say, Cynthia is exactly right.

445
00:43:16,010 --> 00:43:23,350
First of all, if you know something within your community, engaging directly with the local election officials is really critical to help understand.

446
00:43:23,350 --> 00:43:27,310
Did you actually find something or is this something they're aware of?

447
00:43:27,310 --> 00:43:32,350
Otherwise, the second part is engaging with your state officials.

448
00:43:32,350 --> 00:43:34,070
They're prepared to take it on.

449
00:43:34,070 --> 00:43:37,410
They're the ones that know the process, know their systems, can talk to the vendors.

450
00:43:37,410 --> 00:43:42,170
And then the ISAC exists for exactly this reason as well.

451
00:43:42,230 --> 00:44:01,430
There's an avenue, and it happens fairly commonly, that if you report to the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing Analysis Center or directly into CISA, we now have the points of contact that we didn't have in 2016 to be able to get valuable information to state and local election officials so that they can take action on something that's identified.

452
00:44:01,430 --> 00:44:03,110
There are avenues.

453
00:44:03,110 --> 00:44:05,530
Again, the state and local officials know their systems.

454
00:44:05,530 --> 00:44:09,290
They're the best prepared to mitigate a problem.

455
00:44:09,290 --> 00:44:16,510
But if you're not finding success that route, the ISAC, CISA, FBI field office are available to help you get there.

456
00:44:16,670 --> 00:44:23,670
And understandably, some folks may not want to go to the federal government, which is why the ISAC really offers a nice safe place to begin that reporting.

457
00:44:23,830 --> 00:44:25,950
I'll offer up EAC as well.

458
00:44:25,950 --> 00:44:28,690
You can send an email to security at EAC.gov.

459
00:44:28,690 --> 00:44:31,130
Obviously, we have connections with all the manufacturers.

460
00:44:31,130 --> 00:44:40,310
If you're having trouble with a particular manufacturer or having trouble with a particular agency or your local official, or just not getting the response you want, we're happy to help facilitate that conversation.

461
00:44:41,190 --> 00:44:49,350
And just from a cyber count standpoint, one of the big changes for us is, you know, we historically had been focused, you know, working inside SCIFs.

462
00:44:49,350 --> 00:44:55,970
And one of the things that we've really done in support of 2020 is, you know, we have organizations now that live outside SCIFs.

463
00:44:55,970 --> 00:44:58,990
They're on NIPRNet or unclassified internet.

464
00:44:58,990 --> 00:45:00,550
You know, they're in Slack channels.

465
00:45:00,550 --> 00:45:01,950
They're talking to FBI.

466
00:45:01,950 --> 00:45:03,410
They're talking to DHS.

467
00:45:03,410 --> 00:45:05,410
They're talking to private industry partners.

468
00:45:05,410 --> 00:45:13,230
And they're, you know, they're living in that same ecosystem that many of the folks that are listening to this presentation are.

469
00:45:13,230 --> 00:45:25,270
And so we have really tried to adapt some of our behavior so we're able to, you know, in real time collaborate with our partners across government, you know, on a little different time schedule than would be a traditional military one.

470
00:45:25,270 --> 00:45:29,950
Because I know most of you are probably not up at 530 in the morning doing just the same.

471
00:45:31,530 --> 00:45:41,490
So Bill Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence Security Center, just recently put out an official statement today talking about the very threat that we're covering here.

472
00:45:41,750 --> 00:45:45,510
But all of the threats were basically laid out in an equal manner.

473
00:45:45,510 --> 00:45:46,810
Would you say the threats are equal?

474
00:45:46,810 --> 00:45:48,770
Which one would you say is the biggest and why?

475
00:45:50,210 --> 00:45:55,250
Well, I don't think we need to take any of the threats lightly, right?

476
00:45:55,250 --> 00:46:04,170
I think the statement in terms of what you saw out there, it lays out how each adversary is approaching the problem.

477
00:46:04,170 --> 00:46:16,890
Certainly, you know, Russia, China, Iran, they all have intent and they all do activities that they think are advancing their best interests here.

478
00:46:16,890 --> 00:46:25,210
So, you know, I don't think I would say like one is scarier than the other, per se.

479
00:46:25,490 --> 00:46:36,570
Certainly, some of these adversaries are a bit more experienced at this in terms of the amount of time they've been working, you know, doing operations.

480
00:46:36,570 --> 00:46:41,690
But, you know, from our perspective, you know, I care about all those threats.

