WEBVTT 00:07.550 --> 00:09.750 Well, it's great to be here. 00:09.750 --> 00:15.410 I haven't been back to the Voting Village since 2019, and nothing at all has happened since then. 00:16.570 --> 00:31.110 All right, so keynote panel today, timely as ever for Voting Village issues, but this one in particular, you know, right around the corner we have 2024, and it's kind of like the global year of federal or national elections. 00:31.230 --> 00:32.010 Yes, the U.S. 00:32.010 --> 00:46.790 has an election, but in addition to that, we have Mexico, Egypt, Taiwan, that might be interesting, India, Moldova, which has had a little bit of friction lately with Russia, and oh yeah, Russia has an election too. 00:47.110 --> 01:00.330 So what we're going to do today is with our panelists is we're going to cover a global perspective on elections, the various threats that we see, and then what are some of the solutions or things we need to keep an eye out for. 01:00.330 --> 01:07.590 So this is not just going to be a technical conversation, because as we've seen over the last several years, threats to election are not just technical in nature. 01:07.630 --> 01:14.410 We also have, of course, the continuing and growing problem of information disorder, information decay. 01:14.410 --> 01:16.210 And so we'll jump into that. 01:16.610 --> 01:27.330 All right, so we'll go on for 30-40 minutes here, and then we'll open up for some questions that I will hope are respectful. 01:27.550 --> 01:29.170 We'll see how that goes. 01:29.410 --> 01:32.290 You're always respectful here at Voting Village, so we'll be good. 01:32.290 --> 01:34.030 All right, Maja, let's start with you. 01:34.190 --> 01:41.770 You spend a lot of time in Europe lately, looking at the impact of disinformation on democracy and electoral processes. 01:42.010 --> 01:49.270 Understanding that the group here may be US-biased, but we obviously have various perspectives here. 01:49.270 --> 01:53.430 Can you give us your view on threats to elections in Europe? 01:53.650 --> 01:56.050 Sure, I think it's a pleasure being here. 01:56.050 --> 01:58.750 I have a question, like, who's from Europe in here? 01:58.870 --> 01:59.730 Raise your hand. 01:59.830 --> 02:01.010 There we go. 02:01.010 --> 02:01.970 Great. 02:03.130 --> 02:11.310 So we know that we share the same concerns, and indeed 2024 is a big one, and we also have the European elections. 02:11.490 --> 02:13.790 So it's going to be fun. 02:13.790 --> 02:23.790 And also Belarus is on the elections, and I'm coming from Poland, so we're actually starting earlier, and we have the parliamentary elections coming up just on the 15th of October. 02:24.210 --> 02:34.630 And I think, like, what is the difference that you need to understand in between European and the US elections is that we rather don't have e-voting, right? 02:34.630 --> 02:37.810 The only country in Europe that has it is Estonia. 02:38.290 --> 02:44.230 And there were a few trials and check-ups for other countries, but it's not happening. 02:44.230 --> 03:04.790 So, like, one of the concerns that you are having is not really our concern, but how I'm looking at this information, how I work with the Alliance for Europe, we're seeing this information being spread by the operational influence of Russia, but also internal actors to actually change the attitudes of peoples. 03:04.910 --> 03:10.430 And that's how the new technologies are being deployed as well. 03:10.510 --> 03:20.410 And what we're doing right now in Poland, for example, before the elections, we're setting up the ISAC, Information Sharing Analysis Center, to actually research that more and look at it more. 03:20.410 --> 03:25.290 Because also, you know, it's a huge crowd in here of cyber security experts. 03:25.490 --> 03:31.350 In the EU, in most of the countries, there's not that many experts on this matter. 03:31.350 --> 03:39.530 And I think there's a need for more awareness as well, because Poland is a bordering country with Ukraine. 03:39.970 --> 03:47.090 Last year, we got around 10% of our society fluing from Ukraine, right? 03:47.090 --> 03:54.830 Basically, we're a country of 40 million, 47, like more than 4 million Ukrainians are right now in Poland. 03:54.990 --> 03:59.670 And those are the narratives that are being deployed by the bad actors as well. 03:59.670 --> 04:04.770 And it's super easy in this information to use, for example, us versus them narrative. 04:04.770 --> 04:08.850 And just polarizing us, and I think that's a big issue in the US as well. 04:09.110 --> 04:17.870 And those are the biggest concerns of looking at the elections in the EU, and also of the governments. 04:17.870 --> 04:23.310 Because something that you have in the US, it's still trust in the democracy. 04:23.310 --> 04:33.670 In many countries in the EU, or a few countries in the EU, including mine, sometimes it's democracy or the rule of law as being targeted by also populistic governments. 04:34.030 --> 04:35.490 And that's a challenge. 04:35.770 --> 04:53.730 So your takeaway is that because technology is not as prevalent in European elections, save for Estonia, which sidebar here, President Ilves would give me grief every now and then when we were talking about some of the issues we had post-2016 here in the US, 04:53.730 --> 04:57.830 the Russians going after voter registration databases. 04:57.830 --> 05:00.350 And he was constantly saying, you just need to go to mobile voting. 05:00.350 --> 05:01.810 You just need to go to mobile voting. 05:01.810 --> 05:03.630 And I'm trying to see Matt in the back. 05:03.630 --> 05:04.430 There he is. 05:04.470 --> 05:05.070 Yeah. 05:06.110 --> 05:10.930 And then a year after that, he first really pushed me on that. 05:10.930 --> 05:16.870 With their national ID database and the compromise of that system. 05:16.870 --> 05:26.530 So I think it shows that even with those more advanced technologies that are in play in Estonia, they obviously have some challenges as well. 05:26.550 --> 05:40.630 Also want to highlight, though we're not talking about the EU anymore, the UK recently with their database breach, which I don't know if you want to comment on that at all, but I think we're still kind of waiting for the other shoe to drop there. 05:40.630 --> 05:45.910 Who that threat actor might be and really what was the risk? 05:46.450 --> 05:55.510 Yeah, if you look actually what was happening since 2015, because I would say not 2016 was a year, but in 2015, I was working for the previous president of Poland. 05:55.610 --> 06:05.610 And that was the first time when I kind of looked at disinformation, targeted the elections, because there was a year also of the big migration crisis. 06:05.610 --> 06:14.030 And those are the deploys and how Russia, especially in the EU, but also other countries are really getting into the system. 06:14.030 --> 06:19.090 And the election integrity right now is not only happening during the elections itself. 