[00:00.970 --> 00:07.290]  September 2018, Typhoon Jebi smashed into the Japanese coast with gusts of nearly 200 kilometers
[00:07.290 --> 00:13.010]  an hour, flinging fuel tankers into bridges, inundating airports, and inflicting 12.6 billion
[00:13.010 --> 00:18.490]  dollars of damage. Officials at the Taiwanese consulate in Osaka, in the heart of the typhoon,
[00:18.490 --> 00:24.450]  valiantly fought through the storm to evacuate stranded citizens. A few days later, a story
[00:24.450 --> 00:30.710]  claiming the Chinese embassy had dispatched buses to rescue Taiwanese went viral. A flood of
[00:30.710 --> 00:37.670]  criticism, much of it deeply personal, poured on Taiwan's representative in Osaka. Ten days after
[00:37.670 --> 00:44.330]  the typhoon, the representative had hanged himself. But there never were any buses from
[00:44.330 --> 00:49.890]  the Chinese embassy. The story, originating among pro-Beijing trolls in Taiwan and given life by
[00:49.890 --> 00:56.210]  the Communist Party-owned tabloid Global Times, was wholly invented. The story was one of hundreds
[00:56.210 --> 01:01.330]  of examples of disinformation targeted at the Taiwanese government in the past two years.
[01:01.330 --> 01:06.790]  In the lead up to the 2020 presidential elections, Beijing would deploy a campaign to control
[01:06.790 --> 01:11.450]  Taiwanese narratives, whether through outright deception like the Osaka consulate case,
[01:11.450 --> 01:16.230]  misrepresentation like in reporting on Hong Kong protests, or simply highlighting achievements of
[01:16.230 --> 01:23.030]  the Communist Party and stoking pan-Chinese nationalism. China's influence in the Taiwanese
[01:23.030 --> 01:28.810]  elections serves as a case study in how authoritarians make use of digital media to accomplish
[01:28.810 --> 01:34.770]  their geopolitical goals. Over the next 30 minutes, we're going to go in depth with the Taiwanese
[01:34.770 --> 01:39.950]  elections and the recent Polish elections as well, to understand what this new version of
[01:39.950 --> 01:50.040]  information warfare looks like, how it succeeds, how it fails, and why. Taiwan, officially the
[01:50.040 --> 01:55.320]  Republic of China, has a history and present intricately entwined with that of China,
[01:55.320 --> 01:59.880]  officially the People's Republic of China, since both governments in Beijing and Taipei
[01:59.880 --> 02:05.660]  claim to represent all of China. Beijing calls Taiwan a province, and Taipei refers to the
[02:05.660 --> 02:11.320]  territory it administers as free area of China, free area of the Republic of China, in contrast
[02:11.320 --> 02:16.580]  to the mainland. China has been large in each of Taiwan's elections, and much of each campaign
[02:16.580 --> 02:22.420]  focuses on competing views of one day uniting with China, or forging an independent Taiwanese
[02:22.420 --> 02:28.820]  culture, and one day an independent state. Representing a vision of pan-Chinese unity
[02:29.420 --> 02:35.380]  is the Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT, from its Chinese initials. They ran Taiwan as a
[02:35.380 --> 02:42.100]  dictatorship for nearly half a century before transitioning to democracy in the 90s. In 2000,
[02:42.100 --> 02:48.430]  they lost an election to the more independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP.
[02:49.060 --> 02:56.020]  The KMT, or Chinese Nationalist, to this day, maintains close relations with Beijing and pushes
[02:56.020 --> 03:04.300]  an agenda of greater cooperation and economic ties with the mainland. The DPP, or more independence-
[03:04.300 --> 03:09.840]  has a base that comes from the non-Mandarin speaking majority of Taiwan, and favors the
[03:09.840 --> 03:15.700]  cultivation of a unique Taiwanese identity, and is the only party besides the KMT to have held
[03:15.700 --> 03:23.100]  the presidency. In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen, who helped to draft DPP's foreign policy, which emphasized
[03:23.100 --> 03:31.380]  separation from China, defeated the KMT in the presidential elections by 25 points. In response,
[03:31.380 --> 03:36.350]  China suspended official communication with Taiwan and began an economic pressure campaign.
