[00:02.540 --> 00:08.700] Hello, I'm Secretary of State Kim Wyman from Washington State. And I want to first say thank [00:08.700 --> 00:15.460] you for inviting me to be part of DEF CON 2020 and share a little bit about Washington's [00:15.460 --> 00:21.440] experience with vote by mail and the challenges that we have with election security and how we've [00:21.440 --> 00:27.100] tried to overcome them and how we're preparing for the upcoming August primary and November [00:27.100 --> 00:34.940] general elections here in Washington State. So I'm going to real quick share my screen and [00:35.820 --> 00:43.760] walk you through kind of what Washington State has done to prepare for the 2020 election cycle [00:43.760 --> 00:51.460] and how we are dealing with all of the things that are coming at us in 2020. So first and foremost, [00:51.460 --> 00:57.160] I'm pretty certain each one of you has been very aware of Russians trying to hack into [00:57.160 --> 01:05.200] the election system in the 2016 elections. And I've been an election official for many years [01:05.200 --> 01:09.540] and have watched this kind of progression that we've had in the election community [01:09.540 --> 01:16.540] for election security. And in the 1990s, we instituted cutting-edge technology like [01:17.040 --> 01:23.460] using the driver's license information to register voters and put election night results online. [01:23.480 --> 01:27.900] And from that moment to today, election security has been something we've been aware of [01:27.900 --> 01:33.020] and have worked really hard to try to make sure our systems are secure. And I think [01:33.020 --> 01:39.520] right up until 2016, most election officials felt pretty good about the level of security that we [01:39.520 --> 01:47.380] had in our industry. And today what I want to do is share with you kind of what Washington [01:47.380 --> 01:54.160] State's election system looks like, how we inspire public confidence in our process, and what our [01:54.160 --> 01:59.920] kind of triad of election security is, and then talk a little bit about the impacts of COVID-19 [01:59.920 --> 02:08.380] on our election system and quite frankly the nation's election system. So I got into election [02:08.380 --> 02:14.600] administration in the 1990s, early 1990s, and I can tell you when I started in this field, my goal [02:14.600 --> 02:20.440] was to become an elections expert, to learn and understand how the election process works, and to [02:20.440 --> 02:28.580] be able to conduct elections in a secure and accessible manner. And then the 2000s, that [02:28.580 --> 02:34.800] evolved because suddenly the demands on our system were so great that we had to rely on technology [02:34.800 --> 02:41.120] to be able to produce election results quickly and to serve our voters well by providing a lot [02:41.120 --> 02:47.060] of information on the internet. So we now suddenly not only had to become an elections expert, but [02:47.060 --> 02:52.880] also had to be an IT expert and understand at least how systems work and how to use technology [02:52.880 --> 02:59.580] in a way to help us oversee our election systems. And about the time I started feeling like I knew [02:59.580 --> 03:06.400] what I was doing in the IT world, and I say that because I'm just dangerous enough to know [03:06.400 --> 03:13.080] how to use technology, but certainly not to any of the levels that any of you are. But by 2016, it [03:13.080 --> 03:19.740] became very apparent that not only did we need to be election experts and understand IT systems, but [03:19.740 --> 03:25.120] we needed to know how to secure them. And cybersecurity for the last four years has certainly been front [03:25.120 --> 03:31.780] and center in election administration. So let me start kind of with the basics of why [03:31.780 --> 03:40.360] I think the United States election system is very secure just because of the decentralized [03:40.360 --> 03:46.720] nature of it. So when people think of elections, I think oftentimes they think of the national, [03:46.720 --> 03:51.020] that there's some sort of national election administration, when in fact it's a really [03:51.020 --> 03:57.280] decentralized network made up of 10,000 election officials nationwide who, like me, are either [03:57.280 --> 04:05.360] appointed or are elected to office. They take an oath to uphold the Constitution and the Constitution [04:05.360 --> 04:10.560] and laws in their state. And I think the overall strength of this system is that no single person [04:10.560 --> 04:19.720] or group has total control of the overall operation. And so when you get down to election [04:19.720 --> 04:26.060] systems in each individual state, and bear with me here, I'm having a challenge operating my own [04:26.060 --> 04:31.340] PowerPoint system, you have the same similar threads. We have a decentralized system here in [04:31.340 --> 04:37.820] Washington, and each state is going to be different and