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0	10020	Our third presenter will be speaking about the private IP address, or PIA, and how our current thinking needs to change in order to achieve meaningful privacy in aviation.
10400	17580	Martin Strohmeyer is a senior scientist at the Swiss Cyber Defense Campus in Zurich, and a visiting fellow of Kellogg College.
17600	24560	He has been analyzing aviation security issues for over ten years, and has published on this topic in high-making papers.
24660	27480	Please welcome Martin to speak about Elon Quicker.
27480	28440	Wait a second.
28440	29140	That isn't right.
29140	29980	Oh well.
29980	32460	Anyways, why not achieve privacy in aviation?
32660	35020	Well, thanks for that introduction.
35760	45460	Sadly, you know, times are difficult, so I had to change my slide between submitting it to Aerospace Village and today.
45980	51380	So it's now ElonX and the PIA, how not to achieve privacy in aviation.
51880	53420	You've heard the introduction already.
53420	55440	This is mostly my day job.
55440	72180	I'm a senior scientist at the Cyber Defense Campus of Amersfox in Switzerland, where I do mostly security, privacy research and critical infrastructures, in particular aviation, but also satellites, cars, anything that moves in transport.
72760	75620	I have a night job as well.
75620	79060	I'm the co-founder and board member of the OpenSky Network.
79060	80220	It's a non-profit.
80220	86040	It's a crowdsourced air traffic network, just like FlightRadar, FlightAware, I'm sure you all know that.
86340	93640	But we collect the same data and make it available to researchers across the world.
93640	99240	We've used it also in the Aerospace Village before, when DEFCON was just remote.
100080	102500	So, let's jump right in.
102500	104940	Obviously, I think everyone here knows, right?
105100	109360	Aircraft are globally trackable by anyone with different means.
109360	113260	The most well-known, the most popular one is probably ADS-B.
113260	119760	But there are many ways you can use aircraft communication to track aircraft everywhere.
119760	121300	And people are doing this.
121320	124840	And we've talked about this in the village before and elsewhere.
125220	127480	There are real consequences for people.
127600	144340	So, even if you're high and mighty, use your own private jets, even if you're in the government, just as the Vice President of Victoria Guinea had to realize a few years ago, people can track what you're doing.
144340	152020	And that has an impact on your life, in this case, even on legal proceedings.
152020	156100	People know where you are, where you should go and where you shouldn't go.
156500	161680	Likewise, this became mainstream around 2019.
161680	169910	People have been tracking private aircraft and looking at deals, mergers, acquisitions.
170260	176960	They just look for any signal and use that in trading.
177800	185760	It's very obvious if you use your company's aircraft, fly to a certain place where there's another company in your industry, right?
185760	187360	That something is going on.
187360	190240	It's not difficult to figure out.
190240	192160	And everyone has been doing this.
193120	196500	So, that's a problem, quite obviously.
196500	204600	And people have been lobbying hard for now over 20 years to do something about this, because it's only ever gotten worse.
205140	210360	There have been schemes in existence since at least 2000.
210360	217560	But, of course, they have become much more prevalent since ADS-B and aircraft tracking went absolutely mainstream.
217860	223580	And tens of thousands of people provide censorious information around the world.
223860	228060	So, let's have a quick look at what people have been trying over the years.
228300	231080	The first one was the BAR program.
231080	235760	So, that's short for Blocked Aircraft Registration Request Program.
235760	243820	That really traces back to 2000, when we as Congress said, okay, we need some sort of privacy in aviation.
245160	254160	In short, it has a list with individuals who think they have some sort of safety concern.
254160	256740	So, not necessarily privacy at the time.
256740	258180	We said, okay, we have safety.
258180	263460	Maybe we don't want stalkers to turn up at an airport.
263460	266860	So, people shouldn't see when I'm flying live.
267920	275880	This was not run by the state, but this was run by a private industry lobbying group, the National Business Aviation Association.
276820	279700	They provided this list to the FAA.
279700	292860	And the FAA ran basically a data program, the ASDI, where they provided the data they had, radar data, to the industry.
292860	298900	For example, web trackers like flight radar, but others who can use aviation data.
299240	304020	And there were two different ways of basically protecting privacy.
304020	312180	One was, they would not send information about such safety-related aircraft to the industry in the first place.
312180	318660	Or, they would send it, but tell the industry not to display it publicly or share it with anybody.
318660	323260	So, that was the approach that they were taking to privacy.
324180	330480	Of course, most of these things, pretty much all of them at the moment, are really US-only programs.