[03:36.660 --> 03:41.880]  Following guidance from Beijing's National Tourism Administration, Chinese tours to Taiwan
[03:41.880 --> 03:48.870]  dropped by 40%, ravaging an industry that's responsible for 8% of Taiwan's economy.
[03:49.360 --> 03:53.610]  China also released a slew of incentives to peel away Taiwan's best and brightest.
[03:54.060 --> 03:58.970]  Tsai's popularity began to sink, aided by resurgent Chinese information operations.
[03:59.860 --> 04:05.310]  China was pretty late to the game for information operations, especially when compared to Russia,
[04:05.310 --> 04:12.290]  but by 2018, they had established a massive online empire. According to the CCP's propaganda
[04:12.290 --> 04:17.750]  department, quote, information is a battleground, and quote, competition for news and public opinion
[04:17.750 --> 04:24.590]  is a contest over discourse power. CCP outlets witnessed an astronomical rise in popularity,
[04:24.590 --> 04:32.030]  especially on Facebook, which is banned in China, and now Chinese-owned outlets account for seven
[04:32.030 --> 04:39.370]  of the nine most-followed news pages anywhere in the world. Chinese state TV took to YouTube as
[04:39.370 --> 04:45.350]  well and has since amassed billions of views, becoming the leading source of news in Mandarin
[04:45.350 --> 04:53.230]  anywhere. Traditional media came under the party's thumb as well. The Chinese Communist Party
[04:53.230 --> 04:59.210]  bought a $37 million stake in Wanwan, a food conglomerate, which over the next decade added
[04:59.210 --> 05:06.770]  to its portfolio to leading Taiwanese television channels, CCTV and CCITV, which soon became
[05:06.770 --> 05:14.090]  vehemently pro-KMT. The frequency of articles after this takeover criticizing Beijing dropped
[05:14.090 --> 05:20.870]  by 70%. The Financial Times uncovered in a report that the Taiwan Affairs Office, an arm of Beijing's
[05:20.870 --> 05:29.590]  government, had a say in every single headline and report. Throughout 2018, much of what Beijing
[05:29.590 --> 05:37.510]  was demanding attention on was the astronomical rise of Han Kuo-yu. A longtime member of parliament,
[05:37.510 --> 05:44.930]  Han took on the unlikely task of unseating the dominant DPP from Kaohsiung, Taiwan's second city
[05:44.930 --> 05:51.310]  and a base of DPP support. With a populist campaign promising economic rejuvenation,
[05:51.310 --> 05:57.190]  and with extensive use of social media, Han's popularity soared. Unlike other populist social
[05:57.190 --> 06:02.750]  media politicians, Han was unwaveringly cordial, refusing to speak negatively of rivals or even
[06:02.750 --> 06:08.730]  their platforms. A Facebook fan page of Han's soon became one of Taiwan's largest and coordinated
[06:08.730 --> 06:15.430]  rallies with hundreds of thousands of followers. Taiwanese media from all parties spoke of a
[06:15.430 --> 06:24.030]  Han wave. CCTV and CCITV, the two television channels that take orders from Beijing,
[06:24.030 --> 06:31.570]  gushed over Han and the KMT. According to a Taiwanese security official, China mobilized
[06:31.570 --> 06:36.870]  300,000 cyber operatives, twice the size of Taiwan's army, to sway opinion in Taiwanese
[06:36.870 --> 06:43.050]  social media. Adopting tactics from Russia's troll farms, the operatives blasted Tsai.
[06:43.210 --> 06:48.010]  Disinformation abounded, like a rumor the president intended to sell part of Taiwan to the United
[06:48.010 --> 06:54.890]  States. A 2018 survey by the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden,
[06:54.890 --> 07:00.030]  found that only Latvia and the United States were targeted for more disinformation in 2018
[07:00.410 --> 07:10.770]  than Taiwan. The KMT swept local elections. Not only did Han win the mayoralty in Kaohsiung,
[07:10.770 --> 07:17.030]  but the KMT, having lost the national election by 25 points just two years earlier,
[07:17.030 --> 07:24.530]  won local elections nationally by 9%. Tsai's, quote, separatist stance has lost her the support
[07:24.530 --> 07:28.810]  of the people on the island, crowed China Daily, a CCP-owned newspaper.
