$ ls writing/series/regulating-the-teen-internet/
series: Regulating the Teen Internet.
The government's midnight social media curfew for 16 and 17-year-olds is a default, not a control — and after 29 years of telling boards the difference, I can't un-see it. Part 1 of a series on what happens when good intentions meet the technical reality of the teenage internet.
13 parts
Latest · 2026·09·01
- 01 A curfew you can switch off The government's midnight social media curfew for 16 and 17-year-olds is a default, not a control — and after 29 years of telling boards the difference, I can't un-see it. Part 1 of a series on what happens when good intentions meet the technical reality of the teenage internet. →
- 02 What counts as social media? The ban list names the platforms parents can already spell. But grooming happens in a chat window inside a children's game. Part 2: why the law regulates brands while the harm follows a function — and how to audit your household by the function instead. →
- 03 The federation problem Enforcement law assumes someone to enforce against — an office, a legal team, revenue to fine. Then there's Mastodon: thousands of servers, many run by one volunteer, in someone else's country. Part 3: what happens to the teen internet rules when there is no company to write to. →
- 04 The dark routes Every enforcement idea so far has needed a server to find and block. Tor and i2p are built specifically so there isn't one. Part 4: what "just block the dark web" actually asks for, why it fails, and — the twist parents don't expect — why this is the route I worry about least. →
- 05 The browser in the browser An age check inspects the visitor in front of it. But what if the visitor is a data centre in Frankfurt, streaming the real site back as video to a child in Fife? Part 5: browser-as-a-service, the school-proxy underground, and the bypass I sell as enterprise security. →
- 06 Lessons from the age gate we already built We don't have to predict how a national age-verification scheme performs. We switched one on last July for pornography, and a year of data is in. Part 6: what the porn age gate actually did — who it stopped, where the traffic went, and the identity honeypot it built along the way →
- 07 What would actually work Six parts on why the plan fails earns one obligation: say what I'd build instead. The finale — a blanket under-18 rule, enforced at the device, attached to the function, with the exceptions designed in. Not perfect; just honest about where the line can actually be held. →
- 08 So what do I actually do? Seven parts on why the government's plan to protect children online will leak. So here is the other side of the ledger: the evidence-based, do-it-this-weekend guide to protecting your own child — ordered by what genuinely works, not what merely feels reassuring. →
- 09 The experiment goes live: France bans under-15s Part 9: France becomes the first country in Europe to ban under-15s from social media — and the first to make everyone verify their age. Braver than Australia's version, and it builds the identity honeypot at national scale. Scoring the law against the argument. →
- 10 The experiment comes home: Britain bans under-16s Part 10: the experiment comes home. Britain will ban under-16s from social media by spring 2027 — the ban the Commons rejected in March, revived by regulation in June. Held to the same standard as France and Australia, including the objection the government made itself. →
- 11 Struck down before the start: France's court reads the argument back Part 10: eighteen days before launch, France's Constitutional Council struck the under-15 ban down — on the grounds this series pressed: disproportion, and age verification with no guarantees for private life. A reprieve, but the redraft is already commissioned. →
- 12 The honeypot changes address Part 11: Meta settles the US child-safety case for up to $18bn and the UN comes out against outright bans — the week the ban model lost the argument. But the age check just moved from the platform to the app store, and the identity honeypot moved with it. →
- 13 The consent nobody sought: Britain says no to the keys Someone finally asked the public — and across every party, Britain said it would not trust the state with the keys to its private life. A sidebar to the series that goes to the foundation the whole age-verification project rests on: a consent never sought, and never given. →