06:19.090 --> 06:25.570 Election days of voting is not only happening during the campaign, but it's actually happening during the whole electoral cycle. 06:25.570 --> 06:27.690 And that's a big threat. 06:27.690 --> 06:29.750 And that's also the terms of the UK, right? 06:29.750 --> 06:39.530 If you look at what happened with the UK, for example, with the Brexit, we're seeing very similar processes happening right now in Poland or even in Germany. 06:40.050 --> 06:42.770 There are different people coming over. 06:42.770 --> 06:50.770 And very, very often, the voting is being built on what you believe in, what you trust. 06:50.770 --> 07:02.370 And if you don't trust your state, your country, your government, or if you just don't trust other people that are out there, that's when the wrong thing is happening, right? 07:02.370 --> 07:08.030 And we are having a lot of darknet research that we're doing as well. 07:08.030 --> 07:15.530 There are narratives deployed, for example, in Poland, saying that Ukrainians will take over Poland. 07:15.530 --> 07:23.370 And that was pretty much happening in the UK as well, saying that the migrants from the other EU countries, including Poles, were taking over the UK. 07:23.370 --> 07:27.850 And there was no specific cyber security measures as well on it. 07:28.010 --> 07:31.050 So I want to come back to the threat actor piece in a minute. 07:31.050 --> 07:37.270 But what we've already talked a lot about today is Russia, Russia as the influence actor. 07:37.270 --> 07:43.390 I kind of see Russia as the Leroy Jenkins of election interference and election influence. 07:43.390 --> 07:47.390 They're very noisy, very, very corruptive. 07:47.390 --> 08:03.310 On the other hand, I think we're seeing an emergence of China in this space, particularly what happened last year, at least what was announced earlier this year and last year, with Chinese government officials bribing and paying off Canadian provincial officials. 08:03.310 --> 08:04.690 And I think we're going to see more of that. 08:04.690 --> 08:13.190 We see a good chunk of that here in the United States at the local level, not quite at the dog catcher races, but local commission. 08:13.190 --> 08:15.030 We are seeing influence there. 08:15.030 --> 08:26.890 And I am interested in having talked to some French officials, what that level of corruption and disinformation and influence the Chinese actors are copying. 08:26.890 --> 08:34.370 And I've heard some of the French intelligence officials call it the Russification of Chinese influence operations. 08:34.370 --> 08:36.070 We'll come back to that in just a minute. 08:36.070 --> 08:40.810 All right, Kendall, so you have spent some time working with the Germans and over there. 08:40.810 --> 08:47.030 And the Germans, I think this year, have what, four of the 16 federal states have their elections. 08:47.310 --> 09:02.050 So why don't you tell us a little bit about what you see in Germany, because whether they're the bellwether, I think France tends to be kind of the European bellwether for European influence, but we have seen activity in and around Germany. 09:02.050 --> 09:11.930 And so talk to us a little bit about what you're seeing there and how some of the social issues come to play, national identity and how that manifests in information influence operations. 09:11.930 --> 09:12.630 Yeah, thanks so much. 09:12.630 --> 09:17.850 I mean, we're seeing some of the same issues that I think we've been talking about here today. 09:17.850 --> 09:19.750 The biggest one being disinformation. 09:20.050 --> 09:30.630 One of the fascinating kind of discoveries that I, you know, in my discussions with them this year, kind of stumbled upon was, you know, electronic voting is largely unconstitutional there. 09:30.630 --> 09:45.290 And reason being, because they found that because you cannot, in their opinion, have meaningful discussions and meaningful public scrutiny on the validity of electronic voting, they've made it unconstitutional, right? 09:45.290 --> 09:49.590 So they really do rely on a paper-based system, which is great. 09:49.590 --> 09:51.150 We, you know, we love that. 09:51.170 --> 09:56.850 But it also changes how targeted the disinformation is, right? 09:56.850 --> 10:00.950 So here, what we're seeing in terms of threat, it's not so much on the voting machines, right? 10:00.950 --> 10:02.450 Because we don't really have them. 10:02.450 --> 10:09.970 It's more on the mechanisms used to make public political figures' viewpoints. 10:09.970 --> 10:13.090 So online campaigning, that type of thing. 10:13.090 --> 10:23.090 And those are really the kind of states, like the foundational systems that we're seeing, that are actually being targeted in terms of the threat. 10:23.090 --> 10:35.350 So doing things like infiltrating a campaign's website, changing the information that is there, flooding the actual discussion processes in terms of just overloading the system. 10:35.350 --> 10:36.750 We're seeing things like that. 10:36.750 --> 10:48.010 And when we start talking about what that does for national identity, one of the discussions that we spent a lot of time on was just sort of Germany's approach to having that national identity. 10:48.010 --> 10:52.830 And what does it mean to be patriotic and be German, right? 10:52.830 --> 10:56.770 Given Germany's past, a lot of individuals there really struggle with that. 10:56.770 --> 11:05.890 One of the questions we ask is whether or not they feel like they want to identify more as being German citizens versus identifying more as being members of the EU. 11:05.890 --> 11:10.410 And a lot of that fluctuates depending on what's going on in the time. 11:10.410 --> 11:25.410 But something that I believe that they're really working earnestly on is trying to strike that balance of how to develop that level of patriotism and pro-German viewpoint without really feeling like you still have to step on eggshells. 11:25.410 --> 11:28.390 I think that's very difficult for a nation. 11:28.470 --> 11:37.350 And I also think that it heavily impacts young people in the sense of how they decide to go about getting involved in the political process. 11:37.510 --> 11:45.530 If it's hard to be patriotic, if it's hard to really be pro-Germany, what do you tell your kids? 11:45.550 --> 11:51.890 How do you motivate the younger generation to really step up to the plate and fight for what they believe in? 11:51.890 --> 12:04.790 I think that's what we're going to see play out over the next couple of years, is how disinformation is being targeted towards not just younger people, but the individuals running for office and the issues that they really stand for. 12:05.310 --> 12:09.910 I'd like to see how that ends up playing out over the next couple of years. 12:10.370 --> 12:17.210 Again, when we talk about the technology used, one of the things we have to remember is Germany is very risk-averse. 12:17.390 --> 12:21.170 Compared to the United States, they are risk-first, innovation-second. 