481
00:46:41,870 --> 00:46:48,570
I take them all seriously because, you know, again, some of the stuff is very cheap to get into and to execute.

482
00:46:48,770 --> 00:46:54,110
So, you know, I wouldn't do a value judgment on those.

483
00:46:54,690 --> 00:46:56,890
I totally agree more on that.

484
00:46:56,890 --> 00:47:06,290
And I think that it's really important to remember that our threat picture is always informed by what we collect, what we know.

485
00:47:06,290 --> 00:47:08,970
And, you know, we don't have perfect pictures.

486
00:47:08,970 --> 00:47:16,790
And how we really have to approach all of this is what could be the effect from these various groups?

487
00:47:16,790 --> 00:47:19,690
What could happen closer to September, October?

488
00:47:19,690 --> 00:47:23,210
Because, you know, it still is a few months away.

489
00:47:23,210 --> 00:47:28,810
And we need to be prepared for a lot of different things happening within that.

490
00:47:28,810 --> 00:47:31,290
You know, I'm going to flip stop again.

491
00:47:31,290 --> 00:47:33,110
You know, it doesn't just have to be the big three.

492
00:47:33,110 --> 00:47:46,270
It can be other non-state actors or criminal groups and the like that are going to undermine people's confidence in our system.

493
00:47:46,270 --> 00:47:58,470
And really, if you ask me what the biggest threat is, it's these constant drumbeat or influence campaigns that are going to make people feel like they're less confident in our system.

494
00:47:58,470 --> 00:48:00,550
And that could be people who vote less.

495
00:48:00,950 --> 00:48:03,990
And that's really where, you know, I stand tonight.

496
00:48:05,430 --> 00:48:07,170
Hey, Bryson, just real quick.

497
00:48:07,170 --> 00:48:11,250
Everyone in the Fed room actually has to take a drink because the Fed said foot stomp.

498
00:48:11,310 --> 00:48:14,830
So that's actually one sip for everyone in the Fed room.

499
00:48:16,690 --> 00:48:17,470
Thanks.

500
00:48:19,230 --> 00:48:24,650
Matt, I can't help but feel like you're cheating the system a little bit because you don't have a drink.

501
00:48:24,650 --> 00:48:27,230
I've been drinking this whole panel.

502
00:48:27,230 --> 00:48:27,810
Don't worry.

503
00:48:27,810 --> 00:48:28,630
I'm good.

504
00:48:31,470 --> 00:48:32,650
Hey, put up or shut up.

505
00:48:32,650 --> 00:48:33,630
Show us your drink.

506
00:48:34,770 --> 00:48:36,950
It's in a water bottle, but it's vodka.

507
00:48:38,950 --> 00:48:41,030
So we're coming close to our end of time.

508
00:48:41,030 --> 00:48:46,990
So I want to ask a final sort of grab bag questions to each of you.

509
00:48:47,650 --> 00:48:49,830
And you have about a minute to respond.

510
00:48:50,530 --> 00:48:57,510
So you get a non-internet connected wand, magic wand that you can wave.

511
00:48:57,510 --> 00:49:00,410
Is that the magic wand?

512
00:49:00,750 --> 00:49:02,190
Yes, that is how it is.

513
00:49:02,190 --> 00:49:03,490
Wireless, but wired.

514
00:49:04,530 --> 00:49:09,410
And with this magic wand, you can have one thing happen for your agency instantaneously.

515
00:49:10,290 --> 00:49:11,750
This isn't reality, right?

516
00:49:11,750 --> 00:49:15,450
This isn't, oh, if only I could get that $20 million to fund that.

517
00:49:15,450 --> 00:49:18,530
This is, what do you wish from a process perspective?

518
00:49:19,910 --> 00:49:23,110
So 2020 is almost written.

519
00:49:23,690 --> 00:49:25,770
The mail-in ballots start in a month.

520
00:49:25,770 --> 00:49:26,870
People start voting.

521
00:49:26,870 --> 00:49:27,990
Those start happening.

522
00:49:28,250 --> 00:49:30,410
2024 is our next big one.

523
00:49:30,410 --> 00:49:36,370
What is one good thing and one thing we really need to worry about in the future in 2024?

524
00:49:37,750 --> 00:49:41,550
See, I feel like I'm the shortstop being right next to you.

525
00:49:42,210 --> 00:49:43,830
I like you the most.

526
00:49:43,830 --> 00:49:45,050
Okay.