[07:30.570 --> 07:38.370]  As the role of China in the 2018 elections became clear, DPP supporters grew enraged. In 2019,
[07:38.370 --> 07:44.250]  tens of thousands rallied in Taipei against Chinese-controlled media. The proximate cause
[07:44.250 --> 07:49.050]  was the start of protests in Hong Kong against the Chinese extradition bill, inspired by events
[07:49.050 --> 07:55.710]  in Taiwan, as well as the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, both of which were
[07:55.710 --> 08:02.450]  downplayed by KMT-allied media. Taiwan began to lean heavily on the platforms that had long been
[08:02.450 --> 08:07.360]  engines of Chinese disinformation, forging partnerships with Twitter and Facebook.
[08:07.970 --> 08:13.250]  DPP, against accusations that the KMT was using it to muzzle dissent,
[08:13.250 --> 08:17.270]  passed legislation aimed at discouraging meddling from China.
[08:19.050 --> 08:24.250]  In the week leading up to the presidential election on January 11th, 2020, according to
[08:24.250 --> 08:31.990]  our research, CCP-owned media planted 178 stories about Han and the KMT in traditional Chinese,
[08:31.990 --> 08:37.570]  the script used in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but not on the mainland, in addition to 25 videos in
[08:37.570 --> 08:44.970]  Mandarin. The overall sentiment of this content when referring to Han was plus 0.6, on a scale
[08:44.970 --> 08:50.950]  where negative one is most negative and plus one is most positive, and 80% of scores are between
[08:50.950 --> 08:58.210]  0.1 and negative 0.1. Those commenting or replying on videos responded in an exceptionally positive
[08:58.210 --> 09:03.230]  manner as well, with those writing in traditional Chinese, suggesting they're either Hong Kongers
[09:03.230 --> 09:11.890]  or Taiwanese, expressing a sentiment towards Han of plus 0.42. By contrast, China's 142 stories
[09:11.890 --> 09:18.190]  on Tsai in traditional Chinese and 21 Mandarin videos expressed an average sentiment of negative
[09:18.190 --> 09:25.110]  0.32, with traditional Chinese commenters responding with an average sentiment of negative 0.2.
[09:25.210 --> 09:30.370]  But these story counts, as well as engagement counts, were fairly low by Chinese state media
[09:30.370 --> 09:35.970]  standards. The Taiwanese election occurred the week after COVID-19 was first described,
[09:35.970 --> 09:42.130]  which quickly dominated the focus of CCP outlets, with two leading nominally private Taiwanese
[09:42.130 --> 09:48.070]  broadcasters taking orders from Beijing as well. Local proxies could fill in the role that
[09:48.070 --> 09:55.090]  otherwise would have been played by the CCP. More covert operations, however, proliferated.
[09:55.090 --> 10:01.170]  Twitter later detected 170,000 bots spreading Chinese influence. The intelligence service,
[10:01.170 --> 10:06.890]  NSB, found that the Facebook page that helped to coordinate Han's early election
[10:07.350 --> 10:13.890]  was created by the Communist Party. And working with Facebook, they removed that page along with
[10:13.890 --> 10:21.270]  260 others created by the Communist Party, but masquerading as local Taiwanese. Of half a dozen
[10:21.270 --> 10:26.910]  viral disinformation claims that we tracked linked to these pages, none wound up receiving more than
[10:26.910 --> 10:35.430]  7,000 shares. On January 11th, 2020, voters in Taiwan overwhelmingly opted for Tsai,
[10:35.430 --> 10:42.790]  who received 57% of the vote to Han's 39%. In the end, Taiwan successfully fought back against
[10:42.790 --> 10:47.750]  interference from a larger and more powerful adversary with little outside influence on the
[10:47.750 --> 10:53.290]  election detected. But in doing so, they gave sweeping powers to the state to define the limits
[10:53.290 --> 10:58.330]  of reasonable dissent, possibly silencing good faith debates on the extent of cooperation with
[10:58.330 --> 11:04.510]  China, one of the most important issues in every Taiwanese election. China, despite its massive
[11:04.510 --> 11:09.810]  advantage in terms of manpower and funding, launched a sloppy and ineffectual campaign online,
[11:09.810 --> 11:15.710]  distracted by the looming threat of COVID, unable to create viral content, and unable to stay ahead
[11:15.710 --> 11:21.030]  of Twitter's bot detection system. Taiwan's victory over disinformation, though, could very
[11:21.030 --> 11:26.290]  well be illusory. With Han already trailing by 20 points 100 days before the election,
[11:26.290 --> 11:29.990]  and anti-Chinese sentiment running high following the Hong Kong protests,
[11:29.990 --> 11:35.230]  China's digital army may have simply counted its losses and refocused on higher priorities.