unique. And Washington is certainly one of [04:37.820 --> 04:44.980] five vote-by-mail states, but I think you can look at the individual makeup of each state and know [04:44.980 --> 04:51.560] that this decentralization is actually happening within the states as well. So here in Washington, [04:51.560 --> 04:58.840] we have the Secretary of State, myself, my office is the overseer of elections in Washington, [04:58.840 --> 05:05.900] and I'm the chief election officer. I have the rulemaking authority to put into effect rules [05:05.900 --> 05:12.980] that adapt our laws that our legislature passes. So this is how counties implement the day-to-day [05:12.980 --> 05:18.860] operations on the ground. We manage a statewide voter registration database and oversee the [05:18.860 --> 05:25.640] election initiative and referendum process, as well as do election night reporting, we do voter [05:25.640 --> 05:31.680] outreach and education, and we certify and train our election officials, as well as the election [05:31.680 --> 05:38.480] tabulation systems that are used in each of our 39 counties. Our system is decentralized in that [05:38.480 --> 05:44.240] 39 county election officials are the chief election officials in their county, and they [05:44.240 --> 05:50.700] are elected. They oversee the voter registration processing and the management of elections in their [05:50.700 --> 05:56.060] counties. So they're the ones who are actually issuing ballots and operating the tabulation [05:56.060 --> 06:02.940] systems and any kind of other tech like ballot sorting equipment or the actual facilities that [06:02.940 --> 06:09.640] process ballots. They also provide voter outreach and education to their voters and manage all of [06:09.640 --> 06:15.980] that information usually through social media and their web pages. Now I imagine most of you are [06:15.980 --> 06:23.200] aware that in 2016 the federal government designated elections as critical infrastructure, [06:23.200 --> 06:29.620] and this is significant because it put us on the same national security level as the power grid [06:29.620 --> 06:36.840] or the banking system. And so what it has done in our state is really helped us reinforce what [06:36.840 --> 06:42.600] I like to think of as our triad of security for Washington and our vote-by-mail system. [06:42.600 --> 06:48.920] I forgot to mention that earlier. In 2011, Washington state became a vote-by-mail state, [06:48.920 --> 06:55.820] and at that point every single one of our counties had to conduct elections entirely by mail [06:55.820 --> 07:01.940] and mail out a ballot to each of their voters. So this process didn't happen overnight. We [07:02.460 --> 07:08.780] really started back in the 1990s in allowing any voter to be a permanent absentee voter, [07:08.780 --> 07:15.980] which meant they received a ballot every election. And that evolved to the early 2000s when we had [07:15.980 --> 07:21.000] the closest governor's race in the country's history. And following that and following a lot [07:21.000 --> 07:27.800] things that went wrong, both at the polling place and in the absentee balloting, we determined that [07:27.800 --> 07:33.540] we couldn't do both elections well, and the legislature allowed counties to move to vote-by- [07:33.540 --> 07:40.280] mail voluntarily. In 2005, many of the counties in the state did move to vote-by-mail, but it still [07:40.280 --> 07:45.360] took our state five years to completely become a vote-by-mail state. And that's because it took [07:45.360 --> 07:52.120] time to get the equipment and facilities to really provide for processes and procedures [07:52.120 --> 07:58.120] that we could conduct elections well. So, which is what leads us to the triad of security for [07:58.120 --> 08:04.160] Washington vote-by-mail elections. So there's three real pieces to this election model. [08:04.160 --> 08:10.160] It's the physical security, the logical security, things you would just do innately, and the digital [08:10.160 --> 08:16.440] security that we provide. So let me start by just talking through kind of the physical security [08:16.440 --> 08:21.860] elements that are inherent in a vote-by-mail election. First and foremost, I think the strength [08:21.860 --> 08:29.560] is that we rely on paper ballots. Even the ballots that are issued in a vote center and voters use [08:29.560 --> 08:35.640] to use an assistive device to vote them, all of those ballots are paper ballots that [08:35.640 --> 08:42.700] are printed by those machines that the voter actually does mark and are processed. So we can [08:42.700 --> 08:49.540] always go back to those paper ballots and do a risk limiting audit or a full recount if we need to, [08:49.540 --> 08:56.060] to really inspire that confidence that voters need to have in the election results. We have [08:56.060 --> 09:02.020] ballot drop boxes here in Washington state in addition to the blue mailboxes provided by the [09:02.020 --> 09:08.240] USPS. These