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0	4000	If you flew out to DEFCON, you certainly interacted with someone at TSA.
4000	13920	But do you really know who TSA is, and what those employees and many more really do to maintain the safety and security of our nation's aviation, surface, and space systems?
14240	19960	In this fireside chat with David Pekoske, you'll hear it straight from the administrator himself.
20080	33440	He'll cover the TSA's role among many government agencies addressing these issues, and how TSA partners with hackers to maintain the trust we all have in these vital systems and build a more resilient transportation system.
33700	35680	All right, thank you.
39520	45740	I want to complain and be unhappy for the 30-minute flight, but these are pretty darn comfortable.
45960	47440	But you had no waiting.
47440	50620	Yes, I think it was the boarding process that made it that much simpler.
50960	52860	Well, thank you all for being here.
52860	56260	For those of you who don't know, my name is Steve Luzinski.
56260	57900	I am part of the Aerospace Village.
57900	66460	I'm the board chairman working on the nonprofit side with the smart volunteers that you see around here who are running everything you're seeing today at the village.
66460	68580	And we are very happy.
69680	76140	I have the privilege of having David Pekoske, and I practiced that because Luzinski.
76140	77220	I didn't want to screw that up.
77220	86140	So David Pekoske, TSA administrator with us today, share his thoughts, perspectives on the work that they're doing in the aerospace sector.
86140	91760	So thinking about both aviation that we typically think about, but there's also space elements and more.
91760	94440	So, again, I appreciate y'all's time coming here.
94720	102680	For those of you who don't know your full background, I will throw out the distinguished career in the U.S.
102680	108480	Coast Guard, ending with being the 26th Vice Commandant of the U.S.
108480	113820	Coast Guard, followed by moving over to TSA as the 7th Administrator.
113840	121300	60,000 people across TSA, and has been serving in that role for some time now.
121300	122600	And so thank you for being here.
122600	124520	I really appreciate having you on stage.
124520	124580	Thanks , Steve .
124580	125340	Great to be here.
125340	126100	Absolutely.
127000	140800	So, you know, I've been thinking about this, and as we've been coordinating, and I want to come up with this big, fancy, you heard in the introduction, we think about TSA, we think about, well, what do they do?
140800	144500	It's like, well, it's just the blue shirt screeners, and I know there's more.
144500	159180	So I want to start off with getting a better idea of why, beyond just that part of aviation, what's the full extent of what TSA does, so we understand that background and context in this discussion.
159180	160560	Okay, great question.
160560	165680	And, you know, TSA is the Transportation Security Administration, not the Aviation Security Administration.
165680	170080	So that tips off that, hey, there's a lot more to this than aviation.
170080	173360	But aviation is by far the biggest aspect of what we do.
173360	181080	And, Steve, to your point, what you see in screen checkpoints is the most resource-intensive and people-intensive part of our operation.
181120	188020	But we also have a significant role in air cargo security, in aviation security within the airport environment.
188020	198540	We do a tremendous amount of work on the intelligence and analysis side, the vetting side for all the passengers that go through our screening process or transit through U.S.
198580	199600	airspace.
199600	206740	Additionally, we have a good number of people assigned overseas because we're a presence in many, many embassies around the world.
206740	216020	We inspect last-point-of-departure airports, those airports that have a direct flight to the United States, to make sure they're complying with the requirements that we have put in place.
216020	220080	And, importantly, we have a role in surface transportation security.
220080	238060	And if you think back to the Department of Transportation, if you go back to 2001, pre-911, the DOT had a number of modal administrations, like the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, like the Federal Railroad Administration, like the Federal Aviation Administration.
238060	249540	When 9-11 happened and TSA was established in law, the Secretary of Transportation, Norm Mineta, literally took the security functions of all those modes and moved them over to TSA.
249540	257400	So one of the things that TSA has responsibility for is security for pipelines in the United States, oil and natural gas pipelines.