[11:36.470 --> 11:41.870]  Four months later, and halfway around the world, in the brick medieval town of Krakow,
[11:41.870 --> 11:48.510]  the archbishop, whose predecessors include John Paul II, delivered a homily marking the 75th
[11:48.510 --> 11:54.630]  anniversary of the Warsaw uprising. Quote, we also know that our land is thankfully not affected
[11:54.630 --> 12:00.250]  by the red plague, he intoned, referring to communist rule. But that does not mean there
[12:00.250 --> 12:05.050]  is no one that wants to control our souls, our hearts, and our minds. This new plague is not
[12:05.050 --> 12:11.490]  Marxist-Bolshevik, but born out of the same sphere of neo-Marxism. Not red, but rainbow.
[12:12.670 --> 12:17.710]  Both the content of the archbishop's homily, the supposed threat of social liberalism,
[12:17.710 --> 12:23.370]  and the symbolism commemorating Poland's fight against fascism, foreshadowed the political axes
[12:23.370 --> 12:29.190]  in the country's 2020 election, one that inflamed internal intentions to a level not seen since the
[12:29.190 --> 12:35.530]  fall of communism. With both sides staking out staunchly anti-Russian positions, Moscow launched
[12:35.730 --> 12:41.930]  a massive campaign to engender outrage from each side against each other. In thousands of stories,
[12:41.930 --> 12:47.270]  Russian media warned Poles of the coming end of traditional values, or the rise of fascism.
[12:47.270 --> 12:52.070]  The election proved a case study in information operations towards destructive as opposed to
[12:52.070 --> 12:58.770]  constructive ends, not supporting a party, but stirring unrest throughout the country.
[12:58.770 --> 13:04.670]  The response of the ruling Law and Justice Party, PIS, dousing dissent and muzzling independent
[13:04.670 --> 13:10.630]  media, reveals how combating disinformation, like combating terrorism a decade before,
[13:10.630 --> 13:13.790]  can be a pretext to support authoritarian goals.
[13:15.370 --> 13:21.190]  PIS began in 2001 as a standard center-right party allied with Christian Democrats in the EU
[13:21.190 --> 13:27.950]  and won the presidency for the first time in 2005. But disaster struck in 2010 when much of
[13:27.950 --> 13:35.030]  PIS leadership died in a plane crash on its way to a memorial service in Smolensk, Russia,
[13:35.030 --> 13:40.890]  and the party's surviving leaders afterwards adopted an increasingly conspiratorial and
[13:40.890 --> 13:48.030]  nationalistic tone. Though vehemently anti-Russian, PIS's strident defense of traditionalism fit
[13:48.030 --> 13:53.410]  perfectly with Moscow's new self-portrayal as a bulwark against the EU and its, quote,
[13:53.410 --> 13:59.090]  homosexual propaganda. With Russian outlets dominating YouTube and Russian bots dominating
[13:59.090 --> 14:04.690]  Twitter and Facebook, similar far-right populist movements gained traction throughout Europe.
[14:05.290 --> 14:11.470]  In this wave, PIS leader Andrzej Duda captured the presidency in 2015,
[14:11.470 --> 14:18.930]  beating the center-left Civic Platform, or PO, coalition. Duda's first term in office was marked
[14:18.930 --> 14:25.050]  by a series of moves to bring independent institutions under the rule of PIS. The newly
[14:25.050 --> 14:31.250]  PIS-dominated legislature refused to seat duly appointed judges from the previous administration,
[14:31.250 --> 14:36.870]  instead filling the highest courts with partisan loyalists. Claiming threats of foreign influence,
[14:36.870 --> 14:42.250]  Duda ousted the head of the state broadcaster, Televizja Polska, and editors of public media
[14:42.250 --> 14:50.790]  organizations, such as Gazeta Wyborcza and Polityka, in favor of PIS loyalists. A bipartisan
[14:50.790 --> 14:55.970]  report showing that the Smolensk disaster was a result of pilot error was discarded,
[14:55.970 --> 15:03.590]  and conspiracies about foreign agents' involvement became state canon. As Duda and PIS increasingly
[15:03.590 --> 15:09.470]  sought to merge party and state, the center-left PO began to portray the PIS as threatening to
[15:09.470 --> 15:15.350]  establish an authoritarian regime. PIS's ultra-nationalistic language lent itself to
[15:15.350 --> 15:20.810]  charges of fascism, as did new laws curbing free speech, such as one criminalizing any
[15:20.810 --> 15:25.970]  implication of Polish involvement in the Holocaust. Following the ousting of a pro-Russian
[15:25.970 --> 15:32.530]  president in Ukraine in 2014, Russia began a massive multi-year, multi-language campaign
[15:32.530 --> 15:38.810]  to portray the NATO-friendly nationalists in the old eastern bloc as fascists and heirs to those
[15:38.810 --> 15:44.990]  who fought alongside Nazis against the Soviet Union. Nearly 60% of all instances of disinformation
[15:44.990 --> 15:52.370]  from Russia in Polish portrayed Duda's PIS party as fascist or fascist sympathizers.