330640	343440	When we're talking about privacy, this applies only if you're flying in the US, if you're part of the US industry, and if you're using FAA's data feeds.
343440	346000	Otherwise, it's entirely not applicable.
346000	352440	There's no legal requirement that you do not show aircraft data of any kind.
353900	358140	So, as we know, security by obscurity never works, right?
358300	361300	If you even want to call it security.
361540	372460	So, you can go to any tracker who does not use FAA data, but instead uses crowdsourced AGSB or other aircraft data that's widely available.
372460	381440	Anyone can collect with a $10, $20 software-defined radio and provide it to some aggregator and share, or just look at it yourself.
381440	386000	There have been plenty of activities in this direction in the Middle East before.
386000	388760	So, yeah, just one example.
388920	397000	The former president, during the first campaign, wanted to not be shown on public trackers.
397000	407580	So, well, he wasn't, but he was trivially found on any tracker not needing to adhere to these requirements.
408040	412920	So, this is purely by policy, really.
412920	418420	There was one technical attempt over a decade ago by the FAA.
418420	423700	There was an implementation of the DO-282B standard.
423760	431400	This standard is only relevant for general aviation aircraft and only when they're flying VFR.
431520	436000	So, that already limits the utility by a lot, of course.
436920	456060	But the bigger problem of this technical approach, which was to randomize the unique transponder ID of a given aircraft, and thus make it much more difficult to follow somebody on web trackers, was that, as has been shown by Krishnas and the entire decade ago,
456060	470120	that even this implementation in the standard is entirely flawed and can easily correlate the original real transponder ID with all the randomized IDs that are being broadcast later on.
470120	474420	So, that's fairly useless from a security perspective in the first place.
474420	486280	But from a safety perspective, even the FAA says, well, actually don't use that, because we may not be able to save you when you have a problem, right?
486280	491760	So, we may not be able to find you if you have a crash or anything.
491760	502900	We can't search and rescue if you use this randomized transponder ID, which, from my perspective, is also a pretty good incentive not to use it, I suppose.
504340	505980	We go further.
506040	513020	In 2018, the LAB program was introduced, short for limiting aircraft data displayed.
513020	517820	And there was just a rebranding of the previous BAR program that existed.
517880	524480	It was the only real exchange that has been now put on more legal footing.
524640	532700	So, the FAA maintained this list of safety-concerned people directly, of privacy-concerned people.
533280	538420	And that, yeah, not the lobbying group anymore.
538420	540540	However, there was no real technical change.
540540	545680	We're still excluding it from existing aircraft feeds that we're providing to the industry.
546040	549380	And then they are not allowed to display these people.
549440	557560	But if you're not using any of these feeds, you don't have any legal requirement to not show these aircraft.
559020	565380	Finally, we get to the PIA program, which is short for Privacy IKO Address.
565380	572920	So, there was a second attempt at trying to get some random temporary identifiers for aircraft.
572920	575500	And so, prevent continued tracking.
577040	584800	This time, it's actually for all aircraft in US airspace run by the FAA.
585140	589200	A list of aircraft who wanted random identifiers.
591120	596420	The issue, of course, is that it's a very complicated process.
597360	602040	Assume you have your normal transponder ID that's assigned to you.
602240	604680	Then you have to go to the FAA.
604860	606800	You have to fill in a lot of forms.
606800	611900	You have to do a lot of certification and testing, basically, with the FAA.
612340	617280	And then, when you do that, you can have a new IKO address.
617280	620660	You go on the ground, you enter that, and you can fly that.
620660	623780	You can add another call sign as well.
625400	633480	And then, you fly with that for at least, at the moment, 60 business days.
633500	637160	So, it's not like you can change it every flight or every day.
637160	638520	It takes quite a while.
638520	641180	And it's quite a level process.
641180	647060	So, I haven't seen anybody even change it as regularly as possible at the moment.
648200	650760	So, yeah, every 60 days.
650760	654420	It's a fairly complicated bureaucratic procedure.
654580	662880	And you get a third-party call sign from several for-profit providers that were deemed eligible by the FAA.
662880	667580	For example, the .com DCM call signs from Flightplan.
668840	672920	Of course, the problem is that this is a mixed net, right?
672920	675980	I mean, we're familiar with mixed nets from TOR.
676160	679500	We have a bunch of aircraft, and they all change their address.
679600	682320	And they go into an airport, and then they go out.
