peter bassill · operator

Threats — writing by Peter Bassill

peter@hardened:~$ ls -t writing/threats/

Threats · page 4 of 5

Breaches, campaigns and the vulnerabilities being used right now. 67 articles

  • SolarWinds at five

    Five years on from the disclosure of the SolarWinds Orion compromise, what actually changed in how UK boards think about third-party software risk — and what did not. A practitioner's retrospective on the case study that defined the decade.

    • 8 min read
  • The supplier underneath the supplier

    Three disclosures last month tell the same story from three angles: NHS England's tech provider, an NHS GP software supplier, and the Foreign Office. None of them is the headline brand. All of them are where the actual attack surface lives.

    • 6 min read
  • The incidents that do not make the papers

    What three years on the CREST Incident Response Pan-Europe board has taught me about the work the headlines never cover, and the kind of firm a customer should actually want to be on the end of the phone with.

    • 6 min read
  • From prepositioning to action

    Iran has shifted its UK-facing cyber activity from quiet infrastructure presence to operational disruption. The NCSC's August advisory on Salt Typhoon names three Chinese firms. The trajectory of 2025 is no longer ambiguous.

    • 5 min read
  • Synnovis, a year on

    One year after the Qilin ransomware attack on Synnovis took NHS pathology services in south-east London offline, what did we actually learn — and what is still unfixed?

    • 7 min read
  • What the retail wave actually cost

    M&S resumed online orders this week after 46 days offline. Co-op is counting £206m. Harrods got off relatively lightly. Three compromises, one actor, one Easter weekend — and a lesson UK retail boards are still digesting.

    • 6 min read
  • CrowdStrike: cyber resilience without a bad actor

    Four weeks after the CrowdStrike Falcon update that took 8.5 million Windows machines offline, the post-mortem is in. The interesting question is not what CrowdStrike did wrong. It is what the rest of us did wrong by assuming this kind of event could not happen.

    • 7 min read
  • Malware and the layered defence

    Antivirus is necessary but not sufficient. The defence-in-depth approach that actually catches malware — and how it joins up with everything else we have done this year.

    • 6 min read
  • Email is the front door: spotting phishing and stopping BEC

    Over 90% of breaches begin with email. How to spot phishing, build a reporting culture, configure SPF/DKIM/DMARC, and prevent the single most expensive small business fraud: business email compromise.

    • 7 min read
  • Operation Cronos: what disruption actually achieves

    A month on from the NCA-led takedown of LockBit's infrastructure, the affiliate group is already back online and claiming new victims. What Operation Cronos achieved is real and worth defending — but it is not the dismantlement the headlines suggested.

    • 7 min read
  • What a cyber attack actually costs a small business

    The financial number is the smallest part. Operational disruption, reputational damage, and regulatory consequences are the costs that compound. Plus the positive case for getting this right.

    • 5 min read
  • Know your enemy: the threats small businesses actually face

    Phishing, ransomware, social engineering, malware, credential stuffing, insider mistakes, denial of service. The actual menu of threats facing UK small businesses — in plain English, without the drama.

    • 7 min read
  • 23andMe, and the data with the longest half-life

    Last month 23andMe disclosed that attackers used credential stuffing against accounts opted in to relative-matching to scrape data on roughly 6.9 million people. The board lesson is about which data has the longest half-life — and it is not what most firms think.

    • 6 min read
  • What the teenagers taught the Fortune 500

    LAPSUS$ compromised Microsoft, Okta, Nvidia, Samsung, Vodafone, and several others in a few months. They were teenagers using social engineering and MFA fatigue. The lesson, awkwardly, is that the dominant compromise vector in 2022 is social, not technical.

    • 8 min read
  • Log4Shell, and the inventory question we cannot keep ducking

    A month on from CVE-2021-44228, the headline-grabbing exploits have slowed but the underlying problem has not. The discomfort of the past month was not really about Log4j. It was about how few firms could answer the question 'where is it running?'

    • 7 min read
$ finger peter

Get in touch

Email is fastest. If your message says who you are, what you would like, and a rough sense of when, you will get a useful answer within two working days.
EMAILcomms [at] peterbassill {dot} com
GITHUB@pbassill
CRESTEuropean Council · IR Pan Europe
LOCATIONUnited Kingdom · en_GB
no tracking · no third parties · stored only in my inbox
anti-abuse check: waiting for the form…