527
00:49:47,870 --> 00:50:08,750
So thinking about what I really wish we had more of is I wish we had more people right now with the cyber skillset that we could hire quickly and get them on.

528
00:50:08,750 --> 00:50:16,550
So that we could just expand our scope and scale and speed in which we're addressing threats.

529
00:50:16,770 --> 00:50:21,570
And I think that that goes towards, you know, we're putting in so much of what we have against the election.

530
00:50:21,570 --> 00:50:23,850
And I feel really good about where we're at on it.

531
00:50:23,850 --> 00:50:26,910
But what does that take away from some of the other work?

532
00:50:27,190 --> 00:50:28,910
And that, you know, that worries me.

533
00:50:28,910 --> 00:50:36,890
And I'd like us to know that we have the people coming to us that want to do the right thing.

534
00:50:36,950 --> 00:50:45,110
That want to protect America and have those skills necessary to be able to help us in that.

535
00:50:45,110 --> 00:50:47,670
As it looks towards 2024, what do I want to keep?

536
00:50:48,490 --> 00:50:53,180
So I hope we keep the collaboration and the focus alive.

537
00:50:53,180 --> 00:50:57,340
In my opening remarks, I gave a real quick overview of what the FBI does.

538
00:50:57,440 --> 00:51:03,660
Part of it is focused on cyber investigations, looking at influence.

539
00:51:03,660 --> 00:51:06,820
We developed the Foreign Influence Task Force.

540
00:51:07,260 --> 00:51:14,200
And that effort, I think, has really helped us focus on it's not just a cyber issue.

541
00:51:14,200 --> 00:51:15,960
It's not just a criminal issue.

542
00:51:15,960 --> 00:51:17,300
It's not just an influence issue.

543
00:51:17,300 --> 00:51:19,400
It's seeing how it all works together.

544
00:51:19,420 --> 00:51:23,620
Internal, getting the China people to talk to the Russian people to talk to the cyber crime people.

545
00:51:23,620 --> 00:51:26,620
And looking at it as one threat.

546
00:51:27,600 --> 00:51:33,100
That's new within the federal government to really consider it in that space.

547
00:51:33,100 --> 00:51:36,180
And I want to keep that moving forward.

548
00:51:36,180 --> 00:51:40,300
I think that, yeah, that's...

549
00:51:40,920 --> 00:51:41,680
Did I get all your questions?

550
00:51:41,680 --> 00:51:45,060
You asked a spectrum of a few of them here.

551
00:51:46,260 --> 00:51:47,360
But yeah.

552
00:51:47,360 --> 00:51:52,800
And I hope we all stay in touch after we put this in our rear view mirror.

553
00:51:53,540 --> 00:51:56,640
If you don't stay in touch, then the next panel is going to be more awkward.

554
00:51:58,740 --> 00:52:03,040
I think the one answer is pretty easy for me.

555
00:52:03,180 --> 00:52:08,120
Perfect insight into adversary intents and operations is obviously a great thing to have.

556
00:52:08,960 --> 00:52:11,080
Dave, you're not supposed to say that you don't have that.

557
00:52:14,380 --> 00:52:18,540
So, I mean, that's just going to inform our activities moving forward.

558
00:52:19,380 --> 00:52:21,580
Hitting a little bit on Cynthia's point.

559
00:52:21,580 --> 00:52:25,540
And going back a bit to a comment I made before in terms of working counterterrorism.

560
00:52:25,540 --> 00:52:28,020
A lot of times you're fighting the last war, right?

561
00:52:28,240 --> 00:52:31,720
Someone tries to blow up a plane with printer cartridges.

562
00:52:31,840 --> 00:52:34,420
The government swarms to figure out how to stop that.

563
00:52:34,420 --> 00:52:36,000
But then the adversary moves on.

564
00:52:36,000 --> 00:52:38,700
The same thing here.

565
00:52:38,700 --> 00:52:41,580
We've seen adversaries evolve.

566
00:52:41,580 --> 00:52:44,420
We've seen new adversaries come in.

567
00:52:44,920 --> 00:52:49,040
So there's always worry about what you don't know.

568
00:52:49,040 --> 00:52:55,080
But what I'm confident in is that we are positioned, a lot better positioned now, for agility.

569
00:52:55,080 --> 00:53:00,700
In terms of responding to these threats because of the systems we've set up, the partnerships we have.

570
00:53:00,700 --> 00:53:05,220
That is certainly something for 2024 we need to keep building on.

571
00:53:05,220 --> 00:53:08,660
And not losing sight of it when new problems come up.