[15:53.610 --> 16:01.550]  In February 2019, PO's rising star, Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, signed a bill
[16:01.550 --> 16:08.630]  that would include same-sex education in school curriculums. With a dominant grasp on state media,
[16:08.630 --> 16:14.590]  PIS whipped up homophobic hysteria. The next month, a small town in the country's conservative
[16:14.590 --> 16:22.990]  southeast declared itself a, quote, LGBT ideology free zone. By August, 30 towns and four of Poland's
[16:22.990 --> 16:30.170]  16 provinces declared the same. The backdrop made the 2019 parliamentary election among the most
[16:30.170 --> 16:38.450]  divisive in Polish history. With both the PO and PIS taking strident anti-Russian stances,
[16:38.450 --> 16:44.950]  Moscow turned towards inflaming sentiment on both sides. Sputnik Poland published 399 pieces
[16:44.950 --> 16:53.170]  supportive of the LGBT free zones and 265 pieces accusing the government of cozying up with fascists.
[16:53.290 --> 16:59.310]  Journalist Martin Ray uncovered dozens of links between the Kremlin and nationalists on the
[16:59.310 --> 17:05.270]  rightmost edges of PIS' coalition, while a report from the Oxford Institute on Computational
[17:05.270 --> 17:11.490]  Propaganda confirmed that bots were acting to further polarize the electorate. But with near
[17:11.490 --> 17:18.050]  total control over state media, PIS was able to expand its popular vote majority in the parliamentary
[17:18.050 --> 17:27.050]  elections. With the success of the 2019 Rainbow Plague campaign, PIS doubled down in the 2020
[17:27.050 --> 17:33.800]  presidential elections, which pitted Duda against Warsaw mayor and PO candidate Trzaskowski.
[17:33.800 --> 17:40.100]  Trzaskowski sought to make the election a choice between democracy and authoritarianism. Duda
[17:40.100 --> 17:45.400]  aimed to cast the vote as one between foreign imported gay rights and Polish tradition.
[17:45.480 --> 17:50.700]  The election was characterized by widespread disinformation, the most prominent case coming
[17:50.700 --> 17:57.420]  when Russia hacked the Polish War Studies Academy website on April 23rd, allowing the hackers to
[17:57.420 --> 18:03.660]  publish forged letters by a Polish general calling for soldiers to fight, quote, the American occupation.
[18:04.360 --> 18:08.740]  Over 57 public Facebook groups reposted links to the letters,
[18:08.740 --> 18:12.600]  and average Facebook users followed suit in proliferating false stories.
[18:13.560 --> 18:19.840]  Like Russia's I.O. campaigns overall in Poland, the purpose was not to support any one candidate,
[18:19.840 --> 18:24.880]  but to create a sense of chaos and imminent violence. Other posts parroted Polish political
[18:24.880 --> 18:31.400]  leaflets, warning of scandals and poverty if Trzaskowski was elected over Duda. Other content
[18:31.400 --> 18:38.000]  claimed LGBT activists set Polish flags on fire, associating the anarchic behavior with Trzaskowski.