257400	259760	Most people wouldn't assume that.
259760	262320	Or for train systems, mass transit systems.
262320	279840	So the remit is quite large and getting larger all the time because, as you may have seen, we have gotten into the cybersecurity regulation end of our responsibilities, and that really started off in pipelines following the May 2021 ransomware attack of an East Coast pipeline.
279840	283620	So really, it's a big agency, a lot of scope.
283620	292440	What I would offer to all of you at the very beginning of our talk this afternoon is, I'm here and I've got about 30 of my colleagues here at DEF CON.
292440	293700	It's my first time.
293700	296280	For many of my colleagues, it's not their first time.
296280	301740	And what we endeavor to do is to really solicit your help and your expertise.
301740	311400	We're doing a lot of work where we could use another perspective, another point of view, to make sure that we're looking at things in a comprehensive and complete way.
311400	328320	And so as we look at cybersecurity, for example, and I'll talk a little bit more about that later on, but we've changed the way we approach our relationship with the stakeholders, with the regulated parties that exist in the surface transportation and the aviation systems.
328320	346100	We really need your help in helping us define risk and scenarios for cybersecurity because you're in a better position, I think, than certainly I am and than most to say, hey, if I wanted to get into this system, how would I do it?
346100	350860	And we want to make sure that we understand that perspective, benefit from your expertise.
351000	356960	The other thing is that you all represent a lot of talent, and TSA is hiring talent.
356960	363200	So if you go to our booth over in the exhibit hall, you'll see a TSA booth there.
363200	367160	And really, if you're interested in a position, please visit that booth.
367160	371800	There's a quick QR code that will take you right to our open job positions.
371800	376480	And I will tell you, as Steve mentioned, I've been in TSA now for six years.
376480	379200	I spent 33 years in the Coast Guard.
379200	382280	Both tremendous organizations.
382280	386960	I enjoyed immensely my time on active duty in the Coast Guard.
386960	390320	I really, really, really enjoy working in TSA.
390320	399380	I work with an incredible team of people all around the country, all around the world, and we do meaningful national security work every single day.
399400	405760	One of the things that sometimes you hear is, well, TSA really isn't detecting everything.
405760	410300	Let me tell you, we are detecting a lot every single day.
410400	422200	And I know that the aviation system is much more secure as a result of our efforts and getting more and more secure each and every day as we bring more technology into our operation.
422200	427360	And we'll talk about a couple of our technology initiatives where you can also be a tremendous help for us.
427360	431400	So please, we're looking for your expertise to advise us.
431400	437140	And we're open to any opportunities you see that might fit your own personal needs.
437140	447720	And, hey, I think it's a really good thing for somebody to have some time in government, particularly in an agency that I think is one of the most agile agencies in the government.
447720	449400	There are many that I would put in that category.
449400	455300	I would put us up there as well because we've done some pretty incredible things in relatively short time.
455300	458440	And oftentimes very visible to passengers.
458440	460940	So that's a quick thumbnail.
460940	461180	Thanks.
461180	462140	That's awesome.
462140	473940	And one of the other things in learning, because of the work that I do at the village and talking to your folks, all of those things, and there's still a spaceport element to all of that because that is new and emerging.
473940	479260	So think of all those aviation issues and add the space part of it that's growing.
479800	496240	One of the things, having been in government, worked at the Pentagon while I was in the military, but then also working at CISA, looking at these aviation cyber issues, if you could give a brief, what is the difference in roles and responsibilities?
496440	498200	Because we don't think of TSA.
498640	500160	We think of FAA.
500220	503700	Or we may think of all the things that CISA is known for.
503700	510240	How are the three of you dividing up where you have those shared equities when it comes to aviation and space cybersecurity?
510260	510820	Thanks.
510820	519200	And actually, I would add a fourth, and that would be the FBI, with the great work that FBI does in cybersecurity and investigating cyber incidents.