12:21.170 --> 12:25.350 Obviously, here in the States, it's very innovation-focused, risk-second. 12:25.350 --> 12:29.730 They struggle very much with striking that balance. 12:29.730 --> 12:35.450 One of the conversations we had when we were at the German Bundestag was, they still use fax machines. 12:36.050 --> 12:51.150 Phasing those types of systems out in a meaningful way that encourages those individuals to have discussions and still feel safe and build upon some of the values that they find important, I think is going to be a part of that ongoing national discussion. 12:51.170 --> 12:58.870 Under that, how do you situate yourself within that framework as members of the European Union? 12:58.870 --> 13:00.150 Can I just step in? 13:00.150 --> 13:00.610 Yeah , please. 13:00.670 --> 13:02.630 I encourage that, in fact. 13:02.630 --> 13:03.690 Thank you, perfect. 13:03.690 --> 13:12.850 On the patriotic side, I love actually how Kat came in here and said, you're here, you're patriots, and you're here to support your country, right? 13:12.850 --> 13:15.610 That's something that would never happen in Europe. 13:15.670 --> 13:23.170 And that's a challenge that we're having, and I guess it's quite a lot of things that happened in Europe already might happen in here as well. 13:23.170 --> 13:29.110 Because what happened with the patriotism is that the far right took this for themselves, right? 13:29.110 --> 13:33.470 And that's why the stratcom and the counter-narratives are super important as well. 13:33.470 --> 13:38.510 If we look at the information space, it's basically floated by this information. 13:38.510 --> 13:42.350 It's basically put with those narratives, and we are just counterfeiting it. 13:42.350 --> 13:44.990 We are just reacting to it. 13:44.990 --> 13:47.330 And we need to bring those narratives. 13:47.330 --> 13:48.570 And we are patriots. 13:48.570 --> 13:52.410 I'm Polish and I'm patriot, but I'm not the far right, you know? 13:53.010 --> 13:59.770 So I want to come back to some of those solutions in a minute, but let's pull it back here to the United States. 14:00.410 --> 14:09.610 Bryson, in addition to being a unicorn, you have also been advising CISA and other folks for several years on election security issues. 14:09.670 --> 14:16.030 So, you know, we obviously have a more complicated, technologically integrated system of elections here. 14:16.030 --> 14:22.370 We are not Estonia, but we do use machines for casting counting of votes. 14:22.370 --> 14:28.190 So can you talk to us a little bit about what you see on the edge of the 2024 election? 14:28.190 --> 14:35.030 What are those threats that you're seeing, you're worried about, and how do you think these things are going to play out? 14:36.010 --> 14:38.390 So it's Bryson and three lawyers. 14:38.950 --> 14:41.250 I think I represent the average voter. 14:43.530 --> 14:50.550 90% of what I would say, Matt much better phrased it up front as part of the introduction to the voting village. 14:50.550 --> 14:55.950 So I highly encourage you to continue to reference that, because I will do a poor imitation at best. 14:57.970 --> 15:07.250 One of the first things that when I was working with Chris back in 2020, was I saw the issue of there's two aspects here, right? 15:07.250 --> 15:11.690 There's attacking the tech, and then there's attacking the people. 15:12.070 --> 15:13.510 And the two go together. 15:14.030 --> 15:23.550 And one of the first things that I saw as a challenge for us is, we knew in 2020 paper ballots were going to be more of what was going to be a part of that process. 15:23.610 --> 15:26.650 And what we didn't know is how long that was going to take. 15:27.150 --> 15:31.770 You might be surprised, Americans do not have a long attention span. 15:33.810 --> 15:37.730 Therefore, we need results to come in quickly. 15:37.730 --> 15:40.730 And that's a system that is not going to guarantee quick results. 15:40.730 --> 15:41.410 So what, right? 15:41.410 --> 15:44.590 At the end of the day, we're more confident we're going to be secure. 15:44.590 --> 15:50.950 However, because of that attention span, that leaves an opportunity for a narrative to be constructed. 15:50.950 --> 15:53.090 That is a void that could be filled. 15:53.130 --> 15:59.930 And so my view is since 2016, the US government had been doing a lot of work on this. 15:59.930 --> 16:06.810 It's first thing worth noting, here in the United States, the federal government does not directly run elections. 16:07.250 --> 16:14.850 There are around 9,000 jurisdictions all at the community level, run by a 75-year-old grandmother named Eleanor. 16:15.510 --> 16:17.630 That's who runs your elections. 16:17.630 --> 16:18.310 Can I jump in? 16:18.310 --> 16:19.110 You absolutely can. 16:19.110 --> 16:23.090 All right, who do we have here that's a state or local election official? 16:23.090 --> 16:24.730 I know some of the Maricopa guys are here. 16:24.730 --> 16:27.830 All right, let's give them a round of applause. 16:31.830 --> 16:41.210 So the hell these folks have been through over the last several years is absolutely unpatriotic. 16:41.790 --> 16:53.210 And my concern, and I said this on a show the other day, is that this is effectively manifesting in voter suppression of another type. 16:53.210 --> 16:57.850 Because we have election officials that are getting drummed out of the workforce. 16:57.850 --> 17:05.690 We have historical levels of openings and open headcount, FTEs, in these roles. 17:05.690 --> 17:10.510 And so what does that mean when you have fewer people to man the polls, to work the polls? 17:11.010 --> 17:14.070 You're not going to have as many polls open. 17:14.070 --> 17:17.690 You're not going to have as many opportunities to participate in democracy. 17:17.690 --> 17:27.570 So I personally find one of the biggest threats right now is the constant harassment of election officials. 17:27.570 --> 17:35.250 There's kind of a knock-on effect here that we are seeing some folks that are filling these positions. 17:35.530 --> 17:42.050 Many of them are of the right inclination and motivation, incentives to take those jobs. 17:42.050 --> 17:43.290 Others are not. 17:43.570 --> 17:53.590 And we are now seeing, I think, a greater level of insider risk to elections from those that may be pursuing that role for ideological purposes. 17:53.590 --> 18:06.730 You know, I always felt that the technical issues around elections and election security, it was simply an engineering problem. 18:07.430 --> 18:09.770 You address the vulnerabilities. 18:09.770 --> 18:12.390 You upgrade systems. 18:12.950 --> 18:15.510 They're imminently fixable. 18:15.510 --> 18:22.790 But all these other human-driven issues are much, much harder and take a broader set of people. 18:22.790 --> 18:30.550 It's not about how much money the federal government can throw in grant dollars and how quickly you can put it on contract at the state or local level. 