ballot drop boxes are throughout the state and they're managed by our county election [09:08.240 --> 09:15.700] officials. We have about 470 of them statewide, and they open at the beginning of the voting [09:15.700 --> 09:21.980] period, which is 20 days before election day. Anytime they are emptied, they are emptied by two [09:21.980 --> 09:29.700] employees of the county, and I know that sometimes they try to have that be a Democrat and a [09:29.700 --> 09:35.040] possible, but they are staff that are employed by the county and [09:35.040 --> 09:41.120] take an oath to uphold the laws and the procedures and policies for the county. So they are held [09:41.120 --> 09:46.940] accountable for that processing. They lock and seal those boxes, and they do that [09:46.940 --> 09:53.100] with individual numbered seals that are actually logged and kept track of too. So pretty [09:53.100 --> 09:59.100] much all of the steps I'm going to talk about are what we use to build an electronic and physical [09:59.100 --> 10:04.640] audit trail that we have in place in case we ever get into a recount or a situation where [10:04.640 --> 10:12.120] anyone is calling into question our processes. We can go back and show which employees had access [10:12.120 --> 10:18.400] to which ballots at any given time, and we have dual control environments throughout this. So [10:18.400 --> 10:23.720] it's just really important that those audit logs and dual controls are in place to inspire [10:23.720 --> 10:29.640] confidence again. This is true throughout all of our election processing facilities as well. [10:29.640 --> 10:35.720] We have secured storage for ballots and ballot materials that involve physical locks. In some [10:35.720 --> 10:41.400] of our counties, it may be key card access. The server room, for example, for ballot [10:41.400 --> 10:48.640] tabulation equipment is in a secured room and has very limited access and, again, is log or key card [10:48.640 --> 10:54.540] controlled. So we have a record of anyone who has access to it. And then we have security systems [10:54.540 --> 11:00.580] and key card access throughout these facilities as well to just have that physical layer of security [11:00.580 --> 11:07.600] on top of any cybersecurity elements that we have in place. The second, I guess, group of security [11:07.600 --> 11:13.560] measures are those sort of logical ones, things that just make sense. Of course, the first one [11:13.560 --> 11:18.600] would be that our tabulation systems aren't connected to the internet. And I know this is [11:18.600 --> 11:24.520] something that came under fire in the last few years nationally, but our county election officials [11:24.520 --> 11:31.480] have made sure that their tabulation systems not only are air-gapped from the internet in every way, [11:31.480 --> 11:36.940] but there's no modems operating or even installed in those systems and that any connection that [11:36.940 --> 11:42.820] needs to be made with the vendor or with election officials is done on-site in that air-gapped [11:42.820 --> 11:50.640] environment. We have a real love of transparency in elections, and certainly that holds true [11:50.640 --> 11:57.660] in any processing facilities or courthouses across our state, that all of the activities are [11:57.660 --> 12:04.340] observable. We like it when it's bipartisan, when we have Democrats and Republicans overseeing that [12:04.340 --> 12:11.180] process. We actually ask the local county parties to appoint observers to come in and represent [12:11.180 --> 12:16.900] each of the parties. If that can't happen, and of course in the COVID-19 environment, that's [12:16.900 --> 12:24.360] becoming a bit of a problem for just space reasons. Our county courthouses oftentimes do not have a [12:24.360 --> 12:30.200] lot of extra space in the smaller counties, so a lot of counties have used their security money [12:30.200 --> 12:36.080] to install cameras that run 24-7 during the voting period, during that entire 20 days, [12:36.080 --> 12:40.640] and then the 20 days or so after when we're certifying the election, so that people can [12:40.640 --> 12:46.940] watch it online from a safety and comfort environment, but also have that transparency, [12:46.940 --> 12:53.120] so you can show that we're not trying to hide anything or do anything kind of under the table. [12:54.180 --> 13:00.520] Ballot reconciliation is a really important part as well. This would be, you know, counting the [13:00.520 --> 13:05.220] number of ballots that are received each day in the mail, and then through the process, [13:05.220 --> 13:10.300] reconciling them and being able to show whether a ballot was counted that was issued to a voter [13:10.300 --> 13:15.620] or not, and if it wasn't counted, why it wasn't. And the only people that can reject a ballot [13:15.620 --> 13:23.900] are our bipartisan canvassing boards. We also have election night reporting, and we have fail-safe [13:23.900 --> 