519800	539060	When I talked about the Department of Transportation modes and them retaining safety responsibility and then us picking up the security responsibility from them, many, many times when you look at an issue and you look at it, something's going on, some particular process you're looking at or some technology you're looking at,
539060	543520	that technology oftentimes has both a safety and a security impact to it.
543520	549780	And so we want to make sure that we're very, very closely connected to our safety co-sector risk management agencies.
549780	557420	So an SRMA is an agency that has regulatory authority for elements of the critical infrastructure in the country.
557420	563040	So for aviation, the FAA and TSA are the co-sector risk management agencies.
563040	570420	For rail systems, for example, TSA and FRA are the co-sector risk management agencies.
570420	580400	CISA, relatively new as CISA, but really not new necessarily because they were largely in existence, although not quite to the degree they are today.
580400	592760	In the Department of Homeland Security's structure, they just moved over to an independent agency, has been an incredible partner for us as a source of expertise, as a source of looking at cross-sector issues.
592760	594780	I look at the transportation sector.
594960	600460	The transportation sector relies on the electricity sector for a lot of its support.
600460	603800	And so we need to make sure that we're looking at cross-sector issues as well.
603800	605520	That's where CISA comes into play.
605520	615940	And CISA is an agency that can provide help, advice, context to owners and operators of critical infrastructure in the country.
616780	628300	Relatively new but incredibly valuable role, particularly nowadays where cyber is much more in the forefront of owners and operators' calculations with respect to the operations of their companies.
628840	634340	And then finally, the FBI does investigations of cyber incidents and does victim notifications.
634340	641360	And that's an important thing that all of the sector agencies that I mentioned are really closely aligned with each other.
641360	658320	Last thing I would say is that as we look at response to an incident as an agency, one of the things that we're all trying to do very, very hard is to present more of a unified position to the owner and operator of a piece of critical infrastructure.
658320	670020	You can imagine if you are attacked and you're dealing with several different agencies, and they're all calling you at different times, asking sometimes the same question or somewhat different questions.
670020	673120	And in your mind, they're not coordinating with each other.
673120	680200	That's creating for you a lot more work, and it's taking you away from the response to the incident that you're facing.
680200	685880	So part of what we are doing very diligently now is making sure that we coordinate amongst the agencies.
685880	699160	I think a really good example of that is when we issued our cyber regulations across the sector, the reporting for a significant cyber incident, which is required by our regulations, doesn't come to TSA.
699160	700200	It goes to CISA.
700360	704360	And then CISA sends it out to, in the case of aviation, they would send it out to the FAA.
704360	705860	They would send it out to the FBI.
705860	718060	They would make sure that everybody who had an equity in the issue was getting, importantly, the same information, stated the same way, so that there's no daylight between reporting at the same time.
718060	720240	That's really, really valuable to all of us.
721240	728040	So in the context of these things that you're doing, if you could provide some more detail, I think that would help.
728220	733660	What's driving these what seem like new actions that I think the public's seeing?
733660	736880	And then what are those?
736880	738540	What's the objective?
738540	739920	What's the full extent?
739920	745620	Because there are so many things and initiatives that you all are enacting, I think that'd be very useful for everyone.
745660	745960	Sure.
745960	749040	And what's driving it is the intelligence information we have.
749040	750640	And it's significant.
750640	751800	It's concerning.
752000	754700	I've issued emergency amendments.
754700	760080	You don't issue an emergency amendment to a security plan unless you feel like we're in an emergency situation.
760080	762840	So the intelligence is compelling.
762840	764060	It's consistent.
764060	767800	It's getting consistently more concerning over time.
767800	780260	And one of the things that we did, and I think that it's really important for any government entity to be viewed by the American public and by the companies that we work with as a trusted partner.
780260	784120	Being a trusted partner means that you share as much information as you can.
784120	786140	You share it in a timely manner.
786160	793880	And you respect company proprietary information when you're receiving information from that particular owner and operator.