18:30.710 --> 18:33.930 We have a range of challenges here. 18:34.030 --> 18:36.690 I'll let Bryson finish before I interrupt him again. 18:37.050 --> 18:45.150 Again, I just want to say thank you to those state and local folks that are out there every day ensuring that our democracy, that we're able to vote. 18:45.150 --> 18:48.550 This thing, this project, this experiment keeps going forward. 18:48.950 --> 18:49.210 Back to you. 18:49.210 --> 18:50.610 To summarize, right? 18:50.610 --> 18:52.750 This ties to 2024. 18:53.050 --> 18:55.210 The threat is from within. 18:55.430 --> 18:58.650 The system is being attacked from within. 18:58.870 --> 19:04.050 And that sounds abstract, except it is people. 19:04.050 --> 19:05.690 And I'm pointing because you raised your hand, right? 19:05.690 --> 19:06.870 It is people. 19:06.870 --> 19:08.850 They are coming to their houses. 19:09.010 --> 19:10.970 They're hunting them down. 19:11.050 --> 19:12.360 It is personal. 19:12.810 --> 19:14.830 Can you imagine being in that situation? 19:14.830 --> 19:21.170 I mean, it's like out of a science fiction novel where it sounds, again, they're being drummed out like you lost a job. 19:21.690 --> 19:26.910 They're being harassed at a personal level and their family is being harassed at a personal level. 19:27.070 --> 19:28.190 And here's the thing. 19:29.690 --> 19:33.410 Dots are dots, but when there are a lot of them that draw a line, that's a pattern. 19:34.730 --> 19:38.110 The system is being attacked from within by a system. 19:38.810 --> 19:42.970 There is money being poured into organizing and attacking this. 19:42.970 --> 19:44.690 And I know you're seeing that in Europe too. 19:44.690 --> 19:47.010 This is part of what you and I were talking about beforehand. 19:47.010 --> 19:50.670 There is literally forces aligned that are coming after this. 19:50.670 --> 19:52.030 I made the joke to her before. 19:52.030 --> 19:55.210 I was like, do you remember when liberal democracy wasn't a question? 19:57.290 --> 20:00.030 That's no longer an assumption you can make. 20:00.210 --> 20:02.230 There are people that each of you know. 20:02.230 --> 20:03.490 I guarantee you that you know. 20:03.490 --> 20:05.610 You have your racist aunt on Facebook. 20:05.610 --> 20:07.330 That's why you don't go to Facebook anymore. 20:07.370 --> 20:10.070 They don't believe in the system anymore. 20:11.450 --> 20:14.530 One other thing, since we're also giving recognition and applause, right? 20:14.530 --> 20:16.630 I worked with Chris in 2020. 20:16.690 --> 20:18.190 And we tried really hard. 20:18.310 --> 20:20.990 I highly recommend pointing to the panel I pulled together. 20:20.990 --> 20:27.690 It was the first multiple federal agency panel that had ever come together and publicly talked about everything they've been doing since 2016. 20:27.790 --> 20:35.450 It was DEF CON Voting Village 2020, NSA, Cyber Command, State Department, Election Assistance Commission, CISA, and FBI. 20:35.850 --> 20:36.750 Check it out. 20:36.750 --> 20:43.810 But the thing I want to really go here is, it is easy to stand up on a stage and say what you would do. 20:44.550 --> 20:48.150 It is much harder when you're actually in that system. 20:48.810 --> 20:52.890 Chris was a political appointee in 2020 in the Trump administration. 20:53.250 --> 20:58.930 And he not only carried with integrity, he showed character and courage to call it out. 20:59.030 --> 21:01.150 And I think that also deserves a round of applause. 21:01.150 --> 21:03.010 You cannot be recognized enough for that. 21:08.020 --> 21:08.900 Thank you. 21:08.900 --> 21:12.300 No, and just on that too, because, I mean, you went through a lot. 21:12.300 --> 21:13.180 I mean, I was there. 21:13.180 --> 21:14.560 I lived right next to him. 21:14.560 --> 21:17.880 And I cannot tell you the personal cost there was at that time. 21:18.300 --> 21:19.260 That is courage. 21:19.260 --> 21:20.560 I'm an army officer, okay? 21:20.560 --> 21:21.400 I've been shot at. 21:21.400 --> 21:23.180 I have seen things around this world. 21:23.180 --> 21:28.020 That is easier than to stand up against the whole system like you did. 21:28.020 --> 21:30.600 Showing up with a bottle of Yellow Spot helped. 21:31.100 --> 21:33.280 That was much appreciated. 21:34.340 --> 21:42.860 So let me kind of, as a moderator, take a little bit of personal privilege here and give you a bit of my view of what we're looking at in 2024. 21:43.280 --> 21:44.860 I think you're absolutely right. 21:44.860 --> 21:53.280 I think there is a significant threat of the caller is inside the house issue. 21:53.280 --> 21:55.000 And I'll come back to that in just a second. 21:55.000 --> 22:00.800 But I continue to think that we have significant and grave threats from foreign actors. 22:01.060 --> 22:03.580 I look at motivations. 22:03.580 --> 22:07.920 And so this is where strategic intelligence and threat modeling comes in. 22:08.420 --> 22:11.880 We know that there are systems that have vulnerabilities out there. 22:11.880 --> 22:16.350 The existence of a vulnerability doesn't mean it's been exploited or someone has the capability, of course. 22:16.720 --> 22:24.700 But I look at what Putin is thinking right now about his continued war in Ukraine. 22:24.800 --> 22:38.140 And how one of the main things, in addition, beyond the Ukrainians' resilience and ability to defend themselves, is the West's continued support of Ukraine. 22:38.140 --> 22:45.980 And might, if there's a different someone in the White House, might they pull back that support and that aid? 22:45.980 --> 22:50.840 And how would that affect Russia's ability? 22:50.840 --> 22:52.500 So what does that mean? 22:52.500 --> 22:54.180 And how might they act on that? 22:54.180 --> 23:06.540 Might we see more of the continued drumbeat of disinformation that we've seen since the 2014 post-Maidan events in Ukraine? 23:06.540 --> 23:11.300 We also could see, I think, more of that technical mischief. 23:11.300 --> 23:15.460 And I'm not one of those that is... 23:16.640 --> 23:27.600 I still think that it is a significant red line to get into an actual process and affect the casting, counting, and certification of the votes. 23:27.600 --> 23:37.880 But getting in and mucking up election night reporting to cause panic and chaos so that conspiracy theories spin out of control about late night dumps or whatever they call it. 23:37.880 --> 23:40.300 Those are the things that I continue to worry about. 23:40.300 --> 23:41.500 Not just from the Russians. 23:41.500 --> 23:45.580 I think the Chinese similarly now have capabilities. 23:45.580 --> 23:46.600 They have motivations. 23:46.600 --> 23:55.620 I think with President Xi's continued eyes towards Taiwan and some of the saber rattling that we're hearing with friction with the West. 23:55.620 --> 24:10.720 And then if you look at the Volt typhoon reporting out of Microsoft about pre-positioning for conflict, I think the natural extension of that is that they may have the ability or desire to get into our democratic processes. 