13:29.960] measures and checks and balances that my CISO told me to say is out-of-band communication [13:29.960 --> 13:37.200] verification. And what we do on election night is counties are uploading their results to our [13:37.800 --> 13:45.200] state election night reporting system, and we compile those results for offices that go across [13:45.200 --> 13:51.420] county lines. And we take that initial file that they send us, and then we verify it by [13:51.980 --> 13:57.300] a fax or an email that is sent by the county as well, separately, to just make sure that the [13:57.300 --> 14:01.380] information that we're putting up online is accurate and is the way that the counties [14:01.940 --> 14:07.980] reported it in the first place. So all of these systems, you know, this logical element of our [14:07.980 --> 14:16.300] election security is really just trying to create that sense of transparency and provide a lot of [14:16.300 --> 14:22.690] checks and balances, both physical and electronic, that make sense and are easy to explain to the [14:22.690 --> 14:28.590] voters so that they can understand what it is we're doing. Of course, the final leg of that [14:29.730 --> 14:36.330] stool would be the digital security. And for us, we really started working on this [14:36.330 --> 14:42.350] probably five, ten years ago by modernizing our election system. And now we have a highly [14:42.350 --> 14:48.290] segmented network system that employs multi-factor authentication for all of our users. [14:48.290 --> 14:57.830] We have really tried to increase and expand our user training and outreach to just make them aware [14:57.830 --> 15:04.250] of cybersecurity issues and the things that they need to do to make sure our overall system is [15:04.250 --> 15:11.370] secure. And we've done robust testing, and that happens on an ongoing basis. And as all of you [15:11.370 --> 15:16.290] are aware, you know, it's a constant battle to stay ahead of hackers and people trying to get [15:16.290 --> 15:22.510] into our system. So I think just that user awareness has increased in the last four years [15:22.510 --> 15:29.630] on a level and a scale that we just weren't doing before 2016. We're currently part of the National [15:29.630 --> 15:35.690] Censor Network, and this is not only the state system, but counties across the state are part [15:35.690 --> 15:43.070] of it as well. And we built and have created a dedicated election security operation center that [15:43.070 --> 15:49.710] is in my office, but it also supports the 39 county election offices, because what we found [15:49.710 --> 15:55.090] is that many of the smaller and medium-sized counties are lucky if they have an IT professional [15:55.090 --> 16:00.930] for their entire county, let alone in their elections division and let alone a cybersecurity [16:00.930 --> 16:06.070] expert. So this partnership has also helped us have good communication and training with those [16:06.070 --> 16:10.430] election officials and do assessments in their counties that help them strengthen their system [16:10.430 --> 16:16.010] as well. We also played an active role in the critical infrastructure buildout of the election [16:16.010 --> 16:23.930] sector. So these are all kind of the key parts of our system, and I think that critical infrastructure [16:23.930 --> 16:32.650] designation also allowed us to create partnerships with our own state CISO and CIO, but also our [16:32.650 --> 16:38.130] Washington National Guard, who is a very strong cybersecurity team, and they've come in and done [16:38.130 --> 16:44.270] assessments and monitor our system and give us feedback and ways to improve our system. They've [16:44.270 --> 16:51.190] also helped us do tabletop exercises and trainings for our users, which, again, just continues to [16:51.190 --> 16:56.910] raise the awareness level and preparedness level of our election officials. We've worked with them [16:56.910 --> 17:02.730] also to build out our continuity of operation plans, which have obviously a digital component [17:02.730 --> 17:09.950] to in the security of our system, but also how are we going to not only detect and defend our system [17:09.950 --> 17:14.910] or protect and defend our system, but how are we going to detect an intrusion and recover and [17:14.910 --> 17:21.150] respond in case that does happen. We've also worked with the State Auditor's Office, Department of [17:21.150 --> 17:28.430] Homeland Security, and the FBI with similar threads to those activities. So we've been focusing on all [17:28.430 --> 17:35.650] of this for the last four years pretty intently. And as if that wasn't enough, in the early [17:35.650 --> 17:41.150] part of this year, we had to throw in a global pandemic because, you know, why not? So Washington [17:41.150 --> 17:46.890] was in the middle of our presidential primary when COVID-19 began to spike and we started having the [17:46.890 --> 17:54.150] first deaths in the country, actually, for