793880	810340	One of the things we did when we first went down this journey to increase cyber preparedness and cyber resiliency was to bring the CEOs of the companies that we regulate in for a high-level classified briefing on the why.
810340	823380	Why were we about to ask you to do certain things in a relatively quick fashion, generally inside your own company budget cycle, so we shored up some vulnerabilities that we thought were incredibly concerning.
823380	829680	Some CEOs looked at that and said, hey, you really need to talk to my CIO, not to me.
829680	831840	And we said, oh, we will talk to your CIO.
831860	843120	We just wanted you to have the context before we had that conversation, because your CIO most assuredly will be coming to you with a request for resources, for policy changes, things of that nature.
843120	852620	But what we did, and I would credit the industry and our partners for helping us with this in a really substantial way.
852620	859820	When we first started out with cybersecurity regulation, we did what we have been doing for 22-plus years.
859820	863380	Other agencies have been doing for hundreds of years in regulations.
863380	871360	And what I mean by that is you see a problem, you try to make sure that problem doesn't recur again or anything similar to it.
871360	878080	And so you require a whole host of activities to be performed by the party that you regulate.
878080	880500	We initially did that with pipelines.
880520	888480	And the pipeline industry, which was not regulated by us previously, asked us to take another look at that.
888480	895980	They thought that they were being asked to replace what they thought were really good mitigation measures with the specific ones that we were requiring.
895980	904840	So in some cases, their feeling was that we would actually be taking a step backward in security, not a step forward.
904840	912700	Many, many companies, whether it's in aviation or surface, also said, hey, listen, my business operates in a certain way.
912700	923360	You probably don't really fully understand how my business operates, but I'm willing to achieve whatever end goal you want, but I want to have some flexibility in how I get to that point.
923360	931940	And so what we did for the first time in our history, something that's called for in the national cyber strategy, is we went to a performance-based regulation.
931940	941340	So rather than say and do all these specific things, we said, hey, these are four outcomes in cybersecurity we'd like you to achieve.
941340	952400	Come back to us with a plan within a certain amount of time that will tell us how you, an individual owner-operator, is going to achieve that particular set of outcomes.
952480	957120	And so these cybersecurity implementation plans were all submitted to us.
957120	959520	We looked at them, kind of went back and forth a little bit.
959520	963840	In some cases, in other cases, they were very comprehensive when we approved them.
963840	969820	We finally, on the pipeline side, because that's the furthest ahead in all this, approved all these cybersecurity implementation plans.
969920	986240	But the next step was, and this is an area, too, where you can be of tremendous assistance to us, is when you go to an outcome-based system, you have to be able to objectively conclude that the outcomes you have established are being achieved.
986240	1000100	And that can't be just a simple roll-up of all the activities that are being performed, because those activities are certainly just that, they're activities, but are they actually contributing to the achievement of the outcome and to what level?
1000100	1004640	So we require what are called capability assessment plans.
1004640	1015280	Basically, you take your implementation plan and then tell us how you're doing against that plan, and then, importantly, how that collectively is doing against the outcome.
1015280	1028020	And so one of the things that's really important in looking at outcome achievement is, one, prioritizing the threat, because when you're looking at an outcome, some threats are going to be ones that you want to make sure that you've addressed more so than others.
1028020	1043660	So prioritizing the threats and then looking at different scenarios that are very realistic, that all of you would have a very good idea of what some of those would look like, given your work in hacking or hacking research.
1043660	1060680	For example, if I wanted to hack into an aviation, let's say an airport badging system, how would I do it and develop a scenario that would allow us to test that with individual owners and operators so that we can kind of look across the sector and say,
1060680	1070600	hey, to be able to control access, this is how you're doing based on a very realistic and high-priority scenario that you've given us assistance in providing.
1070600	1071860	So we have a project.
1071860	1073780	It's called Project Chariot.