[18:38.720 --> 18:43.160]  On the other side, posts mentioning Duda characterized the current European environment
[18:43.160 --> 18:50.020]  under his leadership as a chaotic storm. Duda was also accused of brutalizing public life of Poles,
[18:50.160 --> 18:56.660]  a dry run for a fascist takeover. In the two weeks leading up to the second round of the
[18:56.660 --> 19:02.040]  presidential election, Polish language media from Russian outlets saw a large spike in incendiary
[19:02.040 --> 19:08.300]  terms. References to fascism, excluding references to Russia's Victory Day parade, which was held
[19:08.300 --> 19:15.640]  during this period, saw a 20% spike with an average sentiment of negative 0.76, and audiences
[19:15.640 --> 19:22.540]  responded similarly negative with negative 0.52. References to LGBT and related key terms
[19:22.540 --> 19:28.740]  increased by 11% in the same period, with an average sentiment expressed of negative 0.22,
[19:28.740 --> 19:34.440]  and audience response of negative 0.17. Russian outlets portrayed both candidates, Duda, negative
[19:34.440 --> 19:42.340]  0.17, Trzaskowski, negative 0.15, and both coalitions, PIS, negative 0.26, PO, negative 0.21
[19:42.340 --> 19:52.590]  in negative terms. On July 12th, 2020, voters in Poland re-elected Andrzej Duda for a second
[19:52.590 --> 20:01.390]  presidential term with 51% of the vote to Rafał Trzaskowski's 49%. Maciej Kieślowski, a professor
[20:01.390 --> 20:07.290]  at the Central European University, called the election, quote, a death blow to Poland's liberal
[20:07.290 --> 20:13.430]  democracy. With anti-Russian sentiment high throughout Poland, especially as Moscow began
[20:13.610 --> 20:19.050]  a campaign to blame the Second World War, and probably on Poland, Russia instead turned to
[20:19.050 --> 20:24.490]  destructive information operations, amplifying divisive voices, sowing distrust among the
[20:24.490 --> 20:30.910]  population, and undermining institutions. Though Russia plays large in Duda's conspiracies, Duda
[20:30.910 --> 20:36.530]  was happy to oblige, parroting Russian talking points and tactics on the EU and gay rights.
[20:36.530 --> 20:42.190]  Even among anti-Russian audiences, Russian I.O. was able to further Russian narratives.
[20:42.370 --> 20:47.970]  Despite Duda's own dalliances with disinformation, he was able to deploy fear of disinformation to
[20:47.970 --> 20:53.510]  win closer NATO support and to silence the Senate home, much as autocrats had done with the fight
[20:53.510 --> 21:00.770]  against terrorism throughout the early 2000s. As we approach the 2020 U.S. presidential election,
[21:00.770 --> 21:07.190]  Russia and China command dominant positions on social media. The top YouTube publisher
[21:07.190 --> 21:12.330]  is the Kremlin, which owns the platform's most-watched news network, even in English,
[21:12.330 --> 21:16.510]  and seven of the nine most-followed news pages on Facebook,
[21:16.510 --> 21:20.310]  all of them in English, belong to the Communist Party of China.
[21:20.790 --> 21:25.730]  In Taiwan, we saw how the Communist Party wove itself into the workings of an opposition party,
[21:25.730 --> 21:31.110]  but facing massive public backlash and the growing unpopularity of the opposition,
[21:31.110 --> 21:35.670]  retreated as the presidential election approached. Efforts to stem disinformation
[21:35.670 --> 21:39.590]  notched up significant victories through partnerships with social media companies,
[21:39.590 --> 21:44.770]  but legislation failed to win bipartisan support and thus shake off the appearance of censorship.
[21:45.490 --> 21:50.130]  In Poland, we saw how Russia adapted to an environment without support on either side
[21:50.130 --> 21:56.730]  by amplifying dissent. Fellow travelers against gay rights and four wild conspiracies helped to
[21:56.730 --> 22:02.290]  ensure civil strife, anti-EU sentiment, and strain all Western European alliances in Russia's near
[22:02.290 --> 22:08.390]  abroad. Successful information warfare is adaptable, and with so much social media power
[22:08.390 --> 22:14.110]  and advanced targeting techniques, anti-democratic forces can easily toggle between constructive
[22:14.110 --> 22:19.730]  campaigns to support a party and destructive campaigns to sow chaos. Only through coordination
[22:19.730 --> 22:25.090]  between apolitical institutions and the social media platforms, we find true progress against
[22:25.090 --> 22:28.810]  information warfare while maintaining our democratic values.