COVID-19. And it did affect and impact our March 10th [17:54.150 --> 18:00.090] presidential primary. We were on track to have turnout of about 60% and the weekend right before [18:00.090 --> 18:05.530] election day was when COVID really started spiking and the governor started to issue stay-at-home [18:05.530 --> 18:11.810] orders. So we ended up with a turnout of 49%. And I think we're running about the third highest in [18:11.810 --> 18:16.010] the country for presidential primary turnout. And a lot of that has to do with vote by mail [18:16.010 --> 18:21.050] because our voters were still able to drop ballots off and didn't have to go into a polling place [18:21.050 --> 18:27.250] or vote center on election day. We've seen, of course, across the country, presidential primaries [18:27.250 --> 18:34.210] canceled or postponed. There has been incredible interest nationally on vote by mail and I've given [18:34.210 --> 18:41.440] many, many talks and been on panels and talked to media about our experience here in Washington. [18:41.890 --> 18:48.110] And what I can tell you is that our state is, well, we're implementing a primary right now. [18:48.110 --> 18:54.510] Our regular primary is on August 4th, so we'll be in the middle of... we're right in the middle [18:54.510 --> 18:59.090] of processing ballots for that election and certifying it. And, of course, we're gearing [18:59.090 --> 19:04.390] up for the general election. And my colleagues across the country are doing the same in their [19:04.390 --> 19:10.050] states, trying to expand absentee voting or vote by mail as best they can because Congress hasn't [19:10.050 --> 19:17.050] allocated money. And as if that wasn't enough, you know, the USPS is in financial distress and [19:17.050 --> 19:23.090] Congress has just allocated an additional 10 billion dollars of potential loans. So we're [19:23.090 --> 19:30.490] hoping that they remain stable between now and November. I think they're going to, but the USPS [19:30.490 --> 19:35.870] is a critical element for elections this year across the country because so many elections [19:35.870 --> 19:43.330] offices are expanding voting by mail. To give you kind of perspective of how significant this is, [19:43.330 --> 19:48.670] if you look at this map, the states in blue are the states that at the end of 2019 were already [19:48.670 --> 19:56.030] vote by mail, including Washington, Oregon, Utah, Colorado, and Hawaii. As you can see, [19:56.030 --> 20:01.410] as you move east in the country, fewer and fewer states either are vote by mail or even have [20:01.410 --> 20:08.130] access to absentee voting. And so the grayer or the whiter the states as you move east, [20:08.130 --> 20:12.970] those are going to be the states that have the hardest time moving to expanded absentee usage [20:12.970 --> 20:18.690] and vote by mail because they don't have the systems in place, high speed ballot sorters, [20:18.690 --> 20:24.510] envelope openers, even just the physical space to socially distance and process those ballots [20:24.510 --> 20:29.210] as efficiently as we can here in Washington or the other four states that do vote by mail [20:29.210 --> 20:35.310] elections. So we're trying to help those states gear up and they're working very hard to expand [20:35.310 --> 20:41.490] that capacity and capability. And I think you're going to see a hybrid model across the country, [20:41.490 --> 20:47.610] including my state here in Washington, of voting at home and voting in person, [20:47.610 --> 20:52.510] because even here in Washington, one to two percent of our voters will vote in person. [20:52.610 --> 20:58.450] So it's going to be a heavy lift, but election officials are working hard to make sure it's [20:58.450 --> 21:04.150] going to happen. And in that environment, of course, we introduce the politics and [21:04.770 --> 21:09.090] it's bipartisan. I like to talk about these things in terms of bipartisanship, but we have [21:09.090 --> 21:15.710] Republicans on the right, certainly the president and Senator McConnell and some of their associates [21:15.710 --> 21:20.910] who are concerned about voter fraud. And on the left, we have members of Congress, [21:20.910 --> 21:26.310] like Senator Wyden and Senator Klobuchar, who are really trying to expand vote by mail access [21:26.310 --> 21:33.030] and voting at home. And unfortunately, out of the White House and Department of Justice, [21:33.030 --> 21:39.070] we're hearing about voter fraud on a level that is implying, and he's point blank said, [21:39.070 --> 21:46.130] that there's going to be rampant fraud and vote rigging. And this is the environment that election [21:46.130 --> 21:52.170] officials are operating in and trying to inspire confidence in. And so I say that because we're [21:52.170 --> 21:57.430] seeing success stories already in the primaries that have been held in the last month or so. [21:57.430 --> 22:03.610] I think Kentucky is a great example of the