1074160	1076920	Chariot as in the horse-drawn chariots.
1076920	1081860	Kind of appropriate because we're here at CSER, so it's in the moment, if you will.
1082680	1092820	But Chariot stands for Critical Infrastructure Hardening Achieved Through Risk Reduction in Information and Operational Technology.
1093160	1107340	And this project is a project that's between the Department of Science and Technology Directorate, our team at CISA, as well as, in the case of pipelines and rail, FRA and PHMSA.
1107380	1119420	We're working with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to really look at, hey, if we prioritize risk, what would that risk prioritization look like from an objective standpoint?
1119440	1134320	And then secondly, working with all of you, validating that and saying, hey, I see that, you know, given my ease of being able to access some systems, for example, or when I do what I see and what potential might be there, I might change that priority.
1134320	1149000	But then give us some scenarios, like I said earlier, that are realistic scenarios, because we want to test those scenarios with each owner and operator to see how they perform against those scenarios to really be able to answer this very simple question.
1149000	1157040	If this specific company is the subject of a successful cyber attack, how well are they equipped to be able to respond to that?
1157040	1162560	And how well are they equipped to be able to prevent most of the attack from affecting them?
1162560	1182980	And so your perspective, your help, is going to be valuable, not just to us, but to those owners and operators as well, because they're looking at their own team, they've contracted, I'm sure, with other countries, but getting that additional validation there will make us all feel much more confident that what we're doing is really the right thing to do to protect this critical infrastructure.
1184340	1197300	One of the things I know, when I was working with Tim and the idea of having you up here and bringing you in for the talk, that was very interesting, just the simple question, why is TSA here?
1197440	1203660	And you covered that a little bit before, but I think the important part is the background is not just the why.
1203660	1209720	There are plenty, what we've seen, just the work that the village does, the aerospace village.
1209720	1216540	We've seen the changing attitudes where government and industry, why would I go talk to those hackers?
1216540	1218480	Why would I talk to somebody dressed like that?
1218480	1226520	All that kind of stuff that, in some respects, it's true, but the stereotypes are on both sides.
1226520	1227600	Why would government be there?
1227600	1231140	Why would I go listen to government come up and do this?
1231140	1249480	And so what I'm interested in is your thoughts on, as we see this changing attitude, and clearly it looks like exactly what you all are thinking too, how are you trying to engage, other than coming to events like this, what are the other things that you all are doing to make sure you're able to reach,
1249480	1252760	to get past those stereotypes and dispel those rumors?
1253160	1255840	The first is, why are you doing it?
1255840	1257420	I would come back and say, why not?
1257420	1259160	You've got all this talent.
1259160	1260140	Why would you not?
1260140	1263960	Because you're going to come up with a less perfect solution.
1263960	1272500	Not that any solution is perfect, but if you don't tap all the talent that's available, you're not going to be doing the best job that you can.
1272680	1294040	Secondly, the how and how this gets sustained is, I think events like this are the beginning of building trust, of understanding better how you see things, you understanding better how I see things, really establishing that personal relationship, starting to build that trust,
1294040	1304060	so that when things come up, we feel like we can actually have a good conversation, where we can share some information that's of incredible value to both of us.
1304060	1314340	The other thing, and I hope you've noticed this when you've gone through our screening checkpoints, is we're working really hard to embed more technology into the work we do in our screening checkpoints.
1314340	1325420	You see the new credential authentication technology, that technology where, rather than having somebody actually look at your driver's license, it goes into a machine that validates its authenticity.
1325600	1339420	One of the things that always concerned me when I first got into this job, and even beforehand, was I'd hand off to the TSA officer my driver's license, let's say back in 2020, or even a little bit earlier than that, I'd hand them off the driver's license,
1339420	1345540	and they would actually physically look at it and try to verify that that's a valid, whatever state you have a driver's license in.