572
00:53:08,760 --> 00:53:10,840
Not making sure this remains a focus.

573
00:53:10,840 --> 00:53:14,480
I think the DEFCON voting village is very important to keep this running.

574
00:53:14,480 --> 00:53:15,840
We need people's help.

575
00:53:16,300 --> 00:53:19,380
From NSA specifically, we have a much...

576
00:53:19,380 --> 00:53:23,580
We're investing a lot more in the White Hat brand.

577
00:53:24,820 --> 00:53:27,620
NSA cyber Twitter account, please go follow it.

578
00:53:27,620 --> 00:53:29,820
You're going to see more good stuff coming out of that.

579
00:53:30,680 --> 00:53:34,820
But continuing to build upon that is going to be a critical thing we're going to invest in.

580
00:53:34,820 --> 00:53:40,500
Moving forward, I can't tell you how excited some of the people were in our building.

581
00:53:40,500 --> 00:53:44,540
Like late May, the cybersecurity advisory on the GRU.

582
00:53:44,540 --> 00:53:46,880
On the mail vulnerability.

583
00:53:47,120 --> 00:53:51,480
Seeing at least five different cybersecurity companies take that information.

584
00:53:51,480 --> 00:53:54,700
Pivot on the indicators in their own data sets.

585
00:53:54,700 --> 00:53:58,260
Figuring out new things that we didn't even know about.

586
00:53:58,300 --> 00:54:02,620
To uncover more of an adversary operation.

587
00:54:02,620 --> 00:54:05,420
That got people excited in the building.

588
00:54:05,800 --> 00:54:08,860
And that's something we do want to do more of.

589
00:54:08,860 --> 00:54:11,080
And again, just hitting on that critical partnership.

590
00:54:11,080 --> 00:54:14,780
And that dynamic of us using each other's information.

591
00:54:14,780 --> 00:54:17,620
And building the security of the enterprise.

592
00:54:17,620 --> 00:54:18,360
Raising all those.

593
00:54:18,360 --> 00:54:19,880
It sounds kind of Pollyanna-ish.

594
00:54:19,880 --> 00:54:22,040
But I think it's really important.

595
00:54:23,840 --> 00:54:24,600
Hey, Bryce.

596
00:54:24,600 --> 00:54:27,640
If I could wave a magic wand, I would wave it.

597
00:54:27,640 --> 00:54:30,140
And we would get COVID-19 under control.

598
00:54:30,860 --> 00:54:33,460
I just got to tell you, there's great collaboration.

599
00:54:33,460 --> 00:54:35,320
But we could do so much more.

600
00:54:35,640 --> 00:54:38,560
We could do so much more with our partners here.

601
00:54:38,600 --> 00:54:40,820
We could do so much more overseas.

602
00:54:41,300 --> 00:54:43,760
If we could get the pandemic under control.

603
00:54:43,760 --> 00:54:46,200
So please wear your mask and help us do that.

604
00:54:46,200 --> 00:54:49,780
The second piece, where do we see this in 2024?

605
00:54:50,100 --> 00:54:52,980
You do get asked questions, but I get to answer the question a lot.

606
00:54:53,220 --> 00:54:55,820
I would rather focus on 2020.

607
00:54:55,820 --> 00:54:58,640
2020 is not a foregone conclusion.

608
00:54:58,640 --> 00:55:01,960
We can have a safe, secure, and credible election.

609
00:55:01,980 --> 00:55:05,140
As an American people, we need to mobilize.

610
00:55:05,480 --> 00:55:07,920
There are thousands of smart people.

611
00:55:08,320 --> 00:55:12,900
Extraordinarily technically capable that are watching this session right now.

612
00:55:12,900 --> 00:55:15,940
Please go work at polling stations.

613
00:55:15,940 --> 00:55:17,540
Please talk to DHS.

614
00:55:17,540 --> 00:55:19,760
Please talk to the FBI.

615
00:55:20,080 --> 00:55:22,540
Again, we are all in.

616
00:55:22,540 --> 00:55:28,420
We have thousands of people that are going to work every day in order to support a safe, secure, and credible election.

617
00:55:28,600 --> 00:55:31,000
And I would just ask for everybody's help.

618
00:55:32,240 --> 00:55:33,760
I like your magic wand answer.

619
00:55:33,760 --> 00:55:35,060
I really appreciate that.

620
00:55:35,060 --> 00:55:38,060
It gives a greater sense of where we all are in the world today.