24:10.720 --> 24:11.680 All right, bringing it back home. 24:11.680 --> 24:13.460 And I'll just interject real quickly. 24:13.460 --> 24:18.580 You don't have to hack a system to undermine confidence in the system. 24:18.820 --> 24:22.400 You don't have to technically compromise something. 24:22.400 --> 24:26.280 All you have to do is get people to not believe what it is. 24:27.180 --> 24:29.580 That's the threat beyond the technical piece, right? 24:29.580 --> 24:31.000 We have vulnerabilities. 24:31.000 --> 24:38.680 I mean, it is amusing having worked with the voting bills for a long time where it was us constantly hammering the voting machine manufacturers. 24:38.940 --> 24:44.780 And now it's like we're kind of on their side, even though there's still problems, because there's this bigger risk we're all facing. 24:44.800 --> 24:45.660 Sorry, Kendall. 24:45.660 --> 24:46.380 Yeah, go ahead. 24:46.380 --> 24:52.340 So if you don't mind, I want to take a bit of a different approach and maybe ask a question. 24:52.400 --> 24:58.160 Bryson, when I hear you talk, when I hear Chris talk, when I hear you talk, like you hear so much passion, right? 24:58.160 --> 25:09.620 And I think when we start talking about democracy and how to protect it and how to examine the threats and how to promulgate solutions to it, a lot of it has to do with how do you get people to care? 25:09.800 --> 25:22.060 And I think one of the interesting questions that I ask when we're examining different cultures and different nations and how they go about their election process is, what are the tools used to sort of protect those systems? 25:22.120 --> 25:41.480 And how do you educate, again, the people, younger generations who are going to matriculate and become positive members of those societies to care and take democracy into their own hands and say, you know what, dammit, I'm going to work at the polls and this is my country too. 25:41.480 --> 25:43.440 And it is up to me to protect it. 25:43.680 --> 25:46.540 And just generationally, we see so much differences there. 25:46.540 --> 25:50.480 And I would just love to know a little bit more about what it is that kind of keeps you going. 25:50.480 --> 25:57.300 And if it was that civics class that so many of you guys had in a different lens than what I had. 26:01.140 --> 26:03.360 So... this is a complicated question. 26:03.360 --> 26:04.140 I've studied... 26:04.140 --> 26:04.880 Didn't mean to throw that. 26:04.880 --> 26:05.360 No, no, no. 26:05.360 --> 26:06.660 It's a good question. 26:07.840 --> 26:09.180 I've taken a look at this. 26:09.180 --> 26:13.140 And I don't think I'm going to meet your expectations for an answer here. 26:13.380 --> 26:18.480 But with the Aspen Institute and the Commission on Information Disorder, we looked in part at this. 26:18.480 --> 26:29.900 And I think one of the common observations is that civics education and opportunities to engage civically have eroded over the last couple decades. 26:29.900 --> 26:46.620 And so you may not have the social studies and civics education in K through 12 that give you the foundational understanding of how the United States came about and what it took to get to this current form of liberal democracy. 26:46.620 --> 26:55.980 And I think a reintroduction of that could certainly, I think, go some degree towards achieving that. 26:56.240 --> 26:57.200 Yeah. 26:57.480 --> 27:00.480 Happy to get to both of you, actually. 27:00.480 --> 27:02.760 Because I'm super passionate about it. 27:02.760 --> 27:05.220 And indeed, it's very important to me. 27:05.220 --> 27:05.820 And why? 27:05.820 --> 27:07.060 Because I feel it here. 27:07.480 --> 27:15.980 And if we think about new technology, if we think about this information, but mostly if we think about our future, it's coming to us here. 27:16.260 --> 27:26.400 And one of the strongest emotions that is being deployed by the bad actors, whether they are the foreign actors or the internal ones, is fear. 27:26.680 --> 27:30.020 We are in fear for the past few years. 27:30.020 --> 27:31.340 We had a pandemic. 27:31.500 --> 27:34.120 You know, in Europe, we have a war in Ukraine. 27:34.340 --> 27:40.380 We have right now AI as one of another emerging fears, which I believe that's actually taken for good, right? 27:40.380 --> 27:40.980 Yep. 27:40.980 --> 27:44.220 And I want other emotions to see there. 27:44.220 --> 27:55.340 Like, I want those young kids not to be afraid, but rather want to be passionate about their future, about the EU, about the US, about our world. 27:55.460 --> 28:00.400 And when we think about it, and if I may just go back on the China issue, right? 28:00.400 --> 28:08.180 We're talking about EU and US and kind of like this dimension, there's Russia, but like that's not the world we live anymore in. 28:08.180 --> 28:14.140 And I think that we also need to realize that the global situation in the world is changing. 28:14.140 --> 28:16.320 The global South is there. 28:16.320 --> 28:22.320 It's emerging and it's heavily deployed by China and by Russia. 28:22.440 --> 28:28.440 Africa right now, it's one of the biggest, you know, regions being deployed with this information. 28:28.440 --> 28:33.920 I've been in Kenya talking with the activists in there and the governments because they just had elections last year. 28:33.920 --> 28:35.760 And did you hear about the Tim Horta? 28:37.080 --> 28:46.360 The Tim Horta, it's one of the biggest investigations that were made by the more than 30 different media outlets. 28:46.360 --> 28:59.860 And it's a company, Israeli company, that was offering the services for 1 million euros to change the elections, then investigated more than 30 presidential elections all over the world. 28:59.860 --> 29:07.380 They said there also was happening in Europe, but they didn't have enough of the details to tell which countries. 29:07.500 --> 29:09.900 But that happened, right? 29:09.900 --> 29:16.260 The guy like Jorge, that's how they named it, he's already in the first pages of Der Spiegel and others. 29:16.260 --> 29:25.620 But I mean, you know better than I do that it's super easy to just set up the bunch of votes, accounts that are looking illegitimate. 29:25.620 --> 29:27.360 And that's what the bad actors are doing. 29:27.360 --> 29:29.500 And they're just giving the hashtags. 29:29.500 --> 29:30.960 They're just giving those emotions. 29:30.960 --> 29:32.520 They're giving the fears on us. 29:32.520 --> 29:34.840 We're going into the Internet and we are afraid. 29:35.000 --> 29:39.160 And that's why I'm here and why I'm doing all of that. 29:39.660 --> 29:41.380 Bryson, do you want to chime in? 29:42.220 --> 29:45.520 This country has a lot of issues, right? 29:45.820 --> 29:47.500 You pick your axis. 29:48.280 --> 29:49.820 I've been all over the world. 29:49.820 --> 29:53.420 The quality of life here is still some of the best you will find anywhere. 