1345540	1363560	I don't know how you possibly do that across 56 states and territories and be accurate all the time, or you're looking at a very small photograph and visually trying to compare the two, and people's facial features can change to a degree over time, licenses last for eight years,
1363560	1366540	and a technology assist on that would be hugely beneficial.
1366640	1383600	Additionally, when the pandemic hit, we wanted to reduce the amount of physical contact that we had with anything that was owned by a passenger or with the passenger themselves, because in the pandemic, everybody was trying not to have physical contact to the greatest extent we possibly could.
1383600	1388600	Inserting your own card into the machine is a way to do that, but there's a better way.
1388600	1407160	You can download, in many states now, your driver's license into your Apple wallet, your Google wallet, your Samsung wallet, and then use that digital ID, which is a different kind of transmission, much more secure to our technology, and has some significant privacy benefits to it,
1407160	1419280	because it shows you, when you pull up your mobile driver's license, exactly what fields in your driver's license that we are going to look at with your driver's license.
1419520	1429420	Before, I've had some people say, I think you're tracking my movement in terms of home addresses, because I know you're ingesting my home address every time you look at my driver's license.
1429420	1432860	We never did, but at least this way, you get to see it for sure.
1432860	1439440	So getting to digital identification, and then eventually to biometric identification, is really where we want to go.
1439800	1442920	Biometrics is an area that we could use your help in.
1442920	1446080	How do we make sure the biometric system is secure?
1446080	1454940	How do we make sure that the biometric system does not disadvantage any demographic group that travels through our system in any way, shape, or form?
1455040	1457960	We've done a lot of great work on biometrics.
1457960	1468580	They are much more accurate than a human verification of identity in our own testing, and in testing done by the Science and Technology Directorate in the department.
1468740	1472760	They're also much more efficient, and we don't transmit that data anywhere.
1472760	1474360	It stays right on that machine.
1474360	1480120	As soon as you, as a passenger, leave, and the next passenger begins their process, your data is erased.
1480120	1480880	We don't keep it at all.
1480880	1482140	It never leaves that machine.
1482240	1486020	So that's an area where we could use some help and advice.
1486060	1498500	The other thing that we're doing is we'd really like to get to the point where all of our technology is developed using open architecture principles and have open architecture requirements in our contracting vehicles.
1498500	1499840	Because think of this.
1500340	1509940	If you look at those big x-ray machines in our screening checkpoints, the original equipment manufacturer owns all the software that's in those x-ray machines.
1510340	1518200	Whenever we want to make a change, we can only go to those vendors, and they're looking at the entire code set whenever we're making a change.
1518200	1521360	It takes a lot longer to get changes put in place.
1521400	1535700	You all might remember about three or four years ago, we had a threat stream that talked about people attempting to bring large quantities of powders onto aircraft and then mixing them with liquids and have it gas off and create a toxic environment.
1535700	1542320	So we needed to detect large quantities of powders, and so we had passengers take out powders out of their carry-on bags.
1542320	1551920	A much better way would be just to add a software layer onto our existing software technology for detection and have it detect that particular threat.
1551920	1564160	So if you think of how agile we have to be, whenever you need to be agile, having to revert to a manual process for a long period of time is not good for passengers.
1564460	1566460	It's really not good for us.
1566580	1572420	So open architecture is another thing that we're very, very interested in and want to move forward on.
1572420	1583900	So those are just a couple of examples of things that, from a technology perspective and from making it as error-free and as cyber-secure as we possibly can.
1583900	1588960	And then the elephant that you talk about a lot here is artificial intelligence.
1589140	1592640	Think about when you go through a screening checkpoint.
1592640	1596660	First off, you see officers sitting next to every single x-ray machine.
1596660	1601740	There's no technological reason why that has to occur because they're now in the noise environment.
1602160	1605520	They're only able to look at images from that particular lane.
1605520	1607260	It's a bit inefficient.