682320	689920	And then, in theory, if enough aircraft do this, we may not be able to tell who's who.
689920	692240	They keep changing their identifiers.
692240	700660	In practice, however, even well-known things like TOR and mixed nets, they don't work if you're the only one using it, right?
700680	710760	So, if you're a student at a university, and you make a bomb threat on TOR, and at the time of the threat, you're the only one on the campus using TOR.
711740	714180	It's quite trivial to find here, right?
714360	718460	I don't think the FBI had a lot of troubles in this case.
719260	732240	So, similarly, and we've pointed this out at the Aerospace Village three years ago, you can do the same with the current attempt by the FAA to randomize transponder IDs.
733800	738540	Basically, if you only have a handful of people using it, you go into an airport.
739020	748980	At some point, you will have to go out of that airport, and if the transponder ID that came in didn't go out, but another one that didn't come in went out later.
748980	753240	I mean, associating these is obviously straightforward and fairly trivial.
753380	759480	We even ran a CTF at the village in 2020 that had such a challenge in it.
760420	764940	So, yeah, we pointed this out, that it does not work in practice.
764940	766940	It's just too few participants.
767340	773040	They don't cycle it often enough, every 60 days at least, but some people just do it once.
773040	778980	And whenever it's associated with your original ID and then everyone else's is.
778980	780520	Of course, it only works in the U.S.
780520	781360	again.
781460	783380	When you leave U.S.
783380	787040	airspace, you have to use your normal transponder ID.
787040	794840	So, you know, if you're a high-profile person, you probably often use the aircraft to leave the country.
795320	797240	That's what it's made for.
797240	803680	And then it's quite trivial to associate your most recent ID with the real one.
804120	813680	That's not even talking about the fact that sensitive aircraft, military aircraft, doesn't apply here.
813680	816500	But in principle, it's the same there.
816500	822020	Business aircraft and others, they have very specific flight patterns.
822020	828480	You typically go to some small, known home airport where you're based.
828700	834100	And if there's not many other people there, it's fairly easy to know that it's you.
834480	836440	And you don't even have to go there.
836440	840880	Quite often, your movements outside of what you do with your aircraft are well known.
840920	845220	So, if you show up somewhere, there's a press release on where you are.
845220	852360	Well, you'd have a quick look at which aircraft have been flying in the vicinity.
852360	854800	And you probably can easily correlate this.
857460	865700	So, the current state of the art means that this is basically detracting from your privacy, making it a honeypot.
865700	870020	Because you can go to some of the web-tracking websites.
870020	875060	They have a nice filter for all of these programs that I've talked about.
876100	879420	And you can display only these aircraft.
879660	882560	And it's just a handful, right?
882560	885000	And suddenly, these become interesting.
885000	889980	They say they have an interest in safety and security and privacy.
890000	901180	So, there are a lot of aviation geeks and plane spotters who just look at these aircraft in particular, instead of the 10,000 aircraft that are flying at all times.
901180	904220	So, you're really standing out here.
906360	910280	Yeah, so that is basically the technical state of the art.
910800	916460	But , yeah, what happened last year really took all of this mainstream.
916460	918520	And I want to talk about this a little bit.
919020	923280	Because before 2022, this was all a bit niche, right?
923320	927000	Maybe talked about here, but not necessarily very mainstream.
927000	945920	So, the preload was that this Twitter account at the time, called ElonJet, well, for some years it has been tracking Elon Musk's jet, just automatically using crowdsourced data and publishing it on Twitter.
946200	955020	Well, that was started originally actually with data from OpenSky, later with another aggregator with more precise US coverage.
955020	961480	But in January 2022, after a while, well, Elon noticed this and got concerned.
961480	965640	He offered the student $5,000 to take a bot down.
965920	971740	The student allegedly wanted $50,000 or some internship at Tesla or SpaceX.
972060	974660	So, that was refused or ignored.
974980	977900	And then the offer was published.
977900	983180	And, of course, from there it went viral and headlines were made all over the world.
984500	989440	Of course, probably also an example of how not to maintain your privacy.
991680	997560	Elon then, at some point, went and got this privacy ICO address.
999020	1002900	As I hopefully pointed out, this is extremely useless.
1003080	1012220	So, this first year computer science student at the time, it took him an hour to identify the plane again and tweet about it, right?
1012220	1015040	So, not surprising.
1015060	1021900	Safe to say this PIA was also a short-lived thing and now he is flying with his original Transponder ID again.
1023420	1026180	Next up, we had more bots.