29:53.700 --> 29:58.880 Two and a half billion people on this planet don't have access to clean water even, right? 29:58.880 --> 30:01.460 You want to talk about Maslow's hierarchy or worrying about things? 30:01.620 --> 30:08.600 You, we as Americans, I say you because I actually did grow up here, don't worry about those kinds of things. 30:08.600 --> 30:10.420 The rest of the world does. 30:10.620 --> 30:14.900 And so I'll say I actually, the opposite of the civics lesson, I saw the dark side. 30:14.960 --> 30:17.120 I grew up in East Germany, the civic union. 30:17.940 --> 30:24.180 You might remember them from your classes as not the beacons of freedom and personal individualism. 30:24.580 --> 30:28.680 And so I saw what humanity could be and what could do. 30:29.180 --> 30:34.660 And that compelled me to join the army here in the United States because I wanted to be a patriot. 30:34.660 --> 30:36.840 I wanted to believe in a higher purpose. 30:36.840 --> 30:39.400 Of course, the military has its own faults too, right? 30:39.400 --> 30:44.260 But I'm just saying, I think we take it for granted what we have and what we're fighting for. 30:44.440 --> 30:53.080 And so that's my passion is my whole career has been a sense of service because I lived and grew up where there was nothing. 30:56.010 --> 30:57.390 Just dawn on me. 30:57.390 --> 31:01.990 You are what the show The Americans was based on. 31:01.990 --> 31:03.090 You're a sleep radio. 31:04.070 --> 31:05.390 I've known you all this time. 31:05.390 --> 31:06.290 You've been hiding it. 31:06.290 --> 31:09.750 You can test me by pushing a cup of coffee off and I catch it immediately. 31:10.190 --> 31:14.650 So let me kind of close out the current threat to release to 2024. 31:14.650 --> 31:16.470 And like I said, bring it back home. 31:16.470 --> 31:29.950 One of the things that I'm worried about is that there were lessons learned from 2020 efforts, observing foreign actors doing things, as well as information that's come across and publicly available over the last couple of years. 31:29.950 --> 31:49.530 I don't know if Alex is here, Halderman, but I think we may see some ideological lone wolf type actor, hacktivist type person, look at something like Alex's report or other systems and just cause a wobble in the machine. 31:49.730 --> 31:56.230 Not actually try to change the outcome of an election or overturn anything, but just say, see, look, I told you. 31:56.230 --> 31:57.510 See, we told you. 31:57.510 --> 32:04.770 Therefore, the entire system is not valid. 32:04.770 --> 32:05.730 Invalid. 32:05.750 --> 32:13.890 And those are the sorts of things I think are going to manifest into a thousand different conspiracy theories that are going to spin out of control. 32:13.890 --> 32:38.670 I will say, though, that there is one aspect of social media chaos that might actually damp down or dampen some of these viral disinformation and conspiracy theories, because they've seemingly kind of sorted out into very narrow ideological spectrums. 32:38.670 --> 32:44.550 And you go to one platform because there are people there that share your beliefs. 32:44.550 --> 32:52.070 And that's, I think, one of the biggest shame of what's happened, in my view, with Twitter is how it is not that global public square anymore. 32:52.730 --> 33:06.070 Now, what that means to me is that we may see conspiracy theories pop up that burn really fast and really hot, but they don't have staying power because they just burn through the population kind of like Ebola would. 33:06.470 --> 33:17.870 And on the other hand, I am worried about TikTok as a very broad platform that can be manipulated, not necessarily just intentionally by the Chinese, but by other actors that can get on there. 33:17.870 --> 33:28.570 That's where you could see a COVID-like disinformation or conspiracy theory, I think, burn very broad and slowly and deeply and corruptively. 33:28.610 --> 33:30.350 So those are the sorts of things that I'm worried about. 33:30.350 --> 33:30.810 All right. 33:30.810 --> 33:34.170 So now we're going to take a little bit of a leap forward. 33:34.170 --> 33:43.490 And since, Maya, you broke the seal and talked about generative AI, in DC, at least, these are a lot of the questions I'm getting from policymakers. 33:44.150 --> 33:50.590 What, how should we think about the threat of generative AI in disinformation and other means for the 2024 election? 33:50.590 --> 33:53.290 So, Kendall, we'll start with you, and then we'll work our way down. 33:54.590 --> 33:57.690 So trying to take the lawyer hat off, right? 33:57.690 --> 34:02.850 Because one of the things I also do, I'm a cybersecurity and data privacy attorney at a firm in Boston. 34:03.830 --> 34:11.790 So part of where I see the issue is it eroding people's motivation to sort of question what they're looking at. 34:11.790 --> 34:19.130 We talked earlier about kind of getting people to care, getting people to understand the institutions that they use to actually carry out the democracy. 34:20.050 --> 34:39.710 And just my generation, personally, that relies heavily on chat GPT and that type of thing, people are using it as a means to take certain shortcuts, which I think down the line, the impact that it's going to have on critical thinking and actually kind of working through some of these tougher issues. 34:39.710 --> 34:43.110 I think we're going to see some problems in that space. 34:43.250 --> 34:56.710 I think on the legal front, kind of putting the lawyer hat back on, you know, we saw a big issue, I want to say a couple months ago, where you had an attorney that had an entire brief written by chat GPT and did not look at the cases. 34:56.710 --> 34:58.290 They were completely fictitious. 34:58.330 --> 34:59.890 That was crazy. 35:00.510 --> 35:08.210 And so sort of where I see the issues are just people kind of, again, getting information just kind of handed to them without questioning it. 35:08.210 --> 35:13.850 And sort of the second tier of analysis of here's what I'm getting. 35:13.850 --> 35:15.690 Does it make sense? 35:15.770 --> 35:17.730 And what is this based off of? 35:17.730 --> 35:20.230 That's where I see the biggest issue, in my opinion. 35:20.230 --> 35:38.290 I think when we get back to sort of talking about education a bit, you know, being trained to think logically and question things is not something that comes as a foundational part of today's education, unless you go and pursue engineering or a STEM field, 35:38.290 --> 35:40.110 or you end up going to law school. 35:40.110 --> 35:44.170 And I'm sure there's, you know, philosophy and some other disciplines will also have that. 35:44.170 --> 35:48.530 And I think that causes a very big problem because it makes it easier to divide people. 35:48.530 --> 35:54.870 It makes it easier to convince you that what you're seeing is real and true and God's honest truth. 