1609420	1624800	The second part of this is that we would really like to take them and put them off in a separate part of the airport and be able for them to have a quiet space and be able to operate any lane in that airport or maybe even in an adjacent airport.
1624800	1634000	And so what we're looking to do is to have the image for a carry-on bag only be visible to the operators if it alarms.
1634000	1637740	Right now, they look at every single image that comes up.
1637740	1640780	Just take a guess at how many images we see in a given day.
1640780	1642140	Just take a rough guess.
1643340	1644580	How many?
1644940	1646200	You're very close.
1646200	1647740	It's about 5.5 million.
1647740	1650280	So 5.5 million images come up.
1650280	1666140	But when you're reviewing so many images and every one is presented to you with the same level of concern, if you only imaged on alarm, you would pay a lot more attention to that particular one image that came up that you really had to look at more.
1666140	1668280	And plus it becomes a heck of a lot more efficient.
1668900	1671580	But artificial intelligence can be spoofed.
1671820	1682940	It's not good at deducing context to a bag where a human can look at a bag and say, okay, all these things sort of ought to belong in this bag given what else I see here.
1683020	1685180	But a machine can't yet do that.
1685240	1686580	And it can be hacked.
1687260	1690200	And particularly generative AI, which can learn.
1690200	1694880	If it's learning and we're not tracking how it's learning, it might not be learning what we want it to learn.
1694880	1698980	So your help in that regard would be incredibly beneficial too.
1698980	1699580	Absolutely.
1699580	1702380	And I will put in a plug the talk following.
1702380	1704460	We'll cover the croissant screening machines.
1704460	1706460	As I've learned, that's the name of them.
1706460	1709780	You may be seeing the newer technology that Dave mentioned.
1709800	1714700	In addition to tomorrow, you're talking with Director Isidore on one of the main stage talks.
1714700	1717860	So if you're looking forward to learning more, you've got those opportunities.
1718280	1719940	So I'm going to close up here.
1720580	1722960	Again, more things to learn.
1723160	1727520	Hopefully seeing, understanding better what TSA is doing, why they're doing it.
1728040	1728940	Closing comments.
1728940	1731340	I know you mentioned it before, but please feel free again.
1731340	1734760	Where can we go to learn more about careers and if there's interest?
1734760	1735540	Yeah, sure.
1735540	1736820	Just go into the exhibit room.
1736820	1737600	There's a TSA booth.
1737600	1738880	You can see our logo there.
1738880	1741400	We've got some really cool stickers there.
1741400	1743280	And we just encourage you to do that.
1743280	1747660	Or if you know somebody who is looking for a really meaningful position in TSA.
1747660	1754100	The other thing just to know is, and if you listen to the Secretary's comments this morning, we're looking for cyber talent.
1754140	1755920	If you'd like to spend a career, great.
1755920	1759220	If you'd just like to come in and work for a couple, three years, terrific.
1759480	1765460	Because that back and forth has a hugely beneficial component to it potentially for all of us as well.
1765460	1768620	But finally, just hey, thank you for attending.
1769220	1775580	Thank you in advance for any help that you're able to give us in making sure that we're doing what I think all of you want.
1775580	1780600	Is making sure that when you get on an aircraft, you have the very best technology solutions.
1780600	1785260	The very safest implementation of those solutions that we can possibly deliver.
1785260	1786360	And you're a big part of that.
1786360	1787360	So thank you.
1787760	1788060	And I
1791440	1797480	feel absolutely obligated to make sure your Vegas trip is worth your time.
1797480	1802640	So the obligatory Vegas dice and drink koozie for whatever drink you want.
1802640	1806200	But more importantly, our 5th anniversary of the Village.
1807700	1809860	120th anniversary of the Wright Flyer.
1810100	1814000	Badge, swag, sticker pack for the administrator.
1814000	1814320	Enjoy.
1814320	1814780	Awesome.
1814780	1815220	Thank you.
1815220	1816080	Appreciate it.