innovation that that election officials are [22:03.610 --> 22:11.530] trying to bring to the COVID environment and make voting a safe experience. So you can see in these [22:11.530 --> 22:16.630] pictures, these are things that happened on election day in Kentucky. We had a huge [22:16.630 --> 22:22.090] shortage as we have seen across the country of election workers because many of our election [22:22.090 --> 22:27.690] workers are senior citizens who are the highest risk for COVID-19. So they have walked a lot [22:27.690 --> 22:37.230] just making these megaphone centers. And I think this was right in Washington. I believe it's [22:37.230 --> 22:42.630] where these pictures are. And they made massive phone centers where people could come and social [22:42.630 --> 22:49.170] distance and see their dogs. And they were able to process those dogs well. The other thing of [22:49.170 --> 22:54.510] course is, as I was talking about, is election officials in our state who are in all offices [22:54.510 --> 23:02.930] throughout the state that are secured, that are serviced daily by the USPS mailboxes. So [23:03.530 --> 23:07.090] you know, what we're really trying to do, I think, here in Washington, I know we're doing [23:07.090 --> 23:11.130] here in Washington state, I think what we're trying to do across the country is provide [23:11.130 --> 23:15.910] voters options and make sure that those are secure options that they can believe in [23:15.910 --> 23:22.850] and try to inspire confidence in the elections. And so I'll leave you with the biggest thing [23:22.850 --> 23:27.610] that I'm concerned with, with all of your hearts in shattered about voter suppression, [23:27.610 --> 23:33.310] if we don't have universal vote by mail or voter fraud, if we don't have complete poll site voting, [23:33.830 --> 23:38.990] is really dealing with the misinformation and disinformation that are out there, [23:39.870 --> 23:45.450] not only from the president or from members of Congress or whoever, but you know, [23:45.450 --> 23:51.670] foreign actors like Russia. We have a national movement or a national movement, national [23:51.670 --> 23:59.530] hashtag trustedinfo2020. And what we're really trying to do is drive voters to trusted sources [23:59.530 --> 24:05.610] like secretaries of state offices or county election departments or local election departments [24:05.610 --> 24:11.030] that are going to provide info that you can believe in and know is true. And, you know, [24:11.030 --> 24:15.650] different jurisdictions have different other hashtags and taglines like ours is the vote [24:15.650 --> 24:21.490] starts with you and really trying to empower voters to know where to go to get information [24:21.490 --> 24:34.450] on social media and online. So that is my point and I hope that that gives you a good overview [24:34.450 --> 24:39.330] of some of the security measures and practices we've implemented here in Washington state. [24:39.330 --> 24:46.030] I'm sorry that we can't be together in person, but I guess I want to leave you all with a word [24:46.030 --> 24:52.390] of thanks for all of the work that you're doing to try to help find the vulnerabilities in election [24:52.390 --> 24:59.710] cybersecurity and giving us feedback so we can make the system better. I think as I look back [24:59.810 --> 25:06.930] a few years ago to a few early DEFCON voting villages where, you know, we all pointed out [25:06.930 --> 25:12.350] some green hand truths and I think that it was difficult for election officials like myself to [25:12.350 --> 25:18.670] hear and our immediate reaction was to push back and say you're wrong. And what I love about DEFCON [25:18.670 --> 25:26.290] now and what I understand more is that we need to work together and we need to help us find [25:26.290 --> 25:31.270] those vulnerabilities and give us tips on how we can better secure our election system because [25:31.270 --> 25:36.350] at the end of all of this, no matter where we are on the political spectrum, no matter what [25:36.350 --> 25:42.110] job we have in this process, we need to inspire confidence in the public that our elections are [25:42.110 --> 25:49.110] accessible and secure and that the election results are fair and accurate. And we look forward to [25:49.110 --> 25:55.830] working with you in the future. I hope in 2021 that you'll invite me back to DEFCON and we can [25:55.830 --> 26:02.090] have these conversations in person, but feel free to reach out to me at the Secretary of State's [26:02.090 --> 26:08.750] office and I'm here in Baltimore. My email address, because this is so unfashionable to [26:08.750 --> 26:21.590] misscript, is Kim.Wyman, that's K-I-M dot W-Y-M-A-N, M-A-N at S-O-S dot WA.gov, S-O-S dot W-A dot G-O-V. [26:21.590 --> 26:24.870] So thank you so much for giving me time at the conference. I hope you [26:24.870 --> 26:31.390] have a great conference remotely and we hopefully can be all together next year. So take care.