35:55.010 --> 36:01.690 And so those are those are some of the areas that I that I see problematic, you know, that I see to be kind of problematic down the line. 36:01.690 --> 36:04.830 I'm sure there's a host of others, but just that's that's right. 36:04.830 --> 36:09.590 I would say my unique view would sort of kind of center on. 36:09.630 --> 36:11.090 All right, Maya. 36:11.290 --> 36:15.110 Yeah, I find, like, first of all, I'm a fan of AI. 36:15.110 --> 36:18.890 I think that it really can do a lot of good things. 36:19.230 --> 36:20.790 And that's the thing. 36:20.790 --> 36:33.490 We need to start to make it good things and put a lot of money into actually deploying AI to the level of the good tech instead of the bad tech, right? 36:33.490 --> 36:35.990 Because that's the approach. 36:35.990 --> 36:38.210 Which values are we putting it in? 36:38.490 --> 36:43.470 If, as a lot of people are saying, right, AI right now, it's like our babies. 36:43.750 --> 36:49.050 So if we're talking about education, that's how we need to educate it as well. 36:49.270 --> 36:54.970 If we're programming and making an AI, we need to teach it our values. 36:54.970 --> 37:00.830 So if we are a society with fear, we're going to build the AI with fear as well. 37:00.890 --> 37:02.710 And that's not something we want to. 37:03.530 --> 37:04.650 So that's one. 37:04.650 --> 37:08.890 And the other one is the legislation and basically how we're looking at the future. 37:09.170 --> 37:16.190 Like, I believe that one of the biggest challenges we face, also on the political level, is that we are all the time reactive. 37:16.190 --> 37:18.550 We are not thinking about the future, what can happen. 37:18.550 --> 37:20.190 We are not building scenarios. 37:20.350 --> 37:21.890 AI is nothing new. 37:21.890 --> 37:24.650 We knew it's going to emerge and it's going to emerge farther. 37:24.650 --> 37:31.750 But only how we are working on it is like looking at how it looks like right now. 37:31.750 --> 37:47.850 I would like to have a group of experts, basically, sitting together and thinking of what we can do in the future, how we can better, how we can make AI better, how we can pour better money into it instead of giving it to the bad actors, because bad actors are also employing it, 37:47.850 --> 37:48.470 right? 37:48.470 --> 37:50.550 Got it. 37:50.550 --> 37:51.260 Bryson. 37:51.850 --> 37:52.520 Iran. 37:53.090 --> 37:54.790 We haven't talked about Iran. 37:54.910 --> 38:01.690 First, I would say Iran is the same as Russia in a regional power that's primary strategy is chaos. 38:01.910 --> 38:08.960 The reason I'm using Iran as an example tied to artificial intelligence is I remember when Iran first started to try to do disinformation campaigns. 38:09.590 --> 38:10.990 They were bad. 38:10.990 --> 38:12.050 They were horrible. 38:12.050 --> 38:17.490 They were the Nigerian scam email to send 10 million dollars to a prince. 38:18.050 --> 38:23.630 Because they didn't have the language capabilities built up and the intelligence services to be able to effectively do them. 38:23.650 --> 38:25.770 Artificial intelligence removes that. 38:26.330 --> 38:31.130 I type in my language, native English spits out on the backside. 38:31.530 --> 38:32.950 The second part of this. 38:33.630 --> 38:49.910 Disinformation and those kinds of campaigns are effectively marketing, which means from a system perspective, the better, the more statistical data-driven insights I can have, the quicker I can recognize what messages go viral to what populations and I can have a technographic profile that I can exploit. 38:50.090 --> 38:57.710 Well, that can be a machine feeding a machine with looking at that data and doing that because there's no consequence to getting caught. 38:58.250 --> 38:59.670 There's no consequence. 39:00.190 --> 39:05.110 We can try to shut things down, but as we've noted, Twitter isn't exactly helping with that. 39:05.110 --> 39:07.030 Sorry , X, are we really even calling it that? 39:07.030 --> 39:08.290 What the fuck is that? 39:09.130 --> 39:13.270 Tying it back into attacks though, so I can now do this at scale. 39:13.270 --> 39:16.470 Well, what's the most common initial access vector to hack somebody? 39:17.050 --> 39:17.770 Email. 39:18.570 --> 39:22.930 Well, email requires a human to look at things, read a language, and decide to do something. 39:23.390 --> 39:24.790 We've just solved that problem. 39:24.790 --> 39:26.930 That's what AI is doing from a threat perspective. 39:29.130 --> 39:31.510 All right, let's open it up for a couple questions. 39:31.510 --> 39:33.570 I saw a hand go up there. 39:38.460 --> 39:39.640 Oh, louder. 39:39.640 --> 39:40.840 It is loud in here. 39:41.420 --> 39:43.040 All right, let's go here. 39:43.920 --> 39:45.060 All right, thank you. 39:45.060 --> 39:53.560 So I really share your concern about poll workers and trust in the process, because if we don't trust the outcome, it doesn't matter if it's right at the end of the day. 39:53.760 --> 40:02.140 And in Vegas, I'm thinking there's processes here where I don't distrust my dealer or the pit boss or the machine, the slot machine, right? 40:02.140 --> 40:04.480 Somehow I just figure that's worked out, there's a process. 40:05.040 --> 40:16.060 Can we do the same thing for our processes for voting, where the people is like, we have people who are human who may have their own motivations, but we don't care, because it's a secure process with insecure people running it. 40:16.060 --> 40:25.940 Can we get to the point where I feel comfortable volunteering to be a poll worker, because I know there's enough checks and balances and people understand the process is that I don't have to trust you because I know the system works. 40:26.140 --> 40:27.780 Is that an approach? 40:27.780 --> 40:28.780 And maybe I'm just ignorant. 40:28.780 --> 40:30.180 We already have these things, and I know that. 40:30.180 --> 40:34.780 But we've had these video cameras where people are like, look, they're taking boxes under the table or whatever. 40:34.840 --> 40:37.500 Can we fix that part so people can trust that? 40:38.600 --> 40:47.340 I think, so I'll give you my view of this first, and then let the panel chime in. 40:47.920 --> 40:51.680 We can do a lot, technically. 40:52.300 --> 40:55.340 We can do a lot to shore up vulnerabilities in the system. 40:55.340 --> 41:07.480 In fact, as Bryson was talking about earlier, the good work state and local election officials did to roll out more voter verifiable paper audit trails for the 2020 election. 41:07.480 --> 41:17.660 According to the Center for Election Innovation and Research, the 2016 election, it was fewer than 80% of votes cast had a paper ballot associated with it. 41:17.660 --> 41:31.000 By the time we hit 2020, due in part to rolling out or getting rid of some of these DRE systems without the sidecar paper due to the increase in mail-in balloting, it was around 95%. 