621
00:55:38,220 --> 00:55:49,980
If I could wave my magic wand on EAC, I would say that we would be doing better to get the VBSG more flexible and faster responding.

622
00:55:49,980 --> 00:56:03,860
So this idea that if we can get you researchers interested in election infrastructure and discover those vulnerabilities, report them responsibly, and then we can get the manufacturers to patch and get those out in the field in a much faster turnaround,

623
00:56:03,860 --> 00:56:06,920
I think we'd be in a much better position.

624
00:56:06,920 --> 00:56:08,020
We're working toward that.

625
00:56:08,020 --> 00:56:13,080
It's still a process that takes some time, but I think we can get there by 2024.

626
00:56:13,560 --> 00:56:19,520
And just to recognize that federal elections are every two years, but locals are running elections every few weeks.

627
00:56:19,560 --> 00:56:26,300
And so there's a bigger stake at play, because every election that's run is a chance to show that we can do democracy right.

628
00:56:26,300 --> 00:56:27,460
We're going to keep doing it.

629
00:56:27,460 --> 00:56:29,880
And it's done very well most of the time.

630
00:56:29,880 --> 00:56:35,440
It's just those few times where there's those hiccups that we have some trouble and it starts to erode that confidence.

631
00:56:35,440 --> 00:56:40,340
So the better we can get at getting those patches, the much better off the whole system will run.

632
00:56:42,040 --> 00:56:49,420
Yeah, so the magic wand, I got two answers, I think, and I had the advantage of time, which is useful.

633
00:56:49,620 --> 00:57:09,760
The first is, if there is a way for CISA to push out service agreements or whatever the case may be to upgrade election systems, not just voting systems, where most of the focus goes, but election systems, including workstations, off of outdated and unsupported software,

634
00:57:09,760 --> 00:57:12,520
I absolutely want to do that.

635
00:57:12,660 --> 00:57:14,000
It's not just Windows 7.

636
00:57:14,000 --> 00:57:15,240
We're talking older.

637
00:57:16,040 --> 00:57:20,560
It's not that the local election officials or state officials don't want to upgrade.

638
00:57:20,560 --> 00:57:25,500
It's that they lack either the IT support or resources, and I'd love to be able to give that to them.

639
00:57:25,500 --> 00:57:33,440
The second is getting to 100% auditability across the nation and having efficient, effective audits for 2020.

640
00:57:33,440 --> 00:57:42,800
We're going to be upwards of 92 plus percent of auditable records, but we need good, efficient, effective audits that are transparent.

641
00:57:43,020 --> 00:57:44,960
I mean, Neil McBurnett asked a question earlier.

642
00:57:44,960 --> 00:57:48,800
He's making it his mission in life to get to this, and I so appreciate it.

643
00:57:48,800 --> 00:57:57,340
If we can provide that public, that transparent auditing process, efficient and effective, I think it would be a real success.

644
00:57:57,340 --> 00:58:03,980
Looking forward, there's something in elections called the election wall, where you literally lack the ability to look past the next election.

645
00:58:03,980 --> 00:58:29,060
You don't even know what life looks like beyond that, but if I had to really push myself through that, it would be increasing the amount of support resources and I don't just mean money, to state and local officials to help them meaningfully manage the risk to their systems and really take some of the innovative steps that they want to take that they're unable to,

646
00:58:29,060 --> 00:58:35,880
either because of a lack of IT support or resourcing that otherwise would allow them to serve voters.

647
00:58:35,880 --> 00:58:55,880
And then finally, I know I'm cheating, but a more resilient American public, a deeper understanding of how elections work, a deeper understanding of what their options are, how ballots reach them, or how they can interact with the process, and then how we reach our final certified elections.

648
00:58:55,880 --> 00:59:00,940
Again, that prepared, patient, and participating voter is everything as we look at 2020.

649
00:59:02,300 --> 00:59:08,160
I feel the same way, Matt, as a village organizer for DEF CON that I can't look past this weekend.

650
00:59:09,020 --> 00:59:14,860
So , thank you to all of the panelists for sharing what your organization is doing.

651
00:59:15,000 --> 00:59:25,420
I have to say it is making me feel a lot better, understanding the level of collaboration, the transparency on the fallibility and the improvement, and very much looking forward to what we can do.

652
00:59:25,420 --> 00:59:28,740
We are all citizens and our voices should be heard.

653
00:59:28,740 --> 00:59:29,520
Thank you.

654
00:59:29,520 --> 00:59:30,920
Thank you.