Siri-ously Leaky

Exploring Overlooked Attack Surfaces Across Apple's Ecosystem

Richard Hyunho Im (@richeeta)

DEF CON 33 • 45 min • Demo, Exploit

Friday at 14:30

LVCC • L1 • EHW3 • Track 4

Are your Hidden Photos really hidden?

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.5



Hidden Photo Leak Under the Hood



Can I peek at your Notes on Lock Screen?

CVE-2024-44235

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.1



Can I peek at your Pages files on Lock Screen?

CVE-2024-44235

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.1



Can I peek at your Numbers files on Lock Screen?

CVE-2024-44235

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.1



Can I peek at your Keynote files on Lock Screen?

CVE-2024-44235

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.1



Can I listen to your last Voice Memo?

Working As Intended

✓ No issue—Face ID kicks in



Can I find out what naughty audiobook you last listened to on Lock Screen?

Related to **CVE-2024-44235**

✗ Not fixed



Can I access your ChatGPT data on Lock Screen?

Related to **CVE-2024-44235**

✓ Fixed by OpenAI in August 2024 ChatGPT for iOS/iPadOS update



CVE-2024-44235 Under the Hood



Are I peek at your locked private Safari tab?

Shortcuts Race Condition

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.3



Shortcuts → Safari Locked Tab Race Condition



Can I read your Note(s) from Lock Screen?

✗ Not fixed



Speak Screen Reading Notes Under the Hood



Can I peek into your most recent ChatGPT convo on Lock Screen?

CVE-2025-24198

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.4



Can I peek into the last Safari tab you had open on Lock Screen?

CVE-2025-24198

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.4



CVE-2025-24198 Under the Hood



Can you trust emails in shared Contacts cards?

CVE-2025-24225

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.5



RFC 5322 Email Addressing Format

```
"Recipient Name" <username@domain.tld>
```

- **Recipient Name**: Often first name + last name; sometimes omitted altogether
  - **Quotation marks** sometimes omitted
- <>: Enclose recipient's actual email address
- Multiple recipients separated by **commas**

```
"Billy Joel" <bj@didntstartfire.us>, Harry Potter <hp@hogwarts.edu>,
GRRM <george@stillwriting.wtf>
```

CVE-2025-24225: Discovery

1. On any iPhone running iOS 18.x (before 18.5) or iPad running iPadOS 17.x (before 17.7.7):
   Open **Contacts** app → Tap **+** to create a new Contact.

2. Fill in the following fields:

   First Name: Harry

   Last Name: Potter

   Email: `harry_potter_likes_long_email_address@hogwarts.edu`

3. Save the Contact.

4. Instead of displaying Harry's ridiculously long email address, iOS chooses to truncate it with …



Hmm...RFC 5322 + iOS Truncating Behavior

- Now recall RFC 5322:
  Recipient Name <username@domain.tld>

- Now imagine Voldemort hijacks Harry's phone and decides to edit Harry's work email with a ton of whitespaces (represented here with the blue ␣):
  `hp@ministryofmagic.co.uk␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣␣<voldemort@slytherin.win>`



Huh? But iOS won't let me type < > here! 😭 😭 😭 😭

😭 That sucks, bro...and we def can't just type it elsewhere then copy & paste it here... OR CAN WE? 😈 😈 😈

Then we get:



Now: Assume Unwitting Harry Shares His Contact Card



Can you see *what* might go wrong and *why*?

Hint:

```
"Recipient Name"
<username@domain.tld>
```



Worse in Outlook!

If you select **Outlook** as your default email app (in **Settings → Apps → Default Apps → Default Email App**):

~~You can **still reproduce issue CVE-2025-24225 right now!**~~

~~Yes, Microsoft knows, but it's Microsoft. :(~~

Fixed in June 2025 😏







Oh my...even worse than Apple Mail??

At least in Mail, if you went to your Sent folder, you'd know you got duped.



Apple:
Hey, at least we aren't gaslighting you!

But Outlook? The Sent folder still shows the **spoofed email**! To know you got duped, you'd have to look under the hood:

Microsoft:
Naw we good!
Nothing to see here!



HUH???????
WTF??!?!?



Oooooooh

Unicode RTL Override (U+202E)

- Flip a filename’s direction, fool the eye, and trick iOS.
- U+202E forces Right-to-Left rendering for the text that follows, reversing visible order while keeping the underlying byte order intact.
- Commonly used for Arabic & Hebrew.
- But also lets attackers can drop files such as:

  <U+202E>fdp.uhcakip.mobileconfig → gifnocelibom.pikachu.pdf

  The invisible RTLO makes the characters render RTL, so the user sees: **gifnocelibom.pikachu.pdf**.