1026180	1030100	There were plenty of Twitter bots available on interesting topics.
1030220	1033620	Lots of celebrities were suddenly being tracked.
1034600	1039160	People also noticed how much some people are flying on private jets.
1039940	1043420	There was definitely some concern over the climate there.
1043880	1047020	And a lot of headlines, again, were made.
1047040	1051060	There were also Instagram bots tracking just very specific people.
1051060	1058580	So, in this case, Dana Anobi, at the time, third or second richest person in the world.
1059280	1070080	Every time he flew, there was just an automatic post on Instagram with the information how much CO2 was being used just during their flight.
1070220	1072940	Safe to say, he also didn't like that.
1074020	1086180	It went to the extent that some people had a look at our own aircraft database and we noticed it's being crowdsourced, right?
1086180	1090460	So, you can make some changes to the database within reason.
1091060	1094260	And we noticed there's something odd going on.
1094580	1103680	And we found that somebody tried to change the information about one of Bernard Arnault's aircraft in the database.
1104440	1106440	So, we don't know.
1106440	1110780	I mean, this was an anonymous ProtonMail account trying to do this.
1110960	1121240	And it was noticed eventually, but they were basically trying to pass off as an Air France commercial aircraft instead of the private jet that it was.
1121280	1126060	So, again, we don't know who this was, but I'm sure this was related.
1126060	1130140	Because this was around the time this was very popular in the media.
1132140	1138180	Next step, Elon again, he banned the account and he reinstated it.
1138180	1143620	Then he banned it again over the space of around a week, last December.
1143700	1145980	So, that was also fairly crazy.
1145980	1149160	The whole incident now has its own Wikipedia article.
1150760	1153240	Still, not much changed, right?
1153240	1157280	Technically, we're still at the same level that we've always been.
1157280	1159060	You can track all these aircraft.
1159060	1160780	But other people also got concerned.
1160780	1171740	So, somebody here pointed out on Twitter that Saudi Arabia is pushing in the ICAO to, well, do something about it.
1171740	1178040	Release in some workgroup and enable privacy if you're flying internationally in the long run.
1178340	1181940	So, they claim out a safety issue.
1182020	1186080	And we should be able to fly without anyone knowing.
1188340	1191920	Likewise, in the US, we have several activities.
1191960	1194380	Actually, I've seen yesterday.
1194380	1205160	Jack from Eon Jet posted something on Twitter saying there's now a congressional bill basically asking the FAA to do much more.
1205400	1213820	And look into random transponder ideas, look into hiding aircraft data from the public.
1213900	1218100	Because this has been a real concern to many of them.
1219640	1223060	Europe, of course, now needs to get in on this as well.
1223920	1228440	This is ever so often not necessarily learned from the US.
1229460	1237100	So, we've heard about the fact that they basically want to do the same thing as a privacy ICAO address now in Europe.
1238380	1242940	Notwithstanding the fact that it's technically still entirely useless.
1243940	1248100	So, sum up basically the current state of play.
1248560	1260020	Eon Jet and many other bots remain active on, not necessarily Twitter anymore, but many other cross-sourced platforms.
1260020	1266200	You can go to Mustadon or Meta or Instagram or whatever and still have the same bots.
1266780	1271740	It's several stakeholders, governments, militaries, companies, private people.
1272360	1275860	I mean, they don't want this.
1275880	1280420	We need some discussion whether we want this.
1280420	1283860	Is it useful?
1283860	1287140	Should governments be responsible to us?
1287140	1294460	Is there concern over climate that very rich people are using aircraft?
1294460	1306680	These are open questions and if we have some answers to these questions, then we can maybe start designing a more private and appropriate aviation system.
1307020	1313360	Either way, a lot of lobbying is happening, particularly business association groups.
1313560	1318480	But I haven't seen any honest discussion so far on this.
1318480	1321600	Trade-offs as always must be considered, right?
1321600	1329580	So, air traffic control, they need to know broadly who, at least what aircraft is going when and where.
1330480	1335840	If they know, then typically other people can also know.
1337760	1348620	The only current solution, which is also what Bernardo realized, is sell your private jets if you have them and charter one.
1348640	1359680	Because if you charter or do some fractional sharing of some of the jets, then it becomes much more difficult to know who is actually on a jet at a given time, right?
1359680	1368280	And then at least this automatic programmatic tracking of the aircraft is not trivial anymore and cannot be attributed to you.
1368280	1373760	So, that's not a technical solution, but it's the only one available at the moment.