41:31.580 --> 41:44.180 And I think one thing we can do, again, if we are purely approaching this from a technical perspective, is continue to get as close to 100% as we can, understanding that due to accessibility reasons, we'll always have DREs throughout the ecosystem. 41:44.880 --> 41:56.680 All that said, there are threat actors on the other side that have incentive structures of power, greed, or power, influence, and money that will continue to introduce doubt, despite all available evidence. 41:56.680 --> 41:59.020 And again, this is what we're talking about happening in 2020. 41:59.160 --> 42:21.340 So, yes, we can cram down as much as possible on some of the trust issues associated with elections, but there are always going to be bad actors out there that, for one reason or another, are going to take any little, again, wobble in the system and turn that into some fanciful tale that will continue forever. 42:21.700 --> 42:22.580 Forever. 42:22.740 --> 42:29.880 There always will be, and it's on us, actually, to make sure that we are louder than them. 42:30.320 --> 42:32.980 And that's the main thing, because it's a great question. 42:32.980 --> 42:45.260 What is happening in Poland right now is that both opposition and the government, government that is responsible for the elections on the 15th of October, are saying there are threats for the integrity of the elections. 42:45.500 --> 42:46.500 I mean, come on, right? 42:46.500 --> 42:47.780 But why they are doing it? 42:47.780 --> 42:53.100 Because if they're going to lose, they may say like, you know, what happened in 2020 in the US? 42:53.100 --> 43:06.480 And what happened in 2020 in the US is that before that, as far as I'm concerned, you were rather having like one thing that no matter whether you are Republican or Democrat, you are trusting within the system. 43:06.480 --> 43:08.680 You trust that democracy is working. 43:09.480 --> 43:14.060 And even though those machines are working great, right? 43:14.060 --> 43:18.520 They were checked, they were hacked or tried to hack, and everything is perfect. 43:19.420 --> 43:23.260 The issue is that there is this disinformation threat. 43:23.260 --> 43:34.360 And there's not enough proper information to go to people and tell them it is safe, it's trusted. 43:34.420 --> 43:45.220 And it's not that something that we should just like, you know, do a big elaborate, but rather make a simple communication campaign on making sure and showing that it's trustful. 43:45.500 --> 43:54.900 Just to build on this real quick, one thing that I think we can do is, from your point of stratcom, strategic communications, increase transparency into the process. 43:54.900 --> 44:09.140 So some of the stuff that Stephen Richard's been doing in Maricopa County, and I know some of the guys here, of opening up the process to the outside, to come view it, to track it, to provide transparency on the process. 44:09.740 --> 44:12.600 Take away the opportunities for everyone else. 44:12.600 --> 44:14.240 Set the narrative and you go drive that. 44:14.580 --> 44:14.800 All right. 44:14.800 --> 44:18.160 Yeah, so I would, you know, it's a great point, a great question. 44:18.260 --> 44:19.400 Something to kind of keep in mind. 44:19.400 --> 44:20.780 You guys hear me in the back, by the way? 44:20.780 --> 44:22.440 I'm trying to speak a little louder without being... 44:23.680 --> 44:24.320 I know, right? 44:24.320 --> 44:25.220 Party on the left. 44:25.220 --> 44:25.740 Yeah. 44:26.540 --> 44:27.000 Okay. 44:27.000 --> 44:28.620 So I'm going to try to speak a little louder. 44:28.740 --> 44:39.300 One of the things that I try to remind people is that, you know, I can stick 10 of the most brilliant engineering technical minds in a room and say, how do we fix this problem? 44:39.300 --> 44:39.840 Right? 44:40.180 --> 44:41.580 We've got a lot of that here. 44:41.780 --> 44:43.000 Here's what happens. 44:43.100 --> 44:48.620 There's always some, pardon my French, there's always some asshole lawyer that says, illegal. 44:48.620 --> 44:49.440 Right? 44:49.440 --> 45:04.160 And so part of what we try to work on and try to find our way around is this sort of tethering of protection and freedom with, like, the legal foundry, you know, like, how do we navigate those type of boundaries? 45:04.160 --> 45:04.320 Right? 45:04.320 --> 45:11.120 We have this nasty patchwork privacy system at the state level that makes it really hard. 45:11.120 --> 45:11.700 Right? 45:11.800 --> 45:13.080 Incredibly difficult. 45:13.080 --> 45:23.900 And I think part of that is one of the ways that Germany has actually made it at least a little bit easier because they have taken such a, like, an extreme risk-based approach. 45:23.900 --> 45:34.340 But here in the States, it's really tough to protect some of these institutions and some of these processes because so many of the great things that we would want to do would be super illegal. 45:34.340 --> 45:34.800 Right? 45:34.800 --> 45:44.460 And so at the state level and into at the national level as well, trying to figure out, well, what's the best process we can implement to sort of make that smoother? 45:44.460 --> 45:49.420 And as we've seen, just trying to get federal privacy rights, it's a very long road ahead. 45:49.900 --> 45:50.180 All right. 45:50.180 --> 45:50.840 But it's cool. 45:50.840 --> 45:53.000 Bryson, you get to close this out here. 45:53.320 --> 45:54.440 Go be a poll worker. 45:54.720 --> 45:55.480 Volunteer. 45:55.480 --> 45:56.660 Be a part of the solution. 45:56.660 --> 45:57.680 Be there at the ground. 45:57.680 --> 45:57.900 Right? 45:57.900 --> 46:00.100 A lot of this is high-level stuff. 46:01.820 --> 46:04.580 Go get your hands in it. 46:04.880 --> 46:06.200 See it for yourself. 46:06.600 --> 46:12.700 Then tying that back to government is accountable to you and that's the transparency and the communication they need to be pushing. 46:12.700 --> 46:15.920 Now you're a part of that because you're seeing it at the bottom and you're seeing it at the top. 46:15.980 --> 46:21.760 In 2020, I think we had 93% coverage with the states from the federal level, which we had never had that before. 46:21.760 --> 46:24.880 And that was something nobody even knew we were doing that in that kind of collaboration. 46:25.140 --> 46:29.840 Then the final piece, which was in Matt's presentation, that's why risk-limited auditing is what it is. 46:29.840 --> 46:35.420 We have a data science approach to being able to statistically sample to then be able to show what we learned. 46:35.420 --> 46:41.720 And if there is the potential of fraud or abuse, we can prove it and we can understand the extent of it. 46:41.720 --> 46:46.520 Because just because something is slightly broken doesn't mean the whole system is. 46:47.200 --> 46:48.160 All right, folks. 46:48.260 --> 46:49.440 I think that's it. 46:49.440 --> 46:52.580 I apologize that we don't have more time for questions. 46:52.580 --> 46:56.140 Please send your complaints to whoever decided to name this place Caesars Forum. 46:57.360 --> 46:58.360 Thank you.