- The real extension remains **.mobileconfig**, but it looks like a harmless PDF.

Back to Apple! ☺

- Files app on iOS allows you to long-press then tap **Rename** to rename the file.
- Similar to CVE-2025-24225, you can insert extra whitespaces, **but you can also** add line breaks when renaming files!
- **But** not directly 😭
  - If you hit the Return key while renaming a file = iOS treats it as **okay, you're done renaming this file** instead of `\n`.
  - But we can copy and paste when renaming. 😁



Back to Apple! ☺

- So we can not only do this:

  `<\U+202E>fdp.uhcakip.mobileconfig → gifnocelibom.pikachu.pdf`

- We can also do:

  `<\U+202E>fdp.uhcakip`
  `<\n * 10>`
  `.mobileconfig → pikachu.pdf`

  No characters after line breaks are displayed in the Files app!

- The real extension remains **`.mobileconfig`**, but it looks like a harmless PDF **AND** doesn't even hint at a **`.mobileconfig`**.



Back to Apple! ☺



- Can also abuse in links to mislead/redirect calls and text messages.
- Copy and paste the payload into Notes and add a hyperlink:

  `tel:<U+202E>80055501231`

- The user sees:

  `tel:3210-555-008-1`

- But when the link is clicked, it will dial:

  `1 800 555 0123`



Safari Punycode Confusion

- ⁄(U+2044 FRACTION SLASH) is visually similar to **/** (U+002F) but **IS NOT** a path separator.
- Parsed as part of the domain name.



- **Example**:
  `https://apple.com/compare.io?modelList=MacBook-Pro-14-M4x,MacBook-Pro`
  →
  `https://apple.xn--comcompare-496e.io`
- ⁄prevents splitting the domain from the path & whole string before first true / is parsed as the domain
- Non-ASCII domain triggers punycode (IDNA) encoding
- Users *think* they're visiting **`apple.com`** but domain is actually **`xn-comcompare-496e.io`**
- Effective for phishing, spoofing Apple product pages, or session hijacking

Apple Intelligence



- Unveiled at WWDC in 2024.
- **Siri:** picks **on-device**, **PCC**, or **Ask ChatGPT**.
- **ChatGPT:** external LLM via Apple relay; opt-in.
- **Private Cloud Compute (PCC):** Apple cloud servers to process complex requests.
- **`writingTools.compose`:** rewrite the **selected text** (document-anchored).
- `GenerativeAssistant` (Siri) vs `writingTools.compose` (Writing Tools)
- When modes blur, **context confusion can leak** (prompts & cached PCC data) to **ChatGPT**

Apple Intelligence Leaking Cached PCC Data → ChatGPT Confusing `GenerativeAssistant` Task w/ `WritingTools.Compose`





Apple Intelligence Leaking Cached PCC Data → ChatGPT Confusing `GenerativeAssistant` Task w/ `WritingTools.Compose`



Can anyone register for & access Apple SEED?

Broken access control

✓ Fixed July 2025



Can anyone install Apple's enterprise cert & StoreFront?

Broken access control

✗ Not yet fixed





Can I access your Apple support ticket?

Insecure direct object reference

✗ Rate limit added but core issue remains unaddressed



Takeaways

- **High-trust components** deserve **scrutiny**.
- **Face ID ≠ foolproof** if trust boundaries aren’t enforced.
- **Intents & daemon handoffs** often **under-audited**.
- Unicode + whitespace = **massively under-explored attack surface**!
- **Security ≠** *not just* **permissions** but **context**.
- **Logic bugs lurk** in **“normal” behavior**!
- **Authentication ≠ Authorization**
- **New/beta features = ripe** for testing.

Thank You!



Apple Product Security

DEF CON staff & goons

Mimi Ahn

Nibin Philip

Hillary Song

Joe Kleve

Colin Monk

Gabriela Loya

Scott Eide

Jack Ma

Mathew Nguyen

Alexander Choi

Clare Yan

Denis Smajlović

Phil Scott

Richard Hyunho Im (@richeeta)

🌐 richardim.com | routezero.security

📧 richeeta AT proton dot me

https://github.com/richeeta/DEFCON33-Siriously-Leaky (will upload soon!)

Stay in Touch?

